COIN IN A BOX: Packaging a Wicked Problem, Richard J. Campbell and Conrad C. Crane, Sept. 2012.

1 COIN IN A BOX: PACKAGING A WICKED PROBLEM

COIN In a Box: Packaging a Wicked Problem

Richard J. Campbell and Conrad C. Crane

Author Note

Richard J. Campbell CIV, NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan (NTM-A), Counterinsurgency

Training Center – Afghanistan (CTC-A), Kabul. Mr. Campbell was the training developer at CTC-A

for 22 months. CTC-A will officially close 12 Oct. 2012.

Conrad C. Crane CIV, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, is the current director of the U.S.

Army Military History Institute. He was the lead author for The Army Field Manual 3-24 / Marine Corps

Warfighting Publication No. 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency (2006).

Acknowledgments: the author would like to thank Paul J. Roberts (COL, SF), Michael G. Murray II

(USMC, MAJ), Prayoot Charoenthep (DIA, GS-15), Conrad Crane (CIV, AWC), and Ben Connable

(RAND Corp.) for their guidance, insights, and exchange of ideas. Technical assistance was provided by

Nicholas J. L. Butler (CAN, CAPT) and Joseph M. Henson (US, CIV).

Comments or questions concerning this paper can be addressed to Nicholas J. L. Butler until 12

Oct. 2012. E-mail: [email protected]

Disclaimer: The opinions, recommendations, and conclusions in this report are those of the author, unless stated, referenced, or

cited otherwise. NATO, NTM-A, ISAF, CTC-A, the U.S. Government, and private companies affiliated with the author, or

agencies, offices, or organizations listed above is not responsible for the content. You the reader and end user are responsible for

determining the value of the information contained herein and the relationship it has to your environment, position, and assigned

tasks, duties, and responsibilities.

mailto:[email protected]


Abstract

Currently, three counterinsurgency (COIN) documents are being revised. The Allied Joint Doctrine AJP –

3.4.4, the United States (U.S.) Joint Publication (JP) 3.24, and U.S. Army / U.S. Marine Corps (USMC)

FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5. New insights, observations, and lessons learned, and a desire to enhance

synchronization and interoperability generated the revisions. Towards this end, several improvements

have already been adopted. The first phase of this project examined the utility of another potential

improvement. That is, a standardized instructional framework 1 for insurgency and counterinsurgency

based on a social continuum. The suggestion was examined by-way of meta-analysis and the results

indicated it is a valid instructional technique. The second phase of the project then looked at the feasibility

and efficacy of integrating a social continuum framework and sociocultural information into COIN

doctrine and planning. Four confounding problems were discovered that may hamper the integration of

any instructional framework into doctrine.

Keywords: instructional framework, social continuum, insurgency, counterinsurgency, logical lines of

operations, lines of effort, lines of operations, sociocultural factors, social sciences, intelligence products,

freedom of movement, ends, scope, core grievances, root causes, prerequisites, breaking point, end game

dynamics, comprehensive COIN, whole of government, systems perspective, population-centric.

1. The term ‗instructional framework‘ is being used to describe a foundational premise that curricula is based upon. Five things

are considered when developing curriculum. They are; the characteristics of the students; the characteristics of the instructors; the

context in which the training or instruction takes place; the content and / or material; and the overlap. This includes e-learning.


COIN In a Box: Packaging a Wicked Problem

―The search for scientific bases for confronting problems of social policy is bound to fail,

because of the nature of these problems. They are ‗wicked‘ problems, whereas science

has developed to deal with tame problems.‖ (Rittel and Webber, 1973, pg. 155)

The term wicked problem was introduced by Rittel in a seminar in 1967 and then later defined by

Rittel and Webber in a journal article 2 (1973). The article provided 10 ―distinguishing properties‖ that

separated societal problems or wicked problems apart from scientific and engineering problems. The

definition that was set forth described the complex interplay that occurs when people try to solve

problems for other people. For instance, the authors explained that when people are involved in problem

solving, there is an abundance of useless information, an absence of important information, a

preponderance of contradictory information, as well as a degree of consistency, inconsistency, and

changes along the way. Added to this, there is a lack of consensus about the actual problem and

disagreement about the solution, plus resistance to logical arguments, and scientific evidence. There is

however lots of support for individual goals and agendas instead of support for pro-social solutions.

(Rittel and Webber, pgs. 155-169) If a small group is satisfied or if one individual is happy, then many

more are not and the problem is still not solved.

If social violence or armed conflict were added to the definition of a wicked problem, an insurgency

might even be called a wicked problem. An insurgency is a social phenomenon with the aim of societal

change. The desired change is typically linked to politics, corruption, the economy, land, religion, or

tribal or ethnic divides. In essence, people want to make plans for other people and use violence to do so.

2. At the time, Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber were urban planners and attending the University of Berkley in California. The

article was titled; ―Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning‖ and was published by Policy Sciences. The thesis was that social

public planning problems could not be solved with a linear, analytical, systems, or step-by-step approach.


To understand the complexity of an insurgency, it must be put into context. The intent of an instructional

framework is to put a complicated topic, such an insurgency, into context. An instructional framework

helps students conceptualize and understand an abstract subject because an abstract subject often requires

an extended definition, but the definition and explanation have to be logical and make sense.

For instructional purposes, this project looked at the validity of using a social continuum to describe

an insurgency. For instance, at one end of the continuum there is a functional society with an efficient

government and governance, a productive economic system, societal growth and development, social

rules and laws, adequate services, safety and security, an effective police force, and a judiciary system

that works. Moving along the same continuum there is, more or less, a dysfunctional society with obvious

social unhappiness and unrest, a weak under developed economy, few services, civil disapproval,

corruption and patronage, nonviolent public protest, government indifference, ineffective policing, and

societal disturbances and disobedience. At the far end of the continuum there are mass mutinies, a failed

economy, public riots and revolt, no services, almost non-existent policing, limited safety and security,

lack of government, civic revolution, subversion, violence, armed conflicts, and terrorism.

If a social continuum can be utilized to describe an insurgency it would have several benefits. The

benefits for U.S., NATO, international, and host nation instructors and students would be:

An established commonly accepted lexicology.

An explainable framework that places insurgency in context.

A relevant societal based method of evaluation and assessment.

Standardization, Quality Control (QC), and Quality Assurance (QA).

Cross domain consistency: i.e. diplomatic – stability – military – civilian.

A step beyond a military centric approach when conducting a counterinsurgency.

The support of a more flexible yet concise polythetic approach for insurgency and COIN.


Research Question

Can a social continuum framework be used to enhance the understanding of an insurgency? Or as

explained by Irregular Warfare (IW) literature, is there a collaborative framework that can help combined

and joint forces to ―understand, plan, act, assess, and adapt in concert with U.S. Government (USG)

interagency and multinational partners and the host nation‖ 3 to solve an insurgency? (2010, pg. 5)

Perhaps the word ‗solve‘ is incorrect, if we accept Rittel‘s and Webber‘s definition of a wicked problem.

Their definition says a wicked problem cannot be solved. If a social continuum framework is a valid

collaborative framework can it then be successfully used for COIN? The question has two parts. The first

is about utility and the second is about feasibility, or is it truly impossible to solve a wicked insurgency?

A review of literature or large scale meta-analysis, will attempt to answer the first part of these questions.

If a social continuum is validated as an instructional framework then feasibility and efficacy of the

instructional method will be explored.

Method

Materials

The meta-analysis of COIN references utilized primary and secondary references. The primary

references included nine international military COIN manuals, 10 scholarly research articles, papers, or

studies, and five contemporary books about insurgency, COIN, subversion, and terrorism. More

specifically, one military manual from each of the following countries were used; Australia, Canada,

Great Britain, France, and Germany, three U.S. manuals, and a concept paper. The nine manuals were

published between 2006 and 2011. Primary references also included 10 academic articles from between

2005 to 2012. Each of these used multiple cases, studies, or reports, or was a straightforward meta-

analysis. For example, one was a case study of 17 insurgencies; another was a case study of 30

3. Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats Joint Operating Concept, v.2.0 (May, 2010).


insurgencies; one more used six case profiles; yet another used 10 research papers and a meta-analysis of

89 insurgencies; and one more was an analysis of 648 terrorist groups. Five contemporary books were

also used as primary references. The books were either specifically about COIN or a very similar topic

like terrorism or state violence and were published between 2010 and 2012. Each of the books cited and

referenced sources of data and supported observations and conclusions with more than anecdotal evidence

(see Appendix A, Figure A1 for the list of primary references).

Secondary references consisted of 15 separate U.S. Military manuals and five documents on IW. The

secondary references were examined for supporting or peripheral information about U.S. Title 10, Title

22, security assistance and security cooperation, stability operations, insurgency, COIN, intelligence, joint

and tactical level planning, and implementation (see Appendix A, Figure A2 for the list of secondary

manuals and IW documents).

Procedures

Of the three types of primary references, the military manuals were reviewed first. During the

examination the best practices, good factors, means of resolution, recommendations and suggestions,

principles, tenets, imperatives, improvements, lessons learned, effective COIN practices, and conclusions

were located, extracted, and documented. The examination produced nine different lists (see Appendix B,

Figure B1 and Figure B2 for the lists from each manual). The third step was the meta-analysis of the

accumulated lists. The meta-analysis contrasted and compared the gathered information concentrating on

similarities, a pattern, or patterns, and redundant themes. The examination revealed five recurring themes

or persistent categories from the lists. The separate information from each list was categorized

respectively into the five categories and the results were posted on a plot chart. Redundant words, terms,

and phrases from the different lists were not re-posted a second or third time; however new additions

were added to the plot chart. The reemerging categories that were exposed by the meta-analysis were;

plans / operations; safety / security; stability / development; information / intelligence; and government /


Safety Security

Info / Intel Stab/Dev

Plan/Ops

Govt. Gover

IW Core ActivitiesCT, UW, FID, COIN, SOIW Key ActivitiesStrat-Com / IOPsy-OPsIntel / InfoCIV-MilCT OPsSupport Law

Strat-Com / IO

Psy-OPs

CIV-Mil

Support Law

Cultural / Regional

CT OPs

Figure 1

SO

FID

FM 3-24 COINLegitimate GovUnity of EffortPolitical PrimaryUnderstand EnviroIntel drives OPsSeparate INS popSecurity / Rule / LawLong TermManage InfoAppropriate ForceLearn & Adapt

Grievances

JP 3-24 COINUnderstand OE LegitimacyUnity of EffortPolitical PrimaryIntel Drives OPsINS Isolate Security / RoLLong TermManage Info Appropriate ForceLearn & AdaptLowest LevelSupport HN

Gov Capacity

FM 3-24.2Attacking INS StrategyGov LegitimacyControl Area / Secure PopOPs from HN Area of StrengthHN Expand OPsInfo Engagement Pop SupportDiscredit INS Propaganda

INS Strategy

Secure Pop

Australian COINPolitical Primacy LegitimacyComprehensive ApproachIntelligenceReinforce Rule LawGood GovernanceDominant NarrativeIsolate the INSPresenceAdaptationHN Primacy

Great Britain AFM COINPrimacy of PoliticalUnity of EffortHuman TerrainSecure PopulationNeutralize InsurgentsGain Popular SupportOperate Within LawIntegrate IntelLong Term & Learn Adapt

Human Terrain

Control Areas

Canadian COINPolitical primacyUnity of PurposeComplex DynamicsExploit Intel / InfoSeparate INSNeutralize INSSustain CommitmentLong Term Planning

German COINSocial AffairsPolice / MilitaryAdmin / LawEconomy / InfraEnviron / Health

French COINCut-off INS PopMobilize PopPrevent ComebackShelter Inaccessible

Primacy of Political

Police / Military

Understand OE

Isolate INS

Unity of Effort

Gain Pop Support

Economy / Infra

Environ / Health

Long Term

Support HN

Discredit INS Propaganda

Good Gov

Advisers

Learn / Adapt

Build Capacity

Oil Spot

OP Within Law

Gov Legitimacy

Admim / Law

1

Exploit Intel

Intel Drives Ops

Manage Info OPs

Appropriate Force

Neutralize INS

governance (see Figure 1 above for the results of the first meta-analysis).

The rest of the primary references were next. This included the 10 academic research articles, papers,

or studies, and the five scholarly publications. Each of the steps described above were repeated for the

research articles and then the books. During the second and third meta-analyses the same reoccurring

categories were observed in the lists for the articles and books (see Appendix B, Figure B3, Figure B4,

and Figure B5 for the lists from the research articles and Figure B6 for the lists from the books). The plot

chart was then up-dated with the accumulated words, terms, and phrases from the rest of the primary


Plan/Ops

Stab/DevSafety

Security

Govt. Gover

Info / Intel

Support Law Psy-OPs

CIV-MilCT OPs

Cultural / Regional

Strat-Com / IO

Stability Operations

Grievances

Gov Capacity

FID

Secure Pop

INS Strategy

Development

Policing

Pacification

Oil Spot

Legit Force

Democracy

Primacy of Political

Border Control

Amnesty / Rewards

Basic Services

Grievances

Reduce Corruption

Separate INS

Human Rights

Law Enforcement

Pop Focused

Political Process

Secure Areas

Expand Security

Isolate INS

Single Auth

Reintegration

Militias

Advisers

Sanctuaries Denied

Emphasis Intel

How Insurgencies End, 2012Embracing Fog of War, 2012Assessing Freedom of Movement, 2012COIN Scorecard, 2011Victory Has a Thousand Fathers, 2010How Terrorist Groups End, 2008War by Others Means, 2008Analytic Support to Intelligence, 2008Money in the Bank, 2007Heads We Win, 2007Subversion and Insurgency, 2007Best Practices in COIN, 2005

Human Terrain

Understand OE

Unity of Effort

Discredit INS Propaganda

Long Term

Gain Pop Support

Economy / Infra

Environ / Health

Support HN Control Areas

Police / Military

OP Within Law

Gov Legitimacy

Admim / Law

Good or Effective Gov

Oil Spot

Expand

Expand Security

Small Business

Education

Narrative

Messaging

1st With Truth

Info OPs

Multi Lines

Info / Intel

Learn / Adapt

Build Capacity

Build Capacity

Build Capacity

Build Capacity

Build Capacity

Figure 2

Economy

Context

Context

COIN Assessment All-source Analysis

Intel Drives OPs

Irregular Warfare Strategy

Counter Violence

Counter Violence

Air Dominance

2 Strategic Commo 3 Support factors

One Democracy Factor

Sufficient Strength

Competent Gov

Positive Relations w/Pop

Improvements

Perception of Security

Kill or Capture

2

How Insurgencies End, 2012Embracing Fog of War, 2012Terrorism Studies A Reader, 2012Understanding COIN Doctrine Operations and Challenges, 2010Rethinking Violence States and Non-state Actors in Conflict, 2010

Tipping Point

Deny Sponsorship

Deny Sanctuary

Metrics

Counter-Ideology Shape-Clear-Hold

IW Strategy

Weak State = violence

Small Local Projects

Investments

references (see Figure 2 above for the final display of terms, words, and phrases).

Discussion

From an instructional and institutional stance, it does appear that the stratification of an insurgency

into socially based categories could be beneficial. A social continuum could establish a standardized

framework and support QC and QA efforts. The terms and definitions used to explain an insurgency and

COIN might also be enhanced. For instance, the idea of a weak state, failing state, or small minded state

could easily be explained with a social continuum framework. Other topics like the difference between a


freedom fighter and an insurgent could also be discussed. In the U.S., a social continuum can easily be

reconciled with the IW Joint Operating Concept (JOC) 3, other IW and USAID documents

4, and civilian

publications about insurgency, violence, and underdeveloped states 5. Studying a community from this

viewpoint also supports stability approaches to instability. The layers of society, just like the layers of an

onion, can be peeled back further with a social framework explanation. A social network analysis and

cognitive behavioral analyses would be the next layers. It is also interesting to note that the five repetitive

categories identified during the meta-analyses were very similar to the logical lines of operations, lines of

effort, and lines of operations used in COIN doctrine 6. If a social continuum is used as a standardized

instructional framework it would support the integration of the conceptual social sciences into COIN

doctrine, as suggested by the Defense Science Board Task Force 7 (DSBTF, 2011) and as mentioned in

the Review of Stability Operations Information Centers in Afghanistan 8 (2011).

3. Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats Joint Operating Concept, v.2.0 (May, 2010).

4. National Strategy For The United States (2002); Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, v.2.0 (2005); National Security

Strategy Of The United States Of America (2006); Quadrennial Review (Feb. 2006); The Irregular Warfare Special Study (Aug.

2006); The Irregular Warfare Roadmap (Sep. 2006); Quadrennial Roles and Missions Report (2009); Joint Publication 3-24

COIN Operations (2009); Posture Statement of Admiral William H. McRaven Before the 112th Congress Senate Armed Services

Committee (2012); USAID Policy Framework 2011-2015, U. S. Agency for International Development Washington D.C.

5. Chenoweth and Lawrence (2010) in ―Rethinking Violence‖ cite Fearon and Laitin ―Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War‖; R.

Brubaker and D. D. Laitin, ―Ethic and Nationalist Violence,‖ Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 24 (Aug. 1998); I. W. Zartmen

ed., Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, Boulder Colo. Lynne Rienner (1995); R. I.

Rotberg, ed. When States Fail: Causes and Consequences, Princeton, N.J. Princeton University Press (2004); M. A. Kocker,

―Insurgency, States, Capacity, and the Rural Basis of Civil War‖, Yale University (Oct. 2007); W. Rosenau, Subversion and

Insurgency, Rand Corp. (2007); D. C. Gompert and J. Gordon, Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for

Counterinsurgency, Rand Corp. (2008); G. H. McCormick, S. B. Horton & L. A. Harrison, Things Fall Apart: The ‗End game‘

Dynamics of Internal Wars (2006).

6. U.S. Army FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5 COIN, pg. 5-3 (2006); U.S. Army FM 3-24.2 Tactics in COIN, pg. 3-8 (2009); U.S. Joint

Publication 3-24 COIN Operations, pg. IX-7 (2009); NATO AJP 3.4.4, Allied Joint Doctrine for COIN, pg. 4-9 (2011).

7. Office of the Sectary of Defense, Final Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense Intelligence –

Counterinsurgency Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Operations (2011).

8. Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Review of Stability Operations Information Centers in Afghanistan Draft

Report, FOUO (2011).


Should a standardized framework be used to explain an insurgency and should it be integrated into

COIN doctrine? Do COIN instructors, students, host nation, supporting forces and other elements really

need a uniform framework? Has the lack of a consistent educational framework for COIN caused

problems? The answer to each of these questions is yes.

When an individual from a NATO contributing country is supporting a country with an insurgency

and that person says they are the intervening counterinsurgent, or says the overarching objective of

NATO and U.S. COIN is to control the population and control groups within the population, there is

definitely a problem and it needs to be addressed 9. NATO Security Assistance missions and U.S.

Security Force Assistance, Foreign Internal Defense, Internal Defense and Development, and Stability

Operations are not intended to control populations, nor are they designed to develop control over

population groups 10

. These statements appear to be out of context and are misleading. The intent of

NATO and U.S. COIN in the context stated above is to support, assist, train, mentor, monitor, and above

all educate host nation counterparts, so they can understand their insurgency, and then deal with their

insurgency. NATO and U.S. forces and supporting elements are unequivocally not the counterinsurgents.

The host nation government, military, police, and other elements within the host nation are the

counterinsurgents. Ownership of the wicked problem needs to be clear to all, as well as the responsibility

for the success or failure of COIN efforts.

Although clarifying and standardizing NATO and U.S. Government guidance are outside the purview

of this project the examples above reinforce the need for standardized curricula developed from concise,

informative, and correct doctrine. An approved instructional framework helps instructors, students, host

nation, and supporting elements on the ground understand the context in which they are operating in and

provides them with the correct language to discuss problems.

9. David J. Kilcullen, Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency (2006); U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide (2009).

10. Mark Ulrich, Cutting the Gordian Knott, The Counterguerrilla‘s Guide to Defeating Insurgencies and Conducting Populist

Centric Operations (Draft, 2010).


Research Question

The results of the meta-analysis indicated that a social continuum could be quite beneficial as an

instructional framework for insurgency curriculum. Therefore the next questions that were addressed

were; how feasible would it be to integrate the instructional framework into doctrine? And what would

hamper or help the integration of a social continuum into doctrine?

Method

Materials

The second phase of the project examined two sets of documents. The first set of references were

U.S. intelligence manuals which included; JP 2-0 Joint Intelligence (2007), U.S. Army FM 2-0

Intelligence (2010), and TC 2-50 Intelligence Officer‘s Handbook (2010). The second set of references

was described earlier (see Appendix A, Figure A2 for the list of secondary manuals and IW documents).

Procedures

The feasibility study focused on the sociocultural content already in doctrine, the quality of that

content, and the prospect of clarifying or enriching that content. With the intent in mind, the three

intelligence documents were reviewed for any content that formally connected information and

intelligence to COIN operations and planning. Each of the listed U.S. manuals was then examined in an

attempt to gather enough information about the joint planning process to produce a graphic

representation. A graphic display would show the layers of the planning process, expose the complexities,

and would improve the overall analysis. It was also thought, for the sake of brevity, that a graphic

representation would be useful since 15 primary documents explained the COIN planning process or

aspects of it and eight others contained supporting content. This was estimated to be well over 2000 pages

of information. Although much of the written content had to be reviewed anyway, interlinking illustrative


slides would be the most proficient way to display the joint planning process for COIN. Six slides were

used to present the process from top to bottom or from the state department / diplomatic level to the joint

level (see Appendix C, Figure C1 through Figure C6 for the graphic representation).

Results

During the feasibility study, four potential problems or deficiencies were noted that might confound

efforts to integrate a social continuum framework into doctrine 11

. The first problem was that certain terms

and definitions associated with sociocultural information were neither standardized in COIN doctrine nor

nested within other doctrine that supported COIN. The second deficiency was that JP 2-0 Joint

Intelligence (2007), U.S. Army FM 2-0 Intelligence (2010), and TC 2-50 Intelligence Officer‘s Handbook

(2010) had minimal information about COIN and even fewer COIN terms. In the same three manuals the

term ‗Irregular Warfare‘ was only used twice and was neither explained nor defined. These findings were

significant and rather surprising because two of the publications were relatively new and intelligence was

supposed to drive COIN operations. The third problem was directly connected to the first two. If the first

or second deficiencies mentioned above were corrected, it would create a chain reaction. If one

publication was corrected, then several other manuals would have to be corrected. The fourth deficiency

was based on the theoretical underpinnings of COIN in U.S. Government and military doctrine. Lack of

an explanation in one and inconsistency and ambiguity in the others were the issues. Each of these four

problems will be explored in greater detail.

The first confounding problem was based on lexicology, conceptualization, and the lack of consistent

definitions and guidance about information, data, and / or intelligence generated by the social sciences.

An explanation for IW and a standardized definition for it were generally missing too. A definition for the

sociocultural factors was found in the JP 1-02 DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (2012)

11. The terms ‗potential problem‘ and ‗deficiencies‘ were used for lack of a better term.


and the same definition was used in JP 2-01.3 Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment

(2009). However, the definitions in the U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide (2009), JP 3-24

Counterinsurgency Operations, and the Defense Science Board Task Force (DSBTF, 2011) were

different. JP 2-0 Joint Intelligence (2007), FM 2-0 Intelligence (2010), and TC 2-50.5 Intelligence

Officer‘s Handbook (2010) did not use the term sociocultural factors at all. This brought-up the question

of whether or not the three intelligence manuals were relevant in a COIN environment. FM 2-0

Intelligence (2010) did have a definition for the term civil considerations (pg. 1-8). The three different

sociocultural definitions are listed below.

―sociocultural factors — The social, cultural, and behavioral factors characterizing the

relationships and activities of the population of a specific region or operational environment.‖

(JP 1-02 Dept. of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated terms, 2012, pg. 305)

(JP 2-01.3 Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment, 2009, pg. GL-9)

Sociolcultural factors: ―society, social structure, culture, power, and authority and interests.‖

(JP 3-24 Counterinsurgency Operations, 2009, pg. xxii & pg. VIII-3)

―social science disciplines (anthropology, ethnography, human geography, sociology,

socialpsychology, political science, and economics).‖ (Defense Science Board Task Force,

2011, pg. 48)

An explanation for the lack of a definition for the term sociocultural factors, in intelligence doctrine,

might be that ―Intelligence products are generally placed in one of seven production categories‖ (JP 2-0,

2007, pg. I-16). The sociocultural factors were not one of the categories. FM 2-0 Intelligence (2010)

restated the fact that there were seven production categories. TC 2-50 Intelligence Officer‘s Handbook


said, ―Army unit intelligence staffs produce and receive, directly or indirectly, six categories of

intelligence support from the U.S. intelligence community‖ (2010, pg. 1-3). However many intelligence

products there are, the sociocultural factors did not seem to fall into any of the categories. In fact, none of

the different definitions for the sociocultural factors fit the descriptions for the categories of intelligence

products. This generated the following questions: Should an eighth production category be devised to fill

this gap? Or should a new category be created for information pertinent to COIN operations?

The discovery initiated a broader look at key COIN terms and definitions. The examination led to the

discovery of the second deficiency. That is, intelligence doctrine contained very little COIN related

Sociocultural factors: @ @ $ @ $ @ $ @

Freedom of movement: @ @ $ @ @

Ends scope: @ $

Core grievances: @ $ @

Root causes: @ @ $ @ $

Prerequisites: @ $

Breaking point: @ $

Comprehensive COIN: @ $ @ $ @ $ @ $

Systems perspective: @ @ $ @ @ $ @ $ @ $

End game dynamics:

@ = Used $ = Defined

US GOV JP 3-24 JP 1-02 JP 2-01.3 JP 2-0 FM 3-24 FM 2-0 TC 2-50

3

Figure 3


information. The investigation of key terms started with a list of what was thought to be significant terms

and concepts that were found in COIN doctrine and would be used in COIN curriculum. The list was

based on the researcher‘s understanding of COIN and personal experiences. It was in no way an official

list. From there, the list of significant terms was cross referenced in several official COIN publications to

see if they were used and defined. The list included; freedom of movement, ends, scope, core grievances,

root causes, prerequisites, breaking point, comprehensive COIN, systems perspective, and end game

dynamics. The list could have included many more terms such as; irregular warfare, civil military

operations, sanctuaries, safe havens, tipping point, and non-state actors and so on, depending upon the

theoretical slant (see Figure 3 on the previous page for the results of cross referencing).

According to the unofficial list of terms, the three U.S. COIN references were not standardized. The

matrix (Figure 3) shows some of the terminology gaps in the three COIN publications and exposes even

greater gaps in the examined intelligence doctrine. Intelligence and information are supposed to support

COIN operations, and intelligence is supposed to drive COIN operations. Numerous scholarly reports,

studies, and papers, and many U.S. and International military manuals have stressed this point for some

time now, but the fact was missing in all three intelligence publications. It might be wise to note these

deficiencies, so they can be corrected and so COIN and intelligence doctrine can be better synchronized

and the concepts nested in field manuals and joint publications.

The third problem was directly linked to the first two problems. U.S. Security Force Assistance and

Foreign Internal Defense arrangements with other countries are multifaceted and involve various

elements, agencies, departments, and organizations on both sides. A social continuum framework and the

five mutually supporting categories support one another and makeup the whole. If one area is affected

then there are consequences in other areas. This would include doctrine. Changes to security doctrine, for

example, would affect planning and operations doctrine, and information and intelligence doctrine. COIN

efforts have to be unified and synchronized, so they can support each other. To solve this ripple effect,


perhaps several JPs and FMs should be revised simultaneously or in conjunction with each other, or

perhaps one document should be designated as the primary reference and the others follow.

The fourth problem that was uncovered during the feasibility study was the theoretical foundations

of COIN that were in doctrine, or were not in doctrine. Today COIN is an important topic, so one would

hope that COIN doctrine was based on substantiated hypothesis, or something even more profound like

scientific evidence. The gold standard in psychology and psychiatry are hypotheses or theories that have

been proven with cross cultural validation studies. To this scientific community this is proof of concept.

By now one would think that COIN guidance and doctrine were based on such evidence.

The DSBTF Report (2011) recommended that the Intelligence Community (IC) develop intelligence

requirements for COIN that encompassed four specific needs; support for current and near-term

operations, and support for population-centric and whole of government approaches 12

(2011, pg. 62).

Before any authority in the IC can develop intelligence requirements for COIN, in some way shape or

form COIN concepts have to be integrated into intelligence doctrine. This first step has to be done before

the second step. This should include a theoretical or better yet a scientific foundation.

The DSBTF Report (2011) also suggested that the U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide ―is

used as a starting point for doctrine.‖ (2009, pg. 62) Just like the previous suggestion this one needs to be

revisited, or several caveats need to be added. The recommended caveats are below.

1. The U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide (2009) appeared to use the term

counterinsurgent rather loosely. From the diplomat to the private the correct usage should be; the

host nation has invited NATO and U.S. support agencies and forces to assist them with their

insurgency. NATO and U.S. agencies and servicemen and women are not counterinsurgents.

12. Office of the Sectary of Defense, Final Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense Intelligence –

Counterinsurgency Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Operations (2011).


2. The U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide (2009) said the intent of COIN was to control

the population and groups within the population. These statements support claims that NATO and

U.S. forces invade and occupy other countries with the intent of colonization. The guidance may

need to be examined and clarified.

3. The cross referencing of the unofficial list of COIN terms indicated that the U.S. Government

Counterinsurgency Guide (2009) might be lacking. IW information was nil since the term IW was

used only once and was not explained.

4. There did not seem to be any theoretical or scientific basis for the guidance in U.S. Government

Counterinsurgency Guide (2009), other than an ―intellectual framework‖ (Preface). This

observation was based on a review of the guidebook and the fact that there were not any citations

or references listed in the U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guidebook (2009).

If the COIN Guidebook (2009) is used as a starting point for doctrine then it might be wise to revise

the COIN Guidebook (2009) first. If so, hopefully the revision would include a validated theory,

increased clarity, citations, and references. A theory that is proven and understood increases consistency

and interoperability and obviously enhances chances of success. Unproven theories or guesses produce

confusion, conflicts, and less chances of success. This brings up yet another question: What academic

construct is being used for the three COIN manuals that are currently being revised?

Perhaps the JP 3-24 Counterinsurgency Operations (2009) and FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency (2006)

should be contrasted and compared with the COIN Guidebook (2009) because the first two documents

had more concise and referenced material than the COIN Guidebook (2009). Several observations support

this claim. First, the work of McCormick, Horton and Harrison (2006) and Hoffman (2007) were


referenced and used correctly. The terms ―ends‖ or ―end game dynamics‖ 13

and ―ways and means‖ 14

are

proof (JP 3-24, pgs. xi, II-3 & II-4). The JP 3-24 also used the McCormick, Horton and Harrison (2006)

term ―breakpoint‖ or ―breaking point‖ (JP 3-24, pgs. xiv, II-28 & II-29), and briefly discussed the idea of

―decelerating decline‖ 13

(JP 3-24, pgs. II-28 & II-29). However, the concept was not fully explained. A

more detailed explanation would have included, ―tipping point‖, and the ―accelerating decline‖ 13

for the

state. Second, the JP 3-24 also used IW terminology and referenced an IW Strategic Guidance Policy, an

IW Joint Publication, and several IW Service Publications 15

. Thirdly, the JP 3-24 somewhat supported a

polythetic approach, but did not actually say so. This was evident with the references to the U.S. Agency

for International Development (USAID) term ―fragile state‖ 16

which USAID still uses today 17

.

As far as application, Christopher, Colin, and Grill (2010) said, they were impressed with the material

in FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency (2006). In fact, in their opinion ―FM 3-24 receives strong

empirical support‖ (2010, pg. 60). The authors statements were based on a quantitative test of

performance for ―20 distinct approaches to COIN‖ (2010, pg. xiv). The authors further described the

―population-centric‖ approach in FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency as a ―blend of classic and

contemporary COIN thinking‖ 18

(2010, pg. 58). However, a word search for the term ‗population-centric‘

reveals that there are more definition, cross referencing, and nesting problems with the term if it is used.

At this point it is not known whether or not the theoretical construct from the JP 3-24 (2009) or FM 3-24 /

MCWP 3-33.5 (2006) will be used in the revised manuals.

13. McCormick G. H., Gordon H., Steven B. Horton, and Laruen A. Harrison. Things Fall Apart: The Endgame Dynamics of

Internal Wars. Third World Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 2, 2007, pp 321-367.

14. Hoffman, F. G. Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars. Arlington, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007.

15. DODD 3000.07, Irregular Warfare; JP 3-05, Joint Special Operations; JP 3-26, Counterterrorism; FM 3-05.201, Special

Forces Unconventional Warfare Operations; FM 7-98, Operations in a Low-Intensity Conflict.

16. United States Agency for International Development‘s (USAID‘s) Fragile States Strategy (2005).

17. USAID Policy Framework 2011-2015, United States Agency for International Development‘s Washington D.C.

18. Christopher P., P. Clarke and B. Grill (2010). Victory has a Thousand Fathers, Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency.

RAND Corporation, Santa Monica CA.


Discussion

To improve COIN doctrine, the institutional management of COIN, and COIN instruction, a

standardized instructional framework should be considered. Formal development, integration, and

evaluation are parts of that process. It is further suggested that a social continuum, as briefly described in

this paper, is considered as the basis of a COIN instructional framework. The results of the meta-analyses,

as illustrated, support these two recommendations. These suggestions would indeed package COIN more

appropriately, improve management, and facilitate delivery.

The subsequent investigation directed towards feasibility and efficacy of a social continuum revealed

that there were several obstacles that might impede the integration of any instructional framework into

COIN doctrine. The first hurdle was COIN doctrine itself. Terms and concepts need to be standardized

and coordinated across various domains, and then nested accordingly in other doctrine. Synchronization

and nesting of content at different levels of the U.S. Government is needed too. Doctrine for such an

important and far researching topic should never be developed in a vacuum. Since three important COIN

manuals are being revised right now, this is the most opportune time to accomplish a multiple level, multi

service, cross domain revision and put COIN in a box. Definitions can be standardized, concepts can be

clarified, information and procedures coordinated, and cross referenced, and shared for the betterment of

doctrine, and for the benefit of society.

The second barrier is information and intelligence doctrine. As demonstrated, the three intelligence

references that were examined had very little COIN related content. From this observation it would seem

that information and intelligence doctrine has some major gaps to overcome before it can support COIN

or drive COIN operations fully and thoroughly. Lack of progress in this area has already been noted 19

.

Because of the high profile nature of Intelligence in COIN, one would think these deficiencies would

19. Michael T. Flynn, Matt Pottinger, and Paul D. Batchelor, Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in

Afghanistan (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, January 2010)


have already been addressed and that intelligence related COIN content would have been developed,

vetted, packaged, and passed on. This does not seem to be the case. The conclusions in this paper

pertaining to intelligence were drawn from the cited material. There may be other published references

that counter these conclusions. More research and study seems to be needed to identify and then rectify

the perceived problems.

The third obstacle is COIN content, nesting, synchronization, and the ripple effect. If the deficiencies

above are corrected, then concurrently or in sequence other doctrine will also have to be revised. This

would include information and intelligence, planning and operations, stability and development, and

government and governance. Multiple players on a battlefield going different directions with different

guidance, and information, different agendas, and goals accomplish absolutely nothing. Insurgents will try

to split the host nation government, military, police, and the population, and try to separate any element,

agency, or force that is assisting or supporting the host nation and / or government. Insurgents will

succeed at this task unless there is a coherent cohesive plan that everyone knows, understands, and

follows. Putting COIN in a box would provide a standardized set of words, terms, theories, concepts,

guidance, and end states.

The fourth deficiency that was uncovered related to the theoretical constructs that were found, or not

found in COIN doctrine, at multiple levels. This point was adequately discussed in the body of this work

and will therefore not be readdressed. However, at this time a fifth deficiency will be added to the list.

During the research phase of this project it was noticed that there was little COIN content designed

specifically for Law Enforcement Professionals (LEP) involved in COIN. A review of CTC-A data also

revealed that LEP Mentors and LEP Trainers in Afghanistan and Afghan National Police had the lowest

attendance rates at the COIN Leaders Course in Afghanistan (respectively in the order listed) 20

. These

20. Attendance data and student characteristics were collected by CTC-A staff and archived. The content is archived at the U.S.

Army Combined Arms Center, COIN Center and the Afghan National Defense University.


findings were also surprising because Policing plays such a vital role in proto-insurgencies and during the

decline of an insurgency 21

. In fact, LEP and ANP attendance rates were so low at the COIN Leaders

Course, it is suggested that perhaps The DoD Inspector General and / or DSBTF examines the reasons for

this deficiency. One of the NATO Contributing Nations did have a caveat against the participation in

COIN, but most LEPs in Afghanistan were U.S. contractors. For some unknown reason LEPs in

Afghanistan had not participated in the COIN training that was available and it looked like the LEP

program in Afghanistan provided no ―in house COIN training‖ to LEPs or ANP. This perceived lack of

content and training adds another confounding element to the development of COIN doctrine.

Together all of these deficiencies show that there is still a lot of work that needs to be done and that

work will require a team effort. If the work is not done or cannot be done, then Rittel and Webber (1973)

were right. A wicked problem like an insurgency cannot be solved. If this is the case then how did society

and the world as we know it get to where we are today?

Conclusions

This is the latest and last paper, in a series of papers, produced under the NATO Training Mission-

Afghanistan (NTM-A), COIN Training Center-Afghanistan (CTC-A) moniker. The NTM-A, CTC-A

COIN Leaders Course is effectively closed. The previous papers produced by CTC-A were about COIN

doctrine and the ongoing revisions. This present paper takes the next step.

The topic of this paper advances the discussion from foundational content to a proposed instructional

framework, which then leads to curriculum development, and on-to instruction and QC and QA. This of

course is the logical sequence, unless we fail to learn from our past mistakes. In the past we published

COIN manuals and asked military training units and contracting company to develop COIN curriculum

21. Byman D. (2007). Understanding Proto-Insurgencies. RAND National Defense Research Institute, RAND Corp. Santa

Monica CA.


and then provide COIN instruction, with absolutely no oversight. As a result, there has been lots of

useless information, a lack of important information, contradictory information, inconsistent information,

and many changes along the way. Plus, a lack of consensus about whether or not there was a problem and

disagreement about a solution, and resistance to logic, arguments, and scientific evidence. COIN efforts

could easily fall into the definition of a wicked problem too, if we allow that to happen. Packaging COIN

is one thing, delivering COIN is yet another. The next step needs to be addressed now.

Wars in the World 22

reports 60 countries currently involved in wars with a total of 362 militias,

guerrillas and separatist groups involved in those wars. The majority of these conflicts are reported to be

in Africa with 24 countries and 107 militias, guerrillas, separatist groups, and anarchic groups drawn in.

Second place goes to Asia with 15 countries at war and 84 militias, guerrillas, separatist groups, and

anarchic groups involved. Europe is next with eight countries and 57 militias, guerrillas, separatist

groups, and anarchic groups at war. Middle East ranks fourth with eight countries and 91 militias,

guerrillas, separatist, and anarchic groups participating. The Americas have 5 countries and 24 wars

between drug cartels, militias, guerrillas, separatist groups, and anarchic groups. These numbers have

been steadily increasing.

The rest of the world may not want to be involved in these wars and may not need to be involved

some of these wars. Unfortunately due to circumstances, relationships, events, or location certain

countries are involved and cannot opt out. Asymmetric tactics would not be used if there were no benefits

and they would not be used if there were no chances of success. If the total number of conflicts continues

to rise, putting COIN in a box and dealing with these wicked problems head-on may become the only

option others countries may have too.

22. Wars in the World Daily News on Wars in the World and on New States (21 Sept. 2012). http://www.warsintheworld.com


Future Prospects Estimate

For me, the biggest problem now in doctrine development is recognizing and developing alternatives

to a resource heavy Clear-Hold-Build approach. While decision-makers in Washington are

understandably reluctant to initiate any large or long land force commitments, the services and even SOF

are balking at making any major commitments to Foreign Internal Defense or advisors. This new

framework promises to be useful in helping determine some of those other methods of COIN that may be

appropriate, but then the services, and the much weaker interagency, have to be willing to buy into them.

That will be the biggest challenge during a period of recoil from COIN and constrained budgets 23

.

23. The Future Prospects Estimate above was provided by Conrad Crane. Mr. Crane is the current director of the U.S. Army

Military History Institute and a noted military historian. During the early concept and design stages of Army Field Manual 3-24 /

Marine Corps Warfighting Publication No. 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency (2006) Mr. Crane was selected to be the lead author. GEN

Petraeus made the selection. During the final stages of this project he was provided a draft copy of the paper and asked if he

would considered reviewing it and then write ―a short conclusion, future prospects, or recommendations piece?‖ He took time out

from his busy schedule and provided the entry above. The piece was presented word for word as extracted from an email

correspondence, except for one minor change. The acronym for FID was spelled out. The contribution was not presented as a

quote since it was written specifically for this paper and was an integral part of the project. His personal contributions to the

development of FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency are documented in; Understanding Counterinsurgency Doctrine,

operations, and challenges. Edited by Thomas Rid and Thomas Keaney, Rourledge (2010).


Appendix A

Figure A1

Primary References

International Military Manuals

U.S. Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats Joint Operating Concept, V. 2.0, 2010

French Doctrine for Counterinsurgency at the Tactical Level, 2010

German Preliminary Basics for the Role of Land Forces in Counterinsurgency, 2010

British Army Field Manual Vol. 1 part 10 Countering Insurgency, 2009

U.S. Joint Publication 3-24 Counterinsurgency Operations, 2009

U.S. FM 3-24.2 Tactics in Counterinsurgency, 2009

Australian Army Joint Warfare Doctrine LWD 3-0-1 Counterinsurgency, 2008

Canada Counter-Insurgency Operations, 2008

U.S. FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, 2006

Reports, Studies, Meta Analysis

Assessing Freedom of Movement for Counterinsurgency Campaigns, 2012

COIN Scorecard, Afghanistan in Early 2011 Relative to the Insurgencies of the Past 30 Years, 2011

Victory Has a Thousand Fathers, 2010

How Terrorist Groups End, 2008

War by Others Means, Building Complete and Balanced Capacities for Counterinsurgency, 2008

Analytic Support to Intelligence in Counterinsurgencies, 2008

Money in the Bank, Lessons Learned from Past Counterinsurgency Operations, 2007

Heads We Win, The Cognitive Side of Counterinsurgency, 2007

Subversion and Insurgency, 2007

Best Practices in Counterinsurgency, 2005

Books

How Insurgencies End, 2012

Embracing Fog of War, 2012

Terrorism Studies A Reader, 2012

Understanding Counterinsurgency Doctrine Operations and Challenges, 2010

Rethinking Violence States and Non-state Actors in Conflict, 2010


Appendix A

Figure A2

Secondary References

Military Manuals

JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations, 2011

JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 2011

JP 5-0, Joint Operational Planning, 2011

JP 3-07, Stability Operations, 2011

FM 2-0, Intelligence, 2010

JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense, 2010

JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, 2009

FM 3-07.1, Security Force Assistance, 2009

JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment, 2009

JP 3-06, Joint Urban Operations, 2009

JP 3-26, Counterterrorism, 2011

JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, 2008

JP 3-60, Joint Targeting, 2007

JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 2007

JP 3-13, Information Operations, 2006

Irregular Warfare Documents

National Strategy For The United States Of America (2002)

Capstone Concept for Joint Operations version 2.0 (2005)

The Irregular Warfare Special Study (Aug. 2006)

The Irregular Warfare Roadmap (Sep. 2006)

Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats Joint Operating Concept, v.2.0 (May, 2010)


Appendix B

Figure B1

Words, Terms, and Concepts From Primary References


U.S. Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats Joint Operating Concept, V. 2.0: Irregular

Warfare Core Activities, counter terrorism CT, unconventional warfare UW, foreign internal defense FID,

counterinsurgency COIN, stability operations SO; Irregular Warfare key related activities, strategic

communication strategic communications, information operations IO, psychological operations Psy-Ops, civil-

military operations civ-mil, support to law enforcement, Intel, counterintelligence operations (2010, pg. 5)

French, Doctrine for Counterinsurgency at the Tactical Level: cut-off the insurgents from the population,

mobilize the population to prevent any offensive comeback by the enemy, make shelters inaccessible to

guerilla units (2010, pg. 33)

German, Preliminary Basics for the Role of Land Forces in Counterinsurgency: establishing security and

state order in crisis areas; political, economic, social, legal, executive, and psychological measures taken by

civilian and military forces; example measures: social affairs, education, police, administration, law, economy,

infrastructure, environment, health, military (2010, pg. 3 and 6)

British Army Field Manual Vol. 1 part 10 Countering Insurgency: primacy of political purpose, unity of

effort, understand the human terrain, secure the population, neutralize the insurgent, gain and maintain popular

support, operate in accordance with the law, integrate Intel, prepare for the long term, learn and adapt (2009,

pg. 1-1)

U.S. Joint Publication 3-24 Counterinsurgency Operations: counterinsurgents must understand operational

environment, legitimacy is the main objective, unity of effort is essential, political factors are primary, Intel

drives operations, insurgents must be isolated from their cause and support, security under the rule of law is

essential, counterinsurgents should prepare for a long-term commitment, manage information and

expectations, use the appropriate level of force, learn and adapt, empower the lowest levels, support the host

nation (2009, pg. xv thru xvi)


Appendix B

Figure B2



U.S. FM 3-24.2 Tactics in Counterinsurgency: offensive operations - establish civil security, establish

civil control, support Host Nation security forces, support to governance, restore essential services, support

to economic and infrastructure development, conduct information engagements, secure the populace

continuously, isolate the insurgency from populace, prevent crime, destroy, disrupt, interdict, deny or

neutralize elements of the insurgency, secure national and regional borders, integrate with and support HN

security forces (2009, pg. 5-1)

Australian Army Joint Warfare Doctrine LWD 3-0-1 Counterinsurgency: political primacy and

legitimacy, comprehensive approach, Intel, reinforcing the rule of law, support good governance, dominant

narrative, physical and moral isolation of the insurgent, presence, adaptation, HN primacy (2008, pg. 3-3 thru

3-8)

Canada, Counter-Insurgency Operations: effect political primacy in the pursuit of strategic aim, promote

unity of purpose to coordinate the actions of participating agencies, understand the complex dynamics of the

insurgency including wider environment, exploit Intel and Info, separate the insurgents from their physical

and moral sources of strength including addressing their grievances, real or perceived, neutralize the INS,

sustain commitment to expand political capital and resources, conduct longer term post insurgency planning

(2008, pg. 3-2 thru 3-3)

U.S. FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency: conduct information operations, conduct combat operations/civil security

operations, train and employ HN security forces, establish or restore essential services, support development

of better governance, support economic development (2006, pg. 4-4 thru 4-5); provide continuous security for

the local populace, eliminate insurgent presence, reinforce political primacy, enforce the rule of law, rebuild

local HN institutions (2006, pg. 5-18)


Appendix B

Figure B3



Assessing Freedom of Movement for Counterinsurgency Campaigns (examines Freedom of Movement

concept in literature): context shapes the availability and meaning of freedom of movement data, a

standardized definition needs to be developed for freedom of movement, the freedom of movement

assessments process should capture contextual assessment, recommended five categories of freedom of

movement (2012, pgs. 51 thru 58)

Counterinsurgency Scorecard, Afghanistan in Early 2011 Relative to the Insurgencies of the Past 30

Years (cases studies of 30 insurgencies worldwide that begun and were completed between 1978 and

2008): good COIN; two strategic communication factors, three tangible support factors, two government

legitimacy factors, one democracy factor, one intelligence factor, sufficient strength to force insurgents to fight

as guerillas, competent government, avoid excessive collateral damage, establish positive relations,

improvements in infrastructure, population supports COIN, establish and secure areas, air dominance,

provides basic services, perception of security was created (2011, pg. 2)

Victory Has a Thousand Fathers (case study of 30 recent INS & performance of 20 COIN approaches):

numerous mutually rein-forcing lines of Op, good vs. bad practices predicts outcome, strategic com principles,

reduce tangible INS support, Gov legitimacy, democracy, Intel, sufficient strength, competent Gov, avoid

CIVCAS, positive relationship with population, improvements development hearts & minds reducing

corruption, popularity, pacification community policing, Oil Spot, Legitimacy of Gov, air dominance, basic

services, cost benefit, border control, security, amnesty reintegration (2010)

How Terrorist Groups End (an analysis of 648 terrorist groups between 1968 and 2006): most groups

have ended because they joined the political process or local police and intelligence agencies arrested or killed

members, a transition to the political process is the most common way in which terrorist groups ended (43%),

policing is likely to be the most effective strategy (40%) against terrorist groups that cannot or will not

transition to non-violence, religious groups take longer to eliminate than other groups, religious groups rarely

achieve their objectives bigger groups do better than smaller ones (2008, pg. xiv)


Appendix B

Figure B4



War by Others Means, Building Complete and Balanced Capacities for Counterinsurgency (12 research

papers on specific cases and an examination of 89 insurgencies since World War II): 4 types of

insurgencies, local-local international-global local-global, understand shape act, COIN demands nonstop

learning, networking and cognition figure importantly in COIN, enhance the effectiveness of government,

government must provide safety, military force may be needed to protect population, proto-insurgency most

crucial task understand groups and popular grievances, greatest payoff in COIN targeted job training and

placement, justice system, lower education capacity, information power is crucial for international-local

insurgencies, smarter use of information in analysis, strategy, and planning, reduce reliance on direct large-

scale military power (2008, pgs. xxix thru xlvi)

Analytic Support to Intelligence in Counterinsurgencies (analysis analytic techniques that can be used

to support COIN): in early phase intelligence and police, intelligence aimed at identifying cell members and

their locations and insurgent command structure, intelligence focused on required information elements,

discerning patterns predictive analysis analyzing insurgent networks friendly enemy interactions, friendly data

generally not captured, sharing data amongst agencies (2008)

Money in the Bank, Lessons Learned from Past Counterinsurgency Operations (6 case profiles,

Philippines, Algeria, Vietnam, El Salvador, Jammu & Kashmir, Columbia): unfettered adaptability and

ability to be objective in the face of failure, ability to learn, civic and humanitarian actions along with credible

pledges of protection in return for cooperation, information operations should be employed to publicize

actions, manage gaps between populations expectations and the COIN ability, information and intelligence,

diversify sources of intelligence, create a competent indigenous police force (2007)


Appendix B

Figure B5



Heads We Win, The Cognitive Side of Counterinsurgency (research project for US DoD on how to

improve US COIN capabilities): improve cognitive capabilities to understand shape and operate, cognitive

profiles for COIN personnel should be developed, attract people that that match the profiles, stress COIN

cognitive abilities during recruitment, professional education should address analysis strategy and operations,

COIN training expanded and improved, integrate intuition reasoning rapid adaptive decision making under

stress and uncertainty , study the path to which suicide terrorist are trained (2007)

Subversion and Insurgency (a set of case studies that explore the elements of subversion, definition of

subversion and ideas for combating subversion): strengthen counterintelligence or counter subversion

capacity, build police capacity, develop public information strategies (2007)

Best Practices in Counterinsurgency (study of 17 insurgencies and 36 other aspects of others to

consider): human rights, basic needs, law enforcement, emphasis on Intel, political process, focus on

population, security, secure areas and expand, isolated INS from population, single authority, psychological

operations, amnesty, reintegration and rewards, police in the lead, police expanded diversified, military learn

COIN, advisors embedded, INS sanctuaries denied, population control, political process, secure borders

(2005)


Appendix B

Figure B6


Books

How Insurgencies End (study of 89 INS): modern INS last about 10-yrs; clear tipping point, deny state

sponsorship, withdrawal of state sponsorship cripples an insurgency, desertions, defections, infiltrations,

popularity, no support, terror campaigns loose, deny sanctuary, anocracies do not often succeed against

insurgencies, insurgencies with two or more parties are longer, more violent, and more complex endings,

governments are better off without support, support creates dependency (2012, pgs. xi thru xvii)

Embracing Fog of War (2-yr study of COIN assessment): context, COIN assessment, all-source analysis,

information, Intel, measurement or metrics are critical, layered context, effects based language should have

been removed by 2008, COIN information is best analyzed at the level at which it is collected (2012, pgs. xii

thru xxv)

Terrorism Studies A Reader: counterterrorism is not very different from counterinsurgency, ascertain

objectives and identify target groups, map the ideas, effective counter-ideological work (2012, pg. 361 thru

363)

Understanding Counterinsurgency Doctrine Operations and Challenges: oil spot, shape clear hold build,

stability and development, intel drives operations, political factors are primary, isolate insurgences from

population, must understand the environment, logical lines of operations, surge operations, irregular warfare

strategy, civil-military integration (2010)

Rethinking Violence States and Non-state Actors in Conflict: studies have linked state weakness to a rise

in intra-state violence, weak poor underdeveloped states are far more likely to experience violence than

wealthier states, when weak states lose their ability to arbitrate between groups or provide guarantees of

protection collective fears of the future prompt ethnic violence, state weakness and violence needs to be taken

seriously; it is one of the few empirical regularities that has been documented through a variety of different

kinds of evidence and tests (2010, pg. 7 thru 8)


Appendix C

Joint Publication 5-0Joint Operation PlanningAug 2011, Chapter I, pg. 4Discusses the Adaptive Planning and Execution System (APEX)

SecDef

Joint Planning In Doctrine

The joint planning and execution communityOr JPEC uses the APEX system to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization activities associated with joint operations.

Planning Doctrine

FM 2-0, Intel, 2010

FM 3-24.2, Tactics In COIN, 2009

JP 2-01.3, Joint Intel Prep of the Op Environment, 2009

JP 3-24, COIN OP, 2009

JP 3-06, Joint Urban OP, 2009

JP 3-26, Counterterrorism, 2011

JP 3-57, Civil-Military OP, 2008

JP 3-60, Joint Targeting, 2007

JP 2-0, Joint Intel, 2007

JP 3-13, Information Op, 2006

FM 3-24, COIN, 2006

Figure C1

The graphic representation of the COIN planning process did show the multiple layers and

complexity of COIN planning. The graphic representation might be a good addition to both the FM 3-24

and JP 3-24 if each respective publication illustrates the interface between joint and tactical level

planning. Joint planning should be based on strategic intent and tactical level planning should support

joint and strategic intent. Another addition might be where does information plug into the planning

process?


Appendix C

DoS DiplomaticJoint OP PlanningOperational ArtOperational DesignJoint OP Planning(National SecurityPolicy & Strategy)JF CDR Input OP ApproachMission StatementPlanning GuidanceIntent & CCIRCONOPS

JIPOE J2Mission Analysis, Intent, CCIRs, PIRs, FFIR, EEFIs, RFIs, ISR, Collection PlanGEOINT, HUMINTSIGINT, MASINTOSINT, TECHINT, Sync & Sharing

Info/Intel, Risk asses

Joint Targeting PhasesCommander’s OBJ Guidance & IntentDevelop, Validation, Nominate / PrioritizeCapabilities AnalysisCommander's Decision & Force AssignmentMission Planning & Force ExecutionCombat Assessment

SA & SC = FID, IDAD, SFA, FHATerrorist Planning Cycle: USSOCOMBroad Targeting selectionIntelligence Gathering & SurveillanceSpecific Target SelectionPre-attack Surveillance & PlanningRehearsalsActions on the OBJEscape & Exploitation

COIN Planning Doctrine

AJP – 3.4.4, Allied Joint Doctrine For COIN, Feb. 11

JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coor During Joint Op, Jun. 11

JP 3-0, Joint Op, Aug. 11

JP 5-0, Joint Op Planning, Aug. 11

JP 3-07, Stability Op, Sep. 11

FM 2-0, Intel, Mar. 10

JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense, Jul. 10

JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, Mar. 09

FM 3-24.2, Tactics In COIN, Apr. 09

FM 3-07.1, Security Force Assistance, May 09

JP 2-01.3, Joint Intel Prep of the Op Environment, Jun. 09

JP 3-24, COIN Op, Oct. 09

JP 3-26, Counterterrorism, Nov. 11

JP 3-57, Civil-Military Op, Jul. 08

JP 3-60, Joint Targeting, Apr. 07

JP 3-13, Information Op, Feb. 06

FM 3-24, COIN, Dec. 06

There are many publications that discussThe planning process. The list Shows theones that were used for this illustration ofCOIN planning or Intelligence PreparationBattlefield / Operational Environment IPB or OE.

KEY: DoS = Dept. of State; SA = Security Assistance; SC = Security Cooperation;

FID = Federal Internal Defense; IDAD = Internal Defense & Development; SFA =

Security Force Assistance; FHA = Foreign Humanitarian Assistance

Figure C2


Appendix C

DoS DiplomaticJoint OP PlanningOperational ArtOperational DesignJoint OP Planning(National SecurityPolicy & Strategy)JF CDR InputOP ApproachMission StatementPlanning GuidanceIntent & CCIRCONOPS



Joint Targeting PhasesCommander’s OBJ Guidance & IntentDevelop, Validation, Nominate / PrioritizeCapabilities AnalysisCommander's Decision & Force AssignmentMission Planning & Force ExecutionCombat Assessment

Terrorist Planning Cycle: USSOCOMBroad Targeting selectionIntelligence Gathering & SurveillanceSpecific Target SelectionPre-attack Surveillance & PlanningRehearsalsActions on the OBJEscape & Exploitation

USAIDRelief MissionDislocated Civ/SupSecurity MissionsTech Assist/Sup Foreign ConsequenceStability OPsNation Assistance OPsHumanitarian/Civ AssistSecurity AssistNoncombatant EVAC

FID

DiplomaticInformationalMilitaryEconomicFinancialIntelligenceLaw Enfor

Indirect SupDirect SupCombat OPs

ATFMFFMSIMETPOCMOCAO

HN = IDAD

SA & SC = FID, IDAD, SFA, FHA

KEY: DoS = Dept of State; JF CDR = Joint Force Commander; JIPOE = Joint Intel Preparation of Op Environment; SA = Security Assistance; SC =

Security Cooperation; FID = Federal Internal Defense; IDAD = Internal Defense & Development; SFA = Security Force Assistance; FHA = Foreign

Humanitarian Assistance; AT = Anti-terrorism (AT) activities; FMF = Foreign Military Financing; FMS = Foreign Military Sales; IMET = International

Military Education & Training; PO = Peace Operations; CMO = Civil-military Operations; CAO = Civil Affairs Operations, as well as, Psychological Op;

IW = Irregular Warfare; CT = Counter terrorism; UW = Unconventional warfare; FID = Federal Internal Defense; COIN = Counterinsurgency; SO =

Stability Operations; COIN = Counterinsurgency Assistance; USAID = US Agency for International Development

Irregular WarfareCTUWFIDCOINSO

USASOC

NSW

AFSOCMARSOC

JSOC

Figure C3


Appendix C



Joint Targeting PhasesCommander’s OBJ Guidance & IntentDevelop, Validation, Nomination/PrioritizationCapabilities AnalysisCommander's Decision & Force AssignmentMission Planning & Force ExecutionCombat Assessment

Terrorist Planning CycleBroad Targeting selectionIntelligence Gathering & SurveillanceSpecific Target SelectionPre-attack Surveillance & PlanningRehearsalsActions on the OBJEscape & Exploitation

JIPOE I Define the OE

1.Identify JF operational Area2. Analyze Mission & JF CDR Intent3. Determine Significant Characteristics of OE4. Establish Limits JF Areas of Interest5. Determine Level of Detail required vs. Time6. Determine Intel/Info Gaps, Shortfalls, priorities 7. Collect Material & Submit RFIs to Support Analysis

DoS DiplomaticJoint OP PlanningOperational ArtOperational DesignJoint OP Planning(National SecurityPolicy & Strategy)JF CDR InputOP ApproachMission StatementPlanning GuidanceIntent & CCIRCONOPS


HN = IDAD

Figure C4


Appendix C

Joint OP PlanningOperational ArtOperational DesignJoint OP Planning(National SecurityPolicy & Strategy)JF Cdr Input OP ApproachMission StatementPlanning GuidanceIntent & CCIRCONOPS

SocietySocial StructureCulturalPower/AuthorityInterests

Info/Intel/ISR

SWEAT – MSOSewersWater Electric AcademicTrashMedical FacilitiesSafety

Info EnvironmentSocio-culturalCivil factorsRoot CausesINS Desired End StateINS Narratives

JIPOEIntel CollectionProcess ExploitationAnalysis ProductionDissemination IntegrationEvaluation Feedback

Establishing, Communicating & Ensuring Understanding of IntentDetermining Roles, Responsibilities & RelationshipsEstablishing Rules & ConstraintsAllocating AssetsMonitoring & Assessing the Situation & Assessing ProgressRevising the Above

AreaStructuresCapabilitiesOrganizationsPeopleEvents

FHAShapingCrisis ActionStabilizationNormalization


PMESII-PT (Operational Variables)

PoliticalMilitary EconomySocialInformationInfrastructurePhysical Environment Time

JIPOE I Define the OE

1. Identify JF Operational Area2. Analyze Mission & JF CDR Intent3. Determine Significant Characteristics of OE4. Establish Limits JF Areas of Interest5. Determine Level of Detail Required vs. Time6. Determine Intel/Info Gaps, Shortfalls, Priorities 7. Collect Material & Submit RFIs to Support Analysis

Figure C5


Appendix C

JIPOE II Describe the Impact of OE

1. Identify JF Operational Area2. Analyze Mission & JF CDRs Intent3. Determine Significant Characteristics of OE4. Establish Limits JF Areas of Interest5. Determine Level of Detail Required vs. Time6. Determine Intel/Info Gaps, Shortfalls, Priorities 7. Collect Material & Submit RFIs to Support Analysis

JIPOE III Evaluate the Adversary


JIPOE IV Determine Adversary Course of Action


Figure C6


References

Brubaker, R. and D. D. Laitin. (1998). Ethnic and Nationalist Violence. Annual Review of Sociology, Vol.

24. http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev.soc.24.1.423

Centre de Doctrine. (2010). Doctrine for Counterinsurgency at the Tactical Level, Forces Employment

Doctrine Center, Paris France.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2010). U.S. Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats Joint

Operating Concept, V. 2.0, Pentagon, Washington D.C.

Chenoweth E. and A. Lawrence, Editors. (2010). Rethinking Violence States and Non-state Actors in

Conflict, Belfer Center for Science, Cambridge, MA.

Connable B. and M. C. Libicki. (2012). How Insurgencies End, RAND National Defense Research

Institute, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica CA.

Connable B. (2012). Embracing Fog of War, RAND National Defense Research Institute, RAND

Corporation, Santa Monica CA.

Connable B., J. Campbell, B. Loidolt, and G. Fisher. (2012). Assessing Freedom of Movement for

Counterinsurgency Campaigns, RAND National Defense Research Institute, RAND Corporation,

Santa Monica CA.


Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense Intelligence. (2011). Counterinsurgency (COIN)

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Operations. Office of the Under Secretary of

Defense for Acquisitions, Technology and Logistics. Washington D.C., U.S. Department of Defense.

Fearsn, J. D. and D. D. Laitin. (1998). Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War. Annual Review of Sociology,

Vol. 24. http://www.annualreviews.org/

German Army Office. (2010). Preliminary Basics for the Role of Land Forces in Counterinsurgency,

Division 1 – Army Development, Frankfurt Germany.

Gompert D. C. (2007). Heads We Win, The Cognitive Side of Counterinsurgency, RAND National

Defense Research Institute, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica CA.

Gompert D. C. and J. Gordon IV. (2008). War by Others Means, Building Complete and Balanced

Capacities for Counterinsurgency, RAND National Defense Research Institute, RAND Corporation,

Santa Monica CA.

Horgan J. and K. Braddock, Editors. (2012). Terrorism Studies A Reader, Routledge Taylor & Francis

Group, New York NY.

Horst R. and M. Webber. (1973). Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning. Policy Sciences, Elsevier

Scientific Publishing Company, Amsterdam, 4, 155-169.


House Armed Services Committee. (2006). Irregular Warfare Roadmap. Hearing Before the Terrorism,

Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services House

of Representatives, No. 109-85. Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office.

HQ Department of the Army, HQ USMC Combat Development Command. (2006). FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-

33.5, Counterinsurgency, Washington D.C.

HQ Department of the Army. (2009). FM 3-24.2 Tactics in Counterinsurgency, Washington D.C.

Jones S. G. and M. C. Libicki. (2008). How Terrorist Groups End lessons for Countering al Qa’ida,

RAND Corporation, Santa Monica CA.

Land Development Warfare Center. (2009). Land Warfare Doctrine LWD 3-0-1 Counterinsurgency,

(Restricted), Australian Army Tobruk Barracks, Puckapunyal VIC.

McRaven. W. H. (2012). Posture Statement of Admiral William H. McRaven, USN. Before the 112th

Congress Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington D.C., Senates Armed Services Committee.

U.S. Government Printing Office.

Ministry of Defense. (2009). British Army Field Manual Vol. 1 part 10 Countering Insurgency, Chief of

The General Staff, D MOD Sy, London, UK.

National Defence Headquarters. (2008). Counter-Insurgency Operations, B-GL-323-004/FP-003, Chief

of Land Warfare, Ottawa, Ontario Canada.


Newton I. (1704). Opticks: or a Treatise of the Reflexions, Refractions, Inflexions and Colours of

Light. Also Two Treatises of the Species and Magnitude of Curvilinear Figures. London.

Paul C. (2011). Counterinsurgency Scorecard, Afghanistan in Early 2011 Relative to the Insurgencies of

the Past 30 Years, RAND National Defense Research Institute, RAND Corp. Santa Monica, CA.

Paul C., C. P. Clarke, and B. Grill. (2010). Victory Has a Thousand Fathers Sources of Success in

Counterinsurgency. RAND National Defense Research Institute, RAND Corp., Santa Monica, CA.

Perry W. L. and J. Gordon IV. (2008). Analytic Support to Intelligence in Counterinsurgencies, RAND

National Defense Research Institute, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica CA.

Rabasa A., L. A. Warner, P. Chalk, I. Khilko, and P. Shukla. (2007). Money in the Bank, Lessons Learned

from Past Counterinsurgency Operations, RAND National Defense Research Institute, RAND

Corporation, Santa Monica CA.

Rid T. and K. Thomas, Editors. (2010). Understanding Counterinsurgency Doctrine Operations and

Challenges, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, New York NY.

Rittel, H. and M. M. Webber. (1973). Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning. Policy Sciences 4

(1973), 155-169. Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company, Amsterdam--Printed in Scotland.

Rosenau W. (2007). Subversion and Insurgency, RAND National Defense Research Institute, RAND

Corp., Santa Monica CA.


Sepp K. I. (2005). Best Practices in Counterinsurgency, Military Review, Combined Arms Center, Ft.

Leavenworth KS.

The White House. (2002). National Strategy for the United States of America. Washington D.C., U.S.

Government Printing Office.

The White House. (2010). National Security Strategy. Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing

Office.

U.S. Department of Defense. (2005). Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, version 2.0 (CCJO)

Washington D.C., U.S. Department of Defense.

U.S. Department of Defense. (2006). 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. Washington D.C., Department

of Defense.

U.S. Department of Defense. (2009). Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, version 3. (CCJO)

Washington D.C., U.S. Department of Defense.

U.S. Government. (2009). Counterinsurgency Guide. Washington D.C., Bureau of Political-Military

Affairs, Department of State.

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (2009). Joint Publication 3-24 Counterinsurgency Operations, Washington

D.C., U.S. Department of Defense.


U.S. Joint Forces Command. (2010). Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats Joint Operations

Concept, version 2.0. Washington D.C., U.S. Department of Defense.

U.S. Joint Forces Command. (2006). The Irregular Warfare Special Study. Washington D.C., Department

of Defense.

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2009). Joint Publication 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. Washington

D.C., U.S. Department of Defense.

COIN IN A BOX: Packaging a Wicked Problem, Richard J. Campbell and Conrad C. Crane, Sept. 2012.

Documents

Transcript of COIN IN A BOX: Packaging a Wicked Problem, Richard J. Campbell and Conrad C. Crane, Sept. 2012.