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"AIR COMMANDAND

STAFF COLLEGE

STUDENT REPORTTHE V-22 PROGRAM'S NEED FOR

A MORE FLEXIBLE AND FARSIGHTEDACQUISITION STRATEGY

MAJ ALAN J. BACON 88-0145"insights into tomorrow"I'

O PST AA AtA

88 •i o 090

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~cr Arcctwon For4NTIS CA

DTIC TAB ]LVnannounctd 13

REPORT NUMBER 88-0145TITLE THE V-22 PROGRAMS NEED FOR A MORE-FLEXIBLE 7

AND FARSIGHTED ACQUISITION STRATEGY oist

AUTHOR(S) MAJOR ALAN J. BACON ....

FACULTY ADVISOR DONALD M. OTTINGER, ACSC/I:AC LTYADVSOR382/sTus/39

SPONSOR DR. JAMES HICKS (GM-14), USASC/PESC-SE

Submitted to the faculty in partial fulfillment ofrequirements for graduation.

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGEAIR UNW.VERSITY

MAXWELL AFB, AL 36112-5542

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE 0MB1 Na 0704'JW

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Mrs AOR S OW"~, 1, and WCOE) 10.SOREF uWw_ýfPORM PWRO TASK WORK UNIT

ELEMENT NO. No. No. CESSION NO.

THE Y-22 PRQOGRAMWS NEED FOR A M4ORE FLEXIBLE.AND FARSIGHTED ACQUISITION STRATEGY

Bacon, Alan J'., Major, USA1. I.P

PROM_____ T0. 1988 Apri11 21It. SUPPLEIMENTARY NOTATION

1.COSATI CODESl SUW C TERMSWH (cwnewu an Rmn it wmue~y awMo"1 bx =)

P1IELD GRO"P SUROUP

In order to control runaway acquisition costs, Congress frequently insiststhat the DOD develop and procure its major weapons sywtms with firm fixed-price contracts. These contracts work well for controlling costs of sy7stemswith few unknowns and low technological risks. However, in the case of theV-22 Osprey, a system whose three relatively new technologies could have manyunknowns and high risks, a long-term fixed-price contract may not be a goodidea. In addition to showing that the V-22Vs current fixed-price contract maynot be able to contend with its potential engineering problems, this studyprovides recommiendations for developing a more flexible and farsighted ac-quisition strategy for the V-22.

rV7

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DO F"n 147?, JUN N P ewiow.toe ie Rno~ai.SCRT CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGEUNCLASS IF IED

PRFFACE

In response to the DOD's runaway acquisition costs ofthe 1980's and 1970's (e.g., the $3.3 billion/114 percentcost uverrun of the P-111), Congress routinely insists onflixed-price contracts for controlling these costs. Fixed-price contracts can keep acquisition costs from skyrocketingduring production. They can effectively regulate coats ofsystems with few unknowns and low technological risks. How-ever, in the case of the multi-service V-22 Acquisition Pro-gram, a long-term fixed-price contract is not a good idea.This paper will show that the unknowns and risks associatedwith V-22's new technologies require that the Osprey beprocured with a more flexible and farsighted acquisitionstrategy.

As a forerunner of the DOD's aviation acquisitionprograms, the V-22 Program will probably undergo severalpurchasing changes. For example, in mid-January 1988, theArmy, which desperately needs its aviation dollars toreplace its aging helicopter fleet, cancelled Its plans tobuy the expensive V-22. Regardless of this cancellation orany future changes in V-22 buys, the thesis of this paperremains intact. The V-22 is a major DOD weapons systemseriously in need of a more flexible and farsightedacquisition strategy.

In addition to thanking my AC1C faculty advisor, MajorDon Ottinger, I would like to thank the aeronautical engi-neers at the U. S. Army Safety Center and the participantsat the V-22 System Safety Working Groups for their insightsinto the complex issues affecting the "higX tech" Osprey.

____ ___ ____ ___ ___ ___ _______ __ _ ___ _ ___ ___ ____ ___ __

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Xajor Bacon Is a student at the Air Command and StaffCollege, Xaxwell Air Fores Base, Alabama. Prior to earninga Bachelor of Science in General Engineering from the U. S.Xilitary Academy, he served an enlisted tour as an Intelli-gence Analyst and Vietnamese Language Student. In 1984 hewas awarded a Naster of Scieuce in Aeronpaice Engineeringfron Texas AME University where he concentrated on sircraftstructures and advanced composite materials. Major Bacr.n'sailitary schooling incluacs the Infantry Officer BasicCourse, the Intelligence Officer Advanced Course, AirborneSchool, Ranger School, and the Army's rotary wing and fixedwing aviator qualification courses. He has worked in avariety of comand a fd staff positions in infantry, avi-ation, and intelligence units within the 4th Infantry Divi-*ion, the 25th Infantry Division, and III Corps. In IIICorps at Port Hood, Texas, he served as a company coinnderand battalion operations officer (S-3). lost recently,Kajor Banon worked as an aeronautical engineer at the U. S.Army Safety Center, Fort Rucker, Alabema, where he evaluatedsafety-related engineering issues of numerous air and groundsystema to include the V-22 Osprey, UH.-60 Blackhawk, AE-64Apache, AH-i Cobra, OV-1 Mohawk, Remotely Piloted Vehicle,and 155.a Howitzer.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface ............................ ....................... IAbout the Author ......................................... 11List of Illu stra tion. .................................... ivlo tsary . ............ . .. . . ... . ....... .......... v

CHAPTER ONE-- INTRODUCTIONHistorical Case for the V-22 Osprey .................. 1Importance of the V-22 to the Dkfense of the U. S......2The V-22's Current Acquisition 6trategy ................ 2Purpose and Overview .......... ................. 3

CHAPTER TWO--TH3 V-22 OSPREY PROORAX "DEscription of the Aircraft ............ .............. 4Status of the V-22 Acquisition ProSram ................. 5

CHAPTER THREE--V-22's POTENTIAL ENGINEERING SHORTCOXINGSCrashworthiness Problem ............................... 10Aircraft Configuration Isues..........................13

Resolution of These Shcrtcoaming ...................... 14

CHAPTER POUR--ACQUISITION STRATEGY SHORTCOXIJGS ......... 15

CHAPTER PIVE--CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMRIDATIONSConclusions. ............................................ 17Recomm ndations ....................................... 17Statement of Finality ................................. 19

BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................. 20

IaI

~ -,

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure 1--V-22 Osprey ...... ..... .. 7Bell-Boeing Briefing, Undated (out. April 1987)Subject: Osprey: Joint Services Advanced

Vnrtical Lift Aircraft Program

Figure 2--XV-15 Tilt Rotor ............................ 7Bell-Boeing Brochure, Undated (eat. April 198?)Subject: V-22: Joint Services Advanced

Vertical Lift Aircraft Program

FPigure 3--V-22 Plight Envelope ............................ 8Bell-Boeing Briefing, Undated (eot. April 198?)Subject: Osprey: Joint Services Adwanced

Vertical Lift Aircraft Program

Figure 4--V-22 Dimensions ..................... ............ 8Bell-Boeing Briefing, Undated (eat. April 1987)Subject: Osprey: Joint Services Advanced

Vertical Lift Aircraft Program

FPigure 5--V-22 Dionsioas ....................... ....... 9Boll-Boeing Brochure, Undated (est. April 1987)Subject: V-22: Joint Services Advanced

Vertical Lift Aircraft Program

Figure 8--Vorldwide Self-Deployability ..................... 9Bell-Boeing Briefing, Undated (eat. April 19A7)Subject: Osprey: Joint Services Advanced

Vertical Lift Aircraft Program

iv

GLOSSARY

AC-C - Air Command and Staff College

APIT - Air Force Institute of Technology

AVSCOX - Aviation System Command

DSARC - Defense System Acquisition Review Council

PLIR - Forward Looking Infared

FSD - Pull Scale Development

OPS - Global Positioning System

LHX - Light Helicopter Experimmntal

LIC - Low Intensity Conflict

LRU - Line Replaceable Unit

XIL-STD - Military Standard

•IP - Multi-stage Improvement Program

nicad - nickel cadium

NOR - nap-of-the-earth

OI - One Engine Innperative

PM - Program Manager

PPBS - Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System

SPO - System Program Office

SSW - System Safety Vorking Group

TEl - Two Engine Inoperative

USASC - U. S. Army Safety Center

v

C~ ~ EXECUTIVE SUMMARY APart of our Collee mission is distribution of thestudents' problem solving products to DoD

S> sponsors and other interested agencies toenhance insight into contemporary, defense

S, related Issues. While the College has accepted thisproduct as meeting academic reqmlrents for

'. graduation, the views and opinions weVpressd orimplied ar solely those of the authot and shouldnot be construed as carrying offical sanction. h

ý"insights into tomorrow",

REPORT NUMBER 88-0145

AUTHOR(S) MAJOR ALAN J. BACON, USA

TITLE THE V-22 PROGRAM'S NEED FOR A MORE FLEXIBLE ANDFARSIGHTED ACQUISITION STRATEGY

I. Purposq: To show that the V-22's long-term fixed-price contract strategy may not be able to contend with itspotential engineering problems and to provide recomnda-tions for a =are flexible and farsighted acquisition sTratag",ýy.

II. Problem: In response to DOD's acquisition "horrorstories" of the 1960's and 1970's, e.g., the $3.a billin.,114 percent cost overrun of the F-i1l, Congress frequentlyinsists that major DOD weapons systems be developed and pro-cured with fixed-priced contracts. Fixed-priced contractsare good for systems with few unknowns and low risks. How-ever, in regards to the V-22, a long-term flxed-price con-tract may not be a good idea. The V-22's three relp.tivelynew technologies, i.e., tilt rotors, all composite airframe,an& fly-by-wire controls, could involve several unknowm,• Qr

high risks.

III. Data: Problems in the following areas could degradethe operational effectiveness and safety of the Osprey: til

fuselage crashworthiness standards, (2) crew seat design,(3) fuel cell burst characteristics, (4) proprotor bladeImpaCt,. () engine heat, (6) lead-acid battery, (7) weather

vi

radar, (8) throttle quadrant, and (9) wire-strike protec-tion, Additionally, the aircraft's contract and acquisitionstrategy does not have any provisions for making majorchanges in the aircraft's production line. Aside from mak-ing minor configuration changes, its atrategy cannot incorp-orate major "lessons learned" or new engineering researchinto the V-22's production. There are no plans for a V-22block improvemnt program.

IV. Conclusions: The V-22 will probably have *one engineer-ing problem that can be eliminated only with monies beyondIts contract.

V. Rpco---ndations: After the current V-22 contractexpires, the V-22 Program Manager should adopt a Multi-stag.Improvement Program (XSIP) acquisition strategy similar tothe Air Force's P-16 MSIP strategy. In addition to correct-ing the issues cited above, a V-22 MSIP could ".ncorporate"lessons learned" and engineering research iw%.o the V-22production line.

vii

Chapter One

INTRODUCTION

HISTORICAL CASE FOR THE V-22 OSPREY

On the morning of 25 April 1980, after their unsuccess-ful hostage rescue attempt in Iran, the United States' DeltaForce was returnine to Egypt. (3:280-281) While sitting de-jected aboard a C-141 Starlifter aircraft, Colonel CharlieBeckwith, the commander of the rescue mission, thought tohimself,

It's over. The mission is a failure.... Afterall that tine and work and sweat, to cox" awayempty. I began to realize what the failure wouldmean. Our country will be embarrassed. Ve losteight good and brave men. And now, what will be-come of the hostages? 3od Almighty, after all theeffort, here we sit returning to Egypt - all be-cause of those bloody halos. (*:281)

The "bloody bqlos" Beckwith cited were RH-53 Sea Stal-lion helicopters. Due to their range limitation of approxi-mately 700 miles, the RH-53s were unable to meke the 900mile flight from the USS Nimitz in the Gulf of Oman to thehostage site in Teheran. Consequently, they had to be re-fueled at Desert One approximately 300 miles southeast ofTeheran. (3:216) Eight RH-53s were launched from the Nimitzto ensure that six would be operational at Deser. One. (3:233) If six "halos", the minimum for carrying Beckwith'sassault team and equipment, were not ready to fly fromDesert One, the mission would be aborted. (3:253) Unfor-tunately, one RH-53 aborted Just two hours after launching.One of its main rotor blades was about to malfunction.Another returned to the carrier due to instrument problemscaused by flying through some sandstorms. (3:283) A thirdRH-53, taking off from Desert One, slid backwards and crash-ed into a parked EC-130 Hercules. (3:278) Vith only fivehelos remaining, the mission was aborted. (3:281)

Beckwith's "bloody halos" were indeed the weak link inthe operation. At that time, the Delta Force did not havean aircraft capable of accommodating the weight and flight

II

.rn - b f

requirements of the Iran rescue mission. The 900 miles ofdesert erceeded the operational ranges of all helicopters.A transport aircraft, such as the C-130, was not acceptablebeca'ise it could be easily detected when landing near Tehe-ran. Beckwith needed an aircraft capable of landing andtaking off in a small secure area and flying undetected overa great distanc3. reckwith needed an aircraft with thecapabilities of the multi-service V-22 tilt-rotor aircraftcurrently undergoing a'quisition. With tactical aerialrefueling capabilities similar to the C-130's, the V-22coulO have flown secretly across the Iranian desert at 250knots in its airplane configuration, transformed to itshelicopter mode, and landed undetected in a secure confinedarea near Teheran. (10:G-8; 20:--)

IMPORTANCE OF THE V-22 TO THE DEFENSE OF THE U. S.

As proposed, the V-22 will fill the void between short-range helicopters which can land in small areas and long-range troop transports which require large landing strips.In addition to "Delta Force" type operations, the Ospreywill perform assault, rescue, transport, and many cther mis-sions for our armed forces. (10:G-1) The "high tech" V-22,built with three new or relatively new technologies (i.e.,tilt rotors, all compcsite airframe, and fly-by-w4 re con-trols), will provide the United States (US) new dimensionsin military and political power. Paramount of which will bethe capability to insert combat power into previously impos-sible-to-reach regions, thereby giving the US the power anddeterrence to contend with terrorist groups and hostilethird-world nations active in low-intensity conflicts(LICs). LICs are generally limited to geographic areas,weapons constraints, and low levels of violence as comparedto conventional military conflicts. (1:7) 'Nonetheless,these limited conflicts have had and will continue to havemaJor impacts on US national interests and world order.Since World War II, over 700 countries have been involved inarmed conflicts. Eighty percent of these have been LICs.(25:--) In 1987, fifty percent of all third-world countrieswere involved in LICs. (30:--) Hence, the Department of De-fense's (DOD's) skillful acquisition of the V-22 is para-mount to the US's capability to contend with future LICssuch as the Iran hostage situation.

THE V-22's CURRENT ACQUISITION STRATEGY

In response to the acquisition "horror stories" of the1P60s and l9?Os, e.g., the $3.3 billion/114 percent costoverrun of the F-111, Congress routinely insists on fixed-

2

_ '• .•-"•" . • - •.• 2 . ' /•. ' • ' . :' . _____' __•'-• • • ? • - '.• •

price contracts for acquisition programs. (2:4-21) Fixed-price contracts are good for controlling systewo with fewunknowns and low risks becaufae these contracts can curtailsky rocketing pruduction costs. (31:--) However, in thecase of the V-22, a system whose three now technologies havemany unknowns and high risks, a long-term fixed-price con-tract strategy for procuring several hundred aircraftthrough the 1990s, may not be a good idea. (6:29) Tonethe-less, the US Navy, as the lead service for the V-22 Fro-gram, has opted to fund th& Osprey with this type of acqui-sition strategy. (24:--; 27:--; 28:--; 29:--)

At this time, the V-22's fixed-price contract will mostlikely have a negative impact on this critical acquisitionprogram. The V-22 will probably have some engineering prob-lems that can be eliminated only with monies beyond its con-tract. If uncorrected, these problem could degrade the op-erational effectiveness and safet;, of the Osprey.

PURPOSE AND OVBRVIEV

The purpose of this paper is twofold. In addition toshowing that the V-22's fixed-price contract may not be ableto contend with the V-22's potential engineering problems,'this paper will provide recommendations for a more flexibleand farsighted acquisition strategy. This will be accomp-.lished by first providing a description of the aircraft anda status of the V-22 Program in Chapter Two. Chapter Threewill identify some of the V-22's potential engineering prob-lem.. The Osprey's acquisition shortcomings will be coveredin Chapter Four. Chapter Five will provide conclusions andrecommendations. Besides rendering recommendations for amore flexible and fairsighted acquisition strategy, ChapterFive will present specific recomuandations for correctingthe engineering problems identified in Chapter Three.

3

ChApter Two

THE V-22 OSPREY PROGRAM

DESCRIPTION OF THE AIRCRAFt

The Bell-Boeing V-22 Osprey Program (see aircraft atFigure 1, page 7) is one of the most ambitious aviationacquisition programs in history. The challenge of integrat-ing three new or relatively new technologies *(i.e.,tiltrotors, all composite airframe, and fly-by-wire digitalcontrols), makes the V-22 Program one of our "highest tech"aviation acquisition programs. At this date, the Osprey'stilt-rotor technology has yet to be integrated successfullyinto either a commercial or military aircraft. The V-22'sengineering test bed, the Bell/NASA/Army/Navy XV-15 researchaircraft (see Figu-e 2, page 7), constitutes the only prac-ticable demonstrat.on of this technology. However, as com*-pared to the V-22, the XV-15 was much smaller and built tosuch less stringent specifications. (28:--) The Osprey'sprimary structure will be made with state-of-art HerculesIM6 and 3501 graphite-epoxy composite materials. (4:47) TheV-22, like many of our new aircraft <e.g., the F-16), willbe controlled with a sophisticated fly-by-wire control sys-tem. This system will be composed of a primary digitalcontrol system and a backup analog control system. (22:--)

As a hybrid helicopter/fixed wing transport aircraft,the Osprey will be capable of taking off and landing inconfined areas in its helicopter mode and transforming tohigh-speed fuel-efficient flight in its airplane mode. Asshown in Figure 3, page 8, the V-22's flight envelope willencompass the envelopes of both the HH-53C helicopter andthe C-130 transport aircraft. The V-22 will be able tosustain cruise flight at 250 knots, accelerate to 320 knots,carry 24 coibat troops, and hover at 3,000 feet at 91.4degrees P with a full load. (5:7) As a large 43,000 to60,000 lb. aircraft (see Figure 4, page 8 and Figure 5, page9), it's fuselage size and troop capacity will be about thesame as the Marine Corps' C-46 Helicopter. Nevertheless,the V-22's capacity will be much lower than the C-130's 92combat-equipped troop capacity. (20:--) While being self-deployable overseas (see Figure 6, page 9), the Osprey willbe able to fly 2100 nautical mile legs, without refueling,

4

S " ,.. • i; • '••..: •_•_ '• •i';: .. ' •:• '••" " "•.........."-...-..."..."*"'"••' "-'':'

against prevailing head winds. (1O:G-0)

As replacements for several of our aging helicoptersand fixed-wing transport aircraft, V-22s will provide ouraviation units with tremendous improvements in their orera-tional capabilities. Ospreys will be ured for medium Cal-sault in the Marine Corps, combat seatrci and rescue in theNavy, and special operations in the Air Force. (1O:G-1)

STATUS OF THE V-22 ACQUISITION PROGRAM

On 17 April 1986, a Defense Systems Acquisition ReviewCouncil (DSARC) approved the V-22 Program for full-scaledevelopment (FSD). The Navy, as the lead service of thismulti-service program, then awarded Bell Helicopter Textronand Boeing Vertol, as joint contractors, a $1.8 billionfixed-price FSD contract. (4:47) This contract calls forproducing components of 11 equivalent aircraft, a groundtest vehicle, six test-flight aircraft, and the major assem-blies for tooling, struutural testing, and ballistic test-ing. (4:46) Once completed, these tooling assemblies willlock the V-22 design for several hundred aircraft in "con-crete". (24:--)

At this time, the Navy Program Manager (?X) has noplans for modifying his long-term fixed-price contract ac-quisition strategy. While not providing for a systematicblock improvement program, i.e., a V-22B, the PX has noplans for major airframe or power-plant improvements. Asidefrom Pre-Planned Product Improvements, he does not have amethodology for fixing major "lessons learned" or incorpo-rating new engineering research into the production line.(24:--) Notwithstanding that the V-22 will be, ".... analmost-all composite tilt-rotor aircraft, something no onehas done before. (4:46)", the acquisition calls for no majorchanges in the V-22 production line, i.e., the first air-craft in Lot 1 will be basically the same as the last air-craft in the final lot. (24:--)

Test flights for six V-22 FSD aircraft are scheduled tocommence in the spring of 1988. (22:--) Production of theactual aircraft will begin in 1989 with deliveries to theMarine Corps in 1991 and to the Navy and Air Force in 1993.The Marines are committed to purchase 552 Ospreys; the Navy,50; and the Air Force, 80. (16:4) In mid-January 1988, theArmy, which desperately needs it aviation dollars to modern-ize its aging helicopter fleet with Black Hawks, Apaches,the new Light Helicopter Experimental (LHX), cancelled itsplans for buying the expensive V-22. (7:36) With an origi-nal commitment to buy 231 Ospreys, the Army has yet to

5

-- i 2 .- -

receive Congressional approval for Its recent cancellation.(19:--) ]everthelees, the V-22 PX, who plans to offset theArmy loss with foreign military sales of 500 to 600 Ospreys,believes the Army "pull.out" will not Jeopardize the pro-gram. He also believes that the Army, who will continue tomonitor the V-22 Program, will "sooner or later" buy theOsprey. (7:36) At this time, the V-22's cost is expected toby as high as $29 million per aircraft. (8:29)

81

Figure 1. V-22 Osprey

Figure 2. XV-15 Tilt Rotor

7

ftOXI 100figure 3. V-22 flight Envelop.

32

24

20

16 C-13012-

4r

0 60 10M6 200 250 300 360

Figure 4.

V-22 Dimensions

388

d____ * - A .*..'*>.

tno N&

Figure" 5. V-22 Dimensions. ,

WORLDWIDE SELF-DEPLOYABILIY

HAWAIIHAWAII

Figure 6.

9

-. !..-n - --- - - - - - - - -

Chapter Three

V-22's POTRITTIAL INGINI JERING SHORTCOMINGS

The Osprey's potential engineering shortcomings falliato ts general categories--crashworthiness problem andconfiguration Issues.

The origin of the fuselage crashworthiness problemcited In this chapter are directly related to the V-22'rogram's fixed-price contract. The aircraft's crashworthl-ness has undergone a neries of reductions because the con-tractors were not willing to assum the risks and costs ofachieving higher levels of crashworthiness under the con-straints of a fixed-price contract. However, with the flex-Ibility of a cost-plus contract, Bell and Boeing would havebeen willing to work toward higher levels of crashworthi-noes. (18:1)

The other crashworthiness problem as well as the con-figuraticn issues cited in thie, chapter are indirectly re-lated to the aircraft's fixed-price contract in that-theycan be eliminated with additional mnies. However, theseissues were not considered during the contract negotiationprocess. (28:--)

CRASHWORTH I NESS PROBLBXS

Puselae Crashworthiness Standards.

The PX contends that V-22's fuselage crashworthinessis, 'equal to or better than the crashworthiness of anyaircraft of similar weight and performance". (28:--) Heoriginally required the ._ntractor to met the crashworthi-ness standards of Military Standard (MIL-STD) 1290. How-ever, he now contends that these standards are not practicalfor the V-22's weight range of 43,000 to 60,000 lbs. (28:--)

The V-22's current level of crashworthiness will mostlikely endanger the lives and safety of its aircrews andpassengers. "Being equal to or better than the crashworthi-hess of any aircraft of similar weight or performance" isnot good enough. (28:--) The Osprey's crashworthiness waynot be commnsurate with its performance characteristics and

10

likely mission scenarios. Biace all of tho vertical atten-uation Is placed In the landing gear, a crew member will beafforded negligible crashworthiness In the event r3: a gear-up crash and a crew-seat binding failure. (9:--j 13:--) liewill be provided litt~le stroking distance (cushion) to dis-sipate his kinetic energy upon coltmIson, thereby causinghim to suffesr from higher 0 forces during Impact. Consider-ing that few Army helicopter Class A mishaps involve landingscenarios, the contractor's heavy reliance on the V-22'sgear-down landing protection iy be Invalid for soot V-22crashes In the helicopter mode. (14:--)

Compunding the gear-up crashworthiness problem areunknown rates of descent for One-Nugine Inoperative (081)and Two-NniLLne Inoperative (TED) emergencies. These ratesmy not be available until completing the V-22's Initialteat flights in the spring of 1988. (29:--) Once determinedthese rates should be correlated with the fuselage's crash-worthiness standards, I.es., the fuselage should be designedto minimize the severity of 011 and TZI Impacts.

The Osprey's fuselage crashworthiness standards havebeen continually reduced from Its original XIL-STD 1290specification. (11:--; 28:--) The first reduction involvedlowering the V-22'. vertical-velocity attenuation from 42 to36 feet per second. (28:--) Pitch, roll, and yaw impactrequiroeusrts were subsequently eliminated. (28:--) Eventu-ally, the vertleal velocity was lowered to 24 feet persecond wItb all the attenuation placed in the landing gear.i(28:--) As result of a modification to the Navy standardfor crash'-iovthiness, the contractor is authorized to merelymeet XIL-STD 1290 to the 1"naximum extent practical" ratherthan to strictly comply with the standard. (9:--; 27:--;28:--; 29;--)

Paralleling the reduction In fuselage crashworthinessstanilards waa a relaxation in the aircraft's fuselage de-sign. 4i:st fiCnificant of these relaxation& was the substi-tution of a prpviously accepted Xevlar honeyc-oub eAergy-absurbing underflouir with an extreunaly stiff and b~rittlegraphite laminate structure. (9:--; &^.:--; 28:--; 29:--)This sacrificed a dedicated energy attonuatiaig crush spacef or a stiff composite structure having unknown energy atten-uating capabilities. Unlike metallic structures, compositeseructureia, with their complex elastic and dynamic quali-tiet, cannot b4- ascurately evaluated for 7ikely crash so-quercw:ý with mithonatical predictions. alone. Compositecrashworth~lwuss can only be ascertained through testing.

Amplifying this problem' Is the Navy contract whichdaes not require the contractor to dynamically crash *.*t

the underfloor. (27:--; 28:--; 29:--) At this point, It inimpossible to project aircraft losses and acb1dent costsattributable to insufficient crashworthiness. Accuratetrade-off analyses, with pitc4 and roll variations, are notavailable which consider fuemlage impact at design sinkspeeds after fully compressing the landing gear or crashingthe alrcraft with its gear up. Vhile the contractor's als-hap analysis shows a crashworthy underfloor would have bene-fited crew members and passengers in only 12% of all R-40,3-47, and R-53 Class A mishaps, the analysis is Incomplete.(29:--) It fails to evaluate all potential V-22 Army, Navy,Narine, and Air Force crash sequences with respect to ser-vice-unique mission scenarios. Overall crashworthineseteosting and analyses conducted by the contractors to dateare Insufficient. Expected aishap frequencles and fore-seeable accident cost. of operational V-22 aission scenariosare yet to be adequately defined by the PX or the contrac-tor.

Crew-Seat Design.

Rail-guided crew seats, similar to those proposed forthe V-22, are susceptible to binding and stroking failures.As discussed above, a crew-seat failure combined with astiff underbelly in a gear-up crash equates to zero ornear zero vertical absorption. Crew members In this situa-tion will be afforded little if any crashworthiness protec-tion. (:- 13.--)

Puel Cell.

The V-22's flexible rubber fuel tanks may be suscept-Ible to puncture and tear. Upon impact, sharp or Jaggedportions of the composite structure could penetrate the cellor cause the tank to burst. Since the dynamic crash charac-teristics of the fuselage are unknown, the cell's ability totemain in tact during a crash sequence can only be demon-strated with a full-scale drop test while the tanks aremounted in the airframe. At this time, there are no provi-sions for a test. of this type. (9:--; 12:--; 13:--)

Proprotor Blade-to-Vinx Inpact.

Vhil* the V-22 Full-Scale (FSD) Developnust Crash-worthiness Assessment cites the potential for a blade-to-wing impact, it does not address blade Impact hazards andsubsequent fire dangers to V-22 crew members or passengers.Considering that the Osprey's wing-borne fuel cells aremounted in the vicinity of the V-22's high RPX proprotors(the V-22's combination airplane propeller and helicopter

12

rotor blade), this accident scenario needs to be evaluated.(Q.---; 13:--

AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION ISSUES

enrine Heat.

In System Safety Vorking Group (8811) No. 8, the con-tractor briefed a V-22 engine exhaust profile, with temper-atures extreme of 575 degrees F, thereby making the air-craft unsuitable for safuly landing or hovering in unim-proved sites where vegetation or combustible materialsexist. In SSW No. 9, the contractor provided a new chart,based on mathematical approximations, which predicted muchlower heats. The contractor asserted that the new heatswould not be a safety factor in theme situations. (28:--)

Notwithstanding these lower heat predictions, de-tailed tests of the 7-22 exhaust plums should be conductedto accurately evaluate its heat profile. If the aircraft'sactual temperatures are excesaive, the V-22 Forward LookingInfrared (PLIR) system and all standard aviation night vi-sion goggle devices could be ineffective. V-22 crews couldexperience degradations in their night vision fields-of-viewdue to engine heat. Consequently, safe conduct of nap-of-the earth (NOR), sling load, and cox fined area operationsmay not be possible at night.

Lead-Acid Battery.

A lead-acid battery in lieu of a traditional nickel-cadmium (nicad) battery will power the aircraft's D.C. elec-trical system. Historically, lead-acid batteries are notor-ious for unreliability and power fluctuations in severe hot/cold environments. Vith the preponderance of its subsystemsdependent upon electrical power, the V-22 will need a highlyreliable battery in all environments. (21:--; 26:--)

Veather Radar.

Absence of a weather radar in long-range, over-water,or self-deployable flights could place V-22 aircrews inJeopardy when flying near or through severe weather. Inmany cases, thunderstorm, hail, ice, and heavy snow cannotbe properly detected, diagnosed, or avoided without weatherradar. Sandstorm, similar to those encountered during theIran hostage rescue attempt, cannot be avoided without anon-board weather radar. Considering that many self-deploy-munts will not have air traffin control radar support,weather radar will be needed in most overseas areas. (23:--)

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Throttle Quadrant.

V-22 throttle/power movements are opposite to helicop-ter collective/power movements. Negative helicopter-habittransfer could cause the average V-22 pilot with consider-able helicopter experience, in a life-threatening situationnear the ground, to move the throttle quadrant in the wrongdirection. (29:--)

Wire-Strike Protect ion.

The Osprey's lack of wire-strike protection could leadto unnecessary aircraft and aircrew losses. Wire strikes atlow level, contour, and NOE altitudes are highly probable onthe modern battlefield. Expected wire hazards include con-trol wires from wire-guided munitions, communications wires,power lines, and enemy wire "booby traps". Historically,both fixed-wing and helicopter crews alike suffer high per-centages of fatalities after striking a wire(s). Reports onthese accidents show that wire-strike protection is neededto cut and channelize wires away from critical flight con-trol components. (14:--; 28:--)

After conducting a detailed study on wire strikes,the Army installed wire-strike protection devices on most ofits tactical helicopters. (14:--; 28:--) Using these "les-sons learned" as justification, the PF should incorporatewire-strike protection into the V-22 Program.

RESOLUTION OP THESE SHORTCOXINGS

In lieu of a piecemeal resolution of these engineeringshortcomings, a strategy which is most likely beyond thecapabilities of the current contract, the PM should adopt amore flexible and farsighted acquisition strategy to system-atically fix these problems. Step one of this process in-volves recognizing the constraints of the current V-22 acqui-sition strategy. Chapter Four will identify these con-straints.

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Chapter Pour

ACQUISITION STRATEGY SHORTCOXINOS

Even though a long-term fixed-price contract can cur-tail runaway acquisition costs during production, a firmfixed-price strategy from PSD through production for procur-Ing several hundred V-22s through the 1990s is not a goodidea. Fixed-price contract* are gooc for system with fewunknowns and low risks. They can curb sky rocketing produc-tion costs. However, the V-22's simultaneous implementationof three new or relatively new technologies, i.e., all com-posits airframe, fly-by-wire controls, and tilt rotors, mostlikely involves risks which are much higher than those ofother major acquisition programs. This chapter will discussconstraints in the V-22 acquisition strategy which reducethe program's ability to contend with the V-22's technologi-cal risks and unknowns.

Considering that many of these risks will not be resol-ved until completion of its upcoming .4velopmental and op-*rational testing (DT and OT), the V-22's risks could proveto be beyond the scope of Its constrained strategy. Firstof all, the contractor's risks for integrating the V-22's

new technologies into the program could be too high or toolow with respect to the value of the contract. Secondly,neither the contractor nor the government may have a goodappreciation of the program's actual risks. Neither mayknow a fair price for the aircraft. Thirdly, the contractorcould be charging the government for assuming these risks.(17:--) Lastly, there are no clauses within the contractfor taking advantage of "lessons learned" or engineeringresearch that pertains to the V-22's three new technologies.There are no provisions for incorporating "lessons le-rned"or new research into the V-22 production line, i.e., thereare no plans for a block improvement program. (24:--)

Good examples of potential engineering research whichmay be beneficial to the program are listed in NASA's Inter-national Aerospace Abstracts. In 1988, this abstract listedover 800 research items applicable to advanced compositematerials. Research breakthroughs such as composite mate-rial environmental effects, fatigue characteristics, andio--destructive damage detection could be helpful to the V-22 Program. (8:--) However, at this time, none of this

15

research can be integrated into the V-22's production line.Considering the volume of V-22 technical unknowns whichcould be resolved by engineering research and DT/OT "lessonslearned", it is imperative for the PM to make provisions forincorporating this knowledge into the V-22 Program.

An acquisition strategy's flexibility is furthermoreimportant in controlling the costs of engineering designchanges. The LOD's~experience has shown that engineeringchanges costing $1 in concept exploratioi or $1 in demon-stration and validation require implementation costs of $10in FSD, $100 in production, and $1,000 after deployment.Experience has also shown that special tools and test equip-ment for new technologies can cost more than 250 times thecist of their production parts. (15:--) It is important to"get it right the first time", but in many cases this isimpossible to accomplish when working with the unknowns ofnew or relatively new technologies.

"It is incumbent upon the PM to develop an acquisitionstrategy tailored to his particular program..... Initially,the strategy may be limited, but it should be expanded andrefined as the program progresses". (2:4-10) Now is thetime for the PM to expand his strategy. Now is the time forthe PM to develop a more flexible and farsighted strategy.

In light of this paper's sound argument for changingthe V-22's long-term fixed-price contract strategy, the PMstill must satisfy Congressional pressures for maintaining a4ixed-price contract. Chapter Five will show that the PM isnot in a "no-win situation". Chapter Five will show thatthe PM can adopt a more flexible and farsighted strategycapable of both satisfying Congress and resolving the engi-neering and technology problems identified in ttis paper.

S-

I 16

Chapter Five

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMIQIDATIONS

CONCLUSIONS

As shown, a long-term fixed price contract is not agood acquisition strategy for the critical multi-service V-22 Program. The V-22's contract and new technologies couldinvolve risks which are too high for the government, thecontractor, or both. The aircraft's operational effective-ness and safety could be degraded with engineering shortcom-ings requiring monies beyond the V-22's contract to correct.Additional contract shortcomings involve no provisions forincorporating "lessons learned" or engineering researchpertaining to the V-22's new technologies into the V-22production line. (24:--)

RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter will provide recommendations for a moreflexible and farsighted acquisition strategy as well asrecommendations for eliminating the potential engineeringshortcomings cited in Chapt...r Three.

Acquisition Strategy Recommendations.

Recommend the V-22 PM look to the Air Force F-16 SystemPrograu Office (SPO) for a more flexible and farsighted V-22acquisition strategy. While satisfying Congress with ashort-term fixed-price contract approach, the Air Force isgrowing their "high tech" P-i1 through a Xulti-stage Im-provement Program (MSIP). The MSIP is advantageous to boththe government and the contractor in that it sufficientlycontrols the program's risks with a firm fixed price. It isflexible because the F-18's fixed-price contract with in-centives is re-negotiated with Congressional backing everyfour years. This four-year re-negotiation process is effec-tive because it enables the Air Force to directly coordinateCongressional budget approvals within the cycles of thePlanning, Programming, anr Budgeting System (PPBS). It isfarsighted because it incorporates "lessons learned" modifi-cations and new engineering research into the aircraft within

17

'•17Y.i i~ . ~-. ...

three blocks of improvement. The NSIP Block One will bene-fit P-18 A's and B's. It will provide installation pointsfor Line Replaceable Units (LRUs), i.e., avionics componentsand other "black boxes". It will also provide for strongeraircraft structural members to include stronger wings, anenvironmental cooling system, new ducting systems, and moreordnance hard points. Block Two provides for the emplace-ment of difficult-to-install wiring harnesses into F-16 Cand D models. Block Three will install the Global Position-ing System (GPS) and all new LRUs. (17:--)

Recommend the V-22 PX procure his FSD aircraft asplanned. Further recommend he adopt a re-negotiable, blockimprovement acquisition strategy similar to the F-16'sstrategy. While the argument for a new V-22 strategy di-rectly parallels the rationale for the above P-16 strategy,a new V-22 strategy, i.e., a V-22 XSIP, could eliminate theshortcomings of the V-22's long-term fixed-price contractcited in Chapter Four.

Engineering Shortcoming Recommendations.

Recommend the V-22 PM incorporate the recommendationsbelow within the provisions of the proposed V-22 MSIP.

Fuselaxe Crashworthiness Standards.

(1) Coordinate modifications to the V-22 designwhich adhere to XIL-STD 1290 and provide adequate underbellyenergy attenuatiov; or,

(2) Coordinate adequate structural testing, engi-neering modeling, and trade-off studies. Coordinate mishapscenario studies similar in scope to the related-sourcereferences on the LHX. Base these studies an gear-up andgear-down accident cost comparisons involving the originalV-22 design, the FSD aircraft, and a XIL-STD 1290. aircraft.Give senior decision makers sufficient information to acceptthe current V-22 design with its crashworthiness risks orJustification to negotiate critical design changes.

Crew-Seat Design. Ensure that adequate dynamic testingof the current design is conducted to demonstrate that theseat will contend with expected forces for all impact sce-narios. Coordinate a design change if necessary.

Fuel Cell. Test the Osprey tank design for crdshworthi-ness. Conduct full-scale tank drop testing, with tanksmounted in the airframe, to demonstrate fuel containmentwhile the tanks are exposed to nearby structural deformationsand fractures.

18

Proprotor Blade-to-Ving Impact. Test and perform accu-rate trade-off analyses for this crash scenario.

Engine Heat. If testing proves that the V-22's exhaustheat is unacceptable, consider mounting the engines in theupper rear fuselage area (similar to the engine positions ofA-10 and the CH-47) on future models of the V-22, i.e. the:V-22B.

Battery. Test the performance of the V-22's lead-acidbattery in severe environments. Emphasize monitoring powerfluctuations and total losses of battery power on the Os-prey's system performance.

Weather Radar. Explore the ramifications of adding aweather radar to the'V-22. Consider the Army's U-21 or C-12weather radars as potential V-22 weather radar candidates tominimize costs.

Throttle. Review DT and OT flight tests to determine ifa redesign of the quadrant is necessary.

Wire Strike. Explore the feasibility of adding wire-strike protection to the V-22 fleet. Considar making thisprotection a user/field *P'stallation item.

STATEMENT OF FINALITY

As discussed, the DOD's skillful acquisition of the V-22 Osprey is critical to the defense of the US. The tilt-rotor V-22, a hybrid helicopter/transport aircraft, willgive us the ability to insert combat power into previouslyimpossible-to-reach regions. Besides giving us a viabledeterrence, the Osprey will give us the military power towin against terrorist groups and hostile third-worldnations during a difficult crisis such as the Iran hostagesituation.

In addition to the potential engineering shortcomingsidentified in Chapter Three, the Osprey's new technologieshave potential for even more problems. In many cases, theresolution of these problems will be beyond the scope of theaircraft's long-term fixed-price contract. Considering thesevere constraints of the V-22's current acquisition strat-egy, it is imperative that the PM adopt a more flexible andfarsighted acquisition strategy. It is imperative that thePM adopt a highly successful "tried and tested" strategysimilar to the Air Force's P-16 stratogy.

19

-,' iLI~• 1 : ~ ~ 2 U .- U2,:.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. REFERENCES CITED

Books

1. Air University, ACJC. Low-Intonsit' Conflict: TheHidden Challene. Varfare Studies. USAF. Xax-wbll APB, AL. August 1987.

2. Air University, APIT. Introduction to AcquisitionXanagement. System 100 Vorkbook. USAF. VrightPatterson APB, OH. 1-87.

3. Beckwith, Charlie A. and Knox, Donald. Delta Force.New York City, N. Y.: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.,1983.

Articles and Periodicals

4. Bulban, Erwin J. "Tilt-Rotor Toolup: Bell Prepares toGive Wing to the V-22." Rotor & Vin Internation-al, 8 July 1986, pp. 46-47 and p. 84.

5. Hanley, Art. "Tilt Rotor Prospects Are on the Rise."Aerospace America, October 1987, pp. 6-8.

6, Polaky, Debra. "Ambrose, Officals Differ on Army V-22Participation." Army Times, 7 December 1987, p.29.

7. Starr, Barbara. "Army Pullout From V-22 Program NoDanger to Tilt-Rotor Osprey." Army Times, 15February 1988, p. 3M.

Official Documents

8. American institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics.NASA International Aerospace Abstracts. January1980 through December 1986.

9. Bell-Boeing. V-22 FSD Crashworthiness Assessment.

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Report No. 901-919-019, 29 April 1986.

10. Department of Defense. Joint Service Operational Re-quirement (JSOR) for the JVX (V-22). April 1985.

11. Department of Defense. Military Standard Light Fixedand Rotary Ying Aircraft Crashworthiness. XIL-STD1290. 25 June 1974.

12. Department of Defense. Tanks, Fuel, Crash and Re-straint. Aircraft. XIL-T-STD 27422. 13 April 1971.

Unpublished Materials

13. U. S. Army Aviation Systems Command, AMSAV-ED. Letter,Subject: Bell-Boeing Report No. 901-919-01i•, V-22PSD Crashworthiness Assessment Report. 29 July1986.

14. U. S. Army Safety Center. Army Aircraft Mishap R±.ports:Class A Mishaps. 1 July 1980 thru 1 August 1986.

Other Sources

15. Air University, AFIT. Manufacturing Management. Intro-duction to Acquisition Management Film. Film No.P3205-86-0056. Wright Patterson APB, OH. April1986.

16. Bell-Boeing. "Joint Services Advanced Vertical LiftAircraft Program." Briefing slides. Undated (May1986).

17. Conner, MAJ, USAF. F-16 SPO Integration. AFSC, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH. Telephone interview. Subject:"F-16 Acquisition Strategy." 21 January 1988.

18. Diamond, LTC, USA. U. S. Army V-22 PM Liaison Officerto V-22 PM Office, NAVAIR. Notes. Subject:"NAVAIR's Response to the U. S. Army Safety Cen-ter's Assessment of the V-22." Undated (November1986).

19. Hicks, James E., PhD, GM-14, USA. Chief, USASC SystemsEngineering Division. Telephone interview. Sub-Ject: "Army Pullout From the V-22 Program." 9February 1988.

20. Martinez, Randy, XAJ, USAF. ACSC Student/Experienced C-

21

S., .* • * .-, .. . -/•.• • . • -• _ ' . ,.- ..

130 Flight Examiner. Interview. Subject: "C-130's Tactical Refueling Capability." 25 January1988.

21. O'Connor, XAJ, USA. CH-47/V-22 Program Manager Office,AMCPX-CH-47X. Telephone interview. Subject: "V-22 Lead-Acid Battery." 11 August 1986.

22. Ratcliff, Ron, LTC, USA, USASC V-22 Project Officer/En-gineer. Telephone interview. Subject: "Statusof the V-22 Program." 10 Deqember 1987.

23. Robinson, CV4, USA, C-12 pilot, USASC, PESC-SPG. Inter-view. Subject: V-22 Weather Radar Requirement.8 August 1986.

24. Schelecher, V-22 Class Desk Officer, NAVAIR, CrystalCity, VA. Telephone interview. Subject: "V-22Acquisition Strategy." 10 December 1987.

25. Shepard, William, XAJ, USAF. Lecture presented at AirCommand and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, AL. Sub-Ject: "Role of Air Power in LICs." 14 December1987.

26. Snyder, John, AVSCOX Electrical Engineer, AXSAV-ED.Telephone interview. Subject: '*V-22 Lead-AcidBattery." 11 August 1986.

27. U. S. Naval Air Engineering Center. Meetings betweenU.S. Military and V-22 contractors. Subject: V-22System Safety Working Gruups. December 1984 thruMay 1988.

28. U. S. Naval Air Engineering Center. Meeting betweenU. S. Military and V-22 Contractors. Subject:"System Safety Working Group No. 8." Philadelphia,PA. 6-7 May 1988 and Meeting between U. S.Military and V-22 Contractors. Subject: "SystemSafety Working Group No. 9." Pt. Worth, TX. 7-8October 1986.

29. U. S. Naval Air Engineering Center. Neeting betweenU. S. Military and V-22 Contractors. Subject:"System Safety Working Group No. 10." Philadel-phia, PA, 3-4 February 1987.

30. Vickery, Jim, MAJ, USA, ACSC LIC Phase Manager, MaxwellAPB, AL. Interview. Subject: "LICs." 15 December1987.

2

22

to ACSC Introduction to Acquisition KanagementElective Course. Subject: "Contracts". 20January 1988.

B. RELATED SOURCES

Official Documents

U. S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, ATZQ-CDX-S. Doc-ument. Subject: "(U) Operational a,,d Organizational(O&O) Plan for the V-22 Osprey." July 1984.

U. S. Army Safe'4.y Center, PESC-SE. Technical Report 83-8.Subject: "Projected Accident, Cost for the LHXAircraft." September 1984.

U. S. Army Safety Center, PESC-SE. Technical Report(Draft). Subject: "Safety Substudy for the LHX Costand Operational Effectiveness Analysis (CODA)." Jan-uary 1986.

23