COLLECTIVE BARGAINING1. University of Pangasinan vs. NLRC, 218 SCRA 65 2013 CASE.. CANNOT BE SEARCH 2. UST Faculty union vs. Bitonio, BLR/MarioGRN 131235 November 16, 1999Panganiban, J.:FACTS:Private respondent Mario et al are duly elected officer of UST faculty. The union has a 5-year CBA with its employer and is set to expire on May 31,1998. On September 21, 1996, Sec Gen of the union posted a general assembly announcement to be held on October 5, 1996. Various UST club presidents requested a general faculty assembly thus union and non-union faculty members convened. New set of officers were elected, violative of the CBL and that GA was held with the attendance of non-union members. Current union officers were served with a notice to vacate the union office as new set of offices were already elected. CBA was likewise ratified by an overwhelming majority. Mad-Arbiter declared the election conducted was violative of the unions CBL. BLR Director Bitonio upheld the decision with a ruling that the CBL which constituted the covenant between the union and its members, could not be suspended during the general assembly of all faculty members, since it had not been authorized by the union.ISSUE:Whether or not the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to recognize the officers elected during the general assembly.RULING:Self-organization is a fundamental right guaranteed by the constitution and labor Code. Corollary to this right is the prerogative not to join, affiliate with or assist a labor union. Therefore, to become a union member, an employee must not only signify the intent to become one but also take some positive steps to realize that intent. The procedure for union membership is usually embodied in the unions CBL. An employee who becomes a union member acquires the rights and the concomitant obligations that go with the new status and becomes bound by the unions rules and regulations.vUnion election hold pursuant to the unions CBL, and the right to vote in it is enjoyed only by union members.vCertification election is the process of determining, thorough secret ballot, the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit for the purpose of collective bargaining the purpose to ascertain whether or not a majority of the employees wish to be represented by a labor organization and by which particular labor organization.3. Benjamin Vidoriano Vs Elizalde Rope Workers union GR No. L-25246 September 12 1974FACTS: Benjamin victoriano a member of iglesia ni cristo had been in the employ of the Elizalde Rope factory Inc since 1958. Her was a member of elizalde rope workers union which had with the company a CBA containing a closed shop provision which reads as follow Membership union shall be required as a condition of employment for all permanent employees worker covered by this agreement. RA 3350 was enacted introducing an amendment to paragraph (4) subsection (a) of section 4 of RA 875 as follows but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sect which prohibit affiliation of their member in any such 0labor organization Benjamin victoriano presents his resignation to appellant union thereupon the union wrote a formal letter to separate the appellee from the service in view of the fact that he was resigning from the union as member of the company notified the apellee and his counsel that unless the appellee could achieve a satisfactory arrangement with the union the company would be constrained to dismiss him from the service . this prompted appellee to file an action for injunction to enjoin the company and the union from dismissing apallee.

ISSUE: WON RA 3350 is unconstitutional

HELD: the constitution provision only prohibits legislation for the support of any religious tenets or the modes of worship of any sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the chosen form of religion within limits of utmost amplitude. RA 3350 does not require as a qualification on condition in joining any lawful association membership in any particular religion on in any religious sect neither does the act requires affiliation with a religious sect that prohibits its member from joining a labor union as a condition on qualification for withdrawing from labor union RA 3350 only exempts member with such religious affililiation from the required to do a positive act to exercise the right to join or to resign from the union. He is exempted from form the coverage of any closed shop agreement that a labor union may have entered into. Therefore RA 3350 is never an illegal evasion of constitutional provision or prohibition to accomplish a desired result which is lawful in itself by vering or following a legal way to do it.4. FULLTEXT G.R. No. 93468 December 29, 1994NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF TRADE UNIONS (NATU)-REPUBLIC PLANTERS BANK SUPERVISORS CHAPTER,petitioner,vs.HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and REPUBLIC PLANTERS BANK,respondents.Filemon G. Tercero for petitioner.The Government Corporate Counsel for Republic Planters Bank.BELLOSILLO,J.:NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF TRADE UNIONS (NATU)-REPUBLIC PLANTERS BANK SUPERVISORS CHAPTER seeks nullification of the decision of public respondent Secretary of Labor dated 23 March 1990, which modified the order of Med-Arbiter Manases T. Cruz dated 17 August 1989 as well as his order dated 20 April 1990 denying reconsideration.On 17 March 1989, NATU filed a petition for certification election to determine the exclusive bargaining representative of respondent Bank's employees occupying supervisory positions. On 24 April 1989, the Bank moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the supposed supervisory employees were actually managerial and/or confidential employees thus ineligible to join, assist or form a union, and that the petition lacked the 20% signatory requirement under the Labor Code.On 17 August 1989, Med-Arbiter Manases T. Cruz granted the petition thus WHEREFORE, . . . let a certification election be ordered conducted among all the regular employees of the Republic Planters Bank occupying supervisory positions or the equivalent within 20 days from receipt of a copy of this Order. The choice shall be: (1) National Association of Trade Unions (NATU)-Republic Planters Bank Supervisors Chapter; and (2) No Union.The payroll three months prior to the filing of this petition shall be utilized in determining the list of eligible voters . . . .1Respondent Bank appealed the order to the Secretary of Labor on the main ground that several of the employees sought to be included in the certification election, particularly the Department Managers, Branch Managers/OICs, Cashiers and Controllers were managerial and/or confidential employees and thus ineligible to join, assist or form a union. It presented annexes detailing the job description and duties of the positions in question and affidavits of certain employees. It also invoked provisions of the General Banking Act and the Central Bank Act to show the duties and responsibilities of the bank and its branches.On 23 March 1990, public respondent issued a decision partially granting the appeal, which is now being challenged before us WHEREFORE, . . . the appeal is hereby partially granted. Accordingly, the Order dated 17 August 1989 is modified to the extent that Department Managers, Assistant Managers, Branch Managers, Cashiers and Controllers are declared managerial employees. Perforce, they cannot join the union of supervisors such as Division Chiefs, Accounts Officers, Staff Assistants and OIC's (sic) unless the latter are regular managerial employees . . . .2NATU filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied on 20 April 1990.3Hence this recourse assailing public respondent for rendering the decision of 23 March 1990 and the order of 20 April 1990 both with grave abuse of discretion.The crucial issue presented for our resolution is whether the Department Managers, Assistant Managers, Branch Managers/OICs, Cashiers and Controllers of respondent Bank are managerial and/or confidential employees hence ineligible to join or assist the union of petitioner.NATU submits that an analysis of the decision of public respondent readily yields certain flaws that result in erroneous conclusions. Firstly, a branch does not enjoy relative autonomy precisely because it is treated as one unit with the head office and has to comply with uniform policies and guidelines set by the bank itself. It would be absurd if each branch of a particular bank would be adopting and implementing different policies covering multifarious banking transactions. Moreover, respondent Bank's own evidence clearly shows that policies and guidelines covering the various branches are set by the head office. Secondly, there is absolutely no evidence showing that bank policies are laid down through the collective action of the Branch Manager, the Cashier and the Controller. Thirdly, the organizational setup where the Branch Manager exercises control over branch operations, the Controller controls the Accounting Division, and the Cashier controls the Cash Division, is nothing but a proper delineation of duties and responsibilities. This delineation is a Central Bank prescribed internal control measure intended to objectively establish responsibilities among the officers to easily pinpoint culpability in case of error. The "dual control" and "joint custody" aspects mentioned in the decision of public respondent are likewise internal control measures prescribed by the Central Bank.Neither is there evidence showing that subject employees are vested with powers or prerogatives to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees. The bare allegations in the affidavits of respondent Bank's Executive Assistant to the President4and the Senior Manager of the Human Resource Management Department5that those powers and prerogatives are inherent in subject positions are self-serving. Their claim cannot be made to prevail upon the actual duties and responsibilities of subject employees.The other evidence of respondent Bank which purports to show that subject employees exercise managerial functions even belies such claim. Insofar as Department Managers and Assistant Managers are concerned, there is absolutely no reason mentioned in the decision why they are managerial employees. Not even respondent Bank in its appeal questioned the inclusion of Assistant Managers among the qualified petitioning employees. Public respondent has deviated from the real issue in this case, which is, the determination of whether subject employees are managerial employees within the contemplation of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 6715; instead, he merely concentrated on the nature, conduct and management of banks conformably with the General Banking Act and the Central Bank Act.Petitioner concludes that subject employees are not managerial employees but supervisors. Even assuming that they are confidential employees, there is no legal prohibition against confidential employees who are not performing managerial functions to form and join a union.On the other hand, respondent Bank maintains that the Department Managers, Branch Managers, Cashiers and Controllers are inherently possessed of the powers enumerated in Art. 212, par. (m), of the Labor Code. It relies heavily on the affidavits of its Executive Assistant to the President and Senior Manager of the Human Resource Department. The Branch Managers, Cashiers and Controllers are vested not only with policy-making powers necessary to run the affairs of the branch, given the independence and relative autonomy which it enjoys in the pursuit of its goals and objectives, but also with the concomitant disciplinary authority over the employees.The Solicitor General argues that NATU loses sight of the fact that by virtue of the appeal of respondent Bank, the whole case is thrown open for consideration by public respondent. Even errors not assigned in the appeal, such as the exclusion by the Med-Arbiter of Assistant Managers from the managerial employees category, is within his discretion to consider as it is closely related to the errors properly assigned. The fact that Department Managers are managerial employees is borne out by the evidence of petitioner itself. Furthermore, while it assails public respondent's finding that subject employees are managerial employees, petitioner never questioned the fact that said officers also occupy confidential positions and thus remain prohibited from forming or joining any labor organization.Respondent Bank has no legal personality to move for the dismissal of the petition for certification election on the ground that its supervisory employees are in reality managerial employees. An employer has no standing to question the process since this is the sole concern of the workers. The only exception is where the employer itself has to file the petition pursuant to Art. 258 of the Labor Code because of a request to bargain collectively.6Public respondent, invoking RA 6715 and the inherent functions of Department Managers, Assistant Managers, Branch Managers, Cashiers and Controllers, held that these officers properly fall within the definition of managerial employees. The ratiocination in his Decision of 23 March 19907is that Republic Act No. 6715, otherwise known as the Herrera-Veloso Law, restored the right of supervisors to form their own unions while maintaining the proscription on the right to self-organization of managerial employees. Accordingly, the Labor Code, as amended, distinguishes managerial, supervisory and rank-and-file employees thus:Art. 212 (m) Managerial employeeis one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees.Supervisoryemployees are those who, in the interest of the employer, effectively recommend such managerial actions, if the exercise of such managerial authority is not routinary in nature but requires the use of independent judgment.All employees notfalling within any of the above definitions are considered rank-and-file employees (emphasis supplied).At first glance, pursuant to the above-definitions and based on their job descriptions as guideposts, there would seem to be no difficulty in distinguishing a managerial employee from that of a supervisor, or from that of a mere rank-and-file employee. Yet, this task takes on a different dimension when applied to banks, particularly the branches thereof. This is so because unlike ordinary corporations, a bank's organizational operation is governed and regulated by the General Banking Act and the Central Bank Act, both special laws . . . .As pointed out by the respondent, in the banking industry, a branch is the microcosm of a banking institution, uniquely autonomous andself-governing.This relative autonomy of a branch finds legal basis in Section 27 of the General Banking Act, as amended, thus:. . . . The bank shall be responsible for all business conducted in such branches to the same extent and in the same manner as though such business had all been conducted in the head office.For the purpose of this Act, a bank and its branches shall be treated as a unit(emphasis supplied).Conformably with the above, bank policies are laid down and/or executed through the collective action of the Branch Manager, Cashier and Controller at the branch level. The Branch Manager exercises over-all control and supervision over branch operation being on the top of the branch's pyramid structure. However, both the controller and the cashier who are called in banking parlance as "Financial Managers" due to their fiscal functions are given such a share and sphere of responsibility in the operations of the bank. The cashier controls and supervises the cash division while the controller that of the Accounting Division. Likewise, their assigned task is of great significance, without which a bank or branch for that matter cannot operate or function.Through the collective action of these three branch officers operational transactions are carried out like: The two (2)-signature requirement of the manager, on one hand, and that of the controller or cashier on the other hand as required in bank's issuances and releases. This is the so-called "dual control" through check-and-balance as prescribed by the Central Bank, per Section 1166.6, Book I, Manual of Regulations for Banks and Financial Intermediaries. Another is in the joint custody of the branch's cash in vault, accountable forms, collaterals, documents of title, deposit, ledgers and others, among the branch manager and at least two (2) officers of the branch as required under Section 1166.6 of the Manual of Regulations for Banks and Other Financial Intermediaries.This structural set-up creates atriad of managerial authority among the branch manager, cashier and controller. Hence, no officer of the bank ". . . have (sic) complete authority and responsibility for handling all phases of any transaction from beginning to end without some control or balance from some other part of the organization" (Section 1166.3, Division of Duties and Responsibilities,Ibid).This aspect in the banking system which calls for the division of duties and responsibilities is a clear manifestation of managerial power and authority. No operational transaction at branch level is carried out by the singular act of the Branch Manager but rather through the collective act of the Branch Manager, Cashier/Controller (emphasis supplied).Noteworthy is the "on call client" set up in banks. Under this scheme, the branch manager is tasked with the responsibility of business development and marketing of the bank's services which place him on client call. During such usual physical absences from the branch, the cashier assumes the reins of branch control and administration. On those occasions, the "dual control system" is clearly manifest in the transactions and operations of the branch bank as it will then require the necessary joint action of the controller and the cashier.The grave abuse of discretion committed by public respondent is at once apparent. Art. 212, par. (m), of the Labor Code is explicit. A managerial employee is (a) one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies, or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees; or (b) one who is vested with both powers or prerogatives. A supervisory employee is different from a managerial employee in the sense that the supervisory employee, in the interest of the employer,effectively recommendssuch managerial actions, if the exercise of such managerial authority is not routinary in nature but requires the use of independent judgment.Ranged against these definitions and after a thorough examination of the evidence submitted by both parties, we arrive at a contrary conclusion. Branch Managers, Cashiers and Controllers of respondent Bank are not managerial employees but supervisory employees. The finding of public respondent that bank policies are laid down and/or executed through the collective action of these employees is simply erroneous. His discussion on the division of their duties and responsibilities does not logically lead to the conclusion that they are managerial employees, as the term is defined in Art. 212, par. (m).Among the general duties and responsibilities of a Branch Manager is "[t]o discharge his duties and authority with a high sense of responsibility and integrity and shall at all times be guided by prudence like a good father of the family, and sound judgmentin accordance with and within the limitations of the policy/policies promulgated by the Board of Directors and implemented by the Managementuntil suspended, superseded, revoked or modified" (par. 5, emphasis supplied).8Similarly, the job summary of a Controller states: "Supervises the Accounting Unit of the branch;sees to the compliance by the Branch with established procedures, policies, rules and regulations of the Bank and external supervising authorities; sees to the strict implementation of control procedures (emphasis supplied).9The job description of a Cashier does not mention any authority on his part to lay down policies, either.10On the basis of the foregoing evidence, it is clear that subject employees do not participate in policy-making but are given approved and established policies to execute and standard practices to observe,11leaving little or no discretion at all whether to implement said policies or not.12It is the nature of the employee's functions, and not the nomenclature or title given to his job, which determines whether he has rank-and-file, supervisory or managerial status.13Moreover, the bare statement in the affidavit of the Executive Assistant to the President of respondent Bank that the Branch Managers, Cashiers and Controllers "formulate and implement the plans, policies and marketing strategies of the branch towards the successful accomplishment of its profit targets and objectives,"14is contradicted by the following evidence submitted by respondent Bank itself:(a) Memorandum issued by respondent Bank's Assistant Vice President to all Regional Managers and Branch Managers giving them temporary discretionary authority to grant additional interest over the prescribed board rates for both short-term and long-term CTDs subject, however, to specific limitations and guidelines set forth in the same memorandum;15(b) Memorandum issued by respondent Bank's Executive Vice President to all Regional Managers and Branch Officers regarding the policy and guidelines on drawing against uncollected deposits (DAUD);16(c) Memorandum issued by respondent Bank's President to all Field Offices regarding the guidelines on domestic bills purchased(DBP);17and(d) Memorandum issued by the same officer to all Branch Managers regarding lending authority at the branch level and the terms and conditions thereof.18As a consequence, the affidavit of the Executive Assistant cannot be given any weight at all.Neither do the Branch Managers, Cashiers and Controllers have the power to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees. The Senior Manager of the Human Resource Management Department of respondent Bank, in her affidavit, stated that "the power to hire, fire, suspend, transfer, assign or otherwise impose discipline among subordinates within their respective jurisdictions is lodged with the heads of the various departments, the branch managers and officers-in-charge, the branch cashiers and the branch controllers. Inherent as it is in the aforementioned positions, the authority to hire, fire, suspend, transfer, assign or otherwise discipline employees within their respective domains was deemed unnecessary to be incorporated in their individual job descriptions; By way of illustration, on August 24, 1989, Mr. Renato A. Tuates, the Officer-in-Charge/Branch Cashier of the Bank's Dumaguete Branch, placed under preventive suspension and thereafter terminated the teller of the same branch . . . . Likewise, on February 22, 1989, Mr. Francis D. Robite, Sr., the Officer-in-Charge of International Department, assigned the cable assistant of the International Department as the concurrent FCDU Accountable Forms Custodian."19However, a close scrutiny of the memorandum of Mr. Tuates reveals that he does not have said managerial power because as plainly stated therein, it was issued "upon instruction from Head Office."20With regard to the memorandum of Mr. Robite, Sr., it appears that the power he exercised was merely in an isolated instance, taking into account the other evidence submitted by respondent Bank itself showing lack of said power by other Branch Managers/OICs:(a) Memorandum from the Branch Manager for theAVP-Manpower Management Department expressing the opinion that a certain employee, due to habitual absenteeism and tardiness, must be penalized in accordance with respondent Bank's Code of Discipline; and(b) Memorandum from a Branch OIC for the Assistant Vice President recommending a certain employee's promotional adjustment to the present position he occupies.Clearly, those officials or employees possess only recommendatory powers subject to evaluation, review and final action by higher officials. Therefore, the foregoing affidavit cannot bolster the stand of respondent Bank.The positions of Department Managers and Assistant Managers were also declared by public respondent as managerial, without providing any basis therefor. Petitioner asserts that the position of Assistant Manager was not even included in the appeal filed by respondent Bank. While we agree with the Office of the Solicitor General that it is within the discretion of public respondent to consider an unassigned issue that is closely related to an issue properly assigned, still, public respondent's error lies in the fact that his finding has no leg to stand on. Anyway, inasmuch as the entire records are before us, now is the opportunity to discuss this issue.We analyzed the evidence submitted by respondent Bank in support of its claim that Department Managers are managerial employees21and concluded that they are not. Like Branch Managers, Cashiers and Controllers, Department Managers do not possess the power to lay down policies nor to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees. They occupy supervisory positions, charged with the duty among others to "recommend proposals to improve and streamline operations."22With respect to Assistant Managers, there is absolutely no evidence submitted to substantiate public respondent's finding that they are managerial employees; understandably so, because this position is not included in the appeal of respondent Bank.As regards the other claim of respondent Bank that Branch Managers/OICs, Cashiers and Controllers are confidential employees, having control, custody and/or access to confidential matters, e.g., the branch's cash position, statements of financial condition, vault combination, cash codes for telegraphic transfers, demand drafts and other negotiable instruments,23pursuant to Sec. 1166.4 of the Central Bank Manual regarding joint custody,24this claim is not even disputed by petitioner. A confidential employee is one entrusted with confidence on delicate matters, or with the custody, handling, or care and protection of the employer's property.25While Art. 245 of the Labor Code singles out managerial employees as ineligible to join, assist or form any labor organization, under thedoctrine of necessary implication, confidential employees are similarly disqualified. This doctrine states that what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed, as elucidated in several cases26the latest of which isChua v. Civil Service Commission27where we said:No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details involved in its application. There is always an omission that may not meet a particular situation. What is thought, at the time of enactment, to be an all-embracing legislation may be inadequate to provide for the unfolding events of the future. So-called gaps in the law develop as the law is enforced. One of the rules of statutory construction used to fill in the gap is the doctrine of necessary implication . . . . Every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms.Ex necessitatelegis. . . .In applying thedoctrine of necessary implication, we took into consideration the rationale behind the disqualification of managerial employees expressed inBulletin Publishing Corporation v. Sanchez,28thus: ". . . if these managerial employees would belong to or be affiliated with a Union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty to the Union in view of evident conflict of interests. The Union can also become company-dominated with the presence of managerial employees in Union membership." Stated differently, in the collective bargaining process, managerial employees are supposed to be on the side of the employer, to act as its representatives, and to see to it that its interests are well protected. The employer is not assured of such protection if these employees themselves are union members. Collective bargaining in such a situation can become one-sided.29It is the same reason that impelled this Court to consider the position of confidential employees as included in the disqualification found in Art. 245 as if the disqualification of confidential employees were written in the provision. If confidential employees could unionize in order to bargain for advantages for themselves, then they could be governed by their own motives rather than the interest of the employers. Moreover, unionization of confidential employees for the purpose of collective bargaining would mean the extension of the law to persons or individuals who are supposed to act "in the interest of" the employers.30It is not farfetched that in the course of collective bargaining, they might jeopardize that interest which they are duty-bound to protect. Along the same line of reasoning we held inGolden Farms, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja31reiterated inPhilips Industrial Development, Inc. v. NLRC,32that "confidential employees such as accounting personnel, radio and telegraph operators who, having access to confidential information, may become the source of undue advantage. Said employee(s) may act as spy or spies of either party to a collective bargaining agreement."In fine, only the Branch Managers/OICs, Cashiers and Controllers of respondent Bank, being confidential employees, are disqualified from joining or assisting petitioner Union, or joining, assisting or forming any other labor organization. But this ruling should be understood to apply only to the present case based on the evidence of the parties, as well as to those similarly situated. It should not be understood in any way to apply to banks in general.WHEREFORE, the petition is partially GRANTED. The decision of public respondent Secretary of Labor dated 23 March 1990 and his order dated 20 April 1990 are MODIFIED, hereby declaring that only the Branch Managers/OICs, Cashiers and Controllers of respondent Republic Planters Bank are ineligible to join or assist petitioner National Association of Trade Unions (NATU)-Republic Planters Bank Supervisors Chapter, or join, assist or form any other labor organization.SO ORDERED.Davide, Jr., Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.Separate OpinionsPADILLA,J.,concurring and dissenting:I concur in the majority opinion's conclusion that respondent Bank's Branch Managers/OICs, Cashiers and Controllers, being confidential employees of the Bank, are disqualified from joining or assisting petitioner labor union or joining, assisting or forming any other labor organization, including a supervisor's union.However, I dissent from its conclusion that respondent Bank's Department Managers and Department Assistant Managers are not disqualified from joining a labor union including a supervisors' union. My years of experience in the banking industry (perhaps irrelevant to this case) have shown that positions of such Department Heads (Managers) are as confidential, if not more, than the position of Branch Managers. In fact, most of such Department Heads are Vice-Presidents of the Bank, which underscores their status both as managerial employees and confidential personnel of the Bank. It would be incongruous for a Department Manager who, as already stated, is usually a Vice-President, to be a member of the same labor organization as his messenger or supervisory account executives. It would be even more untenable and dangerous for a Department Manager who usually is a Vice-President, being a member of a labor union, to be designated a union representative for purposes of collective bargaining with the management of which he is a part. I think the public respondent is correct in disqualifying from membership in a labor union of supervisors, those who are Department Managers and Assistant Managers.I, therefore, vote for the affirmancein totoof public respondent's decision of 23 March 1990 and order of 20 April 1990.#Separate OpinionsPADILLA,J.,concurring and dissenting:I concur in the majority opinion's conclusion that respondent Bank's Branch Managers/OICs, Cashiers and Controllers, being confidential employees of the Bank, are disqualified from joining or assisting petitioner labor union or joining, assisting or forming any other labor organization, including a supervisor's union.However, I dissent from its conclusion that respondent Bank's Department Managers and Department Assistant Managers are not disqualified from joining a labor union including a supervisors' union. My years of experience in the banking industry (perhaps irrelevant to this case) have shown that positions of such Department Heads (Managers) are as confidential, if not more, than the position of Branch Managers. In fact, most of such Department Heads are Vice-Presidents of the Bank, which underscores their status both as managerial employees and confidential personnel of the Bank. It would be incongruous for a Department Manager who, as already stated, is usually a Vice-President, to be a member of the same labor organization as his messenger or supervisory account executives. It would be even more untenable and dangerous for a Department Manager who usually is a Vice-President, being a member of a labor union, to be designated a union representative for purposes of collective bargaining with the management of which he is a part. I think the public respondent is correct in disqualifying from membership in a labor union of supervisors, those who are Department Managers and Assistant Managers.I, therefore, vote for the affirmancein totoof public respondent's decision of 23 March 1990 and order of 20 April 1990.

5. SAN MIGUEL UNION VS.LAGUESMAG.R. No. 110399 August 15, 1997SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION SUPERVISORS AND EXEMPT UNION AND ERNESTO L. PONCE, President V. HONORABLE BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA IN HIS CAPACITY AS UNDERSECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, HONORABLE DANILO L. REYNANTE IN HIS CAPACITY AS MED-ARBITER AND SAN MIGUEL CORPORATIONFACTS: Petitioner union filed before DOLE a Petition for Direct Certification or Certification Election among the supervisors and exempt employees of the SMC Magnolia Poultry Products Plants of Cabuyao, San Fernando and Otis.Med-Arbiter Danilo L. Reynante issued an Order ordering the conduct of certification election among the abovementioned employees of the different plants as one bargaining unit.San Miguel Corporation filed a Notice of Appeal with Memorandum on Appeal, pointing out, among others, the Med-Arbiters error in grouping together all three (3) separate plants, into one bargaining unit, and in including supervisory levels 3 and above whose positions are confidential in nature.The public respondent, Undersecretary Laguesma, granted respondent companys Appeal and ordered the remand of the case to the Med-Arbiter of origin for determination of the true classification of each of the employees sought to be included in the appropriate bargaining unit.Upon petitioner-unions motion, Undersecretary Laguesma granted the reconsideration prayed for and directed the conduct of separate certification elections among the supervisors ranked as supervisory levels 1 to 4 (S1 to S4) and the exempt employees in each of the three plants at Cabuyao, San Fernando and Otis.ISSUE:1. Whether Supervisory employees 3 and 4 and the exempt employees of the company are considered confidential employees, hence ineligible from joining a union.2. If they are not confidential employees, do the employees of the three plants constitute an appropriate single bargaining unit.RULING:(1) On the first issue, this Court rules that said employees do not fall within the term confidential employees who may be prohibited from joining a union.They are not qualified to be classified as managerial employees who, under Article 245 of the Labor Code, are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization. In the very same provision, they are not allowed membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate labor organizations of their own.Confidential employees are those who (1) assist or act in a confidential capacity, (2) to persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies in the field of labor relations. The two criteria are cumulative, and both must be met if an employee is to be considered a confidential employee that is, the confidential relationship must exist between the employee and his supervisor, and the supervisor must handle the prescribed responsibilities relating to labor relations.The exclusion from bargaining units of employees who, in the normal course of their duties, become aware of management policies relating to labor relations is a principal objective sought to be accomplished by the confidential employee rule. The broad rationale behind this rule is that employees should not be placed in a position involving a potential conflict of interests. Management should not be required to handle labor relations matters through employees who are represented by the union with which the company is required to deal and who in the normal performance of their duties may obtain advance information of the companys position with regard to contract negotiations, the disposition of grievances, or other labor relations matters.The Court held that if these managerial employees would belong to or be affiliated with a Union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty to the Union in view of evident conflict of interest. The Union can also become company-dominated with the presence of managerial employees in Union membership.An important element of the confidential employee rule is the employees need to use labor relations information. Thus, in determining the confidentiality of certain employees, a key question frequently considered is the employees necessary access to confidential labor relations information.(2) The fact that the three plants are located in three different places, namely, in Cabuyao, Laguna, in Otis, Pandacan, Metro Manila, and in San Fernando, Pampanga is immaterial. Geographical location can be completely disregarded if the communal or mutual interests of the employees are not sacrificed.An appropriate bargaining unit may be defined as a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees, which the collective interest of all the employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicate to be best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law.A unit to be appropriate must effect a grouping of employees who have substantial, mutual interests in wages, hours, working conditions and other subjects of collective bargaining.6. Pepsi-Cola Products Phils. v. Secretary of Labor (1999)

Facts:Pepsi-Cola Employees Organization-UOEF (PCEU) filed a petition for certification election with the Med-Arbiter seeking to be the exclusive bargaining agent of supervisors of Pepsi-Cola Philippines (Pepsi). The petition was granted, but with the explicit statement that PCEU was affiliated with Union de Obreros Estivadores de Filipinas (UOEF) and 2 other rank-and-file unions, the PCLU and the PEUP.

Pepsi then filed a petition for cancellation with the BLR against PCEU, on the grounds that: (a) the members of PCEU were managers and (b) a supervisors' union cannot affiliate with a federation whose members include the rank and file union of the same company. It also filed an urgent ex-parte motion to suspend the certification election.

PCEU argued that Art. 245 of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 6715, did not prohibit a local union composed of supervisory employees from being affiliated to a federation which has local unions with rank-and-file members as affiliates. Furthermore, Book V, Rule II, Section 7 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code provides the grounds for cancellation of the registration certificate of a labor organization, and the inclusion of managerial employees is not one of the grounds.

However, on 1992, or before the SC decision, the PCEU issued a resolution withdrawing from the UOEF.

Issue: Whether or not PCEU may be affiliated with the rank-and-file unions.

Held:PCEU's withdrawal from the affiliation made the case moot and academic. But for the guidance of others similarly situated, the Court ruled No.

If the intent of the law is to avoid a situation where supervisors would merge with the rank and file or where the supervisors' labor organization would represent conflicting interests, then a local supervisors' union should not be allowed to affiliate with the national federation of union of rank-and-file employees where that federation actively participates in union activity in the company.

The limitation is not confined to a case of supervisors' wanting to join a rank-and-file union. The prohibition extends to a supervisors' local union applying for membership in a national federation the members of which include local unions of rank and file employees. The intent of the law is clear especially where, as in this case at bar, the supervisors will be co-mingling with those employees whom they directly supervise in their own bargaining unit.

In the collective bargaining process, managerial employees are supposed to be on the side of the employer, to act as its representatives, and to see to it that its interests are well protected. The employer is not assured of such protection if these employees themselves are union members. It is the same reason that impelled this Court to consider the position of confidential employees as included in the disqualification found in Art. 245 as if the disqualification of confidential employees were written in the provision. Said employees may act as spies of either party to a collective bargaining agreement.

7. [G.R. No. 88957 June 25, 1992]PHILIPS INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT, INC. vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONSCOMMISSIONFACTS: PIDI is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacturing and marketing of electronic products Since 1971, it had a total of six (6) collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) with private respondent Philips Employees Organization-FFW (PEO-FFW), a registered labor union and the certified bargaining agent of all the rank and file employees of PIDI. In the first CBA (1971-1974), the supervisors referred to in R.A. No. 875, confidential employees, security guards, temporary employees and sales representatives were excluded from the bargaining unit. In the second to the fifth CBAs (1975-1977; 1978-1980; 1981-1983; and 1984-1986), the sales force, confidential employees and heads of small units, together with the managerial employees, temporary employees and security personnel, were specifically excluded from the bargaining unit.The confidential employees are the division secretaries of light/telecom/data and consumer electronics, marketing managers, secretaries of the corporate planning and business manager, fiscal and financial system manager and audit and EDP manager, and the staff of both the General Management and the Personnel Department.In the sixth CBA covering the years 1987 to 1989, it was agreed upon, among others, that the subject of inclusion or exclusion of service engineers, sales personnel and confidential employees in the coverage of the bargaining unit would be submitted for arbitration.The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision ordering the respondent to conduct a referendum to determine the will of the service engineers, sales representatives as to their inclusion or exclusion in the bargaining unit. It declared however that Division Secretaries and all Staff of general management, personnel and industrial relations department, secretaries of audit, EDP, financial system are confidential employees and as such are deemed excluded in the bargaining unit.The NLRC reversed decision and ordered inclusion of all the employees concerned.ISSUE: W/N security personnel are disqualified from joining labor unions. W/N confidential employees may join union for rank and file employeesHELD: 1. A palpable error was committed by the NLRC in ruling that under the law, all workers, except managerial employees and security personnel, are qualified to join a union, or form part of a bargaining unit. At the time Case No. NLRC-NCR-00-11-03936-87 was filed in 1987, security personnel were no longer disqualified from joining or forming a union.Section 6 of E.O. No. 111 repealed the original provisions of Article 245 of the Labor Code disqualifying security personnel. By virtue of such repeal and substitution, security guards became eligible for membership in any labor organization.1. All the subject employees, with the exception of the service engineers and the sales force personnel, are confidential employees. Their classification as such is not seriously disputed by PEO-FFW; the five (5) previous CBAs between PIDI and PEO-FFW explicitly considered them as confidential employees. By the very nature of their functions, they assist and act in a confidential capacity to, or have access to confidential matters of, persons who exercise managerial functions in the field of labor relations. As such, the rationale behind the ineligibility of managerial employees to form, assist or join a labor union equally applies to them.RATIONALE OF PROHIBITIONInBulletin Publishing Co., Inc. vs. Hon Augusto Sanchez,this Court elaborated on this rationale, thus:. . . The rationale for this inhibition has been stated to be, becauseif these managerial employees would belong to or be affiliated with a Union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty, to the Union in view of evident conflict of interests. The Union can also become company-dominated with the presence of managerial employees in Union membership.InGolden Farms, Inc. vs. Ferrer-Calleja,14this Court explicitly made this rationale applicable to confidential employees:This rationale holds true alsofor confidential employees such as accounting personnel, radio and telegraph operators, who having access to confidential information, may become the source of undue advantage. Said employee(s) may act as a spy or, spies of either party to a collective bargainingagreement. This is specially true in the present case where the petitioning Union is already the bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees in the establishment.To allow the confidential employees to join the existing Union of the rank-and-file would be in violation of the terms of the Collective Bargaining Agreement wherein this kind of employees by the nature of their functions/ positions are expressly excluded.

8. FULL TEXT G.R. No. L-13573 February 20, 1960ALHAMBRA CIGAR and CIGARETTE MANUFACTURING COMPANY and KAPISANAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA ALHAMBRA (FOITAF),petitioners,vs.ALHAMBRA EMPLOYEE'S ASSOCIATION (PAFLU),respondent.Angel S. Gamboa for petitioners.Cipriano Cid and Associates for respondent.BARRERA,J.:This is a petition to review oncertiorarithe order of the Court of Industrial Relations (in Case No. 392-MC) dated December 12, 1956, and its resolution en banc December 27, 1957.Respondent Alhambra Employees' Association (PAFLU) filed with the above-mentioned court a petition, which was later amended, praying that it be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent for all the employees, 82 in number, in the administrative, sales, engineering, and dispensary departments of petitioner Alhambra Cigar & Cigarette Manufacturing Company. Petitioner company, later joined by the co-petitioner Kapisanan Ng Manggagawa sa Alhambra (FOITAF), as Intervenor, opposed the petition, on the ground that there was in force an existing collective bargaining agreement covering all the workers of the company, signed by the latter and Intervenor union.The case was referred to Hearing Examiner Antonio P. Amistad who, on November 19, 1956, submitted his report to the court, which reads as follows:REPORTThis concerns an amended petition filed by the Alhambra Employees' Association (PAFLU), a legitimate labor organization, in which it is prayed that said union be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent for all the employees paid either on the monthly, daily or commission basis in the administrative, sales, engineering and dispensary departments of the Alhambra Cigar and Cigarette Manufacturing Company, a business concern existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines, engaged in the manufacture of cigars and cigarettes, with postal address at 31 Tayuman Street, Tondo, Manila.The petition is opposed by the Company and another legitimate labor organization, the Federacion Obrera de la Industria Tabaquera de Filipinas (FOITAF). The opposition is based principally on two grounds, namely, that the appropriate collective bargaining unit is the employer unit not the smaller unit sought by petitioner and that there is an existing collective bargaining agreement between the company and the FOITAF which constitutes a bar to the instant certification proceeding.The first issue to be resolved by the Court concerns the composition of the appropriate unit. The petitioner contends that all the employees paid on the monthly, daily or commission basis in the administrative, sales, engineering, and dispensary departments constitute an appropriate unit, while both the company and the FOITAF maintain that the appropriate unit is the employer unit. While the two contending unions as well as the company were agreed that confidential employees should be excluded, they could not agree on the exclusion or inclusion of the technical employees. The FOITAF'S stand is that technical employees should also be excluded, while the petitioner favors their inclusion. The company on the other hand, manifested that it did not care whether the technical employees are included or not in the bargaining unit.The evidence shows that there are eight departments existing in the company, namely, the administrative department, manlalasi or raw leaf department, cigar department, cigarette department, engineering department and garage, precinteria department, dispensary, and sales department.In the manlalasi or raw leaf department, the work consists mainly of classifying the tobacco leaves removing the middle ribs from them. The cigar and cigarette departments are engaged in producing cigars and cigarettes while the packing of the finished products is done in the precinteria department. The work in the engineering department and garage is devoted to operation of the machines and the maintenance of the machineries, buildings, garage as well as all the vehicles used by the company. The employees in the sales department are engaged in selling the products of the company and they perform their duties outside the factory premises. The dispensary department consists of one doctor and two nurses. In the administrative department are found the office personnel, watchmen, porters and cleaners.Judging from the nature of the work performed in the different departments, the workers in the manlalasi, cigar, cigarette, precinteria and engineering departments may be considered as production and maintenance employees because they are engaged directly in producing the manufactured products of the company and in operating and maintaining its machines, buildings and vehicles.On the hand the employees in the administrative, sales and dipensary departments are engaged in an entirely different kind of work which does not involve production and maintenance and the places where they work are separate from those of the workers in the other departments. It can be said therefore that they have a community of interest among themselves which is entirely separate and distinct from the production and maintenance employees. This paramount consideration has led the undersigned to conclude that all the employees in the administrative, sales and dispensary departments constitute an appropriate collective bargaining unitsubject to the exclusions which are discussed hereinbelow. However, petitioner's contention that the employees in the engineering department and garage should also be included in said unit is without merit. As pointed out earlier, the workers in said department are maintenance employees and for purposes of collective bargaining it is the better policy to group together production and maintenance employees.The second issue which was raised in this case is whether or not the collective bargaining agreement entered into between the company (and the FOITAF constitutes a bar to the instant proceeding. Said agreement, marked as Exh. "3-Alhambra", Exh. "S-Petitioner", and Exh. "1-Intervenor", was entered into on Aug. 18, 1954 and it stipulated that the agreement would be effective until June 30, 1955. The effectivity was extended to June 30, 1957, pursuant to a subsequent agreement entered into on Feb. 24, 1955. (Exh. "3-A Alhambra", Exh. "T-Petitioner", and Exh. "2-Intervenor".)After a close examination of the agreement, in question, the undersigned notes thatin so far as the fixing of the terms and condition of employment is concerned it did not expressly cover the employees in the administrative, dispensary and sales departments. As a matter of fact, the recognition clause states that the FOITAF was acting in representation of all the laborers of the "ALHAMBRA" and certainly it can not be said that all the employees in the administrative, dispensary and sales departments are laborers'. Furthermore, almost all the persons referred to with definite particularly in paragraph 6 of the agreement (Exh. "3-Alhambra",) are those working in the production and maintenance departments. The same observation applies to the two subsequent agreements marked as Exh "3-A Alhambra" and Exh "3-B Alhambra". It was only in the agreement entered into on June 25, 1956 (Exh. "3-C Alhambra", Exh. "V-Petitioner", and Exh. "4-Intervenor") that employees in the administrative department were specifically covered. The coverage, however, was extended only to the security guards. Under the premises, the undersigned is of the opinion thatthe interests of the employees in the administrative, dispensary, and sales departments with the exception of the security guards are not adequately protected in the collective bargaining agreement between the companyand the FOITAF and said agreement therefore could not be validly invoked as a bar to the instant proceeding.The evidence also shows that there are 45 employees in the administrative department, 3 in the dispensary, and 19 in the sales department so that all in all there are 67 employees in the said departments. The evidence for the company shows that the watchmen and porters in the administrative department numbering 16 in all are security guards. (See Exh. "3-C Alhambra"). Following established precedents of this Court, these security guards should be excluded from the bargaining unit sought to be represented by the petitioner. In the sales department there are 2 sales supervisors, who should also be excluded pursuant to a specific provision of Rep. Act No. 875. Although it was agreed upon by all the parties that confidential employees should also be excluded, the evidence does not indicate the particular employees whose positions are confidential. Excluding the 16 security guards and 2 sales supervisors, there are 49 employees who are eligible for inclusion in the appropriate unit in this case.The evidence also conclusively shows that 23 employees in the administrative department, 2 in the dispensary, and 16 in the sales department or a total of 41 are members of the petitioning union. There is no question therefore that said union has been duly selected or designated as the exclusive representative for collective bargaining purposes by the majority of the employees in an appropriate unit.In view of all the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that the Alhambra Employees Association (PAFLU) be certified as the exclusive bargaining representative of all the employees in the administrative, dispensary and sales departments of the Alhambra Cigar and Cigarette Manufacturing Company with the exception of supervisors, security guards and confidential employees. (Emphasis supplied.)On December 12, 1956, the court, by a vote of three to one, with one abstention, adopted the above-quoted reportin toto, in its order which, in part, states:The foregoing report has been found to be completely in accordance with the evidence and the entire record of the case, and the conclusions therein contained are hereby adoptedin toto.Wherefore, and as recommended by the Hearing Examiner, the Alhambra Employees' Association (PAFLU) is hereby certified as the exclusive collective bargaining representative of all the employees in the administrative, dispensary, and sales departments of the Alhambra Cigar and Cigarette Manufacturing Company with the exception of supervisors, security guards and confidential employees. So ordered.Their motions for reconsideration of the foregoing order having been denied, the Company and FOITAF filed the present petition for review.Petitioners claim that the lower court erred (1) in holding that all the employees in the administrative, sales, and dispensary departments of petitioner company, with the exception of the supervisors, security guards, and confidential employees therein, constitute an appropriate separate collective bargaining unit; (2) in holding that the collective bargaining agreement between petitioner company and petitioner labor union (FOITAF) did not cover said employees; and (3) in including in said independent unit the physician and two nurses composing the dispensary department.1. In arriving at the conclusion that all the employees in the administrative, sales, and dispensary department of the company, with the exception of the supervisors, security guards, and confidential employees therein, constitute an appropriate collective bargaining unit, the lower court considered the fact that said employees are engaged in "an entirely different kind of work" which does not involve production and maintenance, and the additional fact that the places where they work are separate from those of the workers in the other departments of the company.We find no reason to disturb said finding of the lower court. There can hardly be any doubt that, since said employees in the administrative, sales, and dispensary departments perform work which have nothing to do with production and maintenance, unlike those in the raw leaf (manlalasi), cigar, cigarette, packing (precinteria), and engineering and garage departments whose functions involve production and maintenance, they have a community of interest which justifies their formation or existence as a separate appropriate collective bargaining unit. (II Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining, 925-931.)1The existence of such a unit will, it is believed, insure to said employees in the three departments its the full benefit of their right to self-organization and collective bargaining and, thereby, effectuate the policies enunciated in the Industrial Peace Act.22. Examination of the collective bargaining agreement entered into between the company and FOITAF on August 18, 1954 (Exh. 3-Alhambra) and the agreements entered subsequent thereto between the same parties dated February 24, 1955 (Exh. 3-A Alhambra) and August 25, 1955 (Exh. 3-B Alhambra) discloses beyond doubt that they expressly cover only the workers in the five departments of the company, namely, the raw leaf (manlalasi), cigar, cigarette, packing (precinteria), and engineering and garage departments. Exhibits 3 Alhambra and 3-A Alhambra are conspicuous for their repeated use of the term "laborers". In no single instance is the term "employees" mentioned to convey the idea that those in the other three departments, namely, the administrative, sales, and dispensary departments, are also covered by said agreements. Exhibit 3-B Alhambra consistently uses the term "Precinteros", referring to the workers in the packing or precinteria department. It is, furthermore, significant to note that the workers who are divided into several categories in Exhibit 3-Alhambra, all belong to the five-mentioned departments of the company, which again unmistakably conveys the impression that said agreement was not intended to cover or apply to those workers or employees in the administrative, sales, and dispensary departments.We agree with the observation of the lower court that it is only in Exhibit 3-C Alhambra (executed on June 25,1956) that the employees in the three-mentioned departments were expressly covered. Nevertheless, said coverage was limited or confined only to the security in said departments.While it may be true that the benefits granted under said agreements were extended to, and enjoyed by, all the workers in all the eight departments of the company, the fact remains that those in the administrative, sales and dispensary departments were not expressly covered and, should the company, at any time, decide not to extend to them said benefits, they can not legally demand their extension to them as they would have nothing to invoke in support of said demand. In fine, they have no legal right to said benefits enforceable before the courts.3. Although the physician and two nurses in the dispensary department perform functions which may properly be designated as technical or professional, the lower in our opinion, did not err in including them in the bargaining unit sought to be represented by respondent labor organization, since, as already stated, they are performing functions which have nothing to do with production and maintenance and, consequently, have a community of interest with the employees in the administrative and sales department.Wherefore, finding no reversible error in the order resolution of the courta quoappealed from, the same are hereby affirmed in all respects, with costs against the petitioners. So ordered.Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia and Gutierrez David, JJ.,concur.9. FULL TEXT G.R. No. 94716 November 15, 1991ASSOCIATION OF COURT OF APPEALS EMPLOYEES (ACAE),petitioner,vs.HON. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, in her capacity as Director, Bureau of Labor Relations, and UNION OF CONCERNED EMPLOYEES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS (UCECA),respondents.GUTIERREZ, JR.,J.:pWe are asked in this petition to ascertain the power, if any, of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), more specifically the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR), to supervise the activities of government employees; in this case, unions of judiciary personnel who serve in the Court of Appeals.The question of power is quite significant. Hitherto, the BLR has concentrated on labor relations in the private sector. Its enforcement machinery and the mass of law and jurisprudence governing its functions are entirely geared to the handling of the peculiar problems arising in private employment. In this case, the BLR has tasked itself to intervene not only in a quarrel between two groups of government employees but more important, in a quarrel between employees working for an independent branch of government, the Judiciary.The two issues raised in this petition are: (1) whether or not the respondent Bureau of Labor Relations acted with grave abuse of discretion when it granted the petition for certification election to determine the certified bargaining agent to represent the rank-and-file employees of the Court of Appeals; and (2) whether or not a petition for cancellation of registration of the union requesting for a certification election is a bar to the resolution of a prior petition for certification election.The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:On April 4, 1990, the respondent Union of Concerned Employees of the Court of Appeals (UCECA), a registered union filed a petition for accreditation and/or certification election with the Bureau of Labor Relations (docketed as BLR Case No. 4-11-90) alleging that the petitioner, Association of Court of Appeals Employees (ACAE) which is the incumbent bargaining representative, no longer enjoys the support of the majority of the rank-and-file employees. The UCECA alleged that there was a mass resignation of ACAE members on April 14, 1989.On May 10, 1990, the ACAE filed its Comment and/or Opposition. It stated that the listing by the ACAE of its membership at three hundred three (303) employees was a product of fraud. It charged the UCECA with misrepresentation, forgery and perjury in attaching to its (UCECA) petition, a copy of the names of members some of which were twice listed, written without consent or unsigned, and some of the signatures of which were forged. In addition, the petitioner alleged that some of the UCECA members, upon learning of the fraudulent act, resigned from the union.In its reply, the UCECA stated that its registry book was not smeared with fraud and claimed that any mistakes were only clerical errors.On June 18, 1990, petitioner ACAE filed a Petition for Cancellation of Certificate of Registration of the UCECA in BLR Case No. 6-19-90 on the ground of fraud and misrepresentation by UCECA in obtaining its Registration Certificate No. 159 and in preparing its Registry Book of members. On June 28, 1990, the ACAE moved for deferment of the resolution of the case of BLR 4-11-90 pending the case of BLR 6-19-90.On July 16, 1990, the UCECA filed a motion to dismiss BLR 6-19-90 for being dilatory, to which ACAE replied that the maxim ofres ipsa loquiturshould be applied as the "fraudulent documents submitted by UCECA speak for themselves."On July 30, 1990, the Bureau of Labor Relationsruled that BLR 6-19-90 (cancellation proceedings) is not a bar to the holding of a certification election. It granted the UCECA's prayer for a certification election. The BLR found that UCECA was supported by three hundred three (303) or forty (40%) percent of the seven hundred sixty two (762) rank-and-file employees of the court. ACAE's motion for reconsideration was denied.On August 21, 1990, the respondent Bureau conducted a pre-election conference.Feeling that it was being stampeded into participating in a certification election, ACAE filed this petition forcertiorariand prohibition. We issued a temporary restraining order effective August 29, 1990.The first question that arises is the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Labor Relations to handle disputes among associations of employees working for the judiciary.There is no question that government employees may organize provided the purposes behind such organization are legitimate.No less than the Bill of Rights specifically identifies government employees as having the right of self-organization. It provides:xxx xxx xxxSec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. (Article III, 1987 Constitution)In the provisions governing the Civil Service Commission, we find:Sec. 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.xxx xxx xxxSec. 2. (5) The right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees.xxx xxx xxx(Article IX-B, Section 2 (1) and (5), Constitution)The article on Social Justice and Human Rights adds:Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law. (Article XIII, Section 3, 1st and 2nd paragraphs)xxx xxx xxxThe issue of what governs and who supervises unions of government employees is of more than passing concern especially when those who organize and hope to engage in certain forms of concerted action are court employees.Government personnel find themselves in an equivocal and ambivalent position. They have a right but it is not clear to what extent they may exercise it. Congress has not legislated as yet on the complicated problems arising from unionism in government as distinguished from unionism in the private sector. Obviously, the same rules do not and cannot apply under the present state of the law. A major re-ordering of government, notably its civil service laws and budgetary and fiscal procedures would result if Congress, in enacting the laws required by the constitutional provisions, gives exactly the same rights and privileges to all workers in the public and private sectors.At present, the terms and conditions of employment in the government service are governed by law, not by the relative strengths of management and labor as they hammer out mutually acceptable terms across the collective bargaining table. Paradoxically, all the representatives of "labor" and "management" in government areemployees.At the same time, everybody forms part of the "owner" of the enterprise, the sovereign people. The qualifications and eligibilities of civil servants, their appointment and promotion, standardization of salaries, disciplinary actions, fringe benefits, and retirement gratuities, among others, are governed by statutes, rules, and established principles which are the products of decades of experience, not to mention borrowings from civil service systems abroad.The provisions of civil service law on the terms and conditions of employment including the regulation of labor-management relations in the government sector, unless Congress decides to amend or repeal them, form part of the response to any requests or demands of organized groups of government personnel. Any understanding between the top officials of a government agency and the union which represents the rank-and-file is subordinate to the law governing the particular issue or situation.We emphasize the above because in ascertaining what agency should supervise certification elections in the public sector, we limit the determination strictly to the question before us the holding of certification elections. Jurisdiction over questions which may arise after the certified bargaining representative flexes its muscles and engages in concerted action will have to await the filing of more appropriate cases and, hopefully, the enactment of applicable legislation.The Constitution provides that the rights ofallworkers to self-organization, collective bargaining, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike, are guaranteed provided these are in accordance withlaw.There is reference to the need for a law governing the procedures incident to self-organization.What is the law which governs certification elections in the Court of Appeals?The Solicitor General argues that the applicable law is Executive Order No. 180 issued on June 1, 1987 entitled "Providing Guidelines for the Exercise of the Right to Organize of Government Employees; Creating a Public Sector Labor-Management Council; and for Other Purposes."The pertinent provisions of Executive Order No. 180 are:SECTION 7. Government employees' organizations shall register with the Civil Service Commission and the Department of Labor and Employment. The application shall be filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations of the Department which shall process the same in accordance with the provisions of the Labor Code of the Philippines as amended. Applications may also be filed with the Regional Offices of the Department of Labor and Employment which shall immediately transmit the said applications to the Bureau of Labor Relations within three (3) days from receipt thereof.xxx xxx xxxSECTION 8. Upon approval of the application, a registration certification shall be issued to the organization recognizing it as a legitimate employees' organization with the right to represent its members and undertake activities to further and defend its interest. The corresponding certificates of registration shall be jointly approved by the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission and Secretary of Labor and Employment.xxx xxx xxxSECTION 10. The duly registered employees' organization having the support of the majority of the employees in the appropriate organizational unit shall be designated as the sole and exclusive representative of the employees.SECTION 11. A duly registered employees' organization shall be accorded voluntary recognition upon a showing that no other employees' organization is registered or is seeking registration, based on records of the Bureau of Labor Relations, and that the said organization has the majority support of the rank-and-file employees in the organizational unit.SECTION 12. Where there are two or more duly registered employees' organizations in the appropriate organizational unit, the Bureau of Labor Relations shall, upon petition, order the conduct of a certification election and shall certify the winner as the exclusive representative of the rank-and-file employees in said organization unit. (Rollo, pp. 235-237)It is obvious that Executive Order No. 180 is at best a stop gap measure for a limited purpose. Certain provisions and procedures in the Labor Code were engrafted into a decree governing the entirely novel situation of unionism in the governmental sector. Enacted a little over one month and a half before Congress reconvened after the revolutionary government was replaced by the present government, it unfortunately lacks a legislative record, parliamentary debates, and the insights that only the elected representatives of all the people can bring to bear in the regulation of a complicated and sensitive relationship.The petitioner questions the validity of Executive Order No. 180 but limits its challenge to an alleged violation of the separation of powers doctrine. The argument is self-defeating because, followed to its logical conclusion, only this Court would have the power to supervise certification elections in the Court of Appeals. The task is not for us and we certainly have no intention to undertake it.It is the function of this Court, and we will not hesitate to exercise the power, to regulate all activities of Judges and court personnel, the Supreme Court included, to the end that the independence, effectiveness, and integrity of the judiciary as mandated by the Constitution are not impaired or compromised. It is axiomatic, for example, that any demands of court employees for higher compensation or improved facilities must be viewed in the context of the fiscal autonomy guaranteed by the Constitution to the Judiciary. (Constitution, Article VIII, Section 3). Neither DOLE, the Civil Service Commission (CSC), nor any other agency would have jurisdiction to adjudicate such claims. And since unresolved legal questions commenced elsewhere are ultimately decided by us, the final decision on all such questions would still be with this Court.All this does not mean that the separation of powers doctrine requires us to supervise the details of self-organization activities in the courts. In the same way that CSC validly conducts competitive examinations to grant requisite eligibilities to court employees, we see no constitutional objection to DOLE handling the certification process in the Court of Appeals, considering its expertise, machinery, and experience in this particular activity. Executive Order No. 180 requires organizations of government employees to register withbothCSC and DOLE. This ambivalence notwithstanding, the CSC has no facilities, personnel, or experience in the conduct of certification elections. The BLR has to do the job.Executive Order No. 180 states that certificates of registration of the legitimate employee representatives must be jointly approved by the CSC Chairman and the DOLE Secretary. Executive Order No. 180 is not too helpful in determining whose opinion shall prevail if the CSC Chairman and the DOLE Secretary arrive at different conclusions. At any rate, we shall deal with that problem when it occurs. Insofar as power to call for and supervise the conduct of certification elections is concerned, we rule against the petitioner.One final point on the petitioner's objection to the jurisdiction of the BLR. ACAE cannot persuasively challenge the validity of Executive Order No. 180 because its very personality to bring this suit is premised on its having organized under the same executive order. The first paragraph of the petition reads:1. Petitioner ASSOCIATION OF COURT OF APPEALS EMPLOYEES, ACAE for brevity, is an association of government employees duly organized and existing under and by virtue of Executive Order No. 180, duly accredited as the exclusive representative of the rank-and-file employees of the Court of Appeals, with office address at the Court of Appeals Compound, M. Orosa Street, Ermita, Manila. (Rollo, p. 2)The petitioner argues that the respondent UCECA failed to prove that it no longer enjoys the support of the rank-and-file employees. ACAE claims that it has 395 members. It states that if the fraudulently entered names numbering 88 are all deducted from the 303 listed names for UCECA, there would actually be 215 members only left. Even assuming, therefore, that the petitioning union has satisfied the required percentage of signatures (20%) according to section of Rule VI, Rules and Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the Right of Government Employees to Self-Organization, no election can be had if the incumbent bargaining representative still has the clear majority.It is precisely because the respondent union has been questioning the majority status of the petitioner that a petition for certification election was filed. Nowhere in the rules is there a further requirement for a petitioning union to prove the lack of a majority status of the incumbent representative or who among its listed members are not actually affiliated with it. What is merely required for a petition for certification election to be granted is the filing of a verified petition which is supported by the signatures of at least twenty (20%) percent of the covered employees. It is also essential that it is not filed within one (1) year from the date a declaration of a previous final certification election result was issued.The BLR has satisfied itself that the private respondent has faithfully complied with the bare requirements for the petition. It is a well-settled rule that "a certification proceeding is not a litigation in the sense that the term is ordinarily understood, but an investigation of a non-adversarial and fact finding character." (Associated Labor Unions (ALU) v. Ferrer-Calleja, 179 SCRA 127 [1989]; Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Corporation v. NLRC, 183 SCRA 451 [1990]) Thus, the technical rules of evidence do not apply if the decision to grant it proceeds from an examination of the sufficiency of the petition as well as a careful look into the arguments contained in position papers and other documents.The public respondent has found the petition to be sufficient in form and substance there being compliance with the twenty (20%) percent support signatures. The factual findings of the Bureau of Labor Relations on this matter appear to be supported by substantial evidence and we, accordingly, accord them great weight and respect. They shall not be disturbed by the Court in the absence of proof of reversible error. (See Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) v. Ferrer-Calleja, 162 SCRA 426 [1988]; Airtime Specialists, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja, 180 SCRA 749 [1989]) On the basis of its findings, it was only proper for the public respondent to order the holding of a certification election which is mandatorily required by Section 12, Executive Order No.180:Section 12. Where there are two or more duly registered employees' organizations in the appropriate organizational unit, the Bureau of Labor Relationsshall,upon petition, order the conduct of a certification election and shall certify the winner as the exclusive representative of the rank-and-file employees in said organizational unit." (Underscoring Supplied)Even assuming there were fraudulently included names or signatures, respondent UCECA would still have complied with the twenty (20%) percent requirement. The remaining membership, i.e. 215, alleged by petitioner ACAE constitutes twenty eight (28%) percent of the rank-and-file court employees.The result of the certification election shall determine who between the petitioner and the private respondent is telling the truth. As we have ruled inPhilippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) v. Ferrer-Calleja, (supra):Whenever there is doubt as to whether a particular union represents the majority of the rank-and-file employees, in the absence of a legal impediment, the holding of a certification election is the most dramatic method of determining the employee's choice of their bargaining representative. It is the appropriate means whereby controversies and disputes on representation may be laid to rest, by the unequivocal vote of the employees themselves. (At page 431)The petitioner likewise argues that the certification proceedings should be suspended pending its petition for the cancellation of union registration of the UCECA.The records show that UCECA was registered with the Civil Service Commission on March 16, 1990. (Rollo, p. 45) When the said union was organized, some of its members allegedly used to be members of the ACAE who tendered mass resignations on August 14, 1989 and on September 29, 1989. (Rollo, pp. 27-35) On January 30, 1990, the officers of ACAE, in Board Resolution No. 8 resolved that the resignations tendered were irregular and must be accomplished individually. (Rollo, p. 55) Thereafter, for some reasons, some of the listed members in the Registry Book of the UCECA wrote individual letters to UCECA in April, 1990 either questioning the inclusion of their names or tendering their resignations.On June 18, 1990, the petitioner herein filed its petition to cancel the union registration of UCECA. The act of the petitioner in charging commissions of fraud and misrepresentation against UCECA only after realizing the rising membership of the latter and the subsequent petition for certification election raises grave suspicions as to whether or not it wants to subvert the right of the employees to determine the proper exclusive representative or agent now that they are given two unions from which to choose. Assuming for the sake of argument that the petitioner ACAE had lawful grounds to challenge the existence of the UCECA, it should have done so, soon after the date it had notice or knowledge of the registration of the latter to protect its own interests and not at a later time when its bargaining position was already at the risk of being lost.At any rate, the Court applies the established rule correctly followed by the public respondent that an order to hold a certification election is proper despite the pendency of the petition for cancellation of the registration certificate of the respondent union. The rationale for this is that at the time the respondent union filed its petition, it still had the legal personality to perform such act absent an order directing a cancellation.It is the policy of the State in protecting the rights of labor to ensure and maintain industrial peace. For this reason, all employees of an appropriate bargaining unit shall be given an opportunity to organize and to determine which labor organization should be their exclusive bargaining representative. Hence, a petition for certification election filed by an interested labor organization shall be dealt with accordingly, with a view to attaining this objective. This is especially true when it involves the ultimate respect for and protection of the rights of government employees. In granting to employees in the civil service the right to organize, a procedure has been enacted to allow them to select what union shall be the recognized representative for all those in one agency, i.e., a certification election. (Sections 5, 6 and 12; Executive Order No. 180; Sections 3 and 4, Rule V and Rule VI, Rules and Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the Government Employees to Self-Organization)The freedom of choice given to workers is a constitutional right. Therefore, the holding of a certification election, being a statutory policy, should not be circumvented. (Associated Trade Unions-ATU v. Noriel, 89 SCRA 264 [1979]; Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) v. Ferrer-Calleja,supra;Airtime Specialists, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja,supra)WHEREFORE, the petitioner having failed to show grave abuse of discretion committed by the public respondent, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed orders of the public respondent are AFFIRMED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued on August 29, 1990 is LIFTED.SO ORDERED.10. DAVAO CITY WATER DISTRICT vs CSC201 SCRA 593Ponente: MEDIALDEAFACTS:Petitioners are among the more than five hundred (500) water districts existing throughout the country formed pursuant to the provisions of PD No. 198, as amended by PDs. 768 and 1479, otherwise known as the "Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973 which was issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos by virtue of his legislative power. It authorized the different local legislative bodies to form and create their respective water districts through a resolution they will pass subject to the guidelines, rules and regulations therein laid down. The decree further created and formed the "Local Water Utilities Administration" (LWUA), a national agency attached to the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), and granted with regulatory power necessary to optimize public service from water utilities operations.The respondents, on the other hand, are the Civil Service Commission (CSC) and the Commission on Audit (COA), both government agencies and represented in this case by the Solicitor General.There exists a divergence of opinions between COA on one hand, and the (LWUA), on the other hand, with respect to the authority of COA to audit the different water districts.COA opined that the audit of the water districts is simply an act of discharging the visitorial power vested in them by law On the other hand, LWUA maintained that only those water districts with subsidies from the government fall within the COA's jurisdiction and only to the extent of the amount of such subsidies, pursuant to the provision of the Government Auditing Code of the Phils.Petitioners' main argument is that they are private corporations without original charter, hence they are outside the jurisdiction of respondents CSC and COA. ISSUE:Whether or not the Local Water Districts formed and created pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 198, as amended, are government-owned or controlled corporations with original charter falling under the Civil Service Law and/or covered by the visitorial power of the Commission on AuditHELD:After a fair consideration of the parties' arguments coupled with a careful study of the applicable laws as well as the constitutional provisions involved, We rule against the petitioners and reiterate Our ruling in Tanjay case declaring water districts government-owned or controlled corporations with original charter.Ascertained from a consideration of the whole statute, PD 198 is a special law applicable only to the different water districts created pursuant thereto. In all its essential terms, it is obvious that it pertains to a special purpose which is intended to meet a particular set of conditions and cirmcumstances. The fact that said decree generally applies to all water districts throughout the country does not change the fact that PD 198 is a special law.It is clear that what has been excluded from the coverage of the CSC are those corporations created pursuant to the Corporation Code. Significantly, petitioners are not created under the said code, but on the contrary, they were created pursuant to a special law and are governed primarily by its provision.ACCORDINGLY, petitioners are declared "government-owned or controlled corporations with original charter" which fall under the jurisdiction of the public respondents CSC and COA.11. Executive Order 180PROVIDING GUIDELINES FOR THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, CREATING A PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR-MANAGEMENT COUNCIL, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSESIn accordance with the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, do hereby order:I. CoverageSec. 1. This Executive Order applies to all emplo