Colombia Internacional No. 75

Catalina Arreaza es Master in International Affairs de The New School y coordinadora del Centro de Estudios Internacionales de la Universidad de los Andes.Angelika Rettberg, PhD, es directora del Departamento de Ciencia Política de la Universidad de los Andes.

Digital Object Identificationhttp://dx.doi.org/10.7440/colombint75.2012.01

7ColombiaInternacional 75, enero a junio de 2012: 6-15

EditorialCatalina Arreaza • Angelika Rettberg

En un reciente viaje a Latinoamérica, la directora del Fondo Monetario Internacional, Christine Lagarde, señaló que el mundo estaba siendo testigo de un importante cambio en el balance del poder económico. Sin el apoyo de los mercados emergentes, indicó, la recuperación de la economía global sería prácticamente imposible. Uno de los principales motores de esta transformación es la economía china. De acuerdo con las cifras oficiales del Banco Mundial, la República Popular China (RPC) registró un crecimiento anual de su PIB del 10,4% en 2010, y se ubicó en 2011 como la segunda economía más grande del mundo, después de Estados Unidos.

El surgimiento de China como potencia económica mun-dial ha estado acompañado de una mayor visibilidad de su papel de liderazgo en el sistema internacional y ha generado alianzas estratégicas con otras economías emergentes y países en vías de desarrollo. Además de su rol de líder regional en el Asia Pacífico, China ha institucionalizado sus relaciones de cooperación con otras regiones como África y Latinoamérica y el Caribe, a través de espacios como el Foro sobre Cooperación China- África (Focac, por su sigla en inglés), impulsado en 1996 por el presidente chino Jiang Zemin en una visita al continente; la Organización de los Estados Americanos, en la cual parti-cipa como Estado observador; y el Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, del cual es miembro permanente.

Otro elemento importante del desenvolvimiento actual de China en el sistema internacional lo constituyen las fuertes re-laciones bilaterales que ha establecido con socios extrarregiona-les. En el caso del continente africano, estados como Sudáfrica y la República Democrática del Congo no sólo mantienen

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COLINT 75, enero a junio de 2012: 6-15

relaciones económicas y comerciales cercanas con China, sino también alianzas políticas importantes en foros multilaterales como la Organización de las Naciones Unidas (Alden 2012).

En el caso de América Latina, las relaciones se han hecho cada vez más estrechas. China es el segundo socio comercial de Brasil y el primer socio comercial de Chile, con quien tiene un tratado de libre comercio desde 2005. Perú y Costa Rica también han fir-mado acuerdos de libre comercio con China, y México y Colombia mantienen dinámicas relaciones de comercio bilateral. En efecto, en 2010 el comercio entre China y Colombia registró un aumento del 500%, equivalente a US$250 millones en ventas (Embajada de la República Popular China en la República de Colombia, 2010). Comparativamente, en el mismo período las exportaciones a EE. UU. crecieron 19%, y China es ahora el tercer socio comercial de Colombia, después de EE. UU. y la Unión Europea.

En este sentido, resulta evidente el papel de polo y foco de crecimiento económico que China ha desarrollado globalmen-te, pero poco sabemos sobre las implicaciones políticas de ese fenómeno en regiones periféricas como la latinoamericana. ¿En qué medida la expansión comercial viene acompañada de una agenda política? ¿En ausencia de una agenda explícita, la actividad económica tiene implicaciones políticas en los gobiernos, en las sociedades de la región? ¿Cuáles son esas im-plicaciones? ¿Cuál ha sido la experiencia de otras regiones del mundo y cuál es el papel de China de cara a Estados Unidos, el país hegemón de mayor trayectoria en Latinoamérica?

Con el fin de abordar estos interrogantes, el Centro de Estudios Internacionales (CEI) del Departamento de Ciencia Política y de la Escuela de Gobierno Alberto Lleras Camargo de la Universidad de los Andes realizó en septiembre de 2010 el seminario internacional “China y sus relaciones políticas con América Latina”. Para la ocasión, reunimos a diez expertos nacionales e internacionales en la materia que examinaron desde diversos puntos de vista los beneficios

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Catalina Arreaza • Angelika Rettberg

ColombiaInternacional 75, enero a junio de 2012: 6-15

y desafíos de la cada vez más significativa presencia de la potencia asiática en Latinoamérica. Durante el evento conta-mos con la participación de Christopher Alden, profesor de Relaciones Internacionales del London School of Economics and Political Science; Sandra Borda, profesora asociada del Departamento de Ciencia Política de la Universidad de los Andes; Han Zhaoying, subdirector del Instituto Confucio en la Universidad del Sur de Florida y profesor de Relaciones Internacionales de la Escuela de Gobierno “Zhou Enlai” de la Universidad de Nankai en China; Ralf J. Leiteritz, Profesor asociado de la Facultad de Relaciones Internacionales de la Universidad del Rosario; Carol Wise, profesora asociada de Relaciones Internacionales de la Universidad del Sur de California; y Song Xinning, Investigador del Programa de Estudios Comparativos Regionales y de Integración de la Universidad de las Naciones Unidas en Bruselas, Bélgica y Profesor “Jean Monnet” para estudios de integración europea de la Universidad de Renmin en Beijing. Como comentaris-tas, contamos con la participación de Diana Andrea Gómez, profesora asociada del Departamento de Ciencia Política de la Universidad Nacional de Colombia; Pío García Parra, profesor e investigador de la Facultad de Finanzas, Gobierno y Relaciones Internacionales de la Universidad Externado de Colombia; y Enrique Posada, director del Observatorio Virtual Asia Pacífico de la Universidad Jorge Tadeo Lozano. Adicionalmente, nos acompañaron como moderadores Angelika Rettberg, directora del Departamento de Ciencia Política y entonces del Centro de Estudios Internacionales (CEI); Benjamin Creutzfeldt, profesor e investigador en estu-dios sobre China contemporánea de la Facultad de Finanzas, Gobierno y Relaciones Internacionales de la Universidad Externado de Colombia; y Carlos Caballero Argáez, director de la Escuela de Gobierno Alberto Lleras Camargo de la Universidad de los Andes.

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Para el desarrollo de la conferencia contamos con el apoyo invaluable de importantes socios como el Instituto Confucio del Departamento de Lenguajes y Estudios Socioculturales y la Facultad de Ciencias Sociales de la Universidad de los Andes; el Consejo Británico; la Embajada de los Estados Unidos de América; y el Centro de Estudios de Integración Regional de la Universidad de las Naciones Unidas (UNU-CRIS).

Este número especial de la revista Colombia Internacional ofrece una selección de las ponencias presentadas durante el evento. Los autores dan cuenta de la diversidad de intereses que explican el acercamiento entre la región latinoamerica-na y la República Popular China durante los últimos veinte años. A grandes rasgos, los trabajos destacan y discuten seis motivaciones: la apetencia de materias primas por parte de China y su creciente preocupación por asegurar el acceso a recursos energéticos y alimentarios; la búsqueda de nuevos socios comerciales y flujos de inversión extranjera directa por parte de Latinoamérica; el común interés en la modificación del balance de poder en las instituciones multilaterales y en la arquitectura financiera internacional; el fortalecimiento de alianzas estratégicas en torno a temas como la soberanía estatal y el desempeño en derechos humanos; el interés chino en consolidar su política de “Un solo país” en una región que mantiene lazos diplomáticos con Taiwán; y la coincidencia entre el declive del interés de Estados Unidos en la región y la movilización política de algunos gobiernos latinoamericanos hacia la izquierda y su rechazo a la hegemonía estadounidense en las relaciones políticas y económicas del hemisferio.

Con el fin de situar los intereses chinos en Latinoamérica dentro de un contexto global, Christopher Alden abre la edi-ción con un artículo que revisa las relaciones de la potencia asiática con el continente africano. Alden realiza un recuento detallado de los intereses que han influenciado la fuerte mo-vilización de recursos de inversión de la República Popular

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China, entre los cuales se cuenta el aprovechamiento de la ventaja comparativa de África en sectores como la agricultu-ra, la minería, los hidrocarburos y el creciente mercado para bienes manufacturados de bajo costo. Así mismo, nos recuerda que si bien China representa un flujo continuo de recursos de inversión directa para el continente que ha redundado en me-gaproyectos de desarrollo y en un crecimiento significativo de sectores como el minero energético, la presencia china, com-binada con un pobre desarrollo institucional de las naciones receptoras de la inversión, ha repercutido negativamente no sólo en la balanza comercial del continente sino también en el desarrollo de medidas de control político y económico por parte de la sociedad civil a sus estados. En palabras del autor, la relación entre China y África se ha caracterizado por la ex-portación de muchas de sus características nacionales, como prácticas financieras y de negocios opacas, y esto incluye una sociedad civil débil cuyos límites de acción están circunscritos en gran medida por el Estado.

Por su parte, Ralf Leiteritz hace un análisis sobre los me-canismos a través de los cuales la República Popular China prefiere ejercer su poder de influencia en la región latinoame-ricana. Según Leiteritz, a diferencia del enfoque tradicional de las potencias occidentales que se han apoyado tanto en el poder coercitivo como en el poder suave, China ha mantenido su doctrina de “emergencia pacífica”, privilegiando estrategias económicas, culturales y diplomáticas para introducirse como un actor importante en Latinoamérica. En este sentido, la polí-tica exterior de China se ejerce sin pretensiones de interferen-cia en los asuntos domésticos de los estados, y se enfoca, más bien, en establecer alianzas de cooperación que logren ganan-cias para ambas partes. En el caso latinoamericano, la política del poder suave tiende a ser la tendencia escogida por China, dado que la región representa no sólo acceso a recursos natu-rales y un mercado importante para sus manufacturas, sino

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también un potencial aliado en la transformación del sistema de gobernanza global, así como un reto para la consolidación de su política de “Un solo país”, dada la insistencia de algunas naciones latinoamericanas en sostener relaciones políticas y económicas con Taiwán. Finalmente, el autor sostiene que si bien la potencia asiática no busca de manera explícita desafiar la hegemonía estadounidense en el hemisferio occidental, su creciente importancia como socio comercial de la región sí podría contribuir al debilitamiento progresivo de la influencia de Estados Unidos sobre América Latina.

La congruencia de intereses políticos en el sistema multi-lateral entre algunas naciones latinoamericanas y la República Popular China es retomada en detalle por Sandra Borda y María Paz Berger. Específicamente, las autoras se enfocan en Colombia y su historial de votación en la Asamblea General de Naciones Unidas en resoluciones relacionadas con violaciones a los dere-chos humanos, y su amplia coincidencia con las posiciones asu-midas por China. Entre los principales hallazgos reseñados en el artículo se encuentra que entre 1990 y 2010, en resoluciones condenatorias a estados (diferentes a Israel) por violaciones a los derechos humanos, el voto negativo de Colombia coincidió en un 91% con el voto de China, en contraste con un 5% de coinciden-cia con el de Estados Unidos. En lo referente a las resoluciones en contra de las violaciones ejercidas por el Estado de Israel, la similitud se amplía, coincidiendo el voto condenatorio de China y Colombia en el 94% de las ocasiones. Esta tendencia lleva a las autoras a concluir que Colombia encuentra en China una “zona de comodidad” que le permite protegerse de las presiones internacio-nales ejercidas en su contra en el área de los derechos humanos.

En el cuarto artículo de la serie, Carol Wise compara los acuerdos comerciales establecidos recientemente por Perú y Chile con la República Popular China y Estados Unidos, y en particular, en lo que atañe a su enfoque y sus implicaciones

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políticas. Para la autora, es posible diferenciar los acuerdos de libre comercio con cada una de las potencias, según su enfo-que: mientras que los tratados de libre comercio establecidos con Estados Unidos por parte de Chile y Perú son acuerdos de orden posindustrial, es decir, con un enfoque mayoritario en el sector de los servicios (sean estos financieros, bancarios, de co-municaciones o farmacéuticos), los acuerdos con la República Popular China giran en torno a la “vieja agenda” comercial: materias primas, manufacturas, textiles, etc. La diferencia de enfoques obedecería tanto a los intereses de las dos potencias como a una estrategia desarrollada por Perú y Chile que Wise ha identificado como una liberalización comercial “a la carta”. Según la autora, el colapso de espacios de negociación regional y multilateral como el Área de Libre Comercio de las Américas (ALCA), en 2005, y la ronda de Doha de la Organización Mundial del Comercio, al año siguiente, impulsó una tenden-cia en América Latina hacia el bilateralismo comercial. Siendo Chile y Perú dos de las naciones suramericanas con mayor índice de liberalización en sus mercados y estando en la bús-queda de afianzarse como puertos o hubs comerciales hacia el Pacífico, resulta evidente para Wise que los dos países hayan implementado una aproximación con este nivel de pragma-tismo. Sin embargo, la autora señala una serie de retos que emanan de esta estrategia y que han de ser tenidos en cuenta por las dos naciones. Si bien la liberalización “a la carta” ha significado una ampliación de los flujos de inversión extranjera directa, Chile y Perú deben buscar satisfacer las demandas in-ternas de su población por un mejor acceso al mercado laboral y al sistema educativo; mejorar su eficiencia productiva y for-mular políticas de competitividad acordes con las demandas de los tratados comerciales; y finalmente, cuidarse de generar excesiva dependencia en el modelo de exportaciones del sector primario que tanto interés genera en la RPC.

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En resumen, los cuatro artículos incluidos en este número especial de Colombia Internacional ofrecen un riguroso análisis de los determinantes detrás de la relación entre América Latina y la República Popular China. Los estudios de caso aquí presen-tados examinan con detenimiento las ventajas y desventajas de una interacción política que ha sido pocas veces abordada por la literatura internacionalista. Así, a partir de múltiples puntos de vista, los autores demuestran que, a pesar de que el acerca-miento entre la segunda economía del mundo y Latinoamérica es relativamente reciente, éste no deja de ser un fenómeno consensuado, sistemático y con fuertes tendencias hacia su expansión y consolidación. Esperamos que este volumen sirva como referencia para futuras aproximaciones a este complejo e inquietante objeto de estudio.

Este número también incluye una reseña del libro Democracias precarias. Trayectorias políticas divergentes en Colombia y Venezuela de Ana María Bejarano, preparada por Cristina Echeverri y Bibiana Ortega, estudiantes doctorales del Departamento de Ciencia Política. La reseña representa un valioso y didáctico insumo para quienes estudian la política colombiana y la política comparada andina.

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REFERENCIAS

1. Alden, Chris. 2012. China and Africa: A Distant Mirror for Latin Ame-

rica? Revista Colombia Internacional 75, 20-49.

2. Embajada de la República Popular China en la República de Colombia.

2010. Exportaciones colombianas a China crecieron más de 500 por ciento en

primeros dos meses 2010. Oficina del Consejero Económico-Comercial de la

Embajada de la República Popular China en la República de Colombia. http://

co2.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/chinanews/201004/20100406878730.html


China y África: un espejo distante para América Latina1

Chris AldenLondon School of Economics and Political Science

RESUMENLa profundidad y la forma del posicionamiento chino en África están bien establecidas en el sector de los recursos naturales y se reflejan en las relaciones comerciales, la inversión y la diplomacia china en la región. De la mano de la creciente diversidad de actores chinos presentes en el continente –que va desde empresas estatales hasta microempresarios–, la creciente presencia china en África da luces sobre las dinámicas que también se evidencian en otras regiones en desarrollo ricas en recursos naturales como América Latina. Este artículo examina el rol de China en África en detalle, con particular énfasis en Sudáfrica, y reflexiona sobre cómo estas experiencias podrían reflejar tendencias emergentes en las relaciones chino-latinoamericanas.

PALABRAS CLAVEChina-África • política exterior china • comercio e inversión chinos • recursos africanos • política exterior sudafricana

China and Africa: A Distant Mirror of Latin America

ABSTRACTThe depth and form of China’s engagement with Africa is well-established in the resource sector and reflected in its trade, investment and diplomacy towards the region. Coupled with the growing diversity of Chinese actors present in the continent - which ranges from state-owned enterprises to small-scale entrepreneurs - the expanding Chinese presence in Africa provides insights into the dynamics that are evident in other resource-rich developing regions such as Latin America. This article examines in detail China’s role in Africa, with particular emphasis on South Africa, and considers how these experiences might reflect emerging trends in Chinese-Latin American relations.

KEYWORDSChina-Africa • Chinese foreign policy • Chinese trade and investment • African resources • South African foreign policy

1 This paper is based on a presentation delivered at the conference “Las relaciones políticas entre China y América Latina”, Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá, September 22, 2010.

Chris Alden, PhD, is Co-Head of the Africa International Affairs Programme at LSE IDEAS. Dr Alden is a Reader in International Relations at the LSE.




Chris AldenLondon School of Economics and Political Science

INTRODUCTION

The rise of China, from stalwart of revolution in the 1950s to global eco-nomic and political actor in the last decade, is one of the defining features of the 21st Century. The initial praise of the leading industrialized economies of the North for China’s gradualist shift to a market economy has evolved into a chorus bemoaning its impact on their trade competitiveness and growing concern as they are upstaged internationally by Beijing. These developments are most clearly visible in Africa, a once-forgotten continent that had been languishing on the margins of the international agenda since the ending of the Cold War. China’s forthright engagement with the African continent, built upon its historical support for independence struggles and, increasingly, on the economic power wielded by Beijing, has helped re-ignite continental economies through new investment and trade opportunities as well as restor-ing African political agency within the international system.

Latin America is a developing region that shares some fundamental characteristics with Africa. However, it retains distinctive features in crucial aspects of its historical, economic and political position both as a region and within the international system. It is itself increasingly the object of Chinese interests. Since the late 1990s, the growing trade and investment linkages be-tween China and Latin America have assumed greater importance and have

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been the object of overt activism by the Chinese government. In particular, the contemporary trade and investment patterns between China and Latin America, driven in the first instance by the resource-seeking conduct of Chinese firms, seem to replicate the trade and investment patterns that have developed between China and Africa. This suggests that there are parallels to be found in Africa’s own experience of decades of engagement with China, with its drive for resources and markets, its forms of diplomatic activism and the proliferation of Chinese actors in the region. These experiences can offer insights into the process currently occurring in the Latin American region, and also highlight some important differences.

This article examines China’s engagement with continental Africa2 as a ‘mirror’ for Latin America. That is to say, it examines the African experience with China as a vehicle for understanding key features of Chinese policy to-wards developing regions as a whole, including an analysis of the role played by an increasingly diverse set of Chinese actors in shaping the implementa-tion of policy. It does not detail the Latin American case, but does make some general analytical observations concerning possible parallels.

First, the article examines the sources of Chinese engagement with Africa; second, the proliferation of Chinese actors on the African continent; third, the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) process, the diplomatic cornerstone of the relationship; and fourth, the particular case of Chinese-South African relations. The article concludes with an assessment of the new trends in the relationship.

1. THE SOURCES OF CHINESE ENGAGEMENT WITH AFRICA

Since the onset of economic reform in 1978, China has had an unmatched record of sustained growth that has transformed key sectors of its economy, and converted it into the leading site for manufacturing and production in the global economy. To maintain the high levels of domestic output that are considered crucial not only for the Chinese economy but for overall social

2 Chinese institutions do not follow the distinction between sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa, hence the use of “continental Africa” in this article.

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and political stability, the economy requires critical energy, mineral and others resources from abroad.3 The promulgation of the government’s ‘going out’ strategy, whereby ultimately over a hundred restructured state-owned enterprises were given the legal and administrative means, preferential access to finance, and diplomatic support necessary to break into markets outside China, has been the main policy response to this need. Given that, in the aftermath of the global financial crisis in 2008, China has become the world’s largest holder of capital, with over US$2.4 trillion in foreign reserves, it was, in retrospect, a fairly straight forward task to carve out a position in the energy and strategic minerals markets in the capital-starved African environment. Concurrently, the willingness of the Chinese government to provide a whole package of inducements alongside a range of leasing or sup-ply agreements designed to meet elite-defined needs (ranging from presiden-tial palaces to large-scale infrastructure projects), has proved to be crucial to securing deals in Africa.4 Underlying this approach is a highly publicized provision whereby the Chinese government forswears any interest in the domestic affairs of African governments, in direct contrast to the European Union (EU) or the United States (US), both of which have selectively applied conditions to their development assistance programmers and even to some investments. In parallel with this state-led drive for resources abroad is a search for new markets aimed at expanding the investment and trade op-portunities for Chinese firms, though the relatively small size of the African market imposes some constraints on Chinese ambitions. Finally, there is a diplomatic imperative, tied to the decades of competition between Beijing and the Taiwanese government in Taipei over official recognition, within which countries in Africa are particular targets.

a. Resource Security

China’s position within Africa’s resource sector has surged in the last decade and a half, from that of a marginal player to a holder of significant

3 See, for instance, Downs (2004, 21-41); Soares de Oliveira (2008, 83-109).

4 For further details, see Alden (2007, 11-36).

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interests in oil leases from Angola to Sudan and mining concessions from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to South Africa. Its two-way trade with Africa, which reached US$127 billion in 2010, is overwhelmingly based on the extraction of oil, strategic minerals and a few other raw materials, which are exchanged for manufactured goods.5 Reflecting these trends, in 1993 China went from a leading Asian oil exporter to, a few years later, the second largest world consumer (2003) and third global importer of oil (2004). This evolution alone justifies the reallocation of energy security to the core of Beijing’s foreign policy formulation6 since, as David Zweig and Bi Jianhai point out, not only is China’s continued economic growth dependent on se-curing the supply of resources but so too is its social stability and, ultimately, the survival of the Communist Party of China (CPC).

Despite featuring among the major oil producers (with 4.8% share of world’s production)7 and coming second only to the US in refinery capacity and output (8.5% and 8.7% respectively),8 China is able to provide for less than half of its domestic oil needs.9 Additionally, China accounted for 9.3% of world’s oil consumption in 2007 (still lagging far behind the world’s major oil consumer, the US, which consumes 24%) and 10.2% of total oil imports (third after the US, which has a 33.9% share, and Japan with 12.5%).10 China’s oil consumption has doubled in the last decade and according to OPEC its oil demand will show the world’s fastest growth rate in the coming decades,

5 See Pinaud et al. (2006).

6 For a detailed account on the emergence of energy security as the major driver of China’s Foreign Policy see: Zweig and Jianhai (2005).

7 China is the fifth largest producer after Saudi Arabia and the Russian Federation (both with 12.6%), USA (8%) and Iran (5.4%). Data taken from BP. 2008. Review of World Energy, http://www.bp.com/productlanding.do?categoryId=6929&contentId=7044622, p. 9.

8 US refinery capacity and output share are 20% of total, over twice China’s share. Data from BP (2008, 18).

9 According to BP, in 2007 China produced 3,7 million b/d and consumed 8,2 million b/d. In BP (2008, 9 and 11).

10 BP (2008, 11).

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doubling again by 2030 when it is expected to consume over 15 million b/d.11 China itself is currently responsible for 30% of global oil demand growth.12

Although China became a net oil importer in 1993 it was not until the new century that energy security became a question of central political im-portance. Although other energy sources such as coal, natural gas, nuclear energy, hydropower, and alternative fuels are important to this debate, oil is China’s principal concern since it represents its largest external reliance. As Erica Downs points out, if the question in the 1990s was whether Beijing would have the financial means to secure the oil supply it needed, in the 2000s the issue became if there would be enough oil available on the inter-national market to supply China (Downs 2006 15). Furthermore, concerns about growing instability in the Middle East encouraged a diversification strategy which, because of the inherent complementarities, swiftly placed Africa high in Beijing’s list of new suppliers. Uneasiness about the matter among the political elite has continued to grow in recent years as illustrated by the creation of the Energy Leading Group in 2005 (a coordination body headed by premier Wen Jiabao), the publication of a White Paper on Energy (‘China’s Energy Conditions and Policies’)13 in December 2007 and the White Paper on Diplomacy (July 2008) whose first chapter is on ‘The issue of energy security during the period of high oil prices’ (Hsiao 2008).

In order to sustain its economic growth, China also became externally dependent on other sectors of the extractive industry, further justifying its growing economic interaction with the African continent in the new century. Over the past decade China has surpassed the US to become the world’s lead-ing consumer of most base metals. Chinese demand has been growing at a rate over 10% a year since 1990, having intensified in recent years (Brett and Ericsson 2006, 22) and has become the major driver behind the soaring prices of metals in the international market. China is the world’s largest consumer

11 OPEC (2009, 46), http://www.opec.org/library/world%20oil%20outlook/WorldOilOutlook08.htm.

12 OPEC (2009, 47).

13 Available online at: http://www.china.org.cn/english/environment/236955.htm

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and producer of aluminium, iron ore, lead and zinc and is a significant actor in all other mineral markets.

Finally, food security itself is becoming an area of great concern for China. The years of rapid economic development have, for the first time in decades, exposed China to the vagaries of supply and to market constraints in agri-cultural commodities. In terms of overall agricultural imports, China is the Asian region’s leading consumer, importing 44% of the world’s soybeans, 35% of cotton, 20% of palm oil and 2.5% of rice, with Japanese, Indian and South Korean demand trailing in its wake. Consumption patterns in China have changed dramatically since the gradualist introduction of market capitalism, and Chinese total caloric intake (2,258 calories in 2003, of which 423 was meat) has risen to levels equivalent to the US (2,736 calories in 2003, of which 446 was meat). Rising domestic demand might have been expected to open up opportunities to expand local agricultural production. But China’s physi-cal constraints – despite its geographical size, it has only 7% of the world’s arable land – and the fact that rapid industrialization and its accompanying urbanization have removed tens of thousands of hectares of fertile land from productive activity. The result has been a steady rise in food imports which, combined with Chinese (and Indian) energy needs, has pushed food prices up world-wide. For China in particular, the fear that inflation and dwindling supplies might contribute to the periodic waves of domestic unrest that had begun to gather force was underscored in a report issued by the State Council on food security in 2005, the first year China had been obliged to import large quantities of food since the CPC took over. In response, the National Development Reform Committee produced a 20 year Food Security Strategy whose preliminary findings were released in November 2008. According to the strategy, food security would be guaranteed first and foremost by maintaining 125 million hectares of arable land under production in order to ensure 95% self-sufficiency in grains.14 One outcome of this rising concern was that the government initiated a search for external supplies intended to

14 Cited by Kelley (2009, 94).

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offset the expected shortfalls, echoing to some extent the drive to seek out energy and strategic minerals that had begun in the early 1990s.

b. The African Resource Bounty

Against this backdrop, Africa has assumed a critical role in China’s search for resource security. The African continent possesses a generous endowment of natural resources, especially hydrocarbons, minerals and timber, which remain mostly untapped as a result of decades of political instability, poor in-frastructure and lack of investment. However, Chinese forays into this sector had to take into account the prevailing dominance of established interests, primarily the US, France and the UK, all of which reproduced a pattern of investment that replicated colonial-era divisions refracted through the poli-tics of the Cold War. With the end of the bipolar conflict, economic interests rapidly took center stage, and the geographical spheres of influence which had shaped energy investment gave way to direct competition between, for instance, French and American interests in West Africa.15 Other major pow-ers like Germany and Japan were attracted to the region, but their interests never challenged the established American and French companies. Among the most prominent new-comers are Asian states (China, India, Malaysia and Singapore) and Middle Eastern countries (Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait). This scenario has prepared the ground for growing competition for economic and political influence in the continent in future decades. This is particularly as-tounding given that less than a decade ago Africa was suffering from a sharp decline in interest from its traditional Western partners.

In world-regional terms Africa possesses the third largest oil reserves with an estimated 9.5% of known global deposits in 2007, behind the Middle East (61%) and North America (11.6%) and ahead of South and Central America (8.5%). Noteworthy is the fact that Africa boasts the fastest growth rate in known oil reserves, which have doubled during the past two decades (BP 2009, 6). In sub-regional terms, North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa each account for half of the continent’s known reserves. Libya (35%),

15 For a detailed analysis see: Schraeder (2000, 395-419).

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Nigeria (31%), Algeria (10%), and Angola (8%) possess the largest reserves. In terms of production, Africa occupies fourth place, with a 12.5% share of the world total, with Nigeria as the main African oil producer (25%), fol-lowed by Algeria (21%), Libya (20%) and Angola (18%).16 In recent years the production of the Northern African countries has shown signs of stabiliza-tion while the Sub-Saharan African countries have expanded their share. For instance, Angola has registered the fastest growth rate in production during the past decade, having overtaken Nigeria as Sub-Saharan Africa’s major oil producer in mid-2008.17

Africa’s endowment in non-fuel minerals further complements the at-tractiveness of this picture, in which South Africa appears as a prize since it sits on one of the world’s richest mineral beds. South Africa produces a range of minerals. It is the leading producer of platinum (80% of total produc-tion and 90% of world reserves) and manganese (holding over 75% of world reserves) and the second largest gold producer (overtaken by Australia in 2007). Moreover, South Africa is a major coal producer and has developed the world’s leading technology in converting coal to synfuels, introducing new possibilities for the coal-rich Chinese state. Recognition of this has led to a joint venture between two Chinese firms and the South African parastatal, Sasol (though the deal which was actually suspended in 2011). By way of con-trast, following decades of neglect and internecine conflict, the DRC’s min-eral wealth is notoriously unexploited. Even so, the DRC is the world’s leading cobalt producer (36%) possessing half of the world’s known reserves, and the largest diamond producer (33% of total world production). With South Africa and Botswana it accounts for over half of global diamond mining output and 60% of known deposits.18 Other African countries that possess significant reserves of minerals and which have attracted Chinese interest are Gabon

16 Data adapted from BP (2009, 8).

17 Although Angola’s production has been increasing exponentially, this situation is partly due to increasing unrest in Nigerian southern oil fields.

18 All figures are for 2007 and are based on data in: USGS (2008).

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(manganese), Zambia (copper and iron ore), Zimbabwe (platinum) and Angola (diamonds, copper and iron ore).

Finally, African agriculture and forestry resources remain underdevel-oped. According to the FAO, only 14% of Africa’s total 184 million hectares of available land is under cultivation, with 93% of that dependent upon rainfall; furthermore, fertilizer usage is low.19 African agriculture, which continues to serve as a mainstay of employment in most countries in the continent, suf-fers from low productivity, chronic under-investment and difficulties in ac-cessing potential export markets. To be sure, the environmental constraints on agriculture in much of the continent are considerable, though viewed from a Chinese perspective, the impediments faced are familiar. Private Chinese farmers have already set up farms in Uganda, South Africa and Zambia (23 in the latter case) (Spieldoch and Murphy 2009, 42). while bigger agricultural firms are engaged in negotiations with African governments to lease larger tracts of land for productive purposes. There are also hundreds of thousands of square kilometerss of virgin forest in parts of tropical Africa that have inspired small and medium sized Chinese, Thai and Malaysian companies to set up logging operations – both legal and illegal – across the continent.

Building on these economic complementarities there has been a dramatic surge in trade. Recent flows illustrate the impressive complementarities that uphold this thriving relationship. Between 1995 and 2000 commercial exchange more than doubled from US$4 billion to US$10 billion, and qua-drupled over the following five years (to US$ 42 billion in 2005), surpassing US$106 billion in 200820 - a year earlier than the 2010 target established by Hu Jintao during the FOCAC III summit in Beijing in 2006. Even with the inevitable downturn that came in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2008, trade soon regained its momentum, reaching US$127 billion in 2010.

19 Jacque Diouf, Director General of Food and Agriculture Organization, 19 June 2008, www.allafrica.com.

20 Figures according to data of the Chinese Ministry of Commerce available at http://eng-lish.mofcom.gov.cn/article/statistic/ie/200802/20080205371690.html and WTO Data in: http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2006_e/appendix_e/a14.xls

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South Africa’s leading bank, Standard Bank, has forecast growth to an ex-traordinary $300 billion by 2015.21

At the same time, the onset of the world’s worst economic crisis since the Great Depression has challenged the new-found certainties of Chinese engagement in Africa. Some analysts are already declaring that the with-drawal of dozens of Chinese firms from the mining sector and Beijing’s push to re-open negotiations on the purported US$9 billion investment package in the DRC are signs that the high water mark of China-Africa economic ties has been reached. The proposed loan to the DRC has itself been the subject of intense criticism by Western donors and the IMF, who were able to pres-sure Kinshasa and Beijing to revise it downwards to US$6 billion in February 2009.22 The pessimistic interpretation is, however, misplaced: China’s involve-ment in Africa remains a priority, albeit one which is subject to changing international and domestic economic circumstances as well as the emergence of a reconsideration of risk in selected African environments.

c. New Markets and Diplomacy

Though resource security impulses are at the forefront of the contempo-rary push into Africa, with China’s energy sector State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) taking the lead, the desire to benefit from commercial opportunities by expanding trade into African markets has also played an important role. In part, the policy of using Chinese finance to support Chinese construction firms building infrastructure in Africa represents a concerted strategy of risk mitigation and, concurrently, provides incentives for domestic firms to ‘go out’ and seek opportunities abroad. Indeed, survey data suggests that once established in the African market, Chinese firms ‘anticipated that they will secure further contracts.’ (Davies and Corkin 2007, 246). The over-supply of infrastructure firms and labor within China itself provided an additional rationale for this expansion into new markets. The appeal for

21 “China’s investment in Africa to increase to $50 billion by 2015, bank says”, Bloomberg (22 February 2011), www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-22/chin-s-investment -inafrica-to-increase-to-50 -billion-by-2015-bank-says.html

22 Cited in Lokongo (2009), www.pambazuka.org

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African governments of the approach, despite the concerns around the use of Chinese labor voiced in some circles, was that these were ‘turkey opera-tions’ that placed few demands on the African recipients and produced in short order a relatively inexpensive and functioning road or railroad sys-tem, bridge or dam (Fletcher 2010, 7).

Another driver is the need of Chinese manufacturing firms to find new outlets for their products, especially those at the low end of the consumer market, which, - losing favor domestically and with little appeal in sophisti-cated Western markets - contributed to a surge in two-way trade (Broadman 2007). With manufacturing accounting for 32% of China’s GDP and 89% of its merchandise exports by 2005, and with the exacerbating factor of rising labor costs in Southeast China, the importance of opening up new opportunities abroad was paramount (Biacuana et al. 2009, 10). At a different level, a new wave of Chinese migrants to Africa has opened up wholesale and retail shops across the continent, bringing low cost goods to the African consumer and contributing to a boom in the purchase of items such as bicycles, radios and watches that were once out of the reach of the majority of the population.23

More traditional diplomatic concerns also influenced the Chinese move into Africa. These included the longstanding competition with Taiwan for diplomatic recognition. Taiwan had been successful over the years in retain-ing or winning recognition from a number of African states (Rawnsley 2000). Beijing’s drive to isolate Taipei internationally meant that it actively sought to provide inducements for African governments to reconsider their links with Taiwan. Finally, as pressure increased on China to play a more activist role on the global stage, the need to seek out partnerships with like-minded states became imperative. Africa’s position as a friendly environment for Beijing was underscored by the unwillingness of African countries to join in the Western sanctions campaign that followed in the wake of Tiananmen Square, and its support for China in international forums as varied as the International Olympic Committee (where African votes helped secure Beijing’s hosting of the 2008 Olympics) and the UN Human Rights Commission. Sharing a

23 See, for instance, Dittigen (2010); Yoon (2009); Dobler (2008).

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common view on sovereignty and human rights – though one that was argu-ably in the process of changing as a result of developments in the African Union and the emergence of the Responsibility to Protect – enabled China to work in tandem on many issues with the largest regional voting bloc in the UN (cited in Chris Alden 2007, 16). To address these complex diplomatic ends, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs established the multilateral Forum for China-Africa Cooperation in 2000.

2. THE CHINESE IN AFRICA: FROM STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES TO RETAIL

SHOPKEEPERS

It is important to capture the diversity of China’s engagement in Africa if the complex and sometimes contradictory reactions that its presence inspires across the continent are to be understood. Ranging from global parastatals like CNOOC to thousands of retails shops, the Chinese have made inroads in the economic life of ordinary Africans in an extraor-dinarily short period of time. Moreover, the rapidity with which these Chinese actors adapt to changing circumstances in Africa –to an extent itself a product of the fast pace of change in China – continually challenges assumptions about their standing in Africa.

At the sharp end of China’s engagement in Africa are a host of SOEs which have sought to gain access to resources and markets formerly domi-nated by Western and South African firms. Using a package of high-profile diplomatic and substantive financial incentives, these SOEs have been able to secure leases for oil exploration in Angola, Sudan and Nigeria as well as deals for access to strategic minerals in countries such as Gabon, the DRC and Zimbabwe. According to one study, the proximity of the top management of these SOEs to leading party officials ‘affords certain strategic SOEs vital political connections and a measure of input into foreign policy decisions per-taining to their particular business interests’ (Jakobson and Know 2010, 26). For developmentally-minded African leaders, the attractiveness of Chinese support for infrastructure development, an area neglected by traditional Western donors in recent decades, is rooted in the visible and immediate impact transportation and communication provision has on enhancing the economic potential in their respective countries and improving livelihoods

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within affected communities. These ‘resources for infrastructure’ deals, often involving billions of dollars’ worth of low interest concessional loans from the China Export Import Bank, have been carried out for the most part by Chinese construction firms whose use of Chinese contracted laborers and even basic supplies has been criticized in some African circles.

Moreover, the overall competitiveness of Chinese firms has meant that, once exposed to the African environment, they have been able to capture a growing portion of the open tenders for infrastructure projects. According to one study, Chinese construction firms have succeeded in recent years in winning 30% of the combined value of infrastructure contracts tendered by the African Development Bank and World Bank (Foster et al. 2007, 5-6). This trend is evident in the conduct of Chinese infrastructure and engineering firms operating in Africa as early as 1988 where, in countries like Liberia, for example, the China State Construction Engineering Corporation was able to stay on and win contracts from the Liberian government to reno-vate the local hospital (Brautigam 1998, 214). Contemporary examples of Chinese construction firms that have entered African markets via a Chinese financed-project before winning public tenders abound. Furthermore, as their personal contracts are completed, an undetermined number of Chinese laborers brought in to work on these construction projects has stayed on in Africa to seek out employment opportunities, joining the swell of migrants opening small businesses.

Indeed, while Chinese SOEs capture the attention of the international media, there is an equivalent drive by small and medium enterprises (SMEs) into the continent which is just as prevalent and is arguably having as much of an impact as the aspiring multinationals. Many of the medium-sized companies are drawn from the ranks of the reformed SOE sector, which has been undergoing a painful restructuring process that has cut it back from 300,000 to 150,000 firms over the last decade (CSIS/IIE 2006, 23-24).24 In some cases, these businesses were motivated by a desire on the part

24 At a cost of 25 million unemployed, this sector having formerly employed 80% of all of Chinese workers.

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of a relatively large Chinese company to establish foreign subsidiaries so as to guarantee access to Western markets should protectionism take root (Hong and Sun 2006, 624). For many smaller businesses, the motivation, as noted above, has been to make use of China’s competitive advantage rela-tive to African and other foreign companies, based on their control of rela-tively advanced technologies and cost-effective production (Hong and Sun 2006, 625). This market-seeking impulse is borne out in surveys conducted with 80 Chinese SMEs working in Africa, which ranked gaining access to the continent’s markets as their top priority (Gu 2009, 570-585). Analysts suggest that over 20,000 Chinese SMEs are operating on the continent, increasingly focused on middle income countries (Gu 2009, 570-585).

At the same time, the poor conduct of some Chinese firms operating in Africa has threatened to tarnish the overall reputation of the country. For instance, the willingness of a number of Chinese mining companies based in Katanga province, DRC, to ignore basic health and safety regulations, local labor laws and even industry environmental standards has brought down a rain of criticism.25 The fact that the collapse in commodity prices in late 2008 caused many of these companies to pull out of the DRC only highlights their opportunistic and exploitative character. In Zambia, which many Chinese consider an exemplary African partner, the poor practices of a leading Chinese mining firm resulted in a flurry of accidental deaths in 2006 and, more recently, the shooting of African laborers by Chinese managers during a labor dispute. These practices have led the political opposition to use anti-Chinese feeling as a mobilization strategy in election campaigns.

Finally, the growing trend of Chinese migration in parts of Africa has not passed unnoticed in communities unaccustomed to hosting foreigners from outside the continent. Much of the Chinese immigration has been undocu-mented, leading to wild speculation as to the numbers of settlers, a situa-tion further compounded by the African tendency to identify all non-Indian Asians as ‘Chinese’. Within the continent’s leading destination for migrants,

25 “China lets child workers die digging in Congo mines for copper”, Bloomberg.com. Accessed 23/7/08.

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South Africa, the Chinese community has surged from 80,000 in the 1980s to an estimated 350,000 in 2006, though Beijing claims that the total num-ber of migrants in Africa is only 750,000 (though other estimates are higher) (Yoon 2009, 3). Concurrently, the evident lack of financial means and the low skills base of many of the migrants have raised concerns amongst educated Africans and small business owners alike. The proliferation of Chinese retail shops in urban and rural communities, introducing low-cost consumer goods to African markets for the first time, is nonetheless driving Africans out of the retail trade and spurring resentment in these circles.

In short, during the last decade and a half, the Chinese presence in Africa has been marked by diversity in composition and depth, defying the easy stereotypes that have accompanied many portrayals in the Western and even the African media. This spectrum of Chinese actors has been matched by changing approaches to Africa at the highest governmental levels in Beijing and, more prosaically, by individual migration strategies. Africa’s resources may have instigated Chinese interest in Africa, but it is clear that China’s ties with the continent are increasingly set to be anchored by an expanding cast of characters and by changing relationships.

3. THE DIPLOMATIC CORNERSTONE OF THE RELATIONSHIP:

THE FOCAC PROCESS

A special dimension of China’s engagement with the African continent has been the founding of a regionally-tailored multilateral platform, the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). This formal structure pro-vides a public setting to celebrate the achievements of the relationship, an opportunity to formulate a raft of economic targets aimed at fostering mutual development interests and recalibrating policies to achieve them, and to endorse common perspectives on global issues. However, while this public diplomacy is multilateral in nature, the substance of the economic ties (notably aid and investment agreements) continues to be rooted in bilateral relations between China and individual African states.

The origins of the FOCAC process are to be found in a variety of con-verging factors. As noted above, the economic context of China’s going out ‘strategy was significant, bringing with it a need for key resources which

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Africa could readily supply. Politically, there was a renewed push to counter Taiwan’s so-called ‘dollar diplomacy’ on the continent, which, by the early 1990s, had succeeded in winning back official recognition from a number of African states. This corresponded to the broader aim of revitalizing dip-lomatic ties with the developing world in the wake of Tiananmen Square and the accompanying Western opprobrium and sanctions. However, the specific shape of Chinese engagement in the form of a large multilat-eral regional coordination mechanism apparently derived from a desire to emulate Japan’s TICAD process which, as interpreted by the CPC’s Central Committee, had found what was deemed to be a successful way of respond-ing to African requests for changes to aid policy (Jin 2010, 13). The initia-tive was taken against the backdrop of the longstanding Franco-African Summit process and a new US-led approach that culminated in a ministerial conference on Africa in 1999 and a widely touted visit to the continent by US President Bill Clinton the previous year.

It was during a 1996 trip to Africa that Chinese President Jiang Zemin promoted the idea of establishing the Forum. The African ambassadors in Beijing served, along with their Chinese counterparts, on what was initially an ad hoc unit within the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as a de facto secretariat for organizing the first FOCAC ministerial meeting held in Beijing in 2000. The agenda was decidedly mixed, resulting in the inclusion in the final declaration of a commitment to increasing trade, strengthening devel-opment co-operation through the expansion of Chinese credit facilities, and monitoring and reducing the flow of Chinese small arms.

The second FOCAC ministerial meeting took place in December 2003 in Addis Ababa and produced a firm commitment to increase two-way trade to US$30 billion by the next FOCAC meeting, forgiving the debt owed by 31 African countries and combating ‘hegemony’ in international af-fairs. It was, however, FOCAC III held in Beijing in November 2006 – and designated a ‘summit’ by the Chinese and Africans in recognition of the participation of high-ranking political leaders – that attracted the atten-tion of the world by bringing together the largest number ever of African leaders in a summit outside the continent. Indeed, in that same year a range of additional developments indicated the rising importance of the

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continent to China, namely the issuing of the first ever ‘White Paper on China’s Africa Policy’ (January 2006) and the visits by Chinese leaders, Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao in April and June 2006 respectively. The final declaration of FOCAC III called for an increase in trade to US$100 billion by the next ministerial meeting as well as commitments to reduce tariffs on 440 items produced by Africa’s least developed countries, the creation of a US$5 billion investment fund and numerous small grant and training programmers. More recently, FOCAC IV, held in Egypt in 2009, included a commitment to a US$10 billion package of concessional loans, commit-ments to raise African agricultural productivity, reduce or eliminate tariff barriers for Africa’s poorest countries, build hospitals and schools, initiate or expand training programmers in human development, provide for 100 clean energy projects and increase support for peace and security.

What is striking about the contents of the FOCAC IV declaration is the degree to which, building upon the previous three meetings, the pro-cess reflects a growing and deliberately constructed convergence between African development needs and Chinese economic interests. For instance, in agriculture – a sector where it has long been recognized that, despite the fact China has provided technical assistance since the 1960s, there has been a lack of investment in Africa’s comparative advantages - the Chinese propose to introduce new techniques, seed varieties and training program-mers derived from their own experience raising agricultural productivity.26 To facilitate this process, the Chinese government is rolling out an addi-tional ten agricultural training centers across the continent in countries like Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Senegal. Coupled to this are additional financial means aimed at providing financial support for commercial enter-prises. Raising Africa’s agricultural productivity will not only dramatically enhance the livelihoods of rural communities in Africa through improve-ments in income generation and employment, but will potentially address a growing problem of food security in China itself.

26 For an overview of Chinese technical assistance in agricultural sector in Africa, see Brautigam (1998).

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Another example is the targeting of Africa’s SMEs for development and growth through a US$1 billion special fund. Moreover, signaling that it un-derstands that a focus on the supply side is not enough to make real develop-ment gains, Beijing has agreed to scrap tariffs on 95% of all products from Africa’s less developed countries. This decision to open up China’s market to African commerce has the potential, when linked with the support for African business, to set in motion a virtuous cycle of development. This re-direction of African capabilities towards accessing the Chinese market could lay the foundation for a more balanced long term trading relationship than has been the case so far. At the same time, it bears mentioning that it could end up like the US African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which gave preferential access to the American market in sectors like clothing but that contributed to a surge not so much in African as Asia-based investment. Africans will have to be nimble investors to make the most out of what seem to be the genuinely generous terms on offer. Indeed, they may even find that they are competing with the growing Chinese communities in their midst, whose proven entrepreneurial acumen and understanding of the Chinese domestic market has fuelled China’s own economic transformation.

Moreover, the diversity of Chinese actors in Africa contrasts with the as-sumption that the notion of ‘Chinese-African relations’ implies the presence of just two unitary entities, and poses a dilemma in structuring and manag-ing the relationship. This was once shaped and led from above by Chinese and African political elites and involved the steady diffusion of economic power to semi-autonomous SOEs, provincial authorities and a sometimes rapacious profit-seeking private sector. The latter has introduced a diversity of interests and practices that are as often at odds with Chinese foreign policy aims as they are in harmony with them. The actions of murky investment houses like the China International Fund and the state-owned national oil company, Sonangol – a joint venture that effectively marries Hong Kong-based finance to Angolan political ambitions and which has sought to secure a huge stake in the illegal military regime in Guinea – raises troubling questions about the long term impact of China’s role in the continent. Operating on the margins of respectability, these organizations are capable of damaging the positive

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intentions on display at FOCAC IV in their unwavering pursuit of profit and willful distain for African sensibilities (as was the case in Guinea).

This situation also highlights one of the most notable gaps in the FOCAC process, namely the role of actors formally outside the state. While much of the media attention focused on what happened within the confines of the ministerial discussions and the press conferences, the FOCAC Business Forum met on the fringes of the event. Missing, however, was the once moot-ed inclusion of a parallel Chinese-African civil society process. In Western practice, the role of guardian of the underlying values of national foreign policies is partially fulfilled by a vibrant and active civil society operating both in the West and in Africa. Unabashedly critical of the state and private capital – and undoubtedly the bane of authoritarian and, at times, democratic governments alike – these sometimes self-appointed ‘voices of the people’ nonetheless play a tremendously important role in re-asserting the moral purpose of foreign policy actions. African civil society varies in its depth and policy impact across different countries. In Africa, China has seemingly exported many features of its domestic setting (such as opaque business and financial practices), including the assumption of a weak civil society whose boundaries of action are circumscribed to varying degrees by the state (Alden and Hughes 2009, 13-34). It remains to be seen whether current arrange-ments, which place the burden of responsibility to anticipate, manage and ameliorate the conduct of a plethora of Chinese actors in Africa exclusively on the party leadership and bureaucracy, will prove sufficient.

4. CHINA AND SOUTH AFRICA

Of all the African countries involved with China, South Africa’s stand-ing as a middle-level economy with a reasonable industrial base coupled with underlying socio-economic divisions rooted in large income disparities and historical policies of discrimination, provides a useful ‘mirror’ for Latin America. The warm official ties between China and South Africa are based in part on close political affinities and growing economic engagement which have placed China as South Africa’s principal trading partner and a lead-ing investor. At the same time, there are a number of areas where shared

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interests are less evident, especially in the eyes of some of South Africa’s businesses, trade unions and civil society actors.

Though the incoming African National Congress (ANC) government un-expectedly retained official diplomatic ties with Taiwan (a holdover from the apartheid government) after the first democratic elections in 1994, and follow-ing two and a half years of domestic debate, the South African government finally announced its decision in November 1996 to switch allegiance in January 1998.27 Once South Africa had officially recognized China it entered a new era characterized by a re-orientation of its diplomacy and, increasingly, its economy away from a singular focus on Europe and North America. The establishment of the bi-national commission, subsequently reinforced in 2004 through the stra-tegic partnership dialogue process and more recently, in 2010, a ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ has ensured that there is regular government to govern-ment contact at deputy/vice presidential and ministerial levels, a process that facilitates close co-operation on areas of mutual concern. During its tenure as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council from 2007-2009, South African positions on matters like Darfur, Zimbabwe and Myanmar/Burma mir-rored those of the China and were a clear indication of the two governments’ shared outlook on the global system. Indeed, Pretoria’s prioritization of con-cerns for sovereignty over human rights and democracy suggests that South Africa’s once-celebrated image as a liberal beacon is definitively waning. In their attitudes to reform of international institutions South Africa and China also share a common view on the need to transform the UN Security Council and the international financial institutions to better reflect developing country interests (though Beijing has been careful not to alienate other African aspirants to a per-manent presence at the Security Council, by supporting the African Union’s call for a rotating seat). The recent decision to grant South Africa a second term as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council is likely to reinforce this trend. Furthermore, South Africa’s aspiration to become a member of the cov-eted BRIC-club (Brazil, Russia, India and China), has been endorsed by China, despite the fact that some observers argue that South Africa is too small (in

27 For a detailed account of that period, see Alden (2001, 119-138).

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terms of territory, population size and economic strength) and that its economic growth falls far short of the growth rates of the BRICs.

These close diplomatic ties have been matched by growing economic en-gagement. With two-way trade rising from US$800 million in 1998 to US$14.1 billion in 2009 – converting China into South Africa’s largest trading partner - economic co-operation between the two countries is being realized at ever-increasing rates (Gelb 2010, 1). That being said, South Africa has a negative trade balance with China and the structure of its exports to China is largely limited to minerals, agricultural goods and related products, whilst its imports are dominated by low-end consumer goods - though this is slowly changing to include higher value-added products such as white and so-called brown goods. At the same time, the once low levels of Chinese investment in South Africa are finally catching up with the high-profile of South African investment in China. Chinese FDI reached new heights with the announcement in November 2007 that the International Construction Bank of China (ICBC) would be purchasing a 20% stake in South Africa’s Standard Bank, worth US$5.6 billion. However, although this deal pumped a massive amount of capital into the economy, it cannot be considered to be the kind of investment that will directly promote job creation (though the potential of the partnership to attract FDI to South Africa and the rest of the continent, should not be underestimated). Of smaller monetary value, though with perhaps more long-term value to the economy, especially in the area of job creation and skills development, is Chinese invest-ment in the country’s mining and construction sectors (Gelb 2010, 8). Another area of Chinese involvement in the South African economy is that of the pro-vision of so-called soft loans, whose significance lies in the announcement in November 2010 that China would provide financial support for the expansion of South Africa’s dormant nuclear capacity.

This development is complemented by significant South African invest-ment in China, which surpassed US$200 million in 2006. Leading the charge are SAB-Miller, which owns 55 breweries in China; Sasol, which has a joint venture with Ningxia and Shenhua CLC to develop coal-to-oil plants; and other resource based companies such as Anglo-American and Kumba Resources. These ventures have generally proved to be a financial boom, with the media group Naspers, for instance, growing 24% in 2009, led by the US$307 million

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profit (of total US$775 million annual earnings) generated by its China-based internet platform.28 SAB-Miller, which entered the Chinese market in 1994 by investing in a joint venture – CR Snow breweries –now dominates the market ahead of local and foreign breweries. With Chinese demand for foodstuffs growing exponentially, the potential for further development of commercial links between South Africa and China is clear.

At the same time, the deepening of economic ties with China has raised important questions as to the uneven impact of trade in certain sectors of the South African economy – with South African textile sales experiencing sharp reductions while exports of agricultural products are soaring – and has created challenges for both countries. The emphasis of South Africa-China trade has been on China securing minerals, agricultural goods and related commodities while South Africa has absorbed imports of low-end consumer goods. Additional frictions exist over the uneven balance of trade which favors Chinese manufacturing. Chinese competitiveness is a phenomenon which is raising concerns not only in certain circles in South Africa but increasingly across the rest of the continent. While talk of a wholesale ‘de-industrialization’ of South Africa (and Africa) may be exaggerated, there are, nonetheless, very real fears that in some areas South Africa’s hard fought gains in manufacturing will fall victim to the economic juggernaut that is contemporary China. According to one study, the value of South Africa’s textile exports to the US has declined 54% since 2005 as a result of Chinese competition, and approximately 60,000 jobs have been shed (Biacuana et al. 2009, 15). It is a measure of the sensitivity of trade relations – and in particu-lar the vocal criticism of China by the South African trade union movement – that the Chinese government agreed to impose unilateral restrictions on its own textile and clothing exports in late 2006 in order to give South Africa’s manufacturers time to retool their operations in anticipation of a re-opening of trade in this sector. The restrictions were lifted 18 months later (Alden 2007, 49). South African construction firms have also railed against Chinese competition, especially in other countries in Africa. For the most part, tough

28 Financial Mail (Johannesburg), 8 July 2010.

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regulatory requirements and stringent labor laws have kept Chinese firms out of the sector inside South Africa.

As noted above, another emerging area of concern is Chinese migration to South Africa, with the burgeoning community estimated to number between 300,000 and 400,000, making the country the overwhelmingly preferred destination for the Chinese in Africa. Though studies are few, both for South Africa and other parts of the continent, many of the migrants have taken up positions in small retail and wholesale shops, and, taking advantage of their superior networks and connections with China, have been able to crowd out some of the local shopkeepers.29

Notwithstanding these issues, it is clear that relations between South Africa and China are fast becoming the linchpin of a new invigorated form of South-South co-operation in Africa. Reflecting this is the signing of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement in 2010 whose overarching aim is to forge a more equitable relationship between the two countries. Featuring in this ar-rangement are talks aimed at gaining long term access to South African resourc-es in exchange for investment and greater market access for value-added and beneficiated products, greater Chinese investment in South African manufac-turing and provisions for technology transfer and human capital development.

Finally, beyond these strictly economic depictions of interests, China exercises a growing hold on the imagination of South Africa’s elites. In one respect, this is due to the phenomenal developmental successes it has achieved over the last three and a half decades. Though conscious of the obvi-ous differences between the two countries, the South African government is nonetheless eager to replicate this success. Another aspect of the Chinese ex-perience that appeals directly to South Africa’s governing party, the ANC, is role of the Communist Party of China (CPC). This attraction is twofold. First, China’s track record on development and poverty reduction confirms the South African elite’s belief in the possibilities inherent in a ‘developmental state’, i.e. efficient state intervention in the economy, in eradicating poverty and promoting growth and development. Concurrently, the ANC is enamored

29 See Yoon (2009).

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of the way in which the CPC has managed to liberalize its economy and im-prove the lives of its huge population while, at the same time, maintaining its grip on national political power. President Jacob Zuma’s public declaration in May 2010 at the regional World Economic Forum that ‘Africa cannot eat democracy’ can be interpreted as sign of the saliency of both aspects of this appeal for the South African elite.

CONCLUSION

China’s emergence as a leading trade and investment partner of African na-tions has had a number of impacts upon the continent which in turn are strong-ly suggestive of parallel implications for Latin America. From this comparative perspective, China’s economic engagement has revived the flagging fortunes of Africa’s resource-based economies, providing new investment and markets that have contributed to the global commodity boom. China’s interest in resources has helped drive up prices while its focus on infrastructure has brought about a renewal of donor interest in financing vital improvements in that neglected sector. At the same time, the Chinese approach to financing its expanding role in the resource sector through the provision of hard infrastructure is, it could be argued, crucially dependent upon its very dearth in the target country. As the South African case demonstrates, middle income countries like Brazil, Argentina and Colombia, which have reasonably well-developed infrastructure, existing expertise in the local business sector, strong labor unions and an es-tablished regulatory environment, are likely to be less attractive investment destinations. However, other Chinese actors – notably those in the financial sector – are drawn to these settings as they provide a stronger institutional framework which will support their pursuit of profits. Both these aspects of Chinese engagement hold lessons for Latin American engagement with China.

In political terms, the African example suggests that China can provide a welcome alternative to established sources of trade and investment, not the least because it is less concerned with using the development process as an instrument to impose normative transformations on target states and more interested in pursuing mutual economic interests. The revival of African economic fortunes has had a direct impact on the international stature of African leaders, allowing them to challenge the certitudes that informed the approach adopted by the OECD

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‘donor cartel’. The result is not, as some critics have feared, a shift away from the North but rather a diversification of development partnerships that – at least in those African countries with sound and committed political leadership – offers an unprecedented opportunity to use all means available to achieve development.

Change and adaptability remain the hallmarks of Chinese-African rela-tions and, to the credit of the Chinese government, whose willingness to revisit and revise specific initiatives in the light of experience on the ground, give the relationship a dynamism lacking in many other trans-regional initia-tives. China’s experience in Africa has in many ways provided a short, sharp lesson in how easy it is to break into the relatively neglected African markets and, at the same time, how it might become increasingly difficult to secure its interests over the long term. China’s willingness to maintain its focus on building a long term economic relationship with the African continent, despite obstacles encountered on the ground and more recently the adverse global economic climate, should be closely observed by Latin Americans who have long complained about the limited interests of traditional investors. However, just as coming to terms with the diversity of Chinese actors and their narrower, and often self-serving, interests is a challenge for Africa it is likely to pose similar challenges to Latin America as the region seeks to ensure that its carefully constructed relationship with China stays on course.

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China y América Latina: ¿el matrimonio perfecto?1

Ralf J. LeiteritzUniversidad del Rosario

RESUMENDurante los últimos veinte años, el asombroso desarrollo económico y una política exterior más proclive hacia el exterior por parte de China han moldeado las relaciones internacionales de manera definitiva. En este contexto, América Latina encuentra un panorama favorable para su intercambio, tanto económico como político, con la gran potencia emergente al interactuar en el marco de un modelo cooperativo de ganancia mutua entre países en desarrollo. Pero, ¿es aquella relación realmente “un matrimonio hecho en el cielo”?

El presente artículo busca identificar los intereses en juego en dicha relación, para lo cual, en un primer momento, tras el análisis del desarrollo político y económico chino, identifica tres pilares sobre los cuales el país asiático ha basado sus relaciones con países desarrollados; a saber: la economía, la cultura y la diplomacia. Seguidamente, mediante el empleo de las categorías de “hard power” y “soft power”, señala las diferencias en el ascenso y el comportamiento chino frente a aquellos de potencias tradicionales como Estados Unidos, y, finalmente, presenta un panorama sobre la estrategia que actualmente emplea el gigante asiático frente a la región latinoamericana.

PALABRAS CLAVEChina • América Latina • economía • política • cultura • soft power • hard power

China and Latin America: A Marriage Made in Heaven?

ABSTRACTDuring the last twenty years, China’s astonishing economic development, and its pursuit of a more outwardly-oriented foreign policy, have shaped international politics to a significant degree. Offered a model of cooperation based on mutual gains between developing countries, Latin America faces a more favorable panorama for its foreign relations, both economic and political, with China. However, is this relationship really “a marriage made in heaven”?

This article seeks to identify the interests at play in the relationship between China and Latin America. First, following an analysis of China’s political and economic development, it identifies three pillars upon which China has based its relations with developing countries: economics; culture; and diplomacy. Second, utilizing the analytical categories of “hard” and “soft” power, the article compares the rise of China, and its behavior, to that of traditional great powers such as the United States. Finally, the article gives an overview of the current Chinese strategy vis-à-vis the Latin American region.

KEYWORDSChina • Latin America • economics • politics • culture • soft power • hard power

1 This paper is based on a presentation delivered at the conference “Las relaciones políti-cas entre China y América Latina”, Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá, September 22, 2010. I wish to thank Alma Castro and Liliana Galvis for excellent research assistance.

Ralf J. Leiteritz, PhD, es profesor asociado de las facultades de Ciencia Política, Gobierno, y Relaciones Internacionales, Universidad del Rosario, Bogotá, Colombia.



China and Latin America: A Marriage Made in Heaven?Ralf J. LeiteritzUniversidad del Rosario

INTRODUCTION

Latin America has changed fundamentally in recent years. It is no longer the region of permanent financial crises, autocratic political regimes and bad governance. Instead, the region has survived the recent economic crisis relatively unscathed and has slowly developed a sense of self-esteem and independence from the United States, its traditional hegemon in the North. With the emergence of regional powers such as Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, the continent has earned a visible position and reputation not only in the international political arena but also as an important player within the world economy. The diversification of its trading and political partners has led to a distancing from the political and economic interests of the United States. In short, Latin America is no longer anybody’s “backyard” (The Economist, September 9, 2010). It has become a lucrative and stable market for foreign investors from various parts of the world while maintaining its traditional role as an important supplier of commodities, especially minerals that are required by developed countries.

Within an overall context of political and economic diversification, Latin American countries have looked to hitherto uncharted territory – Asia in gen-eral, and China in particular. During the last twenty years, China has emerged as an economic and political power on the world stage. Not only is it the big-gest country in terms of population, but it also boasts the fastest growing economy and is the second largest trading nation in the world. Its meteoric

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and unprecedented rise from an economically backward, largely agricultural, country to an industrial powerhouse soon to become the largest economy in the world serves as an example for other developing countries eager to strip off the vestiges of economic underdevelopment and political weakness.

The insatiable demand of the Chinese economy for the commodities it requires to sustain its manufacturing output provides the Latin American economies – which are focused to a large extent on the production of pri-mary resources – with a seemingly irresistible economic option provided by an alternative trading partner. Latin American politicians and businessmen pin their hopes for sustained economic growth, long-term development and poverty reduction on this new player, especially given the increased interest shown by developed countries in linking trade agreements to non-commer-cial aspects such as human rights or labor and environmental standards. Political and business interests in Latin America emphasize the compatibility of the trade profile between the two regions. They argue that it constitutes a text-book example of comparative advantage and the specialization of pro-duction while stressing the ostensibly “non-political” character of Chinese trade relations with other, especially developing, countries. Certain analysts observe that the traditional pattern of commercial relations between the countries of the center and periphery – characterized by the exchange of pri-mary resources for manufactured goods – looks bound for a sequel in which Europe and the United States are replaced by China (Jenkins and Dussel Peters 2009). As a result, they fear that endogenous efforts at industrializa-tion through technological innovation and sophistication will be derailed as China out-competes Latin American manufacturers in world markets, thus undermining the ability of the region to generate long-term economic growth (Gallagher and Porzecanski 2010).

While academics and regional public opinion have focused on the eco-nomic dimensions of the relationship between Latin America and China, political aspects have received much less attention. However, China has not developed exclusively trade-focused relations with developing countries but has also tried to foster political links with them, primarily in function of its role as an emerging great power. In contrast to its earlier attempts to steer developing countries towards a socialist revolution, “Mao-style”, through

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political and financial assistance to an assortment of leftist guerilla groups and Maoist social movements, China now seeks to woo the world at large into supporting or at least tolerating its “peaceful rise” to great power status.

This paper addresses the current state of China’s relations with developing countries in general, and Latin America in particular. First, it briefly high-lights the evolution of China’s foreign policy vis-à-vis developing countries over the last thirty years, briefly describing the development of the new out-ward-looking approach that led, under Deng Xiaoping’s leadership from the mid-1970s onwards, to rapid economic growth based on the export-oriented model pioneered by the four Asian “Tiger Economies”2. The new approach involved an economic policy aimed towards luring foreign investment and technology transfers into the country, and subsequently led to a modified set of active political goals and new foreign policy instruments that heralded China’s open aspiration to becoming a great power under the “peaceful rise” strategy. The paper identifies three pillars on which China has based its rela-tions with developing countries during the last ten years or so: economics, culture, and diplomacy. Brief examples are provided to describe each pillar.

Second, the categories of “hard” and “soft” power are introduced to indi-cate the differences between the rise and behavior of traditional great powers such as the United States on the one hand, and China’s rise as an emerging great power in the 21st Century. While the concepts are not mutually exclu-sive when it comes to the actual behavior of powerful countries in interna-tional politics, the article highlights how China has relied extensively on “soft power” in developing its relations with developing countries.

Third, the article provides an overview of China’s current strategy to-wards Latin America, with a focus not only on economic relations but also on political aspects, for example regarding the issue of Taiwan. It argues that China differentiates its political interests vis-à-vis Latin American countries in terms of their potential influence on global governance issues. Relations with countries that might serve as important allies in the pursuit of Chinese

2 The original four Asian “Tiger Economies” are Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea, and Singapore.

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interests in restructuring global institutions are different to those with coun-tries where economic interests dominate the agenda.

Finally, I consider the question whether China seeks to challenge the hege-mony of the United States in Latin America. After presenting and briefly dis-cussing a range of possible factors, I conclude that the evidence – and not just the official Chinese rhetoric – supports the view that it does not harbor these ambitions. However, while China does not wish to replace the United States as a hegemon in Latin America, its increased economic relations with Latin America certainly contribute to declining United States influence in the region.

1. CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

During the last thirty years, not only has China undergone fundamental internal changes, but it has also seen an evolution in its relations with the outside world. The country’s rapid economic growth, the sheer size of its economy and the way it has identified and approached partners in the devel-oping world have written a whole new chapter in international relations. The following section briefly documents the evolution of China’s foreign policy from the late 1970s to the present day.

After Mao’s death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping became the leading protagonist within the “second generation” of the Chinese communist leadership of the post-Second World War period. Deng was responsible for initiating a new per-spective on socialism, the state and the economy. He believed that some fun-damental reforms would have to be carried out inside the country if it were to open itself up successfully to the outside world. Under Deng’s leadership, China started its road to economic success, emphasizing selected market liberalization measures under the political control of the Communist Party. The achievement of sustainable economic development in the context of a rapidly increasing population was declared a political priority, under which all other domestic and international goals were subsumed. However, Deng wanted China to have a low profile in the international arena, believing that this was the best way to recover from the devastating economic and social situation the country faced in the wake of Mao’s “Cultural Revolution”. Deng’s strategy was intended to create a peaceful external environment and encour-age the massive foreign investment and technology transfers necessary to its

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emergence as a great power in the future. Deng realized how Mao’s approach had isolated China from the rest of the world and how this situation had negatively affected its economy. He started cautiously to open up the Chinese economy to foreign investors by offering tax concessions and creating special economic zones intended to attract new technology, reduce unemployment and qualify the local working force.

Rapid economic growth has transformed Chinese society, not only in terms of its material wealth but also in its mindset. Making money was no longer considered a sin as it had been by Mao’s teachings. Private entre-preneurship became a legitimate way of working and living within Chinese society. In addition, increasing numbers of Chinese turned their eyes to the outside world and became interested in traveling and studying abroad (Kurlantzick 2007, 23).This new attitude somehow clashed with the low-profile approach to international politics advocated by Deng. As an increas-ing number of Chinese people enjoyed increased access to education abroad and to a wider and more varied range of information sources, they formed think-tanks and study circles that argued for changes to the country’s foreign policy and increased, more active, involvement in international affairs com-mensurate with the status of an emerging great power.

The result was the strategy of the “peaceful rise” that came to dominate China’s foreign policy in the late 1990s. The new doctrine was intended to demonstrate to the rest of the world that China was not only willing and de-termined to become a great power, but that it could do so by peaceful means.

China pursues an independent foreign policy in which peace, independence and sovereignty are the main goals, creating an international environment favorable for [sic] its rise and that propels common development in the world, actively facilitat-ing the establishment of a new international political and economic order that is fair and rational (Press Release from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003).

However, Deng’s cautious approach to international relations did not become obsolete. In fact, the actual content or guiding principles of China’s

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foreign policy have not changed all that much since 1978 (Roett and Paz 2008, 32). China advocates a non-interference policy with respect to the domestic affairs of other countries, emphasizing “win-win cooperation” between both parties. It seeks to establish strategic relationships with developing countries using diplomatic channels, active membership in international organiza-tions, peacekeeping missions, and trade and investment relations. China con-siders that countries that share a border with it and countries rich in natural resources - especially gas and oil - are strategic to its interests. According to the official version, the Chinese government treats developing countries as equals and is willing to help them implement the model that has led China to its own successful economic growth (Kurlantzick 2007, 57).

President Hu Jintao of China and the Chinese Government have advocated the building of a harmonious society and a harmonious world. China is committed to peaceful, harmoni-ous, scientific and sustainable development. This initiative is consistent with the trend of our times and meets the interests and the aspirations of the people. On the diplomatic front we are committed to promoting peaceful co-existence between countries. We encourage all countries to treat each other as equals and carry out co-operation of mutual benefit in the in-terests of common development. We have made every effort to pursue good neighborly mutual trust. We resolve differences in these views through diplomatic means including dialogue in pursuit of common security and a lasting peace. We pro-mote the exchanges between different civilizations and aim to build a resource conserving environmental and friendly society (Foreign Minister Li in 2007; Press Conference of the 5th Session of the 10th National People’s Congress).

Based on the principles of the “peaceful rise” strategy, China has invested intensively in developing nations during the last ten years, especially in African countries with great potential in unexploited mineral resources such as Nigeria, Angola, Sudan, and Ethiopia. The Chinese leadership has sought to

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establish diplomatic and economic relations with a variety of countries in the developing world with a view to exploring “win-win cooperation” agreements with them. President Hu Jintao has visited a host of countries in Africa, Latin America, Asia, and the Middle East, and convened high-ranking summits in China with political and business leaders from those regions. The so-called “Go Global” campaign was included in the 2001-2005 five-year plan in order to encourage Chinese companies to trade and invest abroad. Under this program, trade promotion centers were set up and Chinese companies were offered low-interest loans from the Chinese Export-Import Bank to finance foreign investments. The country also joined multilateral organizations out-side its own geographic region such as the Inter-American Development Bank, where it has been a non-borrowing member since 2008.

2. THE THREE PILLARS OF CHINESE RELATIONS WITH DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Given such active dynamics of engagement, in both the economic and political spheres, it is possible to pinpoint three key elements on which of-ficial Chinese relations with developing countries are based: (i) economics, (ii) culture, and (iii) diplomacy. This section illustrates these aspects using brief vignettes drawn principally from the Latin American context. The three pillars all highlight aspects of “soft power”, an analytical concept useful in describing the behavior of (emerging) great powers that is explained in more detail in the next section.

a. Economics

Most observers argue that economic motives underlie China’s relations with developing countries. To a large extent, that is an accurate description. Thus, in Chinese foreign policy politics is subsumed under economics. China has learned how to use its growing economic power, not only as a trade part-ner but also as a key investor in, and provider of aid to, developing countries. Its non-interventionist approach has become the flagship of its relations with the developing world and the main source of its increased attractive-ness, at least for political leaders. This policy stands in marked contrast to the approach of other great powers such as the United States or of Western-dominated international organizations that subject developing countries to a

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range of political and economic conditions in return for financial or technical assistance. Against this background, African countries in particular - some of which, such as Sudan or Zimbabwe have long been ostracized by the interna-tional community for their abysmal human rights records - have enthusiasti-cally embraced increased trade and investment relations with China.

Official Chinese government packages for developing countries offer trade, investment and aid with “no strings attached”, i.e., no political or economic conditions for the receiving countries. The packages are usually related to the building of infrastructure such as roads, rail lines, refineries and ports that directly facilitate exports to and imports from China, as well as the exploration of gas and oil reserves. Even though no data is available on how much China invests in foreign aid, it is estimated that about US$600 million flow to Latin America annually and that credit lines could reach US$ one billion (Shambaugh 2008).

Thus, trade between China and developing countries as a whole has grown significantly in the past decade. In Africa the annual increase has been 33.1% over this period; trade between China and Latin America has increased by about 25% over the past five years at an annual rate of 31%; and free trade agreements have been concluded with Chile in 2005 and with Peru in 2009.3

In fact, strengthening and deepening relations with China seems like a panacea for many developing countries hoping to emulate the Chinese ex-ample of economic development and drastic poverty reduction. Their trade profile, focused on the export of primary goods, especially mineral and agri-cultural products, is highly attractive to the Chinese government. In return, basic, low-cost manufactured goods dominate the import side of developing countries in their commercial relations with China. To many politicians and businesspeople in Latin America this looks like a perfect win-win situation. For example, in the context of the global economic crisis of the last few years, the export of commodities to China has helped several countries in

3 See percentages published at http://www.chinatrade.com.

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Latin America weather the negative effects of the declining demand from developed countries for their main export products.4

In a parallel development, Chinese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) began its rise in the early 1980s when it increased to almost 1% of global FDI – jump-ing from 0 in 1979 to an average of USD 453 million a year between 1982 and 1989. This increment is far behind the growth in China’s export levels but is nonetheless adequate for its newly obtained title as an emerging market economy. By 2008, a sudden and rapid diversification strategy was set in mo-tion taking the Chinese economy to an unprecedented 4% of the global share, and shifting it into the world’s fifth largest investor, after the United States, France, Japan, and Germany (ECLAC 2008b; ECLAC 2010a).

This strategy responded to the need to overcome the limitations imposed on the rapid growth of China’s economy by the nature of its national and lo-cal economies. It resolved the problem of limited natural resource availability, took advantage of low production costs and ensured access to bigger markets, as well as opening up prospects for sustainable production and an increased export-import ratio in the future. These compensatory factors were all avail-able in the Latin American countries, making the region one of the most im-portant destinations for Chinese FDI – of which it accounted for close to 17%.

According to the Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean’s (ECLAC) review of FDI to Latin American and the Caribbean countries, Chinese FDI was not primarily directed towards commercial part-ners such as Brazil, Chile, Peru or Argentina, although these countries re-ceived significant amounts for infrastructural development, natural resource exploitation and other market-related aspects such as the merger and acqui-sition of companies, reduction in production costs, and technology transfers (Cesarin and Moneta 2005, 203-231). In fact, the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands were at the top of Chinese FDI flows to the region, accounting for more than 90% of the total during the last decade. This situ-ation is not only a reaction to the obvious attractions of the fiscal privileges

4 The Inter-American Development Bank keeps a record of these transactions in both the research and data and publication sections of its webpage (http://www.iadb.org).

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provided by tax havens but also suggests that the bulk of these flows does not in fact reflect investment by firms and actors from Latin America, but the channeling of Hong Kong and Taiwanese investment (Breslin 2005, 744).

b. Culture

China not only intends to “charm” the world with the size of its market and its economic growth but also with its culture. Besides fostering trade and investment relations, China’s foreign policy emphasizes the global diffusion of Asian or, more specifically, Chinese culture. Confucian values such as humanity, loyalty, personal relationships and – in particular - har-mony is considered by the Chinese government to be essential elements in achieving political and economic success. The Chinese government believes that acceptance of China’s great power status is inextricably linked to the increased understanding of its cultural foundations in the world. After its long period of self-isolation during the period of Mao’s rule, China initiated a global process of cultural dissemination, creating cultural centers, schol-arships, and media agencies. Following a strategy similar to that followed by Western countries such as France or Great Britain, the Chinese govern-ment created Confucius Institutes to provide language training and other cultural activities abroad. Today there are more than 300 institutes all over the world, six of which are located in Latin America. These institutes not only offer Chinese language studies but also cultural and economic infor-mation for those interested in establishing some type of economic relation-ship with Chinese companies. The Chinese government expects there to be over one-thousand Confucius Institutes by 2020.

The rapid increase of foreign students in China’s higher education system is not only based on the country’s political and economic success in recent times, but is also due to the increasing number of scholarships offered by the government to foreign students. 20,000 government scholarships were offered to overseas students in 2010, of which one hundred are reserved for Latin American students. The Chinese government has also encouraged Chinese students to pursue studies and degrees abroad, especially in the United States, where in 2008 21% of foreign students were Chinese.

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In 2009-10, China invested $US 8.7 billion in “external publicity work”, carried out primarily by China Central Television, China Radio International, the Xinhua News Agency, and the China Daily newspaper. The Xinhua newswire has become a primary source of information for newspapers around the world. It has penetrated the developing world deeply, becoming the principal source of world news in Africa. China Central Television (CCT) increased its daily transmission to 24 hours, com-peting in Africa and Asia with established Western news channels such as the BBC and CNN. China Radio International (CRI) purchased an impor-tant amount of radio time in the United States and Europe and transmits to Africa and the Middle East (Shambaugh 2010).

c. Diplomacy

The Chinese government boasts that it pursues its foreign policy goals using strictly peaceful means. According to this self-assessment, it does not compel or force other countries to engage with it or comply with its interests. Instead, a flurry of diplomatic activities have characterized China’s “charm offensive” in the developing world (Kurlantzick 2007). The strategy includes meetings at presidential level and between senior politi-cians or political parties, professional diplomatic preparation and training and the creation of state-to-state or region-to-region business summits. President Hu Jintao has spent more time on official visits abroad than any previous Chinese president.

The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs began retiring older officials, re-placing them with younger ones. Approximately half of China’s diplomats are now under 35; the government has also prepared its officials properly for the missions they are assigned to. More than 100 officials were sent to universi-ties in Mexico in order to learn Spanish (Kurlantzick 2007, 65).

A characteristic instrument of China’s economic diplomacy has been busi-ness summits where top-level government officials, diplomats, executives of large companies, and investors meet to discuss and explore opportunities for cooperation. Since 2007 there have been four China-Latin America busi-ness summits. Even though it is difficult the assess the overall effectiveness of these meetings in terms of any deals coming out of them, the increasing

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number of participants speaks of their importance as an institutional plat-form for improved business relations.

Exchange visits between political parties involve party presidents and high-level members. These visits have been part of Chinese foreign policy since the Cold War, and continue to be a key element for the diffusion of its policy. In Latin America, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has established relations with more than ninety political parties of various ideologies. The main goal of these visits is to establish diplomatic relations with countries and to acquire better knowledge of their domestic situations. One of the CCP’s main goals is to establish official relations with parties in countries that recognize Taiwan diplomatically. This strategy has been pursued since the 1980s in nine of the thirteen Latin American countries that recognize Taiwan (Roett and Paz 2008, 35).

Chinese diplomacy also extends to the multilateral sphere beyond Asian or global forums. For example, upon its acceptance as an official observer at the Inter-American-Development Bank in October 2008, China contributed US$350 million to strengthen its core programs. Likewise, China has sup-ported the African Union and the African Development Bank.

Less emphasized in official declarations is the increasing cooperation in military affairs between China and several Latin American countries, and not only the “usual suspects” Cuba and Venezuela. Official visits by military delegations have increased in recent years. Four members of China’s leading Central Military Commission visited Latin America between 2007 and 2008 – more than visited any other region in the world – while a steady stream of Latin American defense ministers has visited China. Brazilian military staff have studied at the Chinese National Defense University, and have attended major Chinese military exercises as observers. Chilean and Chinese military units operate together in the Brazilian-led UN stabilization mission in Haiti. Chinese arms sales to Latin America include helicopters, aircraft, artillery, anti-air and anti-ship missiles, and light assault weapons. Early in 2010 China donated US$1 million to the Colombian government for the acquisition of military equipment (Ellis 2009, 61; Shambaugh 2008, 2010).

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3. HARD POWER VERSUS SOFT POWER

To what extent does China’s foreign policy differ from that of its predeces-sors when they were emerging as great powers in the international system? Is there a distinct “Chinese way” of pursuing its national interests that differs from that of other countries? In order to answer these questions it may prove useful to employ the concepts of “hard” and “soft” power as they help explain the different strategies that rising nations adopt in international politics.

The dictionary definition of power emphasizes the employment of ma-terial capabilities to affect or change the behavior of others. According to Max Weber’s classic definition, power implies the ability of an actor to realize his or her will in a social action, even against the will of other ac-tors (Gerth and Mills 1946, 180). In other words, power relates to the abil-ity to command resources in a particular context. The use of force is one way that power is exercised. The application of direct or indirect coercion based on superior material resources is known as “hard power”. However, power can also be exercised without force. For this to occur, those without power must, in some way and to some extent, accept the arrangements as legitimate. Weber calls this form of power “authority”, i.e., the capacity for the legitimate application, actual or potential, of power. For the purposes of this article, authority refers to “soft power”.

The way the behavior of other actors is affected is crucial in international relations and determines the type of relationship that will be forged between actors. “Hard” and “soft” power differ from each other in this regard, while they share the same objective: to change behavior in accordance with one’s own interests. The two dimensions of power are not mutually exclusive but may in fact form part of an overall strategy to pursue national interests in the international system. However, the exercise of hard power has tradition-ally been associated with the behavior of rising and established great powers, while soft power is a more recent attribute of great powers in the interna-tional system. Let us briefly consider each dimension.

a. Hard Power

Hard power is characterized by coercion, the use of military force, and money. The use of any of these three elements symbolizes the use of hard

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power. This type of relationship is especially common between countries with asymmetric economic relations, such as those that exist between developed and developing countries. The country that controls material resources uses its advantage to compel another, less resource-rich country to do what it wants by determining the political and economic agenda of the relationship.

Coercion, the threat of future harm, or the provision of financial and technical assistance with attached conditions for the recipient country are the most frequently-used “hard power” instruments in the contemporary era, where wars and invasion seem a somewhat outdated way of pursuing national interests. Coercion within bilateral and multilateral negotiation processes, which might involve the provision or the removal of assistance in return for specific actions requested of the counterpart, can take many forms – some more open, others more opaque. Membership of a specific or-ganization, the conclusion of free trade agreements, or the acceptance and implementation of human rights or environmental policies are examples of how coercion is used in order to change the behavior of countries in ac-cordance with the interests of the more powerful party.

Relations between Latin America and the United States during the last century offer a wealth of examples of the exercise of hegemonic hard power. Based on the Monroe Doctrine, established early in the 19th Century, the use of military force was one of the main instruments of United States foreign policy in Latin America during most of the 20th Century. The alleged threat to democracy posed by communist regimes or criminal leaders and by their plans to expand their influence to other countries constituted the prevalent excuse for direct US military invasions in Latin America. Interventions ranged from the deployment of marines in the Dominican Republic between 1916 and 1924 and Haiti from 1915 to 1934, to the invasion of Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989. In addition, the indirect participation in, or support of, several coups d’état against left-wing governments such as in Guatemala 1954 or Chile 1973 were a hallmark of US foreign policy towards Latin America (Galen Carpenter 1992; Dunkerley 2008).

The use of money is not exclusive to hard power. However, what makes money essential to its exercise is its use in the context of conditioned economic assistance as well as the application of coercion comprising the

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proverbial “stick” (reduction), or “carrot” (increase) of bilateral economic rela-tions. Trade relations between the United States and several Latin American countries provide ample testimony to the application of money-centered hard power. The United States has employed a variety of economic carrots and sticks to force Latin American countries to comply with its national interests. Insisting that free trade agreements will only be ratified if certain human rights, environmental, or labor standards are met is an example of the stick, while economic and military aid or the granting of trade privileges under “Plan Colombia” or to Mexico in the context of the NAFTA agreement are examples of the deployment by the United States of the carrot.

While hard power has been the traditional weapon of choice employed by (emerging) great powers in the international system in pursuit of their national interests, it has recently gone out of fashion. In other words, hard power seems to be going soft when dealing with nominally weaker coun-tries. Coercion and force are not only considered largely illegitimate means of foreign policy but their effectiveness in changing the behavior of actors over the long run has been questioned. Liberal scholars of international relations such as Joseph Nye have therefore argued that the application of “soft power” constitutes a more legitimate and more effective strategy for great powers in today’s international system.

b. Soft Power

According to Nye, soft power is the power of attraction or what Weber calls authority (Nye 2004, 6; Gerth and Mills 1946). The use of force is ruled out as a method of realizing one’s interests. A country may obtain what it wants in international affairs by providing an example to be emulated, and mak-ing others want the same thing. In other words, soft power is about shaping others’ preferences, guiding by example and having political values and in-stitutions that are seen as moral and legitimate. A country may obtain what it wants by making others want the same thing (Nye 2004).

However, governments do not fully control the degree of global attraction of their polities or cultures. Just as good policies can attract international interest and become the example to be followed; bad policies can do the same. International perceptions of its values, culture and policies are beyond the

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exclusive control of states. As a result, there is no guarantee that only “good things” about an “attractive” country are diffused globally. For example, countries like China have few regulations on environmental and labor issues, which might look attractive to developing countries keen on achieving rapid economic growth and that are wary of the standards of “responsible growth” established for them by rich countries.

Culture is one of the most important assets in a country’s bank of “soft power”. Possessing a national culture that is attractive to other countries is seen as an important entry point in winning the “hearts and minds” of people around the world. The increasing importance attached to “public diplo-macy” within the foreign policy strategies of many countries, including China and Colombia, is just one indicator of this trend. Being an attractive culture implies a sense of admiration and attraction that directly translates into in-creased flows of foreign tourists, and higher exports. In addition, through the operation of institutions, such the British Council or the Confucius Centers, established to disseminate a country’s culture and language abroad, a more positive image or perception of the country, including its domestic and for-eign policy, can be promoted within foreign societies.

Successful political values are a key element that may also serve as an example to other countries. The implementation of policies that are consid-ered legitimate and moral, and of successful economic and political models, is the material basis upon which political values are diffused. It therefore affects the way a country is perceived by its counterparts. There can be no doubt about the attractiveness of the Chinese “economic miracle” over the last twenty years within the developing world. The Chinese government has played on this aspect of its “soft power”, advertising its achievements in economic growth and poverty reduction as a blueprint other develop-ing countries could follow, up to the point where it has publically offered assistance and guidance to countries in implementing the same economic model (Kurlantzick 2007, 57).

In contrast to hard power, with its focus on coercion, diplomacy is the key mechanism for the application of soft power. Cooperation is achieved not through direct or indirect force but on the basis of shared respect and mutually beneficial agreements. The imposition of political conditions for

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economic cooperation is anathema to soft power. A country linking trade relations to non-economic characteristics might be able to get its way because of its superior material resources such as a large domestic market, but it will hardly become an attractive trading partner in the long run.

The Chinese principle of non-interference in domestic affairs makes it hugely attractive to a range of developing countries that complain about the heavy-handedness of Western or especially United States foreign policy. When Evo Morales won the Bolivian presidency in 2005, the United States government responded by threatening to cut aid flows to the country. In contrast, China invited Morales for a state visit to Beijing where he asked for help in developing Bolivia’s vast natural gas reserves. Chinese companies leapt at the opportunity and seized a market which Western companies either abandoned or were forced out of for political reasons.

Money is an essential element of soft power, too. However, in contrast to its employment by hard power, economic aid or trade relations are not linked to political conditions that reflect non-economic preferences or in-terests. The Chinese strategy of establishing “win-win cooperation” with developing countries is attractive because of the absence of coercion and the prospect – at least in the short run – of mutually beneficial economic relations. The application of soft power makes for a fundamentally different type of relationship between emerging great powers and other countries. Instead of feeling bullied, weaker countries are willing to accept the supe-riority of “soft” great powers as legitimate because of the respectful way in which they feel they are being treated.

4. WHY IS CHINA INTERESTED IN LATIN AMERICA?

China’s relations with Latin America, like its dealings with Africa, can be described not so much as a new discovery but as a return (Alden et al. 2008). China and Latin America, specifically Peru and Mexico, were engaged in intense trade relations from as early as 1570, when Chinese exports including porcelain and silk were exchanged for silver and other minerals from Latin America.

China had an indirect presence in Latin America after the end of the Second World War, but in a rather different way than today. During Mao’s rule, Chinese policy towards other developing countries was directed towards

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exporting its version of a communist or “cultural” revolution. Relations between China and Latin American regimes in open rebellion against the United States, such as Cuba, were very close during the period. China pro-vided political and financial support to a variety of guerilla groups in Latin America that adopted the Chinese - rather than the Soviet or Cuban - version of communist ideology (Roett and Paz 2008, 29).

However, under Deng’s leadership in the late 1970s, China renounced the active promotion and support of communist revolutions in other countries. Deng believed that the country needed to orient its efforts inwards towards achieving rapid economic growth. Costly “adventures” in faraway countries for the sake of “world revolution” were simply not affordable, nor politically desirable, under the new economic development model. As a result, Maoist guerilla groups in Latin America saw their political and military support from the “motherland” cut off, contributing to their general decline in the region. China’s presence in Latin America during the 1980s and 1990s was thus virtually nonexistent. This situation was to change during the first decade of the 21st Century.

Evan Ellis identifies four principal reasons why China is today (again) in-terested in Latin America: (i) as a source of primary products, given China’s increasing emphasis on the production of manufactured goods; (ii) as a market for its manufactured exports, given Latin America’s population of over 600 million people; (iii) as a political ally, because of its vision of global governance, including its interest in obtaining support and legitimacy from developing countries for its rise to great power status; and (iv) the pursuit of the “One China” principle given that more than half of the countries that recognize Taiwan worldwide are located in Latin America and the Caribbean (Ellis 2009, 14-15). The following section elaborates briefly on each of the points identified by Ellis and provides some additional context and evidence. It also discusses another aspect of China’s relations with Latin America not mentioned by Ellis: whether the improved relationship is intended to under-mine the traditional hegemony of the United States in the region.

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a. The Demand for Primary Resources

Most authors, and official Chinese rhetoric too, zero in on the economic dimension of the relationship with Latin America. Put simply, the region is rich in natural resources that the Chinese economy requires in order to sustain its impressive growth path. However, compared with other regions of the world, especially Asia, the level of Latin America’s exports to China is rather low – not exceeding 6% of China’s total imports in 2009 (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. China’s imports from world regions, 2009

Source: CEPAL.

The bulk of Latin American exports to China are primary products, main-ly minerals and foodstuffs. Almost 60% are mineral products such as oil, gas, and copper. Agricultural products play an important role too, accounting for nearly 30% of total exports to China (see Figure 2).

Figure 2. Product composition of Latin America’s exports to China, 2009

Source: CEPAL.

EU12.10%

7.70%USA

6.40%LAC

RW18.40%

55.40%Asia

28.00%Products

Others15.00%

57.00%Minerals

Agriculture & Food related

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China is also interested in further encouraging this kind of imports from Latin America and in making the investments necessary for them to increase, primarily in the exploration and exploitation of mineral resources. In this regard, it is important to point out how the Chinese investment strategy in Latin America differs from that followed in Africa. In many African coun-tries, Chinese funds for new infrastructure projects associated with natural resource production are not made available directly to the recipient country. Instead, the recipient country authorizes the Chinese government to select a Chinese construction company to carry out the work. The Chinese Export-Import Bank lends money at low interest rates to this company, which brings workers and technology from China. In return, the recipient government grants the company the concession for the exploitation of the natural re-source in question - generally oil or other minerals (Foster et al. 2008).

This model of investment has not prospered in Latin America, mainly be-cause of the resistance of governments to handing over control of the invest-ment operation completely to foreign companies and allowing them to employ exclusively Chinese workers on construction sites (Ellis 2009, 59). Instead, the Chinese government has opted for lobbying host countries to let Chinese com-panies acquire shares in local mining companies. For example, Chile’s state-owned Codelco, the largest copper mine in the world, reached a US$2 billion deal with China’s Minmetals, a state-owned metals trading house, under which Minmetals would initially invest US$550 million in a 50-50 joint venture. In return, China would receive a long-term copper supply contract (Ellis 2009, 43).

b. The Market for Manufactured Export Products

The Chinese government has recognized that its traditional export markets in developed countries are declining as a result of rising trade barriers imposed in the aftermath of an avalanche of highly competitive Chinese imports. Western countries are nowadays much more reluctant to permit the unrestrained flow of Chinese manufactured products into their economies. Chinese products are sold principally through the vast informal sector in developing countries, including Latin America. The low price structure of China’s manufactured goods translates into superior competitiveness and thus greater market penetration than that enjoyed by traditional imports or domestically manufactured goods. The official

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figure for Chinese exports to Latin America – just 5% of China’s total exports in 2009 (see Figure 3) – most likely understates the increasing presence of Chinese products in developing countries in general, and in Latin America in particular.

Figure 3. China’s exports to world regions, 2009

Source: CEPAL.

In terms of the composition of Chinese exports to Latin America, more than half are manufactured electronic devices and machinery, followed by textiles, accessories and toys (see Figure 4). The complementarity of the Chinese-Latin America trade relationship is, then, clear: primary resources are exchanged for manufactured products; or as some authors put it, a new form of center-periphery relations has been created (Jenkins and Dussel Peters 2009).

Figure 4. Composition of China’s exports to Latin America, 2009

Source: CEPAL.

37.20%Asia

4.70%LAC

RW22.20%

18.40%USA

17.40%EU

54.44%

Electronic devices and machines

Others24.20%

15.42%

Clothesand other accesories

5.71%Toys

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However, there are some notable differences between the major Latin American countries in terms of their trade relationships with China, in particular when their exports to China as a share of total exports are juxtaposed with the percentage of China’s exports going to them (see Figure 5). Generally speaking, the percentage of a given Latin American country’s exports that go to China are higher than the per-centage of overall imports to the region that it receives. For example, while Chile’s exports to China constitute almost 25% of its total exports – with the result that following the signature of the free trade agreement between the two countries in 2005 China has been the most important export destination for Chilean goods - it receives less than 10% of China’s total exports to the seven major Latin American economies. The situation is more symmetrical for Colombia, whose exports to China and the percentage of imports to the region it receives are roughly equal.

Figure 5. Latin American countries’ trade relationship with China, 2009

Source: Invest Hong Kong.

The outlier case in this picture – explaining the discrepancies – is Mexico. Almost 50% of all Chinese exports to Latin America go to Mexico, whereas Mexican exports to China are almost nonexistent, representing less than 2% of total exports from the region. The reason for Mexico’s somewhat awkward position is that, as a member of NAFTA, it enjoys preferential access to the United States and Canadian markets. Chinese companies have taken advantage of this situation and formed integrated global production chains: producing basic components in China, performing final assembly in Mexico in order to comply with the rules-of-origin requirements under the NAFTA agreement, and

Chile

PeruBrazil

Argentina

PanamaColombia

Mexico

25%

20%

15%

10%

5%

0%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%

Expo

rts

to H

K an

d Ch

ina

as a

sha

re o

f to

tal e

xpor

ts

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finally shipping the finished goods to the United States and Canada (Gereffi and Memedovic 2003; Villalobos 2005; Wong-Gonzales 2009). The implications of this situation for the domestic maquiladora industry focused on the production and export of basic manufactured goods have been devastating (Ellis 2009, 205).

c. Seeking Allies for an Emerging Structure of Global Governance

In general terms, economics dominates China’s relations with Latin America. However, they do not always end there. The Chinese government needs allies in the developing world to legitimize its aspiration to become a great power. Along with this desire, China is striving to achieve structural reforms in the institu-tions of contemporary global governance to make them more representative of the realities of the 21st Century. In China’s view, powerful international organiza-tions such as the International Monetary Fund or the World Trade Organization reflect outdated governance structures devised during the era of the Cold War. Emerging regional and global powers such as China feel underrepresented in the crucial decision-making bodies of global governance. In order to initiate and implement reforms, China has sought to engage developing countries as strategic allies in its quest for a general overhaul of global governance (Economy 2010).

China pursues a pragmatic course when it comes to the selection of strategic allies in the developing world that is similar to the approach it follows devel-oping “win-win” economic cooperation agreements. Allies are not selected on the basis of political characteristics such as regime type or respect for human rights. As a result, the current polarization between radical left, social-demo-cratic, and right-wing governments in Latin America is of little importance to China when it comes to the question of whether to engage with them or not. In turn, countries with diverse political and economic backgrounds such as Peru, Mexico and Chile on the one hand, and Cuba, Bolivia, and Venezuela on the other have received similar treatment from China. The important factor is the willingness to establish economic relations and the search for common, mutu-ally beneficial interests. When relations are slow to prosper between China and a specific country, it is usually the decision of the latter.

Apart from the Taiwan issue mentioned below, China imposes no funda-mental reservations or prior conditions that might affect the construction of closer relations with developing countries. However, it is important to grasp

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the differentiation between “mere” economic partners on the one hand and crucial political allies on the other. In order to illustrate this point, the next section considers the relationship between China and Brazil.

China’s relationship with Brazil includes, but at the same time goes far beyond, trade cooperation. Brazil has the biggest market in Latin America and is the largest country in the region, making it an interesting economic partner for China. In contrast to other countries in Latin America, Brazil offers opportunities for lucrative Chinese investment beyond the commodi-ties sector. Brazilian companies such as EMBRAER and the Chinese Aircraft Industry Corporation are engaged in joint ventures intended to increase their global market share of the aviation sector. Conversely, the Brazilian company EMBRACO, a compressor manufacturer, has captured 30% of the Chinese compressor market (Ellis 2009, 49-62).

Potentially more important than trade and investment, however, are the political relations between China and Brazil. Together with Russia and India, they form the so-called BRICs Countries. Initially coined by the investment firm Goldman Sachs as a term to describe countries at a similar stage of newly advanced economic development, the acronym has come into wide-spread use as a symbol of the shift in global economic power away from the developed G-7 economies toward the developing world. Since the four coun-tries are developing rapidly, by 2050 their combined economies could eclipse those of the current richest countries of the world. Brazil, Russia, India, and China, combined, currently account for more than a quarter of the world’s land area and more than 40% of the world’s population.

The term and the associated concept caught on so much that the four countries began to develop and coordinate common positions in interna-tional politics, for example regarding the reform of international financial institutions and global economic governance in general. The leaders of the BRICs countries held their first summit in June 2009 in Russia, where they issued a declaration calling for the establishment of an equitable, democratic and multipolar world order.

The important point here is that China and Brazil see each other as pri-mus inter pares on the world stage. Given the size of their economies they see themselves as the natural leaders of the developing world, poised to

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act as its representatives vis-à-vis the developed countries and the inter-national institutions they dominate. In other words, they view each other as primarily political allies dedicated to the cause of creating new arrange-ments in global governance.5

d. The Taiwan Issue

Probably the longest-standing issue affecting relations between Latin America and China has been the question of Taiwan. Taiwan and China split amid civil war in 1949. Since then they have been engaged in an all-out contest to win diplomatic allegiance from countries around the world. There are presently twenty-three sovereign states left in the world that recognize Taiwan diplomatically. Twelve of these are located in Latin America and the Caribbean: the Dominican Republic, Haiti, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, St. Lucia, Panama, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Belize, and Paraguay.

In recent years, China’s rising political and economic clout has helped it persuade more countries to recognize Beijing instead of Taipei. Based on the “One China Policy”, Beijing offers monetary incentives in the form of infrastructure investment, foreign aid, and trade preferences in return for establishing diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic and thus break-ing formal ties with Taiwan.

In the recent past, several Latin American and Caribbean countries have taken advantage of this attractive offer. After Costa Rica became the first Central American country to establish diplomatic ties with the People’s Republic in 2007, China bought US$300 million of Costa Rican government bonds (Shambaugh 2008). In addition, China spent US$74 million to build a new national soccer stadium in the capital, San José. The way in which the “Taiwan issue” can turn into a lucrative business opportunity for some Latin American countries was demonstrated by the Caribbean island coun-try of Dominica. In 2004, Dominica requested a US$58 million aid package

5 Severino Becerra (Cesarin and Moneta 2005, 269-280) provides an interesting compila-tion of the relations between Brazil and China with a view towards the next ten years.

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from Taiwan, which Taipei declined. Subsequently, Dominica switched sides, changing its diplomatic allegiance to the People’s Republic. In return, the Chinese government provided the island with US$11 million in immediate aid, plus US$100 million in grant aid over a period of six years (Ellis 2009, 15).

e. A Counter–Balance to United States Hegemony in Latin America?

For Latin America, the United States has acted as regional hegemon for almost two-hundred years, since the declaration of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823.6 For decades, it has been the main trade and investment partner for many Latin American countries. Additionally, it has exercised substantial political, military, and cultural influence over the states and societies of the region. Consequently, Latin America has long been described as the “back-yard” of the United States, as asserted in the ideology of “Manifest Destiny” from 1904 onwards, or by frequent military interventions such as the Grenada “Rescue Mission” in 1983 or the Panama invasion of 1989. However, this dynamic has lost force during the 21st Century, mainly as a result of the shifting security priorities of the United States, which has refocused its at-tention towards other regions such as the Middle East.

In addition, with the increasing importance of China in world politics and its concomitant presence in Latin America, it is tempting to interpret current and future international politics as a rivalry between an emerging great power (China) and one in decline (the United States). In the history of the interna-tional system power transitions of this type have usually been associated with violent conflicts or all-out wars for global hegemony (Organski 1958). According to the logic of “offensive realism”, emerging great powers adopt a revisionist stance toward the “rules of the game” that govern international politics, seek-ing to replace them with institutions that fit their interests. As the declining great power will defend the status quo it has created under all circumstances, violent conflicts between old and new are inevitable (Mearsheimer 2001).

6 After the independence of the United States from Great Britain, and Latin America’s from Spain, the United States government decided that any attack on the region would require United States intervention.

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If this logic were to apply in this case, China would be looking to challenge the United States in all areas of international relations, seeking to undermine its hegemony in its traditional spheres of influence. Latin America should be a prime target for China’s aggressive foreign policy given its position as the U.S.’s backyard. Is it, then, possible to describe China’s interest in Latin America as a challenge to the dominant position of the United States? To what extent is China seeking to mount such a challenge as an additional consequence, or col-lateral benefit, of its growing economic, cultural and diplomatic ties?

The official position of the Chinese government emphasizes the “peaceful rise” of the country to great power status. It aims to accommodate the inter-ests of existing great powers rather than to openly challenge or counteract them. Chinese strategy toward Latin America includes no stated aim of tak-ing on the United States’ interests directly, let alone replacing it as regional hegemon.7 However, despite the official rhetoric, there are some signs that China’s relations with Latin America serve at least to lessen the influence of the United States in the region.

Because of the potentially vast purchasing power of its domestic market, China offers a lucrative destination for Latin American products. In the con-text of the current problems affecting the United States economy, China’s capacity to absorb Latin American exports has filled the gap left by declining demand from the region’s traditional trading partner. As a result, the Latin American economies are able to reduce their dependence on the United States market, offering more autonomy and increased growth potential irrespective of macroeconomic trends to the north.8

China’s recent admission to regional organizations such as the Organization of American States (OAS) or the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) does not follow a purely economic logic. It reflects, rather, the government’s greater interest in the political affairs of the region, including its interest in

7 Chinese Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean, November 6, 2008; available online at http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/6528385.html.

8 As emphasized by a recent report from the ECLAC (2010c), China’s growing trade has also implied significant political and cultural exchanges with countries such as Brazil, Chile and Peru and future agreements with various others, including Colombia.

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the long-term possibility of acting as a counterbalance to U.S. positions in these organizations. Given China s interest in reforming the international financial institutions mentioned above, why should institutions such as the OAS and the IADB that have traditionally been dominated by the United States remain exempt from that endeavor?

Finally, China has developed close commercial as well as political and military relations with Latin American countries such as Venezuela and Bolivia that open-ly oppose United States hegemony in the region. Military relations with Venezuela have been strong and the Chávez government has purchased substantial amounts of Chinese weaponry and military paraphernalia, such as radar, ammunition, and aircraft. In addition, military training of and by Chinese officials has been a fre-quent occurrence on Venezuelan territory in recent years (Ellis 2009).

However, China’s incursion into Latin America should not be overesti-mated. Even though China has joined regional organizations, its membership is limited to observer status, leaving it on the sidelines of actual decision-making. In addition, the Chinese government has taken a largely passive, neutral, approach to the different political conflicts that have erupted in the region during the recent past including, for example, the frequent tensions between Colombia and Venezuela.

The Chinese government has refrained from openly supporting political regimes that are hostile to the United States. Economic and military support from China is not exclusive to those countries, but is provided across the ideological spectrum. In other words, Bolivia, Venezuela and Cuba receive the same treatment from China as Colombia, Peru, and Mexico.

CONCLUSION

China’s impressive economic development during the last twenty years, combined with a more outwardly-oriented foreign policy, has fundamentally shaped international relations in the post-Cold War period. The Chinese government proclaims that the “peaceful rise” of the country heralds a new era in the international system, where great powers can co-exist peacefully, bound together by economic interdependencies, and relations of “soft” rather than “hard” power. Instead of pursuing their interests by recourse to force or

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coercion, “soft” great powers elicit cooperation from other countries because of the attractiveness of their model or as an example to follow.

Pursuing a strictly non-interventionist approach towards domestic affairs, China’s official policy toward developing countries is focused on the establish-ment of “win-win” cooperation without imposing political conditions on its partners. In other words, economics - especially complementary trade relations - drive China’s relations with Latin America. The Chinese government roams the planet in search of the natural resources it needs to sustain its current economic development model. At the same time, it is looking for new markets to penetrate with its basic manufactured products. Latin America provides an ideal partner in this endeavor. In other words, trade relations between China and Latin America look like a “marriage made in heaven”.

However, this “new marriage” is built on the economic foundations of the existing center-periphery relations between the region and the United States. Exporting natural resources to China and importing basic manufactured products will do little for the industrial upgrading required by Latin America’s economies. Convenient as the burgeoning trade relationship with China is in boosting Latin America’s exports in times of global economic crisis and declin-ing demand from traditional trading partners, its positive effects in the long-term are very much in doubt. As China becomes obliged over the long-term to change its model of resource-intensive economic development it will reduce its imports of primary products and may as a consequence increase its FDI flows or other forms of direct penetration in economies abroad.

Political aspects play a secondary role in China’s relations with Latin America. Apart from the active pursuit of a “One China” policy, inciting countries to break formal ties with Taiwan and to recognize the People’s Republic diplomatically, China’s strategy to engage political allies for the promotion of its vision of global governance - for example, within the BRIC group - is focused on Brazil, the regional heavy-weight. For the rest of the region, China carefully balances its political and military relations, trying to avoid the impression of favoring one group of countries over another, whether for ideological or economic reasons. As a result, governments hoping to enlist China’s help in order to challenge United States hegemony in Latin America should not hold their breath.

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3. Cesarin, Sergio and Carlos Moneta (eds.). 2005. China y América Latina. Nuevos enfo-

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2011, http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=33036644

4. Dunkerley, James. 2008. US foreign policy in Latin America. In US foreign policy, edited by

Michael Cox and Doug Stokes, 292-312. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

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China y México. CEPAL. Accessed December 23, 2011. http://dusselpeters.com/oportuni-

dades-china-mexico_2007.pdf

6. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, ECLAC. 2008a. Econo-

mic and trade relations between Latin America and Asia-Pacific. The link with China.

Accessed December 23, 2011, http://www.eclac.cl/comercio/publicaciones/xml/5/34235/

ECONOMIC_RELATIONS_LATIN_AMERICA_ASIA_PACIFIC.pdf

7. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, ECLAC. 2008b. Oportu-

nidades de comercio e inversión entre América Latina y Asia-Pacífico. El vínculo con

APEC. Accessed December 23, 2011, http://www.eclac.cl/publicaciones/xml/6/34516/

LC_L_2971_APEC_esp_2008.pdf

8. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, ECLAC. 2010a. Capítulo III: Las

inversiones directas de China en América Latina y el Caribe. In La inversión extranjera directa

en América Latina y el Caribe. Accessed December 23, 2011. http://www.eclac.cl/publicaciones/

xml/9/43289/Capitulo_III__IED_2010_WEB_ FINAL.pdf

9. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, ECLAC. 2010b. Hoja Infor-

mativa China. Accessed December 23, 2011. http://

10. www.eclac.cl/prensa/noticias/comunicados/7/43307/hoja-informativa-China-es.pdf

11. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, ECLAC. 2010c. La Repú-

blica Popular de China y América Latina y el Caribe: hacia una relación estratégica.

Accessed December 23, 2011. http://www.eclac.cl/publicaciones/xml/2/39082/RP_Chi-

na_America_Latina_el_Caribe_una_relacion_estrategica_906.pdf

12. Economy, Elizabeth C. 2010. The game changer. Coping with China’s foreign policy revo-

lution. Foreign Affairs 89 (6): 142-153.

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14. Foster, Vivien, William Butterfield, Chuan Chen, and Nataliya Pushak. 2008. Building

bridges: China’s growing role as infrastructure financier for Sub-Saharan Africa. Washington

DC: The Public Private Infraestructure Advisory Facility, World Bank,

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edited by Peter Schraeder, 153-172. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

16. Gallagher, Kevin P. and Roberto Porzecanski. 2010. The dragon in the room. China and the

future of Latin American industrialization. Stanford: The Stanford University Press.

17. Gereffi, Gary and Olga Memedovic. 2003. The global apparel value chain: What prospects for upgra-

ding by developing countries. Vienna: The United Nations Industrial Development Organization.

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relations in the twenty-first century. Bonn and Mexico City: German Development Insti-

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world. New Haven: Yale University Press.

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Brookings Institution Press.

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industry. University of East Anglia School of International Development: World Eco-

nomy & Finance Research Programme, Working Paper No. 11.


Relaciones bilaterales China y Colombia: 1990-20101

Sandra Borda GuzmánMaría Paz Berger

RESUMENEl propósito de este artículo es examinar las relaciones bilaterales entre la República Popular China y Colombia durante la década de los noventa y la primera de los años 2000. La mayoría de los análisis se enfocan en las relaciones comerciales y financieras entre ambos países, razón por la cual hacemos énfasis en la importancia de la dimensión política. Este artículo busca explicar los orígenes y la evolución de esta relación en cuanto a derechos humanos, negociaciones militares y otros aspectos políticos como el reconocimiento de China como economía de mercado y el papel que juega la cercanía entre Estados Unidos y Colombia. Este artículo expone las razones por las que, aunque la relación se ha fortalecido sustancialmente, ésta sigue siendo marginal, debido a la importancia que da China a economías más grandes en América Latina y a la fortaleza y profundidad de los vínculos entre Estados Unidos y Colombia.

PALABRAS CLAVE China • Colombia • política exterior • economía de mercado • drogas • seguridad • derechos humanos • Estados Unidos • IED

Bilateral Relations between China and Colombia: 1990-2010

ABSTRACTThis article examines the bilateral relations between the People’s Republic of China and Colombia during the 90s and the 00s. Most academic analyses focused on the commercial and financial relationship between the two countries and this is why we draw attention on the importance of the political dimension of this relationship. This article also describes and analyzes the relationship in terms of human rights, military negotiations and other political aspects such as the recognition of China as a market economy and the role played by the very close and special relationship between Colombia and the United States. This article explains why even if the relationship between the two countries has substantially deepened, it is still a marginal relation due to China’s attraction toward bigger economies in Latin America and the special relationship between the United States and Colombia.

KEYWORDS China • Colombia • bilateral relations • foreign policy • market economy • drugs • security • human rights • United States • FDI

1 Agradecemos los comentarios y sugerencias de Pío García, quien se desempeñó como comentador de este capítulo en la conferencia China and Latin American Political Relations organizada por el Centro de Estudios Internacionales de la Universidad de los Andes. Bogotá, 23 de septiembre de 2010.

Sandra Borda Guzmán, PhD, Profesora Asociada del Departamento de Ciencia Política de la Universidad de los Andes.María Paz Berger, Magíster en Ciencia Política de la Universidad de los Andes.

Digital Object Identification http://dx.doi.org/10.7440/colombint75.2012.04


Relaciones bilaterales China y Colombia: 1990-2010Sandra Borda GuzmánMaría Paz Berger

INTRODUCCIÓN

El 7 de febrero de 1980, bajo la administración de Turbay Ayala, el Gobierno colombiano estableció relaciones diplomáticas con la República Popular China (RPC). El inicio oficial de los lazos bilaterales fue posible gra-cias a que “Colombia se adhirió al principio de ‘una sola China’, que reconoce al Gobierno de Beijing como el único y legítimo gobierno legal de China y a Taiwán como parte inalienable de ese territorio” (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores 2008a). Aunque en 2010 se cumplieron treinta años de esta rela-ción, los análisis sobre su dimensión puramente política no son muy frecuen-tes. A lo largo de esta investigación pudimos identificar que efectivamente existe un vacío en la literatura sobre el componente político de las relaciones entre China y Colombia.

Dicho vacío tiene al menos tres explicaciones principales: la primera, que hasta ahora los académicos han tendido a enfocarse más en el aspecto económico y comercial porque éste es mucho más visible y documentado; la segunda tiene que ver con la relativa marginalidad de la relación entre Colombia y China, si se la compara con los vínculos existentes entre otros países latinoamericanos y la potencia asiática. En efecto, la mayoría de los análisis se concentran principalmente en el estudio comparado de las relacio-nes de la RPC con Brasil, Argentina, Chile, México y Perú, sus principales y más antiguos socios en la región. Mientras que Colombia, aunque en ciertas ocasiones es tenida en cuenta, se ha quedado rezagada tanto en el ámbito de

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su relación con China como en el de los análisis sobre este tema.2 Lo anterior está directamente relacionado con la tercera y más importante explicación: la “relación especial” existente entre Bogotá y Washington ha llevado a pos-tergar la densificación de los lazos entre Colombia y China. Este último país, también ha decidido mantener una distancia prudencial.

El propósito de este trabajo es entonces identificar y analizar tendencias en las relaciones bilaterales recientes entre China y Colombia. Se trata de ir más allá del ámbito económico y comercial y analizar el estado de los víncu-los entre ambos países, por ejemplo, en, el tema de los derechos humanos o la cooperación militar. Adicionalmente, profundizaremos en dos temas de la política exterior colombiana y de gran importancia para China: su reconoci-miento como economía de mercado y la inclusión de Taiwán en su territorio. Como lo veremos en detalle más adelante, ambos son asuntos que han de-terminado en gran medida el tipo de relaciones que China establece con los demás países del sistema internacional, donde Colombia no es la excepción.

1. ANTECEDENTES

Colombia y la RPC establecieron relaciones diplomáticas gracias a que el Gobierno colombiano se adhirió al principio de “una sola China”. Este reconoci-miento por parte de Colombia implicó una ruptura de las relaciones políticas con Taiwán. Sobre esta decisión, es necesario resaltar dos elementos: el primero, que el inicio de las relaciones con la RPC se dio en forma más o menos simultánea con la apertura económica de este país; y el segundo, que si bien Colombia se pronunció en contra de la independencia de Taiwán, ambos países continuaron manteniendo relaciones de carácter comercial. Aunque Colombia reconoció a la RPC tempranamente –y en un período inusual, dado que justo en este momento se reintensificó la Guerra Fría–, fue uno de los países latinoamericanos que más tardó en abrirse económica y comercialmente hacia el gigante asiático.3

2 Para algunos ejemplos sobre este tipo de análisis, ver Domínguez et al. (2006), Jubany y Poon (2006) y Tokatlian (2007).

3 Entre los países latinoamericanos que establecieron relaciones oficiales con la RPC se encuentran, entre otros, Chile, que reconoció a China como única en 1970; Perú, en 1971; Argentina y México, en 1972, y Brasil y Venezuela, en 1974.

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De hecho, antes de la apertura económica de China, la mayoría de los gobiernos latinoamericanos –incluido el colombiano– esperaron la visita del entonces presidente de Estados Unidos, Richard Nixon, a Beijing en 1972 para establecer relaciones diplomáticas con la RPC (Lafargue 2006; Shicheng 2003; Shixue 2005). En 1985, y bajo el marco de la reforma y la apertura impulsadas por Deng Xiaoping,4 el primer ministro Zhao Ziyang realizó una gira de visitas oficiales en algunos países de América Latina, entre los cuales incluyó Colombia (Shicheng 2003). Siendo éste el primer funcionario de alto rango del Gobierno chino en visitar el hemisferio, se tra-tó de un evento que puede considerarse de gran importancia para el Estado colombiano, dado que hizo parte de un grupo pequeño de países compuesto también por Argentina, Brasil y Venezuela.

El acercamiento entre China y Colombia durante esta década se explica, en parte, por el establecimiento y uso de una visión mucho más pragmática que ideológica del proceso de inserción internacional de ambos países. En este sentido, Turbay Ayala afirmó, en 1979, que “si China compra café colombiano no habrá problemas para establecer relaciones diplomáticas”,5 y esto fue exac-tamente lo que se sucedió. Además, desde de la administración de Deng, la política comercial de China se había caracterizado justamente por un tipo de pragmatismo en el que las afinidades ideológicas de China con otros países habían sido –en la mayoría de los casos– prácticamente irrelevantes.6

En la actualidad, Colombia se encuentra dentro de la agenda China justa-mente como resultado de la Política de Desarrollo Omnidireccional y Acelerado de este último. Esta política se apoya “sobre la base del consenso estratégico del desarrollo de los nexos bilaterales, donde la confianza política mutua se

4 Para conocer más sobre la reforma de Deng Xiao Ping y los procesos que se presen-taron en el ámbito doméstico en el país asiático bajo el marco de esta reforma, ver Barbosa (2005).

5 Las palabras de Turbay fueron recordadas por Xu Shicheng, miembro de la Academia de Ciencias Sociales de China, quien en ese entonces era miembro de la delegación de la RPC que visitó Colombia ese año (Castro Obando 2005).

6 Aunque cabe aclarar que, como toda regla, ésta también tiene su excepción. China cuenta en la actualidad con aliados de tipo ideológico como Bolivia, Cuba y Venezuela (Malik 2006).

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fortaleció en 2008, como lo demuestran las frecuentes visitas recíprocas de alto rango, que permitieron reforzar la cooperación y coordinación, y promovieron vigorosamente el desarrollo de vínculos en todas las direcciones” (Shicheng 2008).7 A continuación, identificaremos las tendencias que se han presentado en materia económica, para luego enfocarnos en el aspecto político.

2. LO ECONÓMICO

Antes de hablar específicamente sobre las relaciones comerciales entre Colombia y China, es necesario hacer un análisis breve y general sobre la na-turaleza de los vínculos comerciales y económicos de Colombia con el resto del mundo. De esta forma, y desde una perspectiva comparada, es entonces posible llegar a una conclusión acerca del lugar que ocupa China en la lista de socios in-ternacionales colombianos. En esta sección, y como parte de la observación de estas tendencias, argumentamos que los lazos entre Colombia y China están le-jos de alcanzar la importancia de los vínculos entre Colombia y Estados Unidos. Sin embargo, también sugerimos que la presencia económica y comercial china está experimentando un crecimiento evidente, como lo demostraremos más adelante, cuando nos referimos a la balanza comercial bilateral.

a. Exportaciones e importaciones: Colombia y el mundo

Estados Unidos ocupa en la actualidad el primer puesto como país recep-tor de bienes y servicios colombianos, seguido de China, Ecuador, Venezuela y México. La Gráfica 1 muestra que para el año 2010, China superó por poco a Ecuador y a Venezuela –ocupando así el segundo lugar en recepción de impor-taciones colombianas–, con una diferencia de US$142 millones y US$544 mi-llones, respectivamente. Cabe resaltar aquí que la diferencia entre el primer cliente de Colombia y los dos últimos en el gráfico es bastante amplia, lo que muestra que Estados Unidos mantiene una posición privilegiada y constante. En el año 2010, Estados Unidos importó un total de US$16.971 millones, y la diferencia con China se mantuvo muy significativa.

7 Para más información sobre la política omnidireccional de la RPC, ver Shicheng (2008). Disponible en: http://www.chinatoday.com.cn/hoy/2009n/s2009n02/p50.htm

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Gráfica 1. Exportaciones de Colombia hacia el mundo, 1990-2010

Fuente: Base de datos de Direction of Trade Statistics del Fondo Monetario Internacional. Cálculos: María Berger y Sandra Borda.

Ahora bien, en el caso de las importaciones hacia Colombia desde el mundo (ver Gráfica 2), es posible identificar de nuevo que Estados Unidos ha contado siempre con una ventaja significativa frente a México y China, quie-nes ocupan el segundo y tercer lugar, respectivamente. Las cifras del Fondo Monetario Internacional (FMI) muestran que Colombia importó cerca de US$10.531 millones en productos estadounidenses para el año 2010, mientras que recibió un equivalente de US$5.477 millones en importaciones chinas; aproximadamente la mitad en comparación con Estados Unidos.

Sin embargo, sobresale el hecho de que tanto las exportaciones como las importaciones, desde y hacia Colombia, se han incrementado visiblemente en los últimos veinte años, lo que demuestra que el país sí ha buscado fortalecer el intercambio económico con China y con el resto del mundo. En efecto, las cifras del FMI muestran que Colombia aumentó el valor total de sus exporta-ciones en un 585,6% entre 1990 y 2010. Ahora, en materia de importaciones, este aumento es aún más significativo porque Colombia incrementó sus im-portaciones en un 727,8% en los últimos veinte años.

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Gráfica 2. Importaciones a Colombia desde el mundo, 1990-2010


b. Exportaciones e importaciones: Colombia y China

Desde la década de los noventa, Colombia y China han mantenido una in-teracción de carácter esencialmente económico. El establecimiento formal de las relaciones diplomáticas entre ambos países comenzó más o menos simul-táneamente con la apertura comercial de China. Sin embargo, esta apertura no coincidió con la de Colombia, lo que explica por qué el intercambio co-mercial no creció sustantivamente sino hasta 1991, bajo el mandato de César Gaviria, cuya administración inició y lideró el proceso de apertura económica del país. En lo que concierne específicamente a la balanza comercial bilate-ral, se observa que la relación comercial ha aumentado significativamente desde ese entonces. Durante los años noventa, el valor máximo que alcanzó Colombia en materia de exportaciones hacia China fue de US$30,7 millones, en 1995. Aunque el monto es poco significativo en términos absolutos, es preciso señalar que significó un incremento de 17 veces frente al año anterior. En cuanto a las importaciones desde China, éstas alcanzaron los US$227,5 millones en 1999; un aumento notable si se tiene en cuenta que nueve años

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antes Colombia tan sólo recibió US$1,8 millones en productos chinos. Ya para el año 2010, Colombia exportó un total de US$1.966 millones hacia China, y para el mismo año, las importaciones desde el gigante asiático representaron un total de US$5.477 millones.

Aunque lo anterior muestra que efectivamente las relaciones comercia-les entre China y Colombia han aumentado exponencialmente, la Gráfica 3 ilustra cómo a partir de la administración de Álvaro Uribe, la brecha entre exportaciones e importaciones se incrementó hasta 2008, año en que la disparidad se hizo aún más protuberante. Como lo sugiere Ellis, “aunque las exportaciones desde Colombia hacia China y las importaciones chinas hacia Colombia han crecido durante los últimos años, las importaciones colom-bianas desde China han crecido más rápidamente, impulsando una balanza comercial cada vez más a favor de la RPC” (Ellis 2009, 12). Por un lado, este aumento en los flujos comerciales es, en parte, resultado de la necesidad colombiana de diversificar sus relaciones comerciales tras la negativa del Congreso estadounidense a firmar el TLC; ello hizo necesario abrirse a la in-versión china y fortalecer sus relaciones en materia de intercambio comercial con la potencia asiática (El Tiempo 2008a). El incremento en el intercambio fue también posible gracias a la firma del Acuerdo de Promoción y Protección Recíproca de Inversiones (APPRI) entre Colombia y la RPC, que tuvo lugar el 22 de noviembre de 2008, durante la Cumbre del APEC (por su sigla en inglés, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) en Lima.8,9

Por otro lado, el crecimiento en el déficit de Colombia de la balanza co-mercial bilateral con China puede ser explicado parcialmente por la caída de los precios del ferroníquel; dicha caída en los precios perjudicó a Colombia en sus exportaciones hacia China y produjo que éstas se redujeran en un 54% frente al año anterior, “por la tendencia mundial a reducir su consumo,

8 Para más información sobre este encuentro, ver Presidencia de la República de Colombia 2008. Disponible en: http://web.presidencia.gov.co/sp/2008/noviem-bre/22/15222008.html

9 Colombia ha intentado ingresar a esta organización en repetidas ocasiones y su inten-ción de hacerlo ha sido abiertamente apoyada por China a través de comunicados de prensa oficiales del Gobierno de ese país. Para profundizar en el tema de la inclusión de Colombia en APEC, ver García Parra (2005).

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precisamente por las altas cotizaciones registradas en el pasado y la volatili-dad de las mismas” (El Tiempo 2008c).

Gráfica 3. Balanza comercial bilateral de China y Colombia, 1990-2010


c. Inversión Extranjera Directa (IED)

Como lo muestra la Gráfica 4, la IED de China en el mundo no empezó a despegar sino a partir de 2005, cuando las empresas privadas de este país prácticamente doblaron su inversión en el espacio de un año. Según Correa y González (2006), este despegue se debió, principalmente, a su ingreso a la Organización Mundial del Comercio (OMC), y en la medida en que “sobre la base de un exitoso modelo de apertura controlada, logró ubicarse en el centro de las estrategias de los inversores” (Correa y Gonzaléz 2006, 114). A partir de ese momento, la inversión de China se disparó.

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Gráfica 4. Inversión extranjera de China, 1990-2010

Fuente: Base de datos de la Conferencia de las Naciones Unidas sobre Comercio y Desarrollo (UNCTAD). Cálculos: María Berger y Sandra Borda.

Ahora bien, la Gráfica 5 muestra que el aumento significativo en la inver-sión extranjera por parte de China no ha tenido necesariamente un impacto respectivo en el hemisferio latinoamericano. Esto se debe antes que todo a que los inversionistas chinos han privilegiado de modo sistemático la in-versión en su propia región, dejando a América Latina, en general, lejos de obtener un puesto prioritario en materia de inversiones.

Gráfica 5. Distribución por región de la IED de China en 2010

Fuente: Datos de 2010 Statistical Bulletin of China's Outward Foreign Direct Investment. (Ministerio de Comercio de la República Popular de China 2011). Cálculos: María Berger y Sandra Borda.

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La Tabla 1 ilustra el lugar predominante de Brasil en materia de inversión extranjera china. En 2010, este país ocupó el primer lugar en América Latina, con un 62,7% del total de la inversión directa proveniente del gigante asiático; seguido de lejos por Argentina (36,4%) y Perú (0,5%). Por su parte, Colombia ocupó el último lugar como receptor de la IED proveniente de China en el hemisferio latinoamericano, con tan sólo el 0,01%.

Tabla 1. Inversión extranjera directa de China en América Latina

PAÍS Inversiones 1990-2009

Confirmadas 2010

Inversiones anunciadas a

partir de 2011

Argentina 143 5.550 3.530

Brasil 255 9.563 9.870

Colombia 1.677 3 -

Costa Rica 13 5 700

Ecuador 1.619 41 -

Guayana 1.000 - -

México 127 5 -

Perú 2.262 84 8.640

Venezuela (República Bolivariana de) 240 - -

TOTAL 7.336 15.251 22.740

Fuente: Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), sobre la base de información Thomson Reuters, fDi Markets, fuentes oficiales y entrevistas con empresas.

La Gráfica 6 ilustra cómo la IED total en Colombia ha aumentado de un modo significativo y ha variado sustancialmente en la década de los noventa y en la actual coyuntura. Sin embargo, la Gráfica 7 muestra que la inversión proveniente de China, al igual que la estadounidense, es aún poco signifi-cativa, como también sucede en materia de importaciones y exportaciones.

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Gráfica 6. Inversión extranjera en Colombia, 1990-2010

Fuente: Base de datos de la Conferencia de las Naciones Unidas sobre Comercio y Desarrollo (UNCTAD). Cálculos: María Berger y Sandra Borda.

Gráfica 7. Principales países inversionistas en Colombia entre 1994 y 2010.10

Fuente: participación sobre el total de los países con inversión neta positiva, sin reinversión de utilidades ni inversión en el sector petrolero (cuentas excluidas del total de la inversión por país y discriminadas en rubros independientes). Valor: US$2.235,8 millones. NOTA: el orden de los países está establecido de acuerdo con las mayores par-ticipaciones de 2010 del grupo de principales países inversionistas en Colombia según acumulado 1994-2010. Fuente: Balanza de pagos, Banco de la República.

De acuerdo con Creutzfeldt y Gélvez (2010), la inversión china en Colombia representó un magro 0,03% del total de las inversiones en el país. Sin embargo,

10 La totalidad de los datos, así como los cálculos y la gráfica, fueron tomados de ProExport Colombia (2011).

8.000

10.000

6.000

4.000

12.000 Colombia

2.000

0

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

(EN

MIL

LONE

S DE

DÓL

ARES

)

Total IED 2010: 6,760 US$ millones

2%Islas Caimán

28%Panamá

20%Anguila

15%Bermudas

9%Inglaterra

12%Otros

Francia 2%

Venezuela 2%Suiza 2%

Brasil 2%

Canadá 7%

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aseguran que Colombia cuenta con un gran potencial de inversión en los sectores de hidrocarburos, minería y productos agrícolas, y que, en general, existe una percepción positiva por parte de las empresas chinas establecidas en Colombia acerca de la futura evolución de sus negocios (Creutzfeldt y Gélvez 2010, 7). Pero aunque el futuro sea prometedor, la realidad es que hasta el momento “el interés de las empresas chinas en invertir en Colombia ha sido bajo” (Ellis 2009, 14).

Como conclusión general sobre esta parte, podemos afirmar que en ma-teria de IED, la relación entre Colombia y China es poco significativa, en la medida en que, para empezar, Colombia aún recibe un porcentaje muy alto en inversión directa por parte de Estados Unidos. Y además, los empresarios chinos todavía no han generado un interés visible en invertir en América Latina, y mucho menos en Colombia.

d. Un tema crítico: el reconocimiento de China como economía de mercado

Desde que la RPC hizo efectivo su ingreso a la OMC en 2001, ésta ha lucha-do constantemente por obtener el reconocimiento de economía de mercado por parte de los demás miembros de la organización.11

La primera implicación de esta falta de reconocimiento es que afecta de un modo directo el desarrollo del comercio internacional chino. De obtener con celeridad el estatus de economía de mercado, China podría finalmente liberarse de la presión de las investigaciones antidumping. Como lo explica un reporte de la OMC,12 en el segundo semestre de 2008, China fue el Estado investigado con más frecuencia por esta causal (34 casos respecto a las exportaciones sobre 120 nuevas investigaciones). De igual forma, de las 81 medidas antidumping aplica-das, 37 de ellas estuvieron dirigidas hacia este país (OMC 2009). La segunda im-plicación tiene que ver con la dimensión política del reconocimiento de China como economía mercado: este reconocimiento implica una participación plena

11 Para observar en detalle el Protocolo de Adhesión de China a la organización, ver OMC (2001a). Las noticias completas sobre la adhesión y sobre la conclusión de las nego-ciaciones están disponibles en OMC (2001b y 2001c).

12 Para observar el informe completo sobre las investigaciones antidumping de ese año, ver OMC (2009). Todos los informes relacionados con este tema están disponibles en la página web de la organización: www.wto.org

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del gigante asiático en los circuitos de la economía de mercado internacional y su aceptación como miembro de la comunidad de Estados que se rigen bajo los preceptos del libre intercambio. De hecho, son muy pocos los países que aún no cuentan con este estatus.13

Entre los países que aún no han reconocido a China como una economía de mercado se encuentran, por ejemplo, los miembros de la Unión Europea, Estados Unidos, Japón, India y Australia. Aunque hasta el momento más de noventa países sí le han otorgado a la RPC el tan anhelado estatus, éstos no son los de mayor interés para China en términos estratégicos. En lo que concierne al hemisferio latinoamericano, los países que sí han reconocido el estatus de economía de mercado de China son Argentina, Brasil, Chile y Perú.

Sin embargo, la posición colombiana es diferente: Colombia aún no está pre-parada ni dispuesta a reconocer al gigante asiático como economía de mercado. En este aspecto, el mensaje del Gobierno ha sido contundente: “Colombia se comprometió a reconocer a China como una economía social de mercado, siem-pre y cuando se adopten medidas para evitar y/o castigar la competencia desleal por parte de las empresas del gigante oriental” (Barco 2006, 240). Parte de los reparos centrales de Colombia, sin embargo, tienen que ver con que su infraes-tructura industrial no estaría todavía preparada para lidiar con la competencia china; la presión del sector privado industrial colombiano habría sido eficaz en prevenir que el Gobierno emita dicho reconocimiento.14 En este sentido, es probable que Colombia tenga en cuenta la experiencia negativa que han sufrido Argentina, Brasil y Perú al haber reconocido a China como economía de merca-do (Domínguez et al. 2006, 21).15 El problema es que China, antes de firmar un Tratado de Libre Comercio (TLC) con alguna nación, impone la condición de que su contraparte lo reconozca como economía de mercado. Teniendo en cuenta la

13 Entre ellos, se encuentran Albania, Armenia, Georgia, Kazajistán, Kirguistán, Moldavia, Mongolia, Ucrania y Vietnam.

14 Entrevista anónima con un funcionario del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Colombia.

15 Para observar en detalle los efectos negativos de reconocer a China como economía de mercado para estos países, ver Dreyer (2006, 93-5). La autora hace énfasis en la inquietante disminución de las tasas de empleo en México y en Brasil como producto de la entrada de China a la OMC y del posterior reconocimiento como economía de mercado por parte de estos dos países.

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posición colombiana, es posible inferir entonces que un TLC entre Colombia y China tiene pocas probabilidades de firmarse en el corto plazo.16

3. LO POLÍTICO

El desarrollo político interno de China en los últimos años ha seguido un curso bastante particular, en la medida en que ha rechazado abiertamente los intentos independentistas del Tíbet y de Taiwán, pero a la vez ha tolerado grandes diferencias en materia económica con Hong Kong y Macao. Las ten-siones domésticas con los dos primeros han provocado, incluso, que la RPC haya sido criticada con severidad por su forma de manejar sus relaciones con las regiones alejadas de su centro político.

a. Hong Kong y Macao

Hong Kong y Macao son Regiones de Administración Especial que se relacionan con la RPC bajo el principio de “un país, dos sistemas”. Por este concepto se entiende que la parte continental de China pone en práctica un sistema de mercado socialista, mientras que Hong Kong y Macao mantienen la dinámica de mercado capitalista propia de ambas regiones, y que no se modificará en los próximos cincuenta años (Embajada de la RPC en Colombia 2010a). La implicación de esto es que tanto Hong Kong como Macao son ad-ministrados por sus propios habitantes y, por tanto, no son las autoridades centrales de la RPC quienes designan a los funcionarios que se desempeñan en los cargos gubernamentales. Ambas regiones cuentan entonces con un alto grado de autonomía, lo que se traduce en un poder pleno para adminis-trar sus propios asuntos, incluidas las ramas legislativa, ejecutiva y judicial. Colombia, frente a este escenario, insiste en adherirse al principio de “una

16 Sin embargo, las expectativas del Gobierno han sido optimistas en este aspecto. Según declaraciones del ex vicepresidente colombiano, Francisco Santos, Colombia firmaría el TLC con China antes de 2013. Santos declaró que de todas formas Colombia debe-rá actuar con cautela, en la medida en que “China es un mercado complicado. Tiene unas particularidades en las que, primero, nuestra oferta exportadora es muy débil” (El Tiempo 2010a), lo que explicaría por qué el Estado colombiano debe centrarse más en la inversión que en las exportaciones, a la hora de sentarse a negociar con China.

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sola China” e implícitamente reconoce el principio de “un país, dos sistemas” anteriormente mencionado.

b. Taiwán

Taiwán constituye un punto delicado para los asuntos internos de China y, por supuesto, es también un asunto contencioso internacional. La RPC se ha negado a reconocer la independencia de esta isla, razón por la cual ha tratado de aislarla de la arena internacional. En otras palabras, las demás naciones deben romper sus relaciones diplomáticas con Taipéi, si desean tenerlas con Beijing; y esto fue precisamente lo que sucedió en el caso colombiano.

Aunque oficialmente la RPC afirma que estaría dispuesta a aceptar el mismo principio o arreglo administrativo bajo el cual se rigen Hong Kong y Macao para Taiwán (Embajada de la RPC en Colombia 2010b), este último in-tenta superar constantemente los obstáculos impuestos por China para sobre-vivir como un Estado independiente. Una de sus estrategias para hacerlo es prestando asistencia técnica y financiera a los países de bajos recursos y con tendencia a ser víctimas de desastres naturales, dada su posición geográfica (Dumbaugh y Sullivan 2005, 4; Oviedo 2006, 83), lo que explica en parte por qué la gran mayoría de los Estados que aún mantienen relaciones oficiales con Taiwán se ubican precisamente en el Caribe y en Centroamérica. En el ám-bito internacional, el estatus de Taiwán es mayoritariamente definido como parte inalienable de la RPC, antes que todo debido a que tan sólo 23 países17 en el mundo reconocen a la República de China (RC). Además, la resolución 2758 de la Organización de Naciones Unidas (ONU) demuestra que la RPC es el único Estado representante de China frente a esta organización.18 Este problema para Taiwán es de carácter puramente político, en la medida en que,

17 Como ya lo mencionamos, la mayoría de éstos son centroamericanos y caribeños; en América del Sur solamente Paraguay reconoce su independencia. Para observar la lista completa de estos países, ver el anexo 4.

18 Más específicamente, la RPC reemplazó a la RC frente a la ONU en 1971. Para observar en detalle el contenido de la resolución en cuestión, ver http://www.un.org/spanish/aboutun/organs/ga/54/a54194.pdf

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en términos económicos, China ocupa el primer lugar como receptor de las exportaciones taiwanesas:

A pesar de que su economía crece a tasas que rozan el 5%, los taiwaneses temen descolgarse del carro de vanguardia asiático si no mejoran relaciones con su vecino. […] La economía taiwanesa depende cada vez más de China, una situación que los separatistas temen y que muchos conside-ran irreversible. (Villarino 2010)

Esto simplemente sugiere que, aparte del aislamiento diplomático, otra de las estrategias de China para presionar a Taiwán consiste justamente en crear y mantener una dependencia económica para que la reunificación entre la isla y China continental sea cada vez más plausible.19

Al igual que Estados Unidos, Colombia no reconoce ni apoya la inde-pendencia de Taiwán frente a la RPC. El Estado colombiano sólo admite el principio de una sola China y, por tanto, no acepta los intentos separatistas de Taiwán y Tíbet. Sin embargo, Colombia también procuró mantener sus relaciones económicas con la RC, como sucedió en el caso de la apertura de una oficina comercial en Taipéi, autorizada el 14 de febrero de 1992 por la entonces canciller, Noemí Sanín (Sanín 1992, 170).

c. Seguridad y drogas

En materia de drogas, Colombia y China siguen un esquema prohibicio-nista de manera predominante, lo que es con facilidad perceptible en las legislaciones de ambos países. Sin embargo, ambas políticas difieren un poco en cuanto al tratamiento y a las penas impuestas tanto a los consumidores como a los productores y traficantes de estupefacientes.

19 Un ejemplo de esto fue la reciente autorización de la RPC para firmar el Acuerdo Marco de Cooperación Económica (AMCE) con Taiwán, en el que China redujo sus aran-celes sustancialmente para provecho de la isla (Villarino 2010).

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En términos generales, la Ley Anti-Drogas de la RPC20 estipula que el asunto de las drogas es un problema tanto de salud pública como de segu-ridad. Aunque reconoce los efectos negativos de los estupefacientes en la salud de los ciudadanos, esta ley relaciona concretamente el consumo y la producción de drogas con la inseguridad y el crimen21 (RPC 2007, artículos 15 y 18). En lo relacionado con Colombia, es posible sugerir que la aproximación del Gobierno, con leves variaciones, se ha circunscrito a una versión prohi-bicionista de la lucha contra las drogas. Las perspectivas relacionadas con la salud pública o con la legalización han sido marginales en el debate público y han estado mucho más ausentes en las posiciones de diversos gobiernos. Una comparación de la legislación de ambos países en materia de oferta, de intermediarios y, por último, de demanda permitirá identificar los lugares comunes de las políticas antidrogas de ambos países. Sin embargo, es posible decir desde ya que el punto en el que más difieren ambas políticas es aquel que atañe al consumidor, de manera específica en lo relacionado con los temas de punición y tratamiento.

En materia de la oferta y producción de drogas, la ley china penaliza y define como criminales a aquellas personas que incurren en las siguientes actividades (RPC 2007, artículo 59):

• Poseer drogas ilegalmente.• Cultivar ilegalmente plantas madre de narcóticos. • Contrabandear, vender, transportar o manufacturar narcóticos.• Manipular ilegalmente los productos químicos que puedan transformar-

se con facilidad en narcóticos.• Proveer narcóticos a otra persona.• Alentar, instigar o persuadir a una persona para que ésta ingiera, inhale

o se inyecte drogas.

20 Adoptada el 29 de diciembre de 2007 y en vigencia desde el primero de junio de 2008.

21 La RPC hace explícita esta relación en el primer artículo al aseverar lo siguiente: “Esta ley se promulga con el propósito de prevenir y castigar las ofensas criminales relacio-nadas con las drogas, protegiendo así la salud de los ciudadanos en mente y cuerpo y manteniendo el orden social” (RPC 2007, 1).

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Aunque, claramente, se trata de una legislación de mano dura, ésta no es específica en cuanto a las penas impuestas a quienes cometan estos delitos. La ley dispone que:

será investigada (la persona) por responsabilidad criminal de acuer-do con la ley; si el caso no es lo suficientemente serio como para constituir un crimen, una penalidad por administración de segu-ridad pública le será impuesta de acuerdo con la ley. (RPC 2007, 9)

En el caso colombiano, la Ley 30 de 1986 es muy similar a la de la RPC. Las penas impuestas por el Gobierno colombiano oscilan entre altas multas y encarcelamiento. Por ejemplo, el artículo 32 especifica que:

El que sin permiso de autoridad competente cultive, conserve o financie plantaciones de marihuana o cualquier otra planta de las que pueda producirse cocaína, morfina, heroína o cual-quier otra droga que produzca dependencia, o más de un (1) kilogramo de semillas de dichas plantas, incurrirá en prisión de cuatro (4) a doce (12) años y una multa de diez (10) a cua-trocientos (400) salarios mínimos mensuales […] (Congreso de la República de Colombia 1986, artículo 32)22

En cuanto a la exportación e importación de narcóticos, ambas legis-laciones imponen penas fuertes de carácter económico y carcelario. En el caso chino, el Estado ejerce un alto control sobre dichas actividades tanto de sustancias psicotrópicas como de materiales químicos que puedan ser transformados en drogas. Sin embargo, la ley no es precisa en cuanto a los

22 Para obtener información más exacta de los castigos según delito y tipo de droga, ver Congreso de la República de Colombia 1986.

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castigos que reciben las personas que incurren en estos delitos.23 En el caso colombiano, el Estado también ejerce un alto control en este aspecto e impone castigos bastante fuertes.24

Tanto la ley china como la ley colombiana diferencian al consumidor de los demás partícipes en el mercado de las drogas. Sin embargo, en el caso colom-biano podemos ver que este punto específico se ha modificado constantemente en los últimos veinte años. La Ley 30 de 1986 estipulaba, en el artículo 51, que:

El que lleve consigo, conserve para su propio uso o consuma, cocaína, marihuana o cualquier otra droga que produzca depen-dencia, en cantidad considerada como dosis de uso personal, conforme a lo dispuesto en esta ley, incurrirá en las siguientes sanciones: a) Por primera vez, en arresto hasta por treinta (30) días y multa en cuantía de medio (1/2) salario mínimo mensual; b) Por la segunda vez, un arresto de un (1) mes a un (1) año de multa en cuantía de medio (1/2) a un (1) salario mínimo men-sual, siempre que el nuevo hecho se realice dentro de los doce (12) meses siguientes a la comisión del primero, y c) El usuario o consumidor que, de acuerdo con dictamen médico legal, se encuentre en estado de drogadicción así haya sido sorprendido por primera vez, será internado en establecimiento siquiátrico o similar de carácter oficial o privado, por el término necesario

23 De hecho, la única pena exacta que aparece en el documento es la siguiente: “Quien provea refugio para que una persona pueda ingerir o inyectarse drogas narcóticas, o incite a otra persona al tráfico, lo que constituye un crimen, será investigado por responsabilidad criminal según la ley; si el caso no es lo suficientemente serio como para constituir un crimen, será detenido por un organismo de seguridad pública por no menos de 10 días pero tampoco más de 15 días y podrá, adicionalmente, ser multado por no más de 3000 yuanes RMB […]” (RPC 2007, artículo 61).

24 Por ejemplo, en materia de exportaciones, la ley dice que: “El que sin permiso de autoridad competente, salvo lo dispuesto sobre dosis para uso personal, introduzca al país, así sea en tránsito o aquel de él, transporte, lleve consigo, almacene, conserve, elabore, venda, ofrezca, adquiera, financie o suministre a cualquier título droga que produzca dependencia, incurrirá en prisión de seis (6) a veinte (20) años y multa de cien (100) a cincuenta mil (50.000) salarios mínimos legales mensuales” (Congreso de la República de Colombia 1986, artículo 33).

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para su recuperación. En este caso no se aplicará multa ni arres-to. (Congreso de la República de Colombia 1986)

Sin embargo, este artículo fue declarado como inexequible por la Corte Constitucional (a través de la sentencia C-221/94), y por tanto, el ente judicial hizo legal el porte de la dosis mínima (Corte Constitucional 1994). El argu-mento utilizado por la Corte era que dicho artículo, junto con el artículo 87, atentaba contra el libre desarrollo de la personalidad. Razón por la cual, du-rante quince años, el porte de la dosis mínima personal fue legal en Colombia. Para el año 2009, el Congreso emitió el Acto Legislativo Nº 2, que reformó el artículo 49 de la Constitución e ilegalizó de nuevo la dosis mínima (NTN24 2009). Dicho acto legislativo marcó el regreso a una posición abiertamente prohibicionista del Estado colombiano frente al tema de las drogas.

Ahora bien, en lo concerniente a China, aunque se diferencia al consu-midor de los productores, transportadores y vendedores, se penaliza fuerte-mente la posesión. Aunque parecería que el consumidor es visto por el Estado como un adicto enfermo (y no como un criminal), una lectura atenta de esta ley permite concluir que la misma contempla componentes punitivos para el consumo de estupefacientes. Aunque la ley china estipula que el adicto necesita tratamiento, no cárcel, en la realidad lo que ocurre es un proceso de rehabilitación forzada que normalmente tiene lugar en instalaciones aisladas (República Popular de China 2007, 6).

Al mirar detalladamente el artículo 30 de la ley de la RPC, se observa que ésta exige a todos los ciudadanos participar en la prevención del consumo de drogas, y no sólo premia la denuncia, sino que también la impone.25

Frente al tema del narcotráfico, es claro entonces que ambos países cuen-tan con un stock importante de intereses compartidos. Sin embargo, ambos han formalizado su colaboración mutua en contadas ocasiones. Una de éstas

25 Según el último reporte elaborado por la Oficina de las Naciones Unidas contra la Droga y el Delito (UNODC), China es el tercer país del mundo en materia de consumo. El repor-te calculó que para el año 2009 fueron consumidas 45 toneladas de droga en este país. Por ejemplo, fueron aproximadamente 2.254.000 los consumidores de heroína proveniente de Laos y Myanmar (Birmania) (UNODC 2010). Para observar el informe detallado sobre Producción, tráfico y consumo mundial de estupefacientes, ver UNODC (2010).

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se presentó en 1997, cuando la RPC donó cinco millones de yuanes al Estado colombiano. El dinero fue destinado por el Gobierno al “financiamiento del programa de erradicación y sustitución de cultivos ilícitos ‘Plante’” (Mejía Vélez 1997, 319). El año siguiente, ambos países firmaron el Memorándum de entendimiento entre China y Colombia sobre cooperación en la lucha contra el tráfico ilícito de estupefacientes y sustancias psicotrópicas y delitos co-nexos (Fernández de Soto 1999, 343).

La cautela china también se ha traducido en una venta poco significativa de armamento militar. Salvo el Acuerdo de Ayuda Gratuita de la República Popular de China a la República de Colombia (suscrito el 6 septiembre de 2010),26 la mayor parte de la cooperación militar entre ambos países se que-da tan sólo en intenciones.27 Sin embargo, cabe resaltar que China sí quiere aprender de Colombia en cuanto a la lucha contra la guerrilla (Caracol 2006; El Espectador 2010a y 2010b; El Tiempo 2010b y 2008b) y, más específicamente, contra el narcoterrorismo, lo que viene de la mano con el hecho de tratarse de dos países cuyas políticas antidrogas son fundamentalmente prohibicionistas.

En síntesis, en materia de cooperación militar, la relación entre ambos países aún es muy débil y modesta. Algunos analistas sugieren que la entrada de China en la región latinoamericana a través de la venta de armamento militar es una amenaza para Estados Unidos (Dumbaugh y Sullivan 2005, 5), quien tiene una presencia histórica y tradicional muy fuerte en este hemisfe-rio y sobre todo en Colombia. Sin embargo, otros sugieren que es errado asu-mir que las intenciones de China consisten en hacerle competencia a Estados Unidos en su propio “patio trasero”, en la medida en que aún “no hay indica-dores hasta el momento de que China tenga la voluntad ni la capacidad para

26 Este convenio incluye la donación de ocho millones de yuanes (cerca de un millón de dólares) por parte de China a Colombia para la compra de material de logística (Presidencia de la República de Colombia 2010; El Espectador 2010a).

27 Las declaraciones oficiales de ambos gobiernos sobre la necesidad de cooperar en materia de seguridad son numerosas y se hicieron más evidentes a partir de la admi-nistración Uribe. La RPC ha manifestado su apoyo a las políticas implementadas por los mandatarios colombianos frente al conflicto armado. Tal fue el caso durante el proceso de paz del entonces jefe de Estado, Andrés Pastrana (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores 2000), y también apoyó abiertamente la Política de Seguridad Democrática implementada por Álvaro Uribe (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores 2006).

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desafiar a Estados Unidos en el continente” (Tokatlian 2007, 55). Además, es más que claro que “Estados Unidos viene reafirmando su política de prima-cía; esto es que Washington no tolera ni tolerará el surgimiento de ningún peer competitor” (Tokatlian 2007, 50). Si bien ello explica por qué la RPC no ha sido agresiva a la hora de acercarse militarmente a Colombia y sugiere que es consciente de la existencia de un vínculo muy sólido en materia de seguridad entre Colombia y Estados Unidos (Jubany y Poon 2006, 28), no es claro cuál será eventualmente la reacción de China ante el claro deterioro del poder global de Estados Unidos, y más específicamente, en el ámbito regio-nal. Al contrario de lo que sugiere Tokatlian, es evidente que la presencia de Estados Unidos en América Latina es sujeto constante de crítica y recelo por parte de varios países del área. Esta suerte de nuevo “escepticismo” ha estado acompañada también por el surgimiento del poder económico y político de Brasil, un socio bastante cercano a China y con una percepción de su papel internacional mucho más pragmática y diversificada. Frente a este escenario, no debe descartarse tan apresuradamente la idea de que la participación de China en la región sea sujeto de cambios importantes en el mediano plazo.

d. Derechos humanos

En los últimos veinte años, la Asamblea General de la ONU ha emitido y votado 220 resoluciones concernientes a los derechos humanos. Por razones que explicaremos más adelante, las hemos divido en tres grupos: 44 de ellas tratan y reglamentan temas de derechos humanos en general y aplican a todos los miem-bros de la organización; el segundo grupo está compuesto por 86 resoluciones condenatorias a Estados específicos que son identificados como violadores de derechos humanos (con excepción de Israel); y las 90 restantes condenan concre-tamente a Israel como violador de derechos humanos. A continuación, presenta-remos un análisis de la postura de China y de Colombia frente a este problema y la relacionaremos con la posición de Estados Unidos, argumentando que en este tema específico, la alianza entre Colombia y su amigo norteamericano no es tan evidente ni tan absoluta como sí lo es en otros asuntos.

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Como lo muestra la Tabla 2, el porcentaje de coincidencias en la votacio-nes concernientes a derechos humanos en general28 es bastante bajo entre Estados Unidos y Colombia (5%); mientras que China y Colombia coinciden en el 91% de las votaciones. Lo primero que salta a la vista es que la RPC y Colombia votan casi sistemáticamente a favor de estas resoluciones;29 mientras que Estados Unidos hace lo opuesto, dado que sólo ha votado a favor de 3 resoluciones (de 44), se abstuvo en 5 y se opuso en 35 de ellas. Esto demuestra que Colombia y China parecen estar más dispuestos que Estados Unidos a comprometerse con la normatividad internacional que limita la soberanía del Estado a favor de los derechos humanos. El asunto de la soberanía estatal ha sido de mayor importancia para ambos gobiernos y de larga data: en sus memorias al Congreso, Rodrigo Pardo declaró que “en el marco de la Comisión de Derechos Humanos de las Naciones Unidas, los gobiernos de Colombia y la República Popular de China sostuvieron en múltiples ocasiones posiciones similares y se otorgaron mutuo apoyo en la defensa de los Derechos Humanos, dentro del clima de respeto a la sobe-ranía y a la no intervención en los asuntos internos de los Estados” (Pardo 1995, 341). Lo anterior es una clara muestra de que, en materia de derechos humanos y soberanía estatal, ambos gobiernos comparten consciente y abiertamente una misma posición.

28 Dichas resoluciones reglamentan lo siguiente: ejecuciones extrajudiciales, uso de mercenarios, medidas coercitivas, y todos los asuntos que tengan que ver con derechos humanos y terrorismo. Cabe especificar que dentro de este grupo no están incluidas las resoluciones condenatorias a países específicos.

29 Colombia ha votado 43 veces (de 44) a favor y se abstuvo solamente una vez (en 2004). Por su parte, China votó a favor en 39 ocasiones y se abstuvo en cinco de ellas.

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Tabla 2. Votaciones en la Asamblea General de la ONU desde 1990 concernientes a

derechos humanos30

CHINA-COLOMBIA EE. UU.-COLOMBIA

Coincidencias 91% 5%

No coincidencias 9% 95%

TOTAL 100% 100%

Fuente: United Nations Biblographic Information System - (UNBISNET) - Cálculos: Sandra Borda y María Berger.

Ahora, en lo que respecta al segundo grupo, las tablas 3 y 4 nos muestran las coincidencias que se han presentado entre Colombia y la RPC en cuanto a las resoluciones que condenan a Estados identificados como violadores de dere-chos humanos.31 Como ya lo mencionamos, desde 1990 la Asamblea General ha emitido y votado 86 de estas resoluciones condenatorias. Entre 1990 y 2003, la delegación colombiana votó a favor de 37 resoluciones, se abstuvo en 26 opor-tunidades y votó en contra una sola vez. En este mismo período, Colombia se abstuvo sistemáticamente de votar en todas las resoluciones concernientes a las prácticas restrictivas de los derechos humanos en las que incurrieron los Estados de Cuba, Irán y Sudán.32 Lo anterior demuestra que el Estado colombiano tomó, en los primeros trece años, la decisión de no condenar pública y explícitamente, en algunos casos, a Estados con comportamientos cuestionables en materia de derechos humanos, posición que, como lo veremos más adelante, terminó de consolidarse a partir de 2004. En relación con China, la Tabla 3 nos muestra que durante este período las coincidencias no son tan flagrantes, como lo demostrado en el caso de las resoluciones generales. En este caso, podemos ver que la posición de China ha mantenido una tendencia más definida y radical que la de Colombia:

30 Como ya lo mencionamos, estas resoluciones reglamentan, entre otros, las ejecuciones extrajudiciales, el uso de mercenarios, las medidas coercitivas y todos los asuntos que tengan que ver con derechos humanos y terrorismo.

31 Aquí excluimos a Israel por razones que expondremos ulteriormente.

32 Igualmente, se abstuvo dos veces en resoluciones condenatorias de Nigeria, dos en el caso de Kosovo y dos en el de Irak.

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la RPC sólo votó a favor de tres resoluciones, dentro de las cuales una condenó a Sudáfrica y las dos restantes condenaron la prácticas violatorias de los derechos humanos de Irak en territorio kuwaití durante la ocupación a principios de los noventa. El resto de las veces, China ha votado el 50% de las veces en contra de las resoluciones condenatorias y se ha abstenido en el 44% restante.33

Tabla 3. Votaciones en la Asamblea General de la ONU, 1990-2003: resoluciones que

condenan a otros países (excepto Israel)34

CHINA COLOMBIA

Sí 6% 56%

No 50% 3%

Abstención 44% 41%

TOTAL 100% 100%

No + Abstención 94% 44%


Como ya lo mencionamos, la tendencia de Colombia de no condenar a Estados violadores de derechos humanos se consolidó a partir de 2004. En efecto, desde este año, la delegación colombiana se ha abstenido en absolutamente todas las votaciones referentes a sentencias condenatorias de otros Estados. Más concretamente, la administración Uribe,

ha implementado activamente una estrategia de distancia-miento frente a veredictos condenatorios en las votaciones esperando que, en una suerte de quid pro quo, en el futuro los demás estados no voten desfavorablemente si la Asamblea

33 La gran mayoría de las resoluciones en las que China se abstuvo durante este período conciernen a Irak, Irán y los países de los Balcanes.

34 Las resoluciones entre 1990 y 2003 condenaron a los siguientes países: Sudáfrica, Irak, Cuba, Sudán, Irán, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croacia, Serbia y Montenegro, Nigeria, Congo y Turkmenistán.

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General llegase a emitir sentencias de este tipo en contra de Colombia. En otras palabras, al abstenerse de condenar a estos países, Colombia parecería estar evitando sentar un precedente que facilitaría la eventual condena por parte de otros estados hacia las prácticas del gobierno colombiano. (Borda 2011, 146)

De igual forma, Colombia ha evitado entrar en conflictos de carácter diplomático con Estados Unidos al favorecer la abstención por encima de la oposición. La estrecha relación existente entre ambos Estados es algo que el Gobierno colombiano quiere conservar; lo que explica, en gran parte, por qué opta por abstenerse, en vez de estar explícitamente en contra de Estados Unidos, que ha votado a favor de las resoluciones condenatorias en el 95% de los casos. China ha votado en contra del 91% de las resoluciones y se ha abstenido en el otro 9% de los casos. Si se suman las abstenciones con los votos en contra, Colombia y la RPC coinciden en un 100% de las votaciones, lo que permite inferir que comparten una posición muy similar en materia de violaciones de derechos humanos por parte de Estados específicos.

Tabla 4. Votaciones en la Asamblea General de la ONU, 2004-2009: resoluciones que

condenan a otros países (excepto Israel)35

CHINA COLOMBIA

Sí 0% 0%

No 91% 0%

Abstención 9% 100%

TOTAL 100% 100%

No + Abstención 100% 100%


35 Las resoluciones a partir de 2004 condenaron específicamente a los siguientes paí-ses: Bielorrusia, Congo, Corea del Norte, Irán, Myanmar (Birmania), Turkmenistán y Uzbekistán.

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Finalmente, el caso del Israel ha tenido una trayectoria singular en la agenda de la Asamblea General en relación con los derechos humanos. Como ya lo mencionamos, en los últimos veinte años, el Estado israelí ha sido ob-jeto de 90 resoluciones condenatorias por violaciones a derechos humanos:

Estas resoluciones, además de superar por poco la cantidad de resoluciones emitidas condenando a los demás países vio-ladores de derechos humanos, hacen especial énfasis en las prácticas del gobierno israelí en los territorios ocupados de Gaza, Cisjordania, los Altos de Golán (Siria) y el Líbano. Ahora bien, el récord de votaciones de la delegación colombiana fren-te a las resoluciones condenatorias en contra de Israel ha sido contundente: desde 1990 ha predominado el voto a favor de dichas condenas, con tan sólo 4 abstenciones. Esto demuestra una consistencia a través del tiempo de la posición colombia-na en materia de las violaciones a los derechos humanos en los territorios ocupados. (Borda 2011, 146)

A partir de 2004, Colombia se abstuvo de votar el 25% de las resoluciones que condenan a Israel; en el 75% de las veces restantes votó a favor. Las cua-tro únicas abstenciones se dieron durante el gobierno de Uribe, entre 2007 y 2009, lo cual podría explicarse por la estrecha relación entre la administra-ción Uribe y la administración Bush:

Sin embargo, estas cuatro excepciones no son lo suficiente-mente significativas, en términos cuantitativos, como para intuir un cambio sustancial de la tendencia del gobierno co-lombiano a favorecer las sentencias condenatorias en contra de Israel. Esta tendencia puede explicarse como parte del quid pro quo tácito o explícito entre Colombia y otros violadores de derechos humanos como Irán o China: mientras Estados Unidos condena al resto de países violadores de derechos hu-manos y defiende a Israel, estos países con un récord cuestio-nable en este tema forman un frente común y colectivo para

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defenderse de las condenas apoyadas por Estados Unidos y, a su vez, condenan masiva y vocalmente a su principal aliado, Israel. Lo paradójico de esta dinámica es que el tratamiento del tema de los derechos humanos en Naciones Unidas parece ser el único ámbito en el que Estados Unidos y Colombia to-man caminos diferentes y demuestran no tener una relación tan especial ni una alianza tan irrestricta como en otros te-mas. (Borda 2011, 147)

La Tabla 5 ilustra que, de hecho, en el registro de votaciones colombia-nas en las resoluciones que condenan a Israel por violaciones a derechos humanos durante las últimas dos décadas, comparadas con las votaciones de Estados Unidos y China, los gobiernos colombianos han coincidido en 94% de las votaciones con la RPC, país que ha votado sistemáticamente a favor de todas las resoluciones que condenan al Gobierno de Israel. Esto implica un distanciamiento abismal frente a la posición de Estados Unidos, en la medida en que el 100% de sus votos han sido en contra de condenar a Israel:

La coincidencia en las votaciones con un país con el que Colombia mantiene relaciones comerciales y diplomáticas li-mitadas, fuera de una congruencia cultural o ideológica prác-ticamente inexistente, puede ser explicada en función del interés por parte de los gobiernos colombianos de no antago-nizar a sus ‘aliados’ en la Asamblea General, quienes, como lo ha hecho China, han desaprobado reiterativamente las prác-ticas en materia de derechos humanos del estado israelí en los territorios ocupados (la excesiva cantidad de resoluciones condenatorias a Israel en la agenda de la Asamblea General así lo demuestra). (Borda 2011, 147-148)

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Tabla 5. Votaciones en la Asamblea General de la ONU desde 1990: Israel y

derechos humanos36

CHINA - COLOMBIA EE.UU. - COLOMBIA

Coincidencias 94% 0%

No coincidencias 6% 100%

TOTAL 100% 100%


Es posible concluir entonces que hay una enorme coincidencia entre China y Colombia en la suscripción de compromisos formales y una falla sistemá-tica en cumplir con los mismos. En efecto, el último informe sobre derechos humanos del Departamento de Estado de Estados Unidos afirma, para el caso de Colombia, lo siguiente:

Los siguientes problemas sociales y violaciones por parte del Gobierno fueron reportados durante ese año: asesinatos ex-trajudiciales; colaboración militar insubordinada con nuevos grupos armados ilegales y grupos paramilitares que se han rehusado a desmovilizarse; desapariciones forzadas; cárceles superpobladas e inseguras; tortura y maltrato a detenidos; arrestos arbitrarios; un alto número de detenidos antes de jui-cio; impunidad y una rama judicial ineficiente como producto de la intimidación; vigilancia ilegal de grupos civiles, opositores políticos y agencias gubernamentales; acoso e intimidación a periodistas; condiciones antihigiénicas en las unidades para desplazados, con acceso limitado a la educación, a la salud o al empleo; corrupción; […] (U.S. Department of State 2010b)

36 Estas resoluciones condenan a Israel por las prácticas que afectan los DD. HH. en Palestina, Siria, Líbano.

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Además, el último reporte presentado por Human Rights Watch asegura que el surgimiento de nuevos grupos paramilitares ha aumentado drástica-mente los niveles de violación a los derechos humanos en Colombia. El mismo reporte “también expresa su preocupación frente a la presunta tolerancia de las actividades de los grupos sucesores por parte de ciertos funcionarios del Gobierno y de las Fuerzas Armadas” (Human Rights Watch 2010, 10).37

En el caso de la RPC, la falla sistemática frente al cumplimiento con los acuerdos formales no es menos inquietante:

El récord del Gobierno en materia de derechos humanos se mantuvo pobre e incluso empeoró en algunas áreas. Durante el año [2009], el Gobierno incrementó represiones severas en con-tra de las minorías étnicas, culturales y religiosas de la Región Autónoma de Xinjiang Uighur (XUAR). Las zonas tibetanas se mantuvieron bajo controles estrictos ejercidos por el Gobierno. La detención y el hostigamiento a los activistas de derechos hu-manos aumentó y los abogados en pro de la defensa pública […] también fueron objeto de persecución. […] Otros abusos serios a los derechos humanos incluyeron: asesinatos extrajudiciales, ejecuciones sin el debido proceso, tortura y confesiones por medio de la coerción a los prisioneros y el uso del trabajo for-zado, incluido el trabajo en las cárceles. El Gobierno continuó el monitoreo, el hostigamiento, el arresto y posterior encarce-lamiento de periodistas, escritores, disidentes, activistas y abo-gados […]. También se expandieron las detenciones prolongadas

37 Para consultar el informe completo sobre violaciones de derechos humanos en Colombia, ver Human Rights Watch (2010).

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ilegales en instalaciones no oficiales, conocidas como “cárceles negras”.38 (U.S. Department of State 2010c)

Esta posición de China frente a los mandatos de la ONU se hizo más evi-dente en 2009, cuando “en una reunión el 11 de junio del Consejo de Derechos Humanos para adoptar el ‘Informe de Resultados sobre China’, parte de un proceso de revisión requerido para todos los Estados miembros, el Gobierno chino rechazó, sin excepción, 70 recomendaciones hechas por Estados miem-bros de la ONU relacionadas con violaciones de derechos humanos en China” (Human Rights Watch 2009b).

Con tal récord en materia de violaciones, el Gobierno colombiano insis-te en afirmar que sus semejanzas en votaciones de derechos humanos con China son sólo “coincidencias celebradas” en donde no existen acuerdos tácitos (y mucho menos explícitos) entre ambos países. Por coincidencia celebrada entendemos que ambos Estados se rigen por el principio de vivir y dejar vivir, principio según el cual China no habla de nuestra situación de derechos humanos y nosotros no hablamos de la situación en China. Sin embargo, aunque se sostiene que no existen acuerdos previos, tales coinci-dencias en las votaciones sí son celebradas abiertamente. Por tanto, consi-deramos pertinente afirmar que Colombia encuentra en China un respiro y una zona de comodidad frente a la creciente presión internacional por sus violaciones a los derechos humanos.

e. Estado actual de las relaciones bilaterales

Hacia el final de la segunda administración Uribe, y con el inicio de la administración Santos, hay una clara intención de “diversificar” la política

38 Un reporte de Human Rights Watch elaborado en 2009 trata en detalle el surgimien-to y las dinámicas del fenómeno de las cárceles negras. Estas cárceles son sitios de detención ilegal en donde los derechos de los detenidos son violados sistemática-mente por las autoridades que trabajan en ellas. La ONG explica que son los mismos miembros de la fuerza pública quienes detienen rutinariamente a ciudadanos chinos (la mayoría peticionarios) y los dejan incomunicados por días e incluso meses. Estas cárceles generalmente se ubican en hoteles, ancianatos y hospitales psiquiátricos pertenecientes al Estado chino. Sin embargo, este último niega la existencia de dichas instalaciones. Para conocer el informe completo, ver Human Rights Watch (2009a).

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exterior colombiana, intento que obedece, en parte, a un proceso de tran-sición y transformación de la relación con Washington. Teniendo en mente que ambos Estados tienen preocupaciones compartidas como las migracio-nes, el terrorismo y el abastecimiento de energía, la RPC se ha convertido en un punto de atracción cada vez más fuerte para Colombia en los últimos años. En la actualidad, el Gobierno colombiano reconoce un mayor grado de multipolaridad, en donde Asia empieza a tomar impulso e identifica la nece-sidad de rediseñar su política exterior como producto de las modificaciones del sistema geopolítico que ha traído consigo la globalización (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores 2008b).

Según el discurso pronunciado en 2008 por el entonces canciller Fernando Araújo, la meta de Colombia es doble: por un lado, se trata de convertirse en uno de los países más importantes de América Latina; y por el otro, Colombia deberá adelantar un proceso de inserción en la región asiática (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores 2008b). El Gobierno colom-biano ha decidido entonces integrarse a la región Este y ha usado como documento guía para este proceso de largo plazo La Estrategia de Inserción en el Asia Pacífico, un documento elaborado en conjunto por el Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y el Ministerio de Comercio, Industria y Turismo (Ministerio de Comercio, Industria y Turismo 2008). La política exterior colombiana hacia China se encuentra hoy en el marco de esta estrategia y su objetivo es justamente acceder con más facilidad al continente asiático y encontrar socios económicos y políticos de largo plazo.

f. Estrategia de inserción en el Asia Pacífico

El discurso de Araújo expresa que es indispensable reconocer que el crecien-te poder político y económico de los Estados del Pacífico ha incrementado su capacidad y grado de influencia en las decisiones internacionales, lo que con-vierte a países como China en potenciales socios atractivos para Colombia. Asia es una región cada vez más dinámica, donde China e India concentran un tercio de la población mundial, y junto con el resto de la región aportan aproxima-damente el 60% del PIB global y el 48% del comercio (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores 2008b). Sobre China, específicamente, el Gobierno colombiano resal-ta la incorporación de China a la OMC, la importancia de su mercado laboral y

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sus elevados niveles de consumo. Araújo describe a Colombia como el país de América Latina que más ha crecido en su comercio con China y asegura que la firma de un TLC con Estados Unidos sería vista como un punto atractivo para las inversiones asiáticas. Araújo arguye que Colombia cuenta con una posición geográfica privilegiada que le permite pertenecer a la Cuenca del Pacífico, pero advierte que no basta con contar con una buena ubicación para integrarse a la región; y es por esta razón que, a partir del 2008, el Estado colombiano empren-dió una serie de iniciativas diplomáticas y políticas para fortalecer sus vínculos con los países del Asia Pacífico.

El primer objetivo de esta estrategia consiste en fortalecer las relaciones di-plomáticas con la región. En este sentido, la idea es que Colombia continúe con la promoción del diálogo político multilateral y bilateral con sus nuevos socios asiáticos, entre ellos China. De acuerdo con Araújo, esto se haría a través del aprovechamiento de todos los escenarios institucionales de cooperación dispo-nibles, como el Consejo Económico para la Cuenca del Pacífico (PECC, por su sigla en inglés). Además, se buscaría asegurar el ingreso de Colombia en otras organizaciones como el P439 y APEC.40 Sin embargo, se observa que el Gobierno colombiano es consciente de que esta inserción no se dará de la noche a la ma-ñana y “demanda el concurso de los grandes sectores de la economía real y de la academia con la meta de darles un valor agregado en los procesos bilaterales y multilaterales” (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores 2008b).

La Estrategia de Inserción en el Asia Pacífico busca entonces impulsar la firma de más acuerdos comerciales y fortalecer las alianzas entre las empresas colom-bianas y asiáticas para fomentar el comercio y las inversiones. Para lograr este objetivo, el Gobierno considera indispensable difundir las ventajas de Colombia para el inversionista extranjero, y escenarios como Expo Shanghái 201041 son fundamentales para mostrar, por ejemplo, cómo está el país en materia de de-

39 Acuerdo transpacífico de asociación económica estratégica entre Chile, Nueva Zelanda, Singapur y Brunéi.

40 Como ya lo vimos en la sección sobre relaciones comerciales, Colombia aprovechó la presidencia de Perú en APEC para acercarse a China durante la Cumbre de Lima.

41 Para más información sobre esta exposición y la participación de Colombia en ella, ver http://en.expo2010.cn/

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sarrollo urbano. Asimismo, reconoce la necesidad de desarrollar la industria del turismo, siendo esta última uno de sus puntos fuertes. Además, el desarrollo del Pacífico colombiano es indispensable, en la medida en que se trata de la puerta de entrada de Asia, y para esto es necesario invertir en la infraestructura, en el sector de las telecomunicaciones y en el transporte marítimo de esta zona.

Por último, el Gobierno colombiano explica que la estrategia de inserción contempla la posibilidad de ampliar los programas multidisciplinarios de in-tercambio académico.42 Por ejemplo, el Icetex ha otorgado becas a estudiantes chinos que vienen a Colombia con el propósito de mejorar sus habilidades en idiomas extranjeros, al tiempo que enseñan el mandarín en trece ciudades de Colombia. Por su parte, China también recibe estudiantes colombianos en diferentes carreras.43 La discusión sobre la importancia del idioma en las relaciones bilaterales es presentada por Ellis, quien asegura que una de las ba-rreras más grandes que existen entre América Latina y la RPC es justamente la del idioma (Ellis 2011, 10). En este sentido, el autor afirma que la prioridad para los latinoamericanos es el aprendizaje del inglés, y que, aunque el núme-ro de chinos hispanohablantes ha aumentado sustancialmente, siguen siendo muy pocos. Esto es un problema, en la medida en que aunque el poder blando del gigante asiático que menciona Ellis hace a la cultura china muy atractiva para los latinoamericanos, ambas partes aún se encuentran lejos de superar la barrera idiomática, que limita sin duda el entendimiento real del uno sobre el otro (Ellis 2011). Si Colombia quiere traspasar esta barrera, deberá ampliar el programa de conocimiento académico y cultural sobre la RPC y abrir aún más sus puertas hacia los migrantes chinos en este país.

Con el inicio de la administración Santos, Colombia y China tuvieron siete visitas oficiales en un período de tan sólo cuatro meses (de agosto de 2010 a

42 Tanto los idiomas como la ciencia y la tecnología son de gran importancia, dado que ambos son considerados por el Gobierno como sectores de “alto valor estratégico” (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores 2008b).

43 El 6 de noviembre de 2007 se inauguró oficialmente el Instituto Confucio en la Universidad de los Andes. El 30 de abril de 2010, el mismo instituto abrió sus puertas en Medellín con la participación de EAFIT y la Universidad de Antioquia. El Instituto Confucio representa uno de los mayores espacios de cooperación académica entre China y Colombia y opera en aproximadamente 78 países y regiones del mundo.

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diciembre de 2010). Durante estas visitas se discutieron temas como legislación migratoria, el programa colombiano de anticorrupción, educación e infraestruc-tura. En este sentido, la materia comercial no fue la excepción: en noviembre de ese año –con la visita del Viceministro de Comercio de la RPC– “Se firmó un Convenio de Cooperación Económica y Técnica, por medio del cual el Gobierno chino otorga 10 millones de yuanes para financiar programas de desarrollo en las zonas de frontera” (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores 2012). Además, la Cancillería hace énfasis en el Foro de Cooperación de América Latina y el Caribe-Asia del Este (FEALAC, por su sigla en inglés) como mecanismo de diálogo y de concertación política. Tanto Colombia como China hacen parte de este foro, y el Gobierno colombiano lo define como “el único mecanismo de concertación per-manente entre las dos regiones, que busca cooperar y establecer acciones conjun-tas en áreas como la lucha contra la pobreza, el fomento del comercio, el desarro-llo de la tecnología de la información y la generación de una red de colaboración e intercambio intelectual y cultural” (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores 2012).

CONCLUSIONES

Aunque Colombia y China establecieron relaciones en un período relativa-mente tardío, éstas se han destacado por su estabilidad y se han regido por el pragmatismo político y económico. Sin embargo, hemos demostrado que dichas relaciones también se han caracterizado por la asimetría y que Colombia se ha rezagado por un largo período en sus relaciones con China, en comparación con los demás países de América Latina. Estados como Chile, Perú y Bolivia llevan más de una década desde la firma de APPRI e incluso han avanzado en tratados más integrales, como es el caso de Chile y Perú, que ya cuentan con un TLC con ese país.44 Como lo vimos antes, la Estrategia Asia-Pacífico surge como plan que busca revertir esta situación y consolidar alianzas que permitan a Colombia dinamizar las relaciones comerciales con las economías asiáticas.

44 Chile celebró el TLC con la RPC en 2005. El 2 de agosto de 2010, ambos países firma-ron el Acuerdo Suplementario sobre el Comercio de Servicios, que otorgó al país del Cono Sur “ventajas competitivas en el marcado chino, potenciando además su rol como plataforma de inversiones” (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile 2010). Perú, por su lado, firmó el TLC en 2009.

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Más allá de las reticencias por parte de Colombia para reconocer a China como una economía de mercado, la hipótesis que aquí sostenemos es que la razón principal de esto es la evidente cercanía entre Colombia y Estados Unidos. Se trata de una hipótesis inevitablemente triangular: la relación especial con Washington puede haber producido dudas y retrasos en ambas orillas. Ellis desarrolla esta idea y afirma que,

Las relaciones entre Colombia, China y los EE. UU., se pueden entender como un triángulo, en el que las acciones en cada eje impactan los otros dos. La relación estrecha entre Colombia y los EE. UU. impacta la orientación de Colombia hacia China en varias maneras […] (Ellis 2009, 23)

Otros países latinoamericanos,45 como Perú y México, parecen haber alcanzado una política exterior más pragmática, a pesar de su cercanía a Washington, pero Colombia tiene motivos para tomarse más en serio su relación especial con este último. El Gobierno colombiano debe arreglárselas entonces para que el fortalecimiento de sus relaciones con China no debilite necesariamente sus relaciones con Estados Unidos; manteniendo lo que hasta ahora ha demostrado ser un equilibrio bastante ágil.

En materia de derechos humanos demostramos que el alejamiento entre Colombia y Estados Unidos es evidente, y el acercamiento, tácito e implícito, entre China y Colombia es igualmente claro. Sin embargo, éste aún no es el caso en cuanto a relaciones comerciales, dado que Estados Unidos es el principal socio de Colombia y cuenta con una ventaja significativa frente a China. Asimismo, demostramos que aunque en los últimos años China y Colombia han tomado una serie de iniciativas para acercarse en el ámbito militar, el Estado colombiano sigue contando con una fuerte presencia militar de Estados Unidos. Este escenario ha obligado a que China actúe con mucha cautela en este aspecto. No es claro, sin embargo, cómo la actual coyuntura

45 Para un análisis más exhaustivo sobre las implicaciones de la relación entre China y América Latina en general frente a Estados Unidos, ver Roett y Paz (2008).

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y la nueva política exterior de Santos producirán o no un mayor relajamiento de la sólida alianza entre Bogotá y Washington, y si este relajamiento, com-binado con una menor habilidad de EE. UU para imponer vetos, producirá inevitablemente un mayor acercamiento a China.

Ahora bien, si la nueva agenda colombiana no trae consigo un cambio drástico en el contenido de la política exterior del país en materia de de-rechos humanos y de lucha contra las drogas, y si al contrario se continúa apostándoles a la contención de la presión internacional y a la negación de las violaciones a los derechos humanos, y a la vieja estrategia prohibicio-nista en contra de los narcóticos ilegales, entonces un mayor acercamiento a China es más fácilmente predecible. Frente a un escenario internacional (que incluye al Gobierno estadounidense) que parece dirigirse hacia una versión menos punitiva y más pragmática de la llamada “guerra contra las drogas”, y hacia un cumplimiento más irrestricto y claro de las normas de derechos humanos (sin excepciones), la relación con China puede eventual-mente convertirse en un comfort zone para un Gobierno colombiano decidi-do a no transformar su identidad internacional.

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Anexo 1. Inversión de China en América Latina, por sector,

de 2003-2009

PAÍS

Inversión estimada

US$ millones2003 -2009

SECTOR

Brasil 13.648 Industria, Servicios, Energía, Comunicaciones, Productos de consumo, Alimentos, Metales, Transporte.

Perú 4.834 Industria, Metales.

Costa Rica 1.285 Energía.

México 1.127 Industria, Comunicaciones, Metales.

Guyana 1.000 Metales, Manufactura.

Venezuela 746Maquinaria, Energía, Comunicaciones, TIC, Infraestructura internet, Servicios financieros, Metales, extracción.

Argentina 519 Industria, Manufactura, Distribución.

Colombia 246 Industria automotriz, Comunicaciones, Capacitación, Productos de madera, Manufactura.

Ecuador 199 Energía, Extracción, Ventas Bienes Raíces.

Uruguay 100 Industria automotriz, Manufactura.

Cuba 52 Productos electrónicos de consumo, Manufactura.

Chile 37 Servicios financieros, Maquinaria industrial.

Otros 5 Servicios, Metales.

TOTAL 23.833

Fuente: UNCTAD, 2010.

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Anexo 2. IED en Colombia para el año 2009

PAÍS 2008 US$ millones

2009 US$ millones

Variación %

Estados Unidos 1.741,60 2.313,60 33%

Anguilla 1.184,50 646,2 -45%

Inglaterra 199,7 385,6 93%

Panamá 579,6 337,1 -56%

Bermudas 31,4 287,1 815%

México 411,8 202,8 -51%

Francia 70,3 113 61%

Luxemburgo 2,5 99,6 3.889%

Canadá 51,9 78,3 51%

Suiza 56,7 65,4 16%

Otros 308,71 -1.859,27 -588%

Subtotal sectores no petroleros 4.890,7 2.669,4 -45%

Reinversión de utilidades 2.300,9 1.898,7 -17%

Sector petrolero 3.391,5 2.633,1 -22%

TOTAL 10.583,2 7.201,2 -32%

Fuente: Ministerio de Comercio, Industria y Turismo, 2010.

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Anexo 3. Convenios vigentes entre la República Popular China y la República de

Colombia

1. Convenio Comercial entre la República de Colombia y la República Popular de China,

firmado el 17 de julio de 1981.

2. Convenio Cultural entre la República de Colombia y la República Popular de China,

firmado el 1 de octubre de 1981.

3. Convenio de Cooperación Científica y Técnica entre la República de Colombia y la República

Popular de China, suscrito el 23 de diciembre de 1981.

4. Convenio de Cooperación Económica entre la República de Colombia y la República Po-

pular de China, suscrito el 29 de octubre de 1985.

5. Acuerdo de Exención recíproca de visas en pasaportes diplomáticos, firmado en sep-

tiembre de 1987.

6. Memorándum de entendimiento entre China y Colombia sobre cooperación en la lucha

contra el tráfico ilícito de estupefacientes y sustancias psicotrópicas y delitos conexos,

firmado en septiembre de 1998.

7. Tratado sobre Asistencia Judicial en Materia Penal, firmado el 14 de mayo de 1999.

8. Acuerdo sobre la Adhesión de China a la OMC, firmado el 7 de marzo 2000.

9. Protocolo fitosanitario entre China y Colombia, suscrito el 6 de abril de 2005.

10. Protocolo sobre cuarentena de animales entre la República de Colombia y la República

Popular de China, suscrito el 6 de abril de 2005.

11. Memorándum de entendimiento en el sector de información y telecomunicaciones entre

la República de Colombia y la República Popular de China, suscrito el 6 de abril de 2005.

12. Memorándum de entendimiento sobre el intercambio cinematográfico, suscrito el 6 de

abril de 2005.

13. Acuerdo de Promoción y Protección Recíproca de Inversiones (APPRI), firmado el 22 de

noviembre de 2008.

14. Memorándum de entendimiento en turismo entre la República de Colombia y la República

Popular de China, firmado el 7 de julio de 2010.

15. Acuerdo de Ayuda Gratuita de la República Popular de China a la República de Colombia,

firmado en septiembre de 2010.

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Anexo 4. Lista de países en el mundo que reconocen diplomáticamente a la

República de China

ÁFRICA

Burkina Faso (1994)

Gambia

Santo Tomé y Príncipe

Suazilandia

OCEANÍA

Islas Marshall

Islas Salomón

Kiribati (2003)

Nauru

Palau

Tuvalu

EUROPA

El Vaticano

AMÉRICA

Belice (1989)

El Salvador

Guatemala

Haití

Honduras

Nicaragua (1990)

Panamá

Paraguay

República Dominicana

San Cristóbal y Nieves

San Vicente y las Granadinas

Santa Lucía (2007)

Fuente: Cámara de Comercio de España en Taiwán (2011).


El dilema chino: estrategias de desarrollo económico emprendidas por Estados pequeños en Sudamérica

Carol WiseUniversity of Southern California

RESUMENLas tres tendencias predominantes en América del Sur en la década del 2000 han sido 1) la rápida expansión del comercio y los lazos de endeudamiento con China; 2) el colapso de escenarios de negociación comerciales multilaterales y regionales desde el 2006; y 3) la rápida recuperación de la mayoría de los países suramericanos de la crisis financiera global de 2008-2010. Este artículo analiza las formas en las que estas tres tendencias han convergido, y de qué manera han condicionado la escogencia de estrategias de desarrollo en Chile y Perú, quienes tienen los lazos comerciales más importantes con China de toda la región latinoamericana, medidos como porcentaje de su PIB. En efecto, ambos países han buscado forjar sus propios caminos negociando tratados de libre comercio (TLC) bilaterales con China y Estados Unidos. Sin embargo, las implicaciones políticas de estos caminos de desarrollo han resultado más complejas de lo que se esperaba, a pesar de que estas políticas comerciales pueden representar el mecanismo de avance más viable para países con economías pequeñas, mercados emergentes y que han consolidado sus reformas macroeconómicas preparándolos para llevar su estrategia económica al siguiente nivel.

PALABRAS CLAVETratados de Libre Comercio bilaterales • Comercio América Latina y China • Tratados comerciales en Perú y Chile • Tratados de Libre Comercio de EEUU

The China Conundrum: Economic Development Strategies Embraced by Small States in South America

ABSTRACTThe three most prominent trends in South America in the 2000s have been: 1) the rapid expansion of trade and borrowing ties with China; 2) the collapse of both regional and multilateral trade negotiating venues since 2006; and, 3) the quick recovery of most South American countries from the 2008-10 global financial crisis. This paper analyzes the ways in which these three trends have converged and shaped the choice of development strategy in Chile and Peru, which have the strongest trade ties with China in the entire Latin American region when measured as a percent of GDP. Indeed, both countries have sought to stake out their own paths by negotiating separate bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) with China and the US. Yet, although making these respective policy choices may well represent the most viable way forward for small emerging market countries which have consolidated macroeconomic reforms and are prepared to take their economic strategy to the next level, the political implications of this development path have already become more complicated than expected.

KEYWORDSBilateral Free Trade Agreements • Chinese Latin American trade • Peru and Chile trade agreements • US Free Trade Agreements

Carol Wise, PhD, es profesora asociada de Relaciones Internacionales en la University of Southern California, USC.



The China Conundrum: Economic Development Strategies Embraced by Small States in South America1

Carol WiseUniversity of Southern California

INTRODUCTION

Some thirty years in the making, the phenomenon of China’s relatively rapid rise in the international political economy has elicited far more ques-tions than it has answers. The data, for the most part, are unambiguous. Be it China’s historically unprecedented growth rate over the past three decades, its amassment of the world’s highest level of foreign exchange reserves, or its recent emergence as the largest holder of US Treasury securities, there is little doubt as to the dazzling economic prominence that this country has now attained (Subramanian 2011). However, while these economic advances may seem beyond dispute, any consensual interpretation of the mid- and long-term implications of this structural shift in the global economy remains elusive. This is especially so for Latin America, given its geographic proximity

1 The author thanks Kimberly Burtnyk, Javier Colato, Mariana González Insua, Daniel Paly, Victor Paredes-Colonia, Dawn Powell, Chengxi Shi, Vijeta Tandon, and Becky Turner for their excellent assistance in completing the research and compiling the database for this paper.

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to the US and the longstanding designation of the Western Hemisphere as part of the US “sphere of influence”.

Although China’s participation in the region is still largely a matter of its rapidly growing trade and lending ties with any number of Latin American countries, the sheer magnitude of these ties has thrown the US presence into relief. For example, since 2000 China has become the first or second most important trading partner for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica and Peru (Bárcena and Rosales 2010, 16); moreover, between 2003 and 2011 Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in Latin America totaled close to $23 billion, up from basically nothing at the outset of the 2000s. Not only has Chinese demand for South America’s natural resources been a motor for high growth in this sub-region in the 2000s, it was this continued demand that at least partially accounted for Latin America’s quick rebound from the 2008-10 global financial crisis (Porzecanski 2009; Bárcena and Rosales 2010, 9-10). In the wake of this crisis, China has become the second largest economy in the world, after the US, and it has provided the stimulus for global growth as the “Great Recession” in the OECD bloc continues to linger.

A closer examination of the participation of both the US and China in Latin America suggests an emerging division of labor: for better or for worse, the US will continue to promote democracy, market reforms, and rule of law in the re-gion, while China will do the heavy lifting with trade expansion, infrastructure investment, and a range of other development projects. Ever mindful of this being the US sphere of influence (Shixue 2008), and of its own dependence on investing in and exporting to the US market (Lanxin 2008), China has moved cautiously in the Western Hemisphere and its mission in Latin America has largely been developmental in nature (Yang 2009). Still, China is hardly oper-ating under the radar screen. For example, China has now become the major source of demand for soya beans from Argentina and Uruguay, iron ore and soya beans from Brazil, copper and livestock feed from Chile and Peru, and crude oil from Colombia and Ecuador (Bárcena and Rosales 2010, 19). Not only has this prompted the longest resource boom and foreign exchange bonanza ever for some countries in the region, the multiplier effects in terms of Chinese development assistance, infrastructure support, and others forms of lending and investment have been an additional windfall.

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Carol Wise


For large states like Argentina and Brazil, the pattern has been to export raw materials to China and manufactured exports to the region and the rest of the world, except China. For small open economies like Chile and Peru, where the size of the non-resource based manufacturing sector is minor, this is less of an option. In both of these cases the stated goal has been to diversify raw material exports to the region and the rest of the world and to modernize the domestic service sector into a Pacific Rim hub for transport, finance, investment, and all logistics related to trade. Herein lies the decision of both Chile and Peru to negotiate separate bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) with the US and China. Chile was the first to accomplish this dual feat, with the implementation of the Chile–US FTA in 2004 and the Chile–China FTA in 2006, and Peru followed suit in implementing separate FTAs with the US and China in 2009.

When the Chile–US and Peru–US FTAs are examined, both emerge as highly sophisticated post-industrial accords which reflect the eagerness of US investors in services (e.g. banking, finance, telecom, pharmaceuticals, insur-ance) to further imprint US regulatory standards and investment codes on the economic structures of these partners. In short, although US producers were anxious to obtain tariff reductions for agricultural and manufactured exports to Chile and Peru, at heart these US agreements pertain mainly to the new trade agenda (the liberalization of services, investment, and intel-lectual property rights). In essence, and as services and investment have become increasingly interwoven, these two US FTAs have been geared to-ward the efforts of both Chile and Peru to transform their respective service sectors into competitive Pacific Rim hubs. On the US side, as the relation-ship between services and investment has become increasingly interwoven (Kotschwar 2009), this has spawned a North-South FTA pattern whereby “[…] concentrated interests in FDI-exporting countries have a strong incentive to lobby for preferential agreements because they confer specific advantages over competitors” (Manger 2009, 19).

In contrast, for both countries the FTA with China centers primarily on the old trade agenda (market access for agriculture and other raw materials, textiles, and labor-intensive manufactured goods), and in particular China’s resource-based demands for steady access to raw material imports from both

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nations (Wise and Quiliconi 2007). Thus, the Chile–China and Peru–China FTAs hark back to the trade patterns which characterized the turn of the last century, whereby old-fashioned comparative advantage fueled the export of ores and other raw materials by these countries to the more developed North and their import of manufactured and basic consumer goods in return (Bulmer-Thomas 1994, 57–60).

In light of the pre- and post-industrial nature of these respective FTAs with China and the US, it appears that these two small open economies with negligible industrial bases and minor weight in negotiating venues at the World Trade Organization (WTO) have basically short-circuited the current standoff within the Doha round negotiations concerning concessions to be made around the old and new trade agendas. While this two-pronged strate-gy is admittedly incipient, this pursuit of different goals across separate FTAs may well represent a way forward for other small non- or semi-industrial economies which face the challenge of combining comparative advantage based on natural resource exports with the exploitation of a competitive edge based on the modernization of services and investment.

At first glance, this arrangement appears to be quite strategic for all par-ties concerned. However, what might be the costs for these Latin American countries given the steep asymmetries involved, especially with regard to the hefty liberalization demands of the US concerning the new trade agenda? In Peru, direct political costs have already arisen in the form of violent protests in the northern mining town of Cajamarca against pollution of the local water supply by US and Chinese companies operating within these mining communi-ties (Sanborn and Torres 2009; Romero 2010). Similarly, Chilean civil society has rebelled against the prospect of China’s further incursion into that coun-try’s mining sector. In both countries, the deterioration of incomes for those working outside of this traditional primary export-led model, and the failure of policymakers in both countries to generate jobs and badly needed human capital investments in education and health, has invoked mass social protests over the past few years. In the following sections of this article I evaluate the agreements themselves and then explore the political implications that are inherent in the choice of this particular development path.

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1. GOING FOR BROKE? THE RECENT HISTORICAL BACKDROP

As longstanding members of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC), and as two of the top economic performers in Latin America over the past decade, there is little question as to the preparedness of Chile and Peru to literally play both sides of the Pacific in economic and political terms. As figures 1 and 2 show, both countries have grown briskly during the 2000s in terms of the average rate of GDP, and in the case of Peru it is the pace of investment growth that has been especially spectacular. Based on a steady and ongoing process of unilateral liberalization spanning nearly four decades in the case of Chile and two decades in the case of Peru, policymakers in these small open economies have effectively consolidated an export-led model driven by invest-ment and competitive gains. Although both countries took a major hit on the capital account during the 2008–10 global financial crisis (see figures 3 and 4), the previous consolidation of financial sector reforms in both cases enabled policymakers to avoid a full-blown meltdown of the kind that occurred a de-cade earlier during the 1997 Asian financial crises (Porzecanski 2009).

Figure 1. Chile vs LAC-7 GDP Growth and Investment Growth

% Growth

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

LAC-7 GDP Growth (%) 7% 6% 7% 7% 5% -1% 6%

LAC-7 Investment Growth (%) 16% 18% 15% 15% 13% -10% 14%

Chile GDP Growth (%) 6% 5% 4% 4% 4% -2% 5%

Chile Investment Growth (%) 19% 26% 10% 14% 23% -24% 20%

Source: Inter-American Development Bank. http://www.iadb.org/en/inter-american-development-bank,2837.html

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Figure 2. Peru vs LAC-7 GDP Growth and Investment Growth

% Growth

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

LAC-7 GDP Growth (%) 7% 6% 7% 7% 5% -1% 6%

LAC-7 Investment Growth (%) 16% 18% 15% 15% 13% -10% 14%

Peru GDP Growth (%) 5% 6% 4% 8% 9% 1% 8%

Peru Investment Growth (%) 12% 14% 19% 22% 29% -13% 27%


Figure 3A. Chile vs LAC-7 FDI

Millions of Dollars

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

LAC-7 FDI (millions of U$S) 51.983,29 61.644,86 31.548,47 96.466,28 84.227,35 74.088,72 88.941,05

Chile FDI (millions of U$S) 5.609,5 4.801,1 5.126,9 9.960,8 7.108,7 4.813 6.351,1


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20

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Figure 3B. Chile vs LAC-7 International Reserves

% of GDP

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

LAC-7 International Reserves (% of GDP) 14% 14% 12% 13% 14% 14% 14%

Chile International Reserves (% of GDP) 19% 15% 13% 11% 12% 16% 14%


Figure 4A. Peru vs LAC-7 FDI

Millions of Dollars

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

LAC-7 FDI (millions of U$S) 51.983,29 61.644,86 31.548,47 96.466,28 84.227,35 74.088,72 88.941,05

Peru FDI (millions of U$S) 1.599,04 2.578,72 3.466,53 5.490,96 6.923,65 5.576 7.328,24


100.000

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Figure 4B. Peru vs LAC-7 International Reserves

% of GDP

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

LAC-7 International Reserves (% of GDP) 14% 14% 12% 13% 14% 14% 14%

Peru International Reserves (% of GDP) 17% 18% 18% 22% 28% 26% 27%


While Chile and Peru are united by geography, endowment factors, and deep-rooted commitment to economic reforms, there are important differ-ences. As figure 5 shows, Chile now ranks ahead of the US and in the top ten on the Heritage Foundation’s index of economic freedom, one of the most widely referred to indices of economic competitiveness, whereas Peru clearly has a way to go. Since 2008, however, Peru moved up from 57th to 42ndth place on this index in 2012,2 and it now dominates the top seven Latin American countries (LAC-7) on half of the key competitiveness rankings within the World Bank’s Doing Business database (see figure 6);3 Peru can thus be expected to move steadily up in its competitive ranking. China’s abysmal ranking on the eco-nomic freedom index in figure 5 reflects the extent to which its record-breaking growth relies less on productivity and efficiency gains and more on its sheer size, massive economies of scale and decidedly heterodox development strategy

2 See Heritage Foundation, 2012 Index of Economic Freedom, Country Rankings, http://www.heritage.org/Index/Ranking.aspx (accessed 4/24/12)

3 See World Bank, Doing Business: Measuring Business Regulations, http://www.doingbu-siness.org/ (accessed 4/24/12)

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(Naughton 2006; Devlin 2008; Subramanian 2011). In contrast, as small pri-mary exporters with aggregate GDP which totals a mere fraction of China’s, the route to success for Chile and Peru lies in increased efficiency and productivity gains, i.e. making the very most of their endowment factors (Bulmer-Thomas 1994). In both cases, the FTA strategy has emerged as an integral part of this quest to promote higher growth, investment, and overall competitiveness.

Figure 5A. Economic Freedom Ranking

RANKING

10 7 42

United States Chile Peru

Source: The Heritage Foundation. http://www.heritage.org/index/ranking

Figure 5B. Economic Freedom Ranking

RANKING

7 42 138

Chile Peru China

Source: The Heritage Foundation. http://www.heritage.org/index/ranking

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Figure 6. Competitiveness Ranking

Ranking

Ease of Doing

Business Rank

Starting a Business

Dealing with Construction

Permits

Registering Property

Protecting Investors

Enforcing Contracts

LAC-7 Average 84 91 95 87 67 93

Chile 39 27 90 53 29 67

Peru 41 55 101 22 17 111

Source: DoingBusiness.Org. http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings

Apart from signing a number of bilateral FTAs within Latin America, Chile has finalized similar agreements with Canada, Japan and Korea, has put in place a partial preferential agreement with India, and has Economic Association Agreements with New Zealand, Singapore, and the European Union (EU) (Stallings 2009). While these agreements may signal a chaotic spaghetti bowl pattern of trade and investment integration (World Bank 2005), they also reflect Chile’s determination to continue reaping the gains of past liberalization. In particular, Chile’s pursuit of FTAs with developed and large emerging market countries distinguishes it from much larger players in its own sub-region, for example, Argentina and Brazil. Chile’s separate FTAs with China and the US are a hallmark of this competitive strategy.

While Peruvian policymakers have long voiced admiration and a com-mitment to launching a Chilean style export-led model, it has taken the past two decades for the country to implement the institutional and eco-nomic policy reforms that such a strategy necessitates (Wise 2003). Having crossed a threshold of reform consolidation in the early 2000s, Peru has

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embraced the Chilean FTA strategy of negotiating with large countries which promise to deliver the most compelling trade and investment gains. On this point, apart from the launching of FTAs with Canada, Chile, Singapore, the US, and China, Peru is in the process of finalizing separate agreements with Japan, Mexico, and the EU. However, in the case of both countries it is their separate but simultaneous negotiation of bilateral FTAs with China and the US—the two countries with which they have the strongest economic ties—as well as the enormous possibilities for realizing dynamic gains and hub production status by virtue of their strategic Pacific Rim location, which represents something entirely new.

2. TRADE LIBERALIZATION À LA CARTE

A number of additional factors account for the success of Chile and Peru on these FTA fronts. It goes without saying that the implementation and con-solidation of market reforms, the steady pattern of favorable macroeconomic performance and growth, and the impressive professionalization of the trade policymaking apparatus in both countries, were necessary conditions for the launching of FTA negotiations, as was the unique endowment factors and rich array of natural resources that each brought to the table.

It should be pointed out that two larger trends prompted these small, open economies to engage in a pattern of “trade liberalization à la carte.” First, there was the collapse of negotiations for a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) in 2005, a project launched by the Clinton administration back in 1994 with the intention of negotiating a comprehensive liberalization accord amongst all 34 democratically elected countries in the Western Hemisphere. Second, a year later the Doha round negotiations at the WTO broke down. While the lapse of both sets of negotiations occurred amidst a complicated political and economic backdrop, the deal breaker for both the FTAA and Doha was the inability of all sides to agree on the granting of deeper concessions around the aforemen-tioned items on the old and new trade agendas.

Up until 2000, the FTAA option had been touted by Washington as an interim step that would prepare the Western Hemisphere to enter the next round of multilateral negotiations with a cohesive set of accomplishments and demands on the old and new trade agendas (Cohn 2007). Implicitly, as

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a brain child of the US policy establishment, the FTAA offered the opportu-nity to hammer out these differences between North and South on a smaller scale, but in ways meant to favor specific US interests in crafting new invest-ment rules and disciplines within the hemisphere. However, from the Latin American standpoint, the FTAA was also a response to the Uruguay Round (1986-1994), where compromises which had been made on both the old and new trade agendas in order to get the job done, provoked an almost immedi-ate sense of buyer’s remorse.

On the old trade agenda, although the Uruguay Round was the eighth set of multilateral negotiations since the launching of the inaugural GATT Geneva Round in 1947-48, it was the first multilateral agreement to cover reductions in tariff and non-tariff barriers for agricultural goods, textiles, and clothing. However, by the mid-2000s, Stiglitz and Charlton (2005, 46) noted that “the average OECD tariff on imports from developing countries is four times higher than on imports originating in the OECD.” Moreover, the US and the EU have notoriously been stubborn in resisting sizable cuts in agricultural subsidies. On the new trade agen-da, a coalition of developed countries led by the US had finally succeeded in extending WTO coverage to services and trade-related investment and intellectual property. In expectation of their increased market access for agricultural and industrial goods, the developing countries agreed to negotiate new rules and domestic disciplines in these areas. The re-sult was the GATS (General Agreement on Trade in Services) and two agreements on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) and Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) (Kotschwar 2009; Roy, Marchetti and Lim 2009).

The motivation for all parties concerned was the projected welfare gains from the implementation of the Uruguay Round, which ranged wildly from US$50 billion to US$275 billion a year, a large share of which was projected to benefit the developing countries (Stiglitz and Charlton 2005, 46). Yet, five years into the Uruguay Round, the ill preparation and steep costs of com-plying with these various agreements meant that 90 of the 109 developing country members of the WTO were far behind schedule in implementing

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those new trade agenda items to which they had signed up earlier (Finger 2000). While the participation of the developing countries in the Uruguay Round had been unprecedented, there was clearly more work to do in realistically reconciling developed and developing country demands and implementation capabilities around the old and new trade agendas. Herein lay the decision to launch the 2001 Doha round and to assign it a specific development mandate (Cohn 2007).

However, with the subsequent collapse of these regional and multilateral negotiating venues, a more recent and bold trend of bilateralism has pre-vailed, as evidenced by the recently confirmed Colombia-US FTA, the Costa Rica-China FTA and, of course, the China and US FTAs negotiated with Chile and Peru. The bottom line in terms of Chile and Peru is that both countries are seeking to achieve different sets of goals around the old and new trade agendas by simultaneously engaging in FTAs with two of the largest markets in the global economy. Especially with regard to China, it is the rapidity with which its trade ties have grown with Chile and Peru, in both absolute terms and relative to US trade with these countries, which renders this a new chap-ter in the political economy of Latin American integration.

3. BRIDGING THE OLD AND NEW TRADE AGENDAS

a. The Old Trade Agenda

By the time of the 1996 WTO trade ministerial in Singapore, the ‘old’ and ‘new’ issues on the multilateral trade agenda had been clearly demarcated. As mentioned earlier, the new trade agenda issues such as investment, services, and IPRs had been covered in separate mini-accords in the final phases of the Uruguay round. At the Singapore meeting, Japan and the EU called for further negotiations on competition policy, government procurement, and trade facilitation (Cohn 2007, 156–158), which have been incorporated into the new trade agenda. While still contentious, the contours of the new trade agenda are fairly concise. The old trade agenda is less so, mainly because the original GATT clauses dealing with market access and other issues were more generally phrased and thus left open to interpretation.

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For the purposes of this analysis, and following the framework put forth by Estevadeordal, Shearer and Suominen (2009, 98–99), negotiations concerning the old trade agenda refer not just to the quest to liberalize agriculture and labor-intensive manufactured goods but also to: the extent of product cover-age for liberalized tariff lines; the length of the transition period in reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers; and, the removal or phasing out of those policy instruments deemed to be most detrimental to market access. The latter would include, for example, subsidies, technical barriers, rules of origin, customs pro-cedures, anti-dumping, safeguards and other special regimes. As the following analysis will show, the FTA that Chile and Peru each signed with China stuck closely to the extension of product coverage and to timelines for liberalizing all product lines, whereas the FTA which each negotiated with the US was weighted much more heavily toward the Singapore issues.

b. Chile’s FTA with China: Market Access Concerns Prevail

To a certain extent, the trade data in tables 1–4 reflect the triangular dy-namic which is emerging in the Chile–China–US economic relationship, on the one hand, and the Peru–China–US relationship, on the other hand. On the export side, both countries are shipping a rich array of raw materials to China (copper, fishmeal) and the US (fruit, frozen seafood, wood, copper, tin and other minerals), while each is primarily importing manufactured goods from China and the US (see tables 1 and 2). The eagerness of both countries to lock in access to the Chinese market for their respective primary goods is a demand-driven phenomenon, as China’s voracious appetite for raw materials to fuel its high growth has continued almost unabated.

The Chile–China FTA, China’s first Latin American accord, sought the comprehensive reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers for trade in goods. At the same time, the negotiation of services and investment was refer-enced as part of a future work program (Kotschwar 2009, 390). In terms of traded goods, this FTA provided immediate duty-free entry for 92 per cent of Chile’s exports to China, although some of the country’s most successful agro-industrial exports (fruits and fish) were placed on a ten year timeline for accessing the Chinese market (Stallings 2009). On the import side, 50 per cent of Chile’s imports from China were granted duty-free access at the outset

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Table 1. Top Products Traded Chile-China & Chile-US (2010)

TOP EXPORTS TO CHINA (2010)

In Millions of US Dollars % of Total

Copper and articles thereof 11.115,90 62,0%

Refined copper and copper alloys, unwrought 10.232,55 57,1%

Copper cathodes and sections of cathodes unwrought 10.117,43 56,4%

Ores, slag and ash 4.685,70 26,1%

Copper ores and concentrates 3.757,72 21,0%

All Commodities 17.935,19

TOP IMPORTS FROM CHINA (2010)

Electrical, electronic equipment 2.071,43 20,9%

Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery, etc 1.363,06 13,8%

Electric apparatus for line telephony, telegraphy 815,41 8,2%

Articles of apparel, accessories, not knit or crochet 749,24 7,6%

Articles of apparel, accessories, knit or crochet 719,94 7,3%


TOP EXPORTS TO US (2010)

Copper and articles thereof 2.243,01 29,2%

Refined copper and copper alloys, unwrought 2.211,53 28,8%

Copper cathodes and sections of cathodes unwrought 2.096,87 27,3%

Edible fruit, nuts, peel of citrus fruit, melons 1.681,89 21,9%

Grapes, fresh or dried 742,27 9,7%


TOP IMPORTS FROM US (2010)

Mineral fuels, oils, distillation products, etc 2.415,92 24,5%


Oils petroleum, bituminous, distillates, except crude 2.087,77 21,2%

Light petroleum distillates nes 1.626,93 16,5%

Vehicles other than railway, tramway 1.184,65 12,0%


Source: UN comtrade. http://comtrade.un.org/

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Table 2. Top Products Traded Peru-China & Peru-US (2010)

TOP EXPORTS TO CHINA (2010)

In Millions of US Dollars % of Total

Ores, slag and ash 3.470,22 54,5%

Copper ores and concentrates 1.695,44 26,6%

Residues, wastes of food industry, animal fodder 846,10 13,3%

Flour etc of meat, fish or offal for animal feed 846,03 13,3%

Lead ores and concentrates 798,27 12,5%


TOP IMPORTS FROM CHINA (2010)

Electrical, electronic equipment 1.058,14 20,7%

Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery, etc 979,15 19,1%

Vehicles other than railway, tramway 450,88 8,8%

Electric apparatus for line telephony, telegraphy 401,14 7,8%

Automatic data processing machines (computers) 341,77 6,7%


TOP EXPORTS TO US (2010)


Pearls, precious stones, metals, coins, etc 1.302,76 24,3%

Gold in unwrought forms non-monetary 1.222,19 22,8%

Oils petroleum, bituminous, distillates, except crude 980,64 18,3%

Copper and articles thereof 714,15 13,3%


TOP IMPORTS FROM US (2010)



Oils petroleum, bituminous, distillates, except crude 1.040,99 17,9%

Light petroleum distillates nes 943,80 16,2%

Plastics and articles thereof 558,67 9,6%


Source: UN comtrade. http://comtrade.un.org/

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Table 3. Chile’s Trade Balance and Reliance on U.S. and Chinese Markets

CHILE-US

Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Trade Balance with U.S (millions $USD)

Exports to U.S. 3.837,20 4.955,50 6.649,99 9.315,55 8.788,30 8.010,73 6.050,19 7.006,21 9.019,89

Imports from U.S.

2.478,39 3.326,53 4.620,11 5.476,21 7.117,04 10.750,11 7.212,52 9.224,16 13.953,17

Trade Balance 1.358,81 1.628,97 2.029,88 3.839,34 1.671,27 -2.739,38 -1.162,32 -2.217,94 -4.933,28

Reliance on U.S. Markets (millions $USD)

(A)Exports to U.S.

3.837,20 4.955,50 6.649,99 9.315,55 8.788,30 8.010,73 6.050,19 7.006,21 9.019,89

(B)Total Exports

21.664,16 32.520,32 41.266,95 58.680,11 67.971,63 66.258,81 54.004,37 71.028,44 80.585,95

(A)/(B)Percentage

17,71% 15,24% 16,11% 15,88% 12,93% 12,09% 11,20% 9,86% 11,19%

CHILE-CHINA

Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Trade Balance with China (millions $USD)

Exports to China

1.895,34 3.278,23 4.780,71 5.140,45 10.203,30 9.042,85 12.491,78 17.355,61 17.922,97

Imports from China

1.689,29 2.234,06 2.915,50 4.025,23 5.525,34 7.510,07 5.794,52 9.119,81 11.891,20

Trade Balance 206,05 1.044,17 1.865,21 1.115,22 4.677,96 1.532,78 6.697,26 8.235,80 6.031,77

Reliance on Chinese Markets (millions $USD)

(A)Exports to China

1.895,34 3.278,23 4.780,71 51.40,45 10.203,30 9.042,85 12.491,78 17.355,61 17.922,97

(B)Total Exports

21.664,16 32.520,32 41.266,95 58.680,11 67.971,63 66.258,81 54.004,37 71.028,44 80.585,95

(A)/(B)Percentage

8,75% 10,08% 11,58% 8,76% 15,01% 13,65% 23,13% 24,43% 22,24%

Source: Central Bank of Chile. http://www.bcentral.cl/estadisticas-economicas/series-indicadores/index_se.htm

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Table 4. Peru’s Trade Balance and Reliance on U.S. and Chinese Markets

PERU-US

Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Trade Balance with U.S (millions $USD)

Exports to U.S. 2.408,72 3.701,55 5.119,16 5.880,39 5.271,61 5.812,45 4.223,31 5.056,92 6.235,79

Imports from U.S.

1.698,53 2.101,02 2.309,45 2.926,84 4.119,77 6.182,97 4.918,84 6.754,26 8.319,17

Trade Balance 710,19 1.600,53 2.809,71 2.953,55 1.151,83 -370,52 -695,53 -1.697,34 -2.083,37

Reliance on U.S. Markets (millions $USD)

(A)Exports to U.S.

2.409 3.702 5.119 5.880 5.272 5.812 4.223 5.057 6.236

(B)Total Exports

8.995 12.716 17.273 23.800 28.084 30.628 27.073 35.806 45.726

(A)/(B)Percentage

26,78% 29,11% 29,64% 24,71% 18,77% 18,98% 15,60% 14,12% 13,64%

PERU-CHINA

Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Trade Balance with China (millions $USD)

Exports to China

676 1.245 1.871 2.261 3.040 3.567 4.079 5.436 6.962

Imports from China

598 702 958 1.446 2.252 3.715 3.267 5.140 6.319

Trade Balance 78 543 913 815 788 -148 812 296 643

Reliance on Chinese Markets (millions $USD)

(A)Exports to China

676 1.245 1.871 2.261 3.040 3.567 4.079 5.436 6.962

(B)Total Exports

8.995 12.716 17.273 23.800 28.084 30.628 27.073 35.806 45.726

(A)/(B)Percentage

7,52% 9,79% 10,83% 9,50% 10,82% 11,65% 15,07% 15,18% 15,23%

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce http://tse.export.gov/ Peru's Ministry of Foreign Commerce and Tourism http://www.mincetur.gob.pe/newweb/Default.aspx?tabid=2315

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and Chile was able to exclude 152 “sensitive products” (wheat, flour, sugar, some textiles and garments, and some major appliances) altogether (Barton 2009, 244). While the Chile–China agreement was simpler and shallower than those FTAs which Chile has negotiated with other Asian economies, the impact has been immediate. Chilean exports to China jumped by 140 per cent during the first year that the FTA went into effect in 2006, rendering China Chile’s top partner in bilateral trade by 2008 (Ellis 2009, 35).

As table 3 shows, Chile’s trade with China rose from about 9 per cent of its total trade in 2003 to nearly 14 per cent in 2008, the bulk of it based on cop-per. For example, copper represented 84 per cent of Chile’s exports to China in 2008, with the rest made up mostly of other mineral and wood products. The importance of copper and minerals in this agreement is highlighted by the fact that only six of Chile’s agricultural exports are covered by the FTA: apples, grapes, plums, chicken products, cheese, and cherries (Ellis 2009, 38). More than 90 per cent of Chile’s imports from China in 2008 were manufac-tured goods, with over 42 per cent ranking as medium and high-tech (Barton 2009). In both the Chile–China and the Peru–China FTAs, penalties for protectionist measures relating to covered trade were incorporated, includ-ing the application of safeguards in response to preferential tariff treatment which could harm an industry of the other party.4

In 2008 the governments of Chile and China signed The Supplementary Agreement on Trade in Services of the Free Trade Agreement. While the nego-tiation over services is a more recent phenomenon (the 1994 NAFTA and 1995 GATS agreements set important precedents), Chile stands with the US and Singapore as one of the only three countries that are now party to more than five FTAs that include services (Roy, Marchetti and Lim 2009, 318–319). With this 2008 Supplementary Agreement China signaled an increased willingness

4 “Free Trade Agreement Between the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Chile,” Articles 44 and 45, Foreign Trade Information System, Organization of American States, http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/CHL_CHN/CHL_CHN_e/Text_e.asp#Sec1(accessed 4/24/12)

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to tackle the new trade agenda.5 In sum, this agreement covers business services (e.g., engineering, architecture, financial auditing, and advertising), computers and related services (e.g., software implementation, data process-ing, and hardware installation), real estate, research and development, tele-communications, and manufacturing services.

Of note here are the very few limitations applied by Chile in terms of market access for services and national treatment compared with China’s thicker list of restrictions concerning Chile’s access to its services market, in particular. With Chinese FDI in Chile currently amounting to less than one per cent of Chile’s registered FDI (see figure 1), and Chilean flows of FDI to China were actually declining through the 2000s (Barton 2009, 237), the two governments are currently in the process of negotiating an agreement on investment. Despite Chile’s goal of greatly enhancing its services trade and FDI inflows from China, the disproportionate weighting of the Chile–China economic relationship toward trade in goods and the dominance of Chile’s copper exports suggests that old trade agenda issues will dominate Chile–China relations for some time to come.

A 2005 agreement signed by Chile’s state-owned copper firm, CODELCO, and the Chinese company MinMetals bolsters this insight. By far the strongest FDI link between China and Chile, this agreement established a joint venture in which both companies kicked in US$110 million for capital investments (Barton 2009, 240–241). Through this new joint venture firm, Copper Partners Investment Company Ltd, Chile agreed to sell China cop-per at a fixed price and China committed to further capital investments to enable Chile to increase output to further meet Chinese demand (Ellis 2009, 37–38). Because this joint venture is registered in the tax haven of Bermuda, it does not appear in the accounting of Chile’s FDI inflows

5 For a summary of this supplementary agreement on services go to Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/topic/enchile.shtml (accessed 4/24/12)

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(Barton 2009, 242).6 This problem aside, the thrust of the Chile–China part-nership is copper, not the promise of new dynamic Chinese investments in services. The importance of copper is such that China’s efforts to acquire additional mining assets have met with staunch political resistance on the part of Chilean civil society (Ellis 2009, 37).

c. The Peru–China FTA: Broad but Shallow

Some similar dynamics are underway in Peru–China trade and investment relations. The Peru–China FTA was formally implemented in March 2010 and China has hailed this as the most comprehensive FTA it has yet signed.7 While this is true, the very low levels of Chinese FDI in Peru (see figure 2) and the overwhelming role played by Peru’s primary exports in its trade relationship with China also relegate the main action within this FTA to the old trade agenda. Peru’s combined mineral and fishmeal products make up 90 per cent of its exports to China (copper at 42 per cent, fishmeal at 20 per cent, with other minerals comprising the remaining 28 per cent), while the bulk of its imports from China are medium-to-high value-added manufactured products (see table 2). At the outset of this FTA, Peru’s trade with China accounted for around 12 per cent of its total trade, up from 8 per cent in 2003. By 2007 China had joined step with the US as Peru’s most important trading partner (Ellis 2009, 148).

Whereas Chile was the first Latin American country to negotiate a com-prehensive FTA with China for the elimination of tariffs on trade in goods, Peru was the first to actually incorporate items on the old and new trade agendas into an FTA with China. Yet despite Peru’s success in negotiating the broadest agreement so far with China, those portions of the Peru–China FTA which cover the new trade agenda are nowhere near as detailed, for example,

6 There are wild discrepancies in the Chinese data that report FDI flows to Chile and in Chile’s reporting on this same indicator. The difficulty in gauging these numbers is that Chinese FDI is frequently channeled through tax havens in Bermuda or the Cayman Islands and tends to show up under ‘services’ in Chile’s national accounts (Barton 2009, 238). In fact, the bulk of these funds are invested in mining and in mining-related endeavors.

7 See Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/topic/enperu.shtml (accessed 4/24/12)

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as the Chile–China 2008 Supplementary Agreement on Trade in Services. On this count, the Peru–China FTA is rather light. The treatment of labor and en-vironmental issues in both the Chile–China and Peru–China FTAs is another case in point. In both FTAs these issues are addressed under the umbrella of a separate chapter on ‘Cooperation’. However, these are little more than bul-let points which make reference to previously existing letters of agreement between China and these countries on labor and environmental issues.

On the old trade agenda Peru was quite proactive in reducing tariffs on 99 per cent of its exports to China, 83.5 per cent of which entered the Chinese market duty free at the outset of the agreement (González Vigil 2009). In re-turn, 68 per cent of China’s exports to Peru were granted immediate market access. At the same time, Peru altogether excluded some 592 “sensitive prod-ucts” in the textile, garment, shoes, and metal mechanics industries, which amounted to around 10 per cent of the value of China’s exports to Peru. For its part, China excluded wood, paper, and some agricultural products (e.g., coffee, wheat, rice, corn, sugar, and vegetable oils) from the FTA, which re-flected just 1 per cent of the value of Peru’s exports.8

On the new trade issues, separate chapters on services and investment commit both sides to uphold national treatment, greater transparency, and the use of dispute settlement mechanisms in the event of a conflict. The services chapter explicitly covers tourism (China has designated Peru as an official tourist destination), postal express services, transfer payments, and a range of professional services (e.g., translation, consulting, cross-border data transmission). The investment chapter basically reaffirms The Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investment that both countries signed back in 1994. Like Chile, Peru is anxious to attract Chinese FDI and services trade as a result of this FTA. In support of these goals, Peru’s Grupo Interbank opened a branch office in China in 2007, and China Development Bank es-tablished a strategic partnership with Peru’s Banco de la Nacion in 2008 to

8 For more detail go to Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/topic/enperu.shtml (accessed 4/24/12)

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facilitate microfinance lending in Peru (Ellis 2009, 155). Still, this is not where the action lies in China–Peru economic relations.

Like Chile, China’s FDI presence in Peru is concentrated in mining (iron and copper), with some minor commitments in oil and natural gas. In addition, per-haps even more so than in Chile, China’s investment in Peru’s mining sector has at times provoked civic unrest, especially with regard to China’s labor practices and its weak record in the safe disposal of environmental waste (Romero 2010). Although China’s FDI in Peruvian mining has been widely reported, the routing of these investments through tax havens like Bermuda or the Cayman Islands has led to a similar, albeit legal, pattern of under-reporting as has occurred in Chile. Thus, some spectacular investments, like China’s Aluminum Corporation purchase of Peru’s share in the Canadian mining company Peru Copper for US$792 million in 2007 (Ellis 2009, 151), fail to appear in the data. Yet, and akin to Chile, the ties that bind Peru and China are central to the old trade agenda and offer little in the way of new dynamic Chinese investments in services.

d. The New Trade Agenda and Deeper liberalization: Chile’s and Peru’s FTAs with the US

With the Latin American region long regarded as part of the US sphere of influence, the historical timeline on trade and investment between the US and these countries is of course much longer. For the purposes of this discussion, the relevant starting point for Peru was its entry into the Andean Trade and Preference Act (ATPA) in 1991 and for Chile its ultimately thwarted invitation to join NAFTA in 1994. Additional factors shedding light on why the FTAs which each negotiated with the US in the 2000s were weighted heavily toward the new trade agenda, include the longstanding membership of each in the GATT, the concomitant lowering of Most Favored Nation (MFN) tariffs under the GATT/WTO,9 and the deep process of unilateral liberalization underway

9 According to Article 1 of the GATT, member countries must offer market access on par with the ‘most favored nation’ amongst their trading partners; the formation of an FTA, the criteria for which are defined in GATT Article 24, is one way of circumventing the mandate that each signatory to the GATT/WTO charge trade duties on an MFN, or non-discriminatory, basis.

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in each country. There was also the firm realization by policymakers and private actors in both Chile and Peru that the modernization of services and investment was a necessary condition for achieving higher levels of efficiency, productivity, and competitiveness.

As for the antecedents to the Peru–US FTA, in 1991 the US Congress passed the ATPA with an eye toward lessening the reliance of the Andean countries (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru) on the proceeds from drug production and transshipment. So as to encourage the diversification of crops and exports away from the drug trade, the US offered significant aid and generous market access for goods exported from these countries. By 2004, when FTA negotiations between Peru and the US were started, ATPA-covered trade accounted for roughly 20 per cent of Peru’s exports to the US market, all of which consisted of agriculture and other raw materials (see table 2).10 In mounting their lobbying effort for the passage of this agreement, Peruvian policymakers and the various pro-FTA business chambers argued that ATPA-covered exports from Peru to the US market accounted for more than a million jobs in Peru (USTR 2009, 45). There was, moreover, the uncertainty of how much longer the US Congress would continue to approve these ATPA trade preferences, given that Bolivia had abdicated in 2008 and Ecuador was continuing to waver in its compliance.

Thus, Peruvian policymakers and export-oriented producers were eager to lock in ATPA preferences with the negotiation of the Peru–US FTA (De la Flor 2010), as the US Congress had failed to renew this bill in 2001—02, and the trade and investment hit suffered by the Peruvian private sector had been palpable.11 In achieving their goal of completing a bilateral FTA with the US, Peruvian negotiators secured some additional, although minor, concessions for exports covered by ATPA (De la Flor 2010, 66).12 In exchange, the US made

10 Copper cathodes dominated this list of APTA-covered goods, which included apparel, fresh asparagus, mangoes, grapes, paprika, and molybdenum ore (USTR 2009, 11).

11 Author’s interview with Eduardo Ferreyros, Vice-Minister of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Foreign Trade and Tourism, Lima, Peru, September 2, 2008.

12 When renewed in 2002 the ATPA was renamed the ‘Andean Trade Preference and Drug Eradication Act’ (ATPDEA).

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significant inroads with the liberalization of Peruvian agriculture, manufac-turing, and the aforementioned items on the new trade agenda (USTR 2007). On this latter point, both the Peru–US and the Chile–US FTAs are modeled closely after NAFTA, which is considered to be the most comprehensive and detailed of all FTAs (Estevadeordal, Shearer and Suominen 2009, 137).

The nature of the Chile–US FTA was shaped by Chile’s designation as the first new adherent to NAFTA, as announced by the US and its NAFTA partners at the 1994 Miami Summit of the Americas. It was envisioned that NAFTA would be incorporated into the FTAA, which would embrace WTO-plus rules and norms which surpassed the achievements of the Uruguay Round. However, the ability of the US to negotiate the FTAA, or for that matter the accession of Chile to NAFTA, was hampered by the systematic veto of the fast-track negotiating legislation by the US Congress until the passage of the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002 (TPA).13 By this time, Chile’s bilateral trade strategy was highly developed. Apart from negotiating separate FTAs with Canada and Mexico in anticipation of NAFTA entry, Chile had negotiated bilateral FTAs with nine other Latin American countries in preparation for the FTAA. Simultaneously, Chile embarked on the aforementioned negotiation of FTAs with much larger global partners, including the EU, South Korea, Japan, China, and India.

With Trade Promotion Authority finally in hand, the first point of busi-ness for the Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR) was the completion of the Chile–US FTA, which enabled the Bush administration to showcase its newly articulated “competitive liberalization” strategy of rewarding neo-liberal reformers and achieving WTO-plus results in these bilateral deals (Quiliconi and Wise 2009). However, in the case of Chile, the US actually had some catching up to do, as the 2005 Chile–EU agreement had been declared by an EU spokesperson to be “the most innovative and ambitious results ever

13 Fast-track/TPA stipulates that the US Congress can vote up or down on a trade agree-ment submitted by the executive branch, but amendments are prohibited once the final bill is sent to Congress.

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negotiated by the EU” (Stallings 2009).14 Whereas overall US FDI to Chile had dropped from 37 per cent of the country’s total FDI in 1994 to 20 per cent in 2003, Spain, in particular, now represented some 18 per cent of FDI inflows in such Chilean service industries as banking/finance, energy, and telecom-munications, all of which had proved quite profitable (Manger 2009, 164).

From the standpoint of the US, competitive liberalization quickly came to denote the goal of establishing a firm toehold in services and FDI, if not ‘first mover’ status, in the FTAs it negotiated with Chile and subsequently Peru, as well as with other countries in the Western Hemisphere.15 Since the Chile–US and Peru–US FTAs were modeled closely on the NAFTA ac-cord, the old trade agenda items within each concerning the elimination of tariffs and opening up of markets are quite similar. One notable exception lies in agriculture, where Chile negotiated a 12-year transition for the re-moval of tariffs and elimination of an import price band system on wheat, wheat flour, and sugar.16 Similarly, Peru retained a 17-year liberalization timeline on sensitive agricultural products, while some 60 per cent of US farm exports to Peru became duty-free automatically.17 Otherwise, these two North-South FTAs conformed to an emerging trend, one where the bulk of all tariff lines are liberalized by year 5 and the remainder by year 10 (Estevadeordal, Shearer and Suominen 2009, 126).

On the new trade agenda, the Chile–US FTA set the precedent of incor-porating labor and environmental standards within the agreement, rather than the side accord format adopted under NAFTA, and Peru followed suit

14 The Chile–EU accord covered goods, services, government procurement, the liberali-zation of investment and capital flows, the protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs), and a binding dispute settlement mechanism (Stallings 2009).

15 Including the US-Central American-Dominican Republic FTA, or CAFTA-DR, and separate FTAs with Panama and Colombia that have yet to be ratified.

16 See Office of the United States Trade Representative, United States – Chile Free Trade Agreement, Final Text, Article 3.16. http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/chile-fta/final-text (accessed 4/24/12),

17 Office of the United States Trade Representative, United States – Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, Final Text. http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/peru-tpa/final-text. (accessed 4/24/12)

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in its FTA with the US.18 Of particular note are the chapters within both FTAs on investment, cross-border trade in services, financial services, telecommunication, electronic commerce, and intellectual property. The negative-list approach is used in both agreements, which means that ev-erything is liberalized unless otherwise marked. In all respects, both FTAS are considered to be WTO/GATS-plus, “the aim being to achieve greater coherence between services and investment disciplines so as to avoid discrepancies in the treatment of investment in goods and services or in the treatment of trade in services under different modes of supply’ (Roy, Marchetti and Lim 2009, 320–321). Alternatively, to put this in GATS/WTO parlance, both the Chile–US and the Peru–US FTAs made giant leaps in terms of higher levels of commitment and enhanced sector coverage within both mode 1 (cross-border supply, or service flows from one WTO member country to another) and mode 3 (commercial presence, whereby a service supplier from one WTO member country establishes a territorial presence in another to provide services via ownership or leasing provisions) under the GATS (Kotschwar 2009, 370; Roy, Marchetti and Lim 2009, 334–35).

In both Chile and Peru, the US won extensive access to professional services (e.g. engineering, accounting, architecture), the local telecommu-nications market, the supply of financial services across the border, and the right of US insurance companies to establish local branches. In both counties, for example, US insurers were allowed to offer marine, aviation, and transport insurance for the first time; in financial services, asset management companies were allowed to offer new instruments, including mutual funds and voluntary savings plans (Roy, Marchetti and Lim 2009, 346–350);19 and in telecom, US suppliers were granted local access in the provision of basic services. However, given the previously mentioned dif-

18 However, the labor and environmental commitments made by Chile and Peru in these separate FTAs with the US are no more binding that those within NAFTA. In all three agreements, each signatory has pledged to uphold their own domestic laws on these non-trade issues which, in the case of NAFTA, have undermined compliance.

19 Also see Office of the United States Trade Representative, United States – Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, Final Text. http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/peru-tpa/final-text. (accessed 4/24/12)

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ferences between the two countries in terms of the overall level of devel-opment, the US addressed this discrepancy by providing Peru with about $58 million in trade capacity building assistance during the negotiating period between 2004 and 2006.

Moreover, although the Peru–US FTA had been approved by the con-gress of both countries in 2007, the Bush administration held up the formal implementation of that agreement until it had received the green light from the USTR with regard to the Peruvian Congress’s ratification of a core package of regulatory measures which conformed with those of the US.20 From the standpoint of Peruvian policymakers the change of admin-istration in the US in January 2009, at the very moment of the launching of the Peru–US FTA, has left some doubt as to US follow-through on trade capacity building, but little ambiguity in terms of US expectations for deep regulatory reform to uphold Peru’s commitments to implementing the new trade agenda (De la Flor 2010, 75). The USTR has, in fact, closely monitored Peru’s compliance, which has been the source of some tension between the two governments.21

4. THE POTENTIAL COSTS AND BENEFITS

Given the steep asymmetries inherent in these parallel North-South FTAs, it is little wonder that they have invoked the wrath of anti-globaliza-tion activists and fair trade proponents, especially with regard to the lesser developed country, Peru. In the case of each country’s FTA with China, it was this same reliance on raw material exports and manufactured/indus-trial imports that gave rise to the theory of “unequal exchange” in Latin America back in the 1950s (Bulmer-Thomas 1994, 298–299; Jenkins 2009, 60). In other words, this heightened dependence of Chile and Peru on a primary export model riddled with possibilities for adverse terms of trade and comparative disadvantage suggests valid cause for concern. At the same

20 This statement is based on my confidential communication with policymakers at the Office of the United States Trade Representative, Washington, DC, September, 2008.

21 See “EE. UU. constatará posible falta a acuerdo commercial con Perú". http://www.bilaterals.org/spip.php?article17949 (accessed 4/24/12)

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time, the clear intention of the US to stake its claim within lucrative sub-sectors of each country’s telecom, insurance and financial services market has raised old 1960s-style dependency hackles concerning imperialism and exploitation (Weiss, Thurbon and Mathews 2004). In a more tempered vein, there is also the longstanding concern as to whether these agreements are trade-creating or trade-diverting and whether they promise Pareto-optimal welfare gains (Balassa 1961). The question which has been raised here is: can these pitfalls inherent in the old and new trade agendas be mitigated via the “à la carte” strategy that Chile and Peru have pursued through parallel FTAs with China and the US?

Despite the challenges, this strategy does offer some promising prospects. Any concerns over possible trade diversion as a result of these FTAs can be dispensed with rather quickly. As the data in Tables 3 and 4 shows, the US percentage share of total Chilean trade has declined over the six-year lifetime of the Chile–US FTA, and the drop in this similar indicator for Peru–US trade has been even more precipitous since the onset of negotiations for the Peru–US FTA in 2004. In contrast to Colombia and Mexico, where well over 50 percent of exports are destined for the US market, both Chile and Peru have now reduced their percentage dependence on the US market down to 10 percent. While some of this declining trade with the US can be accounted for by the growth of each country’s trade ties with China, the latter has occurred in tandem with a brisk-er pace of growth in both Chile’s and Peru’s trade with the rest of the world.

What about the possibilities for investment diversion, given the heavy emphasis of the US FTAs on the new trade agenda? In fact, as table 5 shows, the US ranks a distant third in its FDI flows in both countries, accounting for just 14 per cent of total FDI in Chile in 2010 (versus 25 per cent for Canada and 20 per cent for Mexico) and 15 per cent of total FDI in Peru (versus 21 per cent for Spain and 21 per cent for Great Britain). Whereas US FDI in Chile declined in the 2000s, in Peru it has more or less stagnated over the same time period (see figures 1 and 2).

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Table 5. Sources of Foreign Direct Investment in Chile and Peru

SOURCES OF FDI - CHILE 2010 (FDI INFLOW BY DL600)

Country of Origin Millions of $USD % of Total

Canada 585,88 25,4%

Mexico 478,66 20,8%

United States 324,95 14,1%

Japan 283,92 12,3%

Colombia 279,05 12,1%

Austrialia 102,87 4,5%

Peru 57,50 2,5%

Total FDI in Chile(By DL600) 2.113 100,0%

Total FDI in Chile(All) 18.200

SOURCES OF FDI - PERU 2010

Country of Origin Millions of $USD % of Total

Spain 4.405 21,2%

United Kingdom 4.372 21,0%

United States 3.167 15,2%

Netherland 1.354 6,5%

Chile 1.323 6,4%

Brasil 1.014 4,9%

Panama 931 4,5%

Total FDI in Peru 20.781 100,0%

Source: Chilean Foreign Investment Committee http://www.cinver.cl/ Peru's Private Investment Promotion Agency (ProInversion) http://www.proinversion.gob.pe/

The trade and FDI portrait that emerges between the US with these two South American countries is decidedly different from that of other US FTA partners in the region, such as Mexico or CAFTA-DR. Under NAFTA, for ex-ample, Mexico’s trade dependence on the US has fluctuated between 80-88 per

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cent of its total trade since the launching of NAFTA in 1994,22 and in 2008 the US percentage share of FDI in Mexico, although on the decline, still towered over distant competitors at 41 per cent.23 Since the launching of FTA negotia-tions with CAFTA-DR in 2004-05, US exports to this bloc have expanded by 44 per cent and US FDI has more than doubled; in Costa Rica, alone, US FDI accounted for 63 per cent of that country’s total in 2008.24 In North and Central America, then, concerns over trade and investment diversion, as well as an over-dependence on the US market, may well be justified. However, the data for Chile and Peru suggest a more defensive posture on the part of the US, one where US service investors are lagging behind their competitors, and US policymakers are anxious to stay in the game, rather than calling the shots.

What about the very legitimate claim concerning the risks of asymmetri-cal integration with the US with regard to items on the new trade agenda (Weiss, Thurbon and Mathews, 2004)? Since the advent of NAFTA, the entry into a bilateral FTA with the US has been prized by capital-scarce developing countries as the most expedient way to signal to foreign investors that their commitment to deep economic reform is authentic. The trade-off, of course, has been the willingness of these US FTA partners in Latin America to sign on to the new trade agenda and to the adoption of US regulatory codes and disciplines. Yet while an FTA with the US may still be the ultimate signal for potential investors, both Chile and Peru have managed to leverage invest-ment from multiple sources even prior to implementing an FTA with the US. By liberalizing unilaterally and covering some 90 per cent of their respective

22 Mexico’s trade statistics are published by the Secretariat of the Economy at: http://www.economia.gob.mx/comunidad-negocios/comercio-exterior/informacion-estadistica-y-arancelaria (accessed 4/24/12)m

23 Mexico’s statistics on FDI are published by the Secretariat of the Economy at: http://www.economia.gob.mx/comunidad-negocios/inversion-extranjera-directa/estadistica-oficial-de-ied-en-mexico (accessed 4/24/12)

24 For these export figures go to U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/international/trade/2012/pdf/info0212.pdf. (accessed 4/24/12). For the FDI data go to U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, International Economic Accounts, http://www.bea.gov/internatio-nal/ii_web/timeseries7-2.cfm (accessed 4/24/12)

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trade in FTAs with more developed and competitive partners, these countries have succeeded in diversifying and strengthening their economic ties in ways that have eluded their northern neighbors in the region.

This is not to say that Chile and Peru have avoided the costs of entering into an FTA with the US, but they have certainly managed to spread the risks. Furthermore, for both countries, the China FTA has been another way of hedging. Firstly, as secured access for exports to the US and Chinese markets are a main priority for producers in these countries, as is the attraction of FDI inflows from these mega-economies, the prospect of dynamic gains and lower opportunity costs enabled political leaders in Chile and Peru to finesse the usual collective action standoff over negotiations around the new trade agenda. Secondly, the pursuit of old and new trade issues across the two FTAs transformed the political incentives for public support of these accords, as the perceived net benefits now appeared to credibly exceed the overall costs.

On the upside, in contrast with the revenue losses associated with a re-duction of tariffs on trade in goods, the reduction of barriers in new trade agenda sectors does not lead to a loss of revenue. Moreover, the nature of services liberalization is such that the removal of barriers for suppliers from one country (e.g., the US or Spain) makes it more likely that this increased access will be applied to suppliers from other countries (Roy, Marchetti and Lim 2009, 353–54). Equally important, under the impulse of unilateral and bilateral liberalization across the old and new trade agendas, both Chile and Peru are quickly advancing their own respective positions within the inter-national political economy. For example, on the World Bank’s 2011 Doing Business competitive rankings,25 out of 183 countries, Chile now stands at number 39 and Peru at number 41, versus scores of 114 for Uruguay, 118 for Argentina, and 130 for Brazil.

However, as Rodrik (1992) reminds us, there are always winners and losers from these arrangements and any semblance of success will require that the losers be compensated. As regional leaders in terms of high growth,

25 See World Bank, Doing Business: Measuring Business Regulations, http://www.doingbu-siness.org/ (accessed 4/24/12)

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low inflation, and rock solid macroeconomic management in the 2000s (Porzecanski 2009), and by virtue of having implemented these parallel FTAs, both Chile and Peru have indeed projected the image of dynamic Pacific Rim hubs. Still, there is a downside. On the new trade agenda, although the re-moval of costly domestic restrictions can lead to lower domestic prices and to the extension of market access to country suppliers from outside the FTA, as a first-mover in some of these markets the US is at a distinct advantage. Hence, there is a strong need for sound regulatory oversight and transpar-ency with regard to anti-trust and decision-making practices on licensing applications (Roy, Marchetti and Lim 2009, 353–54). This is especially urgent for Peru, which is still in the process of implementing many of these laws as a result of the aforementioned US demands around the harmonization of codes, disciplines, and business practices.

The effect of these FTAs on old trade agenda sectors represents another dis-tinct downside, as both have placed considerable pressure on small agricultural concerns and local manufacturing industries in Chile and Peru. This includes, for example, Peru’s textile producers or Chile’s mid and high-tech industrial enterprises. In the agricultural sector, the setting of prolonged liberalization timelines and the offering of structural adjustment support has provided somewhat of a cushion from the US FTA, in particular (De la Flor 2010, 70). In the manufacturing sector, given the ferocity with which China has conquered these markets worldwide over the past decade (Gallagher and Porzecanski, 2010), the disruption of these sectors in Chile and Peru is a foregone conclusion with or without an FTA with China. In the Chilean case, the articulated goal is to move more quickly up the innovation curve, including large investments in the kinds of high-tech infrastructure and scientific human capital that would enable the country to fully emerge as a competitive Pacific Rim transport and logistics hub (Barton 2009, 235; Ellis 2009, 42). The pace of Chile’s advances in this realm has been slower than promised by government policy makers. The strongest evidence of the public’s dissatisfaction is the year-long university protests that paralyzed the public universities for most of 2011-12. At heart, Chilean university students are calling for affordable and relevant courses which will enable them to acquire the skills needed to absorb their labor into this strategy of combining comparative advantage based on natural resource

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exports with competitive edge based on the liberalization and modernization of services, and investment is both credible and tenable.

If the Chilean strategy lacks credibility in the eyes of the electorate, Peru is much further behind in this respect. As the country’s 2011 Presidential election showed, the 50 percent or so of Peruvians who perceived themselves as excluded from the gains of trade and buoyant growth over the past decade succeeded in electing a candidate who offered the equivalent of a massive hu-man capital shock. Without the exponentially higher investment in human capital and small businesses promised by newly elected President Ollanta Humala, these two recent FTAs will mean little without a more compelling public policy framework to bolster and complement them.26 Although the country is clearly reaping the benefits of sound macroeconomic reforms and deep liberalization since the early 1990s, it still lacks the necessary micro-economic policies to bring these reforms to full fruition (Wise 2003; De La Flor 2010, 81–2). Taking a page from Chile’s lesson book, this would include: more targeted and vigorous investment in human capital; the equivalent of an investment shock in infrastructure and productive capacities; and an ex-plicit strategy which promotes ties between R&D, private initiative and the adaption of efficiency-enhancing technology, especially within small and me-dium-sized firms. Should Peruvian policymakers lose focus and mistake the implementation of these FTAs as a substitute for continued reform, they will quickly confront the reality that FTAs cannot substitute for the hard work of microeconomic restructuring, institutional renewal and policy innovation.

CONCLUSION

The pattern that has been analyzed here, whereby the respective US bilat-eral FTAs with Chile and Peru target the new trade agenda, and the respec-tive Chinese FTAs with each country focus closely on the old trade agenda, represents an important breakthrough; these two small open developing countries have managed to overcome the collective action standoff which has

26 “UNDP: Regional Inequities Persist in Peru Despite Economic Growth,” Peruvian Times, 23 April 2010.http://www.peruviantimes.com/undp-regional-inequities-persist-in-peru-despite-economic-growth/235865 (accessed 4/24/12)

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stalled the Doha round at the WTO since 2006. Although a multilateral route to trade and investment liberalization would probably offer longer liberaliza-tion timelines and more flexible terms for small open developing countries, the foreclosing of this venue for the time being has rendered bilateralism a second-best option. The ability of Chile and Peru to successfully engage in this bilateral strategy of liberalization à la carte may well represent the more viable path forward for other small developing countries which have consoli-dated macroeconomic reforms and are prepared to take their development strategy to the next level of modernization and competitiveness.

Finally, although I have basically applauded this pattern of pragmatic bi-lateralism from the Latin American standpoint, I conclude with a note of cau-tion. Both Peru and Chile have set their sights on becoming dynamic Pacific Rim hubs. The launching of these bilateral FTAs with the US and China represents an impressive effort to combine a strategy based on comparative advantage and natural resource exports with one based on promoting com-petitive edge via the liberalization and modernization of services and invest-ment. However, the success of these FTAs will rest crucially on the design and implementation of a more pro-active competition policy, one that invests vigorously in human capital, spurs productive investments, increases ties between R&D and private initiative, and promotes the adaption of efficiency-enhancing technology. For Peru more so than Chile, the negotiation of these path breaking FTAs could mean little without a more compelling political commitment and public policy framework to bolster and complement them.

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Cristina Echeverri Pineda y Bibiana Ortega Gómez. Estudiantes de Doctorado en Ciencia Política, Universidad de los Andes.


Reseña del libro Democracias precarias. Trayectorias políticas divergentes en Colombia y Venezuela de Ana María BejaranoBogotá, Uniandes, Departamento de Ciencia Política, 2011, 387 páginas

En su texto Ana María Bejarano compara las trayectorias democráticas de Colombia y Venezuela. El libro es el primer análisis sostenido, sistemá-tico y comparativo del surgimiento y evolución de estas dos democracias (2011, 335), en el cual se hace énfasis en sus diferencias, más que en sus similitudes. En un contexto general, esta investigación comparativa con-tribuye al debate sobre la complejidad de la democracia en América Latina, comprendiendo bajo qué condiciones históricas particulares las democra-cias evolucionan, cambian y perduran.

El objetivo de Bejarano es presentar un análisis desde el institucionalismo histórico, e intenta mostrar cómo las instituciones son mediadoras entre la agencia y la estructura, para entender la construcción de la democracia en Colombia y Venezuela; las variables histórico-institucionales que usa para tal fin son el Estado y los partidos políticos, resaltando que las diferencias en las trayectorias democráticas en estos dos países pueden rastrearse a través de estas instituciones políticas históricamente divergentes. De ese modo, el desarrollo del argumento está marcado por el énfasis en la interacción entre los actores políticos y sus estrategias, y las restricciones y oportunidades que ofrecen las trayectorias históricas.

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La estrategia de investigación utilizada por la autora, y denominada el “principio de Ana Karenina”, se basa en el análisis desagregado de los fac-tores que constituyen los procesos de democratización, para advertir la au-sencia o presencia de algunos de ellos en los casos de Colombia y Venezuela, con el fin de explicar las fuentes de discrepancia entre estas experiencias de transición pactadas. Esta estrategia se encuentra soportada en dos ele-mentos: primero, en el análisis crítico de literatura especializada sobre la democratización, y segundo, en la utilización de marcos de interpretación dados desde la noción de “contingencia estructurada” de Terry Karl y desde el institucionalismo histórico.

Bejarano construye su estructura teórica partiendo de un análisis crítico de la literatura sobre la democratización en América Latina; es por ello que manifiesta que el uso de conceptos como consolidación y calidad democrática es insuficiente para analizar las variaciones entre las democracias, debido a que estas aproximaciones caen en problemas teleológicos y en trampas etnocéntricas, donde las democracias “maduras” y de alta calidad se asocian con la región noroccidental del mundo (2011, 16-17). Así mismo, señala que los estudios acerca de las transiciones a la democracia no ofrecen un marco conceptual que permita analizar la política posterior al cambio de régimen. Después de hacer visibles los límites de estos marcos teóricos para estudiar los casos de Colombia y Venezuela, la autora propone observar con atención el proceso mediante el cual evolucionan las democracias, las trayectorias que siguen; esto con el fin de definir con precisión los aspectos en que se diferen-cian unas de otras. Para cumplir con esta tarea Bejarano desmenuza la noción de democracia y evalúa cómo varían e interactúan distintas dimensiones. En ese escenario teórico, la autora entiende la democratización como un proceso que admite etapas intermedias, momentos de avances y retrocesos, por lo cual prefiere la noción de institucionalización, la cual hace referencia a la democratización como un proceso conflictivo donde no necesariamente la democracia es resistente y autosostenible (2001, 19).

El análisis se concentra en tres coyunturas: el momento de la consolida-ción del Estado central, las transiciones similares a la democracia en los años cincuenta y sus crisis democráticas a finales de siglo XX. El texto se divide en tres partes. En la primera Bejarano explica que las diferencias entre Colombia

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y Venezuela no pueden explicarse a partir de sus condiciones estructurales, es decir, como resultado del desarrollo económico –exportación de petróleo en Venezuela y café en Colombia–, sino desde las condiciones particulares de formación del Estado y de los partidos políticos. En la segunda sección mues-tra que el desenlace de las “democracias pactadas” depende de los actores incluidos en el pacto, la naturaleza de las restricciones sobre las interacciones políticas durante el pacto y el afianzamiento de dichas restricciones en los di-seños constitucionales; la conjugación de estos elementos tiene consecuencias diversas para el futuro desenvolvimiento de las democracias, como lo ejempli-fican Colombia y Venezuela. Y, finalmente, en la tercera parte Bejarano señala que a pesar de transiciones simultáneas respecto a la democracia, estos países padecieron crisis democráticas a finales del siglo XX, aunque por razones di-ferentes. En Colombia, la crisis se caracterizó por el aumento de la violencia política y la persistencia de la abstención electoral, así como la infiltración del narcotráfico en la política. En Venezuela, la estabilidad democrática se vio rota por los intentos fallidos de reestructuración económica en la década de los noventa, dos intentos de golpe militar, la destitución y encarcelamien-to de un presidente elegido, el colapso del sistema de partidos, la llegada al poder de un coronel ex golpista y el cambio radical en las instituciones del país (2011, 297). En síntesis, en Colombia la crisis obedeció a la debilidad del Estado y la herencia del pacto del Frente Nacional; en Venezuela, por su parte, la centralidad del Estado fue la causa de su crisis (2011, 339).

El texto ofrece algunos contenidos ambiciosos para la discusión y que deben ponerse a prueba en futuros análisis sobre procesos de democratiza-ción en América Latina: primero, el concepto de institucionalización demo-crática como factor explicativo de las trayectorias políticas divergentes de los Estados; segundo, la reconsideración de las concepciones genéricas de los pactos políticos entendiéndolos como legados institucionales que dieron lugar y forma a las transiciones democráticas, y como variables explicativas del proceso de democratización; por último, el reconocimiento de la historia política y la historia institucional comparada como estrategias analíticas para acercarse al desarrollo histórico de las instituciones políticas, enfa-tizando en la temporalidad, la secuencia, el surgimiento y los patrones de consolidación de dichas instituciones.

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Para entender las diferencias entre Colombia y Venezuela, la autora ofrece tres resultados divergentes sobre los que basa su comparación: primero, el grado de control civil de los militares y los límites impuestos a la influencia militar en relación con las decisiones políticas; segundo, la capacidad del Estado para neutralizar e incorporar a los contendores situados en la oposi-ción; tercero, la consolidación de un sistema de partidos políticos competitivo e incluyente (2011, 13-14).

Sin embargo, estos tres resultados divergentes parecen omitir la historia política no institucional. Es decir, al limitar la historia política al Estado y a los partidos políticos, se da por hecho que son los únicos actores que han participado en los procesos de institucionalización democrática; si –como lo señala Bejarano– la institucionalización es un proceso de ires y venires, habría que incorporar al análisis otros agentes que inciden en el desarrollo institucional, ya sea cooperando con él o cuestionándolo. En este sentido, li-mitar la historia política al Estado y a los partidos políticos da por hecho que estos agentes tienen una presencia nacional homogénea y supone que éstos representan los diversos intereses de la sociedad, lo cual puede variar si se analiza en los ámbitos regional y local.

En suma, el texto presenta una argumentación que busca, primero, realzar el valor de la historia política como fuente de relaciones causales con un impac-to de largo plazo; segundo, destacar el valor de las instituciones políticas como el resultado de procesos en los que los actores políticos interactúan con insti-tuciones y estructuras moldeando, en consecuencia, sus estrategias (Bejarano 2011); y tercero, involucrar de una manera novedosa y provocativa el institucio-nalismo histórico en el actual debate de la democratización en América Latina.

Colombia Internacional No. 75

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