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I f society were a steak, and justice its cooked temperature, Cohen prefers his well-done.

I. Rawls initial claims: 1)Inequalities are justified if theyre to the benefit of the least well off.

2) The kind of justice Rawls is concerned with extends only to the basic structure (). Once thebasic structure is set up in accordance with a just rulei.e. the Difference principle (DP)then

so long as individuals/groups abide by those rules as set out, then the outcomes of said activityare justeven stark inequalities.

Cohen rejects both: Principles of justice apply not only to societys instituted rules but also to

the choices that individuals make within said rules. Even in cases where the DP is universally

affirmed and complied with, non-Rawlsian inequalities might still obtain. Cohen claims thatRawls sympathy for at least some measure of egalitarianismperhaps as expressed in the first

principle of justiceis undermined by his allowance of inequalities by the second principle

II.A.Rawls rationale for DP: people need incentives to make socially beneficialproducts/services, e.g. engineers, venture capitalists

Cohen: Why is extra compensation necessary for such socially beneficial production? The

worst off benefit from even if talented folk dont receive extra remunerations for this. For Cohenthis is de facto extortion: its not that they cantprovide these socially beneficial services

without extra compensation, but that they would choose not to, and are holding society hostage

these choices (Cohen 122).

II.B. A market economy is presumed to be motivationally operative among individuals in aRawlsian society.

Cohen: Agents in this system act with the intent to maximize their own economic ends, withoutregard to whether the act honors the ethos of acting justly. If the operative ethos motivating

agents is one that compels them to maximize their self-interested ends, then inequalities that arenot necessary for the least well-off to benefit will obtain (Cohen 123; cf. Cohen 130).S

An ethos of justice needs to inform individual choices, instead of an economic ethos of

maximizing ones own economic ends. Well-designed just rules are insufficient for this task.

Choices within the economic structure cannot be placed outside the primary purview of justice(Cohen 140).

II.C.Cohen anticipates a Rawlsian response: principles of justice only apply to the institutionsthat comprise , and thus notto how individual associations conduct their affairs. Does it only

cover coercive societal institutionse.g. tax policies, property rights, etc.or does it extend tonon-coercive societal institutions like individual associationse.g. the family?

In TJfamily isnt in , so principles of justice dont apply. Historically the family institutionarbitrarily places burdens and limits the reasonable expectations of one group of members,namely women (Cohen 137).

Dilemma: If Rawls principles of justice dont apply to individual associations, then the

disproportionate burdens placed on married women are not actually subject to evaluation by

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these principles. However, if they do apply to individuals, then Rawls is wrong to make the -0

individual distinction demarcating the scope of justice. The principles of justice, Cohen

concludes, would be applicable even to choices that people freely make within a just system of

rules.

III.A.1.Rawls on family: Idea of Public Reason RevisitedPL 468-472

principles of justice do impose constraints on individual associations, namely in protecting the

basic rights and liberties that all members enjoy qua citizens (PL 469). Among these rights:

integrity of person, freedom from psychological and physical oppression, and freedom of

association (TJ53). Included in these rights is the right to exit any association whose terms one

can no longer accept.Is this answer satisfying? Cohen/Okin think it is incoherent: prinicples of justice apply to social

associations insofar as they distribute rights and duties of the members as citizens, but they dontdictate the internal operations of those associations (Okin 2004, 1563).

Does rights-qua-citizens mitigate solve justice problems for other instances of private

associations? E.g. homosexuals in the Boy Scouts.

III.A.2.Division of Labor response: Justice of is a special case of justice (TJ7) soprinciples distinct from Rawls principles of justice might be more suitable for some cases of

individual associations. His two principles secure background justice such that individuals can

be confident in the justice of the arrangements while also allowing for flexibility among a

plurality of values within societies individual groups. BUT this division does not imply thatprinicples have no bearing on indivs rights and duties (Scheffler 2006, 108).

III.B. How egalitarian is Rawls? 43 TJ: social system designed so that the resultingdistribution is just however things turn out (TJ243). No presumption that the outcome is justonly if it produces an equality of outcome. The government is more interested in fostering

equality of opportunity, guaranteeing a basic social minimum: Once a suitable minimum is

provided, it may be perfectly fair that the rest of total income be settled by the price system (TJ245).

Now the scope of the price system is limited by the distribution branch, which levies taxes to

correct distributions of wealth and prevent concentrations of power that would undermine trueequality of opportunity, but theres not a presumption that the

Rawls on socialist central planning, sans price mechanisms/incentives: improbable that socialist

bureaucracy would produce a more just outcome than one that uses price mechanisms and thenreins in some of the excesses through redistribution (TJ248).

III.C. Is an ethos of justice guiding action necessary for the preservation of Rawls system? Isacting from principles of justice necessary for the justice of the system to obtain? What reasons

has Cohen given for us to think it is necessary?

Does Rawls require acting on the basis of principles of justice?

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Rawls: members must have strong and normally effective desire to act as principles of justice

require (TJ398).

Some possible Rawlsian ethos-producing mechanisms:

Shared conception of justiceestablishes the bonds of civic friendshipdesire for justice limits

the pursuit of other ends (TJ5).

Principle of fraternity: one would not want to get greater advantages unless others benefit (TJ90).

NB: ideal of fraternity seems to drop out inPL.

A just system must be arranged such that is citizens are discouraged from developing desires that

conflict with the principles of justice (TJ230-1). [A]n economic regime [fashions]desires andaspirations in the future.the basic structure shapes the way the social system produces...form[s]

of culture. (PL 269).

1. What mechanisms in areshaping individuals desires?

E.g (?) inheritance tax limits what people can expect to keep/transfer intergenerationally

2.Is shapingindividual desires coherent with not directing the free activity of individuals?

III.D. Sen on Cohens allergy to economic incentives: Rawls has non-transcendental purposesin mind. Institutions have to be chosen not only with nature of society in mind, but also on what

behavior patterns we can realistically expect from them (Sen 2009, 69). We have to

accommodate our political theorizings to these patterns.

Additional sources

Scheffler, Samuel (2006). Is the basic structure basic? The Egalitarian Conscience: Essays in

Honour of G.A. Cohen. Oxford University Press. 102-129.

Sen, Amartya (2009). The Idea of Justice. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.