Coercion dnd Compzhion

BY DANIEL HORN*

NE of the most enduring myths about Hitler’s Third Reich is its supposed ability to command the fanatic loyalty and devo- tion of an entire generation of youth enrolled in the Hitler- jugend, or HJ as the National Socialist youth organization was

commonly called. Wartime stereotyping and propaganda have rein- forced this view so that most historians believe that German youth eagerly embraced the Nazi system and completely accepted its de- mands. Did not the Hitler Youth fight for that system with bravery in the 12th SS-Panzer Division Hithugend in Normandy and Belgium, during the final siege of Dresden, and most gloriously but hopelessly at the Pichelsdorf bridge in Berlin during the Gotterdammerung of Hit- ler’s Reich in April 1945?1

While this is certainly true, it does not tell the entire story. Not all German youngsters joined the HJ of their own volition. Not all of them supported its program as the highest embodiment of national ideal- ism. Indeed, there is much evidence to indicate that those who fought so valiantly during the final stages of the war were an unrepresentative minority in comparison to the majority of their comrades who greeted the collapse of the Reich with weary equanimity and passivity.

Since most scholars have characterized Nazi Germany as a totalitar- ian system, they have taken it for granted that the party’s youth organi- zation shared the omnipotence of the regime and operated in a

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*The author is Professor of History at Douglass College, Rutgers University. He wishes to thank the National Endowment for the Humanities, the American Philosophi- cal Society, and the Rutgers University Research Council for fellowships that supported his research for this article.

1. For depictions of the response of German youth to the Nazi state as not only voluntary, but enthusiastic and indeed frequently frenetic, see Walter Z. Laqueur, Young Germany: A History of th German Youth Movement (London, 1962). 191, 200 ff.; Karl D. Bracher, Die Aufosung rler Wamarer Republik (Villingen, 1960), 131 ff.; Peter H. Merkl, Political Violace under I h Swastika: 581 Early Nazis (Princeton, 1975). parsim; and Peter Loewenberg, “The Psychohistorical Origins of the Nazi Youth Cohort,” Amencan Histori- cal Rev& 76 (December 1971). 1463, 1471, 1496 ff.

For the military valor of certain HJ contingents at the end of the war, see H.W. Koch, The Hitler Youth: Origtmand Developmmt, 1922-1945 (New York, 1976), 243 ff.; and Werner Klose, Generation irn Ghchschntt (Oldenburg, 1964). 257 ff.

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The Historian thoroughly efficient manner.* Without wishing to deny that the totali- tarian attributes of Hitler Germany were shared to some extent by the HJ, I think it would be very useful if the functioning of the entire Nazi system was subjected to thorough empirical analysis rather than con- tinuing to be interpreted through possibly outworn and simplistic conceptual models. This is especially relevant to the history of youth in the Nazi era, which suffers not only from an overly rigorous applica- tion of totalitarian theory but, in addition, is distorted by the uncritical assumption that a general psychosocial rejection of the Weimar Re- public and the older generation caused an entire youth cohort to stampede enthusiastically into the Nazi camp.3

While there was undeniable support for the Nazi regime among some sections of youth, it would hardly be correct to view this as the uniform response of an entire generation. Even within a totalitarian context it would not be unreasonable to look for attitudinal variations that might be attributed to such factors as social status, religion, prior political and organizational affiliation, and a varying response to au- thority. Moreover, the espousal of totalitarian doctrines by a regime and its youth organization does not necessarily mean that they success- fully mobilized all youngsters to march forever in rhapsodic lockstep. Indeed, it is possible to assert that the HJ was not nearly so effective an instrument of youth control as we have been led to believe but that this failure has long been masked and obscured by its policies of compulsion and coercion. While these policies created a superficial illusion of youthful unity, they also generated grave difficulties that were in turn concealed and controlled by a constant escalation of coercion.

Even such staunch proponents of the totalitarian model as Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski have long suspected that the Nazis were not nearly so adept as the Soviets in capturing and retaining the loyalties of the younger generation. Although that suspicion hardly

2. See Hannah Arendt, The 0np.s of Totalitarianism (New York, 1951); Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, Totalitarian Lkctatorship and Autocracy (Cambridge, 1956); and Hans Buchheim, Totalitiire Herrschaft (Munich, 1962).

For revisionistic treatments, see Carl J. Friedrich, Michael Curtis, and Benjamin Barber, Totalitarianism in Perspective: Three Views (New York, 1969); Wolfgang Sauer, “National Socialism: Totalitarianism or Fascism?” A m ’ c a n Historical Revim 73 (Decem- ber 1967): 404-22; as well as the second, revised edition by Carl J. Friedrich of Totalitar- ian Dictatorship and Autocracy (Cambridge, 1965).

A refreshing empirical approach that produces some astounding evidence is con- tained in E.N. Peterson, The Limits of Hitler’s Power (Princeton, 1969). For a pragmatic but fairly uncritical retention of the old model, see Aryeh L. Unger, The Totalitarian Party: Party and People in Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia (Cambridge, 1974).

3. See Loewenberg, “Nazi Youth Cohort,” 150 ff. However, see also Helmut Schelsky, Dae skeptkche Generation (Diisseldorf and Cologne, 1957), 6 6 8 4 ; Koch, Hitler Youth, 95-98; and Klose, Gkhschritt, 28-33,

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Hitler Youth rests on an adequate empirical foundation, these two scholars ques- tioned whether the Nazi regime could have perpetuated itself from one generation to the next. The chances for such a generational transition, in their view, were reduced by a vital and unresolved problem in Nazi Germany that distinguishes it from a generally successful Communist Russia. Although both systems sought to acquire total control through “constant and unremitting pressure,” the Soviet Union alone pos- sessed the necessary additional ingredient of “simultaneous appeals to the future through grandiose projects.”4

This paper will demonstrate that these suspicions are substantially correct and that Nazi Germany failed to attain its objective of complete youth control. This resulted in large measure from its overdependence on coercive measures along with its singular neglect of the other re- quirement of grandiose projects and an ideology to inspire faith in them. Compensating for that weakness, the HJ and the regime were forced to ever-greater reliance on coercive measures. Indeed, these measures grew so strong that they may well be regarded as the essen- tial hallmark of the HJ youth control system.

Almost from the moment that Hitler came to power, the HJ sought to include all German youngsters in its ranks and to achieve a monop- oly of youth control. Accordingly, all competing youth organizations, such as the bourgeois Bundische Jugend and the Protestant and Catholic youth leagues, to say nothing of the Communist and Socialist youth movements, were eliminated by violence and threats coupled with appeals for national unity.5

However, the problem of “coordinating” all German youngsters could not be solved so easily. While significant numbers of middle- class students like Melita Maschmann and Hans Scholl were indeed swept up in a wave of nationalist euphoria and initially regarded the HJ as an expression of the highest ideals and social unity,6 that eupho- ria was not permanent and was soon replaced by disillusionment. Moreover, there was a sizable group of youngsters that never shared such feelings and never wanted to join.

Statistics bear this out. At the end of 1933 the HJ and its affiliated organizations such as the Bund deutscher Madel (BDM) for girls, and the Junguolk (JV) and the Jungmadelbund (JMB) for boys and girls between the ages of ten and fourteen, had enrolled only 2.3 million youngsters and encompassed only a quarter of the eligible age group. This num-

4. Friedrich and Brzezinski, Dictatorship and Aufocracy, 42. 5. Laqueur, Young Germuny, 204-16; Lawrence D. Walker, H i t k Youth and Catholic

Youth, 1933-1936 (Washington, D.C., 1970). 31 ff.; Manfred Priepke, Dic mangelische Jugend im Dntlen Rcich, 1933-1936 (Hanover, 1960), 44 ff.; Baldur von Schirach, Dic Hitk-Jugend: ldee und Gestalt (Berlin, 1934), 38 ff.

6. See Melita Maschmann, Farit. Kein Rechtfnligungsuerswh (Stuttgart, 1963). 1618; and Inge Scholl, Die Wcisse Rose (Frankfurt, 1953), 10 ff.

64 1

The Historian ber grew to 3.5 million in 1934 and reached a plateau of 3.9 million in 1935. These youngsters enrolled while membership was still in theory if not in practice voluntary. However, legislation making mem- bership compulsory was necessary at the end of 1936 for the HJ’s ranks to spurt upward again. Accordingly, in that year membership reached 5.4 million and thus managed to incorporate slightly more than half or 55 percent of German youth. In 1937 that figure grew to 5.8 million and, as pressure for compulsory membership mounted, reached the 7 million mark in 1938 and 8.1 million at the beginning of 1939.7

It was the laggards and recalcitrants who became the first victims of intensive coercion by the HJ. Although never articulated as such, this policy, prior to the era of outright compulsion that began late in 1936, consisted of giving preference in jobs and apprenticeships to members and ordering all state and party officials to enroll their chil- dren.

From the first, the schools that enrolled youngsters up to the age of fourteen were the most profitable recruiting ground. The teachers, frequently members of the National Socialist Teachers’ League (the NSLB), were eager to assert their influence on their students. Enroll- ments in this age group were also facilitated by a less rigorous training program, greater individual freedom, and the availability of a large corps of well-trained leaders from the BiindischeJugend who sought a haven from the HJ in the JunguoLk. Accordingly, theJunpoLk achieved a membership of approximately 90 percent by 1936.8

Older and more recalcitrant youngsters, who, for the most part, came from the working class, the peasantry, or Catholic families, were subjected to stronger pressures. These took the form of periodic threats that the HJ would close its ranks to new members who-had

7. See “Hitler-Jugend 1933-1943: Uber die Chronik eines Jahrzehnts,” in Dasjunge Deutschland 37 (January 1943): 13 (hereafter cited as DJD). See also Giinter Kaufmann, Dm Kommende Deutschland. Die Eniehung der Jugend im Reich AdoyHi tbs , 3rd ed. (Berlin, 1943), 42 ff. However, see also Martin Bormann’s “Denkschrift betr. Einrichtung und Stellung von Reichsluftsportkorps und Staats-jugend,” 22 April 1936, stating that 50 per cent of eligible boys between the ages of 14 and 18 belonged. Bundesarchiv Koblenz, NS 10/53 (hereafter cited as BA).

8.For a vast collection of material on recruiting in the schools, see the 1934 activity reports of the Saxon NSLB in Hoover Institution, Microfilms of the NSDAP Hauptar- chiv, Roll 12, Folder 244, and Roll 13, Folders 247-52 (hereafter cited as HA followed by roll and folder numbers).

For orders allowing schools that attained an HJ membership of 90 percent to fly a special HJ flag, see Verordnungsbhtt der Rachjugendjuhrung IV/25, 16 October 1936, but see also Verordnungsblatt III/l 1 of 21 March 1935 for a Reich Education Ministry order calling for special recruitment efforts at graduation and at the end of the school year.

For the special circumstances in theJungvolk and its relationship to former leaders from the Bundische Jugend, see Hans-Christian Brandenburg, Die Geschichte der HJ (Co- logne, 1968), 151.

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Hi tler Youth taken too long to make up their minds. This occurred on both the local and national levels. In Bavaria such a membership embargo was pro- claimed in January 1934 while the Reich had a general embargo during long stretches of the period 1935-37.9 Such closings were a considera- ble threat to youngsters who were about to leave school and embark on a career since they were frequently coupled with the injunction that good jobs or apprenticeships, especially in state agencies, would go only to HJ members.10

Despite the unstinting use of such pressures to obtain what the jargon of totalitarianism in its vocabulary of “double speak” calls “vol- untary compulsion,”” complete control over German youth still eluded the HJ. The reasons for this were many, but most important among them were the HJ’s problems regarding leadership, training methods, and, possibly most crucially, its enduring inability to dissemi- nate an effective ideology among large segments of German youth.

Ever since Hitler’s rise to power, the HJ had suffered from a short- age of leaders to organize the many youngsters it enrolled and to engender in them an enduring enthusiasm for its activities. The old HJ leaders might well have excelled at conducting street fights, demon- strations, and marches during the years of struggle, but it lacked the training to lead youngsters in games and other youthful pursuits that could inspire enthusiastic participation. Instead HJ leaders frequently adopted a “feudal tone,” became “Caesars of demonstrations and tri- umvirs of marches,” and stubbornly insisted that their strenuous parades and military exercises constituted the best way to train Ger- man youth. As Emil Klein, head of the Bavarian HJ, admitted, his organization hardly accomplished anything beyond “marching around” durings its early years.12

9. For the Bavarian embargo, see Munchaer A’mste Nachrichta, 6/7 January 1934, in Stadtarchiv Miinchen; for general closings, see inter a h , Verordnungsblatt III/9 and IV/2 of 7 March 1935 and 28 May 1936, and Reichbefehl9/1, 35/I, 11/11 and 17/11 of 6 March and 9 October 1936 and 19 March and 7 May 1937.

10. For examples, see Gebietsbefehl, HJ Gebiet Wiirttemberg, 23/35 and 3/36 of 25 November 1935 and 10 February 1936; regarding jobs in the Reich Finance Ministry, see Dalsclre Wissmchaft 1 (20 December 1935): 503; for an announcement on January 13, 1936, by Reich Interior Minister Frick that henceforth only HJ members would be eligible for government jobs, see International Military Tribunal Unpublished Docu- ments, PS-290.

11. For the concept of “voluntary compulsion” as a major force of mass mobiliza- tion in totalitarian societies, see Unger, 30-31, 86, 99. Actually, the phrase was used much earlier; see F. von Hippel, Die nationalsozialistische Herrschaftordnung ah Warnung und hhre (Tiibingen, 1946), 6.

12. For the HJ’s ideas on education and youth training, see Daniel Horn, “The Hitler Youth and Educational Decline in the Third Reich,” Histo7 ofEducation Quarterly 16, no. 4 (Winter 1976): 425-47. See also Emil Klein to Reichstatthalter Ritter von Epp, 28 November 1936, in Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Geheimes Staatsarchiv Miinchen,

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The Historian Middle-class families, especially, were repelled by the HJ’s rowdy

tone and its lack of discipline and program. They objected to the late hours, overexertion, and “night excursions” to which the HJ exposed their youngsters. The vulgarity cultivated by many leaders plus their scurrilous antireligious slogans and agitation made the HJ highly un- popular among Catholics who responded by boycotting the HJ in large numbers.13 These same factors influenced many Catholic state and party officials not to enroll their children in the Nazi youth organiza- tion. It required the repeated intervention of Rudolf Hess and the party and subordinate state agencies to cajole their children into the HJ.14

Despite such unequivocal warnings, the HJ did little to improve its leadership corps. Responsible for this was its strict adherence to Hit- ler’s dictum that “youth must lead youth.” This forced the HJ to rely exclusively on young, inexperienced leaders to take charge of their only slightly younger comrades while leaving untapped a vast reservoir of trained and willing manpower that was available in the teaching profession. In the generational struggle that naturally arose between these two groups, the teachers complained that the HJ was led by incompetent students who could be employed more usefully tending their neglected books than competing with their elders for control over youth.15

Fearful of losing its monopoly to teachers or to army officers, the HJ admitted the failure of its voluntary enrollment program by pro- mulgating the Hitler Youth Law of December 1, 1936. This made it

Abteilung 11, Reichstatthalter 450 (hereafter cited as BHStAr). However, see also SA to Baldur von Schirach, 19 June 1934, complaining that such marching destroyed the health and morale of youngsters. BA, NS 10/77.

13. For a list of such complaints, see the December 1934 activity report of the NSLB of Saxony, HA 13/250, and letters of the principals of the Stadtlyzeum und Frauenschule Bamberg and Madchenlyceum zu Dillingen of 27 September 1935 and 19 August 1936 in BHStAr, Abt. I, MK 14,858.

For examples of individual resignations and complaints, see BHStAr, Abt. I, MK 14,858, the correspondence of Professor Dr. Joseph Frank of the Technical University of Munich, 1 December 1935 and 6 March 1936, as well as that of Studienrat Dr. Alfons Lehner on 1 and 27 March 1938.

14. On August 24, 1935, Rudolf Hess had ordered party officials to enroll their children in the HJ and not in religious youth organizations. Indicative of HJ ineffective- ness is Martin Bormann’s reiteration on January 29, 1936, and Hess’s own order of August 11, 1937, announcing that henceforth the party would recruit new members exclusively from the HJ. For Bormann’s reminder, see National Archives, Captured German Documents, Microfilm Series T-580, Roll 38, Ordner 239 (hereafter cited as NA followed by series, roll, and ordner, bundle, or frame numbers). See also Reichbcfchl 7/1, 21 February 1936, and Hess’s Anwdnung 99/37 in NA T-580/38/239 as well as Vorschnjlhhandbuch der HJ, 2238 (hereafter cited as VSHB).

15. Horn, “Hitler Youth.”

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Hitler Youth clear that eventually all youngsters would be forced to belong to the HJ whether they liked it or not. Indicative of the HJ’s desire to conceal that failure was von Schirach’s announcement that the law had not really been necessary. As he declared in an obvious logical contradic- tion, the law merely represented “the state’s recognition of an accom- plished event” that demonstrated the “voluntary commitment of youth.”16

Von Schirach was realistic enough to understand that the HJ was not yet ready to compel universal membership. He therefore avoided implementing the law for nearly three years. On March 25, 1939, however, he abruptly ordered all youngsters between the ages of ten and eighteen to serve. Demonstrating that he was resorting to outright compulsion in order to subdue continued resistance, he threatened that parents who refused to send their children would be fined or jailed while recalcitrant youngsters could be brought to their “service of honor” by the police. As a reward for those youths who had joined on their own volition prior to April 20, 1938, he announced the formation of a core or elite HJ (the so-called Stumm-HJ). Those who had to be coerced, however, were relegated to a less prestigious and presumably less rewarding general HJ (Allgemeine or Pjicht HJ). Clear evidence that the HJ’s ambitions were still outrunning its training capacities was the fact that actual recruitment had to be confined to seventeen-year-olds of the class of 1923 and that it took until September 12, 1941, to implement compulsory membership for all classes.”

Having forced so many youngsters into its ranks, the HJ had to make sure that they performed their service with regularity and were indoctrinated in the Nazi spirit. The problem was that the HJ was ill equipped to cope with these tasks. Its personnel practices and strong antiintellectual animus condemned its political indoctrination to al- most certain failure, while enforcement of attendance and service merely enhanced its coercive tone and produced even stronger resist- ance.

16. For the text, see Reichbefehl43/1,4 December 1936. However, see also for von Schirach’s behind-the-scenes maneuvering to make membership compulsory, Martin Broszat, Der Staat Hitlers (Munich, 1969), 334-36.

For the view that this law acknowledged the fact that four million youngsters had refused to join and that this rendered false all pretense that its members had volun- teered, see Peter D. Stachura, Nazi Youth in the Weimar Republic (Santa Barbara, 1975), 202.

17. See Amtliches Nachrichtenblatt &sjugen&ihrers &s Deutschen Reich und der Reich- jugendhhmng der NSDAP, 2 /39 of 6 April 1939, NA T-175/45/2,557,084-090; and VSHB, 2: 1 1 , 98. For the additional orders of implementation, see Reichbefehle 8 / K , 3 November 1939, and 4 1 / K , 6 July 1940 (Dienstanweisung zur Durchfuhrung der Ju- genddienstpflicht, 10 May 1940), NA T-81/113/132,167, 113,098-133, and 113,111- 113; also Reichsjugendfuhrung,jahrbuch der Hitbugend (Munich, 1941). 16, and Edgar Randel, “Die Anmeldung zur Hitler-Jugend,” DID 35 (December 194 1 ) : 299-301.

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The Historian Ideological training had never been the HJ’s strong suit. Its history

as an activist, fighting, and paramilitary organization caused it to reject ideas in favor of deeds. As a consequence, the entire organization, like its adult counterparts in the party and the fascist movement in general, was suffused with a strong antiintellectual animus. Therefore, the HJ lacked the capacity to envision “grandiose projects” or the desire to give much time to the turgid ideology of National Socialism. For most HJ leaders, it was enough that Hitler had done some thinking. Their obligation was not to think but to act. This antiintellectualism per- vaded even the HJ’s own department of ideological training, Abteilung E/1. As early as 1934 this section announced that in its leadership training courses there was no place for “overintellectualization.” Leaders merely needed slightly more knowledge than their followers and should not be distracted by knowing too many details.18

As a result, political indoctrination in the HJ was treated in a mechanical fashion. Prior to the outbreak of World War 11, it was confined to distributing four different kinds of training manuals geared to the needs of specific age and sex groups. These were is- sued every two weeks and contained plans for eight separate ses- sions. After 1939, in defiance of all dictates of reason, the HJ re- duced its manuals by half, abandoned age grouping, and, most significantly, instructed its leaders that the best way to strengthen character and ideological commitment was to emphasize military training.Ig By April 1941 the training manuals were cut in half once more so that German youngsters now received only one hour of Weltanschauung a month.20

Worse than the mere reduction in time spent on ideology was the increasing militarization of all aspects of HJ service. Originally some- what equivocal toward the military,*1 the HJ in power could not resist the temptation to allow military drill and a parade ground tone to dominate all of its training. This growing militarization ap- peared relatively early. For example, on July 11, 1933, the lead- ership of the Wurttemberg HJ had to prohibit “hour-long, boring

18. See Reichsjugendfuhrung, Abteilung E/1, Betr. Fuhrerschulung, Rundbnef; no. 1, 15 January 1934. In some quarters, ideological training was held in such low esteem that troublemakers were sent to the Fuhrerschuk to get rid of them temporarily. However, see also Verordnungsbkztt (Sonderdruck), no. 7, Abteilung E.S., n.d., which reveals that in a three-week-long training course less than a quarter of the time was devoted to ideological training while virtually all the rest was spent on physical development.

19. See “Die weltanschauliche Schulung in Kriege,” Die HJ zrn Kriege, 102 If., HA 19/359. For sample programs from such manuals for the months of March through May 1940, see Reichsbefehf 30/K, 32/K, and 36/K in NA T-81/113/132,808-907.

20. Reichsbefehl, 20/41K, 28 April 1941, NA T-81/114/133,728. 2 I . For attitudes towards the army, see john R. Gillis, Youth and History (New York,

1974), 151.

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Hitler Youth dri11.”22 But the problem persisted and grew because many leaders found it easier and personally more gratifying to stress drill and in- stant obedience than to inspire their charges with ideas or by their own example.23 Indeed, it is quite evident that the HJ eventually substi- tuted war and preparation for war for any sort of ideological training.

A look at some training manuals makes this clear. For example, in 1940 Baldur von Schirach was still trying to prevent progressive mili- tarization from jeopardizing the training of the Junpolk. He there- fore declared, “under no circumstances do we want to destroy the joy of youngsters in this movement through . . . useless . . . pseudo- military drill.” Yet the very same booklet that contained this injunc- tion demanded that leaders adhere to a strict timetable of instruction “without any deviation” and ordered them to see to it that in ideo- logical training “every boy steps forward smartly, conducts himself in a soldierly manner and recites his answers in a clear and concise form. ”24

The deterioration of the quality of education in the HJ was given additional impetus by the shortage of leaders and the method of their selection. Even before the war accentuated this problem, the HJ always favored a good military bearing over intelligence. It preferred young men who conducted themselves as soldiers while it generally frowned upon introverted and introspective types. Proof of this comes from evaluations of a class of HJ leaders at the District Leader School Hans Schemm in 1938.

The boy who most closely approximated HJ criteria was Georg Schneider, who, although not overly intelligent, was “large physically, strongly developed . . . who knows what he wants and gets his way.” This favorable impression was enhanced because of his ambition to become an army officer. By way of contrast, Josef Arnold was criticized for his “sloppy bearing” and was characterized as “a harmless Central European” without much promise. Similarly, an uninspiring career was predicted for Ferdinand Stadlbauer because he was “shy and un- certain and could not look one in the eye.”25

The consequence of such practices was entirely predictable. The typical HJ leader cultivated a domineering tone and stressed drill, marches, and strictly prescribed military exercises but cared little

22. Gebzetsmndschreiben 1/33. 1 1 July 1933, HJ Gebietsfuhrung Wiirttemberg. 23. Ludwig Hemm, L h unleren Fuhrer in der HJ. Versuch threr psychologwhen Typen-

gliedrmng (Leipzig, 1940), 28 ff., 78 ff. 24. Reichsjugendfuhrung, Der Dienst irn Deutschen Jungvolk in dm Hitler-Jugend. Richt-

linien fur dm fienst des ersten Iahrganges, January 1940 and February 1941, NA T- 8 1/68 1/4,7 18, 872-888.

For evidence of similar militarization in the BDM, see Oberguubefehl BDM Schwaben A3/40/K6, 1 April 1940, NA T-81/99/114,599-606.

25. For these and other evaluations, see NA T-81/100/116, 732-797

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The Historian about ideological matters and the problems of his followers.*6 This kind of domination emphasized the coercive nature of the HJ system and fostered dislike and rejection among many youngsters. Document- ing this tendency are the biographies of some of the members of the Weisse Rose conspiracy at the University of Munich. One of its leaders, Alexander Schmorell, responded to compulsory membership in the HJ by being “deeply frightened and repelled.” More significant were the reactions of Hans Scholl. Originally an ardent enthusiast because of the HJ’s “marching columns of youth with banners waving, their eyes directed forward, their drum beat and their song,” Scholl broke with the organization and left his position of leadership because of the HJ’s increasingly strident drill and regimentation.“

Indicating that militarization and coercion alienated large groups of youngsters are the findings of some postwar studies. One of these reveals that 46.4 percent of HJ members disliked the organization for its military features, while another study finds that an even larger number, 51 percent, responded by declaring that the worst feature of National Socialism was its “compulsion and lack of freedom.”28 If this is true, the HJ can hardly be regarded as an instrument of effective totalitarian youth control. Its positive appeal was much too limited and its coercive features were too strong to merit such a designation. Moreover, this appeal was also sharply limited by social considera- tions.

As I have shown elsewhere, upwardly mobile middle-class boys were the HJ’s strongest supporters. This group had the most to gain from the movement by way of social and political advancement and dominated its leadership positions. While members of the upper class or the upper middle class by no means rejected the HJ, they frequently criticized it for its roughness and lack of idealism. Most significant, however, is that the greatest opposition to the HJ came from working- class boys who did not respond well to its system of “dominance” and authority.29 Still another significant limitation was the HJ’s failure to

26. Daniel Horn, “Youth Resistance in the Third Reich: A Social Portrait,”Jounzal of Social HiStoty 7 (Fall 1973): 31.

27. Christian Petry, Studenten aufs Schafott. Die Weisse Rose und ihr Sche i ta (Munich, 1968), 17 ,2627; Inge Scholl, Lhe WeisseRose (Frankfurt, 1953), 10-15; Gunther Weisen- born, Der lautlose Aufstand (Hamburg, 1953), 9 6 1 0 1 , 267 ff.

28. Knut Pipping, Rudolf Abshagen, and Anne-Eva Brauneck, Cesprache mit der deutschen Jugend. Ein Beitrag zum Autoritatsprobh (Helsingfors, 1954), 325-29; EMNID- Institut fur Meinungsforschung Bielefeld,Jugendzwzschen 15 and 24. Eine Untersuchung der deutschen Jugend im Bundesgebiet (Bielefeld, 1954), 23, 84, 158.

29. Pipping et. al., Gespruche, 390-93; Horn, “Youth Resistance,” 30-41. For general treatments and chronicles of youth resistance, see also Arno Klonne,

Gegen den Sfrom (Hanover and Frankfurt, 1957); Hans Ebeling and Dieter Hespers, eds., fugend Contra .VationaLsozialiSm~ (Frechen, 1968); and Hans-Christian Brandenburg, Die Geschichte ah HJ (Cologne, 1968), 194-227.

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Hitler Youth muster the support of Catholic youth. This group consistently rejected not only the HJ’s coercive features but also what passed for its ideol- ogy.

Instead of altering its personnel practices, raising the intellectual and ideological abilities of its leaders, and trying to accommodate a broader spectrum of German youth, the HJ continued to place its faith in coercion. In fact, ideology was allowed to deteriorate further as the war progressed. As early as 194 1 the Reichjugendfiihrung commanded that ideological training in rural units, where the educational level of leaders was notoriously low, be confined to reading out loud the bold- face print of its training booklets.30 When it eventually became embar- rassed by such conditions, the HJ resorted to sending its unit com- manders to ideological training sessions of six days duration to provide them with a modicum of learning.

This had become necessary, according to Oberbannfuhrer Gries- mayr, head of the HJ Ideological Training Section, because “our entire work is being jeopardized by the lack of enthusiastic, truly motivated leaders.” In the lower echelons, ideological training had “sunk to a frightening level.”31 When even this failed, the HJ admitted with resig- nation in 1944 that the “personnel requirements” were not always present. Therefore in February of that year it began to supplement the meager ideological fare of its charges by compelling them to attend monthly parades at which a half-hour talk was piped in over the radio from Berlin.32

Its utter failure in the ideological sector jeopardized the HJ’s con- trol over large groupings of youngsters. Most important among these were the religious youth groups of the Catholic and Protestant churches. Catholics, in particular, had waged a stubborn struggle against the HJ, the party, and the state to preserve the loyalties of their youth and to ward off the neopagan doctrines of National Socialism. While the Catholic Church failed to save its youth organizations from the HJ, its young followers formed one of the largest contingents of

30. See “HJ Arbeit auf dem Lande,” 1941, NA T-81/96/111,389 ff.; and Rund-

For the view that the HJ scarcely had any impact in either an organizational or

3 1. Griesmayr to Huuplgefolgschuftsfuhrer Braun of Cologne-Aachen, 1 1 September

32. See “Die Weltanschauliche Schulung,” Die HJtm Knege, HA 19/359. However, see also Meldungen aus dem Reich, Nr. 380, 17 June 1943, and SD-Berichte zu Inlands- fragen, 12 August 1943, NA T-175/265/2,759,676-681 and 2,760,132-139, for the complaints of the Security Service of the SS that after eight years of HJ service most German youngsters were actually prejudiced against entering the party. Only a small minority joined for ideological reasons. The small number who volunteered did so solely for the purpose of professional preferment.

schreiben 8/44 BDM Bann Salzburgen, NA T-81/100/116,819.

ideological sense in some South German villages, see Peterson, Lzrntts, 409 ff.

1943, NA T-81/96/111,224-226.

649

The Historian holdouts and in many instances could not be persuaded to join even after the passage of the HJ law of 1936.

Moreover, mere organizational losses could hardly affect the hold of the Church over its youth. All available evidence indicates that in the battle centering on ideological issues and loyalties, the Church was much stronger than the HJ because of its dedicated and well-trained priesthood. Repeated complaints from the HJ as well as from the SD, the Security Service of the SS, demonstrate conclusively that the Church was not only winning the ideological battle but also retaining the attendance and services of its youth and surmounting all the legal obstacles the’ Nazi system placed in its path. Responsible for this was what one Nazi spokesman termed its “masterful ability to capitalize on the intrinsic needs of youth.”33

Under these circumstances, the HJ had little choice but to rely more than ever on its arsenal of coercive measures. It is questionable whether this was a wise strategy. By forcing attendance, by resorting to the police power of the state, and by compelling a total mobilization, the HJ risked losing all youthful spontaneity and turning large sectors of German youngsters into a sullen and resentful herd. Only strong patriotism and a universally shared appreciation of the national crisis that beset Germany during World War I1 could prevent a far-reaching collapse of morale.

At any rate, this was a risk the HJ was prepared to take in 1940 as it launched a vastly invigorated program of compulsory attendance and service by means of new threats and punishments. For failing to appear at an HJ meeting, a youngster now received a written warning. A second unexcused absence resulted in notification to the parents, while a third absence produced the intervention of a higher leader who was empowered to call on the police to fine, arrest or undertake “im- mediate physical compulsion.”~4

Nevertheless, the HJ did not think it was sufficiently protected against its “compulsory youth.”35 Consequently, on April 2, 1940, its Chief of Staff, Hartmann Lauterbacher, announced a set of new disciplinary regulations and penalties. The mildest of these was a warning, while for more severe violations youngsters could be sep- arated from the HJ or excluded permanently. Even though such

33. Daniel Horn, “The Struggle for Catholic Youth in Hitler’s Germany: An Assessment,” Catholic Histoncal Review (Summer 1979); Meldungen aus dem Reich, 28 September 1942, NA T-175/263/2,757,665 ff.

34. Decree of 26 March 1940, “Polizeiliche Massnahmen zur Erfullung derJugend- dienstpflicht,” VSHB, 2:115-17; Gunter Kaufmann and Hans Burmann, Hundbwh des gesammten jugendrechts (Berlin-Charlottenberg, n.d.), 23d-23f.

35. For this identification of the HJ as a “Zwangsjugend, ” see Klonne, Gegen da Strom, 97.

650

Hi tler Youth separations and exclusions were reserved for the judgment of older men, the HJ had created a very draconian regimen. The only re- straint upon the discretion of such judges was that they be cautious about issuing the extreme penalty of exclusion, for this signified os- tracism from the “volk-community” and might lead to a rise of ju- venile delinquency.36

This injunction could hardly temper the HJ’s harshness. According to statistics compiled by HJ courts for the year 1937, prior to the much tougher 1940 regulations, 30.73 percent of the cases tried resulted in exclusion; 43.06 percent in permanent separation; 1 1.66 percent in temporary separation; and 1.35 percent in reduction in rank. Only 10.57 percent of the cases were resolved by a warning or reprimand, and a mere 2.63 percent were lucky enough to be acquitted.37

During the war, the two severest penalties continued to be invoked with undiminished regularity. In the period from September 1, 1939, to August 1, 1941, there were at least 2,800 recorded exclusions and separations.38 While such figures may not appear very impressive for an organization of over eight million members, what matters in this connection was that these punishments enabled the HJ to perennially threaten and coerce youngsters to obey its regulations.

In this fashion the HJ turned itself into a juvenile enforcement agency which sought to control every facet of life for German adoles- cents in order to curb their freedom to make independent choices. By not only prescribing attendance at HJ functions but also seeking to control moral and social behavior, the HJ became a bourgeois child- saver organization that narrowly circumscribed the lives of lower-class youngsters by means of duty and regulations.39 The impetus for this stemmed from a fear that the war would produce a wave of juvenile delinquency and criminality like the one of World War I, when 27

36. See “Die Dienststrafordnung der Hitler-Jugend fur die Dauer des Krieges,” marked top secret, in Reichsbefehl 34/K, 2 April 1940, NA T-81/113/132,862-871. For the entire disciplinary legislation, see Kaufmann and Burmann. Gruppe I, 29-328. However, see also Zwht und Ehre - Mitteilungs - und Schulungsblatt fur die Dimtstrafvor- gesetzten der Hitler-Jqmd, 26 April 1940, NA T-81/115/135,131-150.

37. “Die Erfahrungen des Jahres 1937. Eine Auswertung der Statistik der HJ Gerichtsbarkeit,” Der HJ-Richter. Schulungsblatt der HJ-Gerichtsbarkeit, 1: 1 , 5-6.

38. For a somewhat unreliable central listing of approximately twenty-eight hun- dred exclusions, see Reichsbefehl 35/41K, 25 September 1941, NA T-31/114/113,973- 134,024. Individual Reichsbefehls carried additional names that were not entered in the main listing. See, for instance, Reichsbefehl 7/K of 27 October 1939, NA T- 81/113/132,152-155 for the exclusion of seventy-eight members for various fiscal crimes and misdemeanors.

39. For the concept of child-saving organizations as a means of controlling adoles- cent rebelliousness in England and Germany, see the invaluable analysis in Gillis, Youth, especially 166-70.

65 1

The Historian percent of all crimes were committed by juveniles. The HJ correctly felt that such delinquency would be not only a blow to its function as an educational agency but also a distinct threat to its ability to control the social and political behavior of its youngsters.40

An order for the Protection of Youth, dated March 9, 1940, was aimed precisely at preventing a “barbarization and endangerment of youth.” Accordingly, youngsters were prohibited from the streets after dark, visiting taverns after 9 P.M., attending unchaperoned dances, drinking distilled beverages, smoking in public, and visiting cabarets and adult films.41 To this the HJ added numerous restrictions of its own. On March 8, 1940, it forbade the drinking of Coca Cola, and on July 15 it banned as “trashy literature” the harmless-sounding titles, Rolf Toning S Adventures, Jom Farrow ’s Adventures, Tex Bulwer, Salto Mor- tale, John Kling S Memoirs, Billy Jenkins, Tom Shark, Alaska Jim, and Sun Koh: Heir of Atlantis. 42

Deploring such prohibitions as counterproductive, one HJ official wrote with considerable insight, “I am of the opinion that a plethora of prohibitions is not in order. After all, we do not want to conduct the training of youth by means of police regulations. Such prohibitions should only be issued where education is especially jeopardized and where appropriate countermeasures cannot be put into play.”43 Nevertheless, the HJ continued to pursue a contradictory policy of endless prohibitions that restricted the automony of youngsters while simultaneously depriving them of protection from the law by holding them fully accountable for any disciplinary infractions. One prominent legal official of the HJ, Walter Tetzlaff, went so far as to declare that disciplinary maturity began at the age of ten. As he bluntly put it, “Pimpfe and Jungmadel are not really children any more and therefore not pure objects of education.” Their entry into the HJ made them “coresponsible for their training” and therefore subject to disciplinary

40. For lengthy discussions of juvenile delinquency, see Herbert Vornefeld, ‘Ju- gendfuhrung gegen Jugendkriminalitat. Was lehren die Erfahrungen des Weltrieges?” and ”Die Jugendkriminalitat im Weltkriege. Erscheinungsformen und Ursachen,” DJD 33 (November 1940): 475-78 and 32 (December 1939):496501. See also Walter Tetz- laff, Dm Disziplznarrecht der Hitler-Jgend (Berlin, 1944). 9-10, For an extremely perceptive view that youth manifests its dissatisfaction with society through various modes of juvenile delinquency and rebelliousness, see David Matza, “Subterranean Traditions of Youth,” Annah of the American A c a h y ofPoliticaland Social Sciences 338 (November 1961): 102-18, especially 1 0 6 1 0 .

4 1. For the text and justification, see Reichsjugendfuhrung, Soziales A m . , Das Recht derjugend, H4t I. Gefahrenquellen fir dielugend. Erlauterungen zu den neuen Polizeiuerord- nungen (Berlin, 1943). 58 ff.; and Jugendfuhrer des Deutschen Reichs, Kriminalitat und Gefahrdung derJugend. Lagebmcht bzr zum Stande uom 1. Januar 1941, ed. Bannfuhrer W. Knopp (Berlin, n.d.), 142 ff.

42. Rezchsbefehl 30/K and 53/K, NA T-81/113/132,813 ff. and 133,154. 43. Knopp to HJ Gebiet Schwaben, 13 October 1941, NA T-580/352/13.

652

Hitler Youth punishment. This was “consonant with the fundamental law of any real youth movement.”44

Accordingly, when the HJ issued a new disciplinary code on May 19, 1941, it devised a new form of punishment to enforce its will on reluctant youngsters. This was Jugenddienstarrest, youth service arrest, first introduced by decree on September 17, 1940. As the regulation stated, this was created for “especially severe infringements of disci- pline. It is the last appeal to the youngster’s honor before the HJ gives up on him and removes him from its ranks.” This applied only to boys over fourteen years of age and could take one of the following forms: a boy could be placed under arrest for a weekend lasting from Saturday through Sunday; he could be imprisoned for a maximum of three weekends; or he could be incarcerated for a concurrent period of three to eight d a y ~ . ~ 5

According to Gebietsjiiihrer Luer, the new penalty was specifically designed for war conditions; in simply excluding dissident boys from the HJ there had been an inherent danger, and other punishments had not proven sufficiently preemptive. Luer felt that the shock of being deprived of liberty and being placed in solitary confinement on a diet of bread and water would have a salutary effect on obstreperous youngs ters.46

One of the major reasons for this was to complement a new punish- ment devised by the state and known asjugendarrest (youth arrest). It ostensibly “filled a gap” between the reformatory on the one hand and a longjail sentence on the other. Enacted on October 12, 1940, the law empowered judges to send youngsters to jail for periods ranging from one to four weekends and from one week to a month. During that interval the youthful offender would be placed in solitary confinement on a diet of bread and water. According to one of its major proponents, the notorious State Secretary Roland Freisler, the law had the signal advantage of not saddling a youngster with a criminal record for life and thus being eminently suited to the passionate temperament of

In actuality, however, Jugendarrest seems to have been used principally to punish youngsters who somehow still evaded member- ship in the HJ and were therefore not subject to its jurisdiction.48

44. Tetzlaff, Dm Duzzpltnarrecht, 26. 45. “Dienststrafordnung der Hitlerljugend fur die Dauer des Krieges (Neufas-

sung),” Rmrhsbe/ehl23/41K, 19 May 1941, NA T-81/114/133,761-782; VSHB, 3: 934-

46. Heinrich Luer, “ner Jugenddienstarrest. Eine neue Dienststrafe der Hitler-

47. Roland Freisler, “Der Jugendarrest und die Neugestaltung des Jugendstraf-

48. Amtsgerichtsrat Alexander Wirrzfeld, “Typische Jugendarrestfalle,” DJD 36

38, 997-1005.

Jugend,” DID 34 (November 1940): 250-54.

rechts,” DJD 34 (November 1940): 241-50.

(October 1942): 264-70.

653

The Historian With all these novel penalties and regulations going into effect

after just one year of war, the life of Germany’s youth came to be rigidly circumscribed and fraught with the constant threat if not indeed the reality of punishment. One of the best ways of gauging the re- sponse this evoked is to examine some specific cases that led tolugend- diem tarrest.

According to the periodical for HJ judges, Der Hith-Jugend Richter, the most persistent problem was enforcing compulsory attendance. Thus a sixteen-year-old boy from Mecklenburg who had missed four meetings and was caught smoking in public was first brought in by the police and reprimanded severely and, when this proved to be of no avail, was sent to jail for two weekends. Documenting similar difficulty is the case of a seventeen-year-old Bavarian worker. After missing five meetings, he was forcibly brought before his leader for a reprimand. Thereupon he retorted defiantly, “You may kiss my arse. . . . I work all day and shall not hop around with you in the evening.” For this he was sentenced to a weekend of jail as a final warning prior to being excluded from the organization.

In the Cologne-Aachen area, the HJ experienced the same problem with a seventeen-year-old who persistently drank and smoked. He shirked his HJ service and threatened his leaders with bodily harm. Even when present at meetings, he was disruptive and undermined the authority of the leaders. For this he was sentenced to three days in prison. Another illustration is the case of a boy from Brandenburg. Having been expelled initially for showing lack of interest, he was forced to re-enter. So resentful was he that he immediately insulted his superior and was therefore remanded to jail for a weekend. In still another instance the resentments of an entire group of boys recently drafted into the Pjicht-HJ were expressed in an attack on their leader in a snowball fight.49

In actual fact, the HJ availed itself of youth service arrest in a fairly sparing fashion. It was therefore more of a threat than a uni- versally applied penalty. This is revealed by some figures. During its first year of use, ending on October 21, 1941, a mere 815 boys were imprisoned. This averaged twenty-one instances in each of the forty HJ Cebiete. In 61 percent of the cases it was employed for dis- ciplinary infractions among which 11 percent were for shirking HJ service. The other 39 percent of the cases involved “punishable ac- tions’’ such as inflicting bodily injury (8 percent) and forgery of

49. Walter Tetzlaff, ‘lugenddienstarrest-Entscheidungen der Sonderbeauftragten der Reichsjugendfuhrung,” Der Hitler-Jugend Richter (June 1941): 7-1 I , NA T- 580/39/239; Der Hihr-Jugend Richter (June 1942): 9-1 I , in Archiv des Hanseatischen Oberlandesgerichts Hamburg, OL6 42i-la/4, Forschungsstelle fur die Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus in Hamburg.

654

Hitler Youth documents (7 percent).50 In a similar vein, exclusion from the HJ represented more of a threat than a tangible reality for most Ger- man youngsters. In the five-month period between November 1, 1942, and March 31, 1943, the HJ excluded or separated on a per- manent basis 1,111 male and 399 female members.5I

It would be incorrect, however, to construe this kind of moderation as being characteristic of the HJ’s policies in regard to enforcement of regulations and coping with nonconformity or dissidence. The HJ could and did resort to much more frightening measures that created an atmosphere of terror for German youngsters who challenged its authority. An example of this was its handling of the Hiibener case. Helmuth Hiibener, a seventeen-year-old administrative apprentice from Hamburg, had entered the JungvoZk in 1938 as an ardent Nazi. However, he quickly became disillusioned by the HJ’s drill and com- pulsion as well as by its persecution of the Mormon Church to which he belonged. As a result, he began to oppose the HJ and to publish agitational literature against it. While Hubener cried out against a whole range of Nazi abuses, one of his most telling flyers was squarely directed against the HJ’s coercive measures and itsJugenddienstarrest. In this he asked, “Boys of Germany, do you know what country is without liberty, a land of terror and tyranny? You know the answer very well, but you don’t want to say it. You have been so oppressed that you do not dare because you are afraid of being punished. Yes, you are right. It is Germany; Hitler’s Germany.” Indicative of the HJ’s sense of justice and its desire to enforce conformity by means of dreadful exam- ples was the fact that Hubener was sentenced to death in the spring of 1942 while his accomplices were jailed for terms ranging from four to ten years.52

The HJ also employed other threats designed to evoke terror. These were only slightly less barbaric and frightening. Instead of the death penalty, they conjured up the dreadful vision of a special youth concentration camp. This was supposedly established at Neuwied to incarcerate youthful opponents of the HJ.59 In actuality, rumors about such a camp in all probability derived from the establishment early in 1940 of a new type of penal institution, a so-called Jugendschutzlager, youth protective camp, for incorrigible juveniles not suited for ordi- nary reform schools. According to Hermann Goering, who originated

50. Walter Tetzlaff, “Der Jugenddienstarrest im ersten Jahr,” DjD 36 (March

51. Jugendfuhrer to Dr. H. Kiimmerlein of Reich Justice Ministry, BA R22/1305. 52. Ursel Hochmuth and Gertrud Meyer, eds., Strazachter auc da Hamburger Wider-

stand 1933-1945. Berichte und Dokumente (Frankfurt, 1969), 325-41; Klonne, Gegen den Strom, 104-6; Giinter Weisenborn, Der hutlose Aufitand (Hamburg, 1953), 80 ff.

1942): 53-57.

53. Klonne, Gegen den Strom, 108; Klose, 225.

655

The Historian the idea, several camps were to be established on the model of a prototype at Moringen in South Hanover. This was to be run by the SS while the educational functions were to be exercised by the HJ. The inmates of the Jugendschutzlager Moringen were to serve unspecified terms, and if they proved beyond correction, they could be transferred to a concentration camp.54

By 1942 Jugendrchutzlager Moringen was in full operation with 489 inmates, a heterogeneous lot of “work-shirkers,” mentally retarded boys, an assortment of gypsies, half-gypsies and halfgews, and even two illegitimate black boys (“und sogar zwei Negerbastarde”). The young prisoners were compelled to work eleven hours a day and were sub- jected to a great deal of military drill. Discipline was extremely strict; the commandant was empowered to order “punitive sport” of up to an hour’s duration, corporal punishment to the tune of five, ten, or fifteen lashes, and solitary confinement of up to twenty-one days. In order to facilitate punishment on the spot, block leaders were allowed to administer up to five lashes without consultation.55

A year later the camp had grown considerably and had refined its distinctive penal routines. Some 18 percent of the inmates were la- beled incorrigible and slated for ultimate transfer to concentration camps. The rate of release, however, was very small. After a year and a half of operation, eighty-six boys had been relinquished to the army and four to the Labor Service, twelve had been sent home, and twenty- seven had been transferred to milder prisons. However, twenty-one inmates had died a “natural death,” twenty-two had been sterilized, two had died in accidents, there had been two suicides, and one boy had been shot while trying to escape. More important than these grim figures was the fact that from a prophylactic point of view, the exis- tence of the camp and its selection procedures had been widely publi- cized by the HJ. It became generally known that future inmates were to be nominated by either the Gau Youth Bureau, the criminal police, or, perhaps most significantly, by the HJ Gebiets or area leaders.56

54. See Director ofyouth Prison at Naugard to Generalstaatsanwalt Stettin, 25 July 1940, BA R42/1304.

55. Ministerialrat Dr. Eichler and Justizrat Dr. Kiimmerlein, “Reisebericht iiber die Besichtigung des polizeilichen Jugendschutzlagers Moringen,” 16 April 1942, BA R22/1305.

56. For conditions, see Director of Youth Prison at Heilbronn to Dr. Eichler, 31 July 1943. BA 22/1306.

For the publicity about the camp, see Gebzekrundtchraben HJ Gebiet Schwaben 5/42, 28 February 1942, NA T-580/349/5; VSHB, 3: 977; and SS-Obersturmbannfuhrer Paul Werner, “Die Polizei in ihrem Kampf gegen die Gefahrdung der Jugend,” DJD 35 (October 1941): 245. However, see also Muller, Betraung, 57, for a declaration that a comparable camp for females had been established at Uckermark bei Fiirstenberg in Mecklenburg and that it had two hundred inmates by mid-1942. Cf. Amtlzches Nuchn‘hta- blutt, 30 May and 12 September 1942.

656

Hi tler Youth Although such drastic measures eventually tended to enhance at-

tendance at meetings, even the HJ could not avoid noticing that the hoped-for enthusiastic participation of youngsters was singularly lack- ing. Reluctant youngsters could indeed be forced to attend meetings and to work for the HJ, but the results tended to be disappointing and counterproductive. They gave the appearance of being “weary of ser- vice,’’ and one could hardly escape the impression that “some of the boys only attend service out of compulsion,”57 demonstrating HJ’s failure to live up to the totalitarian principle of mobilizing the masses in active and enthusiastic participation.

Despite such warning signals, the HJ consistently placed its faith in increasing control and pressure. On January 1, 194 1, it instituted roll call meetings (Appelle) every Sunday morning in order to round up young evaders. When even this expedient proved to have loopholes, the HJ established a new system of membership cards in 1943. These had to be stamped every month and were required for presentation prior to receiving ration coupons.58

Nevertheless, the HJ’s difficulties persisted. On such occasions the police were called in for help. As the war progressed, the incidence of police intervention multiplied to such a point that it became embar- rassing. In June 1943 the HJ in Swabia had to instruct its units not to have the police drag recalcitrant boys into open meetings. It felt that such practices “were psychologically bad because they gave the popu- lation the impression that the HJ had to bring its boys to their service by means of the police.” Despite this, the frequency with which the police were called to cope with dissident youngsters continued to grow.59

Even when the HJ was successful in compelling membership and service, it encountered unexpected problems and resistance. The most visible manifestation of this was a pronounced deterioration in the appearance and discipline of its membership. In May 1941, the Reich leadership commented, “Lately we have repeatedly discovered that the public appearance of youngsters has declined. HJ boys are frequently encountered on the streets with hands in their pockets, in dirty uni-

57. Streifadienrt reports of Bann Lindau, 30 July 1940 and 3 March 1941, NA T-81/104/120,708 ff. and 120,664.

58. “Dienstappelle der HJ,” DJD 35 (January 1941): 39; Otto Wurschinger, “Die Jugendappelle und das Erfassungswesen der Hitler-Jugend,” DJD 37 (November 1943): 266-77.

For implementation on the local level, see Gebietsrundcchreiben HJ Gebiet Schwaben 23/43, 5 October 1943, NA T-580/349/5.

59. See Gebietsrundcchraba 14/43 ofHJ Gebiet Schwaben, 4 June 1943, and Gebiets- befhl, 30 September 1942, for this prohibition and an earlier one forbidding the police picking boys up at their jobs. For a sample of the growing number of police actions, see also the periodic reports of HJ Bann Mernmingen. NA T-580/349/5 and 348/2, part 2.

657

The Historian forms, bad haircuts, and even smoking cigarettes.”60 Haircuts formed a separate chapter of HJ complaints since youngsters found a way to counter their oppression by cultivating distinctive hair styles. Order after order was issued with boring regularity as the HJ tried to keep its members from looking like “tango-boys” and members of the disso- lute youth of the Weimar Republic.61 Given the coercion and regimen- tation to which these youths were subjected, hair styles had become a matter of more than symbolic significance. This is indicated by the exclamation of one HJ boy in September 1944, “Why don’t they leave us our long hair? Do they absolutely insist on making us the same externally too and stamping us as idiots?”65

Such feelings were difficult to eradicate. Indeed, with its ranks filled with youths whom only threats could compel to serve, the HJ could legitimately complain that “the non-HJ, now the compulsory HJ . . . is composed of troublemakers and tango-boys. The elite HJ is also partially infiltrated by these elements.”69 The HJ thus knew that many of its compulsory members, disaffected and disillusioned by the orga- nization, were hardly the best material to perform the multitude ofjobs that it took on during the war.

What could not be accomplished by ordinary means, the HJ sought to achieve by increased supervision and police tactics. For such pur- poses the HJ had long possessed an instrument in its internal police, the StrmLfendzenst or Patrol Service, best known by its abbreviation, the SRD. Founded in 1933 or 1934 to supervise the public appearance of the HJ at demonstrations and gatherings and to combat competing youth organizations, the Streifendienst gradually turned into a very large police and spying service. Even before the war vastly multiplied its functions, the SRD administered a body of legislation and supervisory functions that filled a 157-page booklet while at the same time it scught to acquire official police powers from the state to control Germany’s youth.64

6 0 . Gebietsrundrchreaben RJF 16/41 , 26 May 1941, VSHB, 2:632. 61. For a sample of the haircut legislation, see Reichbefehl36/K and 31/41K of 12

April 1940 and 10 July 1941, NA T - 8 1 / 1 1 3 / 1 3 2 , 894 , and VSHB, 2: 638 . For local versions.seeGebietsbefeh1 K13/42 , HJ Gehiet Westmark, 24 July 1942, and Gebietsrund- schreiben 10/42, HJ Gebiet Schwaben, NA T-81/101/177,246 and T - 5 8 0 / 3 4 9 / 5 .

6 2 . Klaus Granzow, Tagebwh eines Hitleyungen 1943-1945 (Bremen, 1965) , 133 ff. 6 3 . SRD Monthly Report HJ Gehiet Schwaben, 1 November 1940. NA T -

81/103/120,524. 6 4 . For the early history of the SRD, see Muller, Betreuung, 34; Reichsjugendfuh-

rung, Amt fur Jugendverbande, Vorlaujge fimtvorschnfl fur den HJ-Stre@ndimt, 15 May 1936, HA, 18/338; and Stammfuhrer Heuser, Reichstr~~endienstlehrgange. Stoff-Sammlung. Anlage zu den Anweisungen fur die Durchhhrung des Dienstes in den Reichlehrgangen und Reich- slrafmdienstlehrgangen der Hitler-Jugend, n.d., 105.

For the extent of its jurisdiction, see Reichsjugendfuhrung, Personalamt-uherwa-

Hitler Youth Failing to obtain this, the Streijmdienst developed an affinity for the

SS, most particularly its Security Service.65 With the support of the most powerful agency of the police state behind it, the Stra@dienst developed its characteristic features of control and harassment. So infectious was the success of this enterprise that even the girls’ organi- zation of the HJ, the BDM, sought to emulate its male counterpart by creating its own patrol service.66

The SRD could hardly avoid abusing its power. Indicative of its exaggerated pretensions and overzealousness as a police agency is the fact that the Strajmdienst began to conduct major roundups or “grand sweeps” on the streets of Germany’s major cities in which large groups of youths were indiscriminately apprehended for infractions of a multi- tude of regulations and for the formation of illegal cliques. An example of such an odious practice is the “grand sweep” conducted in Dresden on July 12, 1940, in which 1,715 youngsters were unceremoniously arrested .67

The SRD’s constant patrols and interference in the lives of young- sters made it extremely unpopular and also frequently engendered outright hostility and opposition. This fact was detected fairly early. One SRD leader, Obergejolgschufhfuhrer Ott of Lindau on Lake Con- stance, commented on September 7, 1940, that sometimes the mere appearance of the Streijmdienst could lead the youngsters to become obstreperous. Ott maintained that in all likelihood there was a direct connection between frequent SRD patrols upon the streets and the rise of illegal cliques. These same sentiments were repeated much too late and to little avail in the spring of 1944 by Bunnfiihrer Knopp of HJ

chung, Richtlinien fur den HJ-Streifadienst. Ted IV. Anhang. Sammlung uon Gesetzen und Dienstbestimmungen uom 1. Juni 1938, Arbeitsrichtlinien der Hitler-Jugend, AR. HJ. P. IV.

For the unsuccessful attempt to acquire police powers, see Gebiekfuhrer Liier to Deutscher Gemeindetag, 3 August 1937, and Deutscher Gemeindetag to its Press De- partment, 10 October 1938, BA R36/2014 and 2018, as well as Reich Ministry of the Interior to Interior Ministry in Karlsruhe, 31 August 1937, BHSTar. Abt. I, MInn 7 1,800.

65. For the SD affiliation, see the correspondence of SD Oberabschnitt Rhein with SD in Koblenz, and Memorandum to Staff of Reichsfiihrer SS, 21 and 23 November 1936 and 24 April 1937, NA T-175/506/9,370,866-873.

For the SS affiliation of 26 August 1938, see VSHB, 2: 916 ff. and 881 IT. 66. See Rundschreiben 23/39G of 31 August 1939, marked secret and issued by

Reichsjugendfiihrer Schirach and BDM Reichsreferentin Jutta Riidiger, NA T- 81/97/112,822f. The plan for a BDM-SRD, however, never developed beyond this stage.

67. See for this Knopp, Kriminalitut, 187. It is interesting to note in this connection that of the youths apprehended on this occasion, 43 percent were still not members of the HJ, while of the remainder, a large proportion had not attended HJ services for a long time.

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The Historian Headquarters in Berlin. He warned, “The Streiimdienst must never take the character of an odious spy system which might destroy the confi- dence of the community. The HJ-Fiihrer shall lead and educate Ger- man youth, but should not ‘play police’ with it. False measures in this area are all too prone to produce a youthful spite reaction which may turn against the HJ.”6*

Knopp’s prediction was in actuality a longstanding fact. Such reac- tions had become increasingly evident as the pressures on the part of the HJ and the state were intensified and as coercion came to supplant other forms of mobilization. Indeed, compelling evidence demon- strates that the HJ’s coercive practices were turning large sectors of the youth population into active opponents who directly challenged its authority in open fashion on the streets. The rise of oppositional cliques in the Rhineland region around Diisseldorf and in Hamburg and Cologne, encompassing an estimated 30 percent of the area’s youth in groups such as the Kittelsbach Pirates, the Edelweiss Pirates, the Navajos, and the North German Swing Youth, provides most per- suasive testimony that the HJ’s coercion and threats were producing a violent and potentially devasting resistance that jeopardized its very foundations. Their members not only rejected every manifestation of HJ youth control but also indicated under interrogation that the prin- cipal impetus for their rebellion was their intense hatred of the cardi- nal features of the HJ regime: its compulsion, coercion, and over- regimentation.69

The growing opposition of masses of youngsters in such cliques, which could not be eradicated even by the most drastic measures, undermined the HJ’s ability to effectively mobilize more complaisant youths. By providing alternative and voluntary modes of organiza- tional affiliation, the cliques weakened the HJ monopoly and exposed its coercive tactics to constant ridicule and challenge. In fact, the growing number of youngsters who came to break the tough laws of the Nazi state, either by their opposition or by manifesting a tendency toward juvenile delinquency, raised serious doubts as to the HJ’s gen- eral effectiveness.

As early as February 1, 1940, Hermann Goring had noted an omi- nous rise of juvenile delinquency and criminality in Germany that conflicted with his vision of a disciplined and dedicated generation of Nazi youngsters. Publicly demanding that such delinquency be brought under immediate control, Goering convened a meeting to remedy this worrisome problem.70 The HJ could, of course, hardly

68. For Ott’s report, see NA T-81/104/120,694; for Knopp’s views, see his article, “Das Ubenvachungswesen der Hitler-Jugend. Bekampfung der Jugendgefahrdung und Jugendknminalitat,” DID 38 (May/June 1944): 102-3.

69. Horn, “Youth Resistance,” 32-41. 70. See minutes entitled “Besprechung Uber Jugendbetreuung unter Vorsitz des

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Hitler Youth help being disturbed by this attack on its prerogatives and reputation. Accordingly, it insisted that the problem was vastly exaggerated. De- spite all the difficulties arising from the war, it maintained, the general conduct of German youth presented a very “happy picture,” especially when contrasted with the crime rate that had prevailed during World War 1.71 Consequently, the HJ sought to stem the criticism of its effectiveness by prohibiting use of the term “delinquency” (Verwahr- losung), substituting a much milder word “endangerment” ( G ~ a h r - dung), and finally rejecting altogether the assertion that its youth was endangered.72

Under these circumstances, it was a foregone conclusion that the HJ could not do anything effective to combat juvenile delinquency. On October 17, 1940, Stabsfiihrer Mockel convened a Reich Committee for the Care of Youth. This met in a desultory fashion for the remainder of the war but confined itself to setting up similar committees on the local leve1.73 As a result, the juvenile crime rate continued to rise. In 1937 it had constituted a mere 6 percent of all crimes, but by 1943 it had nearly tripled and stood at 17.6 percent.74

That youthful crimes and delinquency continued to mount despite all the pressures for obedience and conformity may be seen as an additional sign that a fairly large sector of German youth was becom-

Herrn Ministerprasidenten Generalfeldmarschall Goring,” 1 February 1940, BA R43W512; and Meldungen aus dem Reich, 5 and 10 April 1940, NA T- 175/258/1,751,170 and 2,75 1,304f.

71. For such claims, see, for instance, SRD Schwaben to Reichsjungendfuhrung, 8 July 1940, NA T-580/352/13. For comparative statistics and claims about World War I, see Knopp, Kriminalitat, 27-28, 33, 41-43, 52-62, and 215.

72. For the prohibition, see Rundschrtiben der ‘VSDAP/Re ichs jugad~uh~n~ 15 (20 June 1942), and Rundschreiben 17/41 and 15/42, HJ Gebiet Schwaben, 30 August 1941 and 24 June 1942, NA T-580/349/5.

For the rejection of the charges, see Stabsfuhrer Mockel to Reichskanzlei, 8 Septem- ber 1941, upon presenting a copy of Knopp’s book, BA R4311/522. For a public state- ment to the same effect, see Helmut Mockel, “Planmassige Jugendbetreuung,” DJD 35 (October 1941): 241-43.

73. See Mockel to Deutschen Gemeindetag, 17 October 1941, and “Bericht iiber die erste Sitzung der Arbeitsgemeinschaft fur Jugendbetreuung, October 27, 194 1 ,” BA R36/2020. For the creation of local committees, see Anordnung A17/42 of 17 April 1942 by Martin Bormann, BA R36/2020. The minutes of subsequent meetings on 20 October 1942, 17 May 1943, and 24 April 1944, are found in BA R36/2021.

74. This was reflected in the penalties as well. In 1942, 7 1.9 percent of all youthful offenders were sentenced to youth arrest and 37,717 cases were recorded. A half year later, the youth arrest rate had bounded upward to 52,964 on an annual basis. For these figures, see Statistisches Reichsamt, “Die Jugend-Kriminalitat in Grossdeutschen Reich im Jahre 1942 und im 1. Halbjahr 1943”; and idem, “Die Entwicklung der Kriminalitat im Deutschen Reich vom Kriegsbeginn bis Mitte 1943,” Yivo Institute Archive, New York.

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The Historian ing restive over its loss of freedom and was striking out in dangerous ways to reassert its autonomy and independence. This was occasionally understood but never acted upon by the Nazi state.

That the regimentation and consuming activism of the HJ was long regarded as a grave problem is indicated by the remarks of no less prominent a personage than Heinrich Himmler. At a meeting with Rudolf Hess at the end of 1938, the SS chief indicated his concern over the overinvolvement of young men in the party and other organiza- tions. He declared that they no longer had time “for self-reflection” or “mischief.” Therefore he planned to reduce the number of SS meetings to grant them greater personal freedom. In his judgment, the HJ was similarly overburdened; parents no longer got any enjoyment from their children. This too would have to be remedied as would the increasingly shrill “barracks-square tone” that pervaded all segments of German life.75

These sentiments were echoed approximately two years later by Artur Axmann, the new leader of the HJ. At a cultural convention of the HJ at Weimar in mid-June 1940, he proclaimed that “youth had been impossibly overstrained” and declared that “every boy and girl must be afforded some time for himself.” At a subsequent meeting with Hess, Axmann confessed that many youngsters performed their HJ service solely because of coercion and that this had given rise to a problem of boredom and rebelliousness. “The HJ must under no circumstance cast out these individualists and little rebels and, espe- cially, the talented youngsters. One must avoid forcing them in a single mold,” he wisely declared. However, the solution he proposed was entirely inadequate. Axmann did not call for an immediate halt to all the coercive practices and pressures that had created the problem in the first instance. Instead, he merely advocated applying some sympto- matic relief by calling for the establishment of special workshops and grouping according to common interest to accommodate the young- sters’ striving for independence. Moreover, even this slight remedy was not to be implemented at once, for Axmann deferred it until Germany had won the war.76

This indefinite postponement is indicative of the HJ’s growing callousness toward its youngsters and its almost total preoccupation with the war. Another manifestation of the same feelings and an unwill- ingness to grapple with the immediate needs of an increasingly alien- ated and weary segment of youth is provided by a speech from an even higher quarter, Helmut Friedrichs, Martin Bormann’s chief aide in the

75. See the minutes of this meeting of 16 December 1938 as transcribed by Friedrichs of the Party Chancellery, NA T-580/79/368.

76. See Hauptmann Kaether, Wehrmacht representative to the Reichsjugendfuh- rung, to Generalmajor Reinecke, 4 July 1940, NA T-78/281/6,299,385; and Friedrichs minutes, “Notiz fur den Stabsleiter,” 1 November 1940, NA T-58/79/368.

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Hitler Youth party chancellery. “Misguided people complain that our youth has had to surrender too much of its personal freedom,” he announced in October 1943. But “this cannot be changed now during the war. We are first obliged to secure the future of our nation. After our victory there will once again be room for personal freedom within the frame- work of the entire volk-community.” Manifesting no sympathy for the plight of the oppressed youngsters, Friedrichs bluntly advised them to find solace in the fact that their loss of freedom was not without its compensations, for “in the truest sense of the word the German Pimpf already carries a fieldmarshall’s baton in his rucksack.”’’

Blind to the special needs of youth and deluded by its belief in the efficacy of coercion and compulsion, the HJ persisted in its brutal but unproductive practices until the very collapse of the Third Reich. That a handful of German youngsters fought for that state until the very end, however, should not be regarded as evidence that the Hitler Youth had succeeded in inspiring real faith and abiding loyalty. The weary equanimity and passivity with which the overwhelming majority of German youngsters responded to that collapse provides much sounder proof that the HJ had failed to form an enduring foundation for Nazi rule.

77. NA T-580/79/386.

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