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Collaborative Groundwater Governance: Two Cases from South Australia

Andrew Ross1

Introduction

Groundwater provides most of the freshwater accessible for human consumption (Gleich

1996) but groundwater governance has received less attention than surface water

governance. Historically landowners have been allowed to pump water from underneath

the land with minimal control. This has lead to significant social and economic benefits,

but can also cause water table depletion and groundwater quality degradation. Effective

groundwater governance remains an important challenge to ensure long-term

sustainability of communities, industries and nature (Llamas and Martinez Santos 2004).

Groundwater boundaries do not coincide with surface water catchments or administrative

jurisdictions. Groundwater planning and management requires the coordinated

governance of land, water and the environment at multiple geographical scales and

administrative levels (Turrall and Fullagar 2007, Ross and Dovers 2008). Governments

have insufficient authority, resources and knowledge to govern water resources by

themselves. Therefore, collaborative governance by governments, water users and

interested third parties is needed. Effective groundwater governance requires strong

collaboration between governments and users, with broad direction by high-level

governments and more detailed local planning and action tailored to local resources and

user communities (Ross 2012).

Collaborative governance enables people to engage and work together constructively to

carry out a common purpose that could not otherwise be achieved. This study examines

collaborative water governance in the McLaren Vale Prescribed Wells area and North

Adelaide Plains Prescribed Wells area in South Australia, using a framework and

questions derived from a synthesis of international work on collaborative governance

(Emerson et al 2012).

The study proceeds as follows. The next section sets out a framework for collaborative

governance from which the issues explored in the study are derived. This is followed by

an introduction to the case study areas, followed by a comparative analysis of factors

affecting groundwater governance in those areas. The paper concludes with a discussion

of the findings and implications for further research.

1 Fenner School of Environment and Society, Australian National University (ANU) and National Centre for

Groundwater Research and Training (NCGRT). This paper has benefitted from comments from Dr Sondoss El Sawah,

ANU and NCGRT.


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Framework and methodology to guide an exploration of factors affecting collaborative groundwater governance

Water governance refers to the range of political, social, economic and administrative

systems that are in place to develop and manage water resources, and to deliver water

services at different levels of society. The functions of water governance include the

definition of sustainable limits and priorities for the use of water resources, the

establishment of water use entitlements and plans and organisations to administer them

(Svendson 2005). Decision-making in a water governance system takes place at many

different spatial, temporal and jurisdictional scales (Cash et al 2006, Young 2002). Also

water planning and catchment management processes can be considered as ongoing

negotiation with evolving/emerging outcomes (Daniell 2010).

Several frameworks could be used for investigating collaborative water governance2.

The framework for collaborative governance proposed by Emerson, Nabatchi and Balogh

(2012) – CG framework – is preferred because it integrates numerous components of

collaborative governance, drawing on knowledge and concepts from a wide range of

fields. The authors have invited exploration and testing of the CG framework.

The CG framework

The CG framework includes three nested dimensions; the surrounding system context

(including political, legal, socio-economic, environmental and institutional influences);

the collaborative governance regime (CGR); and the innermost collaborative dynamics

and actions of the regime. The system context generates opportunities and constraints.

Drivers emerge from this context, including leadership, incentives, interdependence and

uncertainty, which help initiate and set the direction for a CGR. The CGR is the central

feature of the CG framework. The term regime refers to a system of public decision-

making in which cross-boundary collaboration is the prevailing pattern of behaviour and

activity. Collaborative dynamics consists of three interacting components; principled

engagement, shared motivation and capacity for joint action. These collaborative

dynamics are the primary focus of this paper. The three components of collaborative

dynamics interact over time. The process of collaboration leads to actions taken in order

to implement the shared purpose of the CGR. These actions can lead to outcomes both

within and external to the regime, ranging from results on the ground to transformations

within the system context and the CGR.

2 Integrated water resource management (GWP TAC 2000, 2004) does not analyse choices or trade-offs

between options. Further work under the advocacy coalition framework (Sabatier et al 2005) is needed to

demonstrate the prevalence and advantages of coalitions. The high-level framework for analysing social

and ecological systems, (Ostrom 2009) does not have a specific emphasis on collaborative governance.


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Figure 1: Integrative Framework for Collaborative Governance

Source Emerson et al 2012

Drivers for collaborative governance

The CG framework can be applied to a wide variety of collaborative governance settings.

The cases examined in this study represent a special category of collaborative governance

ie policy level collaborations (Margerum 2008, Robinson et al 2011). Implementing

change in policy collaborations involves consensus building in policy communities

including elected officials, interest groups and other policy entrepreneurs. It also depends

on policy based incentives and disincentives for involvement and compliance. In a

policy-based collaborative leadership may come from non-government policy

entrepreneurs or governments, but government policy incentives are likely to play an

important role (Sabatier and Mazmanian 1983). State water allocation planning provides

the primary incentive and driver for collaborative governance in the cases explored in this

paper.

Principled engagement

Engagement may include different participants at different points. It may take place in

face-to-face or virtual formats, across organisational networks or private and public

meetings. Participants may represent clients, constituencies, agencies, NGOs, businesses,

communities or individual interests. There is general agreement that it is important to get

the “right” people to the table (Ansell & Gash 2008, Emerson et al 2012).

Principled engagement occurs over time through processes of discovery, definition,

deliberation and determination. Discovery refers to the revealing of individual and

shared interests, concerns and values, and the identification and analysis of relevant


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information and its implications. Definition involves an ongoing effort to articulate

common purpose and objectives, to agree on concepts, terminology, and shared methods

for analysing alternatives, and to clarify tasks and expectations. Deliberation involves

listening to others’ perspectives, open and candid debate, asking and answering

challenging questions and expressing honest disagreements, and making public

judgements about the best way forward. In policy collaborations there are often a diverse

group of participants with marked differences in objectives, values and perceptions.

Shared motivation and commitment

Shared motivation involves a cycle of four elements: mutual trust, understanding, internal

legitimacy and commitment. Trust is widely recognised as a necessary element of

collaboration (Sabatier et al 2007, Poteete et al 2009). Trust is closely linked to mutual

understanding because it enables people to understand and respect others’ positions and

interests without necessarily agreeing with them. Mutual understanding generates a sense

of process legitimacy. This may lead to shared goals and a shared commitment to action.

However it is easier to agree on goals than a specific path to achieve those goals,

especially if it involves losses to particular individuals or groups of stakeholders, such as

irrigators (Ross & Martinez-Santos 2010, Ross 2012).

Capacity for joint action

Capacity for joint action depends on procedural and institutional arrangements,

leadership, knowledge, and resources. Procedural and institutional arrangements include

the range of process protocols and organisational structures used to manage repeated

interactions over time. They include operational protocols and rules, and institutions such

as charters, by-laws and regulations. They can encompass a wide range of matters such as

membership, and agenda setting, meetings, record-keeping and finances. The

transparency and accountability of procedural and institutional arrangements is an

important contributor to the perceived legitimacy of the collaborative process (Ross and

Dovers 2008).

Leadership can be an external driver, an essential ingredient of collaborative governance

or an outcome of the process. Collaborative governance offers multiple opportunities for

leadership including sponsor, convener, facilitator, mediator, representative, science

translator, technologist or public advocate. Different sorts of leadership needed to tackle

different problems, and to gain confidence with different stakeholder groups. Previous

experience of leadership can be an important ingredient of success in collaborative

governance processes (Imperial 2005).

Knowledge is in many ways the currency of collaboration. Contested knowledge requires

full and careful consideration. Incomplete knowledge must be balanced and enhanced

with new knowledge. As knowledge becomes increasingly specialised the demand for

collaboration may increase (Ansell & Gash 2008). The cases examined by Robinson et al

(2011) and in this paper indicate that policy-level collaboration requires significant


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investment in scientific study and assessment in order to obtain agreement about policy

objectives, management models and standards. An ongoing engagement between

scientists and practioners is required (Letcher and Jakeman 2002, Richardson et al 2011).

Resources, including money, time, skills and technical support are an essential element of

the capacity for joint action. Resource disparaties among participants can present barriers

to engagement or agreement. Collaborative groundwater governance often depends on

some government funding, and the ongoing squeeze of government budgets in many

locations presents a challenge for collaborative groundwater governance processes.

Research questions and methodology

This study explores the factors that have affected collaboration in and outcomes of

groundwater planning in the North Adelaide Plains and McLaren Vale Prescribed Wells

Areas in South Australia. These two areas were selected because they have strong

biophysical, socio-economic and institutional similarities. Yet stakeholders have

achieved more progress towards a sustainable level of groundwater extraction in

McLaren Vale than the North Adelaide Plains. This study explores whether a

comparison of the two areas using the CG framework throws light on the reasons for the

differential progress and outcomes in the two areas.

The methodology used in this study consists of analysis of government, academic and

consultancy documents supplemented by semi-structured interviews with participants in

collaborative groundwater governance. Interviewees were selected to represent water

users, industry and government. All but one of the interviewees had participated in water

allocation planning advisory committees (WAPACs) established by the Adelaide and

Mount Lofty Ranges Natural Resource Management Board.

Introduction to the case studies

Biophysical and socio-economic characteristics

Northern Adelaide Plain Prescribed Wells area

The Northern Adelaide Plains Prescribed Wells Area Covers Approximately 800 Km²

of an area 30 Km to the north of Adelaide. Water users in the Northern Adelaide

Plains Prescribed Wells Area rely on the extraction of groundwater from the tertiary

aquifers. The main users are crop and horticultural irrigation and industrial uses. The

average use is 18,000 ML per year, which is pumped from 1200 wells spread

throughout the region. The groundwater resource is considered to be insufficient to

meet current average demands for water without unacceptable impacts including

increases in salinity, losses of elastic storage and reduction in pressure on water level


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decline. Further increases in use would be unacceptable, but the current total water

allocation on water licences in the prescribed Wells area is 26,500 ML/year

(NA&BCWMB 2000).

McLaren Vale Prescribed Wells area

The McLaren Vale Prescribed Wells Area covers an area of about 320 km² 50 km

south of Adelaide . Average annual rainfall between 1992 and 1998 was 649 mm. The

annual safe yield of the aquifers in the McLaren Vale PWA was estimated to be 6560

ML in the 2000 Water Allocation Plan for the PWA (OCWMB 2000). Most

groundwater used by wetlands is sourced from quaternary aquifers, rather than those

used for irrigation (AMLRNRMB 2007). In 1998-99 there were 340 licensed

irrigators in the McLaren Vale PWA irrigating a total of 4450 hectares (OCWMB

2000b). Metered irrigation use ranged from 3713 ML in 1992/93 to 8924ML in

1994/95. In 1999 Pasture was the main land use in the area (42%). Vineyards

accounted for 22% of land use. In 1997 grapes provided 52% of the total value of crop

production3.

Figure 1 The North Adelaide Plains and McLaren Vale prescribed Wells areas

North Adelaide Plains McLaren Vale

3 This percentage has increased since 1997. In 1997 numbers are retained because they are relevant to the

negotiation of the 2000 Water Allocation Plan.


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Policy and institutional settings

The Council of Australian Governments (Commonwealth, State and Territory

Governments - COAG) has lead responsibility for national water policy. In 2004 COAG

established an Intergovernmental Agreement on a National Water Initiative (NWI)

(COAG 2004). Key NWI provisions include comprehensive planning for surface water

and groundwater and secure tradable water access entitlements.

Under Australia’s federal system of government, the primary right to own or to control

and use water is vested with the States and Territories (Lucy 2008, Gardner et al 2009)).

The Natural Resource Management Act 2004 (NRMA 2004)4 set out requirements for

water allocation and planning in South Australia through the development and

implementation of statutory Water Allocation Plans (WAPs). WAPs must include

assessments of the amount and timing of water needed by ecosystems, impacts of water

use on other water resources, and present and future needs of occupiers of the land.

WAPs can be amended at any time, and are required to be reviewed every five years.

WAPs were completed for 17 prescribed water resources in the period 2000-2006.

The responsibility for developing, implementing and reviewing WAPs rests with

regional NRM boards established under the NRMA 2004. The South Australian Minister

responsible for water approves WAPs. The State government department responsible for

water provides advice on all aspects of water planning and management, and carries out

some administrative functions including licensing and permitting. The legislation requires

consultation regarding draft concept statements and draft WAPs.

Key events in the development of groundwater regulation and planning in the North

Adelaide Plains and McLaren Vale Prescribed Wells Areas (PWAs) are summarised in

Table 1.

Table 1: Key events in development of groundwater regulation and planning: North

Adelaide Plains and McLaren Vale5

Key events North Adelaide Plains McLaren Vale

1990-97 1990 Willunga Basin Prescribed Wells Area

1993 Upper Wilunga Catchment Area

4 http://www.legislation.sa.gov.au/LZ/C/A/Natural%20Resources%20Management%20Act%202004.aspx

accessed 27 September 2009 5 Under the 2004 Natural Resource Management Act catchment management boards were restructured. In

2005 Adelaide and Mt Lofty Ranges Natural Resource Management Board (AMLNRMB) took over

responsibility for preparing water allocation plans in both the North Adelaide Plains and McLaren Vale

from local catchment management boards. The AMLRNRMB is in the process of preparing a combined

water allocation plan for the Northern and Central Adelaide Plains area.

http://www.legislation.sa.gov.au/LZ/C/A/Natural%20Resources%20Management%20Act%202004.aspx


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1997- 2000 2000 Water Allocation Plan 1999 Mclaren Vale Prescribed Wells Area gazetted

2000 Water Allocation Plan

2001-05 2004 Review of 2000 Water Allocation Plan & proposal statement

2004 Kangaroo Flat proposal statement

2004 Review of 2000 Water Allocation Plan

2005-10 2007 Water Allocation Plan

Collaborative dynamics in groundwater planning

The following section examines the collaborative dynamics in the groundwater planning

processes relating to the North Adelaide Plains and McLaren Vale Prescribed Wells

Areas. The analysis focuses on the period between 1997, when catchment water

management boards were established, and 2007 when the second water allocation plan

for the McLaren Vale area was completed. The analysis concentrates on collaborative

processes covering water availability and allocation issues, because these have been the

most important and difficult issues to be resolved in collaborative groundwater planning6.

Much of the analysis is drawn from the interviews with 15 irrigator and community

representatives and officials.

Engagement and interactions in groundwater planning processes

Engagement in groundwater planning processes in South Australia occurs through semi-

formal mechanisms, including advisory committees, broader community consultation

meetings, and through informal networking. Communication between government

agencies and the advisory committees and the community occurs in a variety of ways

which are explored in a later section.

WAPACs play a major role in the engagement of local communities and groundwater

planning7. Members are invited to apply and are selected and appointed by the NRM

boards. The advisory committees generally meet about 4 times a year. The McLaren

Vale committee met more frequently during the negotiation of the first McLaren Vale

water allocation plan. The North Adelaide Plain advisory committee consists of six

industry and three state representatives, with one local government representative and one

from SA Water. The McLaren Vale advisory committee includes six industry, four

community, and four government representatives8.

6 The analysis largely excludes other issues covered in the water allocation planning processes, including

water dependent ecosystems, water transfers, aquifer storage recovery and monitoring. 7 Following the passage of the Natural Resource Management Act 2004, water allocation? committees

CHECK have been renamed water allocation planning advisory committees 8 The irrigation sector can be divided into different commodities, different levels of use (active, in

active)and different resource mixes (bore, recycled, mains). The government sector can also be divided

into different groups; catchment and state. The state government can be subdivided into

technical/scientific, licensing and policy.


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WAPAC members in both of the regions considered that the committees provided good

opportunities to learn about other participants’ interests, concerns and values. There was

plenty of opportunity for members to put their views on the table, and the discussions

were open and frank. Relevant information, including scientific studies and information

gained from practical experience were also put on the table9.

In the North Adelaide Plains the WAPAC members developed a much improved

understanding about aquifers, their connections and acceptable yield and pumping limits.

The difficulty of arriving at an acceptable yield for the North Adelaide Plain is

complicated by the exclusion of the Kangaroo flat area from the 2000 plan, and

subsequent expansion of the unregulated pumping in Kangaroo flat which is connected to

the North Adelaide Plain aquifer. Recently the position has been complicated further by

proposals to amalgamate the North Adelaide Plain and Central Adelaide Plain planning

areas. Outside the WAPAC there seems to be less consensus than in the Committee.

In McLaren Vale there was less controversy about information concerning the acceptable

yield from the aquifer and its implications. The area is relatively small and water use is

not very diverse. Zonal differences in the intensity of groundwater use were addressed in

trading rules. One area of continuing uncertainty was the impact of pumping east of the

fault line that divides the eastern segments of the basin from the wine irrigation areas in

the West. The greatest area of debate both in the WAPAC and the community concerned

the water requirements of different crops and consequent allocations of available water.

Commitment

In both the North Adelaide Plains and Mclaren Vale members of the WAPACs have

developed mutual respect and trust, and also agree on the common objectives of

sustainable water use and conserving the aquifer. It has been more difficult to get

agreement on the pathways to achieve these objectives, especially on the distribution of

cuts in water entitlements.

In the North Adelaide Plains some interviewees argued out that the value of water

entitlements is reflected in land and property values, and that growers should be

compensated for any reduction in entitlements to current levels of use, even if it is not

proposed to cut water use itself. However the State government has refused to consider

compensation or entitlement buyback. Another contentious issue is the mixture of

groundwater and recycled treated effluent from the Bolívar plant, which supplies some

(or all) of the water supply for many irrigators. Bolívar water is more salty than

groundwater, but when users contract for supplies of Bolívar water their bore water

9 The same scientific consultant provided advice to both the North Adelaide Plains and McLaren Vale committees. In

both cases it is difficult to estimate an aquifer sustainable yield and in any event makes more sense to talk about an

acceptable yield (Richardson et al 2010).


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allocation may be reduced to bring their overall allocation into line with historical use.

This provides a disincentive against contracting for recycled water.

Irrigator representatives have expressed frustration that a revised water allocation plan

has not been finalised following the review in 2003-04. This led some interviewees to

observe that there is a perception that the government’s commitment to the area has

diminished, a perception reinforced by a decrease in the number of committee meetings

and information releases to the community.

Participants in the McLaren Vale WAPAC and community consultations generally

thought that the views of other participants were reasonable and predictable. Participants

learned to respect each other’s views and to generally trust each other. They agreed on a

common objective of conserving the aquifer. It was more difficult to reach an agreement

on the acceptable yield, and even more difficult to agree on water allocations for different

crops. Viticulturalists eventually accepted a progressive cut in allocation from 1.8-1.1

ML/hectare. This was made possible by increasing irrigation efficiency and increasing

supplies of recycled water from the Christies Beach treatment plant. Almond growers

considered that their allocation of 2.8 ML/ hectare made their operations unviable, and

did not think that others understood their situation, but they were not sufficiently

numerous or influential to prevent the reduced allocations.

Capacity

When stakeholders agree on objectives and actions to achieve them, several factors

influenced their capacity to implement agreed actions including institutions and

procedures, leadership, knowledge, and resources.

Institutions and procedures

In both cases the there have been well-defined administrative procedures and adequate

funding. Meetings of the McLaren Vale WAPAC have been quite formal, with an

agenda and accompanying agenda papers. Committee decisions have generally been

followed up, although there have been some shortcomings and delays in follow-up in the

case of the North Adelaide Plains. In both cases informal communications between

WAPAC members and the community provided one of the main channels for community

members to provide views and feedback to the planning process. Both committees have

used a variety of strategies and media to inform their communities, including newsletters,

position papers, leaflets, internet material and word-of-mouth. Staff turnover and board

restructuring has interfered with the flow of information, and interpersonal relations and

trust, especially in the North Adelaide case.

In the North Adelaide Plains there have not been broad community consultation meetings

following the 2003-04 review. Grower members of the NAP WAPAC committee

explained that they did not want to go to the community until all the relevant facts about

the resource were available and the implications for water allocations could be presented


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clearly. Some committee members were concerned about adverse community reactions

to any cuts in entitlements and risks to their personal safety. The lack of community

consultation has excluded the Vietnamese and Cambodian grower communities who are

not represented in the WAPAC10

. More generally it has lead to community suspicion and

distrust of government intentions.

In the McLaren Vale case the Onkaparinga catchment management board organised

several community meetings in McLaren Vale to inform people about draft groundwater

plans and related issues, and to obtain community feedback. Several members of the

WAPAC represent broad community interests, and they took responsibility for making

information available to the community at strategic locations such as newsagents, post

offices and schools. These members have also been active in organising and publicising

community meetings.

Leadership

The Minister responsible for water provides high-level leadership for groundwater

planning in South Australia and approves water plans. The NRM Boards are responsible

for preparing groundwater plans. The NRM Board provides administrative leadership for

the WAPACs. The scientific and technical experts hired by the boards played an

important leadership role in improving knowledge for decision-making.

In the North Adelaide Plains the members of the WAPAC formed a coherent

collaborative group. The WAPAC chair and other grower representatives provided some

leadership in their communities, but some growers were not represented in the WAPAC

and growers remained a diffuse and to some degree divided group. Government

involvement has been coordinated but also discontinuous. Representation changed over

time as did the agenda of government agencies. These leadership weaknesses help to

explain why the 2000 water allocation plan is a relatively limited document that does not

tackle the overallocation of water entitlements in the region.

In the McLaren Vale the growers, community and representatives formed a coherent and

collaborative WAPAC, and this collaboration was extended into the wider community.

The difficult water allocation issues were tackled during the first planning period.

Knowledge

Two aspects of knowledge are important; capacity to integrate scientific and practical

knowledge, and the ability to act despite gaps in knowledge. WAPACs have provided an

arena for gathering, sharing and integrating knowledge in both the North Adelaide Plains

and McLaren Vale. Although users and community members were unable to fully

understand the language and scientific analysis presented to the committees, they learned

10 Attempts were made to include the Vietnamese and Cambodian communities in the WAPAC but it was difficult to

find a person to represent the diverse groups in the communities.


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to trust scientists and to accept the results of their analysis. Collaboration improved as a

result of the discussions about aquifers and their connections.

In the North Adelaide Plains case government officials and users respond in different

ways to gaps in knowledge about the impact of use on aquifers and related risks. These

differences have added a further dimension to mistrust between governments and the user

community. Government officials use uncertainties as an argument to justify reductions

in entitlements. Some users argue that current entitlements and use levels should be

maintained until adverse impacts can be proved. Some users emphasise the potential for

adverse impacts of salt in recycled water on orchards and crops. Government officials

and scientists argue that recycled water is relatively unlikely to have adverse effects.

In the McLaren Vale case too there are several knowledge gaps and uncertainty as

including the effects of pumping across the fault line, the impacts of forest plantings,

stock and domestic use, recycled water use, aquifer storage and recovery, and the effects

of trading. However, none of these issues was sufficiently important to undermine

agreement on the water sharing plans.

Resources

Stakeholders in the North Adelaide Plains and McLaren Vale cases commented that

resources, supplemented by NRM board levies were sufficient to support the planning

process. However, government representatives said that budget cuts are reducing the

capacity of the Department to support resource intensive water planning processes. The

recent closure of the department’s local office on the North Adelaide Plains, and the

reduction the frequency of reports about aquifer conditions are indications of the effect of

tighter departmental budgets.

Discussion and conclusions

The discussion and conclusions are divided into two parts. Firstly there is a summary of

the outcomes of collaborative groundwater governments in the two case studies, followed

by a brief discussion of reasons for the different progress towards sustainable

groundwater governance in the two cases. Secondly there is a brief consideration of the

relevance and usefulness of the analytical framework, together with some points that may

have wider relevance, beyond the cases presented in this paper.

Outcomes of collaborative groundwater governance in the North Adelaide Plains and McLaren Vale

The comparative analysis of factors affecting collaborative groundwater governance in

the North Adelaide Plains and McLaren Vale is summarised in table 2.


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Table 2: Comparison of Collaborative groundwater governance in the North

Adelaide Plains and McLaren Vale

Factors

North Adelaide Plain McLaren Vale

Engagement & interaction

Partial agreement on objectives, concepts and terminology

Delayed communication about results of negotiations. Criticism of government “withdrawal”.

Agreement on objectives

concepts and terminology (after long negotiation)

Good communication to affected community

Common understanding and commitment

Lack of agreement on necessity for action and path to reduce overallocation of entitlements

Distrust of government

Mixed role played by recycled water

Commitment to modest cuts in allocation based on “crop factors”. Objectors overruled.

Positive role played by recycled water

Procedures Good engagement and communication in the W(P)AC, weaker engagement outside the committee

Effective processes of engagement and communication inside and outside the WAPAC

Leadership Coherent leadership in WAPAC, more fragmented positions in the community, evolving government directions

Community criticism of (lack of) government decision-making

Coherent leadership in WAPAC the NRM board and Department

Knowledge Knowledge gaps and water quality issues delayed planning processes. Different emphasis on precaution by government and users

Knowledge gaps and water quality issues debated and resolved or put aside for resolution in later rounds

Outcomes Agreement in the WAPAC on goals and some issues but lack of agreement between government and users on path to reduced entitlements. Agreement inside the WAPAC not extended to the outside community

General agreement on both goals and a path to meet them inside and outside the WAPAC

In both cases the groundwater planning processes have led to better shared understanding

of the resources, and socio-economic and policy issues arising from resource use. In the

North Adelaide Plains in 2003-04 plans and policies were brought near to completion but

have not been finalised. Some growers perceive that State government efforts to secure

an agreement have declined, although government representatives do not share this

perception. In McLaren Vale the outcomes have been more complete. Reduced

allocations have been accepted by the community and adopted by the government. The

water allocation plans have given a good basis for further work.

In terms of progress towards sustainable entitlement levels the outcomes in the North

Adelaide Plains have been limited, although the efficiency of groundwater use, and use of

alternative sources of water has increased. The second round of planning stalled because

there is no ready solution to overallocation of entitlements. Now, the boundaries of the

North Adelaide Plains planning area are being enlarged, raising further water sharing

issues. In McLaren Vale there have been a range of positive outcomes including more


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efficient use of water by irrigators, restrictions on further bores and groundwater

allocations, and the development of recycled water.

There are several possible reasons why it has been easier to achieve an agreement on

sustainable groundwater use or a comprehensive water allocation plan in McLaren Vale

than in the North Adelaide Plains.

Firstly, the groundwater resource in the North Adelaide Plains is somewhat larger and

more complicated. The resource management boundaries are more contentious and still

evolving. Kangaroo flat was not included in the original water allocation plan, and the

water allocation plan for this area has still not been finalised. Connections with the

central Adelaide Plain not been closely considered until relatively recently. By contrast

the boundaries of the McLaren Vale resource are clear and the resource is relatively small

and contained.

Secondly, the user community in the North Adelaide Plains is larger and more diverse.

The growers on the North Adelaide Plains are quite diverse both in terms of crops and in

terms of sources of water. The community is also ethnically diverse, and some

communities are not well represented in the collaborative groundwater governance

process. The McLaren Vale community is more homogeneous. Commercial advantages

and the potential for increases in irrigation efficiency and use of recycled water have

supported concentration in the viticultural industry.

Thirdly the proposed reductions in water entitlements following resource assessments in

McLaren Vale were relatively small compared to the reductions proposed in the North

Adelaide Plains. Many viticulturists were adopting more water efficient practices, and

availability of recycled water helped growers to adapt to the reduced allocation. The

proposed reductions in the North Adelaide plain were larger and more contentious.

Fourthly, the water allocation committee in the North Adelaide Plains was largely made

up of industry representatives came to accept the need for cuts in entitlements, but were

unable to gain broad support from a diverse user community. Negotiations lost

momentum because of changes of government representatives, and delays in the planning

process. This resulted in frustration in the grower community and some loss of

confidence in the process. In McLaren Vale there were some leaders in the viticultural

community who strongly supported the water allocation planning process, and provided

leadership in their community. Moreover several members of the McLaren Vale

committee represented broad community interests and played an active role in

communication and community education.

Broader implications of the study

The analytical framework proposed by Emerson et al provides a relevant and useful

methodology and questions for the exploration of differences in the outcomes of

collaborative groundwater governance in the North Adelaide Plains and McLaren Vale.


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These cases confirm that there is a strong relationship between principled stakeholder

engagement and commitment to common action. Procedural factors and communication,

leadership, knowledge and resources all contribute significantly to collaborative

governance outcomes.

Four points emerge from this case study that may have a wider significance. Firstly it is a

relatively easy for stakeholders to agree on objectives, especially general objectives like

protecting an aquifer from long-term depletion. It is much more difficult for stakeholders

to agree on a path to achieve objectives. It is particularly difficult for a community to

agree on the need for and distribution of cuts to water use entitlements. The case for

reductions needs to be clear and unambiguous and it is important to include all users of

the resource in negotiations from an early stage, and to effectively communicate

information about the resource condition, implications for water allocations, water

sharing options and other related issues. Community leaders who are able to adopt and

effectively promote actions that take account of the values and interests of all of the

stakeholders play an important part in achieving positive outcomes.

Secondly, it is relatively easy to bring together many different kinds of knowledge, and to

use these constructively in a collaborative governance process. It is more difficult to deal

with knowledge gaps and uncertainties. Governments frame the risks of aquifer

drawdowns and mixing different sources of water, such as bore water and recycled water

in a different way from user communities. Therefore collaborative groundwater planning

should include a process to engage different views on uncertainties and risks, and to work

towards a common understanding of them. The information and knowledge demands of

groundwater governance are high, and ongoing investment is required. Grower levies

have provided an important source of funding in the South Australian cases.

Thirdly, the case studies lend some support to several propositions advanced by Robinson

et al about the characteristics of policy level collaborations. Grower representatives in

the North Adelaide Plains WAPAC certainly experience a two table problem – they come

to common understandings in the WAPAC which are difficult to uphold in their grower

communities. At the same time the McLaren Vale case study illustrate the potential for a

user community to resolve difficult water allocation problems consistent with the policy

objectives of the government.

Fourthly, collaborative dynamics is influenced by the characteristics of the problem,

practices, players and politics in particular cases (Young 2008). In the North Adelaide

Plains analysis of the resource condition is more complicated, overallocation of

entitlements is more long-standing and entrenched, the user community is more

fragmented. These factors have added to the difficulty of making a comprehensive water

allocation plan.

The case studies included in this paper provide quite a useful vehicle for testing a a

framework for collaborative governance. Nevertheless they also have some weaknesses.

First, most of the interviewees were drawn from the WAPACs. The positive view of the


16

committee members towards the stakeholder engagement process could reflect the

privileged position of committee members in terms of access to information and

government representatives. It would have been beneficial to interview a wider group of

committee and non-committee members. Secondly, it would be interesting to compare

the results in this study, with other case study comparisons from different institutional

settings. It would be particularly interesting if further case study comparisons could be

constructed to provide comparisons across a number of different studies.


17

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