COMAH LAND USE PLANNING ASSESSMENT OF PROPOSED …Authority to COMAH Risk-based Land-use Planning...

_____________________________________ Technical Report Prepared For

Intel Ireland Ltd.

_____________________________________ Technical Report Prepared By

Maeve McKenna BEng MEngSc CEng MIEI

AMIChemE

_____________________________________ Our Reference

MMcK/19/10914RR01

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Date Of Issue

30 August 2019

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COMAH LAND USE PLANNING ASSESSMENT OF PROPOSED

DEVELOPMENT AT INTEL IRELAND LTD.

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MMcK/19/10914RR01 AWN Consulting Limited

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Document History

Document Reference Original Issue Date

MMcK/19/10914RR01 30 August 2019

Revision Level Revision Date Description Sections Affected

Record of Approval

Details Written by Approved by

Signature

Name Maeve McKenna

Title Principal Risk Consultant

Date 30 August 2019

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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY AWN Consulting Ltd. was requested by Intel Ireland Ltd. to assess the consequences and risk of fatality arising from Major Accident Hazards (MAHs) associated with proposed developments at their existing integrated circuit manufacturing campus at Collinstown Industrial Park, Leixlip, Co. Kildare. Planning permission is being sought for additional installations including cryogenic liquid oxygen tanks, cryogenic liquid hydrogen tanks, waste solvent collection tanks, a truck staging yard, waste water holding tanks, a wastewater treatment system, an Air Separation Unit (ASU) and a waste water balancing tank. A risk based land use planning assessment was completed of major accident hazards associated with the proposed planning application. The assessment considers the consequences and individual risk of fatality associated with the proposed development. The assessment was conducted in accordance with the Policy & Approach of the Health & Safety Authority to COMAH Risk-based Land-use Planning (19 March 2010) including Detailed Implementation by Sector (HSA, 2010). The impacts of physical and health effects on workers and the general public outside of the establishment boundary were determined by modelling accident scenarios using DNV PHAST Version 8.22 modelling software. Individual risk of fatality contours were plotted using TNO Riskcurves Version 10.1.9 modelling software. The assessment was completed based on available information and knowledge to date which may be subject to change at detailed design stage. The following major accident hazards were identified for the proposed development:

Location Installation Major Accident Scenario

Liquid oxygen compound

Cryogenic liquid oxygen tanks (2 No. vertical tanks)

Tank rupture, BLEVE with overpressure effects and oxygen

enrichment

Liquid hydrogen compound

Cryogenic liquid hydrogen tank (3 No. horizontal)

Hydrogen tank rupture with BLEVE and fireball

Hydrogen tank leak with jet fire or vapour cloud explosion

Waste solvent collection tanks

Waste solvent stream A collection tanks (2 No. plus 2 No. future tanks)

Waste solvent stream B collection tanks (2 No. plus 2 No. future tanks)

Tank release, bund fire Tank rupture with bund overtopping

or spill at truck dock and uncontained pool fire

Confined explosion in waste solvent collection tank

Air Separation Unit Liquid oxygen tank Tank rupture, BLEVE with

overpressure effects and oxygen enrichment

Air Separation Unit Liquid argon tank Argon tank rupture and dispersion

of asphyxiating gas

Air Separation Unit Coldbox Vessel rupture and overpressure

consequences

Impacts Off Site No off site impacts are predicted at any off site receptor location. Impacts On Site

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There is the potential for fatalities to arise on site from the consequences of major accident scenarios, however areas affected are primarily outdoor areas that are not normally occupied. Impacts indoors in the ASU Control Building were assessed and there is for a risk for fatalities to arise as a result of major accident scenarios at the ASU. At detailed design stage, the required performance of the ASU Control Building will be determined in accordance with the methodology described by the CIA (CIA, 2010) to ensure the risk of fatal effects is acceptably low. Risk Based LUP Contours The individual risk of fatality for the proposed development was determined. Individual risk of fatality contours that correspond to the boundaries of the inner (1E-05 per year), middle (1E-06 per year) and outer (1E-07 per year) risk based land use planning zones are illustrated as follows:

It is concluded that the risk based land use planning zones are confined within the site boundary. The level of individual risk of fatality on site and off site is acceptable.

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CONTENTS Page

NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY .................................................................................................. 3

List of Figures .......................................................................................................................... 7

List of Tables ............................................................................................................................ 9

1.0 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 10

2.0 BACKGROUND TO RISK ASSESSMENT AND LAND USE PLANNING ............... 11

2.1 Risk Assessment – An Introduction ................................................................. 11

3.0 DESCRIPTION OF DEVELOPMENT, MAJOR ACCIDENT HAZARDS AND RECEIVING ENVIRONMENT .................................................................................. 16

3.1 Description of Development ............................................................................ 16 3.2 Identification of Major Accident Hazards .......................................................... 20 3.3 Description of Receiving Environment ............................................................. 25

4.0 ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY AND CRITERIA ................................................. 27

5.0 ASSESSMENT FOR LIQUID OXYGEN MAJOR ACCIDENT HAZARDS ................ 37

5.1 Oxygen BLEVE and Dispersion Model Inputs .................................................. 37 5.2 BLEVE Model Outputs..................................................................................... 37 5.3 Pool Evaporation Model Outputs ..................................................................... 40 5.4 Oxygen Dispersion Results ............................................................................. 41 5.5 Probability of Fatality from LOx BLEVE ........................................................... 43 5.6 Frequency of Liquid Oxygen Tank Rupture ..................................................... 44 5.7 Risk Contours at the Liquid Oxygen Tanks ...................................................... 45

6.0 ASSESSMENT FOR LIQUID HYDROGEN TANK MAJOR ACCIDENT HAZARDS 46

6.1 Assessment for Hydrogen Leak through Venting System ................................ 46 6.2 Assessment of Hydrogen Tank Catastrophic Rupture ..................................... 54 6.3 Individual Risk of Fatality contours at Liquid Hydrogen Tanks ......................... 61

7.0 ASSESSMENT FOR WASTE SOLVENT MAJOR ACCIDENT HAZARDS .............. 63

7.1 Waste Solvent Storage .................................................................................... 63 7.2 Waste Solvent Pool Fire .................................................................................. 63 7.3 Confined VCE in Waste Solvent Tank ............................................................. 69 7.4 Individual Risk of Fatality Contours at Waste Solvent Tanks ........................... 74

8.0 AIR SEPARATION UNIT MAJOR ACCIDENT SCENARIOS ................................... 75

8.1 Cryogenic Liquid Oxygen ................................................................................ 75 8.2 Cryogenic Liquid Argon ................................................................................... 85 8.3 Coldbox Rupture ............................................................................................. 88 8.4 Risk Contours at the ASU ................................................................................ 92

9.0 SUMMARY OF MAJOR ACCIDENT SCENARIOS .................................................. 93

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10.0 ASSESSMENT OF IMPACTS ON OCCUPIED BUILDINGS .................................... 95

10.1 Methodology .................................................................................................... 95 10.2 Occupied Building Risk Assessment ............................................................... 95

11.0 RISK BASED LAND USE PLANNING CONTOURS ................................................ 97

12.0 CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................... 99

13.0 REFERENCES ....................................................................................................... 101

APPENDIX A ......................................................................................................................... 103

APPENDIX A Hazard Classifications and Hazard Statements

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List of Figures

Figure 1 Site Location ................................................................................................................ 17 Figure 2 Layout of Proposed Development at Mound Area ...................................................... 18 Figure 3 Off Site Receiving Locations ....................................................................................... 26 Figure 4 Chemical Industries Association Overpressure vs. Vulnerability Relationship ........... 32 Figure 5 Wind Rose Casement Aerodrome 1988 - 2018 .......................................................... 35 Figure 6 Cryogenic Oxygen Tank Rupture and BLEVE Blast: Overpressure vs. Distance ....... 38 Figure 7 Cryogenic Liquid Oxygen BLEVE at LOx Compound: Blast Damage Contours ......... 39 Figure 8 Cryogenic Liquid Oxygen BLEVE at LOx Compound: Outdoor and Indoor Vulnerability

Contours ...................................................................................................................... 39 Figure 9 Oxygen Tank Rupture at LOx Compound and Pool Formation: Evaporation Mass Flow

Rate vs. Time ............................................................................................................... 40 Figure 10 Oxygen Tank Rupture at LOx Compound and Pool Formation: Mass Evaporated vs.

Time ............................................................................................................................. 41 Figure 11 Liquid Oxygen Tank Rupture at LOx Compound Dispersion Model Outputs: Maximum

Concentration vs. Distance Downwind ........................................................................ 42 Figure 12 Liquid Oxygen Tank Rupture at LOx Compound Dispersion Model Outputs: Maximum

Concentration Footprint ............................................................................................... 43 Figure 13 Oxygen Tank Rupture and BLEVE Blast: Probability of Fatality vs. Distance ............ 44 Figure 14 Liquid Oxygen Compound: Individual Risk of Fatality Contours ................................. 45 Figure 15 Hydrogen Leak Model Outputs: Jet Fire Thermal Radiation Results .......................... 47 Figure 16 Hydrogen Vapour Cloud Explosion: Overpressure vs. Distance ................................. 49 Figure 17 Hydrogen Vapour Cloud Explosion: Blast Damage Contours ..................................... 50 Figure 18 Hydrogen Vapour Cloud Explosion: Mortality Contours .............................................. 50 Figure 19 Hydrogen Jet Fire: Probability of Fatality vs. Distance ................................................ 51 Figure 20 Hydrogen Vapour Cloud Explosion: Probability of Fatality vs. Distance– Worst Case

Category F2 ................................................................................................................. 52 Figure 21 Event Tree for Hydrogen Leak from Relief Valve ........................................................ 53 Figure 22 Hydrogen BLEVE Model Outputs: Overpressure Results ........................................... 55 Figure 23 Hydrogen BLEVE: Blast Damage Contours ................................................................ 56 Figure 24 Hydrogen BLEVE: Probability of Fatality Contours for Persons Outdoors and Indoors

57 Figure 25 Hydrogen Fireball Model Outputs: Thermal Dose Results .......................................... 58 Figure 26 Hydrogen Tank Rupture at Hydrogen Tank and Fireball: Fireball Diameter (100%

Mortality) and 1% Mortality Contours .......................................................................... 59 Figure 27 Rupture of Proposed Hydrogen Tank at Bulk Gas Yard and BLEVE Blast: Probability of

Fatality vs. Distance ..................................................................................................... 60 Figure 28 Hydrogen Tank Rupture and Fireball: Probability of Fatality vs. Distance .................. 61 Figure 29 Liquid Hydrogen Tanks: Individual Risk of Fatality Contours ...................................... 62 Figure 30 Pool Fire at Waste Solvent Collection Tanks: Thermal Radiation vs. Distance .......... 64 Figure 31 Bund Fire at Waste Solvent Collection Tanks: Threshold of Fatality Contour ............ 65 Figure 32 Pool Fire at Waste Solvent Truck Dock: Threshold of Fatality Contour ...................... 65 Figure 33 Bund Fire at Waste Solvent Collection Tanks: Persons Indoors Protected Contour

(Worst Case) ................................................................................................................ 66 Figure 34 Pool Fire at Waste Solvent Truck Dock: Persons Indoors Protected Contour ............ 66 Figure 35 Bund Fire at Waste Solvent Collection Tanks: Equipment Damage Contour ............. 67 Figure 36 Pool Fire at Waste Solvent Truck Dock: Equipment Damage Contour ....................... 67 Figure 37 Waste Solvent Pool Fire: Probability of Fatality vs. Distance ...................................... 68 Figure 38 Confined VCE at Waste Solvent Collection Tanks: Overpressure vs. Distance ......... 70 Figure 39 Waste Solvent Tank Confined VCE: Blast Damage Contours .................................... 71 Figure 40 Waste Solvent Tank Confined VCE: Vulnerability Contours ....................................... 72 Figure 41 Confined VCE in Waste Solvent Tank: Probability of Fatality vs. Distance ................ 73 Figure 42 Waste Solvent Collection Tanks: Individual Risk of Fatality Contours ........................ 74 Figure 43 ASU Liquid Oxygen Tank Rupture and BLEVE Blast: Overpressure vs. Distance ..... 76 Figure 44 ASU Liquid Oxygen BLEVE: Blast Damage Contours ................................................ 78 Figure 45 ASU Liquid Oxygen BLEVE: Outdoor and Indoor Vulnerability Contours ................... 79 Figure 46 ASU Liquid Oxygen Tank Rupture and Pool Formation: Evaporation Mass Flow Rate

vs. Time ....................................................................................................................... 80 Figure 47 ASU Liquid Oxygen Tank Rupture and Pool Formation: Mass Evaporated vs. Time . 81

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Figure 48 ASU Liquid Oxygen Tank Rupture Dispersion Model Outputs: Maximum Concentration vs. Distance Downwind................................................................................................ 82

Figure 49 ASU Liquid Oxygen Tank Rupture Dispersion Model Outputs: Maximum Concentration Footprint ....................................................................................................................... 83

Figure 50 ASU Liquid Oxygen Tank Rupture and BLEVE Blast: Probability of Fatality vs. Distance ..................................................................................................................................... 84

Figure 51 Argon Dispersion Model Outputs: Maximum Concentration Footprint (D5) ................ 85 Figure 52 Argon Dispersion Model Outputs: Maximum Concentration Footprint (F2) ................ 86 Figure 53 Argon Asphyxiation Contours for ASU Liquid Argon Tank Rupture Scenario ............. 87 Figure 54 Coldbox Rupture: Overpressure vs. Distance ............................................................. 88 Figure 55 Coldbox Rupture: Probability of Fatality vs. Distance ................................................. 90 Figure 56 Coldbox Rupture: 50 mbar Contour ............................................................................. 90 Figure 57 ASU: Individual Risk of Fatality Contours .................................................................... 92 Figure 58 Risk Based Land Use Planning Contours for Proposed Development ....................... 97 Figure 59 Risk Based Land Use Planning Contours for Overall Site .......................................... 98

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List of Tables

Table 1 Annual Fatality Rates for a Variety of Activities ........................................................... 12 Table 2 LUP Matrix ................................................................................................................... 14 Table 3 Location of Hazardous Substances ............................................................................. 19 Table 4 Hazardous Substances at Mound Area ....................................................................... 19 Table 5 Physical Properties of Solvent Waste Constituents .................................................... 22 Table 6 Summary of Major Accident Hazards .......................................................................... 24 Table 7 Heat Flux Consequences ............................................................................................ 27 Table 8 Heat Flux Consequences Indoors ............................................................................... 27 Table 9 Conversion from Probits to Percentage ....................................................................... 28 Table 10 Blast Damage .............................................................................................................. 30 Table 11 Process Vessel Blast Damage Criteria ........................................................................ 31 Table 12 Injury Criteria from Explosion Overpressure................................................................ 31 Table 13 Blast Overpressure Consequences Indoors ................................................................ 32 Table 14 Oxygen Enrichment: Hazardous Concentrations ........................................................ 33 Table 15 Oxygen Reductions due to Ambient Concentration of Asphyxiating Gas ................... 34 Table 16 Atmospheric Stability Class ......................................................................................... 34 Table 17 Surface Roughness ..................................................................................................... 36 Table 18 Liquid Oxygen Tank at LOx Compound: Catastrophic Rupture Model Inputs ............ 37 Table 19 Cryogenic Oxygen Tank Ruptre and BLEVE Blast at LOx Compound: Calculated

Distances at Specified Overpressure Levels ............................................................... 38 Table 20 Liquid Oxygen Tank Rupture at LOx Compound: Dispersion Results ........................ 42 Table 21 Hydrogen Leak Model Inputs ...................................................................................... 46 Table 22 Hydrogen Leak and Jet Fire Model Outputs ................................................................ 47 Table 23 Hydrogen Tank PRV Leak and Jet Fire: Calculated Distances at Specified Thermal

Radiation Levels at 1.5 m Above Ground Level .......................................................... 48 Table 24 Hydrogen VCE: Calculated Distances at Specified Overpressure Levels .................. 49 Table 25 Failure Frequency Data Sources ................................................................................. 53 Table 26 Hydrogen Tank Catastrophic Rupture Model Inputs ................................................... 54 Table 27 Hydrogen BLEVE Blast: Calculated Distances at Specified Overpressure Levels ..... 55 Table 28 Hydrogen Fireball Model Outputs ................................................................................ 58 Table 29 Hydrogen Fireball: Calculated Distances at Specified Thermal Dose Levels ............. 59 Table 30 Waste Solvent Pool Fire Results ................................................................................. 63 Table 31 Pool Fire at Waste Solvent Collection Tanks: Distances to Specified Thermal Radiation

Levels........................................................................................................................... 64 Table 32 Waste Solvent Tank Confined VCE: Model Inputs ...................................................... 70 Table 33 Waste Solvent Tank VCE: Calculated Distances at Specified Overpressure Levels .. 71 Table 34 ASU Liquid Oxygen Tank Catastrophic Rupture Model Inputs ................................... 76 Table 35 ASU Liquid Oxygen Tank Ruptre and BLEVE Blast: Calculated Distances at Specified

Overpressure Levels .................................................................................................... 77 Table 36 ASU Liquid Oxygen Tank Rupture: Dispersion Results .............................................. 82 Table 37 Argon Model Inputs ...................................................................................................... 85 Table 38 ASU Coldbox Rupture Model Inputs ............................................................................ 88 Table 39 Coldbox Rupture: Calculated Distances at Specified Overpressure Levels ............... 89 Table 40 Summary of Major Accident Scenario Consequences and Frequencies .................... 94 Table 41 Occupied Building Assessment for ASU Control Building ........................................... 96

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1.0 INTRODUCTION AWN Consulting Ltd. was requested by Intel Ireland Ltd. to assess the consequences and risk of fatality arising from Major Accident Hazards associated with proposed developments at their existing integrated circuit manufacturing campus at Collinstown Industrial Park, Leixlip, Co. Kildare. Operations at Intel Ireland Ltd. are such that the establishment is an Upper Tier Seveso establishment under the Chemicals Act (Control of Major Accident Hazards Involving Dangerous Substances) Regulations 2015 (S.I. 209 of 2015). The assessment was completed based on available information and knowledge to date which may be subject to change at detailed design stage. This report includes the following:

• Background to risk assessment and land use planning context;

• Description of development, receiving environment and identification of major accident hazards;

• Assessment methodology and criteria;

• Quantitative Risk Assessment of Major Accident Hazards;

• Assessment of impacts on occupied buildings;

• Risk based Land Use Planning contours;

• Conclusions.

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2.0 BACKGROUND TO RISK ASSESSMENT AND LAND USE PLANNING

2.1 Risk Assessment – An Introduction Trevor Kletz (Kletz, 1999) in his seminal work on the subject stated that the essential elements of quantitative risk assessment (QRA) are (i) how often is a Major Accident Hazard (MAH) likely to occur and (ii) Consequence Analysis – what is the impact of the incident: Kletz also commented that another way of expressing this method of QRA is:

How often? How big? So what?

In QRA, the “how often?” question is answered by using Event Tree Analysis (ETA) and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). FTA was first developed by Bell Telephone Laboratories in 1961 for missile control launch reliability and further developed by Haasl at the Boeing Company (Haasl, 1965) and was first applied to the process industries by Rasmussen in 1975 (Rasmussen, 1975). The FTA process involves using a combination of simple logic gates (AND and OR gates), to create a failure model for a process or an installation. The frequency or probability of the top event is calculated from failure data for more simple events. A fault tree is developed by first defining the top event, in FTA for MAH this may be events such as a release of toxic gas, an explosion, or the loss of containment of a material. A series of events which lead to the top event are then developed and the relationship between events is defined, using AND and OR gates. The probability or frequency of occurrence of individual events is then obtained from generic data, or from manufacturers data and the probability or frequency of the top event is then calculated. Section 2 of the Health and Safety Authority (HSA) Policy and Approach document (Introduction to Technical Aspects) describes the policy and approach as follows: “The policy of the HSA is that a simplified application of a risk based approach is the most appropriate for land use planning. The difficulties associated with the complexity of analyzing many scenarios can be avoided by considering a small number of carefully chosen representative events, whose frequency has been estimated conservatively.” The frequency data for major accident scenarios identified in this assessment is based on these conservative even frequency values. Where the HSA Policy and Approach document (HSA, 2010) does not provide suitable frequency values, FTA and ETA is included and data for failure of pipes, tanks and protection systems has been obtained from various published sources including, the “Purple Book” (TNO, 2005) and the UK HSE Planning Case Assessment Guide, Chapter 6K (UK HSE, 2012).

The ‘how big’ element of the QRA was conducted using DNV PHAST and TNO Effects modelling software.

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Judgement will be applied in the approach taken to major accident consequence modelling and quantitative risk assessment. Reference is made to the hazard identification (HAZID) study for the existing Intel Ireland establishment, which has similar hazards to the proposed development. The HAZID study is detailed in the Safety Report. The “so what” element is perhaps the most contentious issue associated with QRA, as one is essentially asking what is an acceptable level of risk, in this case risk of fatality, posed by a facility. It is widely accepted that “no risk” scenarios do not exist. The occupier of a house with gas fired central heating is exposed to the risk posed by the presence of a natural gas supply in the house. Statistics from the UK Health and Safety Executive (UK HSE Risks associated with Gas Supply, 1993) show that the annual risk of death from gas supply events in the UK (risks include explosion, asphyxiation by fumes from poorly vented heaters, poisoning by gas leaks) is approximately 1.1 in a million. In other words, for every 10 million persons living in houses with a gas supply, 11 will die annually from events related to the supply. Table 1 below presents the annual fatality rates, and the risk of fatality, for a number of activities (from CIRIA Report 152, 1995) in the UK.

Risk Annual Fatality Rate (per 1,000, 000 people at

risk)

Annual Risk of Fatality

Motorcycling 20,000 1 in 50

Smoking (all causes) 3000 1 in 333

Smoking (cancer) 1200 1 in 830

Fire fighting 800 1 in 1250

Farming 360 1 in 2778

Police work (non-clerical) 220 1 in 4545

Road accidents 100 1 in 10,000

Fires 28 1 in 35,700

Natural gas supply to house 1.1 1 in 909,090

Lightning strike 0.5 1 in 2,000,000

Table 1 Annual Fatality Rates for a Variety of Activities

Kletz has shown that the average industrial worker is exposed to a risk of accidental death of somewhere around 1 x 10-3 per year, for all situations (work, home, travel). Kletz has argued, that a risk of fatality which is 1% of the possible risk of death normally posed to individuals in their normal day to day activities, which is equal to 1 x 10-5 risk of death per annum, would be considered acceptable. However, it has since been more widely accepted by regulatory agencies in Ireland (Health and Safety Authority), UK (Health and Safety Executive) and the US (US Environmental Protection Agency) that an individual risk of fatality of 1 x 10–6/annum (1 in 1,000,000 per year), for off-site impacts of Major Accident Hazard Facilities, with respect to residential development, is considered acceptable and that an acceptable risk of fatality for employees on-site is 1 x 10 –5/annum.

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Land Use Planning and Risk Assessment The Seveso III Directive (2012/18/EU) requires Member States to ensure that the objectives of preventing major accidents and limiting the consequences of such accidents for human health and the environment are taken into account in land use planning policies through controls on the siting of new establishments, modifications to establishments and certain types of new developments in the vicinity of establishments. Under the 2015 COMAH Regulations, the Central Competent Authority (the Health and Safety Authority) provides land use planning advice to planning authorities. A risk-based approach to land use planning near hazardous installations has been adopted by the HSA and is set out in the HSA’s Policy and Approach to COMAH Risk-based Land-use Planning (HSA, 2010). This approach involves delineating three zones for land use planning guidance purposes, based on the potential risk of fatality from major accident scenarios resulting in damaging levels of thermal radiation (e.g. from pool fires), overpressure (e.g. from vapour cloud explosions) and toxic gas concentrations (e.g. from an uncontrolled toxic gas release). The HSA has defined the boundaries of the Inner, Middle and Outer Land Use Planning (LUP) zones as: 10-5/year Risk of fatality for Inner Zone (Zone 1) boundary 10-6/year Risk of fatality for Middle Zone (Zone 2) boundary 10-7/year Risk of fatality for Outer Zone (Zone 3) boundary

The process for determining the distances to the boundaries of the inner, middle and outer zones for a Seveso establishment is outlined as follows:

• Determine the consequences of major accident scenarios using the modelling methodologies described in the HSA LUP Policy/Approach Document (HSA, 2010);

• Determine the severity (probability of fatality) using the probit functions specified by the HSA;

• Determine the frequency of the accident (probability of event) using data specified by the HSA;

• Determine the individual risk of fatality as follows:

Risk = Frequency x Severity (Equation 1)

The HSA’s 2010 Risk-Based LUP Policy/Approach document provides guidance on the type of development appropriate to the inner, middle and outer LUP zones. The advice for each zone is based on the UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE) PADHI (Planning Advice for Developments near Hazardous Installations) methodology. The PADHI methodology sets four levels of sensitivity, with sensitivity increasing from 1 to 4, to describe the development types in the vicinity of a COMAH establishment. The Sensitivity Levels used in PADHI are based on a rationale which allows progressively more severe restrictions to be imposed as the sensitivity of the proposed development increases. The sensitivity levels are:

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Level 1 Based on normal working population; Level 2 Based on the general public – at home and involved in normal

activities; Level 3 Based on vulnerable members of the public (children, those with

mobility difficulties or those unable to recognise physical danger); Level 4 Large examples of Level 3 and large outdoor examples of Level 2 and

Institutional Accommodation. Table 2 details the matrix that is used by the HSA to advise on suitable development for technical LUP purposes:

Level of Sensitivity Inner Zone (Zone 1) Middle Zone (Zone 2) Outer Zone (Zone 3)

Level 1 ✓ ✓ ✓

Level 2 ✓ ✓

Level 3 ✓

Level 4

Table 2 LUP Matrix

Individual Risk Criteria

In the UK, the following annual individual risk of fatality criteria apply to members of the public (Trbojevic, 2005):

10-4 Intolerable limit for members of the public; 10-5 Risk has to be reduced to the level As Low As Reasonably Practicable

(ALARP); 3 x 10-6 LUP limit of acceptability; 10-6 Broadly acceptable level of risk 10-7 Negligible level of risk

In relation to tolerability criteria for individual risk of fatality to persons on-site, the HSA applies UK HSE criteria published in the guidance document Reducing Risks Protecting People (2001). The UK HSE generally uses a three tier framework for risk tolerability:

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The recommended upper risk of fatality bound for employees is set at 1 x 10-3/year. The Chemical Industries Association (CIA, 2003) suggests that to allow only for the major hazard aspects of an employee’s job, the upper bound should be reduced by a factor of 10 and thus be set at 1 x 10-4/year. The lower bound of risk – that at which no further effort needs to be applied to reduce risk - is generally considered to be about 1 x 10-6/year. In relation to new establishments, the HSA LUP Policy and Approach document (HSA, 2012) states that it will be necessary for them to demonstrate that they do not present a risk of fatality greater than 5E-06 (per year) to their current non-residential type neighbours or a risk of fatality greater than 1E-06 ( per year) to the nearest residential type property. This may be relaxed in respect of neighbours where the new development is the same/similar to the existing neighbours; for example, new oil storage depot being set up in a location already occupied by tank farms.

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3.0 DESCRIPTION OF DEVELOPMENT, MAJOR ACCIDENT HAZARDS AND RECEIVING ENVIRONMENT

3.1 Description of Development

Site Layout Intel Ireland Ltd. is located in Collinstown Industrial Park, Leixlip, Co. Kildare where operations comprise the manufacture of integrated circuits on silicon wafers or ‘chips’. Planning permission is being sought for additional installations including cryogenic liquid oxygen tanks, cryogenic liquid hydrogen tanks, waste solvent collection tanks, a truck staging yard, waste water holding tanks, a wastewater treatment system, an air separation unit and a waste water balancing tank. Figure 1 illustrates the site location and Figure 2 illustrates the layout of the proposed development. Table 3 provides details of the hazardous substances at the locations marked up on Figure 2.

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Figure 1 Site Location

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Figure 2 Layout of Proposed Development at Mound Area

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Table 3 Location of Hazardous Substances

Location Details

1 Liquid oxygen bulk storage tanks (2 No.)

2 Solvent Waste Stream B collection tanks (2 No.)

3 Solvent Waste Stream A collection tanks (2 No.)

4 Solvent Waste Stream B collection tanks (future) (2 No.)

5 Solvent Waste Stream A collection tanks (future) (2 No.)

6 Liquid hydrogen tanks (3 No. horizontal tanks)

7 Air Separation Unit including Liquid Oxygen Tanks and Liquid Argon Tank

Hazardous Installations It is proposed to install liquid oxygen, liquid hydrogen and waste solvent bulk storage tanks at the mound area. The proposed Air Separation Unit (ASU) compound will contain associated towers 63 meters high and 45 meters high, tanks and equipment, and ancillary support buildings housing plant and equipment. The air separation unit will generate liquid oxygen, liquid argon, gaseous oxygen and gaseous nitrogen in a low temperature distillation process that follows air compression and purification in molecular sieve adsorbers. Storage of liquid oxygen and liquid argon will be provided at the ASU installation. Table 4 provides details of hazardous installations that will be installed at the mound area and summarises associated hazards.

Table 4 Hazardous Substances at Mound Area

Substance Physical

State Vessel details Classification

Hazard Statements

Oxygen Liquefied cryogenic

57 m3 vertical bulk tanks (2 No.)

Ox. Gas 1 Refrigerated liquefied gas

H270 H281

Hydrogen Liquefied cryogenic

87.4 m3 horizontal bulk tanks (3 No.)

Flam. Gas 1 Refrigerated liquefied gas

H220 H281

Solvent Waste Stream A

(dilute (40 – 70% water),

high flash point solvent waste)

Liquid

60.6 m3 collection tanks (2 No. at mound) in a

bunded area measuring 8 m x 16 m x 1.3 m high Provision for 2 No. future

tanks

Flam. Liq. 3, Acute Tox. 2 (oral), Acute

Tox. 1 (dermal), Skin Corr. 1B,

STOT SE 3 Resp. Tract Irr., STOT SE 3 narcotic effects,

Repr. 2

H226, H300, H310, H314, H335, H336,

H361

Solvent Waste Stream B (mainly

cyclohexanone)

Liquid

60.6 m3 collection tanks (2 No. at mound) in a

bunded area measuring 8 m x 16 m x 1.3 m high Provision for 2 No. future

tanks

Flam. Liq. 3, Acute Tox. 4 (oral), Acute Tox. 4 (inhalation), Eye Dam. 1, STOT

SE 3 Resp. Tract irr.

H226, H302, H332, H318,

H335

Oxygen (at ASU)

Liquefied cryogenic

53 tonne vertical bulk tanks (3 No.)

Ox. Gas 1 Refrigerated liquefied gas

H270 H281

Argon Liquefied cryogenic

225 tonne vertical bulk tank (1 No.)

Refrigerated liquefied gas

H281

The meaning of hazard classifications and hazard statements is given in Appendix A.

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With the exception of pressurised/refrigerated liquefied gas hazards, argon is not classified with any health or physical hazards. However, a release has the potential to cause an oxygen diminished atmosphere and to lead to asphyxiating effects. These effects are assessed herein.

Occupied Buildings The control building at the ASU will be occupied by ASU operations personnel.

3.2 Identification of Major Accident Hazards Major accident scenarios are similar to those previously identified for the existing Intel Ireland Ltd. integrated circuit manufacturing complex which are assessed in the Safety Report for the facility. Major accident scenarios assessed within the scope of this study are identified with reference to the Safety Report (2018) as well as the Policy & Approach of the Health & Safety Authority to COMAH Risk-based Land-use Planning (19 March 2010) (HSA, 2010). Major accident hazards associated with the following buildings/installations are described:

• Liquid oxygen tanks

• Liquid hydrogen tanks

• Waste solvent collection tanks

• Air separation unit

Liquid Oxygen Tanks Liquid oxygen is classified as an oxidising gas category 1, and has the following hazard statements:

• H270 Extremely flammable gas

• H281 Contains refrigerated gas, may cause cryogenic burns or injury It is proposed to install 2 no. 57 m3 liquid oxygen tanks and associated vaporisers at the North Mound. The following major accident scenarios are identified for liquid oxygen tanks and are assessed in Section 5.0:

• The bulk cryogenic oxygen tanks will contain liquefied oxygen under pressure and may explode if heated. Catastrophic rupture of a cryogenic oxygen tank can lead to a Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion (BLEVE) with overpressure consequences.

• In the event of catastrophic rupture of a cryogenic oxygen tank the dispersion of oxygen following a release has the potential to result in an enriched oxygen atmosphere resulting in enhanced combustion hazards.

Liquid Hydrogen Tanks

Hydrogen is classified as a flammable gas category 1, and has the following hazard statements and classification:

• H270 May cause or intensify fire; oxidiser

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• H281 Contains refrigerated gas, may cause cryogenic burns or injury It is proposed to install 3 No. horizontal 87.4 m3 bulk tanks at the mound area. The main hazards arising from the use of low-temperature liquefied hydrogen are:

• cold burns, frostbite and hypothermia from the intense cold

• over pressurisation from the large volume expansion of the liquid (Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion or BLEVE)

• fireball following ignition of instantaneous release

• jet fire for high pressure release (direct ignition)

• Vapour Cloud Explosion (VCE) following delayed ignition of a vapour phase leak Hydrogen has the following flammable properties (DIPPR Database, 2015):

• Lower flammable limit 4% (v/v) (40,000 ppm)

• Upper flammable limit 75% (v/v) (750,000 ppm) The bulk cryogenic hydrogen tanks will contain liquefied hydrogen under pressure and may explode if heated. Catastrophic rupture of a cryogenic hydrogen tank can lead to a BLEVE with overpressure consequences as well as a fireball as it is a flammable substance (following impingement of a significant fire on the tank for a significant length of time). A leak from a pressure relief valve could result in a jet fire on direct ignition or a vapour cloud explosion on delayed ignition. These scenarios are assessed in Section 6.0 herein.

Waste Solvent Collection Tanks It is proposed to install 2 No. Solvent Waste Stream A and 2 No. Solvent Waste Stream B collection tanks in bunds at the development area. Solvent Waste Stream A has a flash point of approx. 57 oC and Solvent Waste Stream B has a flash point of approx. 37.5 oC and is mainly comprised of cyclohexanone. Solvent Waste Stream A has a flash point of 57 oC and is classified as follows:

• Flam. Liq. 3, H226 Flammable liquid and vapour (flash point 57 oC).

• Acute Tox. 2 (oral), H300 fatal if swallowed.

• Acute Tox. 3 (dermal), H310 Fatal in contact with skin.

• Skin Corr. 1B, H314 Causes severe skin burns and eye damage

• STOT SE 3 Resp. Tract Irr., H335 May cause respiratory irritation

• STOT SE 3 narcotic effects., H336 May cause drowsiness or dizziness

• Repr. 2, H361 Suspected of damaging fertility or the unborn child Solvent Waste Stream B has a flash point of 37.5 oC and is classified as follows:

• Flam. Liq. 3, H226 Flammable liquid and vapour (flash point 37.5 oC).

• Acute Tox. 4 (oral), H302 Harmful if swallowed.

• Acute Tox. 4 (inhalation), H332 Harmful if inhaled.

• Eye Dam. 1 H318 Causes serious eye damage.

• STOT SE 3 Resp. Tract Irr., H335 May cause respiratory irritation. It is noted that the Solvent Waste Stream A and B do not have any inhalation toxicity classification within the scope of the COMAH Regulations 2015.

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Solvent Waste Stream B (mainly cyclohexanone) has a high flash point (37.5 oC) and a low vapour pressure and is unlikely to ignite in the event of an accidental release meeting an ignition source. Solvent Waste Stream A has a higher flash point (57 oC) and is dilute (up to 70 % water). As the lower flash point stream, Solvent Waste Stream B is modelled. Cyclohexanone is representative of this stream. Cyclohexanone has the following physical properties:

Table 5 Physical Properties of Solvent Waste Constituents

Property Units Cyclohexanone

Flash point oC 44

Lower flammable limit % v/v 1.1

Upper flammable limit % v/v 9.4

Vapour pressure kPa 0.2 (10 oC) 0.4 (20 oC)

Vapour density - 3.4

Auto-ignition temperature oC 420

Boiling point oC 154 - 156

Immediate Danger to Life and Health concentration (based on 30 minute exposure duration)

ppm 700

Heat of combustion J/kg 3.36E07

Data on flash point, lower and upper flammable limits and heat of combustion was obtained from the DIPPR Database 2015. Data on other physical parameters was obtained from the European Chemicals Agency chemical substances database (ECHA, online). IDLH data is published by the US Centre for Disease Control (US CDC, online). A conservative approach is taken and a fire or explosion hazard is assessed for Solvent Waste Stream B as follows:

• Waste solvent collection tank release to bund and bund fire;

• Tank rupture with bund overtopping or spill during road tanker filling at truck dock, pool formation and pool fire (modelled as cyclohexanone);

• Confined explosion in waste solvent tank modelled as cyclohexanone. Equipment will be ATEX rated in the waste solvent areas. Section 7.0 contains an assessment of major accident scenarios associated with the solvent waste streams.

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Air Separation Unit It is proposed to install an Air Separation Unit (ASU) at the mound area. The ASU comprises an assembly of distillation columns, heat exchangers, adsorbers and supporting machinery for compression, expansion and control of gases and liquids. The ASU will contain the following hazardous installations:

• 3 No. 53 tonne cryogenic liquid oxygen bulk storage tanks (159 tonnes in total)

• 225 tonne cryogenic liquid argon bulk storage tank (1 no. total on site)

• Coldbox (at each ASU) – there are 3 No. columns within the coldbox unit, the main heat exchanger, high pressure column and low pressure column.

The following major accident scenarios were identified for the ASUs and are assessed in Section 8.0: Cryogenic liquid oxygen:

• The bulk cryogenic oxygen tank will contain liquefied oxygen under pressure and may explode if heated. Catastrophic rupture of a cryogenic oxygen tank can lead to a Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion (BLEVE) with overpressure consequences;


Cryogenic liquid argon:

• In the event of catastrophic failure of the proposed 225 tonne cryogenic bulk argon storage tank, the dispersion of argon following a release has the potential to displace ambient oxygen resulting in asphyxiating effects.

Coldbox:

• Liquid leak from pipe/instrument line failure within the coldbox LP/HP column leading to column failure with overpressure consequences;

• Reboiler explosion with overpressure consequences.

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Summary of Major Accident Scenarios Table 6 summarises the major accident scenarios that have been identified for the proposed development. Table 6 Summary of Major Accident Hazards

Substance Installation Location Scenario Major Accident Hazard

Liquid oxygen Bulk tanks LOx compound

Tank rupture, rapid evaporation and expansion of oxygen vapour

BLEVE overpressure

Oxygen enrichment

Liquid hydrogen Bulk tank LH2 compound

Venting system leak, direct ignition

Jet fire

Venting system leak, delayed ignition

Vapour cloud explosion

Tank rupture BLEVE overpressure

Tank rupture Fireball

Waste solvent Collection tanks

Waste solvent collection tank bunds

Tank rupture with bund overtopping or spill at truck dock, ignition

Uncontained pool fire

Spill to bund, ignition Bund fire

Ignition of vapour within vapour space of tank


Liquid oxygen Bulk tanks ASU

Tank rupture, rapid evaporation and expansion of oxygen vapour

BLEVE overpressure

Oxygen enrichment

Liquid argon Bulk tank ASU

Tank rupture, rapid evaporation and expansion of argon vapour

BLEVE overpressure

Oxygen depletion

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3.3 Description of Receiving Environment The Intel Ireland Ltd. site location and surrounding environment is illustrated on Figure 1 (see Section 3.1.1). Intel Ireland Ltd. is located at Collinstown Industrial Park, Leixlip, Co. Kildare. The site is located north of the M4 motorway on the R148 Leixlip-Maynooth road, and is accessed from M4 Junction 6. The site is served by railway and bus services, which provide frequent connections to Dublin City and west to Maynooth. The Rye River flows to the north of the existing Intel Leixlip site. Approximately 2.2 km of the Rye River are located within the Intel land ownership boundary. Lands (within the ownership of Intel) to the north of the Rye River are zoned for open space and amenity and agricultural uses. The Rye Water Valley (including the Rye River) is designated as a Proposed Natural Heritage Area under the Wildlife (Amendment) Act, 2000 and as a Special Area of Conservation under the EU Habitats Directive (Site Code 001398). Confey Road is located to the north of the site. Land use in this area is for residential and agricultural purposes. There are a number of residential dwellings north of Intel that are accessed by Confey Road, the nearest is approximately 400 m from the footprint of the existing facility. The western site boundary is bounded by Kellystown Road. There is a residential dwelling along Kellystown Lane, approximately 290 m north of the footprint of the Intel facility. There are 2 No. residential dwellings to the west of the Intel site, south of the Rye River, accessed south from Kellystown Lane. These dwellings are 65 m and 142 m west of the footprint of the Intel facility. There is an additional residential dwelling approximately 310 m west of the footprint of the Intel facility. Lands west of the Kellystown Road (Blakestown townland) are used for agricultural uses. Carton Demesne lies further west/northwest. The estate contains a residential development, hotel, spa resort and golf club. Blakestown conference centre is located within the Intel site ownership boundary in the south western corner of the site at the Kellystown Road/R148 Maynooth-Leixlip Road junction. The southern site boundary is bounded by the R148 Leixlip/Maynooth Road. Access points to the Intel facility are via the R148. There are a number of occupied residential dwellings along the southern side of the R148. Land use south of the R148 is summarised as follows:

• Agricultural use (including Collinstown Study);

• Commercial use and retail (Lidl outlet) (zoned general development);

• Amenity use: Leixlip Amenity Centre, Leixlip United F.C. and sports grounds (zoned open space and amenity).

These lands are bounded to the south by the Royal Canal and the railway line. The Royal Canal is designated as a Proposed Natural Heritage Area (Site Code 002103). Intel applied for planning permission to construct a car park on agricultural lands south of the R148 (Kildare County Council planning reference 11-846). The eastern site boundary is bounded by an agricultural/greenfield area and also the railway line/Royal Canal. Louisa bridge crosses the railway line and Royal Canal at the south eastern corner of the site. Louisa Bridge Railway Station is located to the east of the railway line. There is an apartment development (Louisa Park) east of the Railway Station on Station Road.

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The nearest off site receiving locations are illustrated on

Figure

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Figure 3 Off Site Receiving Locations

The ground level at these locations is as follows:

• Location 1: 43 m O.D.




• Location 5: 50 m O.D. Consequence modelling takes account of the ground level at off-site receiving locations.

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4.0 ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY AND CRITERIA

Physical Effects Modelling The impacts of physical and health effects on workers and the general public outside of the establishment boundary were determined by modelling accident scenarios using DNV PHAST Version 8.22 modelling software. Thermal radiation, overpressure and toxic exposure criteria are based on the concept of a ‘dangerous dose’. A ‘dangerous dose’ is defined by the UK Health and Safety Executive as a dose where there is extreme distress to almost everyone, with a substantial proportion of affected persons requiring medical attention and some highly susceptible people might be killed (about 1% fatalities).

Thermal Radiation Criteria Fire scenarios have the potential to create hazardous heat fluxes. Therefore, thermal radiation on exposed skin poses a risk of fatality. Potential consequences of damaging radiant heat flux and direct flame impingement are categorised in Table 7 (HSA, 2010, CCPS, 2000, EI, 2007 and McGrattan et al, 2000).

Thermal Flux

(kW/m2) Consequences

1 – 1.5 Sunburn

5 – 6 Personnel injured (burns) if they are wearing normal clothing and do not escape quickly

8 – 12 Fire escalation if long exposure and no protection

32 – 37.5 Fire escalation if no protection (consider flame impingement)

31.5 US DHUD, limit value to which buildings can be exposed

37.5 Process equipment can be impacted, AIChE/CCPS

Up to 350 In flame. Steel structures can fail within several minutes if unprotected or not cooled.

Table 7 Heat Flux Consequences

In relation to persons indoors, the HSA have specified the thermal radiation consequence criteria (from an outdoor fire) detailed in Table 8 (HSA, 2010).

Thermal Flux

(kW/m2)

Consequences

> 25.6 Building conservatively assumed to catch fire quickly and so 100% fatality probability

12.7 – 25.6 People are assumed to escape outdoors, and so have a risk of fatality corresponding to that outdoors

< 12.7 People are assumed to be protected, so 0% fatality probability

Table 8 Heat Flux Consequences Indoors

Thermal Dose Unit (TDU) is used to measure exposure to thermal radiation. It is a function of intensity (power per unit area) and exposure time: Thermal Dose = I1.33 t (Equation 2)

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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thermal_radiation


where the Thermal Dose Units (TDUs) are (kW/m2)4/3.s, I is thermal radiation intensity (kW/m2) and t is exposure duration (s). The HSA recommends that the Eisenberg probit function (HSA, 2010) is used to determine probability of fatality to persons outdoors from thermal radiation as follows:

Probit = -14.9 + 2.56 ln (I1.33 t) (Equation 3)

I Thermal radiation intensity (kW/m2) t exposure duration (s) Probit (Probability Unit) functions are used to convert the probability of an event occurring to percentage certainty that an event will occur. The probit variable is related to probability as follows (CCPS, 2000):

−

−

−=

5 2

2exp

2

1Y

duu

P

(Equation 4)

where P is the probability of percentage, Y is the probit variable, and u is an integration variable. The probit variable is normally distributed and has a mean value of 5 and a standard deviation of 1. The Probit to percentage conversion equation is (CCPS, 2000):

−

−

−+=

2

5

5

5150

Yerf

Y

YP (Equation 5)

The relationship between Probit and percentage certainty is presented in Table 9 (CCPS, 2000).

Table 9 Conversion from Probits to Percentage

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For long duration fires, such as pool fires, it is generally reasonable to assume an effective exposure duration of 75 seconds to take account of the time required to escape. With respect to exposure to thermal radiation outdoors, the Eisenberg probit relationship implies:

• 1% fatality – 966 TDUs (6.8 kW/m2 for 75 s exposure duration) (Dangerous Dose)

• 10% fatality – 1452 TDUs (9.23 kW/m2 for 75 s exposure duration)

• 50% fatality – 2387 TDUs (13.4 kW/m2 for 75 s exposure duration)

Flammable Effects A Vapour Cloud Explosion (VCE) may be observed during major accidents. Combustion of a flammable gas-air mixture will occur if the composition of the mixture lies in the flammable range and if an ignition source is available. When ignition occurs in a flammable region of the cloud, the flame will start to propagate away from the ignition source. The combustion products expand causing flow ahead of the flame. Initially this flow will be laminar. Under laminar or near laminar conditions the flame speeds for normal hydrocarbons are in the order of 5 to 30 m/s which is too low to produce any significant blast over-pressure. Under these conditions, the vapour cloud will simply burn, causing a flash fire. In order for a vapour cloud explosion to occur, the vapour cloud must be in a turbulent condition. Turbulence may arise in a vapour cloud in various ways:

• By the release of the flammable material itself, for instance a jet release from a high pressure vessel.

• By the interaction of the expansion flow ahead of the flame with obstacles present in a congested area.

Factors affecting the probability, magnitude and effect of a vapour cloud explosion include (CCPS, 2012):

• Amount of flammable material in the cloud, within an area where there are objects that will induce turbulence and create a degree of confinement;

• Degree of cloud mixing (cloud composition);

• Reactivity of flammable material (highly reactive materials increase the likelihood of a fireball transition to a VCE);

• Fundamental burning velocity;

• Energy of ignition source;

• Release conditions (high pressure releases generate greater turbulence than do low pressure releases);

• Presence of obstacles, or confinement, or other turbulence enhancing mechanisms;

• Cloud configuration (some incidents have exhibited directional blast effects);

• Wind speed and direction.

Overpressure Criteria Explosions scenarios can result in damaging overpressures, especially when flammable vapour/air mixtures are ignited in a congested area. Table 10 describes blast damage for various overpressure levels (Mannan, 2012).

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Side-on Overpressure, mbar

Description of Damage

1.5 Annoying noise

2 Occasional breaking of large window panes already under strain

3 Loud noise; sonic boom glass failure

7 Breakage of small windows under strain

10 Threshold for glass breakage

20 “Safe distance”, probability of 0.95 of no serious damage beyond this value; some damage to house ceilings; 10% window glass broken

30 Limited minor structural damage

35 – 70 Large and small windows usually shattered; occasional damage to window frames

>35 Damage level for “Light Damage”

50 Minor damage to house structures

80 Partial demolition of houses, made uninhabitable

70 - 150 Corrugated asbestos shattered. Corrugated steel or aluminium panels fastenings fail, followed by buckling; wood panel (standard housing) fastenings fail; panels blown in

100 Steel frame of clad building slightly distorted

150 Partial collapse of walls and roofs of houses

150-200 Concrete or cinderblock walls, not reinforced, shattered

>170 Damage level for “Moderate Damage”

180 Lower limit of serious structural damage 50% destruction of brickwork of houses

200 Heavy machines in industrial buildings suffered little damage; steel frame building distorted and pulled away from foundations

200 – 280 Frameless, self-framing steel panel building demolished; rupture of oil storage tanks

300 Cladding of light industrial buildings ruptured

350 Wooden utility poles snapped; tall hydraulic press in building slightly damaged

350 – 500 Nearly complete destruction of houses

>350 Damage level for “Severe Damage”

500 Loaded tank car overturned

500 – 550 Unreinforced brick panels, 25 - 35 cm thick, fail by shearing or flexure

600 Loaded train boxcars completely demolished

700 Probable total destruction of buildings; heavy machine tools moved and badly damaged

Table 10 Blast Damage

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Lees’ Loss Prevention also gives the following damage criteria for process vessels (Mannan, 2012):

Peak Overpressure (mbar)

Description of Damage

Steel floating roof petroleum tank

240 20% damage

1,380 99% damage

Vertical cylindrical steel pressure vessel

830 20% damage

965 99% damage

Spherical steel petroleum tank

550 20% damage

1100 99% damage

Table 11 Process Vessel Blast Damage Criteria

There are a number of modes of explosion injury including eardrum rupture, lung haemorrhage, whole body displacement injury, missile injury, burns and toxic exposure. Table 12 describes injury criteria from blast overpressure including probability of eardrum rupture and probability of fatality due to lung haemorrhage.

Probability of Eardrum Rupture (%) Peak overpressure (mbar)

1 (threshold) 165

10 194

50 435

90 840

Probability of Fatality due to Lung Haemorrhage (%) Peak overpressure (mbar)

1 (threshold) 1000

10 1200

50 1400

90 1750

Table 12 Injury Criteria from Explosion Overpressure

The HSA recommends that the Hurst, Nussey and Pape probit function (HSA, 2010) is used to determine probability of fatality to persons outdoors from overpressure as follows:

Probit = 1.47 + 1.35ln P (Equation 6)

P Blast overpressure (psi) The Hurst, Nussey and Pape probit relationship implies:

• 1% fatality – 168 mbar (Dangerous Dose)

• 10% fatality – 365 mbar

• 50% fatality – 942 mbar

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The HSA uses relationships published by the Chemical Industries Association (CIA) to determine the probability of fatality for building occupants exposed to blast overpressure. The CIA has developed relationships for 4 categories of buildings (CIA, 2010):

• category 1: hardened structure building (special construction, now windows);

• category 2: typical office block (four storey, concrete frame and roof, brick block wall panels);

• category 3: typical domestic dwelling (two storey, brick walls, timber floors); and

• category 4: ‘portacabin’ type timber construction, single storey. The overpressure vulnerability relationships for persons indoors are illustrated on Figure A2.1 of the CIA Guidance for the location and design of occupied buildings on chemical manufacturing sites (CIA, 2010) which is reproduced as follows:

Figure 4 Chemical Industries Association Overpressure vs. Vulnerability Relationship

The CIA relationships imply the overpressure levels corresponding to probabilities of fatality of 1%, 10% and 50% detailed in Table 13.

Probability of fatality Overpressure Level, mbar

Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 Category 4

1% fatality (dangerous dose)

435 100 50 50

10% fatality 519 183 139 115

50% fatality 590 284 300 242

Table 13 Blast Overpressure Consequences Indoors

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Oxygen Enrichment Criteria The European Industrial Gases Association (EIGA) describes the following criteria to be used for limits of oxygen enrichment (EIGA, 2006):

• The maximum safe oxygen concentration for entry into a confined space that is being controlled or measured because of the risk is 23.5 % total O2. The space should be ventilated sufficiently to obtain a value approaching 21% O2 (i.e. indistinguishable from atmospheric air).

• For cases of leakage, venting or uncontrolled release of oxygen into the outdoor atmosphere, there is no risk of harm in clouds containing up to 25% O2. At anticipated level above 25% O2 it may be possible by means of risk assessments to determine that such atmospheres can be safely entered with appropriate control: e.g. there is no permitted smoking in an area where venting is possible, or hot work is controlled by permit because of the risks of venting.

• For purposes of quantification, or for cases of reporting boundary conditions from predicted release cases calculated by dispersion, there is an anticipated lethal risk from atmospheres with concentrations of 35% O2 and higher.

• Care has to be taken with regard to special circumstances such as definition of safety from releases involving cold oxygen clouds that may accumulate in depressions or pits, or from atmospheric concentrations that might enter air intakes to compressors, blowers or Heating Ventilation Air Conditioning (HVAC) units, where the machinery design anticipates that only atmospheric air (i.e. 21% O2) could be present.

• These criteria are only designed to cover cases of excess O2 concentration in anticipated atmospheric air, they cannot be justified in any other cases e.g. oxygen – flammable gas mixtures or gases used for medical purposes.

The following criteria are used in the assessment of oxygen enrichment following an accidental release:

Consequences

Oxygen concentration of atmosphere

% ppm

Normal ambient concentration 21 210,000

Safe limit (outdoors) 25 250,000

Dangerous dose LOx spill (lethal) 35 350,000

Table 14 Oxygen Enrichment: Hazardous Concentrations

Criteria for Exposure to Asphyxiating Gases

The criteria for asphyxiation effects described below are based on European Industrial Gases Association (EIGA) criteria (EIGA, IGC Document 44/09/E). Elevated concentrations of asphyxiating gases can lead to an oxygen diminished atmosphere (<19.5% oxygen in air) which can lead to dizziness, drowsiness, nausea, vomiting, excess salivation, diminished mental alertness, loss of consciousness and death.

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Exposure to atmospheres of 8 – 10% oxygen or less will quickly bring about unconsciousness without warning, leaving individuals unable to protect themselves. The ambient oxygen concentration in air at sea level is 20.947%, so a reduction in oxygen concentrations of greater than 1.447% is likely to bring on symptoms of asphyxia. A reduction of approximately twice this level (2.894% oxygen) is likely to lead to significant symptoms of asphyxia in most affected persons and a reduction to 10% or less ambient air oxygen concentrations, a reduction in oxygen concentration of 10.947% oxygen is likely to lead to rapid unconsciousness and death. The concentrations of asphyxiating gas resulting from an accidental release which are required to achieve these oxygen reductions in ambient air were calculated and are shown in Table 15. These concentrations were calculated based on the assumption that oxygen makes up approximately 1/5th of the atmosphere at sea level and that the dilution of oxygen in the atmosphere by another gas is in the ratio of just over 1/5th to 4/5th.

Consequences

Released gas Resulting O2

conc.(%) Gas conc. (%) of atmosphere

Gas conc. (ppm) of atmosphere

Onset of symptoms of asphyxia

6.91 69,100 19.50

Significant symptoms of asphyxia

13.83 138,300 18.05

Rapid unconsciousness and death

52.26 522,600 10.95

Table 15 Oxygen Reductions due to Ambient Concentration of Asphyxiating Gas

Breathing an oxygen deficient atmosphere can have serious and immediate effects, including unconsciousness after only one or two breaths. The exposed person has no warning and cannot sense that the oxygen level is too low.

Weather Conditions Weather conditions at the time of a major-accident have a significant impact on the consequences of the event. Typically, high wind speeds increase the impact of fires, particularly pool fires, while the associated turbulence dilutes vapour clouds, reducing the impact of toxic and flammable gas releases. Atmospheric Stability Class and Wind Speed Atmospheric stability describes the amount of turbulence in the atmosphere. The stability depends on the windspeed, time of day, and other conditions. Atmospheric stability classes are described in Table 16 (DNV, PHAST supporting documentation).

Wind speed (m/s)

Day: Solar Radiation Night: Cloud Cover

Strong Moderate Slight Thin, <40%

Moderate Overcast,

>80%

2 A A-B B - - D

2 – 3 A-B B C E F D

3 – 5 B B-C C D E D

5 – 6 C C-D D D D D

6 C D D D D D

Table 16 Atmospheric Stability Class

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Stability classes are described as follows:

• A very unstable (sunny with light winds)

• B unstable (moderately sunny, stronger winds than class A)

• C slightly unstable – very windy/sunny or overcast/light wind

• D neutral – little sun and high wind or overcast night

• E stable – moderately stable – less overcast and windy than class D

• F very stable – night with moderate clouds and light/moderate winds The following Pasquill stability/wind speed pairs are specified by the HSA in Ireland for consequence modelling:

• Average weather conditions are represented by stability category D and a wind speed of 5 m/s, i.e. Category D5;

• Worst case conditions for toxic dispersion are represented by stability category F and a wind speed of 2 m/s, i.e. Category F2;

• A wind speed of 10 m/s represents the worst case condition for fire scenarios, with stability category D, i.e. Category D10.

Wind Direction and Ambient Temperature Figure 5 illustrates a wind rose for Casement Aerodrome (1988 – 2018). It can be seen that the prevailing wind direction is from the south west.

Figure 5 Wind Rose Casement Aerodrome 1988 - 2018

Ambient Temperature The ambient and surface temperature conditions significantly impact the results of the consequence modelling. Atmospheric temperatures in the Kildare area may range from -16°C to 31°C through the year.

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According to the weather data recorded between 1981 and 2010 at Casement Aerodrome, the average atmospheric temperature observed is 9.7°C. A representative temperature of 10 oC has been selected to represent typical temperature conditions at the site. Ambient Humidity Weather data for Casement Aerodrome, monthly and annual mean and extreme values datasheet (recorded between 1981 and 2010) supplied by Met Éireann, indicates a mean morning (09:00 UTC) relative humidity of 83.6% and a mean afternoon (15:00 UTC) humidity of 73.8%. Therefore, for this assessment, a representative ambient humidity of 80% has been assumed.

Surface Roughness Surface roughness describes the roughness of the surface over which the cloud is dispersing. Typical values for the surface roughness are as follows (DNV, PHAST supporting documentation):

Roughness length Description

0.0002 m Open water, at least 5 km

0.005 m Mud flats, snow, no vegetation

0.03 m Open flat terrain, grass, few isolated objects

0.1 m Low crops, occasional large obstacles, x/h > 20

0.25 m High crops, scattered large objects, 15 < x/h < 20

0.5 m Parkland, bushes, numerous obstacles, x/h < 15

1.0 m Regular large obstacles coverage (suburb, forest)

3.0 m City centre with high and low rise buildings

Table 17 Surface Roughness

Intel is in an industrial site with adjoining agricultural and commercial activities. A surface roughness length of 1.0 m has been selected for this study.

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5.0 ASSESSMENT FOR LIQUID OXYGEN MAJOR ACCIDENT HAZARDS It is proposed to install 2 no. 57 m3 liquid oxygen tanks and associated vaporisers at the proposed development area. The following major accident scenarios were identified for the liquid oxygen tanks:

• The bulk cryogenic oxygen tanks will contain liquefied oxygen under pressure. Catastrophic rupture of a cryogenic oxygen tank can lead to a Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion (BLEVE) with overpressure consequences.


5.1 Oxygen BLEVE and Dispersion Model Inputs

The PHAST Version 8.22 BLEVE blast, catastrophic rupture and unified dispersion model were used to model overpressure effects and the dispersion of oxygen following rupture of a bulk oxygen tank. Model inputs are as detailed inTable 18.

Parameter Details Source/Assumption

Scenario BLEVE BLAST -

Material Oxygen -

Storage conditions Cryogenic oxygen stored as

liquid at low temperature under

pressurised conditions

Intel

Operating pressure 12 barg Intel

Burst Pressure 3 x operating pressure Recommended by HSA

Table 18 Liquid Oxygen Tank at LOx Compound: Catastrophic Rupture Model Inputs

Following rupture of a liquid oxygen storage tank, a pool of liquid oxygen will form on the ground. Oxygen will evaporate from the surface of the liquid and disperse with the potential to form an oxygen enriched atmosphere. Model inputs are as detailed in Table 18. In the absence of detailed drainage design, it is conservatively estimated that the maximum LOx pool size that could form at the development area measures 2,500 m2.

5.2 BLEVE Model Outputs Figure 6 illustrates the level of overpressure with distance following rupture of the cryogenic liquid oxygen tank. Table 19 presents distances to overpressure levels associated with specified levels of probability of fatality to persons outdoors and to persons indoors in Category 2 (office type buildings) buildings, Category 3 buildings (residential dwellings) and Category 4 buildings (Portacabins).

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Figure 6 Cryogenic Oxygen Tank Rupture and BLEVE Blast: Overpressure vs. Distance

Peak overpressure (mbar)

Consequences Distance (m)

20 Safe distance - probability of 0.95 of no serious damage beyond this value; some damage to house ceilings; 10% window glass broken

37

35 Light damage 23

170 Moderate damage 8

350 Severe damage 5

168 1% mortality outdoors 8



100 1% mortality indoors in Category 2 Structures 11






Table 19 Cryogenic Oxygen Tank Ruptre and BLEVE Blast at LOx Compound: Calculated Distances at Specified Overpressure Levels

The overpressure damage contours from a LOx BLEVE are illustrated on Figure 7. The overpressure contours corresponding to 1%, probability of fatality (vulnerability) outdoors and indoors in category 2 structures (representative of buildings on site) and at category 3 structures (residential dwellings and assumed to be representative of the proposed ASU control building) from a LOx BLEVE illustrated on Figure 8.

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LEGEND

0.02 bar 0.035 bar 0.17 bar 0.35 bar Safe distance Light damage Moderate damage Severe damage Figure 7 Cryogenic Liquid Oxygen BLEVE at LOx Compound: Blast Damage Contours

Overpressure

level 0.05 bar, 1% mortality

indoors in Category 3

structures (residential)

0.100 bar, 1% mortality


structures


outdoors

Shape/Effect

Zone

Figure 8 Cryogenic Liquid Oxygen BLEVE at LOx Compound: Outdoor and Indoor Vulnerability Contours

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In the event of a BLEVE involving a cryogenic liquid oxygen tank the following is concluded:

• The overpressure levels corresponding to a safe distance, light, moderate and severe damage do not extend outside of the site boundary;

• The overpressure level at the solvent waste collection tanks is predicted to be 50 mbar. This is not sufficient to cause damage (for steel petroleum vessels (floating roof), 240 mbar would cause 20% damage, see Section 4.1.4);

• The overpressure level corresponding to 1% mortality outdoors is confined to the LOx compound and does not extend to any normally occupied areas or outside of the site boundary;

• The overpressure level corresponding to 1% mortality indoors does not extend to any occupied buildings on site and persons indoors are protected;

• There are no impacts anticipated off site, including at residential dwellings.

5.3 Pool Evaporation Model Outputs The pool evaporation model in DNV Phast Version 8.22 was used to model evaporation of oxygen vapour from the surface of a liquid pool following rupture of a liquid oxygen tank. Figure 9 illustrates the mass evaporation rate of liquid oxygen versus time and Figure 10 illustrates mass evaporated versus time.

Figure 9 Oxygen Tank Rupture at LOx Compound and Pool Formation: Evaporation Mass Flow Rate

vs. Time

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Figure 10 Oxygen Tank Rupture at LOx Compound and Pool Formation: Mass Evaporated vs. Time

5.4 Oxygen Dispersion Results The unified dispersion model in DNV Phast Version 8.22 was used to model dispersion of oxygen vapour following rupture of a liquid oxygen tank. The normal ambient concentration of oxygen is 21% volume or 210,000 ppm. The safe limit outdoors is 25% volume or 250,000 ppm, at this concentration the probability of fatality or serious injury is 0.17% (BCGA, 2013). The dangerous dose level at which lethal effects may occur is 35% volume or 350,000 ppm which corresponds to a probability of fatality or serious injury of 0.53%. The maximum concentration of oxygen (above background ambient levels) following catastrophic rupture of a liquid oxygen tank with distance downwind is illustrated on Figure 11. Results are summarised in Table 20. The worst case contours are illustrated on Figure 12. These results are at 1.5 m above ground level. The shape of the area impacted is shown for the prevailing wind direction as well as the total effect area taking account of all wind directions.

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Figure 11 Liquid Oxygen Tank Rupture at LOx Compound Dispersion Model Outputs: Maximum

Concentration vs. Distance Downwind

Consequences


Distance (m) Distance (m)

% ppm D5 F2

Safe Limit (outdoors) (0.018% probability of fatality or serious

injury) 25 250,000 170 265

0.27% probability of fatality or serious injury

30 300,000 100 135

Dangerous Dose (lethal) (0.53 % probability of fatality or serious

injury) 35 350,000 72 62


40 400,000 54 21

Table 20 Liquid Oxygen Tank Rupture at LOx Compound: Dispersion Results

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Legend O2 Concentration Consequences Maximum Distance

Contour dimensions

Shape

250,000 ppm Safe Distance (0.018% probability of fatality or

serious injury) 265 m

390 m diameter

Effect zone

Figure 12 Liquid Oxygen Tank Rupture at LOx Compound Dispersion Model Outputs: Maximum Concentration Footprint

There is the potential for an oxygen enriched atmosphere to arise in the area within the contour illustrated on Figure 12. There are no receptors in the area off site within the 250,000 ppm contour.

5.5 Probability of Fatality from LOx BLEVE The probability of fatality outdoors from the overpressure consequences of a BLEVE blast following rupture of a cryogenic liquid oxygen tank is calculated using the Hurst Nussey Pape Probit Equation (see Section 4.1.4). The probability of fatality indoors from the overpressure consequences of a BLEVE blast was determined using the CIA relationships (CIA, 2010) for different building types (see Figure 4). The probability of fatality with distance outdoors and indoors for the BLEVE blast scenario is illustrated on Figure 13.

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Figure 13 Oxygen Tank Rupture and BLEVE Blast: Probability of Fatality vs. Distance

5.6 Frequency of Liquid Oxygen Tank Rupture

The HSA Land Use Planning document (HSA, 2010) recommends frequencies for BLEVE and fireballs from LPG tank rupture scenarios. The frequencies apply to sites with multiple LPG vessels, and are not reflective of individual cryogenic oxygen tanks on manufacturing sites. LPG vessels are single skinned. LOx vessels are double skinned, vacuum insulated vessels providing additional protection from the effects of a fire engulfing the vessel. However, a conservative frequency of 1E-05 per year for a BLEVE following rupture of the bulk liquid oxygen tank is taken for the purposes of this assessment. There are 2 no. oxygen tanks at the LOx compound. Therefore, it is concluded that a tank rupture frequency of 2E-05 per year is a conservative figure and is appropriate for use in a land use planning study.

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5.7 Risk Contours at the Liquid Oxygen Tanks TNO Riskcurves Version 10.1.9 risk modelling software was used to model individual risk of fatality contours at the liquid oxygen compound. The model inputs include consequence modelling results as described herein, wind speed and direction data (see Section 4.1.8) and event frequencies. Individual risk of fatality contours are illustrated on Figure 14.

LAND USE PLANNING ZONES

Inner Middle Outer

1 x 10-5 /year 1 x 10-6 /year 1 x 10-7 /year

Figure 14 Liquid Oxygen Compound: Individual Risk of Fatality Contours

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6.0 ASSESSMENT FOR LIQUID HYDROGEN TANK MAJOR ACCIDENT HAZARDS As outlined in Section 3.0, it is proposed to store cryogenic liquid hydrogen in 3 No. bulk horizontal storage tanks (87.4 m3 each) in a hydrogen compound at the proposed development area illustrated on Figure 2 in Section 3.1. Hydrogen tank leak and rupture scenarios were identified as follows:

• Leak of hydrogen vapour through venting system, direct ignition and jet fire;

• Leak of hydrogen vapour through venting system, delayed ignition and VCE;

• Engulfment of bulk hydrogen tank in fire, failure of venting system and catastrophic release of hydrogen accompanied by BLEVE and fireball.

6.1 Assessment for Hydrogen Leak through Venting System

It is assumed that an event occurs which causes hydrogen to be released through a pressure relief device leading to the release of hydrogen through the venting system (release point 5 m above ground level). The maximum flow capacity for the pressure safety valve is set at 490 kg/hr.

Hydrogen Leak Model Inputs

The PHAST Version 8.22 leak model was used to model the discharge of hydrogen vapour following this accident scenario. Model inputs for the scenario are detailed in Table 21.


Scenario Line rupture Release of hydrogen through vent system

Material Hydrogen -

Storage conditions Liquefied pressurised gas

(cryogenic)

-

Release rate 490 kg/hr Pressure safety valve capacity from tank

specification sheet

Release height 5 m Estimated venting system release height

Direction Horizontal Assumed – worst case for flame

impingement on equipment

Averaging time Flammable – 18.75 s DNV PHAST default value

Table 21 Hydrogen Leak Model Inputs

Hydrogen Jet Fire Thermal Radiation Consequences

The leak model predicts a jet fire hazard following direct ignition of a hydrogen leak through the bulk storage tank venting system. Table 22 presents the jet fire model outputs. Figure 15 illustrates thermal radiation levels with distance. Thermal radiation results are shown at 1.5 m above ground level to represent exposure to persons in the vicinity of the hydrogen tanks.

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Parameter Units Category F2 Category D5

Flame Emissive Power kW/m2 47 69

Fraction of Emissivity fraction 0.16 0.16

Expanded Diameter m 0.015 0.015

Jet Velocity m/s 453.6 453.6

Flame Length m 10.34 8.0

Frustrum Lift Off Distance m 0.155 0.121

Frustrum Length m 10.2 7.9

Frustrum Base Width m 0.024 0.033

Frustrum Tip Width m 2.93 2.52

Table 22 Hydrogen Leak and Jet Fire Model Outputs

Figure 15 Hydrogen Leak Model Outputs: Jet Fire Thermal Radiation Results

The jet flame is at 5 m above ground level, and is 8 m in length. The waste solvent tanks are approximately 7 m high and located over 20 m from the liquid hydrogen tanks. The maximum thermal radiation level at the tanks (at the jet flame height of 5 m) is 1.5 kW/m2 and is not sufficient to damage the waste solvent collection tanks. In addition, it is noted that a jet fire at the bulk hydrogen tank would not impinge on any cryogenic liquid tanks at the development area, and cannot contribute to a BLEVE event elsewhere on site. The effect height in Figure 15 above (1.5 m above ground level) is 3.5 m lower than the release height/height at which the jet fire would occur. Table 23 details the distances to thermal radiation levels associated with specified levels of probability of fatality.

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1.5 m AGL, F2

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Criterion

Thermal

Radiation

Level

Thermal

Dose Level Distance (m) Distance (m)

kW/m2 TDUs D5 F2

Threshold of fatality 4.1 500 11 13

1% fatality (Dangerous dose) 6.8 960 10 11

10% fatality 9.23 1441 8 10

50% fatality 13.4 2367 6 Not reached

Building protected below this

level, 0% fatality probability 12.7 2222 7 Not reached

Building will catch fire quickly,

100% fatality probability 25.6 5659 Not reached Not reached

Damage to process equipment 37.5 9414 Not reached Not reached

Table 23 Hydrogen Tank PRV Leak and Jet Fire: Calculated Distances at Specified Thermal Radiation Levels at 1.5 m Above Ground Level

It is concluded that thermal radiation effects from a jet fire following a PRV release at the hydrogen tank compound are confined to the immediate vicinity of the compound and the adjoining vehicle unloading area. No off site consequences are expected to arise. Persons indoors at the Intel establishment are protected.

VCE Overpressure Consequences The leak and unified dispersion models predict a VCE hazard for both Pasquill stability/wind speed categories (F2 and D5) following delayed ignition of a hydrogen release through the bulk storage tank venting system. The dispersion model predicts a flammable mass of 0.15 kg for the F2 stability/windspeed category and 0.09 kg for the D5 category. The TNO multi-energy model was used to predict overpressure consequences. A conservative ignition strength of 7 was selected. Figure 16 illustrate the overpressure with distance for the hydrogen VCE scenario for F2 and D5 categories. The explosion is centred 10 m from the release point.

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Figure 16 Hydrogen Vapour Cloud Explosion: Overpressure vs. Distance

Table 24 presents distances to overpressure levels associated with specified levels of probability of fatality to persons outdoors and indoors in various categories of buildings.



Category F2

Distance (m)

Category D5


76 63

35 Light damage 50 42

170 Moderate damage 21 19

350 Severe damage 17 15

168 1% mortality outdoors 21 19



100 1% mortality indoors in Category 2 Structures 26 23






Table 24 Hydrogen VCE: Calculated Distances at Specified Overpressure Levels

Figure 17 illustrates blast damage contours. Figure 18 illustrates the worst case overpressure contours corresponding to 1% mortality for persons indoors in category 3 structures, indoors in category 2 structures and outdoors. The shape of the area impacted is shown for the prevailing wind direction as well as the total effect area taking account of all wind directions.

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Overpressure

level 0.02 bar, safe

distance

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damage

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damage

0.35 bar, severe

damage

Effect Zone

Shape

Figure 17 Hydrogen Vapour Cloud Explosion: Blast Damage Contours

Overpressure






structures


outdoors

Effect Zone

Shape

Figure 18 Hydrogen Vapour Cloud Explosion: Mortality Contours

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There is the potential for a vapour cloud explosion to damage the liquid hydrogen tanks. The worst case scenario (catastrophic rupture) is assessed in Section 6.2. Overpressure levels exceeding 1%, mortality outdoors extend to 21 m from the proposed hydrogen tanks. These contours are extend to road tanker offload areas and site roadways. Overpressure levels corresponding to 1%, mortality for persons indoors in Category 2 type buildings (typical office buildings) extend to 26 m from the proposed bulk hydrogen tanks. This category of buildings represents the on-site buildings at Intel. There are no occupied buildings within this distance of the proposed bulk hydrogen tanks. No offsite consequences are expected to arise.

Probability of Fatality from Jet Fire or VCE Jet Fire The probability of fatality outdoors from the thermal radiation consequences of a jet fire was calculated using the Eisenberg Probit Equation (see Section 4.1.2), and assuming an exposure duration of 75 seconds. The probability of fatality indoors from thermal radiation effects are based on the HSA’s criteria described in Section 4.1.2 (see Table 8). The probability of fatality vs distance for the hydrogen jet fire scenario is illustrated on the following figure.

Figure 19 Hydrogen Jet Fire: Probability of Fatality vs. Distance

Vapour Cloud Explosion The probability of fatality outdoors with distance from a vapour cloud explosion following a vapour leak through the proposed bulk hydrogen tank venting system has been

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F2, Outdoors

D5, Indoors

F2, Indoors

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calculated using the Hurst Nussey and Pape probit function described in Section 4.1.4 herein. The level of probability of fatality with distance is illustrated on Figure 20.

Figure 20 Hydrogen Vapour Cloud Explosion: Probability of Fatality vs. Distance– Worst Case

Category F2

Jet Fire or VCE Frequency

The current approach of the HSA to the assessment of major accident hazards is described in Section 4.0 herein. Risk is the product of frequency and severity. The probability of fatality outdoors with distance from a jet fire or from a VCE following a leak of hydrogen vapour through the bulk hydrogen tank venting system was calculated above (see Figure 20). No injuries or fatalities are expected to arise from a jet fire therefore the frequency of this scenario is not relevant. The HSA Land Use Planning document (HSA, 2010) does not recommend frequency values for vapour cloud explosions following a release of flammable gas from a bulk storage tank. Therefore, reference is made to fault tree analysis conducted for this scenario following an accidental release from the existing bulk hydrogen tanks at the Intel establishment as part of the HAZID study contained in the Safety Report (2018). Figure 21 illustrates a fault tree for a vapour cloud explosion scenario.

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Hydrogen Leak from Bulk Tank through Venting SystemProbability of Fatality vs. Distance Category F2

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Indoors Category 2

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Indoors Category 4

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Figure 21 Event Tree for Hydrogen Leak from Relief Valve

Frequency values and failure rates were obtained from the sources detailed in Table 25.

Failure frequency value Reference

Pressure relief device failure Purple Book (Committee for Prevention of Disasters, 2005), Table

3.13, discharge of a pressure relief device with maximum discharge

rate

Direct ignition Purple Book (Committee for Prevention of Disasters, 2005), Table 4.5,

probability of direct ignition for stationary installations, continuous

release of a highly reactive gas at a rate of < 10 kg/s

Delayed ignition Purple Book (Committee for Prevention of Disasters, 2005), Table

4.A1, probability of ignition for a time interval of one minute for a

chemical plant

Table 25 Failure Frequency Data Sources

The frequency of a jet fire is estimated as 4 x 10-6 per year. The frequency of a vapour cloud explosion is estimated as 1.44 x 10-5 per year. This frequency assumes that all liquid hydrogen vessels will have one common vent release point, as is currently the case.

Initiating Event Direct ignition Delayed ignition Consequence Frequnecy

Yes

P= 0.2

Liquid hydrogen tank

vent system release F= 2.00E-05 /year

Yes

No P= 0.9

P= 0.8

No

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VCE

/year

/year1.44E-05

Jet fire 4.00E-06

No consequences

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6.2 Assessment of Hydrogen Tank Catastrophic Rupture The worst case major accident scenario associated with the storage of bulk liquefied hydrogen is the catastrophic loss of containment followed by a hydrogen BLEVE and fireball. The consequences and risk of fatality arising from this scenario are considered herein. It is assumed that bulk hydrogen tank is engulfed in an external fire, eventually leading to a sudden release of the liquid hydrogen contained therein overpressure effects as the release liquid boils and expands and thermal radiation effects from a fireball as the released material is ignited.

BLEVE Blast and Fireball Model Inputs The PHAST Version 8.22 BLEVE model was used to model the impacts of a BLEVE following this accident scenario. The PHAST Version 8.22 Fireball model was used to model the impact of a fireball following this accident scenario. The BLEVE model and Fireball model inputs are detailed in Table 26.


Scenario BLEVE BLAST and Fireball

model

-

Material Hydrogen -

Storage conditions Cryogenic hydrogen stored as



Intel


Fireball vapour mass fraction 0.3 (tanks) Calculated by PHAST Vessel

Rupture Model

Averaging Time 18 seconds DNV recommended averaging

time for flammable effects

Table 26 Hydrogen Tank Catastrophic Rupture Model Inputs

BLEVE Blast Outputs Figure 22 presents overpressure levels with distance downwind from a BLEVE. Table 27 presents distances to overpressure levels associated with specified levels of probability of fatality to persons outdoors and indoors in various categories of buildings.

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Figure 22 Hydrogen BLEVE Model Outputs: Overpressure Results




164

35 Light damage 111


350 Severe damage 24










Table 27 Hydrogen BLEVE Blast: Calculated Distances at Specified Overpressure Levels

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Figure 23 illustrates the worst case blast damage overpressure contours. Figure 24 illustrates the worst case overpressure contours corresponding to 1% probability of fatality for persons outdoors, indoors in category 2 buildings and indoors in category 3 buildings.

LEGEND

0.02 bar 0.035 bar 0.17 bar 0.35 bar Safe distance Light damage Moderate damage Severe damage

Figure 23 Hydrogen BLEVE: Blast Damage Contours

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LEGEND

0.05 bar 0.100 bar 0.168 bar

1% mortality indoors in Cateogry 3

structures

1% mortality indoors in Category 2

structures 1% mortality outdoors

Figure 24 Hydrogen BLEVE: Probability of Fatality Contours for Persons Outdoors and Indoors

The following is concluded regarding the overpressure consequences of a BLEVE following rupture of a bulk hydrogen tank:

• The overpressure level corresponding to a safe distance (probability of 0.95 of no serious damage beyond this value; some damage to house ceilings; 10% window glass broken) extends outside of the site boundary to the north but does not extend to any receptor;

• The proposed waste solvent tanks are approx. 20 m from the liquid hydrogen tanks and in the event of a BLEVE, the overpressure level at the waste solvent tanks is predicted to be 500 mbar. This is sufficient to cause damage to the waste solvent tanks and the worst case consequences are estimated as an uncontained pool fire following a tank rupture and major release scenario. This scenario is assessed in Section 7.0 herein.

• The proposed liquid oxygen tanks are approx. 60 m from the liquid hydrogen tanks and in the event of a BLEVE, the overpressure level at the liquid oxygen tanks is predicted to be 80 mbar. This is not sufficient to cause damage to the liquid oxygen tanks (as outlined in Section 4.1.4, 830 mbar is expected to cause 20% damage to a vertical steel pressure vessel). No knock on effects are predicted to arise at the liquid oxygen tanks.

• The overpressure levels corresponding to 1% vulnerability outdoors and indoors do not extend outside of the site boundary and off-site consequences are negligible.

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• The overpressure level corresponding to 1% vulnerability outdoors extends to the road tanker offloading area for the hydrogen tanks.

• The overpressure level corresponding to 1% vulnerability indoors in category 2 buildings (representative of buildings on site) arising from a BLEVE following rupture of the tank does not extend to any normally occupied building on site.

Hydrogen Fireball Outputs The DNV recommended Fireball model in PHAST Version 8.22 calculates the following fireball diameter and durations:

Tank / Trailer Storage Capacity Fireball Radius Fireball Duration

Proposed hydrogen tank at mound area

47 m 7.31 s

Table 28 Hydrogen Fireball Model Outputs

Figure 25 illustrates the level of thermal dose with distance from a fireball following rupture of the hydrogen tank.

Figure 25 Hydrogen Fireball Model Outputs: Thermal Dose Results

The fireball is of short duration (7.31 s) and it is assumed that 100% fatalities will occur within the fireball radius. However the fireball is confined to the hydrogen tank compound which is not normally occupied and no fatalities are expected to arise. There are no occupied buildings within this radius and therefore no impacts will arise to persons indoors in occupied buildings at the proposed development. The distance to end point thermal dose levels associated with specified levels of mortality outdoors and damage to process equipment are summarised as follows.

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Criterion

Thermal Dose

Level

Distance

TDUs m

1% fatality (Dangerous dose) 960 122 m

100% fatality (fireball radius) 47 m

Damage to process equipment 9414 37 m

Table 29 Hydrogen Fireball: Calculated Distances at Specified Thermal Dose Levels

Figure 26 Hydrogen Tank Rupture at Hydrogen Tank and Fireball: Fireball Diameter (100% Mortality) and 1% Mortality Contours

A fireball at the hydrogen tank would impinge on other hydrogen tanks and the waste solvent collection tanks. There is the potential for a confined explosion in the waste solvent tanks followed by a waste solvent pool fire. It would also extend to the road tanker offload areas and site roadway. However the duration is short. The following is concluded:

• The thermal dose levels corresponding to 1% mortality outdoors does not extend outside of the site ownership boundary and no off-site consequences are expected to arise;

• Significant thermal effects would be experienced in the bulk gas yard area and fatal impacts may arise at the tanker offloading area if personnel are present;

• The thermal dose level corresponding to the threshold of fatality extends to the yard area to the west of the Water Treatment Building, however this area is not normally occupied and it is concluded that persons indoors are protected.

Probability of Fatality from Hydrogen Tank Rupture

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The probability of fatality outdoors from the overpressure consequences of a BLEVE blast following rupture of a hydrogen tank is calculated using the Hurst Nussey Pape Probit Equation (see Section 4.1.4). The probability of fatality indoors from the overpressure consequences of a BLEVE blast was determined using the CIA relationships (CIA, 2010) for different building types (see Figure 4). The probability of fatality with distance outdoors and indoors for the BLEVE blast scenario is illustrated on Figure 27.

Figure 27 Rupture of Proposed Hydrogen Tank at Bulk Gas Yard and BLEVE Blast: Probability of

Fatality vs. Distance

The probability of fatality outdoors from the thermal radiation and dose of a fireball following rupture of a hydrogen tank is calculated using the Eisenberg Probit Equation (see Section 4.1.2.). The probability of fatality with distance outdoors for the fireball scenario is illustrated on Figure 28.

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Figure 28 Hydrogen Tank Rupture and Fireball: Probability of Fatality vs. Distance

Frequency of Hydrogen Tank Rupture, BLEVE and Fireball

The HSA Land Use Planning document (HSA, 2010) recommends frequencies for BLEVE and fireballs from LPG tank rupture scenarios. The frequencies apply to sites with multiple LPG vessels, and are not reflective of individual cryogenic hydrogen tanks on manufacturing sites. However, a conservative frequency of 1E-05 per year per vessel for a BLEVE and fireball following rupture of the bulk hydrogen tank is taken for the purposes of this assessment. For 3 No. vessels the total tank rupture frequency is 3E-05 per year.

6.3 Individual Risk of Fatality contours at Liquid Hydrogen Tanks Individual risk of fatality contours for major accident hazards associated with the bulk liquid hydrogen tanks were calculated using TNO Riskcurves Version 10.1.9 risk modelling software. The model inputs include consequence modelling results as described herein, wind speed and direction data (see Section 4.1.8) and event frequencies. Individual risk of fatality contours are illustrated on Figure 29.

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Inner Middle Outer


Figure 29 Liquid Hydrogen Tanks: Individual Risk of Fatality Contours

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7.0 ASSESSMENT FOR WASTE SOLVENT MAJOR ACCIDENT HAZARDS

7.1 Waste Solvent Storage It is proposed to install 2 No. Solvent Waste Stream A and 2 No. Solvent Waste Stream B collection tanks in bunds at the development area. As outlined in Section 3.2.3 Solvent Waste Stream B has a lower flash point (approx. 37.5 oC) than Stream A (approx. 57 oC). Solvent Waste Stream B is mainly comprised of cyclohexanone. Provision is also made for future solvent waste collection tanks, 2 No. Solvent Waste Stream A collection tanks in a bunded area and 2 No. Solvent Waste Stream B collection tanks in a bunded area. A conservative approach is taken and a fire or explosion hazard is assessed for Solvent Waste Stream B as follows:

• Bund fire (modelled as cyclohexanone);

• Tank rupture with bund overtopping or spill during road tanker filling at truck dock, pool formation and pool fire (direct ignition) (modelled as cyclohexanone) or flash fire/vapour cloud explosion (delayed ignition) (modelled as cyclohexanone).

• Confined explosion in waste solvent tank modelled as cyclohexanone.

7.2 Waste Solvent Pool Fire

Model Inputs The solvent waste bunds measure 12 m x 15 m. A bund fire is conservatively assumed to measure 180 m2 (no allowance is made for area occupied by tanks). In relation to an uncontained pool fire, it is assumed that a pool of 150 m2 in size could form at the truck loading area in the event of an accidental release. This is similar to the maximum pool size that is estimated to form at the truck dock at the existing Waste solvent tanks at the Intel establishment. The pool would form at local ground level which is taken as 1.5 m below receptor height. A conservative approach is taken and the consequences of a 180 m2 pool fire are assessed at the truck loading area. Cyclohexanone is taken as the representative substance for pool fire modelling purposes (see Section 3.2.3). The pool fire scenario is modelled at a wind speed of 5 m/s as per the HSA’s land use planning policy and approach document (HSA, 2010).

Thermal Radiation Consequences The pool fire model predicts the following results.

Criterion Bund Fire or Uncontained

Pool Fire

Combustion rate (kg/s) 7.307

Surface emissive power flame (kW/m2)

102.4

Flame tilt (deg) 49.43

Length of the flame (m) 17.61

Table 30 Waste Solvent Pool Fire Results

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Pool fire consequence results are presented on the following figures:

• Figure 30 illustrates Pool Fire at Waste Solvent Collection Tanks: Thermal Radiation vs. Distance

Table 31 presents distances to thermal radiation levels associated with specified levels of probability of fatality to persons outdoors and to persons indoors and to equipment damage.

Figure 30 Pool Fire at Waste Solvent Collection Tanks: Thermal Radiation vs. Distance

Criterion

Thermal Radiation

Level

Uncontained Pool Fire at Manufacturing Support Building

Waste Solvent Truck Dock

Kw/m2 Distance (m)

Threshold of fatality 4.1 48

1% fatality (Dangerous dose) 6.8 39

10% fatality 9.23 35

50% fatality 13.4 30

Building protected below this level, 0% fatality probability

12.6 31

Building will catch fire quickly, 100% fatality probability

25.6 23

Damage to process equipment

37.5 18

Table 31 Pool Fire at Waste Solvent Collection Tanks: Distances to Specified Thermal Radiation Levels

The following figures illustrate thermal radiation contours arising from a bund fire or truck dock fire at the waste solvent collection tanks. The shape of the area impacted is illustrated

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for the prevailing wind direction as well as the full extent of the effect zone which takes account of all possible wind directions.

Figure 31 Bund Fire at Waste Solvent Collection Tanks: Threshold of Fatality Contour

Figure 32 Pool Fire at Waste Solvent Truck Dock: Threshold of Fatality Contour

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Figure 33 Bund Fire at Waste Solvent Collection Tanks: Persons Indoors Protected Contour (Worst

Case)

Figure 34 Pool Fire at Waste Solvent Truck Dock: Persons Indoors Protected Contour

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Figure 35 Bund Fire at Waste Solvent Collection Tanks: Equipment Damage Contour

Figure 36 Pool Fire at Waste Solvent Truck Dock: Equipment Damage Contour

The following is concluded regarding the thermal radiation consequences following a waste solvent pool fire:

• The threshold of fatality contour does not extend outside of the site boundary and no off site consequences are anticipated to arise;

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• The threshold of fatality contour extends to the waste solvent collection tank truck dock and adjacent roadway

• The thermal radiation level below which persons indoors does not reach any building on site and persons indoors are protected.

• The thermal radiation level resulting in equipment damage extends to the adjacent waste solvent collection tank and the consequences are expected to include damage to the tank, release of additional waste solvent and prolonging of the bund fire (assuming no action is taken to extinguish the fire).

Probability of Fatality from Waste Solvent Bund Fire or Truck Dock Fire The probability of fatality outdoors from the thermal radiation consequences of a pool fire was calculated using the Eisenberg Probit Equation (see Section 4.1.2), and assuming an exposure duration of 75 seconds. The probability of fatality indoors from thermal radiation effects are based on the HSA’s criteria described in Section 4.1.2 (see Table 8). The probability of fatality vs distance for the waste solvent pool fire scenarios is illustrated on the following figure.

Figure 37 Waste Solvent Pool Fire: Probability of Fatality vs. Distance

Frequency of Waste Solvent Pool Fire

For pool fire scenarios, the HSA Land Use Planning document (HSA, 2010) recommends a frequency of 1E-04 for an uncontained event and 1E-03 per year for a pool fire covering the surface of the bund.

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Indoor vulnerability

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7.3 Confined VCE in Waste Solvent Tank

Model Inputs The TNO Effects Multi-Energy Explosion model was used to model the overpressure consequences of a confined vapour cloud explosion within a solvent tank. It is assumed that the vessel contains 10% waste solvent and 90% vapour. The flammable mass within the tank is calculated as follows:

Volume m3 22.7 Assume 10% full 90% vapour space m3 20.43

Assume vapour space contains a stoichiometric mixture of cyclohexanone and air

Complete combustion equation for cyclohexanone

C6H10O + 8O2 = 6CO2 + 5H2O

Compound Mol Mol

fraction

Molecular weight

(kg/kmol) Mass (kg) Mass

fraction

Cyclohexanone 1 0.026 60.100 1.55 0.052

O2 8 0.206 31.999 6.60 0.223

N2 29.76 0.768 28.014 21.51 0.725

38.76 1 29.66 1

Volume of stoichiometric mixture (model input) m3 54.5

Density of flammable vapour mixture (calculated in PHAST) kg/m3 1.29

Mass of flammable mixture kg 70.57

Mass of solvent, O2 and N2 in flammable mixture:

Compound Mass (kg)

Cyclohexanone 3.69 O2 15.71 N2 51.17

Mass of flammable mixture 70.57 The flammable mass within the tank is 3.69 kg.

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Vapour cloud explosion model inputs are detailed in Table 32.

Parameter Manufacturing Support building tank area

Source/Assumption

Scenario Vapour Cloud Explosion

-

Material Cyclohexanone -

Tank Volume 60.6 m3 Intel

Flammable mass 3.69 kg See above

Ignition strength 7 HSA Policy and Approach to COMAH Risk-based Land Use Planning (HSA, 2010)

Table 32 Waste Solvent Tank Confined VCE: Model Inputs

Overpressure Consequences

Figure 38 illustrates the level of overpressure with distance following a confined VCE in a solvent waste tank. Table 33 presents distances to overpressure levels associated with specified levels of probability of fatality to persons outdoors and to persons indoors in Category 2 (office type buildings) buildings, Category 3 buildings (residential dwellings) and Category 4 buildings (Portacabins).

Figure 38 Confined VCE at Waste Solvent Collection Tanks: Overpressure vs. Distance

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125

35 Light damage 76












Table 33 Waste Solvent Tank VCE: Calculated Distances at Specified Overpressure Levels

Figure 39 illustrates blast damage contours at the waste solvent collection tanks. Figure 40 illustrates the 1% vulnerability contours outdoors and indoors in Category 2 buildings (typical office block – representative of on-site buildings) and Category 3 buildings (residential dwellings) arising from a confined VCE in a waste solvent tank.

LEGEND

0.02 bar 0.035 bar 0.17 bar 0.35 bar Safe distance Light damage Moderate damage Severe damage Figure 39 Waste Solvent Tank Confined VCE: Blast Damage Contours

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Overpressure






structures


outdoors

Shape/Effect

Zone

Figure 40 Waste Solvent Tank Confined VCE: Vulnerability Contours

In the event of a confined VCE in a waste solvent tank at the Manufacturing Support building tank area the following is concluded:

• It is likely that adjacent waste solvent tanks would be damaged leading to a release of waste solvent to the bund and a pool fire within the bund. The consequences of this scenario are assessed in Section 7.2 herein;

• The overpressure levels corresponding to 1% mortality outdoors and indoors do not extend outside of the site boundary and off-site consequences are negligible;`

• The overpressure level corresponding to 1% mortality outdoors extends to the truck dock and roadway adjacent to the waste collection tanks;

• The overpressure level corresponding to 1% mortality indoors in category 2 buildings (representative of buildings on site) does not extend to any building on site and persons indoors on site are protected;


Probability of Fatality from Solvent Tank Confined VCE The probability of fatality outdoors from the overpressure consequences of a confined VCE in a waste solvent tank was calculated using the Hurst Nussey Pape Probit Equation described in Section 4.1.4. Figure 41 illustrates the probability of fatality vs distance from a confined vapour cloud explosion at the Manufacturing Support building tank area.

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Figure 41 Confined VCE in Waste Solvent Tank: Probability of Fatality vs. Distance

Frequency of Solvent Tank Confined VCE

The most likely scenario by which a confined VCE would occur in a waste solvent tank is through the build-up of a static electric charge during a tank unloading event due to failure of the operator to follow the standard tank unloading procedure and to earth the tanker before commencement of the event. The safe guards that are currently in place at the Intel establishment will also be put in place for the proposed development as follows:

• The tanker driver will be accompanied from arrival on site by a technician and both are present throughout the waste solvent tank offload event;

• On arrival of the tanker at the loading area, the technician will inspect the general condition of the area (including solvent truck, tanker and hoses) ensuring appropriate safety equipment (including PPE) and protection is in place and in good condition;

• Personal protective equipment is worn;

• Checks will be carried out to ensure the tanker has adequate capacity to receive the contents of the waste solvent tank;

• The rear wheels of the truck are chocked;

• The tanker is earthed;

• Checks will be carried out to ensure that no naked flames are present throughout the transfer.

With reference to the HSA’s Land Use Planning document (HSA, 2010), given that there will be many protective layers in place and that the likelihood of a confined VCE in a tank containing a high flash point solvent with a low vapour pressure is low, the likelihood of a confined VCE in the waste solvent tanks at the proposed development is taken as 1E-05 per year per tank or 8E-05 per year for 4 No. waste solvent collection tanks plus 4 No. future waste solvent collection tanks at the development area.

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Indoors Cat 3

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7.4 Individual Risk of Fatality Contours at Waste Solvent Tanks Individual risk of fatality contours for major accident hazards associated with the waste solvent collection tanks were calculated using TNO Riskcurves Version 10.1.9 risk modelling software. The model inputs include consequence modelling results as described herein, wind speed and direction data (see Section 4.1.8) and event frequencies. Individual risk of fatality contours are illustrated on Figure 42.


Inner Middle Outer


Figure 42 Waste Solvent Collection Tanks: Individual Risk of Fatality Contours

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8.0 AIR SEPARATION UNIT MAJOR ACCIDENT SCENARIOS It is proposed to install an Air Separation Unit (ASU) at the mound area. The ASU comprises an assembly of distillation columns, heat exchangers, adsorbers and supporting machinery for compression, expansion and control of gases and liquids. The ASU will contain the following hazardous installations:

• 3 No. 53 tonne cryogenic liquid oxygen bulk storage tanks (159 tonnes in total)

• 225 tonne cryogenic liquid argon bulk storage tank (1 no. tank on site)

• Coldbox (at each ASU) – there are 3 No. columns within the coldbox unit, the main heat exchanger, high pressure column and low pressure column.

The following major accident scenarios were identified for the ASUs: Cryogenic liquid oxygen:

• The bulk cryogenic oxygen tank will contain liquefied oxygen under pressure and may explode if heated. Catastrophic rupture of a cryogenic oxygen tank can lead to a Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion (BLEVE) with overpressure consequences.


Cryogenic liquid argon:

• In the event of catastrophic failure of the proposed 225 tonne cryogenic bulk argon storage tank, the dispersion of argon following a release has the potential to displace ambient oxygen resulting in asphyxiating effects.

Coldbox:

• Liquid leak from pipe/instrument line failure within the coldbox LP/HP column leading to column failure with overpressure consequences;

• Reboiler explosion with overpressure consequences.

8.1 Cryogenic Liquid Oxygen

Oxygen BLEVE and Dispersion Model Inputs

The PHAST Version 8.22 catastrophic rupture model and unified dispersion model were used to model the dispersion of oxygen following rupture of a bulk oxygen tanks. Model inputs are as detailed in Table 34.

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Scenario BLEVE BLAST -

Material Oxygen -

Storage conditions Cryogenic oxygen stored as



Intel

Operating pressure 14 barg Intel


Table 34 ASU Liquid Oxygen Tank Catastrophic Rupture Model Inputs

Following rupture of a liquid oxygen storage tank, a pool of liquid oxygen will form on the ground. Oxygen will evaporate from the surface of the liquid and disperse with the potential to form an oxygen enriched atmosphere. Model inputs are as detailed in Table 18.In addition, the following model inputs were used:

• Maximum LOx pool size at ASU (conservative estimation) 2,500 m2

BLEVE Model Outputs Figure 43 illustrates the level of overpressure with distance following rupture of the cryogenic liquid oxygen tank. Table 35 presents distances to overpressure levels associated with specified levels of probability of fatality to persons outdoors and to persons indoors in Category 2 (office type buildings) buildings, Category 3 buildings (residential dwellings) and Category 4 buildings (Portacabins).

Figure 43 ASU Liquid Oxygen Tank Rupture and BLEVE Blast: Overpressure vs. Distance

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ASU LOx Tank Catastophic Failure and BLEVEOverpressure vs. Distance

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201

35 Light damage 124












Table 35 ASU Liquid Oxygen Tank Ruptre and BLEVE Blast: Calculated Distances at Specified Overpressure Levels

The overpressure damage contours from a LOx BLEVE at the ASU are illustrated on Figure 44. The overpressure contours corresponding to 1%, probability of fatality (vulnerability) outdoors and indoors in category 2 structures (representative of buildings on site) and at category 3 structures (residential dwellings) from a LOx BLEVE at the ASU are illustrated on Figure 45.

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LEGEND

0.02 bar 0.035 bar 0.17 bar 0.35 bar Safe distance Light damage Moderate damage Severe damage Figure 44 ASU Liquid Oxygen BLEVE: Blast Damage Contours

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Overpressure






structures


outdoors

Shape/Effect

Zone

Figure 45 ASU Liquid Oxygen BLEVE: Outdoor and Indoor Vulnerability Contours

In the event of a BLEVE involving a cryogenic liquid oxygen tank at the proposed ASU the following is concluded: Damage and knock-on effects:

• The overpressure levels corresponding to a safe distance, light, moderate and severe damage do not extend outside of the site boundary and off-site consequences are negligible;

• The overpressure level at the gas compound is predicted to be 55 mbar which is not sufficient to cause damage (see Section 4.1.4);

• The overpressure level at the silane pad is predicted to be 30 mbar which is not sufficient to cause damage;

• The overpressure level at the ASU to the south (future) from a LOX BLEVE is predicted to be 55 mbar at the cold box units and 45 mbar at the liquid oxygen and liquid argon tanks. This is not sufficient to cause damage

• No knock on effects are expected to arise; Consequences to personnel outdoors and indoors:

• The overpressure level corresponding to 1% mortality outdoors extends to the area surrounding the proposed ASU and the proposed waste water balancing tank which are not normally occupied;

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• The ASU control building is approx. 7 m from the nearest LOX vessel and the maximum overpressure level is estimated as up to 9 bar which is sufficient to demolish the building and result in fatal consequences for occupants. An assessment of this building is included in Section 10.0. No other occupied buildings on site are expected to be impacted;


Pool Evaporation Model Outputs The pool evaporation model in DNV Phast Version 8.22 was used to model evaporation of oxygen vapour from the surface of a liquid pool following rupture of a liquid oxygen tank. Figure 46 illustrates the mass evaporation rate versus time and Figure 47 illustrates mass evaporated versus time.

Figure 46 ASU Liquid Oxygen Tank Rupture and Pool Formation: Evaporation Mass Flow Rate vs.

Time

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LOx Tank RuptureEvaporation Mass Flow Rate vs. Time

5 m/s

2 m/s

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Figure 47 ASU Liquid Oxygen Tank Rupture and Pool Formation: Mass Evaporated vs. Time

Oxygen Dispersion Results The unified dispersion model in DNV Phast Version 8.22 was used to model dispersion of oxygen vapour following rupture of a liquid oxygen tank. The normal ambient concentration of oxygen is 21% volume or 210,000 ppm. The safe limit outdoors is 25% volume or 250,000 ppm, at this concentration the probability of fatality or serious injury is 0.17% (BCGA, 2013). The dangerous dose level at which lethal effects may occur is 35% volume or 350,000 ppm which corresponds to a probability of fatality or serious injury of 0.53%. The maximum concentration of oxygen (above background ambient levels) with distance downwind following catastrophic rupture of a liquid oxygen tank at the proposed ASU is illustrated on Figure 48. Results are summarised in Table 36. The worst case contours are illustrated on Figure 49. These results are at 1.5 m above ground level. The shape of the area impacted is shown as well as the total effect area taking account of all wind directions.

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LOx Tank RuptureEvaporated Mass vs. Time

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2 m/s

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Figure 48 ASU Liquid Oxygen Tank Rupture Dispersion Model Outputs: Maximum Concentration vs.

Distance Downwind

Consequences


Distance (m) Distance (m)

% ppm D5 F2

ASU

Safe Limit (outdoors) (0.018% probability of fatality or serious

injury) 25 250,000 232 234


30 300,000 140 120

Dangerous Dose (lethal) (0.53 % probability of fatality or serious

injury) 35 350,000 97 77


40 400,000 73 64

Table 36 ASU Liquid Oxygen Tank Rupture: Dispersion Results

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LOx Tank RuptureMaximum Concentration vs. Distance Downwind

D5

F2

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Legend O2 Concentration Consequences Maximum Distance

Contour dimensions

Shape

250,000 ppm Safe Distance (0.018% probability of fatality or

serious injury) 234 m

361 m diameter

Effect zone

Figure 49 ASU Liquid Oxygen Tank Rupture Dispersion Model Outputs: Maximum Concentration Footprint

An oxygen enriched atmosphere will arise in the areas within the contour illustrated on Figure 49. There are no receptors in the area off site within the 250,000 ppm contour.

Probability of Fatality from LOx BLEVE The probability of fatality outdoors from the overpressure consequences of a BLEVE blast following rupture of a cryogenic liquid oxygen tank is calculated using the Hurst Nussey Pape Probit Equation (see Section 4.1.4). The probability of fatality indoors from the overpressure consequences of a BLEVE blast was determined using the CIA relationships (CIA, 2010) for different building types (see Figure 4). The probability of fatality with distance outdoors and indoors for the BLEVE blast scenario is illustrated on Figure 50.

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Figure 50 ASU Liquid Oxygen Tank Rupture and BLEVE Blast: Probability of Fatality vs. Distance

Frequency of Liquid Oxygen Tank Rupture

The HSA Land Use Planning document (HSA, 2010) recommends frequencies for BLEVE and fireballs from LPG tank rupture scenarios. The frequencies apply to sites with multiple LPG vessels, and are not reflective of individual cryogenic oxygen tanks on manufacturing sites. However, a conservative frequency of 1E-05 per year for a BLEVE following rupture of the bulk liquid oxygen tank is taken for the purposes of this assessment. There are 3 no. oxygen tanks at each location therefore, it is concluded that a value of 3E-05 per year is a conservative figure and is appropriate for use in a land use planning study.

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Liquid Oxygen Catastophic Failure and BLEVEProbability of Fatality vs. Distance

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Indoors Category 2

Indoors Cateogry 3

Indoors Category 4

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8.2 Cryogenic Liquid Argon

Argon Dispersion Model Inputs In the event of catastrophic failure of the proposed 225 tonne cryogenic bulk argon storage tank, the dispersion of argon following a release has the potential to displace ambient oxygen resulting in asphyxiating effects.

The PHAST Version 8.22 unified dispersion model was used to model the dispersion of argon following catastrophic failure of the proposed bulk argon tank. The model inputs are detailed in Table 37.


Scenario Catastrophic Rupture -

Material Argon -

Storage conditions Cryogenic argon stored as liquid

at low temperature under


Intel

Operating pressure 12.7 bara Intel


Averaging Time 18 seconds DNV recommended averaging

time for flammable effects

Table 37 Argon Model Inputs

Argon Dispersion Consequences The maximum concentration footprint of argon following catastrophic rupture of the proposed bulk argon tank at the ASU is illustrated on Figure 51 for weather category D5 and on Figure 52 for weather category F2.

69,100 ppm Onset of symptoms of asphyxia 166 m (max. distance)

138,300 ppm Significant symptoms of asphyxia 101 m

522,600 ppm Rapid unconsciousness and death

32 m

Figure 51 Argon Dispersion Model Outputs: Maximum Concentration Footprint (D5)

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69,100 ppm Onset of symptoms of asphyxia 126 m (max. distance)

138,300 ppm Significant symptoms of asphyxia 64 m

522,600 ppm Rapid unconsciousness and death 15 m

Figure 52 Argon Dispersion Model Outputs: Maximum Concentration Footprint (F2)

Figure 53 illustrates the worst case asphyxiation end point contours for the argon release scenario.

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Figure 53 Argon Asphyxiation Contours for ASU Liquid Argon Tank Rupture Scenario

It is concluded that in the event of rupture of the bulk cryogenic liquid argon tank, the worst case hazard range for rapid unconsciousness and death are confined to the ASU area. The worst case hazard range for significant symptoms of asphyxiation extend to the Fab 14 yard area and the north road. These areas may be occasionally occupied and there is the possibility of fatalities in the event of rupture of the argon tank. It is noted that there are no probit equations available to estimate the individual risk of fatality due to exposure to asphyxiating gases such as argon. Therefore, model outputs are assessed in terms of consequences only for this scenario.

Frequency of Liquid Argon Tank Rupture The UK HSE cites catastrophic failure rates of 2E-06 per year to 6E-06 per year for pressure vessels (UK HSE, 2012). The Dutch Committee for the Prevention of Disasters recommends a catastrophic failure rate for pressure vessels of 5E-07 per year per vessel (Purple Book, 2005). Therefore, it is concluded that a value of 6E-06 per year is a conservative figure and is appropriate for use in a land use planning study.

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8.3 Coldbox Rupture

Vessel Rupture Model Inputs The TNO Effects Version 10.1 pressure vessel rupture model was used to model the overpressure consequences of rupture of the coldbox at the proposed ASU. Model inputs are detailed in Table 38.


Scenario Vessel rupture -

Material Oxygen -

Storage conditions Cryogenic oxygen stored as liquid at low temperature under pressurised conditions

Intel


Table 38 ASU Coldbox Rupture Model Inputs

Vessel Rupture Overpressure Consequences

Figure 54 illustrates the level of overpressure with distance following rupture of the Coldbox high pressure column. Table 39 presents distances to overpressure levels associated with specified levels of probability of fatality to persons outdoors and to persons indoors in Category 2 (office type) buildings, Category 3 buildings (residential dwellings) and Category 4 buildings (Portacabins).

Figure 54 Coldbox Rupture: Overpressure vs. Distance

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ASU01/02 Coldbox RuptureOverpressure vs. Distance

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Probability of fatality

Persons outdoors

Overpressure level Distance

mbar (m)

1% 168 8

10% 365 6

50% 942 3


Persons indoors: Category 2 (typical office block)


mbar (m)

1% 100 11

10% 183 8

50% 284 7


Persons indoors: Category 3 (residential dwellings)


mbar (m)

1% 50 20

10% 139 10

50% 300 7


Persons indoors: Category 4 (Portacabins)


mbar (m)

1% 50 20

10% 115 11

50% 242 7

Table 39 Coldbox Rupture: Calculated Distances at Specified Overpressure Levels

Probability of Fatality from Coldbox High Pressure Column Rupture

The probability of fatality outdoors from the overpressure consequences of a BLEVE blast following rupture of the Coldbox high pressure column is calculated using the Hurst Nussey Pape Probit Equation (see Section 4.1.4 herein). The probability of fatality indoors from the overpressure consequences of a BLEVE blast was determined using the CIA relationships (CIA, 2010) for different building types (see Figure 4). The probability of fatality with distance outdoors and indoors for the coldbox high pressure column rupture scenario is illustrated on Figure 55.

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Figure 55 Coldbox Rupture: Probability of Fatality vs. Distance

The distance to the overpressure level corresponding to 1% mortality in vulnerable structures is 20 m. This contour is illustrated on Figure 56.

Figure 56 Coldbox Rupture: 50 mbar Contour

It is concluded that the overpressure effects of a Coldbox rupture at the ASU are confined to the ASU area. There are no impacts off site. There is the potential for damage to the ASU control building and for injuries or fatalities of personnel within the building. Personnel

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Coldbox RuptureProbability of Fatality vs. Distance

Outdoors

Indoors Category 2

Indoors Cateogry 3

Indoors Category 4

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may be occasionally present at the ASU plant areas for maintenance purposes, otherwise it is not normally occupied.

Frequency of Coldbox High Pressure Column Rupture The initiating event for the Coldbox high pressure column rupture scenario is a liquid leak leading to column overpressurisation. There are multiple safeguards that would prevent this from occurring including the following:

• Pipework within the coldbox is pressure tested before service;

• Pressure monitoring on the interspace to detect a leak and automatic Plant shutdown on high;

• Written scheme of examination and annual examination of the coldbox

• Weekly checks for ice patches and on the purge rate The HSA recommends a frequency of 1E-04 per year for pressure vessel burst scenarios for land use planning purposes (HSA, 2010).

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8.4 Risk Contours at the ASU TNO Riskcurves Version 10.1.9 risk modelling software was used to model individual risk of fatality contours at the proposed ASU. The model inputs include consequence modelling results as described herein, wind speed and direction data (see Section 4.1.8) and event frequencies. Individual risk of fatality contours are illustrated on Figure 57.


Inner Middle Outer


Figure 57 ASU: Individual Risk of Fatality Contours

It is concluded that the individual risk contours are confined to the ASU area and do not extend outside of the site boundary or to any other building or installation at the proposed development or at the existing manufacturing site.

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9.0 SUMMARY OF MAJOR ACCIDENT SCENARIOS Table 40 (overleaf) summarises the consequences, impacts outdoors, impacts indoors and frequency of each major accident scenario.

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Table 40 Summary of Major Accident Scenario Consequences and Frequencies

Substance Installation Location Scenario Hazard Consequences Impacts outdoors Impacts indoors in occupied buildings Frequency

Liquid oxygen Bulk tanks Liquid oxygen compound

Tank rupture

BLEVE overpressure and oxygen enrichment

37 m to 20 mbar (safe distance) 8 m to 1% lethality outdoors 11 m to 1% lethality indoors in Category 2 structures Enriched oxygen atmosphere within 265 m.

Lethal effects confined to LOx compound, not to any normally occupied areas. No damage to equipment or buildings. No off site effects.

Persons indoors are protected. 2E-05 per year

Liquid hydrogen Bulk tank Liquid hydrogen compound

Venting system leak, direct ignition

Jet fire

Release is at 5 m above ground level and flame is 8 m in length. 13 m to 4.1 kW/2 (threshold of fatality) at a receptor height of 1.5 m. Max. thermal radiation level incident on waste solvent collection tanks is 1.5 kW/m2, not sufficient to cause damage

Personnel outdoors are protected on site No impacts off site No damage to waste solvent collection tanks or knock on effects predicted

No buildings on site within 1% lethality contour in Category 2 structures, persons indoors are protected

4E-06 per year


Venting system leak, delayed ignition


76 m (F2) / 63 m (D5) to 20 mbar (safe distance) 21 m (F2) / 19 m (D5) to 1% lethality outdoors 26 m (F2) / 23 m (D5) to 1% lethality indoors in Category 2 structures

Potential for damage to the liquid hydrogen tanks. Lethal effects extend to the truck dock and roadways in the vicinity of the liquid hydrogen compound. No impacts outside of site boundary

No buildings on site within 1% lethality contour in Category 2 structures, persons indoors are protected

1.44 E-05 per year per vessel


Tank rupture BLEVE overpressure

164 m to 20 mbar (safe distance) 38 m to 1% lethality outdoors 53 m to 1% lethality indoors in Category 2 structures

Potential for damage to waste solvent collection tanks with knock-on effects Lethal effects extend to truck offload areas and roadways No impacts outside of the site boundary

No buildings on site within 1% lethality in Category 2 structures contour, persons indoors are protected

3E-05 per year


Tank rupture Fireball 47 m fireball radius, 7.31 s duration 122 m to 1% lethality outdoors thermal dose

Potential for knock on effects at the waste solvent collection tanks including a confined tank explosion and waste solvent pool fire. Lethal effects are confined within the site boundary No impacts outside of site boundary

Fireball duration is short and persons indoors are protected

Waste solvent Bulk tanks

Waste solvent stream A and B collection tank bunds and future tanks

Tank release Bund fire

39 m (5 m/s wind speed) to thermal radiation level corresponding to 1% lethality outdoors 31 m (5 /s wind speed) to thermal radiation level below which persons indoors are protected

Potential for damage to adjacent waste solvent collection tanks. Lethal effects extend to the waste solvent collection tank truck dock and adjacent roadway No impacts outside of the site boundary

The thermal radiation level below which persons indoors does not reach any building on site and persons indoors are protected.

1E-03 per year at each bund


Waste solvent stream A and B collection tank bunds

Tank rupture with bund overtopping or spill at truck dock

Uncontained pool fire

39 m (5 m/s wind speed) to thermal radiation level corresponding to 1% lethality outdoors 31 m (5 /s wind speed) to thermal radiation level below which persons indoors are protected

Potential for damage to adjacent waste solvent collection tanks. Lethal effects extend to the waste solvent collection tank truck dock and adjacent roadway No impacts outside of the site boundary

The thermal radiation level below which persons indoors does not reach any building on site and persons indoors are protected.

1E-04 per year per tank


Waste solvent stream A and B collection tank bunds

Tank explosion Vapour cloud explosion

125 m to 20 mbar (safe distance) 21 m to 1% lethality outdoors 26 m to 1% lethality indoors in Category 2 structures

Lethal effects extend to the vicinity of the tanks and adjacent truck docks No impacts outside of the site boundary

No buildings on site within 1% lethality in Category 2 structures contour, persons indoors are protected

1E-05 per year per tank

Liquid oxygen Bulk tanks Air Separation Unit

Tank rupture

BLEVE overpressure and oxygen enrichment

201m to 20 mbar (safe distance) 43 m to 1% lethality outdoors 56 m to 1% lethality indoors in Category 2 structures Enriched oxygen atmosphere within 234 m.

Lethal effects extend to the ASU area and proposed waste water balancing tank. No damage to equipment or to buildings outside of site boundary

Potential for fatalities in the ASU control building

3E-05 per year

Liquid argon Bulk tank Air Separation Unit

Tank rupture Oxygen displacement

166 m (D5) / 126 m (F2) to onset of symptoms of asphyxia

Potential for fatalities in the vicinity of the ASU

None 1E-05 per year

Liquid oxygen Coldbox Air Separation Unit 1/2

Coldbox rupture Overpressure 8 m to 1% lethality outdoors 11 m to 1% lethality indoors in Category 2 structures

Lethal effects are confined to the ASU area

None 1E-04 per year

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10.0 ASSESSMENT OF IMPACTS ON OCCUPIED BUILDINGS 10.1 Methodology

The assessment of impacts on occupied buildings is completed in accordance with the CIA Guidance Document (CIA, 2010) which recommends the following assessment methodology:

The risk based approach is adopted herein. The CIA recommends that for a range of events a risk assessment is carried out and compared with established criteria.

10.2 Occupied Building Risk Assessment The following occupied buildings are included within the proposed development:

• ASU control building The impacts of major accident hazards associated with the proposed development and the existing establishment (including the new facility in the western area of the site for which planning permission has been sought) the ASU control building are summarised in Table 41. A screening approach has been taken and only those scenarios resulting in consequences with > 1% probability of fatality indoors at the ASU are included.

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Installation

Distance to

ASU

Control

Building

Hazard Consequences Frequency

Risk of fatality

indoors in ASU

Control Building

from MAH

scenario

Comments

ASU LOx tank

rupture and

BLEVE

7 m to 27 m

Tank rupture and

BLEVE leading

to overpressure

0.365 bar (55%

mortality assuming

category 3 strength)

to 9 bar (100%

mortality)

3E-05 per year 3E-05 per year

Based on

conservative

land use

planning

frequency

ASU Coldbox 7 m

Coldbox rupture

leading to

overpressure

300 mbar (50 %

mortality, assuming


1E-04 per year 5E-05 per year

Based on

conservative

land use

planning

frequency

Silane ISO

tube trailer at

silane pad

110 m

Tube rupture and

delayed vapour

cloud explosion

200 mbar (21 %

mortality, assuming


5.28E-08 per

year

1.11E-08 per

year

Event

frequency from

silane QRA in

safety report

for

establishment

Total Risk of Fatality 8E-05 /year Negligible

Table 41 Occupied Building Assessment for ASU Control Building

It is concluded that the total individual risk of fatality at the ASU control building is 8E-05 per year which is assessed as Tolerable if As Low as Reasonably Practicable when compared to the individual risk criteria outlined in Section 2.1.2 herein. It is noted that this is based on conservative land use planning frequencies that do not take into account safety and risk reduction measures on vessels such as pressure relief valves, burst discs etc. At detailed design stage, the required performance of the ASU Control Building will be determined in accordance with the methodology described by the CIA.

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11.0 RISK BASED LAND USE PLANNING CONTOURS TNO Riskcurves Version 10.1.9 software was used to plot the individual risk of fatality contours corresponding to the boundaries of the inner (1E-05 per year), middle (1E-06 per year) and outer (1E-07 per year) risk based land use planning zones. Figure 58 and Figure 59 present the risk based land use planning zone for the proposed development and the risk based land use planning zones for the overall site (including the proposed development) respectively.

Figure 58 Risk Based Land Use Planning Contours for Proposed Development

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Figure 59 Risk Based Land Use Planning Contours for Overall Site


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12.0 CONCLUSION A risk based land use planning assessment was completed of major accident hazards associated with proposed development including liquid oxygen tanks, liquid hydrogen tanks, waste solvent collection tanks and an Air Separation Unit at Intel Ireland, Collinstown Industrial Park, Leixlip Co. Kildare. The following major accident hazards were identified for the proposed development:

Location Installation Major Accident Scenario

Liquid oxygen compound

Cryogenic liquid oxygen tanks (2 No. vertical tanks)

Tank rupture, BLEVE with overpressure effects and oxygen

enrichment

Liquid hydrogen compound

Cryogenic liquid hydrogen tank (3 No. horizontal)

Hydrogen tank rupture with BLEVE and fireball

Hydrogen tank leak with jet fire or vapour cloud explosion

Waste solvent collection tanks

Waste solvent stream A collection tanks (2 No. plus 2 No. future tanks)

Waste solvent stream B collection tanks (2 No. plus 2 No. future tanks)

Tank release, bund fire Tank rupture with bund overtopping

or spill at truck dock and uncontained pool fire

Confined explosion in waste solvent collection tank

Air Separation Unit Liquid oxygen tank Tank rupture, BLEVE with

overpressure effects and oxygen enrichment

Air Separation Unit Liquid argon tank Argon tank rupture and dispersion

of asphyxiating gas

Air Separation Unit Coldbox Vessel rupture and overpressure

consequences

Impacts Off Site No off site impacts are predicted at any off site receptor location. Impacts On Site There is the potential for fatalities to arise on site from the consequences of major accident scenarios, however areas affected are primarily outdoor areas that are not normally occupied. Impacts indoors in the ASU Control Building were assessed and there is the potential for fatalities to arise as a result of major accident scenarios at the ASU. At detailed design stage, the required performance of the ASU Control Building will be determined in accordance with the methodology described by the CIA (CIA, 2010) to ensure the risk of fatality is minimised. Risk Based LUP Contours The individual risk of fatality for the proposed development was determined. Individual risk of fatality contours that correspond to the boundaries of the inner (1E-05 per year), middle (1E-06 per year) and outer (1E-07 per year) risk based land use planning zones are illustrated as follows:

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13.0 REFERENCES Center for Chemical Process Safety of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers (1989), Guidelines for Process Equipment Reliability Data, AIChE, New York, USA Centre for Chemical Process Safety of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers (2000), Guidelines for Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Analysis, 2nd Edition, AIChemE, New York, USA Chemical Industries Association (2003), Guidance for the location and design of occupied buildings on chemical manufacturing sites, revised 2nd Edition November 2003 Committee for the Prevention of Disasters, Guidelines for Quantitative Risk Assessment, CPR 18E, Second Edition, 2005 (“Purple Book”) European Chemicals Agency, Online: https://echa.europa.eu/information-on-chemicals (accessed 1st December 2018) Energy Institute (2007), Model Code of Safe Practice Part 19 Fire Precautions at Petroleum Refineries and Bulk Storage Installations, 2nd Edition, London, UK European Industrial Gases Association (2006), Position Paper PP-14, Definitions of Oxygen Enrichment/Deficiency Safety Criteria, Available from: https://www.eiga.eu/index.php?id=180 (accessed December 2018) Haasl, D.F. (1965), Advanced Concepts in Fault Tree Analysis, System Safety Symposium, June 8-9 1965, Seattle, The Boeing Company Harper P. (2011), Assessment of the Major Hazard Potential of Carbon Dioxide, UK Health and Safety Executive Health and Safety Authority (2010), Policy & Approach of the Health & Safety Authority to COMAH Risk-based Land-use Planning (19 March 2010) Including Detailed Implementation by Sector Kletz, T. A., 1999, Hazop and Hazan– Identifying and Assessing Process Industry Hazards, 4th edition, Chapter 2 (Institution of Chemical Engineers, Rugby, UK) Mannan S. (2012), Lees’ Loss Prevention in the Process Industries Hazard Identification, Assessment and Control, 4th Edition, Elsevier McGrattan K.B., Baum H.R., Hamins A. (2000), National Institute for Standards and Technology (US Department of Commerce), NISTIR 6546, Thermal Radiation from Large Pool Fires, November 2000 O'Riordan, N.J. and Milloy, C.J. (1995) Risk assessment for methane and other gases in the ground, London, GB, Construction Industry Research & Information Association (CIRIA) (CIRIA Reports R152) Rasmussen, N.C., Reactor Safety Study, An assessment of accident risk in US nuclear power plants, WASH 1400, NUREG 75/014, US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington DC, 1975

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https://echa.europa.eu/information-on-chemicals

https://www.eiga.eu/index.php?id=180


TNO (1999), Guidelines for Quantitative Risk Assessment (First Edition), the Purple Book. CPR 18E, the Netherlands Organization for Applied Scientific Research, Committee for the Prevention of Disasters, the Hague, Netherlands, 1999 Trbojevic V.M., Risk criteria in EU, European Safety and Reliability Conference, 2005 UK Health and Safety Executive (2001), Reducing Risks Protecting People HSE’s Decision Making Process, HSE Books, R2P2 UK Health and Safety Executive (2005), An Experimental Investigation of Bund Wall Overtopping and Dynamic Pressures on the Bund Wall following Catastrophic Failure of a Storage Vessel (prepared by Liverpool John Moores University for the HSE), Research Report 333, 2005 UK Health and Safety Executive (2009), Comparison of risks from carbon dioxide and natural gas pipelines, Research Report 749 (Online: http://www.hse.gov.uk/research/rrpdf/rr749.pdf) UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE) (2012), Planning Case Assessment Guide, Chapter 6K, Failure Rate and Event Data for use within Land Use Planning Risk Assessments (http://www.hse.gov.uk/landuseplanning/failure-rates.pdf) UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE), Toxicity levels of chemicals, Assessment of the Dangerous Toxic Load (DTL) for Specified Level of Toxicity (SLOT) and Significant Likelihood of Death (SLOD) Online: http://www.hse.gov.uk/chemicals/haztox.htm (Accessed 1st December 2018) US American Industrial Hygiene Association (AIHA) ERPG Values (2013) https://www.aiha.org/get-involved/AIHAGuidelineFoundation/EmergencyResponsePlanningGuidelines/Documents/2013ERPGValues.pdf US Centre for Disease Control, http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/idlh/idlhintr.html (accessed 1st December 2018)

UK Health and Safety Executive, An Experimental Investigation of Bund Wall Overtopping and Dynamic Pressures on the Bund Wall following Catastrophic Failure of a Storage Vessel (prepared by Liverpool John Moores University for the HSE), Research Report 333, 2005 Dutch National Institute for Public Health and the Environment, Ministry of Health, Welfare and Support (2017), Dichlorosilane Probit Function Technical Support Document (Interim) Online: https://www.rivm.nl/sites/default/files/2018-11/20170606-dichlorosilane-interim.pdf

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http://www.hse.gov.uk/research/rrpdf/rr749.pdf

http://www.hse.gov.uk/landuseplanning/failure-rates.pdf

http://www.hse.gov.uk/chemicals/haztox.htm

http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/idlh/idlhintr.html

https://www.rivm.nl/sites/default/files/2018-11/20170606-dichlorosilane-interim.pdf

https://www.rivm.nl/sites/default/files/2018-11/20170606-dichlorosilane-interim.pdf


APPENDIX A HAZARD STATEMENTS AND CLP CHEMICAL CLASSIFICATIONS

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Code Hazard Statement Hazard Class Category Abbreviation

H200 Explosives, Unstable explosives

Explosives

Unstable explosives Unst. Expl.

H201 Explosives, Division 1.1 Division 1.1 Expl. 1.1





H220 Extremely flammable gas Flammable gases

Category 1 Flam. Gas. 1

H221 Flammable gases Category 2 Flam. Gas. 2

H222 Extremely flammable aerosol Aerosol

Category 1 Aerosol 1

H223 Flammable aerosols Category 2 Aerosol 2

H224 Extremely flammable liquid and vapour

Flammable liquids

Category 1 Flam. Liq. 1

H225 Highly flammable liquid and vapour Category 2 Flam. Liq. 2

H226 Flammable liquid and vapour Category 3 Flam. Liq. 3

H228 Flammable solid Category 1, Category 2 Flam. Sol. 1, Flam. Sol. 2

H240 Heating may cause and explosion

Self-Reactive

Substances and

Mixtures,

Organic peroxides

Type A Self React. A, Organic

Perox. A

H241 Heating may cause a fire or explosion Type B Self React. B, Organic

Perox. B

H242 Heating may cause a fire

Types C, D, E, F Self React. C&D, Organic

Perox. C&D

Self React. E&F, Organic

Perox. E&F

H250 Catches fire spontaneously if exposed to air Pyrophoric Liquids

Pyorphoric Solids

Category 1 Pyr. Liq. 1

Pyr. Sol. 1

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H251 Self-heating; may catch fire Self-heating

substances and

mixtures

Category 1 Self-heat 1

H252 Self-heating in large quantities; may catch fire Category 2 Self-heat 2

H260 In contact with water releases flammable gases which may

ignite spontaneously

Substances and

Mixtures which, in

contact with water,

emit flammable

gases

Category 1 Water-react. 1

H261 In contact with water releases flammable gases

Category 2

Category 3

Water-react. 2

Water-react. 3

H270 May cause or intensify fire; oxidiser Oxidising Gases Category 1 Ox. Gas 1

H271 May cause fire or explosion; strong oxidiser Oxidising Liquids

Oxidising Solids

Category 1 Ox. Liq. 1, Ox. Sol. 1

H272 May intensify fire; oxidiser Category 2

Category 3

Ox. Liq. 2, Ox. Sol. 2

Ox. Liq. 3, Ox. Sol. 3

H280 Contains gas under pressure; may explode if heated Gases under

pressure

Compressed gas

Liquefied gas

Dissolved gas

Press. Gas

H281 Contains refrigerated gas; may cause cryogenic burns or

injury

Refrigerated gas Press. Gas

H290 Corrosive to metals, Hazard Category 1 Corrosive to metals Category 1 Met. Corr. 1

H300 Fatal if swallowed

Acute toxicity

Category 1

Category 2

Acute Tox. 1

Acute Tox. 2

H301 Toxic if swallowed Category 3 Acute Tox. 3

H302 Harmful if swallowed Category 4 Acute Tox. 4

H304 May be fatal if swallowed and enters airways Aspiration toxicity Category 1 Asp. Tox. 1

H310 Fatal in contact with skin Acute toxicity

Category 1

Category 2

Acute Tox. 1

Acute Tox. 2

H311 Toxic in contact with skin Category 3 Acute Tox. 3

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H312 Harmful in contact with skin Category 4 Acute Tox. 4

H314 Causes severe skin burns and eye damage Skin corrosion /

irritation

Category 1A, 1B, 1C Skin Corr. 1A, 1B, 1C

H315 Causes skin irritation Category 2 Skin Irr. 2

H317 May cause an allergic skin reaction

Sensitisation of the

respiratory tract or

the skin

Category 1 and Sub-

Categories 1A and 1B

Skin. Sens. 1, 1A or 1B

H318 Causes serious eye damage Serious eye damage

/ eye irritation

Category 1 Eye Dam. 1

H319 Causes serious eye irritation Category 2 Eye Irr. 2

H330 Fatal if inhaled

Acute toxicity

Category 1

Category 2

Acute Tox. 1

Acute Tox. 2

H331 Toxic if inhaled Category 3 Acute Tox. 3

H332 Harmful if inhaled Category 4 Acute Tox. 4

H334 May cause allergy or asthma symptoms or breathing

difficulties if inhaled

Sensitisation of the

respiratory tract or

the skin

Category 1 and Sub-


Resp. Sens. 1, 1A or 1B

H335 May cause respiratory irritation Specific target organ

toxicity (single

exposure)

Category 3 STOT SE 3

H336 May cause drowsiness or dizziness Category 3 STOT SE 3

H340 May cause genetic defects Germ cell

mutagenicity

Category 1 and Sub-


Muta. 1, 1A or 1B

H341 Suspected of causing genetic defects Category 2 Muta. 2

H350 May cause cancer

Carcinogenicity

Category 1 and Sub-


Carc. 1, 1A or 1B

H350i May cause cancer when inhaled

H351 Suspected of causing cancer Category 2 Carc. 2

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H360 May damage fertility or the unborn child. Reproductive toxicity

Category 1 and Sub-


Repr. 1, 1A or 1B

H361 Suspected of damaging fertility or the unborn child Category 2 Repr. 2

H362 May cause harm to breast-fed children Reproductive toxicity

Additional category for

effects on or via

lactation

Lact.

H370 Causes damage to organs Specific target organ

toxicity (single

exposure)

Category 1 STOT SE 1

H371 May cause damage to organs Category 2 STOT SE 2

H372 Causes damage to organs through prolonged or repeated

exposure Specific target organ

toxicity (repeated

exposure)

Category 1 STOT RE 1

H373 May cause damage to organs through prolonged or repeated

exposure

Category 2 STOT RE 2

H400 Very toxic to aquatic life

Hazardous to the

aquatic environment

Acute Category 1 Aquatic Acute 1

H410 Very toxic to aquatic life with long lasting effects Chronic Category 1 Aquatic Chronic 1

H411 Toxic to aquatic life with long lasting effects Chronic Category 2 Aquatic Chronic 2

H412 Harmful to aquatic life with long lasting effects Chronic Category 3 Aquatic Chronic 3

H413 May cause long lasting harmful effects to aquatic life Chronic Category 4 Aquatic Chronic 4

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END OF REPORT

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COMAH LAND USE PLANNING ASSESSMENT OF PROPOSED …Authority to COMAH Risk-based Land-use Planning...

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Transcript of COMAH LAND USE PLANNING ASSESSMENT OF PROPOSED …Authority to COMAH Risk-based Land-use Planning...