Clear and Distinct

7/30/2019 Clear and Distinct

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Royal Institute of Philosophy

Clearness and Distinctness in DescartesAuthor(s): Alan GewirthSource: Philosophy, Vol. 18, No. 69 (Apr., 1943), pp. 17-36Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of Royal Institute of PhilosophyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3748353 .

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CLEARNESS AND DISTINCTNESSIN DESCARTESALAN GEWIRTH

I. Descartes's eneral ule hat whateversclearlynddistinctlyperceiveds true" has traditionallyeen criticized n twocloselyrelated rounds. s Leibniz, or xample, uts t,clearness nd dis-tinctnessre of no valueas criteria ftruth nlesswehavecriteriaofclearness nd distinctness;ut Descartesgivesnone. And con-sequently,hestandards f udgmentwhich he rule n fact vokesarepurelyubjectivendpsychological.heremusthencebe setupanalytic,ogical"marks"by means of which t can infalliblyndwithout rbitrarinesserecognized hetherny deasorpropositionsareorare notclear nddistinct.2In a general ense, hese riticisms adbeen aid before escarteshimself.n theFifthObjectionsassendiwrites: Whyare there omany nd so variedopinionsmongmen? Each one thinks hatheperceives learly nd distinctlyheopinionwhichhe defends. ndlest yousay thatmanyare eitherbeingpartisan r pretending,wantyouto notice hatthere re thosewho even facedeathfor hesake oftheopinionswhich heyhold,eventhough hey ee othersfacing t forthesake of the opposite pinions."Hence,Gassendiconcludes, escartes'smainconcernhouldhavebeen to "propounda methodwhich houlddirect s and teachus whenwearedeceivedand whennotdeceived n thinkinghatwe clearly nd distinctlyperceiveomething."3n thefaceofthisobjection, escartes's eplyis significant.he instance fmenwhofacedeathonbehalf f theiropinions,he writes, proves nothing . . because it can never beproved hat they clearly nd distinctly erceive hatwhichtheypertinaciouslyffirm.nd as forwhatyouthen dd, thatthecon-cernmust enot omuchwith hetruthf herule swith methodto discernwhether r notwe are deceivedwhenwe think hatweclearly erceive omething, do notdenythis;but I contend hat

I This is the thirdin a series of articleson some basic problems n thephilosophy fDescartes. The firstwowere"Experienceand theNon-Mathe-matical n the CartesianMethod,"JournaloftheHistory f deas, II, 2 (AprilI941), p. 183ff., nd "The CartesianCircle,"The PhilosophicalReview, .,4(July I94I), p. 368 ff.2 Cf. L. Couturat, La Logique de Leibniz (Paris, 1901), pp. I96, 202-3, withtextstherecited. For a morerecentversionofthiscriticism, f. C. S. Peirce,CollectedPapers, 5. 39I.3 Vae Obj., VII, 278-9. Cf. ibid., 318. References re to the volume andpage of (Euvres de Descartes, d. Adam-Tannery.B I7

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PHILOSOPHYthisvery hing as been ccuratelyet forthyme n tsplace,wherefirst discardedllprejudices,ndthen numeratedll theprincipalideas and distinguishedhosewhichwereclear fromheobscure rconfused.'"Descartes s herereferring,fcourse, o theprocedure ollowedin the first hreeMeditations.ut before xamininghe relevantdetailsof thatprocedure,t shouldbe notedwhathe considers obe thegeneral haracterf the"proof" fclearness nddistinctnesssuch s hementionedoGassendi.Whereas eibnizdemandshat hecriterione "palpable," mechanical,"nd ackingn"eventhe eastdifficulty,"nd declares hat"there s no need for rolix iscussionsconcerningurprejudices,"2escartes tates lreadyntheDiscoursethat "there s somedifficultyn notingwell whatare the thingswhichwe conceivedistinctly,"3nd tellsGassendi hat"I do notbelievethat those who are so littleconcernedwiththeuprootingofprejudices hattheycomplain hatI have notspokenof them'simplynd in fewwords,'willreadily erceivehemethodwherebywe can distinguishhatwhich s reallyperceived learly rom hatwhichs only houghtobe clearly erceived."4hesetting orth fcriteria f clearness nddistinctness,hen,willforDescartesneces-sarilynvolve psychologicaliscipline. mong isbasic commentsconcerningormalogicand the"synthetic"method f demonstra-tion,both of whichhe opposedto his ownmethod,werethat theformerermitshe mind o "go on a holiday romheevident ndattentive onsiderationf the inferencetself,"5 nd the latter"wrests ssentfrom hereader,no matterhowunwillingnd per-tinacioushe may be."6 Both of these methods, n their formalcharacter,husrealizeLeibniz's deal,butonly,Descartesholds, tthe expenseoflosing ll heuristic alue. His ownmethod, n theother and, sdedicated ottoexhibitingheformalnterrelationsfideasandpropositionsut to researchnto ubject-mattershetruthconcerninghich s notyetknown o themind, o that henecessitywhich t achieves annotbe a merely ormal nebut mustderivefrom he mpact fthesubject-mattertself ponthemind.Hence,evenwhenthe results f the method re set down n writing,ut1 Vae Resp.,VII, 361-2. (Italicshereand in all otherquotationsaremine.)An anonymousexponent of Gassendi took up the debate at this point,"denying"that Descarteshad set forth methodfordistinguishinghereallyfrom heapparently learand distinctX*** toDescartes,July 64I; III, 402).Unfortunately,owever,his examplesof menfirmlyonvinced of the clear-ness and distinctness f theirperceptions, nd nevertheless n contradictionto one another,wereall takenfrom heological ontroversy,o thatDescarteswas able to say in rebuttalmerely hat "replyto themwould be veryeasyforonewhodistinguisheshelightof faithfrom henatural ight, nd setstheformer efore he latter" (toX***, Aug. I64I; III, 426).2 Couturat, p. cit.,p. Ioo, nn. 2 and 3; p. 203, n. 2. 3 Disc. IV, VI, 33.4 Vae Resp., VII, 379. 5 Reg. X, X, 405-6. 6 IIae Resp., VII, 156.I8



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CLEARNESS AND DISTINCTNESS IN DESCARTESexhibitinghe same procedures s were followedn the originalinvestigation,hemethod has nothingwherebyt may impelaninattentiverunwillingeader obelieve: forfthe east bit ofwhatit propounds e notattended o,thenecessity f ts conclusionssnot apparent."'Whenthisconsiderations putwithin heframe-work fa theory frepresentativeerception, here nly deascanbe directly erceived y themind, hereasonfor hepsychologicalorientationfDescartes'smethod ecomes vident.Yet ifDescartes'scriteria f clearness nd distinctness ill notbe logical n theformal,mechanical" ensedemanded yLeibniz,neither ill hey e so radically sychologicals to be divorced romall logicalconsiderations. t least there s a difference,escartesinsists, etween heevidentness f clearand distinct erceptionndthe"precipitation,"pertinacity,"nd"persuasion" fmindswhichcannot rovewhat hey ssert, r whose ssertionsary ccordingoarbitrary him.'And theaccomplishmentfthe differenceomesthrough certainprudence cquiredby habituation: only theprudentorrectly istinguishetween hatwhich s clearly nddis-tinctly erceived,nd thatwhichonlyseemsor appearsso";3 for"there are few who are accustomed o clear and distinctper-ceptions."4This differences accentuatedfromthe side of thesubject-mattertself;for f Descartes nsistsupon the ease andinfallibilityf the deductionprescribed y his method,5 e alsowarns that thedeductionmustfirst e "preparedfor" and "dis-covered," nd the orderof the deduction excogitated,"6o thatthe clearness nd distinctnessxhibited y the processwillhavehad to meetthe testspresented y thesepreliminaryperationisuponthespecific roblemnhand.

2. But let us now examine he basis and developmentf theseconsiderations,ollowinghe Cartesianorder from he simpletothecomplex. hedirect bjectof the mind's ct ofperceptions forDescartesalwaysan idea.7 deas, however, ave a double status:on the onehand, hey re themselvesxistents,formal ssences,"modesofthought; ntheotherhand, hey resignificances,objec-tiveessences,"representativefthings ther hanthemselves.8nX IIae Resp., VII, I55-6.2 Cf. Disc. II, VI, I8. IIIae, IIae Resp.,VII, 146, 92. Reg. II, X, 363. ToRegius,24 May, I640; III, 65. To X***, Aug. I641; III, 430-I. Princ. I, 50,68.Notae in Prog., VIII (2), 352. 3 VIIae Resp., VII, 461-2.4 Ibid., 5 . 5 Reg. II, III, IV, XII, X, 365, 369, 372, 429.6 Reg. IV, XII, XIV, X, 372, 428, 439-40, 451.7 ". . . ostendo me nomen ideae sumere pro omni eo quod immediate amentepercipitur." IIae Resp.,VII, I8I.8 Med. III, VII, 40ff.Cf. ibid., 37: "Quaedam ex his (cogitationibus)tanquam rerum magines unt,quibus solisproprie onvenit deae nomen."

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PHILOSOPHYorder hat deasbe susceptibleftruth,heymustbe viewednot nthefirst ay, r"materially,"ut n the econdway, r"formally."IThe total cognitive ituation for Descartes thus containsthreefactors: erceptivect, dea (thedirect bjector content erceived),and thingpurportedlyepresented y the idea. From thischarac-terization,t is at onceapparent hattheclearness nddistinctnessof n idea cannotdirectlyonsist ntherelationf"correspondence"or"conformity"etween he dea and thething. or since"we canhavenoknowledgefthings therwisehan hroughhe deas whichwe conceive fthem,"2t followshat f clearness nd distinctnesswerequalitiesconsistingn somedirectrelation etween heideaand thething t purportso represent,hemind,notknowinghethingwithout heidea, couldneverknowwhethert had attainedthesequalities, o that thefirst recept f Descartes'smethod, oacceptas trueonlywhat s clearly nd distinctly erceived,ouldlead onlyto obscuritynd indecision. learness nd distinctness,then, annot ntheir ssential ature e the ameas truth;t remainsthatthey requalities nternal o ideas andperceptivects.Andyetthe ignificatoryharacterf deasplays n mportantartin theirbeingclear and distinct. t is precisely rom herelationbetween hese wo spectsof deas, he nternal nd therepresenta-tive, that thedifficultieshichhave traditionallyeenfound nDescartes's octrine rise.To understandhenatureofthose diffi-culties,we must firstconsiderDescartes'sgeneraldescriptionfclearness nddistinctness:

A clearperception call that which s presentand open to the attendingmind; just as we say that those thingsare clearlyseen by us which,beingpresentto the regarding ye,move it sufficientlytrongly nd openly. Butthatperceptionsdistinctwhich snotonlyclear but s so precise nd separatedfrom llothers hat tplainly ontains n tself othing ther han what sclear.3It willbe notedthatthewordwhichDescarteshere uses is "per-ception,"not"idea." But thathe meansby it theperceived atherthan theperceiver,heobjectrather hantheact, s apparent romtheanalogywhichhe drawswith ight: "perception"s giventhesamerelative tatus s "thingseenbyus." Since,however,dea andperceptivect arecorrelative,herequirementsndicated or itherwillto a certain xtent elong o the other s well.In order o be clear,then, n idea mustbe (i) "present" o themind, 2) "open" to themind, nd (3) themind n turnmustbe"attending" o the dea. Some of theproblems fDescartes'sdoc-trine re already pparentn thisformulation.t might eemthatthefirstnd third equirementsre really hesame,thatan ideacannotbe "present" o themind t all unlessthemind s "attend-ing" to it,for there an be no thoughtn us ofwhichwe are notIVae Resp.,VII 232. 2 ToGibieuf,Q Jan.1642; III, 476. 3 Princ. , 45.20



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CLEARNESS AND DISTINCTNESS IN DESCARTESconscious t that samemomentt which t is in us."I Moreover,tmight e heldthat there annotevenbean idea unlessthese tworequirementsrefulfilled,incean idea is "all that which s imme-diatelyperceived y themind." n theserespects, ifficultyightbe foundwithDescartes's nalogyofvision.For an objectcan belocally"present"to the eye without he eye's "regarding" heobject;moreover,heobjectsofvision can presumablyxistevenwhile hey renotbeing een; but an idea is constituted oth s toits veryexistence y themind'sact ofperception,nd as to itssignificancer representativeharacterby precisely hat aboutwhich he mind s thinking.he case is the samewithDescartes'sother equirement,hat theidea be "open" to themind.The ana-logous phraseon the side ofvision s thatthings move the eyesufficientlytrongly nd openly." The "sufficiency"o whichDescartes s herereferringbviouslys theability fthemindtorecognize he objectwhich s seen. But hereagain,does not themind ecognizeny dea,since n ideais preciselyhat, nd all that,ofwhich hemind s at anymomenthinking? tleast, uchwouldseem obe the enor fdefinitionsike hese: I callgenerally,ythename idea,' all thatwhich s in ourmindwhenwe conceive thing,in whatevermannerwe conceive t";2 and "by the name idea' Iunderstandhatform fany thought, hroughheimmediate er-ceptionofwhich am conscious f that same thought."3n theNouveaux ssais, Leibnizprotestsgainst ustthisdefinitionfanideawhen, o Philalethes' uestion, Is it not true hatthe dea istheobjectofthought?" e has Theophilus eply, I grant t,pro-videdyouadd that t is an immediatenternal bject, ndthatthisobject s anexpressionfthenature rqualities fthings.fthedeawerehe ormf hought,t would riseorceasewithhe ctual houghtswhichorrespondo t; but ince t is their bject,t canbeanteriorrposteriorothe houghts."4Now forDescartes t is also correct o say thatideas, at leastthosewhich re clearanddistinct,epresenthe essences fthings.Butapartfromhedifferencen the nterpretationfthis tatementowing o fundamental etaphysicalissimilaritiesrom eibniz, hestatementtself annotbe used by Descartes n a methodologicalcontext; .e. he cannotconsult he essencesofthingsn ordertospecifyheclearness f n idea,because hingshemselvesannot edirectly erceived.t is only fter henature fclearness nd dis-tinctnessas beendetermined,ndtheveracityfGoddemonstrated,thatDescartes s ableto assert hat lear nddistinctdeas aretrue.Andthisdifferencenthe nitialnterpretationfthe tatusof deasalsoprevents solution fourgeneral roblemlongthe inesgiven

I IVae Resp., VII, 246. 2 To Mersenne, July I64I; III, 392-3.3 IIae Resp., Def. II, VII, I60. 4 Nouv. Ess., II, i, I.21



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PHILOSOPHYby Leibniz.The problem o which he above considerationsavepointed s, ofcourse,howcan anyideawhatsoever ailto be clearand distinct,.e. how can clearness nd distinctnessn any wayconstitute normativeequirementor deaswhen, n Descartes'sformulation,very dea seems psofacto lear and distinct? or ifwhathas been said about ideas makes all ideas clear,then t alsomakesthemdistinct,incethe mindperceives nly hatwhicht isin factperceiving,nd nothingother"thanthat. n the aterdis-cussion f thesameproblem yLockeand Leibniz,'the solution ftheformer,ased uponthe relation f ideas to theirnames,wasamendedby the atter o restuponthe relation fthe dea to thething t purportso represent:n idea is not clearif it does notpermitecognitionf tsobject.But ntheCartesianontextwherebythingsnanycase can be perceived nly hroughdeas,this olutioncannotbe accepted, t leastwithout erious ualification.

3. The difficulties hichwe have been canvassing rise out oftheneed to find n Descartes'sdoctrine istinctions,nalogous oLocke's between dea and name,and Leibniz'sbetween dea andthing,whichwill explainhow clearness nd distinctness an benormativeualities ndyetcapableofascertainmentna methodo-logical ontext,within hesphere f deasandperceptivects. TheCartesian istinctionsreforthcominghen t is seenthat the deaandtheperceptivect are esssimple hanour bove nterpretationshave indicated.Let us examinesome instanceswhereDescartescalls deas obscure ndconfused; or heconsiderationsnwhich ebases thischaracterizationhouldhelpto reveal thenature ftheopposite ualities s well.Senseperceptionsre thebest-knownlassofDescartes'sobscure nd confuseddeas.Yet this s nottheonlycharacterizationhichhe appliesto them.They are called clearand distinctn two differentontexts: I) "whentheyare viewedonlyas sensations r thoughts,"2nd (2) whentheyare used as"signifyingo the mindwhat s helpful rharmfulo thecompositeofwhich t is a part."3Theyare called obscure nd confused,ow-ever,whenviewedas representinghe essence ofmaterial hingsoutside hemind.4From this examplewe may infer hat the clearness nd dis-tinctness,robscurityndconfusion,f n idea areneitherntrinsicto the deanorexplicablenterms fa simple elation etweendeaandperceptivect; for he ame deas of ensationmaybeboth learand obscure, istinct nd confused.t seemshardly ossible o say

I Essay concerninguman Understanding,I, xxix, 5-6. Nouv. Ess., ad loc.For Kant's echo of the same difficulty,f. Krit. d. r. V.,Paralog.,B 414-I5Anm. X Princ.I, 68. Cf. Med. III, VII, 35. Reg.XII, X, 423.3 Med. VI, VII, 83. 4 Princ. I, 66-70. Med. VI, VII, 83.22



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CLEARNESS AND DISTINCTNESS IN DESCARTESthatthe deas nvolvedn thesedifferentnstancesre n nowaythesame; at least Descartes ppliesto all ofthem he common ame"sense perceptions." heremust,then,be someadditional actorwhose ombination ith he twoalreadyndicated ives o the deaorperceptivect one or another fthesequalifications.his thirdfactor s revealed n Descartes's significantxpression hat thesensations re "viewed s" (spectanturt).Forthe ituation n whichthereenterclearness and distinctnessnvolvesnot merelythepassiveapprehensionf a directly erceivedontent, utalso someinterpretationithregard o thatcontent.n each ofthe three n-stances iven boveoftheperceptionf deasof ensation,he amecontentwas directly erceived; ut in thefirst ase the deas (e.g.colours)were"viewed"or interpretedimply s sensations,n thesecondcase as having omebiologicallyymbolic unction,nd inthe third s being"similar"or cognitivelydequate to externalmaterialhings.t wouldhence eem hat t s n therelation fdirectand interpretiveontents rperceptionshatthe clearness nddis-tinctness,robscurityndconfusion,f n idea are tobe found.The same conclusionmerges rom onsiderationf other deaswhichdo not involve he sharpdistinctionetween ssential ndnon-essentialepresentationound n Descartes's ccountof senseperception. hus the ideas of the modesthought nd extension,Descarteswrites,canbeclearlynddistinctlynderstoodf hey eviewed ot s substances,rthingseparated romther hings, utonly s modes fthings. . . But if, nthe other and,we were oconsider hemwithout he substances n which heyare,by thatveryfactwe wouldview hem s subsistinghings,nd sowe wouldconfuseheideas of a modeand ofa substance."'Hereagainthesamecontents directlyerceived,nd it s fromherelationfthatcontent o the way in which t is "viewed" or interpretedhatclearnessnddistinctness,rconfusion,esult.Descartes'sdoctrinedmits,however, fgreater eneralityhanis envisagedn thesetwoexamples. or in each oftheseexamples,the direct content sense qualities,or "the modes thought ndextension")s heldconstant,whilethe nterpretiveontent aries.But Descartes lso discusses learness nddistinctnessnsituationswhere the direct contentvaries while the interpretiveontentremains ixed. or example,noteverydea which s interpretedobe representativef God is clearand distinct. he idea willhavethesequalities nly f"we do notputanythingictitiousnto t,butnote those thingsalone which are reallycontained n it, andwhichwe evidently erceive o pertain o the natureofthemostperfectbeing."2 Amongthese "real" attributesDescartes lists"eternal, mniscient,mnipotent,ource f all goodness nd truth,I Princ. I, 64. 2 Ibid., 54.

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PHILOSOPHYcreator fall things,nd in sumhaving nhimselfll thosethingsin whichwe can clearlynotesomeperfection hich s infinite,rterminatedyno imperfection."'n the otherhand,the dolaters'"idea ofGod,"whichn its direct ontentepresentativelyncludes,togetherwithperfection,uch attributes s vindictivenessndcorporeality,s obscure ndconfused.2We can now see the sense in whichDescartes'sdescriptionfclear nd distinct erceptionn thePrincipless a normativeharac-terization,nd not one belongingo any idea whatsoever. or ineveryperceptual ituation here s some ontent which s presentandopento theattendingmind" e.g.sense ualities, r"vindictivecorporeal eing") but this content need not be an integral ndcomplete erceptionfthething,"3.e. what is directlyperceivedmaybe other, r less,thanwhatthe mind nterpretsorwishes ointerpret)4tself o be perceivinge.g. "matter," r "God"). Thusthe direct ontentwhich,nDescartes's tatement,s requiredobe"present ndopento theattendingmind" s notanycontentwhat-soever sinceeveryperceptual ituation ulfillshiscondition),utrather hat contentwhich hall be "integralnd complete"nrela-tion o themind's nterpretationf t.When he nterpretiveontentis taken as basic, then, n idea is clear if its direct ontent e.g."incorporeal," "good") includes all that which is included in theinterpretation"God"), and distinctf thedirect ontentncludesnothing ther han this.And similarly, henthedirect ontentstaken as thepointofreference,n idea is clear fits interpretivecontente.g. "havingbiological tility") ncludes ll that which sincluded n its direct ontent sensequalities), nd distinctftheinterpretationncludesnothing lse. In mostgeneral erms, hen,the clearness nd distinctnessfan idea maybe said to consistnthe"equality"6 f tsdirect ndinterpretiveontents.

I Princ. I, 22.2 Ilae, IVae Resp.,VII, I38-9, 233-4. 3 Princ. I, 34.4 Thus Descarteswritesthat "the ideas which have of heat and cold areso littleclear and distinct hat I cannot earnfrom hemwhether old is onlya privationofheat, or heat a privationofcold, or each is a real quality, orneither"(Med. III, VII, 44). It is hence in relationto such contemplatedinterpretation f their directcontent, n whichone wishesto "learn fromthem"thenatureofthe qualitiestheyrepresent,hat these deas are lackingin clearness nd distinctness. n theotherhand,an interpretationf them ntermsofbiologicalutilityfinds he same ideas, i.e. the same directcontents,clearand distinct.5 From this t can readilybe seen thatwhenthedirectcontent s thebasisof evaluation (as in Descartes's exampleoftheclearbut confusedperceptionof pain in Princ. I, 46), ideas are usually clear, but their distinctnessmaycomeintoquestion;on theotherhand,whentheinterpretiveontent s madethe basis, ideas mayoftenbe lacking n clearness,but iftheyare clear,theywillusuallybe distinct s well. 6 Cf.Reg.XIV, X, 439-40.24



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CLEARNESS AND DISTINCTNESS IN DESCARTESThisequalitys,ofcourse, logical ather han narrowlyuanti-tativerelation.n the context fscience,where heconcern s with

the ssences f hings,heconnectionetween hetwo ontentsmustbenecessary.he minimumequirementor nideatobeclear, hen,is that whicheverontent e taken s basic,the otherncludewhatin the Replies s calledtne "formal ature" ratio ormalis)' f itsobject,and whatin the Principless called the object's "leadingproperty,whichconstitutests natureand essence."2Thus theequality etween hesquareofthe base and thesquareofthe othertwosidesof a triangle is notclearly nderstoodnless n a righttriangle"3 i.e. the deawhich s interpretedo berepresentativefthat qualitys notclearunlesswhat sessential o such proportion,its inherencen a right riangle, e included n the idea's directcontent.Similarly,he minimumequirementoran idea to bedistincts thatnothing ontradictoryo the essenceof its objectbe includednit; it is in this ense that Descartesdefines distinctidea as onewhich contains othingtherhanwhat s clear."Thusa right riangle cannotbe distinctlynderstoodftheproportionof equalitybetweenthe squares of its sides and of its base bedenied,"4 or hen hecontradictoryf thatproportion,n essentialpropertyf he riangle, ould econtainednthe deaof he riangle.Similarly,an atomcan never e conceived istinctly,ince heverysignificationf theword mplies ontradiction,iz. to be bodyandtobe indivisible"5 nd"as for truepart fmatter,hedeterminatequantity fspace which t occupies s necessarilyncluded n thedistincthought hich necanhaveof t" 6 i.e. ifthe dea inwhicha direct ontents interpretedo represent partofmatter s tobe clear and distinct, hat direct contentmustrepresentativelyinclude heoccupancy fa determinateuantity fspace.

4. Buthas notourdiscussioneenconfusingdeawithudgment?It is perhaps signof the correctnessftheabove formulationhatthissame objectionwas made to Descartes himself y Arnauld.7Foralthough escartes nsists hatneitherdeas norperceptivects,but only udgments,may incurerror,8 e holds that there s a"material alsityn ideas,whentheyrepresents realwhat s notreal."9 t willbe noted that ust as perceptivects "viewas," soideas "represents": in each case the orientations interpretiveratherthan consistingn simple apprehension. ow if ideas be1 lae, IIae, IIIae, Vae Resp., VII, II3, 147, I75, 368. 2 Princ. I, 53.3 IVae Resp., VII, 225. 4 Ibid.5 To Mersenne, 30 Sept. I640; III, 191. Cf. IIae Resp., VII, 152. Conversa-tion,V, I60.6 Ibid., loc. cit. 7 IVae Obj., VII, 206.8 Med. III, IV, VII, 37, 56-8. 9 Ibid., III, VII, 43.

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PHILOSOPHYviewed ormatively,romhe tandpointolely fwhat hey really"represent,t is nonsense o speakof deasnot"representing"heirobjects"as" thoseobjectsare. Thus DescartestellsGassendi hat"the idea representshe essenceof the thing, nd if somethingbe added to orsubtractedromt, t forthwithecomes he dea ofa differenthing."IAnd from reciselyhe amestandpoint rnauldobjectsto Descartes: "thatidea ofcold,whichyoucall materiallyfalse,what does it exhibit oyourmind?A privation? hen t is atrue dea. A positive eing?Then t is notthe dea ofcold."2Des-cartes's eply tresses hat he ssue nvolves otmerely normativeconceptionf deas,but a mixturefdirect ontentwith nterpreta-tion:"I cannotdecidewhether hat t exhibits ome is somethingpositive utsidemy ense, rnot."3Such interpretationoes not,of course,make the idea or per-ceptiveact judgmental; or udgmentnvolves n act ofwill inaddition o perception. ence,anyobjectof theunderstanding,omatter owcomplex,s an idea so long s there nters o volitionalact.Now a propositionr nferences not of tself olitional;tmay,andin this ontext tindeedmust, e an objectofperceptionn thesame senseas thesimplestdea. For if it is simply y the act ofwilling n idea or perceptionhat the udgment omes ntobeing,mustnotthe dea orperceptionavepreviouslyeena propositionorgroup fpropositions?f the dea were ogicallyquivalent nlyto a term, headdition hereto f theact ofwillcould n no wayresultna judgment.Whatoneaffirmsrdenies s nota term utapropositionwhich,havingpreviously een simplya perceptualinterpretationf significantontent,stransformednto judgmentbythevolitionalct of ffirmationrdenial.That the interpretiveerceptions not a judgments, indeed,indicated xplicitly yDescartes n one of his etters:4Whatmenjudge frequently isagreeswith what theyunderstand. . . . Thus,when heyudgethat pace,which hey allempty,s nothing,heynonethe ess understandt as a positive hing. hus,too,when heythink hat accidents rereal,theyrepresenthem o themselvesssubstances,lthoughheydo not udgethem obe substances." o"represents" or to"understands" is hence ifferentromudging;andthe deawhich esults romuch n interpretiveperationakesthe ogicalform fa propositionr nference.5

I Vae Resp., VII, 37I. 2 IVae Obj., VII, 207.3 IVae Resp., VII, 234. 4 To X***, Aug. I64I; III, 430.I For a statementof indifferences to whether deas are expressedastermsor as propositions, f.toMersenne,July1641; III, 395: "Car, qu'elles(les idees) s'expriment ar des noms ou par des propositions, e n'estpas celaqui faitqu'ellesappartiennent l'esprit u i l'imagination; esunes et es autressepeuvent 'exprimerecesdeuxmanieres. . ."In another etter oMersenne(22 July 64I; III, 417), Descartes writes:"Je n'entendspas bienla question26



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CLEARNESS AND DISTINCTNESS IN DESCARTESThenon-formalrientationfDescartes'smethod ears outtheseconsiderations.oreven the"simplenatures" re described s "pro-

positions,"' nd of course ntuition, hich s theelementaryct ofperception,s stated ohaveas itsobjectnowpropositions,owthesimplenatures nd theirnecessary onnections,owconsequencesor series fpropositions.oth thesimplenatures nd the act of n-tuition rebyDescartesopposedprimarilyo judgments,n virtueof hevolitional haracterfthe atter,whichmayresultn "formal"falsity. utsince deasmaybe propositions,heres noabsurdityncalling hem materially" alse.5. Once an idea has whatwe have seento be theminimumfclearness nd distinctness,t can become learer f,while t is stillinterpretedo berepresentativefthe ameobject, ts direct ontentcomes o nclude dditionalttributesecessarilyonnected ith heinterpretiveontent. The moreattributeswe apprehendn thesamething rsubstance,hemore learly o we know t."' Andbythe sametoken, he idea willbecomemoredistinct, or hericheritscontent,hemore s it distinguishedromwhat s other han t:"A concept s not made moredistinct y thefactthatwe compre-hendfewerhingsn t,butonlybythefact hatthose hingswhichwedo comprehendn itweaccurately istinguishrom ll others."3This variationn degreereveals another istinction,n additionto thatbetweendirect nd interpretiveontents, equired o giveclearness nd distinctness normativeasis.This otherdistinctionis between heexplicit nd implicit ontents fan idea. We haveseenthatalthough clear and distinct erceptions "integralndcomplete," t neverthelessan becomemoreclear, .e. evenmore

"complete."The limitof such increase s an "adequate" idea, inwhich re representativelycontained bsolutelyll thepropertieswhich re in thething nown."4 nlyGod can havesuchadequateknowledge;hehumanmind s incapable f t,althoughtmayhave"complete" nowledge.hus manmayhavea completendhenceclearand distinctdea of God although his dea is by no meansadequatetoGod's nfiniteerfection,ustas "wedo notdoubt hatoneunlearnedngeometryasthe dea ofa whole riangle, henheunderstandst tobe a figureomprehendedythree ines, lthoughmanyother hings anbygeometerse known boutthattriangle,andbe noted nthe dea of t,ofwhich e is ignorant."5or a directque vousmefaites, avoirsi nos id&es 'expriment ar un simple erme;carlesparoles6tant de l'inventiondes hommes, n peut toujoursse servird'une oude plusieurs, ourexpliquerunem6me chose ...."Reg. V, VI, XI, XII, X, 379, 383, 409, 410, 428.' Princ. I, II. Cf. Med. II, VII, 33. 3 Ibid., 63.4 IVae Resp.,VII, 220. Cf. IIae Resp., VII, I40, 152.5 Vae Resp.,VII, 368.

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PHILOSOPHYcontent ot to "contain bsolutely ll theproperties hich re inthethingknown" s possibleonlybecauseofthe ogical rientationofDescartes's iewof deas.Metaphysically,fcourse, n idea refersbeyond tself o a thingwhich hemind an neverperceive irectly;but in denyingdequacyto human ognition escartes s notrely-ingexclusively,r evenprimarily,ponthisbasicfact;rather, eisreferringowhatcanbe ascertainednideasthemselves. ow forstrictly sychologicalosition,n idea is preciselynd exhaustivelythat ontentfwhich hemind s at anytime ware, o that puttingDescartes'sdefinitionfadequate knowledgen terms f deas andperceptivects)tospeakof perception hich s not ware fevery-thing ontainednan idea is a contradictionnterms. orDescartes,on the otherhand, a distinctions possiblebetweenthose deaswhichare "fictitious,".e. arbitrarilyompounded y the minditself, nd those which he mindmerely iscoverswithout ddingto their objective eality." t stillremains rue hateverydeanotonlydependsuponthemindfor ts existence, ut consists n thatverycontent fwhich he mind s directlyware.But once thusconstituteds a directobjectofperception,n idea of the lattersort is, withregardto its further ignificance,n independentlogical entity ontaining ithintself system fimplications,fsimplenatures nd their elations,whichdeductionmay graduallyreveal, nd which ndeed t is thetask ofscienceprogressivelyodiscover. hus,to take againDescartes'sfavouritexampleoftheideaof triangle,when I imaginea triangle, lthoughperhapssuch a figure xists nowhere ntheworldoutsidemythought, nd neverhas existed,yet it has forthwithdeterminatenature,or essence,or form, mmutableand eternal,which hasnot been made up (efficta)y me,and does not depend upon mymind; as isshownbythe factthatvariouspropertiesan be demonstrated f thistriangle,viz. that its threeangles are equal to two right ngles,that its greatest ideis subtendedbythegreatest ngle,and the ike,whichwilly-nillynowclearlyperceive, venif have in nowaythought f thempreviouslywhen imagineda triangle, o thattheyhave notbeenmade up byme.iHence,eventhough hepropertiesevealedby suchdeductive e-velopment ave notpreviouslyeensuspected y themind, heseoperationso notbasically augment" he dea,butmerelyrenderit moredistinctndexplicit, ecauseall thesepropertiesmusthavebeencontainedn that dea whichwashad at first."2It is importantonote,however,hatthisvariationnthedegreeof clearness nd distinctnesss possibleonlybecause an idea forDescartes nvolves n interpretives wellas a direct ontent. he"idea" which emains ixed nd unchanged hroughoutheprocess

I Med. V, VII, 64. Cf. Reg. XII, X, 422. Conversation,V, I5I-2.2 Vae Resp.,VII, 37I. Cf. bid.,368.28



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CLEARNESS AND DISTINCTNESS IN DESCARTESin whichproperties reviously nknown re discovered n "it" isnotmerely he initialdirect ontent,incethisundergoes bviousincrease; t is rather he nterpretiveontentwhich, quatedat theoutsetwith hedirect ontent,s found o be necessarilyonnectedwiththe "new" properties,ince these are found o be necessarilyconnected ith he nitial irect ontent,o that hemindnterpretseach succeeding ropertyo be representativefthesameobject.It canreadily e seen howthis nterpretiveerceptions the nitialmethodological asis of Descartes's doctrineof substanceandessence.

6. Thusfarwehave beendiscussingheclearnessnd distinctnessof deassimplyn terms fthecharacteristicshich he deasthem-selvesmustpossess.But we must nowturnto considerust howthesecharacteristicsf deas are tobe ascertained,.e.what s that"method" fwhich escartes poke oGassendi,wherebyhatwhichis really learand distinct an be distinguishedrom hat which sonlythought o be so. In termsofthepreceding iscussion,hisquestionhas a specialurgency. or onthe onehand,Descarteshassaid thatthings an be known nlythroughhe deas ofthem;onthe otherhand,in callingsense perceptions,r the idea of cor-poreality, bscure nd confusedwhentheyare viewed as repre-senting, espectively,he essenceofmaterial hings, nd God,heseems ohaveassumed hat hemindhas some ndependentnsight,apartfromdeaspurportingorepresenthem,nto he real"essenceofthings. hequestion fhowtheclearness nd distinctnessf deasaretobe ascertaineds thus asically he ame s thequestion fhowthe mind,withinthe methodologicalontextof ideas and per-ceptive cts, can ascertain hat its definitionsfobjects,whichtemploys s a basis for valuating he clearness nd distinctnessftheequatingof direct nd interpretiveontents,re real and notmerely ominal rarbitrary.hisproblem,tmustbe emphasized,is differentrom he ultimatemetaphysicaluestionof whetherclear nddistinctdeasare true.The divine uaranteenters nly ogivefinal anction o thedecisions lready rrived t bymethodo-logicalmeans.

Thesemeans re setforthn theRules nd n the econd art f heDiscourse.twillbe recalled hat ntelling assendi fhis"method,"Descartesemphasizedfirst he removalof "prejudices."Now aprejudices a judgmentmadeprior o clearand distinct erceptionofthecontentwhich s judged.zDoes thismean thatclearnessnddistinctness ustbe employed o attaintheseveryqualities?TheI Cf. IIae Resp., Def. II, VII, i6I, and especially IVae Resp., VII, 222,where Descartes showsthat substance s that which s interpretedo be thesubjectofdirectly erceived deas. 2 Cf. Princ. I, 47.

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PHILOSOPHYanswer s givenby thedistinctionetween heperceptivect andthe dea orcontent erceived. or t s possible hatdirect ndinter-pretive ontents e "equal" ornecessarilyonnected, hile hefullperceptionfthegrounds or hisbe lacking. his wouldbe thecaseifthe deawerenot"open" to themind, .e. if tselementsndtherelations etween hemwerenotrevealed o the extent equired ojustify,rtopermit he deduction f, hisnecessaryonnection.nthisperceptual,s againsttheprecedingogical, ense,an idea isobscure nd confused ot becauseof an actualinequality etweenitsdirect nd interpretiveontents,ut "onlybecause here s con-tained n it something hich s unknown."' ndeed, t is from hislatterobscuritynd confusionhat deas become ontradictory,.e.confusednthe ogical ense.2 o make n idea "open"to themind,to render nownts elementsnd to see howthenecessaryonnec-tion of its direct nd interpretiveontents ollows rom hem, sthus hepurpose fDescartes's asicmethodologicalreceptwhereby"we reducenvolvednd obscure ropositionstepbystep osimplerones,"untilwecometo an "intuitionf thesimplest nesofall."3Theultimateonceptual lementsf deasare calledbyDescartes"simplenatures."They nclude,n the sideofmaterial hings,uchconcepts s "figure," extension," motion," nd on the side ofmentalphenomena,cognition,"doubt,""ignorance,"volition."Unlike ompositedeas, nwhich t is possible o discriminateromone anothernot onlydirectand interpretiveontents, ut alsovariouspartsof the directcontent, he necessity f whosecon-nectionwithoneanothern the dea is notself-evident,hesimplenatures annot emisinterpreted,or t is impossibleodiscriminatein thema direct nd an interpretiveontent.To thinkof thesesimples t all is to think fthemcompletely,nd henceclearly;similarly,heirverysimplicitymakesit difficultor the mindtoconfuse hemwith, .e. interprethemas, anythingother"thanthemselves,o thatthey reperceived istinctlys well.4 inceallcompositedeas involvethesesimples, t follows hatto attain aclear and distinct erception f any compositedea requires hereduction fthe idea to theseself-evidentlements nd then theperception f the precise way in whichtheyare combined n anecessary exus oformhe dea originallynquestion.I Ilae Resp., VII, I47. 2 Ibid., I52.3 Reg. V, X, 379. The de omnibusdubitandum f the First Meditation sjust sucha systematic eduction f deas received from he sensesorthroughthesenses,"to the thoughtswhichare their lements.4 Reg. XII, X, 4I8-420, 422. The further refinements which Descartesmakeson thisdoctrineof the simpleor primitive notions" (Princ. I, 47 if.,and toElizabeth, 1 May I643; III, 663), since theyinvolveessentiallythesameprinciple s thediscussion ftheRegulae, lthough na broadercontext,are herepassed over.30



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CLEARNESS AND DISTINCTNESS IN DESCARTESThis reduction oesnot,ofcourse, esult n an "adequate" idea.Forinorder o be clearanddistinct,he dea must n its direct on-

tentrepresent nlythe "formalnature" of the objectwhich t isinterpreteds representing,utnot theobjector "matter" tself-the dea of nfinity,or xample,mustnot tself e infinite,ust astheidea ofobscurity eed notbe obscure--sothat thereductionwillattainnotthe totalsystem f mplicationsnwhich n idea isinvolved, utthose lementswhich re "sufficient"zo establishorrefute)henecessaryonnectionfthe dea'sdirect ndinterpretivecontents. he various relations rproportions"n which hepro-positionwas initiallynvolvedwill hencehave been so "reduced"thattheequalitybetween ts direct nd interpretiveontentswillitself be "clearlyseen."3 The reduction ttains this perceptualclearness nd distinctnessecause t enables themind,within hemethodologicalontext f deas andperceptivects,to "distinguishthat whichpertains o the trueand immutablessenceof a thing,from hatwhich s attributedo it onlythrough fiction f theunderstanding."The contents fa fictitiousdea, suchas thatofa wingedhorseorof a trianglenscribedn a square, an be clearly nd distinctlyconceived n separation rom ne another,.e. even if one partbeexplicitly eniedof the other, ach can still be fully onceivedwithoutn any waycontradictinghesignificancehich t presentstothemind.An deawillbe representativefa true nd immutablenature, hen, f the connection f its contents s necessary, otcontingent,o thattheycannotbe sundered y way of a "real"distinction:although necan think f theone without aying nyattentiono theother, ne cannot,however, eny t ofthat otherwhenonethinks f both."5 Those deas which o not contain rueand immutable atures,but onlyfictitiousnes compounded ytheunderstanding,anbe dividedbythat sameunderstandingotonlyby abstraction,ut bya clear nd distinctperation,o thatthosewhich heunderstandingannot husdividehaveundoubtedlynotbeencompounded y itself."6f, then, hemind finds hat tcannotdenythepartsof deas ofone another nd stillbe truetothemeaningwhich achpartdirectlyresentedo it,such deas arerepresentativefobjectswhich re essential aturesndependentfthe mind or heir eingwhatthey re.The direct ontents f theseideasareseen, s a result fthis method fdifference,"orepresenttheessence, r at leastpartoftheessence, ftheobjectswhich hey

I ae, IIae, Resp.,VII, II3, I47-8.2 Cf. IIae, IVae Resp., VII, I40, 152, 221.3 Reg. XIV, X, 440. 4 Iae Resp., VII, II6.s To Gibieuf, I9 Jan. I642; III, 474. Cf. VIae Resp. VII, 443.6 lae Resp., VII, I17.3I



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PHILOSOPHYare interpreteds representing,o that thedirect nd interpretivecontentsreequal tooneanother.It willhave beennoted,however,hat the criterionf"immuta-bility" tated nthesecond uotation iven bovewas the nabilityof ideas to be divided"by a clear and distinct peration,"whichDescartes oeson tospecifysmeaningrightly nderstandinghatI say." Hereagain, s previouslyn the discussionf thediscardingof"prejudices," helogical enseofclearness nd distinctness,scharacteristicsf deas, s statedtobe ascertained yclearnessnddistinctnesss characteristicsftheperceptivectwhich, esultingfrom he reductive rocess,findsnecessity f connectionwithinthe deas.Anexcellentxample f thisprocesss thefamous pera-tionuponthewax in theSecondMeditation.t is required o ascer-tain theessential ature fmatter.A direct ontentwhich s inter-pretedto be representativef matter s chosen, onsistingn thevarious ensequalitieswhich hewax nitiallyresented.henthesequalities reput through series freductionso seewhetherheyand the nterpretiveontent so dependupononeanother,hatonecan in no way be changedwhiletheotherremainsunchanged."'It is found hatthe sensequalities re changed, lthoughhe waxstill "remainsthe same." Hence, those qualitiesare essentially"other"thanthewax,and the nterpretiveerceptionf them srepresentingheessence fthewax was notdistinct. his"identity"of thewax throughouthechangingf thedirect ontent,which sgreatly mphasized y Descartes,2an be understoodnlythroughthe interpretivespectofhis doctrine f ideas. It is because theinterpretiveerceptions heldconstant hatthe reductive rocesscan be viewed, n themethodologicalontext, s goingfromcci-dentalto essential ttributesfthe sameobject, nd not from neset of ideas to another et whollyunrelated hereto. he processconsists, hen, n gradually ivestinghe direct ontentnterpretedas representing certainobject of the "forms xternal"to thatobject, .e. ofthosequalitieswithwhosedenial theobjectcan stillbe conceived,o thatthere s no necessaryonnectionetween heobjectand thosequalities.The end of theprocess omes whenadirectcontent s attainedwhich urvives veryreductive evice,remainingo long as the object can be conceived, nd withoutwhich heobjectcan no longer e conceived. hisdirect ontentshencenecessarilyonnectedwiththeinterpretiveontentwherebythe mindthinksof the object in question, nd constitutes he

I Reg. XII, X, 429.2 "Remanetadhuceademcera?Remanerefatendum st; nemonegat,nemoaliter putat. Quid erat igitur n ea quod distincte omprehendebatur? ertenihileorumquae sensibusattingebam;nam. . mutata jam sunt: remanetcera." Med. II, VII, 30. Cf. Princ. II, 4.32



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CLEARNESS AND DISTINCTNESS IN DESCARTESessentialdefinitionf that object.And onlyin virtueof such areductive rocess s the resultant erceptivect clear as attainingtheessence ftheobject, n that hedirect ontentwhichs actuallyrepresentativef theessenceof the objectwhich t is interpretedas representingas been made"present nd opento theattendingmind")and distinctas excludingverythingother han" what sessential). hewax s thus scertainedo consist ssentiallyfexten-sionand mobility, otofany peculiar olours, ounds, nd tastes;hence, t theconclusionfthereductive rocesswherebyhesensequalities re removed, escarteswrites hat theperceptionf thewax "can be either mperfectnd confused,s it was before, rclear and distinct,s itnow s,in so far s I attend essormore othethings fwhich tconsists."IThe physicalmanipulation hich heprocedure f thewax in-volves s themostgraphic utnottheonly ormwhich hereductiveoperationeading o thisperceptual learnessnd distinctness aytake.The culminationf theprocess, escartespoints ut,consistsinan "inspectionfthemind lone."Thesameoperationnprincipleoccurswhen nfiniteerfections found obe essential oGod: ulti-matelyt is the mpossibilityhich he mind indsnconceivinghelatterwithout he former hat methodologicallyhowsthe ideaequating hem o be a realdefinition,epresentativef a "true ndimmutable ature."2 hese essentialdefinitionsonsist, f course,not n genus nd differentiaut in various ombinationsfsimplenatures. Onceattained, hey anthenbe usedtotesttheclearness

Med. II, VII.Med. V,VII, 67,11. 1-4. It is becauseDescartesholdsthathehas shownin thisway that the idea of God as an infinitelyerfectbeingrepresentstrue or real essence,and is notmerely nominaldefinition,hat he maintainsthat his ontologicalargument,unlike that of St. Anselm as reportedbyThomas Aquinas, is neitherverbal norfallacious.Cf. ae Resp., VII, II5-I9.To Mersenne, I5 June I64I; III, 383.3 Definitions y genusand differentia,s viewed in the Aristotelian radi-tion,presuppose essentiallydifferent inds of things, o that to defineanygivenspecies requiresshowingthe genus to whichthe species belongs,andthen the formwhichdifferentiatest from ther peciesofthegenusand con-stitutes twhat it is. Such definitionsre hencebasically additive: thediffer-entia adds a characteristicwhich s essentially ther than that of any otherspecies.The Cartesiandefinitiony simplenatures, n theotherhand,adds no"new" characteristic, ut consists n a differentrrangement r "mixture"of the same basic elementspossessedby all otherthings;such definitionsrehence "mechanistic" (cf.the example of a right riangleto exhibitwhat ismeantby "species," Princ. I, 59). The onlypoint at whichthe Aristoteliandifferentia ould enter nto the Cartesian scheme s in the initialseparationofthe "material" from he"intellectual"natures.There s,however, certainanalogybetweenthe twomethods; ust as forAristotle fthe definition faspeciesstates thegenusalone it has not differentiatedhe speciesin questionfromotherspecies, i.e. the definitions not "distinct," but if it states the

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PHILOSOPHYand distinctnessf all other deas which re nterpretedo be repre-sentative ftheobjectsdefined.t is thusthatthe dolaters' ideaof God," wherethe direct ontent ncludes vindictiveness"nd"corporeality,"s shownto be confused; orboth thesequalitiesimplymperfection,he formerecause t is a tendencywayfromgoodness,ndhence owardnon-being,he atter ecausewhateveris corporeals divisible, nd "it is a greater erfectionot to bedivided hanto be divided," o that"ifyoumean by God') onlywhat s mostperfectn thenature fbody, his s notGod."I Theprocedures nowdeductive, nd consists n "comparison" f theessential efinition ithotherdeas,throughs many ntermediatestepsas arenecessary.2t is in this ensethatDescartesmentionedtoGassendi, s thesecondpartofhis method fascertaininghatis reallyperceived learlynd distinctly,fter he removalof pre-judicesby theprocessofreduction,hat he "enumerated ll theprincipaldeas anddistinguishedhosewhichwere learfrom hosewhichwereobscure rconfused"; .e. he set forthwhich deascon-stitutedherealdefinitionsfGod,themind,material bjects, ndwhichnot, o thatdeductive omparisonouldthen scertainwhatfurtherdeas nterpreteds representativefthese bjectswouldbeclear nddistinct.The discovery fwhat ideas representheessencesof thingssthuseffectedyoperationsnternalo ideas andperceptivects. Itis precisely ecause deas are viewedby Descartes s beingrepre-sentative fthingswhich re notthemselveserceived irectly,hatclearness nd distinctness,haracteristicsmergingwithintheseoperations, re not in their mmediatenaturethe same as thetranscendentalelationf onformityetweendeasandthings hichDescartes alls"truth,"sothat hemethodologicalrientation ustbe supplementedy a metaphysicalne culminatingn thedivineguarantee. hisaddition,whichaterrationalists,ikeSpinoza,wereto find uperfluous,ndicatesfrom he side of things he circum-spectionwhich imilarlyontrols escartes's nternal pproach oclearness nd distinctnesshemselves.t is by subjectinghemindto the coercivenessxercisedby the internalmeanings f ideas,rather hanby subjectinghose deas to thewhims fa dogmaticmind, hatthesequalities re ascertained. hat this s Descartes'srealemphasis as beenoverlookedythe traditionalnterpretationdifferentiat also includesthegenus cf.Met.VII I2, Io37b, 29 ff.);so forDes-cartes if a definitorydea contains that mixtureof simple natureswhichrepresentshe "formalnature" of ts object,but other ngredients otneces-sarily connectedtherewith, he idea is clear but not distinct,but if it isdistinct t is also clear (cf.Princ.I, 46).IlIae Resp.,VII, 138. Cf. Med. V,VII, 67-8. Conversation,, I6I.2 Cf.Reg.XIV, X, 439.3 To Mersenne,6 Oct. 1639; II, 597.34



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CLEARNESS AND DISTINCTNESS IN DESCARTESofhismethod ecauseof theopposition,nsisted pon n that nter-pretation,etweenherationalisticnd theexperimentalpproachesto science.Yet boththeformulae hemselvesfclearness nd dis-tinctness nd Descartes's actual application f them show thatthese qualities pertain s muchto the experimentalmethods fagreementnddifferencehichhe employednhisphysical pera-tions s to theoperations ealingwith he "intellectual" aturesnwhich ense xperiencelaysnopart.The purposeofphysical cienceforDescartes s to explainthephenomenafmaterial ature ya deductiveystem f deaswhoseprinciplesre thesimple oncepts fextension,igure,ndmotion,which epresentheessence fall bodies.The clearnessnddistinct-nessofthe deasorpropositionsfphysicswillrequire ecessityfconnection,hen,not onlywithin hedeductive ystemtselfbutalso between ach explanatoryropositionnd theclass ofpheno-menawhich t is designed o explain:thephenomena,reffects,rdirectcontents, nd the explanations, r causes, or interpretivecontents, illsimilarly ave to be "proved o to dependupononeanother hat the one can in no way be changedwhilethe otherremains nchanged." heascertainmentfthismutualdependence,in turn, nvolvesrecourse o "crucial"experiments herebyt isdetermined hichofvariouspossibleexplanations,ach a certain"composition"r"mixture" fthematerial imple aturesogicallycompatiblewiththe priorpropositionsf the system, s in factnecessarilyonnectedwiththephenomenonn question: in orderto be able to ascertainwhich f thesecauses is the trueone, t isnecessaryo considerxperimentshich annot greebothwith heone and withtheother";' or, n another tatement,to seek outsomeexperimentshichwillbe suchthattheir utcomewillnotbethe ame f t s in oneof heseways hat he ffectsto beexplained,as if t is in another."2 clearand distinctdea in physics, hen,especiallywhendetailedproblems re beingdealt with,mustbean experimentallyerifieddea: a proposition urportingo beexplanatoryfa given henomenon ustbe "equal" to thatpheno-menonndnot other" han t,butthe scertainmentf his equiresrecourse o experiment,ecause sciencemust be of the actuallyexistingworld,whoseobjects, s existing,he sensesalonerevealdeterminatelyo themind,whereas hepureunderstandingouldbe unableto differentiatehichof its ideas representedctuallyexistingmaterial hings nd which nlypossibleones.Nor is thisappeal to phenomenand experiment departure rom heintra-ideational rientationfDescartes'smethod. orthephenomena,sdealtwith nthemethod,rethemselvesideas" directly erceivedthroughhesenses, ndrepresentative,lthoughonfusedly,ftheDescription u CorpsHumain,XVIII, XI, 242. 2 Disc. VI, VI, 65.

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PHILOSOPHYexistingmaterial hingswhich he scientificdeas representlearlyand distinctly. scientificdea, then,findsts place as clearanddistinctwithin hesystem fphysicsn virtue fa triplenecessaryconnection:I) withthebasic principlesfextension,motion,ndfigure hich,s the xample f hewaxshowed, epresenthe ssenceofmaterial hings; 2) with he deasprecedingt in thedeductivesystem; nd (3)with heparticularhenomenahysicallyausedbyand hencerepresentativef theparticularmaterial xistentswhichareto be explained.'Thebasicemphasis f the method f clearnessnd distinctnesssthus upon the testing nd confirmationf scientificdeas: theprinciple is that "for rightphilosophizing. . . the greatest caremustbe takennotto admit nythings truewhichwecannot roveto be true."2And thefactor etermininghichdeas arerepresenta-tiveoftheessences f various bjects, nd hence learanddistinct,consists n that whichthe ideas themselves ompelthemindtoperceive fter t has reduced hemto their lements nd triedtoseparateand combine hem n variousways.There s, indeed,apsychologicalspectofthemethod lso, as is shown, or xample,in Descartes'sdescriptionf intuition s "a pure and attentivemind'sconception,o facileand distinct hat there remainsnodoubtconcerninghat whichwe understand."3ut thisfacilityndindubitablenessreregardedyhim s effectsather han as causesofclearness nddistinctnessn the ogical ndperceptualenses, sculminatingheprocesswherebyhemindrecognizeshecontentsof deas to be of such sort hat t is unabletoperceive hemnanywayother hantheconnection eforet. It is in this ense,not nanarrowly sychologicalne, that Descartes can say, as Burmanreports,hat "whether r notperceptionsre clearwe shall knowbestfrom ur ownconsciousness,nd for his t is ofthegreatesthelpto know ll those elucidationsfthingswhich he author etforthn the first ookof thePrinciples."4hemethod fclearnessand distinctnesss Descartesdevelops t henceexhibits o merelypsychologicalrsubjectiveriteria,ut ratherogical ndperceptualoneswhich hemind s to use in order o ascertain heconformityof tsthought ith world xternaloit.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

I Cf. Iae Resp.,VII, 135. 2 Vae Resp.,VII, 354.3 Reg. III, X, 368. 4 Conversation,, I60. Cf.Princ. I, 47 ff.

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Clear and Distinct

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