COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY IN SOCIAL ONTOLOGY Corrado Roversi University of Bologna Faculty of Law...

COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY IN SOCIAL ONTOLOGY

Corrado RoversiUniversity of Bologna Faculty of Law

[email protected]

EUROPEAN UNIVERSITYINSTITUTE

DECEMBER 12, 2012

Institutional facts

Rule-dependent

A complex institutional fact such as:

«Last week Prime Minister Monti said he is going to resign after Berlusconi announced that he intends to be the right-wing candidate for premiership. President Napolitano is trying to

ensure the Government’s stability until some laws crucial for the financial stability of the State are passed by the Parliament.

After Monti’s resignation, elections will very likely be called in February 2013.»

presupposes rules about elections, Prime minister, President, laws, resignations.

Constitutive rules

X counts as Y in context C

and

Y has normative outcome(s) or status functions Z

Institutional facts

Rule-dependentConstitutive rules

DOES THIS THEORY AMOUNT TO AN ONTOLOGY OF

INSTITUTIONAL FACTS?

NOT WITHOUT AN ONTOLOGY OF RULES

Collective Intentionality

Institutional facts

Rule-dependentConstitutive rules

DOES THIS THEORY AMOUNT TO AN ONTOLOGY OF

INSTITUTIONAL FACTS?

NOT WITHOUT AN ONTOLOGY OF RULES

Collective Intentionality

We collectively intend (and/or accept) that:

X counts as Y in context C and

Y has normative outcome(s) or status functions Z

THREE CONCEPTIONS OF COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY

Collective intentionality as a biologically primitive mental

phenomenon in the form of We

SEARLE

Collective intentionality as a network of mutual

beliefs

BRATMAN, TUOMELAGILBERT, MILLER

Collective intentionality as the outcome of a collectivization of

reason

PETTIT

COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY AND MUTUAL BELIEFS

I intend that we X, and believe that you intend that we X, and

believe that you believe that we

intend that we X, and believe that you

believe that I believe that we intend that

we X …

I intend that we X, and believe that you

intend that we X, and believe that you believe that we



we X …

Collective intentionality as a network of

intentions and mutual beliefs



As member of group g, I intend that p, and

believe that you intend that p, and

believe (or at least am disposed to believe) that we

mutually believe that p …

Collective intentionality as a We-mode we

attitude

RAIMO TUOMELA

We-mode intentions

Fixed vs. iterative mutual beliefs

Explicit agreement: collective intention

vs. co-intention


As member of group g, I intentionally express

my willingness to jointly do or accept p together with the other members of g, believe

that you have expressed your

willingness, believe that you believe that I

have expressed my willingness…

Collective intentionality as the intention/belief

of a plural subject

MARGARETH GILBERT

The group may believe/intend that p

even if no one believes/intend that p. Believing/intending as member of a group vs. believing/intending

as an individual.

Communicative act (even if not explicit) at the root of a plural subject: normative

dimension

«Group belief» meaningful at least as

a metaphor


I intend that we j because I and you intend

that we j by means of meshing subplans, and I

believe that you intend that we j because you and

I intend that we j by means of meshing

subplans, and I believe that you believe that I

intend that we j because ….

Collective intentionality as a shared intention

having a shared cooperative activity as

its outcome

MICHAEL BRATMAN

Part of the concept of a shared intention is that the effectiveness of

your intention is included in the content

of my intentionWhat makes a shared

intention different from a mere joint intention is

a commitment to mutual support

Reductive analysis in terms of individual

intentions


I intentionally perform x, if and only if I believe that you have performed

or will perform x, in order to realise end e, and I (truly) believe that you intentionally perform x,

under the same conditions, in order to

realise end e, and I (truly) believe that you believe

that I believe…..

«Collective intentionality» not as a shared

intention but as a shared end

SEUMAS MILLER

«Behaviourism»: Insistence on the

actual regularity in action – Less

importance to the actual intention as an

occurring mental stateTheleological

account: What is relevant is the shared end, which in the case of institutions is always

a moral good - NormativityEven more reductive

analysis in terms of individual intentions






we X …

Collective intentionality as a network of

intentions and mutual beliefs


Some of the open questions are:

Cognitive overload

Individualism vs. collectivism

Tacit/dispositional vs. explicit

Normativity


Collective intentionality as a biologically primitive mental

phenomenon in the form of We

SEARLE





we X …

We intend that X

Intentionality «in the plural»: a biologically primitive phenomenon

Radical internalism: something that even a «brain in a vat» could

haveCollective recognition

is weaker than collective action: «a

continuum from enthusiastic

endorsement to just going along with the

structure»


The group, as an intentional subject,

intends that X

No intentionality without rationality:

reason must be collectivized over the

actual preferences of individuals in order to have genuine collective

intentionalityTypically, purposive

groups must collectivize reason in this way.

Collective intentionality as the outcome of a collectivization of

reason

PETTIT

Groups that collectivize reason are institutional

persons and thus subject to epistemic

rationality.

COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY IN SOCIAL ONTOLOGY Corrado Roversi University of Bologna Faculty of Law...

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