Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaFIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. 120864 October 8, 2003MANUEL T. DE GUIA,petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS (Former Sixth Division) and JOSE B. ABEJO, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, Hermenegilda Abejo-Rivera,respondents.D E C I S I O NCARPIO,J.:The CaseThis is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1assailing the 22 August 1994 Decision2as well as the 27 June 1995 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 39875. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision3of the Regional Trial Court ("trial court") of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 16, in Civil Case No. 8796-M. The trial courts Decision ordered petitioner Manuel T. De Guia ("DE GUIA") to turn over to private respondent Jose B. Abejo ("ABEJO") possession of the one half () undivided portion of a fishpond and to pay actual damages and attorneys fees.The AntecedentsOn 12 May 1986, ABEJO4instituted an action for recovery of possession with damages against DE GUIA. In his complaint, ABEJO alleged that he is the owner of the undivided portion of a property used as a fishpond ("FISHPOND") situated in Meycauayan, Bulacan and covered by TCT No. T-6358 of the Bulacan Register of Deeds. He alleged ownership over approximately 39,611 square meters out of the FISHPONDs total area of 79,220 square meters. ABEJO further averred that DE GUIA continues to possess and use the FISHPOND without any contract and without paying rent to ABEJOs damage and prejudice. ABEJO also complained that DE GUIA refuses to surrender ownership and possession of the FISHPOND despite repeated demands to do so after DE GUIAs sublease contract over the FISHPOND had expired. ABEJO asked the trial court to order DE GUIA to vacate an approximate area of 39,611 square meters as well as pay damages.DE GUIA, a lawyer by profession, appeared on his own behalf. He filed his Answer on 12 January 1990 after the Court of Appeals resolved several issues concerning the validity of the service of summons on him. In his Answer, DE GUIA alleged that the complaint does not state a cause of action and has prescribed. He claimed that the FISHPOND was originally owned by Maxima Termulo who died intestate with Primitiva Lejano as her only heir. According to him, ABEJO is not the owner of the entire FISHPOND but the heirs of Primitiva Lejano who authorized him to possess the entire FISHPOND. He assailed ABEJOs ownership of the undivided portion of the FISHPOND as void and claimed ownership over an undivided half portion of the FISHPOND for himself. DE GUIA sought payment of damages and reimbursement for the improvements he introduced as a builder in good faith.The trial court set the pre-trial and required the parties to file their pre-trial briefs. ABEJO filed his pre-trial brief5on 05 April 1990. DE GUIA filed his pre-trial brief6on 31 July 1990. DE GUIAs pre-trial brief raised as the only issue in the case the amount of damages in the form of rent that DE GUIA should pay ABEJO. DE GUIA also submitted an Offer to Compromise,7offering to settle ABEJOs claim forP300,000 and to lease the entire FISHPOND to any party of ABEJOs choice.Hearing commenced on 30 July 1990. ABEJO rested his case on 4 December 1990. DE GUIAs last witness completed her testimony on 22 November 1991. The trial court summarized the evidence presented by ABEJO and DE GUIA as follows:Evidence adduced from plaintiff shows that there are two parcels of land covering a fishpond with a total area of 79,220 sq. m. more or less, situated at Ubihan, Meycauayan, Bulacan and covered by TCT No. 6358 equally owned by Primitiva Lejano and Lorenza Araniego married to Juan Abejo (Exh. A). The one half undivided portion owned by Lorenza Araniego corresponding to 39,611 sq. m. was later purchased by plaintiff from his father Teofilo Abejo (Exh. B), the only heir of the original owner on November 22, 1983. Prior to this sale on July 30, 1974 the whole fishpond (79,220) was the subject of a "Salin ng Pamumusisyong ng Palaisdaan" executed by the heirs of Primitiva Lejano with the knowledge and consent of Teofilo A. Abejo in favor of one Aniano Victa and defendant. The contract provided that the period of lease shall be until November 30, 1979. When the contract expired and defendant failed to surrender the fishpond, written demands the last of which was on November 27, 1983 were made for defendants to pay back rental and to vacate the premises in question (Exh. D & E). Defendant refused to deliver possession and also to pay the rentals due. In anticipation, however, that defendant will vacate the fishpond, plaintiff, on December 21, 1983 entered into a two year "Kasunduan ng Buwisan ng Palaisdaan" with Ruperto C. Villarico for a consideration ofP50,000.00 (Exh. G). This contract, despite its execution and even already notarized, had to be cancelled and the amount ofP50,000.00 returned by plaintiff to Villarico when the defendant did not heed the demand to vacate the fishpond. For unpaid rental, actual as well as moral and exemplary damages, plaintiff asks payment ofP450,000.00 andP20,000.00 attorneys fees.On the other hand, defendants evidence tends to show that the entire fishpond with an area of 79,200 sq. m. was leased to him by the heirs of Primitiva Lejano. Subsequently, defendant became the absolute owner of one half of the undivided area of the fishpond and he questioned plaintiffs ownership of the other half as void and fraudulent. As to the area pertaining to plaintiff, defendant claimed that he introduced improvements worthP500,000 and being in good faith, he asked that he should be reimbursed by plaintiff. In his pre-trial brief, however, defendant raised the only issue which is the amount of damages plaintiff is entitled to in the form of rental. Hence, the thrust of the testimonies of defendants witnesses particularly Ben Ruben Camargo and Marta Fernando Pea was the amount of rental of fishponds in the same locality as the fishpond in question at a given time. However, the documentary evidence (Exhs. 1 and 2) in support of their testimony were not offered as evidence.8The trial court rendered its decision on 8 June 1992, disposing as follows:WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant and hereby orders that:1. Defendant shall turn over possession to plaintiff one half undivided portion of the 79,200 sq. m. fishpond who shall enjoy the benefits and fruits in equal share with the defendant effective immediately until such time that partition of the property is effected;2. Defendant shall pay to plaintiff the amount ofP262,500.00 by way of actual or compensatory damages;3 Defendant shall pay plaintiffP20,000.00 as and for attorneys fees; and4. To pay the costs.SO ORDERED.9Aggrieved, DE GUIA went to the Court of Appeals insisting the trial court erred in ordering him to vacate and surrender possession of the undivided portion of the FISHPOND and to pay actual damages and attorneys fees. The Court of Appeals found DE GUIAs appeal without merit and affirmed the trial courts decision. Upon DE GUIAs motion for reconsideration, the appellate court reduced the compensatory damages fromP262,500 toP212,500.Hence, the instant petition.The undisputed facts as found by the trial court and adoptedin totoby the Court of Appeals are restated as follows:1. The subject of the dispute are two undivided parcels of land used as a fishpond situated in Barrio Ubihan, Meycauayan, Bulacan, originally co-owned by Primitiva Lejano and Lorenza Araniego married to Juan Abejo.2. The FISHPOND is registered under the names of Primitiva Lejano and Lorenza Araniego under TCT No. 6358 of the Bulacan Register of Deeds as follows:PRIMITIVA LEJANO, Filipina, of legal age, single - share; and LORENZA ARANIEGO, Filipina, of legal age, married to Juan Abejo, share, ---3. The FISHPOND has a total land area of approximately 79,220 square meters. ABEJO is seeking to recover possession of the undivided portion of the FISHPOND containing 39,611 square meters.4. DE GUIA (along with a certain Aniano Victa) acquired possession of the entire FISHPOND by virtue of a document captionedSalin ng Pamumusisyong ng Palaisdaan("Lease Contract") executed between him and the heirs of Primitiva Lejano. The Lease Contract was effective from 30 July 1974 up to 30 November 1979 for a consideration ofP100,000.5. The Lease Contractwas executed with the knowledge and consent of Teofilo Abejo, sole heir of Lorenza Araniego Abejo. Teofilo Abejo acquired Lorenza Araniego Abejos undivided share in the FISHPOND by intestate succession.6. Teofilo Abejo (now deceased) sold his undivided share in the FISHPOND to his son, ABEJO, on 22 November 1983.7. DE GUIA continues to possess the entire FISHPOND and to derive income from the property despite the expiration of the Lease Contract and several demands to vacate made by Teofilo Abejo and by his successor-in-interest, ABEJO. The last demand letter was dated 27 November 1983.8. ABEJO filed his complaint for recovery of possession with damages against DE GUIA on 12 May 1986.9. DE GUIAs claim of ownership over the other undivided portion of the FISHPOND has not been finally adjudicated for or against him.DE GUIA offers the verifiedComplaint for Annulment of Real Estate Mortgage and Contract of Lease with Preliminary Injunctionsigned by the heirs of Primitiva Lejano as proof of his ownership of the other undivided half portion of the FISHPOND. Records show that DE GUIA filed the complaint for himself and as attorney-in fact of the heirs of Primitiva Lejano ("Lejano Heirs")10against Spouses Teofilo Morte and Angelina Villarico, Spouses Ruperto and Milagros Villarico, et al. ("Defendants"). The case was raffled to Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, and docketed as Civil Case. No. 86-27-M. The complaint alleged that DE GUIA acquired his undivided share in the FISHPOND from the Lejano Heirs in February 1986. DE GUIA and the Lejano Heirs sought to annul theKasulatan ngSanglaanandKasulatan ng Pagbubuwis ng Palaisdaan,executed on 10 November 1979 by Primitiva Lejano in favor of the Defendants. DE GUIA and the Lejano Heirs claimed that Primitiva Lejano signed these documents under duress and without consideration.The trial court rendered judgment11on 28 February 1992 against DE GUIA and the Lejano Heirs as follows:WHEREFORE, the evidence having shown the plaintiffs, particularly Manuel De Guia, their successor-in-interest, not entitled upon the facts and the law to the relief prayed for in the amended complaint, the same is hereby DISMISSED with costs against said plaintiff. Instead, as prayed for by defendants, judgment is hereby rendered:1. Declaring the "Kasulatan ng Sanglaan" (Exhs. "A" & "1") dated November 10, 1979, and the "Kasulatan ng Pagbubuwis ng Palaisdaan" (Exhs. "C" &"3") also dated November 10, 1979, as valid for all legal intents and purposes;2. Ordering the Ex-Officio Sheriff, RTC, Bulacan, to proceed with the extrajudicial foreclosure of the subject real estate mortgage; and3. Ordering plaintiffs to pay defendants attorneys fees in the amount ofP20,000.00.SO ORDERED.12The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court in a Decision dated 30 August 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No. 38031. The Court of Appeals found the claim of force and intimidation in the execution of the documents as highly improbable since Primitiva Lejanos son, Renato Davis, witnessed the signing of the documents and found nothing irregular at the time. The appellate court also held that assuming Defendants threatened DE GUIA and the Lejano Heirs with immediate foreclosure, Defendants were merely exercising their legitimate right of foreclosing the mortgaged property for non-payment of the loan. In addition, Primitiva Lejanos lawyer and notary public, Atty. Mamerto Abao, testified that the parties appeared before him to affirm the contents of the documents. He also stated that he was present when Defendants paid Primitiva Lejano Davis and her son Renato. As of this writing, DE GUIA has a pending motion for reconsideration before the Court of Appeals. In the event the Court of Appeals Decision attains finality, DE GUIA may lose whatever right he claims over the FISHPOND.The Trial Courts RulingThe trial court ruled that ABEJO has the right to demand that DE GUIA vacate and surrender an area equivalent to ABEJOs undivided share in the FISHPOND. The trial court explained that DE GUIAs sublease contract expired in 1979 and ABEJO acquired his fathers share in 1983. However, the trial court pointed out that ABEJO failed to present evidence of the judicial or extra-judicial partition of the FISHPOND. The identification of the specific area pertaining to ABEJO and his co-owner is vital in an action to recover possession of real property. Nevertheless, the trial court declared that pending partition, it is only just that DE GUIA pay ABEJO a reasonable amount as rental for the use of ABEJOs share in the FISHPOND. DE GUIA admitted this obligation when he raised as sole issue in his pre-trial brief how much rent he should pay ABEJO. DE GUIA even proposedP300,000 as the reasonable amount but under certain conditions which ABEJO found unacceptable.In determining the reasonable rent due to ABEJO, the trial court considered the Lease Contract between ABEJO and a certain Ruperto C. Villarico which provided for a yearly rent ofP25,000 for undivided portion of the FISHPOND. The trial court declared that the total amount of rent due isP212,500, computed from November 1983 when ABEJO became a co-owner of the FISHPOND up to 199113or a period of eight and one half years. The trial court further ordered DE GUIA to pay an additionalP50,000 which represents the amount ABEJO returned to Ruperto C. Villarico when they cancelled the Lease Contract between them due to DE GUIAs refusal to vacate the FISHPOND.Lastly, the trial court ruled that pending partition, ABEJO as co-owner has the right to possess the FISHPOND and to receive an equal share in the benefits from the FISHPOND effective immediately. Until there is a partition, and while there is no contract of lease, the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership shall govern the rights of the parties.The Court of Appeals RulingThe Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision. The Court of Appeals debunked DE GUIAs claim that partition and not recovery of possession was the proper remedy under the circumstances. The Court of Appeals pointed out that DE GUIAs failure to respect ABEJOs right over his undivided share in the FISHPOND justifies the action for recovery of possession. The trial courts decision effectively enforces ABEJOs right over the property which DE GUIA violated by possession and use without paying compensation. According to the Court of Appeals, partition would constitute a mechanical aspect of the decision just like accounting when necessary.The Court of Appeals likewise rejected DE GUIAs claim that the award of compensatory damages ofP242,000, computed based on the rent stipulated in the Lease Contract between ABEJO and Ruperto C. Villarico, is grossly exorbitant. The Court of Appeals clarified that the amount the trial court awarded wasP262,500 and notP242,000 as erroneously alleged by DE GUIA. The Court of Appeals pointed out that the notarized Lease Contract between ABEJO and Ruperto C. Villarico carries more evidentiary weight than the testimonies of DE GUIAs witnesses, Ben Ruben Camargo and Marta Fernando Pea. The Court of Appeals also upheld the award of attorneys fees since the parties could have avoided litigation had DE GUIA heeded the justifiable demands of ABEJO.On motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals reduced the compensatory damages fromP262,500 toP212,500. The Court of Appeals explained that the trial court correctly computed the total amount of rent due atP212,500. The trial court erred, however, in adding the sum ofP50,000 representing the rent for 1983 and 1984 which ABEJO returned to Ruperto C. Villarico. The appellate court clarified that the sum ofP212,500 was arrived at by multiplying the rent ofP25,000 by 8 years. The 8 year period already included the two months rent received from and then subsequently reimbursed to Ruperto C. Villarico.The IssuesDE GUIA raises the following issues in his Memorandum:I.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURTS DECISION DENYING PETITIONERS PLEA FOR DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION;II.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURTS ORDER DIRECTING PETITIONER TO TURN OVER THE ONE-HALF UNDIVIDED PORTION OF THE FISHPOND WHICH IS STILL UNDER A STATE OF CO-OWNERSHIP;III.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING, IN PART, THE AWARD OF ACTUAL OR COMPENSATORY DAMAGES DESPITE LACK OF CREDIBLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE SAME;IV.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES IN PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FAVOR.14In essence, this Court is asked to resolve: (1) whether an action for recovery of possession and turn-over of the undivided portion of a common property is proper before partition; and (2) whether there is sufficient basis for the award of compensatory damages and attorneys fees.The Courts RulingThe petition is partly meritorious.First and Second Issues: Cause of Action and Turn-Over of PossessionDE GUIA contends that a co-owner cannot claim a definite portion from the property owned in common until there is a partition. DE GUIA argues that ABEJO should have filed an action for partition instead of recovery of possession since the court cannot implement any decision in the latter case without first a partition. DE GUIA contends that an action for recovery of possession cannot prosper when the property subject of the action is part of an undivided, co-owned property. The procedural mode adopted by ABEJO, which is recovery of possession, makes enforcement difficult if not impossible since there is still no partition of the subject property.Under Article 484 of the Civil Code, "there is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons." A co-owner of an undivided parcel of land is an "owner of the whole, and over the whole he exercises the right of dominion, but he is at the same time the owner of a portion which is truly abstract."15On the other hand, there is no co-ownership when the different portions owned by different people are already concretely determined and separately identifiable, even if not yet technically described.16Article 487 of the Civil Code provides, "[a]ny one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment." This article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession. Article 487 includes forcible entry and unlawful detainer (accion interdictal), recovery of possession (accion publiciana), and recovery of ownership (accion de reivindicacion). The summary actions of forcible entry and unlawful detainer seek the recovery of physical possession only. These actions are brought before municipal trial courts within one year from dispossession. However,accion publiciana,which is a plenary action for recovery of the right to possess, falls under the jurisdiction of the proper regional trial court when the dispossession has lasted for more than one year.Accion de reivindicacion,which seeks the recovery of ownership, also falls under the jurisdiction of the proper regional trial court.171awphi1.ntAny co-owner may file an action under Article 487 not only against a third person, but also against another co-owner who takes exclusive possession and asserts exclusive ownership of the property.18In the latter case, however, the only purpose of the action is to obtain recognition of the co-ownership. The plaintiff cannot seek exclusion of the defendant from the property because as co-owner he has a right of possession. The plaintiff cannot recover any material or determinate part of the property.19InHermogena G. Engreso with Spouse Jose Engreso v. Nestoria De La Cruz and Herminio De La Cruz,20we reiterated the rule that a co-owner cannot recover a material or determinate part of a common property prior to partition as follows:It is a basic principle in civil law that before a property owned in common is actually partitioned, all that the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire property. A co-owner has no right to demand a concrete, specific or determinate part of the thing owned in common because until division is effected his right over the thing is represented only by an ideal portion.As such, the only effect of an action brought by a co-owner against a co-owner will be to obtain recognition of the co-ownership; the defendant cannot be excluded from a specific portion of the property because as a co-owner he has a right to possess and the plaintiff cannot recover any material or determinate part of the property. Thus, the courtsa quoerred when they ordered the delivery of one-half () of the building in favor of private respondent.Indisputably, DE GUIA has been in exclusive possession of the entire FISHPOND since July 1974. Initially, DE GUIA disputed ABEJOs claim of ownership over the undivided portion of the FISHPOND. Subsequently, he implicitly recognized ABEJOs undivided share by offering to settle the case forP300,000 and to vacate the property. During the trial proper, neither DE GUIA nor ABEJO asserted or manifested a claim of absolute and exclusive ownership over the entire FISHPOND.1a\^/phi1.netBefore this Court, DE GUIA limits the issues to the propriety of bringing an action for recovery of possession and the recovery of compensatory damages.Following the inherent and peculiar features of co-ownership, while ABEJO and DE GUIA have equal shares in the FISHPOND quantitatively speaking, they have the same right in a qualitative sense as co-owners. Simply stated, ABEJO and DE GUIA are owners of the whole and over the whole, they exercise the right of dominion. However, they are at the same time individual owners of a portion, which is truly abstract because until there is partition, such portion remains indeterminate or unidentified.21As co-owners, ABEJO and DE GUIA may jointly exercise the right of dominion over the entire FISHPOND until they partition the FISHPOND by identifying or segregating their respective portions.Since a co-ownership subsists between ABEJO and DE GUIA, judicial or extra-judicial partition is the proper recourse. An action to demand partition is imprescriptible and not subject to laches.22Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the common property unless a co-owner has repudiated the co-ownership under certain conditions.23Neither ABEJO nor DE GUIA has repudiated the co-ownership under the conditions set by law.To recapitulate, we rule that a co-owner may file an action for recovery of possession against a co-owner who takes exclusive possession of the entire co-owned property. However, the only effect of such action is a recognition of the co-ownership. The courts cannot proceed with the actual partitioning of the co-owned property. Thus, judicial or extra-judicial partition is necessary to effect physical division of the FISHPOND between ABEJO and DE GUIA. An action for partition is also the proper forum for accounting the profits received by DE GUIA from the FISHPOND. However, as a necessary consequence of such recognition, ABEJO shall exercise an equal right to possess, use and enjoy the entire FISHPOND.DE GUIA further claims that the trial and appellate courts erred when they ordered the recovery of rent when the exact identity of the portion in question had not yet been clearly defined and delineated. According to DE GUIA, an order to pay damages in the form of rent is premature before partition.We disagree.The right of enjoyment by each co-owner is limited by a similar right of the other co-owners. A co-owner cannot devote common property to his exclusive use to the prejudice of the co-ownership.24Hence, if the subject is a residential house, all the co-owners may live there with their respective families to the extent possible. However, if one co-owner alone occupies the entire house without opposition from the other co-owners, and there is no lease agreement, the other co-owners cannot demand the payment of rent.Conversely, if there is an agreement to lease the house, the co-owners can demand rent from the co-owner who dwells in the house.The co-owners can either exercise an equal right to live in the house, or agree to lease it. If they fail to exercise any of these options, they must bear the consequences. It would be unjust to require the co-owner to pay rent after the co-owners by their silence have allowed him to use the property.25In case the co-owners agree to lease a building owned in common, a co-owner cannot retain it for his use without paying the proper rent.26Moreover, where part of the property is occupied exclusively by some co-owners for the exploitation of an industry, the other co-owners become co-participants in the accessions of the property and should share in its net profits.27The Lejano Heirs and Teofilo Abejo agreed to lease the entire FISHPOND to DE GUIA. After DE GUIAs lease expired in 1979, he could no longer use the entire FISHPOND without paying rent. To allow DE GUIA to continue using the entire FISHPOND without paying rent would prejudice ABEJOs right to receive rent, which would have accrued to his share in the FISHPOND had it been leased to others.28Since ABEJO acquired his undivided share in the FISHPOND on 22 November 1983, DE GUIA should pay ABEJO reasonable rent for his possession and use of ABEJOs portion beginning from that date. The compensatory damages ofP25,000 per year awarded to ABEJO is the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the leased property,29considering the circumstances at that time. DE GUIA shall continue to pay ABEJO a yearly rent ofP25,000 corresponding to ABEJOs undivided share in the FISHPOND. However, ABEJO has the option either to exercise an equal right to occupy the FISHPOND, or to file a new petition before the trial court to fix a new rental rate in view of changed circumstances in the last 20 years.1a\^/phi1.netABEJO made an extrajudicial demand on DE GUIA by sending the 27 November 1983 demand letter. Thus, the rent in arrears should earn interest at 6% per annum from 27 November 1983 until finality of this decision pursuant to Article 220930of the Civil Code. Thereafter, the interest rate is 12% per annum from finality of this decision until full payment.31Third Issue: Lack of Credible Evidence to Support Award of Compensatory DamagesDE GUIA contends theP212,500 in rent awarded to ABEJO is exorbitant. He assails as doubtful and self-serving evidence the Lease Contract between ABEJO and Ruperto C. Villarico that served as basis for the yearly rent ofP25,000 for ABEJOs share in the FISHPOND.DE GUIA says the trial and appellate courts should have given credence to the testimonies of his witnesses, Ben Ruben Camargo ("Camargo") and Marta Fernando Pea ("Pea") that rentals of fishponds in the same vicinity are for much lesser considerations.This issue involves calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of witnesses. As a rule, a party may raise only questions of law in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The Supreme Court is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh again the evidence considered in the proceedings below.32More so in the instant case, where the Court of Appeals affirmed the factual findings of the trial court.33It is not true that the trial court disregarded the testimonies of Camargo and Pea because DE GUIA failed to present documentary evidence to support their testimonies. Actually, the trial and appellate courts found the testimonies of Camargo and Pea unconvincing. Judges cannot be expected to rely on the testimonies of every witness. In ascertaining the facts, they determine who are credible and who are not. In doing so, they consider all the evidence before them.34We find no cogent reason to overturn the trial and appellate courts evaluation of the witnesses testimonies. We likewise find reasonable theP25,000 yearly compensation for ABEJOs undivided share in the FISHPOND. Indeed, being a question of fact, it is for the trial and appellate courts to decide and this Court will not disturb their findings unless clearly baseless or irrational. The exception does not obtain in this case.Fourth Issue: Attorneys FeesThe trial court did not err in imposing attorneys fees ofP20,000. Attorneys fees can be awarded in the cases enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code specifically:xxx(2) Where the defendants act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;xxxDE GUIA is a lawyer and he should have known that a co-owner could not take exclusive possession of a common property. Although DE GUIA offered to settle the case out of court, such offer was made under conditions not acceptable to ABEJO. Certainly, ABEJO was still put to unnecessary expense and trouble to protect his interest under paragraph (2), Article 2208 of the Civil Code.WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 22 August 1994 and Resolution dated 27 June 1995 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 39875 is AFFIRMED with respect to that portion ordering Manuel T. De Guia to pay Jose B. Abejo compensatory damages ofP212,500 and attorneys fees ofP20,000, and MODIFIED as follows:1. The co-ownership between Manuel T. De Guia and Jose B. Abejo over the entire FISHPOND covered by TCT No. 6358 of the Bulacan Register of Deeds is recognized without prejudice to the outcome of CAG.R. CV No. 38031 pending before the Court of Appeals and other cases involving the same property;2. Manuel T. De Guia and Jose B. Abejo shall equally enjoy possession and use of the entire FISHPOND prior to partition;3. The compensatory damages ofP25,000 per annum representing rent from 27 November 1983 until May 1992 shall earn interest at 6% per annum from 27 November 1983 until finality of this decision, and thereafter at 12% per annum until full payment;4. Manuel T. de Guia shall pay Jose B. Abejo a yearly rent ofP25,000 from June 1992 until finality of this decision, with interest at 6% per annum during the same period, and thereafter at 12% interest per annum until full payment;5. After finality of this decision and for as long as Manuel T. de Guia exclusively possesses the entire FISHPOND, he shall pay Jose B. Abejo a yearly rental ofP25,000 for the latters undivided share in the FISHPOND, unless Jose B. Abejo secures from the proper court an order fixing a different rental rate in view of possible changed circumstances.SO ORDERED.Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Ynares-Santiago and Azcuna, JJ., concur.Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. L-4656 November 18, 1912RICARDO PARDELL Y CRUZ andVICENTA ORTIZ Y FELIN DE PARDELL,plaintiffs-appellees,vs.GASPAR DE BARTOLOME Y ESCRIBANO andMATILDE ORTIZ Y FELIN DE BARTOLOME,defendants-appellants.Gaspar de Bartolome, in his own behalf.B. Gimenez Zoboli, for appellees.TORRES,J.:This is an appeal by bill of exceptions, from the judgment of October 5, 1907, whereby the Honorable Dionisio Chanco, judge, absolved the defendants from the complaint, and the plaintiff from a counterclaim, without special finding as to costs.Counsel for the spouses Ricardo y Cruz and Vicente Ortiz y Felin de Pardell, the first of whom, absent in Spain by reason of his employment, conferred upon the second sufficient and ample powers to appear before the courts of justice, on June 8, 1905, in his written complaint, alleged that the plaintiff, Vicente Ortiz, and the defendant, Matilde Ortiz, are the duly recognized natural daughters of the spouses Miguel Ortiz and Calixta Felin y Paula who died in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, in 1875 and 1882, respectively; that Calixta Felin, prior to her death, executed on August 17, 1876, a nuncupative will in Vigan whereby she made her four children, named Manuel, Francisca, Vicenta, and Matilde, surnamed Ortiz y Felin, her sole and universal heirs of all her property; that, of the persons enumerated, Manuel died before his mother and Francisca a few years after her death, leaving no heirs by force of law, and therefore the only existing heirs of the said testatrix are the plaintiff Vicenta Ortiz and the defendant Matilde Ortiz; that, aside from some personal property and jewelry already divided among the heirs, the testatrix possessed, at the time of the execution of her will, and left at her death the real properties which, with their respective cash values, are as follows:1. A house of strong material, with the lot on which it is built, situated on Escolta Street, Vigan, and valued atP6,000.00

2. A house of mixed material, with the lot on which it stands, at No. 88 Washington Street, Vigan; valued at1,500.00

3. A lot on Magallanes Street, Vigan; valued at100.00

4. A parcel of rice land, situated in the barrio of San Julian, Vigan; valued at60.00

5. A parcel of rice land in the pueblo of Santa Lucia; valued at86.00

6. Three parcels of land in the pueblo of Candon; valued at150.00

Total7,896.00

That, on or about the first months of the year 1888, the defendants, without judicial authorization, nor friendly or extrajudicial agreement, took upon themselves the administration and enjoyment of the said properties and collected the rents, fruits, and products thereof, to the serious detriment of the plaintiffs' interest; that, notwithstanding the different and repeated demands extrajudicially made upon Matilde Ortiz to divide the aforementioned properties with the plaintiff Vicente and to deliver to the latter the one-half thereof, together with one-half of the fruits and rents collected therefrom, the said defendant and her husband, the self-styled administrator of the properties mentioned, had been delaying the partition and delivery of the said properties by means of unkept promises and other excuses; and that the plaintiffs, on account of the extraordinary delay in the delivery of one-half of said properties, or their value in cash, as the case might be, had suffered losses and damages in the sum of P8,000. Said counsel for the plaintiffs therefore asked that judgment be rendered by sentencing the defendants, Gaspar de Bartolome, and Matilde Ortiz Felin de Bartolome, to restore and deliver to the plaintiffs one-half of the total value in cash, according to appraisal, of the undivided property specified, which one-half amounted approximately to P3,948, or if deemed proper, to recognize the plaintiff Vicenta Ortiz to be vested with the full and absolute right of ownership to the said undivided one-half of the properties in question, as universal testamentary heir thereof together with the defendant Matilde Ortiz, to indemnify the plaintiffs in the sum of P8,000, for losses and damages, and to pay the costs.Counsel for the defendants, in his answer denied the facts alleged in paragraphs 1, 4, 6, 7, and 8 thereof, inasmuch as, upon the death of the litigating sister's brother Manuel, their mother, who was still living, was his heir by force of law, and the defendants had never refused to give to the plaintiff Vicente Ortiz her share of the said properties; and stated that he admitted the facts alleged in paragraph 2, provided it be understood, however, that the surname of the defendant's mother was Felin, and not Feliu, and that Miguel Ortiz died in Spain, and not in Vigan; that he also admitted paragraph 3 of the complaint, with the difference that the said surname should be Felin, and likewise paragraph 5, except the part thereof relating to the personal property and the jewelry, since the latter had not yet been divided; that the said jewelry was in the possession of the plaintiffs and consisted of: one Lozada gold chronometer watch with a chain in the form of a bridle curb and a watch charm consisting of the engraving of a postage stamp on a stone mounted in gold and bearing the initials M. O., a pair of cuff buttons made of gold coins, four small gold buttons, two finger rings, another with the initials M. O., and a gold bracelet; and that the defendants were willing to deliver to the plaintiffs, in conformity with their petitions, one-half of the total value in cash, according to appraisement, of the undivided real properties specified in paragraph 5, which half amounted to P3,948.In a special defense said counsel alleged that the defendants had never refused to divide the said property and had in fact several years before solicited the partition of the same; that, from 1886 to 1901, inclusive, there was collected from the property on Calle Escolta the sum of 288 pesos, besides a few other small amounts derived from other sources, which were delivered to the plaintiffs with other larger amounts, in 1891, and from the property on Calle Washington, calledLa Quinta, 990.95 pesos, which proceeds, added together, made a total of 1,278.95 pesos, saving error or omission; that, between the years abovementioned, Escolta, and that on Calle Washington,La Quinta, 376.33, which made a total of 1,141.71, saving error or omission; that, in 1897, the work of reconstruction was begun of the house on Calle Escolta, which been destroyed by an earthquake, which work was not finished until 1903 and required an expenditure on the part of the defendant Matilde Ortiz, of 5,091.52 pesos; that all the collections made up to August 1, 1905, including the rent from the stores, amounted to only P3,654.15, and the expenses, to P6,252.32, there being, consequently, a balance of P2,598.17, which divided between the sisters, the plaintiff and the defendant, would make the latter's share P1,299.08; that, as shown by the papers kept by the plaintiffs, in the year 1891 the defendant Bartolome presented to the plaintiffs a statement in settlements of accounts, and delivered to the person duly authorized by the latter for the purpose, the sum of P2,606.29, which the said settlement showed was owing his principals, from various sources; that, the defendant Bartolome having been the administrator of the undivided property claimed by the plaintiffs, the latter were owing the former legal remuneration of the percentage allowed by law for administration; and that the defendants were willing to pay the sum of P3,948, one-half of the total value of the said properties, deducting therefrom the amount found to be owing them by the plaintiffs, and asked that judgment be rendered in their favor to enable them to recover from the latter that amount, together with the costs and expenses of the suit.The defendants, in their counter claim, repeated each and all of the allegations contained in each of the paragraphs of section 10 of their answer; that the plaintiffs were obliged to pay to the administrator of the said property the remuneration allowed him by law; that, as the revenues collected by the defendants amounted to no more than P3,654.15 and the expenditures incurred by them, to P6,252.32, it followed that the plaintiffs owed the defendants P1,299.08, that is one-half of the difference between the amount collected from and that extended on the properties, and asked that judgment be therefore rendered in their behalf to enable them to collect this sum from the plaintiffs, Ricardo Pardell and Vicenta Ortiz, with legal interest thereon from December 7, 1904, the date when the accounts were rendered, together with the sums to which the defendant Bartolome was entitled for the administration of the undivided properties in question.By a written motion of August 21, 1905, counsel for the plaintiffs requested permission to amend the complaint by inserting immediately after the words "or respective appraisal," fifth line of paragraph 5, the phrase "in cash in accordance with the assessed value," and likewise further to amend the same, in paragraph 6 thereof, by substituting the following word in lieu of the petition for the remedy sought: "By reason of all the foregoing, I beg the court to be pleased to render the judgment by sentencing the defendants, Gaspar de Bartolome and Matilde Ortiz Felin de Bartolome, to restore and deliver to the plaintiffs an exact one-half of the total vale of the undivided properties described in the complaint, such value to be ascertained by the expert appraisal of two competent persons, one of whom shall be appointed by the plaintiffs and the other by the defendants, and, in case of disagreement between these two appointees such value shall be determined by a third expert appraiser appointed by the court, or, in a proper case, by the price offered at public auction; or, in lieu thereof, it is requested that the court recognize the plaintiff, Vicenta Ortiz, to be vested with a full and absolute right to an undivided one-half of the said properties; furthermore, it is prayed that the plaintiffs be awarded an indemnity of P8,000 for losses and damages, and the costs." Notwithstanding the opposition of the defendants, the said amendment was admitted by the court and counsel for the defendants were allowed to a period of three days within which to present a new answer. An exception was taken to this ruling.The proper proceedings were had with reference to the valuation of the properties concerned in the division sought and incidental issues were raised relative to the partition of some of them and their award to one or the other of the parties. Due consideration was taken of the averments and statements of both parties who agreed between themselves, before the court, that any of them might at any time acquire, at the valuation fixed by the expert judicial appraiser, any of the properties in question, there being none in existence excluded by the litigants. The court, therefore, by order of December 28, 1905, ruled that the plaintiffs were entitled to acquire, at the valuation determined by the said expert appraiser, the building known asLa Quinta, the lot on which it stands and the warehouses and other improvements comprised within the inclosed land, and the seeds lands situated in the pueblos of Vigan and Santa Lucia; and that the defendants were likewise entitled to acquire the house on Calle Escolta, the lot on Calle Magallanes, and the three parcels of land situated in the pueblo of Candon.After this partition had been made counsel for the defendants, by a writing of March 8, 1906, set forth: That, having petitioned for the appraisement of the properties in question for the purpose of their partition, it was not to be understood that he desired from the exception duly entered to the ruling made in the matter of the amendment to the complaint; that the properties retained by the defendants were valued at P9,310, and those retained by the plaintiffs, at P2,885, one-half of which amounts each party had to deliver to the other, as they werepro indivisoproperties; that, therefore, the defendants had to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P3,212.50, after deducting the amount which the plaintiffs were obliged to deliver to the defendants, as one-half of the price of the properties retained by the former; that, notwithstanding that the amount of the counterclaim for the expenses incurred in the reconstruction of the pro indiviso property should be deducted from the sum which the defendants had to pay the plaintiffs, the former, for the purpose of bringing the matter of the partition to a close, would deliver to the latter, immediately upon the signing of the instrument of purchase and sale, the sum of P3,212.50, which was one-half of the value of the properties alloted to the defendants; such delivery, however, was not to be understood as a renouncement of the said counterclaim, but only as a means for the final termination of thepro indivisostatus of the property.The case having been heard, the court on October 5, 1907, rendered judgment holding that the revenues and the expenses were compensated by the residence enjoyed by the defendant party, that no losses or damages were either caused or suffered, nor likewise any other expense besides those aforementioned, and absolved the defendants from the complaint and the plaintiffs from the counterclaim, with no special finding as to costs. An exception was taken to this judgment by counsel for the defendants who moved for a new trial on the grounds that the evidence presented did not warrant the judgment rendered and that the latter was contrary to law. This motion was denied, exception whereto was taken by said counsel, who filed the proper bill of exceptions, and the same was approved and forwarded to the clerk of this court, with a transcript of the evidence.Both of the litigating sisters assented to a partition by halves of the property left in her will by their mother at her death; in fact, during the course of this suit, proceedings were had, in accordance with the agreement made, for the division between them of the said hereditary property of common ownership, which division was recognized and approved in the findings of the trial court, as shown by the judgment appealed from.The issues raised by the parties, aside from said division made during the trial, and which have been submitted to this court for decision, concern: (1) The indemnity claimed for losses and damages, which the plaintiffs allege amount to P8,000, in addition to the rents which should have been derived from the house on Calle Escolta, Vigan; (2) the payment by the plaintiffs to the defendants of the sum of P1,299.08, demanded by way of counterclaim, together with legal interest thereon from December 7, 1904; (3) the payment to the husband of the defendant Matilde Ortiz, of a percentage claimed to be due him as the administrator of the property of common ownership; (4) the division of certain jewelry in the possession of the plaintiff Vicenta Ortiz; and (5) the petition that the amendment be held to have been improperly admitted, which was made by the plaintiffs in their written motion of August 21, 1905, against the opposition of the defendants, through which admission the latter were obliged to pay the former P910.50.lawphil.netBefore entering upon an explanation of the propriety or impropriety of the claims made by both parties, it is indispensable to state that the trial judge, in absolving the defendants from the complaint, held that they had not caused losses and damages to the plaintiffs, and that the revenues and the expenses were compensated, in view of the fact that the defendants had been living for several years in the Calle Escolta house, which waspro indivisoproperty of joint ownership.By this finding absolving the defendants from the complaint, and which was acquiesced in by the plaintiffs who made no appeal therefrom,the first issue has been decidedwhich was raised by the plaintiffs, concerning the indemnity for losses and damages, wherein are comprised the rents which should have been obtained from the upper story of the said house during the time it was occupied by the defendants, Matilde Ortiz and her husband, Gaspar de Bartolome.Notwithstanding the acquiescence on the part of the plaintiffs, assenting to the said finding whereby the defendants were absolved from the complaint, yet, as such absolution is based on the compensation established in the judgment of the trial court, between the amounts which each party is entitled to claim from the other, it is imperative to determine whether the defendant Matilde Ortiz, as coowner of the house on Calle Escolta, was entitled, with her husband, to reside therein, without paying to her coowner, Vicenta Ortiz, who, during the greater part of the time, lived with her husband abroad, one-half of the rents which the upper story would have produced, had it been rented to a stranger.Article 394 of the Civil Code prescribes:Each coowner may use the things owned in common, provided he uses them in accordance with their object and in such manner as not to injure the interests of the community nor prevent the coowners from utilizing them according to their rights.Matilde Ortiz and her husband occupied the upper story, designed for use as a dwelling, in the house of joint ownership; but the record shows no proof that, by so doing, the said Matilde occasioned any detriment to the interest of the community property, nor that she prevented her sister Vicenta from utilizing the said upper story according to her rights. It is to be noted that the stores of the lower floor were rented and accounting of the rents was duly made to the plaintiffs.Each coowner of realty heldpro indivisoexercises his rights over the whole property and may use and enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his coowners, for the reason that, until a division be made, the respective part of each holder can not be determined and every one of the coowners exercises, together with his other coparticipants, joint ownership over thepro indivisoproperty, in addition to his use and enjoyment of the same.As the hereditary properties of the joint ownership of the two sisters, Vicenta Ortiz, plaintiff, and Matilde Ortiz, defendant, were situated in the Province of Ilocos Sur, and were in the care of the last named, assisted by her husband, while the plaintiff Vicenta with her husband was residing outside of the said province the greater part of the time between 1885 and 1905, when she left these Islands for Spain, it is not at all strange that delays and difficulties should have attended the efforts made to collect the rents and proceeds from the property held in common and to obtain a partition of the latter, especially during several years when, owing to the insurrection, the country was in a turmoil; and for this reason, aside from that founded on the right of coownership of the defendants, who took upon themselves the administration and care of the properties of joint tenancy for purposes of their preservation and improvement, these latter are not obliged to pay to the plaintiff Vicenta one-half of the rents which might have been derived from the upper of the story of the said house on Calle Escolta, and, much less, because one of the living rooms and the storeroom thereof were used for the storage of some belongings and effects of common ownership between the litigants. The defendant Matilde, therefore, in occupying with her husband the upper floor of the said house, did not injure the interests of her coowner, her sister Vicenta, nor did she prevent the latter from living therein, but merely exercised a legitimate right pertaining to her as coowner of the property.Notwithstanding the above statements relative to the joint-ownership rights which entitled the defendants to live in the upper story of the said house, yet in view of the fact that the record shows it to have been proved that the defendant Matilde's husband, Gaspar de Bartolome, occupied for four years a room or a part of the lower floor of the same house on Calle Escolta, using it as an office for the justice of the peace, a position which he held in the capital of that province, strict justice, requires that he pay his sister-in-law, the plaintiff, one half of the monthly rent which the said quarters could have produced, had they been leased to another person. The amount of such monthly rental is fixed at P16 in accordance with the evidence shown in the record. This conclusion as to Bartolome's liability results from the fact that, even as the husband of the defendant coowner of the property, he had no right to occupy and use gratuitously the said part of the lower floor of the house in question, where he lived with his wife, to the detriment of the plaintiff Vicenta who did not receive one-half of the rent which those quarters could and should have produced, had they been occupied by a stranger, in the same manner that rent was obtained from the rooms on the lower floor that were used as stores. Therefore, the defendant Bartolome must pay to the plaintiff Vicenta P384, that is, one-half of P768, the total amount of the rents which should have been obtained during four years from the quarters occupied as an office by the justice of the peace of Vigan.With respect to the second question submitted for decision to this court, relative to the payment of the sum demanded as a counterclaim, it was admitted and proved in the present case that, as a result of a serious earthquake on August 15, 1897, the said house on Calle Escolta was left in ruins and uninhabitable, and that, for its reconstruction or repair, the defendants had to expend the sum of P6,252.32. This expenditure, notwithstanding that it was impugned, during the trial, by the plaintiffs, was duly proved by the evidence presented by the defendants. Evidence, unsuccessfully rebutted, was also introduced which proved that the rents produced by all the rural and urban properties of common ownership amounted, up to August 1, 1905, to the sum of P3,654.15 which, being applied toward the cost of the repair work on the said house, leaves a balance of P2,598.17, the amount actually advanced by the defendants, for the rents collected by them were not sufficient for the termination of all the work undertaken on the said building, necessary for its complete repair and to replace it in a habitable condition. It is therefore lawful and just that the plaintiff Vicenta Ortiz, who was willing to sell to her sister Matilde for P1,500, her share in the house in question, when it was in a ruinous state, should pay the defendants one-half of the amount expanded in the said repair work, since the building after reconstruction was worth P9,000, according to expert appraisal. Consequently, the counterclaim made by the defendants for the payment to them of the sum of P1,299.08, is a proper demand, though from this sum a reduction must be made of P384, the amount of one-half of the rents which should have been collected for the use of the quarters occupied by the justice of the peace, the payment of which is incumbent upon the husband of the defendant Matilde, as aforesaid, and the balance remaining, P915.08, is the amount which the plaintiff Vicenta must pay to the defendants.The defendants claim to be entitled to the collection of legal interest on the amount of the counterclaim, from December 7, 1904. This contention can not be sustained, inasmuch as, until this suit is finally decided, it could not be known whether the plaintiffs would or would not be obliged to pay the sum whatever in reimbursement of expenses incurred by the plaintiffs in the repair work on the said house on Calle Escolta, whether or not the defendants, in turn, were entitled to collect any such amount, and, finally, what the net sum would be which the plaintiff's might have to pay as reimbursement for one-half of the expenditure made by the defendants. Until final disposal of the case, no such net sum can be determined, nor until then can the debtor be deemed to be in arrears. In order that there be an obligation to pay legal interest in connection with a matter at issue between the parties, it must be declared in a judicial decision from what date the interest will be due on the principal concerned in the suit. This rule has been established by the decisions of the supreme court of Spain, in reference to articles 1108, 1109, and 1110 of the Civil Code, reference on April 24, 1867, November 19, 1869, and February 22, 1901.With regard to the percentage, as remuneration claimed by the husband of the defendant Matilde for his administration of the property of common ownership, inasmuch as no stipulation whatever was made in the matter by and between him and his sister-in-law, the said defendant, the claimant is not entitled to the payment of any remuneration whatsoever. Of his own accord and as an officious manager, he administered the saidpro indivisoproperty, one-half of which belonged to his wife who held it in joint tenancy, with his sister-in-law, and the law does not allow him any compensation as such voluntary administrator. He is merely entitled to a reimbursement for such actual and necessary expenditures as he may have made on the undivided properties and an indemnity for the damages he may have suffered while acting in that capacity, since at all events it was his duty to care for and preserve the said property, half of which belonged to his wife; and in exchange for the trouble occasioned him by the administration of his sister-in-law's half of the said property, he with his wife resided in the upper story of the house aforementioned, without payment of one-half of the rents said quarters might have produced had they been leased to another person.With respect to the division of certain jewelry, petitioned for by the defendants and appellants only in their brief in this appeal, the record of the proceedings in the lower court does not show that the allegation made by the plaintiff Vicenta is not true, to the effect that the deceased mother of the litigant sisters disposed of this jewelry during her lifetime, because, had she not done so, the will made by the said deceased would have been exhibited in which the said jewelry would have been mentioned, at least it would have been proved that the articles in question came into the possession of the plaintiff Vicenta without the expressed desire and the consent of the deceased mother of the said sisters, for the gift of this jewelry was previously assailed in the courts, without success; therefore, and in view of its inconsiderable value, there is no reason for holding that the said gift was not made.As regards the collection of the sum of P910.50, which is the difference between the assessed value of the undivided real properties and the price of the same as determined by the judicial expert appraiser, it is shown by the record that the ruling of the trial judge admitting the amendment to the original complaint, is in accord with the law and principles of justice, for the reason that any of the coowners of apro indivisoproperty, subject to division or sale, is entitled to petition for its valuation by competent expert appraisers. Such valuation is not prejudicial to any of the joint owners, but is beneficial to their interests, considering that, as a general rule, the assessed value of a building or a parcel of realty is less than the actual real value of the property, and this being appraiser to determine, in conjunction with the one selected by the plaintiffs, the value of the properties of joint ownership. These two experts took part in the latter proceedings of the suit until finally, and during the course of the latter, the litigating parties agreed to an amicable division of thepro indivisohereditary property, in accordance with the price fixed by the judicial expert appraiser appointed as a third party, in view of the disagreement between and nonconformity of the appraisers chosen by the litigants. Therefore it is improper now to claim a right to the collection of the said sum, the difference between the assessed value and that fixed by the judicial expert appraiser, for the reason that the increase in price, as determined by this latter appraisal, redounded to the benefit of both parties.In consideration of the foregoing, whereby the errors assigned to the lower court have been duly refuted, it is our opinion that, with a partial reversal of the judgment appealed from, in so far as it absolves the plaintiffs from the counterclaim presented by the defendants, we should and hereby do sentence the plaintiffs to the payment of the sum of P915.08, the balance of the sum claimed by the defendants as a balance of the one-half of the amount which the defendants advanced for the reconstruction or repair of the Calle Escolta house, after deducting from the total of such sum claimed by the latter the amount of P384 which Gaspar de Bartolome, the husband of the defendant Matilde, should have paid as one-half of the rents due for his occupation of the quarters on the lower floor of the said house as an office for the justice of the peace court of Vigan; and we further find: (1) That the defendants are not obliged to pay one-half of the rents which could have been obtained from the upper story of the said house; (2) that the plaintiffs can not be compelled to pay the legal interest from December 7, 1904, on the sum expanded in the reconstruction of the aforementioned house, but only the interest fixed by law, at the rate of 6 per cent per annum, from the date of the judgment to be rendered in accordance with this decision; (3) that the husband of the defendant Matilde Ortiz is not entitled to any remuneration for the administration of thepro indivisoproperty belonging to both parties; (4) that, neither is he entitled to collect from the plaintiffs the sum of P910.50, the difference between the assessed valuation and the price set by the expert appraisal solicited by the plaintiffs in their amendment to the complaint; and, (5) that no participation shall be made of jewelry aforementioned now in the possession of the plaintiff Vicenta Ortiz. The said judgment, as relates to the points appealed, is affirmed, in so far as its findings agree with those of this decision, and is reversed, in so far as they do not. No special finding is made regarding the costs of both instances. So ordered.Arellano, C.J., Mapa, Johnson, Carson and Trent, JJ., concur.Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. L-32047 November 1, 1930MANUEL MELENCIO, MARIANO MELENCIO, PURA MELENCIO, and CARIDAD MELENCIO,plaintiffs-appellants,vs.DY TIAO LAY,defendant-appellee.Jose V. Valladolid, Jose P. Melencio and Camus and Delgado for appellants.Araneta and Zaragoza for appellee.OSTRAND,J.: On August 1,1927, the plaintiffs, Manuel, Mariano, Pura and Caridad Melencio, brought the present action against the defendant-appellee, Dy Tiao Lay for the recovery of the possession of a parcel of land situated in the town of Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, and containing an area of 4,628.25 square meters. The plaintiffs further demand a monthly rental of P300 for the use and occupation of the parcel from May, 1926, until the date of the surrender to them of the possession thereof; and that if it is found that the said appellee was occupying the said parcel of land by virtue of a contract of lease, such contract should be declared null and void for lack of consent, concurrence, and ratification by the owners thereof. In his answer, the defendant pleaded the general issue, and as special defenses, he alleged in substance that he was occupying the said tract of land by virtue of a contract of lease executed on July 24,1905, in favor of his predecessor in interest, by Ruperta Garcia, Pedro Melencio, Juliana Melencio, and Ruperta Melencio under the terms specified therein, and which contract is still in force; that Liberata Macapagal, the mother of the plaintiffs, in her capacity as judicial administratrix of the estate of Ramon Melencio, one of the original coowners of the parcel of land in question, actually recognized and ratified the existence and validity of the contract aforesaid by virtue of the execution of a public document by her on or about November 27,1920, and by collecting from the assignees of the original lessee the monthly rent for the premises until April 30, 1926; and that said defendant deposits with the clerk of court the sum of P20.20 every month as rent thereof and that as a counterclaim, he seeks the recovery of P272 for goods and money delivered by him to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed a reply to the answer alleging, among other things, that Ruperta Garcia was not one of the coowners of the land in question; that the person who signed the alleged contract of lease never represented themselves as being the sole and exclusive owners of the land subject to the lease as alleged by the defendant in his answer; that the said contract of lease of July 24,1905, is null and void for being executed without the intervention and consent of two coowners, Ramon Melencio and Jose P. Melencio, and without the marital consent of the husbands of Juliana and Ruperta Melencio; that the lessee has repeatedly violated the terms and conditions of the said contract; and that Liberata Macapagal, in her capacity as administratrix of the property of her deceased husband, could not lawfully and legally execute a contract of lease with the conditions and terms similar to that of the one under consideration, and that from this it follows that she could not ratify the said lease as claimed by the defendant. On January 21,1928, Liberata Macapagal Viuda de Melencio, duly appointed and qualified as administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband, Ramon Melencio, filed a petition praying to be allowed to join the plaintiffs as party to the present case, which petition was granted in open court on January 31,1928. Her amended complaint of intervention of February 14,1928, contains allegations similar to those alleged in the complaint of the original plaintiffs, and she further alleges that the defendant-appellee has occupied the land in question ever since November, 1920, under and by virtue of a verbal contract of lease for a term from month to month. To this complaint of intervention, the defendant-appellee filed an answer reproducing the allegations contained in his answer reproducing the allegations contained in his answer to the complaint of the original plaintiffs and setting up prescription as a further special defense. It appears from the evidence that the land in question was originally owned by one Julian Melencio. He died prior to the year 1905 leaving his widow, Ruperta Garcia, and his five children, Juliana, Ramon, Ruperta, Pedro R., and Emilio Melencio. Emilio Melencio also died before 1905, his son Jose P. Melencio, then a minor, succeeding to his interest in the said parcel of land by representation. A question has been raised as to whether the land was community property of the marriage of Julian Melencio and Ruperta Garcia, but the evidence is practically undisputed that Ruperta Garcia in reality held nothing but a widow's usufruct in the land. On July 24,1905, Ruperta Garcia, Pedro R. Melencio, Juliana Melencio, and Ruperta Melencio executed a contract of lease of the land in favor of one Yap Kui Chin, but neither Jose P. Melencio nor Ramon Melencio were mentioned in the lease. The term of the lease was for twenty years, extendible for a like period at the option of the lessee. The purpose of the lessee was to establish a rice mill on the land, with the necessary buildings for warehouses and for quarters for the employees, and it was further stipulated that at the termination of the original period of the lease, or the extension therof, the lessors might purchase all the buildings and improvements on the land at a price to be fixed by experts appointed by the parties, but that if the lessors should fail to take advantage of that privilege, the lease would continue for another and further period of twenty years. The document was duly acknowledged but was never recorded with the register of deeds. The original rent agreed upon was P25 per month, but by reason of the construction of a street through the land, the monthly rent was reduced of P20.20. Shortly after the execution of the lease, the lessee took possession of the parcel in question and erected the mill as well as the necessary buildings, and it appears that in matters pertaining to the lease, he dealt with Pedro R. Melencio, who from 1905 until his death in 1920, acted as manager of the property held in common by the heirs of Julian Melencio and Ruperta Garcia. The original lessee, Yap Kui Chin, died in 1912, and the lease, as well as the other property, was transferred to Uy Eng Jui who again transferred it to Uy Eng Jui & Co., an unregistered partnership. Finally the lease came into the hands of Dy Tiao Lay, the herein defendant-appellee. Ramon Melencio died in 1914, and his widow, Liberata Macapagal, was appointed administratrix of his estate. In 1913 the land which includes the parcel in question was registered under the Torrens system. The lease was not mentioned in the certificate of title, but it was stated that one house and three warehouses on the land were the property of Yap Kui Chin. In 1920 the heirs of Julian Melencio made an extrajudicial partition of parts of the inheritance, and among other things, the land here in question fell to the share of the children of Ramon Melencio, who are the original plaintiffs in the present case. Their mother, Liberata Macapagal, as administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband, Ramon, collected the rent for the lease at the rate of P20.20 per month until the month of May,1926, when she demanded of the lessee that the rent should be increased to P300 per month, and she was then informed by the defendant that a written lease existed and that according to the terms thereof, the defendant was entitled to an extension of the lease at the original rental. The plaintiffs insisted that they never had any knowledge of the existence of such a contract of lease and maintained that in such case the lease was executed without their consent and was void. It may be noted that upon careful search, a copy of the contract of lease was found among the papers of the deceased Pedro R, Melencio. Thereafter the present action was brought to set aside the lease and to recover possession of the land. Upon trial, the court below rendered judgment in favor of the defendant declaring the lease valid and ordering the plaintiffs to pay the P272 demanded by the defendant in his counterclaim. From this judgment the plaintiffs appealed. The contention of the appellants is that the aforesaid contract of lease (Exhibit C) is null and void for the following reasons:1. That Exhibit C calls for an alteration of the property in question and therefore ought to have been signed by all the coowners as by law required in the premises.2. That the validity and fulfillment of the said agreement of lease were made to depend upon the will of the lessee exclusively.3. That the said contract of lease being for a term of over six years, the same is null and void pursuant to the provision of article 1548 of the Civil Code.4. That the duration of the same is unreasonably long, thus being against public policy.5. That the defendant-appellee and his predecessors in interest repeatedly violated the provisions of the agreement. The first proposition is based on article 397 of the Civil Code which provides that "none of the owners shall, without the consent of the others, make any alterations in the common property even though such alterations might be advantageous to all." We do not think that the alterations are of sufficient importance to nullify the lease, especially so since none of the coowners objected to such alterations until over twenty years after the execution of the contract of lease. The decision of this court in the case of Enriquez vs. A. S. Watson and Co. (22 Phil., 623), contains a full discussion of the effect of alterations of leased community property, and no further discussion upon the point need here be considered. The second proposition is likewise of little merit. Under the circumstances, the provision in the contract that the lessee, at any time before he erected any building on the land, might rescind the lease, can hardly be regarded as a violation of article 1256 of the Civil Code. The third and fourth proposition are, in our opinion, determinative of the controversy. The court below based its decision principally on the case of Enriquez vs. A.S. Watson & Co. (22 Phil., 623), and on the resolution of theDireccion General de losRegistrosdated April 26,1907. (Jurisprudencia Civil, vol.107, p. 222.) An examination of the Enriquez case will show that it differs materially from the present. In that case all of the coowners of a lot and building executed a contract of lease of the property for the term of eighteen years in favor of A. S. Watson & Co.; one of the owners was minor, but he was represented by his legally appointed guardian, and the action of the latter in signing the lease on behalf of the minor was formally approved by the Court of First Instance. In the present case only a small majority of the coowners executed the lease here in question, and according to the terms of the contract the lease might be given a duration of sixty years; that is widely different from a lease granted byallof the coowners for a term of only eighteen years. The resolution of April 26,1907, is more in point. It relates to the inscription or registration of a contract of lease of some pasture grounds. The majority of the coowners of the property executed the lease for the term of twelve years but when the lessees presented the lease for inscription in the registry of property, the registrar denied the inscription on the ground that the term of the lease exceeded six years and that therefore the majority of the coowners lacked authority to grant the lease. TheDireccion General de losRegistrosheld that the contract of lease for a period exceeding six years, constitutes a real right subject to registry and that the lease in question was valid. The conclusions reached by theDireccion Generalled to considerable criticism and have been overruled by a decision of the Supreme Court of Spain dated June 1,1909. In that decision the court made the following statement of the case (translation): The joint owners of 511 out of 1,000 parts of the realty denominatedEl Mortero,leased out the whole property for twelve years to Doa Josefa de la Rosa; whereupon the Count and Countess Trespalacios together with other coowners brought this suit to annul the lease and, in view of the fact that the land was indivisible, prayed for its sale by public auction and the distribution of the price so obtained; they alleged that they neither took part nor consented to the lease; that the decision of the majority of part owners referred to in article 398 of the Code, implies a common deliberation on the step to be taken , for to do without it, would, even more than to do without the minority, be nothing less than plunder; and that, even if this deliberation were not absolutely necessary, the power of the majority would still be confined to decisions touching the management and enjoyment of the common property, and would not include acts of ownership, such as a lease for twelve years, which according to the Mortgage Law gives rise to a real right, which must be recorded, and which can be performed only by the owners of the property leased. The part owners who had executed the contract prayed in reconvention that it held valid for all the owners in common, and if this could not be, then for all those who had signed it, and for the rest, for the period of six years; and theAudiencia of Cacereshaving rendered judgment holding the contract null and void, and ordering the sale of the realty and the distribution of the price, the defendants appealed alleging under the third and fourth assignments of error, that the judgment was a violation of article 398 of the Civil Code, which is absolute and sets no limit of time for the efficacy of the decisions arrived at by the majority of the part owners for the enjoyment of the common property, citing the decisions of June 30th, 1897, of July 8th,1902, and of October 30th, 1907; under the fifth assignments of error the appellants contended that in including joint owners among those referred to in said article, which sets certain limits to the power of leasing, in the course of the management of another's property, the court applied article 1548 unduly; and by the seventh assignments of error, they maintained the judgment appealed from also violated article 1727, providing that the principal is not bound where his agent has acted beyond his authority; whence it may be inferred that if in order to hold the contract null and void, the majority of the part owners are looked upon as managers or agents exercising limited powers, it must at least be conceded that in so far as the act in question lies within the scope of their powers, it is valid; the contract cannot be annulledintoto. The Supreme Court held that the appeal from the decision of theAudiencia of Cacereswas not well taken and expressed the followingconsideranda: Considering that, although as a rule the contract of lease constitutes an act of management, as this court has several times held, cases may yet arise, either owing to the nature of the subject matter, or to the period of duration, which may render it imperative to record the contract in the registry of property, in pursuance of the Mortgage Law, where the contract of lease may give rise to a real right in favor of the lessee, and it would then constitute such a sundering of the ownership as transcends mere management; in such cases it must of necessity be recognized that the part owners representing the greater portion of the property held in common have no power to lease said property for a longer period than six years without the consent of all the coowners, whose propriety rights, expressly recognized by the law, would by contracts of long duration be restricted or annulled; and as under article 1548 of the Civil Code such contracts cannot be entered into by the husband with respect to his wife's property, by the parent or guardian with respect to that of the child or ward, and by the manager in default of special power, since the contract of lease only produces personal obligations, and cannot without the consent of all persons interested or express authority from the owner, be extended to include stipulations which may alter its character, changing it into a contract of partial alienation of the property leased; Considering that, applying this doctrine to the case before us, one of the grounds upon which the judgment appealed from, denying the validity of the lease made by the majority of the part owners of the pasture landEl Morterois based, must be upheld; to wit, that the period of duration is twelve years and the consent of all the coowners has not been obtained; hence, the third, fourth. and fifth assignments of error are without merit; firstly, because article 398 of the Civil Code, alleged to have been violated, refers to acts decided upon by the majority of the part owners, touching the management and enjoyment of the common property, and does not contradict what we have stated in the foregoing paragraph; secondly because although the cases cited were such as arose upon leases for more than six years, yet this point was not raised on appeal, and could not therefore be passed upon; and thirdly, because it cannot be denied that there is an analogy between a manager without special authority, who is forbidden by article 1548 of the Code to give a lease for a period of over six years, and the joint owners constituting a legal majority, who may decide to lease out the indivisible property, with respect to the shares of the other coowners; and having come to the conclusion that the contract is null and void, there is no need to discuss the first two assignments of error which refer to another of the bases adopted, however erroneously, by the trial court; Considering that the sixth assignment of error is without merit, inasmuch as the joint ownership of property is not a sort of agency and cannot be governed by the provisions relating to the latter contract; whence, article 1727 of the Code alleged to have been violated, can no more be applied, than, the question of the validity or nullity of the lease being raise, upon the contract as celebrated, it would be allowable to modify aposteriorisome one or other of the main conditions stipulated, like that regarding the duration of the lease, for this would amount to a novation; still less allowable would it be to authorize diverse periods for the different persons unequally interested in the fulfillment. Taking into consideration articles 398,1548, and 1713 of the Civil Code and following the aforesaid decision of June 1,1909, we hold that the contract of lease here in question is null and void. It has been suggested that by reason of prescription and by acceptance of benefits under the lease, the plaintiffs are estopped to question the authority for making the lease.To this we may answer that the burden of proof of prescription devolved upon the defendant and that as far as we can find, there is no proof that Ramon Melencio and his successors ever had knowledge of the existence of the lease in question prior to 1926. We cannot by mere suspicion conclude that they were informed of the existence of the document and its terms; it must be remembered that under a strict interpretation of the terms of the lease, the lessees could remain indefinitely in their tenancy unless the lessors could purchase the mill and the buildings on the land. In such circumstances, better evidence than that presented by the defendant in regard to the plaintiff's knowledge of the lease must be required. The fact that Ramon during his lifetime received his share of the products of land owned in common with his coheirs is not sufficient proof of knowledge of the existence of the contract of lease when it is considered that the land in question was only a small portion of a large tract which Pedro R. Melencio was administering in connection with other community property. The appealed judgment as to the validity of the lease is therefore reversed, and it is ordered that the possession of the land in controversy be delivered to the intervenor Liberata Macapagal in her capacity as administratrix of the estate of the deceased Ramon Melencio. It is further ordered that the defendant pay to said administratrix a monthly rent of P50 for the occupation of the land from May 1st, 1926, until the land is delivered to the administratrix. The sum of P272 demanded by the defendant in his counterclaim may be deducted from the total amount of the rent due and unpaid. The building erected on the land by the defendant and his predecessors in interest may be removed by him, or otherwise disposed of, within six months from the promulgation of this decision. Without costs. So ordered.Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaFIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. L-51283 June 7, 1989LOURDES MARIANO,petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS, and DANIEL SANCHEZ,respondents.Jose V. Natividad & Associates for petitioner .Arturo S. Santos for respondents.NARVASA,J.:The proceedings at bar concern (1) an attempt by a married man to prevent execution against conjugal property of a judgment rendered against his wife, for obligations incurred by the latter while engaged in a business that had admittedly redounded to the benefit of the family, and (2) the interference by a court with the proceedings on execution of a co-equal or coordinate court. Both acts being proscribed by law, correction is called for and will hereby be effected.The proceedings originated from a suit filed by Esther Sanchez against Lourdes Mariano in the Court of First Instance at Caloocan City,1for recovery of the value of ladies' ready made dresses allegedly purchased by and delivered to the latter.2A writ of preliminary attachment issued at Esther Sanchez' instance, upon a bond posted by Veritas Insurance Company in the amount of P 11,000.00, and resulted in the seizure of Lourdes Mariano's property worth P 15,000.00 or so.3Her motion for the discharge of the attachment having been denied,4Lourdes Mariano went up to the Court of Appeals on certiorari. That Court ordered5the Trial Court to receive evidence on whether or not the attachment had been improvidently or irregularly issued.6The Trial Court did so, came to the conclusion that the attachment had indeed been improperly issued, and consequently dissolved it.7Trial then ensued upon the issues arising from the complaint as well as Lourdes Mariano's answer with counterclaim-which included a claim for damages resulting from wrongful attachment. Thereafter judgment was rendered in favor of defendant Lourdes Mariano and against plaintiff Esther Sanchez containing the following dispositions, to wit:81. On the complaint, defendant is ordered to pay unto the plaintiff for the value of the dishonored check (Exhs. G-1, H and I) in the total amount of P 1,512.00.2. On the counterclaim, the plaintiff is ordered to pay unto defendant the following, as follows:a) P 7,500.00 for loss of income of the defendant for 75 days;b) P 16,000.00 for the value of attached goods;c) P 25,000.00 for moral and exemplary damages;d) P 5,000.00 as attorney's fees plus costs of suit.The Veritas Insurance Company which issued the attachment bond is ordered to pay unto the defendant the full insurance coverage of P 11,000.00 to answer for the total liability of the plaintiff thereofEsther Sanchez sought to perfect an appeal by filing a notice of appeal, an appeal bond and a record on appeal.9Pending approval of the record on appeal, Lourdes Mariano filed a motion for the immediate execution of the judgment which the Court granted.10In virtue of the writ of execution which afterwards issued in due course, the sheriff garnished the sum of P 11,000.00 from Veritas Insurance Company, and levied on real and personal property belonging to the conjugal partnership of Esther Sanchez and her husband, Daniel Sanchez. Esther Sanchez then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, praying for the annulment of the execution pending appeal authorized by the Trial Court; but her petition was adjudged to be without merit and was accordingly dismissed.11Daniel Sanchez, Esther's husband, now made his move. He filed a complaint for annulment of the execution in the Court of First Instance at Quezon City in his capacity as administrator of the conjugal partnership.12He alleged that the conjugal assets could not validly be made to answer for obligations exclusively contracted by his wife, and that, moreover, some of the personal property levied on, such as household appliances and utensils necessarily used in the conjugal dwelling, were exempt from execution. He also applied for a preliminary injunction pending adjudication of the case on the merits.13The Quezon City Court issued an order setting the matter of the injunction for hearing, and commanding the sheriff, in the meantime, to desist from proceeding with the auction sale of the property subject of Daniel Sanchez' claim.14Lourdes Mariano filed a motion to dismiss the action; this, the Court denied.15She then instituted a special civil action of certiorari in the Court of Appeals16where she initially enjoyed some measure of success: her petition was given due course, and the Quezon City Court was restrained by the Appellate Court's Seventh Division17from further proceeding with the case.18Eventually, however, the Eighth Division19came to the conclusion that there was no merit in her cause and dismissed her petition.20It ruled that the Quezon City Court had not interfered with the execution process of the Caloocan Court because Daniel Sanchez's action in the former court raised an issue-the validity of the sheriffs levy on the conjugal partnership assets of the Sanchez spouses different from those adjudicated in the Caloocan Court, and Sanchez was not a party to the case tried by the latter.From this verdict Lourdes Mariano has appealed to this Court, contending that the Appellate Court committed reversible error-1) in ruling that the conjugal partnership of Daniel and Esther Sanchez could not be made liable for Esther's judgment obligation arising from the spouses' joint business with Lourdes Mariano;2) in ruling that the Quezon City Court of First Instance had not interfered with the execution process of the Caloocan Court of First Instance; and3) when its Eighth Division decided the petition of Lourdes Mariano although the case had been raffled to the Seventh Division and the latter had in fact given due course to the petition.1. There is no dispute about the fact that Esther Sanchez was engaged in business not only without objection on the part of her husband, Daniel, but in truth with his consent and approval.21It is also established that, as expressly acknowledged by Esther herself and never denied by Daniel, the profits from the business had been used to meet, in part at least, expenses for the support of her family, i.e., the schooling of the children, food and other household expenses.22Under the circumstances, Lourdes Mariano action against Esther Sanchez was justified, the litigation being "incidental to the ... business in which she is engaged23and consequently, the conjugal partnership of Daniel and Esther Sanchez was liable for the debts and obligations contracted by Esther in her business since the income derived therefrom, having been used to defray some of the expenses for the maintenance of the family and the education of the children, had redounded to the benefit of the partnership.24It was therefore error for the Court of Appeals to have ruled otherwise.2. It was also error for the Court of Appeals to have held that there was no interference by the Quezon City Court of First Instance with the execution process of the Caloocan Court.The rule, one of great importance in the administration of justice, is that a Court of First Instance has no power to restrain by means of injunction the execution of a judgment or decree of another judge of concurrent or coordinate jurisdictions.25But this is precisely what was done by the Quezo