Real Evidence for the Trial Practitioner

Presented by:

Peter J. Moschetti Jr.

Brian H. BreedlovePennock, Breedlove & Noll, LLP

Mark J. McCarthyHarris Beach PLLC

John T. Wilkins

phone : 866-466-2253 · web : www.nacle.com · email : info@nacle.com

Real Evidence for the Trial Practitioner

Prepared by:

Peter J. Moschetti Jr.

Brian H. BreedlovePennock, Breedlove & Noll, LLP

Mark J. McCarthyHarris Beach PLLC

John T. Wilkins

© 2007 Lorman Education Services. All Rights Reserved.

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Latham, NY • March 7, 2007

REAL EVIDENCE FOR THE TRIAL PRACTITIONER

I. ETHICS AND EVIDENCE ..................................................................................................................... 3

II. MOTIONS IN LIMINE .........................................................................................................................27 A. History Of Use .............................................................................................................................27 B. State Court ...................................................................................................................................30 C. Federal Court ...............................................................................................................................31

III. FOUNDATIONS ...................................................................................................................................37

IV. SCIENTIFIC AND EXPERT EVIDENCE IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS ..........................47

PRACTICAL HEARSAY

I. WHAT IS HEARSAY .............................................................................................................................57

II. EXCEPTIONS TO THE HEARSAY RULE ..........................................................................................59

III. STRATEGIES FOR ADDRESSING HEARSAY PROOF .............................................................. 113

PRACTICAL COURTROOM EVIDENCE DIRECT/CROSS-EXAMINATION

I. PROPER FORM OF QUESTIONS ................................................................................................. 119

II. DOCUMENTARY AND DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE ........................................................... 121

III. SCOPE OF CROSS-EXAMINATION ............................................................................................. 123

IV. CROSS-EXAMINATION ON COLLATERAL MATTERS ............................................................ 124 V. IMPEACHMENT OF A NON-EXPERT WITNESS ....................................................................... 124

TABLE OF CONTENTS i

PENNOCK, BREEDLOVE & NOLL, LLPATTORNEYS AT LAW

1407 RT. 9, Nine North

Building 4, 2nd FloorClifton Park, New York 12065

John H. Pennock, Jr. Tel (518) 383-9400Brian H. Breedlove Fax (518) 383-1959Carrie McLoughlin NollTracy M. LarocqueSara E. Paupini

ETHICS AND EVIDENCE

Respectfully submitted

BRIAN H. BREEDLOVE, ESQ.

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ETHICS AND EVIDENCE

1. Ethical responsibilities regarding evidence collection and presentation duringthe course of litigation starts with your retainer.

2. Your clients must be educated to your ethical obligations re: their case. Mostclients’ think we are all accomplished cheats, liars and master manipulators of evidence,all to the good. Some want to hire us for that very reason. You must cure thismisconception from the outset by explaining with great care:

a. Their view of how to proceed vs. yours;

b. their view of important facts vs. yours;

c. the importance of the truth throughout the litigation;

d. their position to the extent that you can understand it at the firstmeeting in order to give proper advice; (litigation is not always the answer)

e. advise that they will testify and what your responsibility is if youbecome aware that they have not been truthful;

f. advise as to what to expect in discovery and the need to beforthcoming; (no shredding)

g. advise that you must act in a professional manner at all times with thecourt and adversary;

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QUERY: What do you do if you know your client, in an ancillaryproceeding, lied under oath. You represented her before proceeding butshe knew you would not go along with perjury so she proceeded on herown and was successful; she now comes to you with regard to litigation onsame issues?

QUERY: What do you do if your client gets on the stand in the middle of aproceeding and he/she tells a completely different story than he/she hastold you?

Section 1200.32 [DR 7-101] Representing a client zealously.

(a) A lawyer shall not intentionally:

(1) Fail to seek the lawful objectives of the client through reasonably available meanspermitted by law and the disciplinary rules, except as provided by subdivision (b) of thissection. A lawyer does not violate this disciplinary rule, however, by acceding toreasonable requests of opposing counsel which do not prejudice the rights of theclient, by being punctual in fulfilling all professional commitments, by avoidingoffensive tactics, or by treating with courtesy and consideration all personsinvolved in the legal process……..

(b) In the representation of a client, a lawyer may:

(1) Where permissible, exercise professional judgment to waive or fail to asserta right or position of the client.

(2) Refuse to aid or participate in conduct that the lawyer believes to beunlawful, even though there is some support for an argument that the conduct islegal.

Section 1200.33 [DR 7-102] Representing a client within the bounds of the law.

(a) In the representation of a client, a lawyer shall not:

(1) File a suit, assert a position, conduct a defense, delay a trial, or take otheraction on behalf of the client when the lawyer knows or when it is obvious thatsuch action would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another.

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(2) Knowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existinglaw, except that the lawyer may advance such claim or defense if it can besupported by good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal ofexisting law.

(3) Conceal or knowingly fail to disclose that which the lawyer is required bylaw to reveal.

(4) Knowingly use perjured testimony or false evidence.

(5) Knowingly make a false statement of law or fact.

(6) Participate in the creation or preservation of evidence when the lawyerknows or it is obvious that the evidence is false.

(7) Counsel or assist the client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal orfraudulent.

(8) Knowingly engage in other illegal conduct or conduct contrary to adisciplinary rule.

(b) A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that:

(1) The client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upona person or tribunal shall promptly call upon the client to rectify the same, and ifthe client refuses or is unable to do so, the lawyer shall reveal the fraud to theaffected person or tribunal, except when the information is protected as aconfidence or secret.

(2) A person other than the client has perpetrated a fraud upon a tribunal shallpromptly reveal the fraud to the tribunal.

In re Truong (1 Dept. 2003) 768 N.Y.S.2d 450 Attorney's conduct of proffering aforged document as evidence and offering false testimony in support of the document,….. constituted violations of Rules of Professional Conduct prohibiting conduct involvingdishonesty, conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, harassment, advancingan unwarranted claim, and using false evidence.

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In re Capoccia (3 Dept. 2000) 709 N.Y.S.2d 640, 272 A.D.2d 838, leave to appealdismissed 738 N.E.2d 782, 715 N.Y.S.2d 378, 95 N.Y.2d 887 Attorney's repeatedsanctionable conduct of asserting defenses and counterclaims without making good-faith inquiry into their applicability to any given case as part of an intentional strategy todelay litigation and to harass his opponents in order to extract settlements in routineconsumer collection cases violated disciplinary rules barring conduct prejudicial to theadministration of justice, conduct adversely reflecting on fitness to practice law,harassing conduct, conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation,and knowingly advancing unwarranted claims or defenses.

People v. DePallo 96 N.Y.2d 437, 754 N.E.2d 751, 729 N.Y.S.2d 649, 2001 Court ofAppeals Defendant was not deprived of his right to effective assistance of counsel whenhis attorney disclosed to the trial court that defendant intended to commit perjury duringhis trial testimony. An attorney who receives information that a client has perpetrated afraud upon a tribunal must ask the client to rectify the same, and if the client refuses todo so, the lawyer shall reveal the fraud to the tribunal, except when the information isprotected as a confidence or secret (DR 7-102 [b] [1] [22 NYCRR 1200.33 (b) (1)]).Here, defense counsel first sought to dissuade defendant from testifying falsely, andindeed from testifying at all. When defendant insisted on perjuring himself, counselproperly notified the court. Counsel did not reveal the substance of any clientconfidence, as the intent to commit a crime is not a protected confidence, anddefendant had already admitted at a pre-trial hearing that he had forced one of hisaccomplices to participate in the crime under threat of death. Nor should counsel havesought to withdraw from the case, for to do so would have done little to resolve theproblem and might have facilitated any fraud defendant wished to perpetrate upon thecourt. Counsel's actions properly balanced the duties he owed to his client and to thecourt and criminal justice system.

Defendant's right to be present during a material stage of his trial was not violated byhis absence from the ex parte conference between the trial court and defense counselto place on the record matters which had already occurred regarding defendant'sperjury and defense counsel's response.

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People v. Berroa, 287 A.D.2d 88, 733 N.Y.S.2d 52, (2001 First Department)Defendant, who was convicted of murder in the second degree, was not deprived ofeffective assistance of counsel where defense counsel stipulated in open court that twodefense witnesses had not told her prior to their alibi testimony at trial that defendanthad been elsewhere at the time of the shooting. After the stipulation was read to thejury, defense counsel indicated that the pivot point of the case was misidentification,and that the jury was free to "look at," or "disregard" the alibi testimony. Under thesecircumstances, defendant has failed to demonstrate the absence of strategic or otherlegitimate explanations for defense counsel's conduct. Defense counsel's motivationin agreeing to the stipulation was not the result of a desire to protect herreputation, but was the result of her obligation to comply with ethical standardsrequiring an attorney to prevent and disclose frauds upon the court (see, Code ofProfessional Responsibility DR 1-102 [a] [4], [5]; DR 7- 102 [a] [3], [6] [22 NYCRR1200.3 (a) (4), (5); 1200.33 (a) (3), (6)]). Moreover, there was no violation of theadvocate-witness rule (see, DR 5-102 [b] [22 NYCRR 1200.21 (b)]) that wouldsupport a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. A defense attorney's stipulation, oreven testimony, to facts facially adverse to the client does not ipso facto constituteineffective assistance of counsel or a violation of the advocate-witness rule. Thedeterminative consideration is whether counsel's decision to stipulate to certain factscould be viewed as part of a legitimate defense strategy that a "reasonably competentattorney" might have pursued under similar circumstances. The record indicates thatdefense counsel's decision to stipulate was a legitimate tactic designed to minimize thepotential damage to defendant's case, and may have been the preferred method to dealwith the witnesses' perjury under the circumstances. Finally, defendant failed todemonstrate that he suffered any prejudice in view of the overwhelming evidenceagainst him.

Section 1200.37 [DR 7-106] Trial conduct.

(a) A lawyer shall not disregard or advise the client to disregard a standing ruleof a tribunal or a ruling of a tribunal made in the course of a proceeding, but thelawyer may take appropriate steps in good faith to test the validity of such rule orruling.

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(b) In presenting a matter to a tribunal, a lawyer shall disclose:

(1) Controlling legal authority known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to theposition of the client and which is not disclosed by opposing counsel.

(2) Unless privileged or irrelevant, the identities of the clients the lawyerrepresents and of the persons who employed the lawyer.

(c) In appearing as a lawyer before a tribunal, a lawyer shall not:

(1) State or allude to any matter that he or she has no reasonable basis tobelieve is relevant to the case or that will not be supported by admissibleevidence.

(2) Ask any question that he or she has no reasonable basis to believe isrelevant to the case and that is intended to degrade a witness or other person.

(3) Assert personal knowledge of the facts in issue, except when testifying as awitness.

(4) Assert a personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, as to the credibilityof a witness, as to the culpability of a civil litigant, or as to the guilt or innocenceof an accused; but the lawyer may argue, upon analysis of the evidence, for anyposition or conclusion with respect to the matters stated herein.

(5) Fail to comply with known local customs of courtesy or practice of the bar ora particular tribunal without giving to opposing counsel timely notice of the intentnot to comply.

(6) Engage in undignified or discourteous conduct which is degrading to atribunal.

(7) Intentionally or habitually violate any established rule of procedure or ofevidence.

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See: People v Levandowski, 2004 WL 1405922 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept.), 2004 N.Y. SlipOp. 05494 Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York. Formultiple violations of these trial rules by a prosecutor. Special rules pertain to publicprosecutors as well, set forth below.

Section 1200.34 [DR 7-103] Performing the duty of public prosecutor or othergovernment lawyer.

(a) A public prosecutor or other government lawyer shall not institute or cause to beinstituted criminal charges when he or she knows or it is obvious that the charges arenot supported by probable cause.

(b) A public prosecutor or other government lawyer in criminal litigation shall maketimely disclosure to counsel for the defendant, or to a defendant who has no counsel, ofthe existence of evidence, known to the prosecutor or other government lawyer, thattends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the degree of the offense or reducethe punishment.

3. Witness contacts. Extreme care must be taken in assembling evidencewhether by witness statement or contact or in assembling documents or things forpresentation in court.

a. Beware the advocate witness rule;

1. scene visit immediately after an accident and participation incollecting evidence and/or measurements might not be wise if youintend to litigate the case:

2. taking a witness statement is ripe with hazard. You might needa witness to the statement in the event of a recantation or claim ofoverreaching or fraud etc. Get an investigator; stay away from thewitness until trial or deposition; make sure the statement is inwriting, recorded is best and video even better;

3. contacting your advesaries clients and/or employees.

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4. intimidation of a witness.

Section 1200.36 [DR 7-105] Threatening criminal prosecution.

(a) A lawyer shall not present, participate in presenting, or threaten to presentcriminal charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter.

Section 1200.35 [DR 7-104] Communicating with represented and unrepresentedparties.

(a) During the course of the representation of a client a lawyer shall not:

(1) Communicate or cause another to communicate on the subject of therepresentation with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by a lawyer in thatmatter unless the lawyer has the prior consent of the lawyer representing suchother party or is authorized by law to do so.

(2) Give advice to a party who is not represented by a lawyer, other than theadvice to secure counsel, if the interests of such party are or have a reasonablepossibility of being in conflict with the interests of the lawyer's client.

(b) Notwithstanding the prohibitions of subdivision (a) of this section, andunless prohibited by law, a lawyer may cause a client to communicate with arepresented party, if that party is legally competent, and counsel the client withrespect to those communications, provided the lawyer gives reasonable advancenotice to the represented party's counsel that such communications will betaking place.

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QUERY: CAN A LAWYER ADVISE A CLIENT TO CONTACT AND DISCUSSRELEVANT ISSUES IN EMPLOYMENT LAW CONTEXT DURING LITIGATIONWHEN SPECIFICALLY PROHIBITED BY ADVERSARY LAWYER? SEE SECTIONa1 vs section b; does b completely abrogate consent of employees lawyer to thepoint wherein employees lawyer objects to any such contact and contact madeanyway in light of section b. Add in factor that employee will be terminated ifemployee does not contact and “cooperate”; now add in further factor that anyenforced contact with employee by discriminator or harasser is forbidden by caselaw in such cases and in itself could be retaliatory; can evidence assembled inmeetings be used in ongoing title 7 suit;

In re Chan, 2003, 271 F.Supp.2d 539, Disciplinary rule barring lawyer fromcommunicating with represented party without consent of party's lawyer applies tocriminal as well as civil actions.

Gidatex, S.r.L. v. Campaniello Imports, Ltd., 1999, 82 F.Supp.2d 119, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d1008 Furniture manufacturer's counsel did not violate New York rule againstcommunicating with represented parties by having private investigators secretly tapeconversations with terminated distributor's salespeople, in effort to gain evidence intrademark infringement suit; investigators did not intrude upon distributor's attorney-client privilege or attempt to use superior legal knowledge to take advantage ofsalespeople.

McHugh ex rel. Kurtz v. Fitzgerald 719 N.Y.S.2d 785, 280 A.D.2d 771(3 Dept. 2001)Law firm did not violate rule prohibiting lawyers from communicating directly withadverse parties who are represented by counsel when it obtained affidavit from dogowner in dog bite case before her insurer had retained counsel to represent her, eventhough litigation had already commenced.

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Commencement of litigation is not criteria for determining whether communication withadverse party is in derogation of rule precluding lawyers from having directcommunication with adverse parties who are represented by counsel; lawyer can act inviolation of rule even where litigation has not yet commenced. McHugh, supra

Nassau Health Care Corp. v. New York State Ethics Com'n, 2003, 764 N.Y.S.2d795, 196 Misc.2d 867 State Ethics Commission's determination to bar corporatecounsel representing operator of medical center from its interviews with operator's stateemployees during investigation of employees' alleged ethical wrongdoing was notarbitrary and capricious, where operator and its high-level employees were not "parties"for purposes of disciplinary rule prohibiting attorney from communicating directly withadverse parties known to have counsel, and presence of corporate counsel would havehad chilling effect on candor of employees.

In re Harris 694 N.Y.S.2d 678, 259 A.D.2d 170 (2 Dept. 1999) Attorney'scommunications with parties whom he knew to be represented by attorney aboutsubject matter of their representation violated applicable professional responsibilityrules.

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4. Witness preparation.

a. whether client or non-party start and end your discussions with “ TELLTHE TRUTH”.

b. I always tell witnesses to tell the truth and do not worry about theconsequences; it is my job to make the true facts fit properly into acoherent theme in the case.

c. you can discuss testimony and how to present it; even words to use;

d. you can advise to answer only question asked on cross examination,nothing more and nothing less;

e. you must not intentionally mislead in the process;

YOUR CLIENT MUST UNDERSTAND THAT YOU CAN WIN WITH THETRUTH; IF YOU CAN’T THEN THE CLIENT MUST REEVALUATEHIS/HER POSITION AS TO WHAT IT MEANS TO WIN IN ANYPARTICULAR CASE;

5. Improperly obtained evidence.

a. client takes papers and documents left on deposition table or counseltable in court;

b. illegal wiretap;

c. client steals documents from employer;

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d. misuse of subpoena (issuance out of jurisdiction, without proper notice,securing private records(meds, college records, employment records etc)(see new subpoena provisions CPLR 3120 AND 2303)

N.Y. County Op. 730 (2002) A lawyer who receives inadvertently disclosed privilegedinformation must, upon recognizing its privileged nature and without further review oruse thereof, notify the sender and follow the sender's instructions regarding the return ordestruction of the material.

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STANDARDS OF CIVILITY

Preamble

The New York State Standards of Civility for the legal profession set forth principles ofbehavior to which the bar, the bench and court employees should aspire. They are notintended as rules to be enforced by sanction or disciplinary action, nor are they intendedto supplement or modify the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct, the Code ofProfessional Responsibility and its Disciplinary Rules, or any other applicable rule orrequirement governing conduct. Instead they are a set of guidelines intended toencourage lawyers, judges and court personnel to observe principles of civility anddecorum, and to confirm the legal profession’s rightful status as an honorable andrespected profession where courtesy and civility are observed as a matter of course.The Standards are divided into four parts: lawyers’ duties to other lawyers, litigants andwitnesses; lawyers’ duties to the court and court personnel; court’s duties to lawyers,parties and witnesses; and court personnel’s duties to lawyers and litigants.

As lawyers, judges and court employees, we are all essential participants in the judicialprocess. That process cannot work effectively to serve the public unless we first treateach other with courtesy, respect and civility.

LAWYERS’ DUTIES TO OTHER LAWYERS, LITIGANTS AND WITNESSES

I. Lawyers should be courteous and civil in all professional dealings with otherpersons.

A. Lawyers should act in a civil manner regardless of the ill feelings that their clientsmay have toward others.

B. Lawyers can disagree without being disagreeable. Effective representation does notrequire antagonistic or acrimonious behavior. Whether orally or in writing,lawyers shouldavoid vulgar language, disparaging personal remarks or acrimony toward other counsel,parties or witnesses.

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C. Lawyers should require that persons under their supervision conduct themselves withcourtesy and civility.

II. When consistent with their clients’ interests, lawyers should cooperate withopposing counsel in an effort to avoid litigation and to resolve litigation that hasalready commenced.

A. Lawyers should avoid unnecessary motion practice or other judicial intervention bynegotiating and agreeing with other counsel whenever it is practicable to do so.

B. Lawyers should allow themselves sufficient time to resolve any dispute ordisagreement by communicating with one another and imposing reasonable andmeaningful deadlines in light of the nature and status of the case.

III. A lawyer should respect the schedule and commitments of opposing counsel,consistent with protection of the client’s interests.

A. In the absence of a court order, a lawyer should agree to reasonable requests forextensions of time or for waiver of procedural formalities when the legitimate interests ofthe client will not be adversely affected.

B. Upon request coupled with the simple representation by counsel that more time isrequired, the first request for an extension to respond to pleadings ordinarily should begranted as a matter of courtesy.

C. A lawyer should not attach unfair or extraneous conditions to extensions of time. Alawyer is entitled to impose conditions appropriate to preserve rights that an extensionmight otherwise jeopardize, and may request, but should not unreasonably insist on,reciprocal scheduling concessions.

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D. A lawyer should endeavor to consult with other counsel regarding scheduling mattersin a good faith effort to avoid scheduling conflicts. A lawyer should likewise cooperatewith opposing counsel when scheduling changes are requested, provided the interestsof his or her client will not be jeopardized.

E. A lawyer should notify other counsel and, if appropriate, the court or otherpersons atthe earliest possible time when hearings, depositions, meetings or conferences are tobe canceled or postponed.

IV. A lawyer should promptly return telephone calls and answer correspondencereasonably requiring a response.

V. The timing and manner of service of papers should not be designed to causedisadvantage to the party receiving the papers.

A. Papers should not be served in a manner designed to take advantage of anopponent’s known absence from the office.

B. Papers should not be served at a time or in a manner designed to inconvenience anadversary.

C. Unless specifically authorized by law or rule, a lawyer should not submit papers tothe court without serving copies of all such papers upon opposing counsel in such amanner that opposing counsel will receive them before or contemporaneously with thesubmission to the court.

VI. A lawyer should not use any aspect of the litigation process, includingdiscovery and motion practice, as a means of harassment or for the purpose ofunnecessarily prolonging litigation or increasing litigation expenses.

A.A lawyer should avoid discovery that is not necessary to obtain facts or perpetuatetestimony or that is designed to place an undue burden or expense on a party.

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B. A lawyer should respond to discovery requests reasonably and not strain to interpretthe request so as to avoid disclosure of relevant and non-privileged information.

VII. In depositions and other proceedings, and in negotiations, lawyers shouldconduct themselves with dignity and refrain from engaging in acts of rudenessand disrespect.

A. Lawyers should not engage in any conduct during a deposition that would not beappropriate in the presence of a judge.

B. Lawyers should advise their clients and witnesses of the proper conduct expected ofthem in court, at depositions and at conferences, and, to the best of their ability, preventclients and witnesses from causing disorder or disruption.

C. A lawyer should not obstruct questioning during a deposition or object to depositionquestions unless necessary.

D. Lawyers should ask only those questions they reasonably believe are necessary forthe prosecution or defense of an action. Lawyers should refrain from asking repetitive orargumentative questions and from making self-serving statements.

VIII. A lawyer should adhere to all express promises and agreements with othercounsel, whether oral or in writing, and to agreements implied by thecircumstances or by local customs.

IX. Lawyers should not mislead other persons involved in the litigation process.

A. A lawyer should not falsely hold out the possibility of settlement as a means foradjourning discovery or delaying trial.

B. A lawyer should not ascribe a position to another counsel that counsel has not takenor otherwise seek to create an unjustified inference based on counsel’s statements orconduct.

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C. In preparing written versions of agreements and court orders, a lawyer shouldattempt to correctly reflect the agreement of the parties or the direction of the court.

X. Lawyers should be mindful of the need to protect the standing of the legalprofession in the eyes of the public. Accordingly, lawyers should bring the NewYork State Standards of Civility to the attention of other lawyers whenappropriate.

LAWYERS’ DUTIES TO THE COURT AND COURT PERSONNEL

I. A lawyer is both an officer of the court and an advocate. As such, the lawyershould always strive to uphold the honor and dignity of the profession, avoiddisorder and disruption in the courtroom, and maintain a respectful attitudetoward the court.

A. Lawyers should speak and write civilly and respectfully in all communications with thecourt and court personnel.

B. Lawyers should use their best efforts to dissuade clients and witnesses from causingdisorder or disruption in the courtroom.

C. Lawyers should not engage in conduct intended primarily to harass or humiliatewitnesses.

D. Lawyers should be punctual and prepared for all court appearances; if delayed, thelawyer should notify the court and counsel whenever possible.

II. Court personnel are an integral part of the justice system and should be treatedwith courtesy and respect at all times.

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JUDGES’ DUTIES TO LAWYERS, PARTIES AND WITNESSES

I. A Judge should be patient, courteous and civil to lawyers, parties andwitnesses.

A. A Judge should maintain control over the proceedings and insure that they areconducted in a civil manner.

B. Judges should not employ hostile, demeaning or humiliating words in opinions or inwritten or oral communications with lawyers, parties or witnesses

C. Judges should, to the extent consistent with the efficient conduct of litigation andother demands on the court, be considerate of the schedules of lawyers, parties andwitnesses when scheduling hearings, meetings or conferences.

D. Judges should be punctual in convening all trials, hearings, meetings andconferences; if delayed, they should notify counsel when possible.

E. Judges should make all reasonable efforts to decide promptly all matters presentedto them for decision.

F. Judges should use their best efforts to insure that court personnel under theirdirection act civilly toward lawyers, parties and witnesses.

DUTIES OF COURT PERSONNEL TO THE COURT, LAWYERS

AND LITIGANTS

I. Court personnel should be courteous, patient and respectful while providingprompt, efficient and helpful service to all persons having business with thecourts.

A. Court employees should respond promptly and helpfully to requests for assistance orinformation.

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B. Court employees should respect the judge’s directions concerning the proceduresand atmosphere that the judge wishes to maintain in his or her courtroom.

STATEMENT OF CLIENT’S RIGHTS

1. You are entitled to be treated with courtesy and consideration at all times by yourlawyer and the other lawyers and personnel in your lawyer’s office.

2. You are entitled to an attorney capable of handling your legal matter competently anddiligently, in accordance with the highest standards of the profession. If you are notsatisfied with how your matter is being handled, you have the right to withdraw from theattorney-client relationship at any time (court approval may be required in some mattersand your attorney may have a claim against you for the value of services rendered toyou up to the point of discharge).

3. You are entitled to your lawyer’s independent professional judgment and undividedloyalty uncompromised by conflicts of interest.

4. You are entitled to be charged a reasonable fee and to have your lawyer explain atthe outset how the fee will be computed and the manner and frequency of billing. Youare entitled to request and receive a written itemized bill from your attorney atreasonable intervals. You may refuse to enter into any fee arrangement that you findunsatisfactory.

5. You are entitled to have your questions and concerns addressed in a prompt mannerand to have your telephone calls returned promptly.

6. You are entitled to be kept informed as to the status of your matter and to requestand receive copies of papers. You are entitled to sufficient information to allow you toparticipate meaningfully in the development of your matter.

7. You are entitled to have your legitimate objectives respected by your attorney,including whether or not to settle your matter (court approval of a settlement is requiredin some matters).

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8. You have the right to privacy in your dealings with your lawyer and to have yoursecrets and confidences preserved to the extent permitted by law.

9. You are entitled to have your attorney conduct himself or herself ethically inaccordance with the Code of Professional Responsibility.10. You may not be refused representation on the basis of race, creed, color, religion,sex, sexual orientation, age, national origin or disability.

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McKinney's CPLR Rule 3120

1. After commencement of an action, any party may serve on any other party a notice or on any other person asubpoena duces tecum:

(i) to produce and permit the party seeking discovery, or someone acting on his or her behalf, to inspect, copy, test orphotograph any designated documents or any things which are in the possession, custody or control of the party orperson served; or

(ii) to permit entry upon designated land or other property in the possession, custody or control of the party or personserved for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, sampling, testing, photographing or recording by motionpictures or otherwise the property or any specifically designated object or operation thereon.

2. The notice or subpoena duces tecum shall specify the time, which shall be not less than twenty days after serviceof the notice or subpoena, and the place and manner of making the inspection, copy, test or photograph, or of theentry upon the land or other property and, in the case of an inspection, copying, testing or photographing, shall setforth the items to be inspected, copied, tested or photographed by individual item or by category, and shall describeeach item and category with reasonable particularity.

3. The party issuing a subpoena duces tecum as provided hereinabove shall at the same time serve a copy of thesubpoena upon all other parties and, within five days of compliance therewith, in whole or in part, give to each partynotice that the items produced in response thereto are available for inspection and copying, specifying the time andplace thereof.

4. Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to change the requirement of section 2307 that a subpoenaduces tecum to be served upon a library or a department or bureau of a municipal corporation, or of the state, or anofficer thereof, requires a motion made on notice to the library, department, bureau or officer, and the adverse party,to a justice of the supreme court or a judge of the court in which the action is triable.

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McKinney's CPLR § 2303

(a) A subpoena requiring attendance or a subpoena duces tecum shall be served in the same manner as asummons, except that where service of such a subpoena is made pursuant to subdivision two or four of section threehundred eight of this chapter, the filing of proof of service shall not be required and service shall be deemed completeupon the later of the delivering or mailing of the subpoena, if made pursuant to subdivision two of section threehundred eight of this chapter, or upon the later of the affixing or mailing of the subpoena, if made pursuant tosubdivision four of section three hundred eight of this chapter. Any person subpoenaed shall be paid or tendered inadvance authorized traveling expenses and one day's witness fee. A copy of any subpoena duces tecum servedin a pending civil judicial proceeding shall also be served, in the manner set forth in rule twenty-one hundredthree of this chapter, on each party who has appeared in the civil judicial proceeding so that it is received bysuch parties promptly after service on the witness and before the production of books, papers or otherthings.

(b) A child support subpoena issued pursuant to section one hundred eleven-p of the social services law to publicutility companies and corporations, including but not limited to cable television, gas, electric, steam, and telephonecompanies and corporations, as defined in section two of the public service law, may be served by regular mail, orthrough an automated process where information sought is maintained in an automated data base. All other childsupport subpoenas issued pursuant to section one hundred eleven-p of the social services law shall be served inaccordance with the provisions of subdivision (a) of this section.

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MOTIONS IN LIMINE

Jeffrey K. Anderson, Esq. Anderson, Moschetti & Taffany, PLLC 26 Century Hill Drive, Suite 206 Latham, New York 12110 (518) 785-4900

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A. History of Use

The motion in limine is one of the single most underutilized devices for the limiting of proof at trial, in the opinion of this practitioner. This brings us to the question, what is the motion in limine? “Limine” is derived from the latin “…at the threshold”. This is reflective of the fact that the motion is typically made in advance of trial, although not always. Its fundamental purpose is to limit the introduction of evidence on a particular issue, in whole or in part.

There are relatively few appellate cases dealing with the subject of motions in

limine. Cases appear more frequently beginning in the 1980’s and through the 1990’s, perhaps consistent with the increasing number of civil cases generally. Or, the reason may lie in the fact that they have been used all along, only generating appellate questions as to their propriety and boundaries in more recent years, with the increasing complexity of litigation (e.g., in the Frye or Daubert context involving the admissibility of scientific evidence).

Since the United States Supreme Court decided Daubert v. Merrell Dow

Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (June 28, 1993), motions in limine to prevent an adversary’s expert from testifying to a scientific opinion had been on the rise, initially in federal courts and thereafter in state courts, following the Daubert reasoning. In New York, Daubert “type” motions have been brought more frequently under the guise that the expert’s opinion fails to meet the accepted New York standard under Frye v. U.S., 293 F. 1013 (1923), on the basis that the opinion is not consistent with commonly accepted scientific principles. Examples of the variety of cases in which expert testimony has been challenged in recent years in New York include use of spinoscopy (Castrichini v. Rivera, 175 Misc. 2d 530 [Sup. Ct., Monroe Co. 1997]), validity of hypnotically-enhanced testimony (Bennett v. Saeger Hotels, Inc., 209 A.D.2d 946 [4th Dep’t. 1994]), expertise of a rape trauma specialist (Gutierrez v. Iulo, 156 Misc. 2d 79 [Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co., 1992]), as well as “garden variety” negligence actions, products liability cases, medical malpractice cases and securities litigation.

Procedurally, the motion in limine addressed to scientific evidence should be

supported by material of a “scientific nature”, having “evidentiary value”, as the court will not “undertake an independent review of scientific literature” (see Drago v. Tishman Construction Corporation of New York, 4 Misc. 3d 354 [Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co., 2004]).

The motion is a useful mechanism and provides flexibility in that it can result in

a complete preclusion of the expert’s proposed testimony and opinions, or alternatively, let the parties know that the expert will be allowed to testify fully as to his opinions; or, to establish parameters for the foundation materials he or she may base his opinions upon, or, to otherwise limit the scope of his or her testimony in some manner (see

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Hornbrook v. Peak Resorts, Inc., 194 Misc. 2d 273 [Sup. Ct., Tompkins Co., 2002]; Mariano v. Schuylerville Cen. Sch. Dist., 309 A.D. 2d 1116 [3d Dep’t. 2003]).

The motion can be made by either party and there is no limitation as to the

particular type of evidence that can be the subject of the motion. While inherently the introduction of most evidence is “prejudicial” to the adversary, the motion in limine seeks preclusion of introduction of irrelevant, extraneous, collateral or otherwise inflammatory evidence.

One of the benefits of bringing the motion is that if the trial judge rules that the

evidence, or some part of it, will be inadmissible, the trial may be shortened or simplified. Sometimes the motion is used to preclude or eliminate evidence on an issue that is generally not in dispute or limit proof to one issue, where other theories that were alleged during the pre-trial stage are not supportable by competent proof.

A major advantage of the motion, when brought sufficiently in advance of trial,

is that it affords the trial judge the opportunity to carefully consider the arguments from both sides in a deliberate and unrushed manner, thus avoiding the need for the judge to make an immediate ruling in the “heat of the battle” during trial. This reduces the potential for judicial error.

When the motion is made in advance of jury selection and the judge makes

her/his ruling, an important advantage is obtained in that the attorneys can question the prospective jurors knowing that certain evidence will not come out at trial, or alternatively, will.

Further, a ruling by the judge prior to trial also provides the important

opportunity to counsel for both sides to prepare all of their proof with the knowledge that particular evidence either will, or will not, be a part of the case.

From the standpoint of credibility of the attorney who seeks to have evidence

excluded, a favorable ruling by the trial judge may help to enhance the standing of the attorney with the jury. Without the ruling, the jurors will hear some mention of evidence that may be highly prejudicial or inflammatory. The attorney then objects and the jury may conclude that counsel is attempting to “hide the truth” from them.

At the same time, the attorney who desires to make the motion should not make

it prematurely. The evidentiary issues should be fully framed. If there is evidence not available by affidavit, deposition or other competent evidence available for inclusion in the motion before trial, the judge may well deny it, granting leave to renew it during the trial. Case law is clear that this right is available (Van Guilder v. Town of Fallsburgh, 25 A.D. 2d 338 [3d Dep’t. 1966]; Speed v. Avis Rent-A-Car, 172 A.D. 2d 267 [1st Dep’t. 1991]). The risk of this is that the moving attorney has “tipped his hand” and the

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adversary now has a better opportunity to oppose the application during trial, or circumvent the issue entirely by properly framing his or her proof. Examples of evidentiary issues where motions in limine have been used, or may be used, are as follows:

- to exclude the history portion of a hospital record (Passino v. DeRosa, 199

A.D. 2d 1017 [4th Dep’t. 1993]);

- to bar a party from submitting proof relating to a new liability theory (Barksdale v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 294 A.D. 2d 210 [1st Dep’t. 2002]);

- to preclude testimony concerning wage loss by an illegal alien (Sanango

v. 200 E. 16th St. Hous. Corp., 15 A.D. 3d 36 [1st Dep’t. 2004]);

- to preclude the admission of a surveillance video (Hairston v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 6 Misc. 3d 399 [Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co., 2004]);

- to limit proof at trial concerning settlements (Pellegrino v. New York City

Transit Authority, 141 A.D. 2d 709;

- to limit proof at trial concerning prior similar acts of malpractice (Cotgreave v. Public Administrator of Imperial County, 91 A.D. 2d 600);

- to limit proof at trial concerning damages (Mauro v. Freeport, 113 A.D.

2d 876);

Tactically, motions in limine can help to accomplish a number of objectives: - to prevent proof about an issue damaging to your case and to thereby

promote settlement of the claim before trial;

- as a discovery device to force production by your adversary of evidence to be offered at trial;

- to sharpen and focus the issues;

- to narrow the scope of proof to be offered at trial, thereby “streamlining”

the process.

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With respect to how the motion is made, there is no statutory basis either under New York state law, or in federal practice, for bringing the motion. It can be made orally or in writing (Wilkinson v. British Airways, 292 A.D. 2d 263 [1st Dep’t. 2002]), but this practitioner highly recommends that the motion be made in writing, for a number of reasons. First, your arguments, the issues and case law can be set forth in an articulate, well-documented manner that will enable the judge and his or her clerk to properly consider the matter. Second, you create a record, should the case be appealed after trial. Third, putting the motion in writing enables you to make the motion in advance of trial (perhaps a week or two), increasing the probability that you will have a decision before trial, thereby enabling better preparation of your case. Bear in mind that if the motion is made in the course of regular pre-trial motion practice the time requirements set forth in CPLR 2214 must be followed. However, this is ordinarily not when the motion is made, for a number of reasons. First, in the IAS system, it is quite possible that the judge assigned to the case prior to trial may not be the judge before whom it will be tried. The judge assigned prior to trial may be reluctant to rule on the motion, although tactically, if you believe that he would rule in your favor, you may want to put the motion before him and hope that he is willing to make a ruling. With respect to the form of a motion in limine, there is no prescribed form, either in state or federal practice in New York. This practitioner’s recommendation is that there be a title page “Motion(s) in Limine”, with the caption of the action, followed by separately numbered or designated issues that are the subject of the motion, as well as attached exhibits, if any; followed by a separate memorandum of law, corresponding in its sections to the body of the motion.

B. State Court

As previously described, the use of the motion in limine is probably an

underutilized tool historically, although its use, particularly regarding the admission of scientific testimony, has increased in the “Daubert” era. In one recent criminal case, the Court of Appeals criticized defense counsel for failing to use the device (People v. Rodriguez, 3 M.Y. 3d 462 [2004]).

The practitioner should become familiar with the rules of each supreme court

justice, in addition to the rules of each judicial district within which the court is located. Motions in limine are dealt with by some justices, and not others, and in some districts, and not others.

For example, in the 3rd Judicial District, which includes Albany, Columbia,

Greene, Rensselaer, Schoharie, Sullivan and Ulster counties, the district-wide rule regarding motions in limine is that they must be made in writing and “…be prepared

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and filed at the earliest possible time to the extent that the basis for these motions are know by a party and will arise during trial of the action.” Looking to the rules of individual justices within the 3rd District, those of Judge Teresi require that “any motions in limine should be in writing, timely served on all counsel a reasonable time before trial”, while rules of other individual justices within the same district either specifically defer to the district-wide rule, or are silent, thereby deferring to the district rule.

However, if the motion involves an expert response served on behalf of a party,

the rule is different. There, the district-wide rule states that: “Any motion by a party to preclude, or limit expert testimony under the rule, must be made as soon practicable but no later than forty-five (45) days after the party’s receipt of the expert disclosure or the motion will be waived.” Thus, at least with respect to expert disclosure, the rule provides a very limited

window of time within which to object to your adversary’s disclosure. In the 4th Judicial District, which includes Clinton, Essex, Franklin, Fulton,

Hamilton, Montgomery, St. Lawrence, Saratoga, Schenectady, Warren and Washington counties, there is no district-wide rule specifically addressing motions in limine. The justices do address motion practice, but presumably this would apply to a motion in limine only if made during the timeframe encompassed by pre-trial discovery proceedings, thereby invoking CPLR 2214 and its timing requirements. However, it is certainly possible that an individual justice will issue to the attorneys his or her individual rules with respect to trial practice. The practitioner should make such an inquiry at the pre-trial conference.

C. Federal Court

The United States Supreme Court has held that judicial authority for the motion

in limine arises from the trial court’s “…inherent authority to manage the course of trials” (Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38 [1984]).

As with New York state courts, there is no express statutory mechanism within

the Federal Rules of Evidence with respect to motions in limine. However, there are a number of rules that come into play on the issue.

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FRE 103(c) states that: “In jury cases, proceedings shall be conducted, to the extent practicable, so as to prevent inadmissible evidence from being suggested to the jury by any means, such as making statements or offers of proof or asking questions in the hearing of the jury.”

The Advisory Committee Note to the 2000 Amendment indicates that the rule encompasses rulings on evidence both before and during trial, including motion in limine rulings. The note describes one of the difficult issues arising from an in limine or other evidentiary ruling, which is whether the losing party must renew an objection or offer proof when the evidence is or would have been offered at trial, in order to preserve a claim of error on appeal. The Second Circuit addressed this issue in United States v. Valenti, 60 F.3d 941 [1995], where the Court held that the failure to proffer evidence at trial waives any claim of error where the trial judge had indicated that he would reserve judgment on the in limine motion until he had heard the trial evidence. The note also indicates that even where the court’s ruling is “definitive”, nothing prohibits the court from revisiting its prior decision when the evidence is offered or attempted to be offered at trial. Other rules that apply to the motion in limine, from a substantive standpoint, include FRE 402, which essentially states that all relevant is admissible, while evidence not relevant is not admissible, and FRE 403, which essentially states that even relevant evidence may be excluded if “…its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Finally, with respect to the types of issues that may be raised on a motion in limine in federal court, they are the same as in New York state court. Evidence that the adversary believes, in good faith, would unfairly prejudice his client, is irrelevant, relevant but outweighed by its prejudicial impact (FRE 403) or which would otherwise not be admissible (e.g., privileged, eliminated by pre-trial ruling, is beyond the scope of the parties defined claims or allegations, etc.) may be the subject of a motion in limine. For example, FRE 404(b) deals with the admissibility of “other crimes, wrongs or acts”. It defines the limited parameters under which such evidence may be used in both criminal and civil cases. Certainly, a carefully prepared motion in limine would help to prevent evidence involving an event or offense in a party’s past being heard by the jury, where its presentation would only serve to unfairly prejudice the individual or his cause.

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With respect to the timing of the motion in limine in federal court, the Uniform Pre-Trial Scheduling Order, issued in each case, addresses this. For example, in one recently issued by Judge McCurn in the Northern District, the Order required that:

“One week before the trial ready date counsel shall file with the Clerk’s Office in duplicate, with a copy to opposing counsel, a letter brief containing a concise statement of any and all evidentiary issues to be presented upon trial, citing the applicable rules of evidence and case law.”

Further, to the extent there is an objection that might otherwise be the subject of a motion in limine with respect to the use of proposed deposition testimony designated by another party, or objection to the admissibility of an exhibit described in the initial disclosures, the scheduling order speaks to this separately. For example, in Judge McCurn’s Order, a list of the objections must be filed and served within 14 days after service of the Rule 26(a)(3) initial pre-trial disclosures.

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PENNOCK, BREEDLOVE & NOLL, LLPATTORNEYS AT LAW

1407 RT. 9, Nine North

Building 4, 2nd FloorClifton Park, New York 12065

John H. Pennock, Jr. Tel (518) 383-9400Brian H. Breedlove Fax (518) 383-1959Carrie McLoughlin NollTracy M. LarocqueSara E. Paupini

FOUNDATIONS

Respectfully submitted

BRIAN H. BREEDLOVE, ESQ.

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FOUNDATION ISSUES

Informal judicial admissions. Are a much overlooked source of admissible evidence.

( the rule is: watch what you say as your words may come back to haunt you.) Taking a

position at a deposition or at trial on the record might just bind you to something you

might regret. See, De Vito vs. Katsch, 157 A.D.2d 413 (2nd Dept. 1990). People vs.

Rivera, 58 A.D. 2d 147 (1st Dept., 1977); DiCamillo v. City of New York, 245 A.D. 2d

332 (2nd Dept., 1997); Payne v. New Hyde Park Dodge, 163 A.D. 2d 285 (2nd Dept.,

1990); Bellino v. Bellino Construction Company, 75 A.D. 2d 630 (2nd Dept., 1980).

Video tape surveillance: simple photo graphic foundation will do. Fair and accuraterepresentation of the matters depicted therein at the relevant time.

Edit : it is smart to edit the film down to those small sections you want the jury to see;Put the investigator on to testify that tape is the original; when it was taken; where;complete tape and a fair and accurate representation; offer the complete tape; Now givethe second edited version to the witness and ask if he reviewed it recently; and if it is afair and accurate edited version of the tape for the short segments shown therein; offer it;stating in the presence of the jury if possible that you are offering the edited version inthe interest of judicial economy in order to shorten the time the jury will have to spendlooking at the tape; if you have an objection on the basis that it is edited respond byindicating the entire tape is in evidence and your adversary can certainly show anyaddition portions or the whole tape to the jury. I have never failed to get it in this wayand more than one adversary looked bad for raising the objection and insisting the jurybe forced to watch it all.

Business records foundation

Records made in the regular course of business are hearsay when offered for the truth oftheir contents.

CPLR § 4518(a) creates in New York a business records exception to the hearsay rule.The rule was amended by the State legislature in 2002 to include "tangible evidence" ofan electronic record stored in the ordinary course of business as a "true and accurate"representation of the electronic record (CPLR § 4518(a)).

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The courts themselves have liberally construed the application of this exception tohearsay. (See, People v. Etienne 192 Misc.2d 90, 745 N.Y.S.2d 867; People v.Markowitz 187 Misc.2d 266, 269, 721 N.Y.S.2d 758.)

Nonetheless, the decisions have held fast to three foundation requirements:

"first, the record must be made in the regular course of business--reflecting a routine,regularly conducted business activity, needed and relied on in the performance of thefunctions of the business. Second, it must be the regular course of business to make therecord--in other words, the record was made pursuant to established procedures for theroutine, habitual, systematic making of such a record. Finally, the record must have beenmade at the time of the act, transaction, occurrence or event, or within a reasonable timethereafter, assuring that the recollection is fairly accurate and the entries routinely made."86 N.Y.2d 81, at 89, 629 N.Y.S.2d 992,

Naturally, in most instances, the proponent of business records can lay the foundationfor admission into evidence its own business record, as it should have knowledge that thedocument was made in the regular course of its business and the record keeping practicesof the business. However, the general rule precludes the admission of a writing made byanother business entity because "such papers are not made in the regular course ofbusiness of the recipient, who is in no position to provide the necessary foundationtestimony as to the regularity and timeliness of their preparation or source of informationcontained in the records." Alexander, Practice Commentaries,McKinney's Cons.Laws ofNY, Book 7B, CPLR 4518:1 at 105.

However, the business record exception has expanded to permit the recipient to lay thefoundation given "the relationship between the two entities and the nature of the recordsin question, including the circumstances of their preparation...." (Alexander, PracticeCommentaries, McKinney's Cons.Law of NY, Book 7B, Cumulative Pocket Part 2003,4581:1 at 36).

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Given the nature of modern transactions, a proponent of the hearsay exception hopes tobe able to provide the proper foundation for a document not made in the regular courseof its business, but created by another entity and yet retained in its file. Nonetheless "themere filing of papers received from other entities, even if they are retained in the regularcourse of business, is insufficient to qualify the documents as business records (seeBurgess v. Leon's Auto Collision, 87 Misc.2d 351, 385 N.Y.S.2d 470, aff'd 91 Misc.2d128, 397 N.Y.S.2d 358)" (Standard Textile Company, Inc.-v-National EquipmentRental, Ltd. 80 A.D.2d 911, 437 N.Y.S.2d 398, wherein Plaintiff's employee had not therequisite knowledge of defendant's record keeping).

The assurance that the documents sought to be admitted are reliable and trustworthy layat the heart of this exception. (See Air Land Forwarders, Inc., et al, 172 F.3d 1338;Munoz v. Strahm Farms, Inc., 69 F.3d 501). In People v. DiSalvo, 284 A.D.2d 547,727 N.Y.S.2d 146, the Appellate Division held that a prosecution witness could lay aproper

RODRIGUEZ v.TRIBOROUGH BRIDGE AND TUNNEL AUTHORITY, 276A.D.2d 769, 716 N.Y.S.2d 24, 2000 N.Y. Slip Op. 09398 ( Second dept. Oct. 30, 2000.)

The Legislative history shows that CPLR 4518(a), which sets forth the foundationalelements for the admission of business records, was amplified by the Legislature toinclude CPLR 4518(c) for remedial purposes. Pursuant to CPLR 4518(a), a record isadmissible as a business record upon a showing that (1) it was made in the regularcourse of business, (2) it was the regular course of the business to make such arecord, (3) it was made by someone who had the obligation to make the record inthe regular course of business and who had actual knowledge of the event recordedor had received the information from someone within the business who had actualknowledge and was under a business duty to report the event to the maker of therecord, and (4) the record was made at the time the transaction or event occurred.

Hospital records

CPLR 4518(c) provides that a hospital record that bears a certification settingforth the foundational requirements of CPLR 4518(a) is admissible into evidence asprima facie evidence of the facts contained therein, without requiring the proponentto establish the foundational elements for the admission of business records throughoral in-court testimony. While CPLR 4518(c) dispenses with in-court foundational oraltestimony required by CPLR 4518(a), legislative history and case law indicate that theprima facie element of CPLR 4518(c) is not one that must be accepted without question.In its 1958 report to the Legislature, the Advisory Committee on Practice and Procedurestated, "As used, the term ['prima facie'] means a presumption which shifts the burden ofcoming forward and not the burden of persuasion. It is rebutted when evidence contraryto the presumed fact sufficient to support a finding of its negative has been introduced"

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SEE NEW SECTION 3122-A added in September 2003; to dispense with the needto call a foundation witness;

McKinney's CPLR Rule 3122-a

(a) Business records produced pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum under rule 3120 shallbe accompanied by a certification, sworn in the form of an affidavit and subscribedby the custodian or other qualified witness charged with responsibility of maintainingthe records, stating in substance each of the following:

1. The affiant is the duly authorized custodian or other qualified witness and hasauthority to make the certification;

2. To the best of the affiant's knowledge, after reasonable inquiry, the records orcopies thereof are accurate versions of the documents described in the subpoenaduces tecum that are in the possession, custody, or control of the person receivingthe subpoena;

3. To the best of the affiant's knowledge, after reasonable inquiry, the records orcopies produced represent all the documents described in the subpoena ducestecum, or if they do not represent a complete set of the documents subpoenaed, anexplanation of which documents are missing and a reason for their absence isprovided; and

4. The records or copies produced were made by the personnel or staff of thebusiness, or persons acting under their control, in the regular course of business,at the time of the act, transaction, occurrence or event recorded therein, or withina reasonable time thereafter, and that it was the regular course of business to makesuch records.

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(b) A certification made in compliance with subdivision (a) is admissible as to the mattersset forth therein and as to such matters shall be presumed true. When more than oneperson has knowledge of the facts, more than one certification may be made.

(c) A party intending to offer at a trial or hearing business records authenticated bycertification subscribed pursuant to this rule shall, at least thirty days before thetrial or hearing, give notice of such intent and specify the place where such recordsmay be inspected at reasonable times. No later than ten days before the trial orhearing, a party upon whom such notice is served may object to the offer of businessrecords by certification stating the grounds for the objection. Such objection may beasserted in any instance and shall not be subject to imposition of any penalty orsanction. Unless objection is made pursuant to this subdivision, or is made at trialbased upon evidence which could not have been discovered by the exercise of duediligence prior to the time for objection otherwise required by this subdivision,business records certified in accordance with this rule shall be deemed to havesatisfied the requirements of subdivision (a) of rule 4518. Notwithstanding theissuance of such notice or objection to same, a party may subpoena the custodian toappear and testify and require the production of original business records at thetrial or hearing.

New rule on the service of subpoenas duces tecum; prevents previous commonunethical practice of seeking records subject to privilege. What if any sanction ifthe subpoena is not served appropriately on adverse parties?

McKinney's CPLR § 2303

(a) [Eff. Jan. 1, 2004. ] A subpoena requiring attendance or a subpoena duces tecum shallbe served in the same manner as a summons, except that where service of such asubpoena is made pursuant to subdivision two or four of section three hundred eight ofthis chapter, the filing of proof of service shall not be required and service shall bedeemed complete upon the later of the delivering or mailing of the subpoena, if madepursuant to subdivision two of section three hundred eight of this chapter, or upon thelater of the affixing or mailing of the subpoena, if made pursuant to subdivision four ofsection three hundred eight of this chapter. Any person subpoenaed shall be paid ortendered in advance authorized traveling expenses and one day's witness fee. A copy ofany subpoena duces tecum served in a pending action shall also be served, in themanner set forth in rule twenty-one hundred three of this chapter, on each partywho has appeared in the action so that it is received by such parties promptly afterservice on the witness and before the production of books, papers or other things.

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Investigative reports under federal law admitted under FRE 803(8)(c) ( See; BeechAircraft v Rainey, 488 U. S. 153; public records exception certification providesmanner of foundation in New York but not the basis for admission but See:Kozlowski v. City of Amsterdam 111 A.D.2d 476, 488 N.Y.S.2d 862 (Third Dept 1985)Plaintiff sought to admit into evidence a report prepared by the Medical ReviewCommission of the State Commission of Corrections pursuant to Correction Law § 47 (1)(a), (d) concerning decedent's death. Trial court refused and the third dept reversed. Courtstated “In its report, the Medical Review Commission concluded that a violation of 9NYCRR 7504.1 had occurred in that defendant failed to maintain constant supervision ofdecedent after placing him in a cell in view of his intoxication and expressions of suicidalideation. Since the report was prepared pursuant to statutory mandate, it was at the veryleast admissible under the public documents common-law exception to the hearsay rule(see, Sklar, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLRC4520, p 480; Richardson, Evidence §§ 342, 346, at 308-309, 313 [Prince 10th ed]).Contrary to defendant's contention that admission of the report would serve to preemptthe jury's function, a violation of an administrative rule is simply some evidence ofnegligence which a jury is free to disregard even where the adverse party offers noevidence on the point (see, Conte v. Large Scale Dev. Corp., 10 NY2d 20, 29; 41 NY Jur,Negligence, § 43). Since the report was properly prepared and clearly relevant, plaintiffhad a right to have it admitted into evidence (see, Wolfe v. Samaritan Hosp., 104 AD2d143, 146; Rolnick v. 25th Ave. Bldg. Corp., 27 AD2d 844). Additionally, twomemoranda of the Commission of Corrections certified by counsel to said Commission,concerning the standard of care for intoxicated prisoners, were also improperly excluded.These documents, which were included by reference in the Medical ReviewCommission's report, were admissible under the business records exception to thehearsay rule (CPLR 4518) and relevant to the issue of whether defendant was negligent inits care of decedent. In view of the close question of negligence presented in this case, weconclude that the failure to admit these materials constitutes prejudicial error warranting anew trial (CPLR 2002; Wolfe v. Samaritan Hosp., supra.; see, 2A Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Prac ¶ 2002.02).” Id. At 478.

DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE: Illustrates of demonstrates a witness’ testimonywith regard to the subject matter of his testimony. Accident, medical issue, how amachine works charts, diagrams, skeletons, medical art, computer simulations, etc. mustbe relevant; and will serve to assist the jury in understanding the witnesses testimonywithout being unduly prejudicial. Beware the content!!!!!!! Limit the material to thatwhich is necessary to demonstrate or clarify the testimony. Object to that which simplybolsters or repeats the testimony. As the opponent of the evidence make sure the courtrules that it is admitted for demonstrative purposes only as it should not go to the juryroom. If it goes to the jury they will put undue emphasis on it and will not have thebenefit of the explanation that should go with it. Court has discretion to allow jury totake the exhibit to the jury room. CPL & 310.20(1) and see: Uss v Town of Oyster Bay,37 N.Y. 2d 639.

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Demonstrations and experiments: In the discretion of the trial judge. A foundation ofsufficient “ similarity” must be laid. The conditions of the experiment or demonstrationmust be substantially similar to the actual events. It is dangerous to do this in thepresence of the jury. Has anyone forgotten the “Glove”.

Computer simulations: Re-enactment v. a representation of an expert’s opinion atthe occurrence.

Foundation includes:

1. the computer generated graphic is relevant;

2. the graphic representation fairly and accurately demonstrates the opinionof the expert that is offering it; and ,

3. The graphic will aid the jury in understanding the experts testimony.

See: People v McHugh, 124 Misc. 2d 559; Feastor v New York City TransitAuthority, 172 A. D. 2d 284 ( First Dep’t, 1991) and See: People v Yates, 290 A.D. 2d888 ( 3rd Dep’t 2002) Shaken baby syndrome case. Court instructs carefully on use byjury of the simulation as not purporting to show what actually happened( NOT AREENACTMENT). Danger is clear in that it is unduly prejudicial and you should fightto keep it out.

Experts: an expert opinion can be based upon hearsay when he relies upon material ofout of court origin if it is the kind accepted in the profession as reliable in forming aprofessional opinion. Borden v Brady, 92 A.D. 2d 983; Fed and State rules are thesame. Ask the expert if this is the type of information relied upon in the profession informing opinions.

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Scientific And Expert Evidence In State And Federal Courts

Prepared and Presented by:

Mark J. McCarthy Harris Beach PLLC

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PRACTICAL HEARSAY  ©2006 – John T. Wilkins Wilkins & Griffin, PLLC 

2461 Main Street Lake Placid, NY 12946 

(518) 523‐1409 

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 I.  WHAT IS (AND WHAT IS NOT) HEARSAY  1.  Hearsay defined.  Hearsay is an out‐of‐court statement offered to prove the truth of the fact asserted in the statement.   2.  Corollary to the Rule Where an out‐of‐court statement is being offered not to prove the truth of its content, but rather to prove that the statement itself was made, that is not hearsay. This is oftentimes found where the issue is the state of mind of the person making the statement, or the   statement  itself  is  an issue.     (A)  State of Mind   By way of example, where a particular act of a declarant is at issue, the        declarant’s statement of a future intention to perform that act is admissible as      proof of the declarant’s intent on that issue and is inferential proof that the      declarant carried out his intent. People v. D’arton, 289 A.D.2d 711, 734 N.Y.S.2d      309 (3d Dep’t 2001).     (B)  Statement in Issue – Examples   Defamation action where issue is defendant’s utterance of defamatory        comments; Existence of oral contract where the contract itself cannot be proved      absent testimony concerning the statements made by the parties to the        agreement; §4506 of the CPLR that allows the use of unlawfully obtained       eavesdropping evidence in any civil or criminal trial, hearing or proceeding      against a person who has or is alleged to have committed the crime of        eavesdropping.                (C) Res Gestae (verbal acts)                            People v. Sostre, 70 A.D.2d 40, 418 N.Y.S.2d 662 (2d Dep’t 1979). Use of utterance as   verbal acts has four limitations: conduct to be characterized by words must be material   to issue; conduct must be equivocal in its nature; words must aid in giving legal   significance to conduct; and words must accompany conduct.    It has been defined, Inter alia, as an utterance which accompanies an act or conduct to   which it is desired to give a legal effect (cf. Keefe v. State, 50 Ariz. 293, 72 P.2d 425; 22A   C.J.S. Criminal Law s 662(2)). Verbal acts are themselves part of the transaction which   they illustrate, explain or interpret (People v. Willson, 401 Ill. 68, 81 N.E.2d 485). The use   of utterances as verbal acts has four limitations: (1) the conduct to be characterized by   the words must be material to the issue; (2) the conduct must be equivocal in its nature;   (3) the words must aid in giving legal significance to the conduct; and (4) the words    must accompany the conduct (Keefe v. State, supra ; 6 Wigmore, Evidence 

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  (Chadbourn Rev.), s 1772).    (D)  Rule 4514. Impeachment of witness by prior inconsistent statement      In addition  to  impeachment  in  the manner permitted by common  law, any party may   introduce  proof  that  any  witness  has made  a  prior  statement  inconsistent  with  his   testimony if the statement was made in a writing subscribed by him or was made under   oath.  3. Hearsay can take the form of more than the spoken word.   (A)  Hearsay by Silence       People v. Harold, 125 A.D.2d 491, 509 N.Y. Sup. 2d 409 (2d Dep’t 1986). Declarations or   statements made  in  the  presence  of  a  party  are  only  competent  evidence when  the   person effected hears and fully comprehends the effect of the words spoken and when   he is at full liberty to make answer thereto and only under such circumstances  as would   justify  the  inference of ascent or acquiescence as  to  the  truth of  the statements   by his   remaining silent. Statements that are of such a nature that there would be no reason for   the defendant necessarily to reply to them do not constitute admission by  silence.     People v. Frias, 250 A.D.2d 495, 673 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1d Dep’t 1998). Defendant who heard   another  person’s  statement  accusing  him  of  a  crime,  understood  its  implication  and   remained silent although he was free to answer notwithstanding defendant’s contention   that  his  silence  was  due  to  fear  of  the  person  who  made  the  statement  properly   admissible as admission by silence exception to the hearsay rule.    People v. Goldston, 6 A.D.3d 736, 776 N.Y.S.2d 102 (3d Dep’t 2004). Where a defendant    invokes his or her constitutional right against self incrimination, the People may not use   his or her silence against him or her on their direct case. This principal not only applies   where  a  defendant  refuses  to  answer  any  questions,  but  also  to  situations where  a   defendant responds to questioning, but declines to answer selective questions.     

(B) Conduct as Hearsay    

Non‐verbal  acts  intended  as  an  expressive  communication  are  inadmissible.  Non‐assertive  acts  are  considered  circumstantial  evidence  and  are  governed  by  rules applicable to circumstantial evidence 

 Examples: pointing, sign language. Compare: umbrellas 

    

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 II.  EXCEPTIONS TO THE HEARSAY RULE  Exceptions  to  the hearsay rule can be  found  in both  the CPLR and common  law. CPLR §4543 makes clear  that CPLR Article 45 does not exclude proof of a  fact or writing by any method authorized by any applicable statute or by the rules of evidence at common law.   1.  Common Law Exceptions to the Rule  (A)  Admissions. “An admission is an act or declaration of a party, or his  representative or predecessor in interest, which constitutes evidence against the party at trial. As a general rule, any declaration or conduct of a party which is inconsistent with his position on trial may be given in evidence against him as an admission.” Richardson on Evidence, 10th Edition.     (1)  Admissions may be judicial or extrajudicial. Judicial admissions may be      either  formal judicial admissions or informal judicial admissions.                a) Formal Judicial Admissions are conclusive.                   1)stipulated facts                                         2)response to CPLR §3123 Notice to Admit (only in the action then        pending)                                         3) Facts formally admitted in Court (guilty plea)                                         4) Facts admitted in the pleadings              b)  Informal  judicial  admissions  constitutes  evidence,  but  are  non‐                               conclusive.                                                                               1) deposition testimony                                         2) testimony at trial of the present action                                      3) Affidavits                  4) Formal judicial admissions made in another proceeding                                         5) party’s testimony or pleadings in a different matter      Knutson v. Sand, 282 A.D.2d 42, 725 N.Y.S.2d 350 (2d Dep’t 2001). [T]he        statement by the defendant‐oral surgeon made under oath during trial that he      was not supposed to intrude into the inferior alveolar canal of the mandibular      bone constitutes a judicial admission. A partyʹs statement, made during        testimony at a trial, which is adverse to his   or her contention and is        uncontradicted by other witnessesʹ testimony, constitutes a judicial admission      (see, **356 Matter of Union Indem. Ins. Co. of N.Y., 89 N.Y.2d 94, 103, 651 N.Y.S.2d      383, 674 N.E.2d 313; see generally, Skelka v. Metropolitan Tr. Auth., 76 A.D.2d      492, 430 N.Y.S.2d 840). Although such an admission is not conclusive, it is  

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    evidence of facts which bear upon the ultimate issue to be resolved (seMatter of      Union Indem. Ins. Co. of N.Y., supra, at 103, 651 N.Y.S.2d 383, 674 N.E.2d 313).   

CRAMER v. KUHNS, 213 A.D.2d 131, 630 N.Y.S.2d 128 (3d Dep’t 1995)  We are also of the view that Supreme Court erred in excluding a notice of claim filed by plaintiff in a Court of Claims action arising out of the same incident. In that claim, plaintiff asserted that the accident was caused by the motorcycle being "thrown out of control when the kickstand struck a defective piece of roadway". We previously have held that a complaint filed in one lawsuit is admissible against the same party in another lawsuit as an informal judicial admission and that exclusion of such evidence constitutes reversible error (see, Carter v. Kozareski, 39 A.D.2d 703, 704, 331 N.Y.S.2d 875, appeal dismissed 31 N.Y.2d 779, 339 N.Y.S.2d 106, 291 N.E.2d 386).

     c)  Extrajudicial admissions     All admissions that are not judicial admissions are extrajudicial admissions. Such     admissions may be made directly by statement, by conduct, or by silence.           Gangi v. Fradus, 227 N.Y. 452, 125 N.E. 677 (1920). In a civil action, statements      made out of court or of judicial proceeding or record, or, as they are        denominated, extrajudicial admissions, by a party to the action, adverse to his      claim, are evidence against him that the facts they state are true. Koester v.      Rochester Candy Works, 194 N. Y. 92, 87 N.  E. 77, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 783, 16 Ann.      Cas. 589.   

d) Admission must be against the declarant’s  interests 

Knesz v. Singman, 37 A.D325 N.Y.S.2d 885.2d 1026 (3d Dep’t 1971). The testimony of the appellant Hope and of the respondent Singman establishes that during the two hours preceding the accident, Singman had had at most four glasses of beer. The appellant Hope also admitted in cross examination that she had told her prior attorney that Singman ʹoperated his vehicle while his ability operate the same was impairedʹ. Since the appellants had the burden of proving that Hope was free of contributory negligence and since accepting a ride in an automobile known to be operated by an intoxicated person is either an assumption of risk or contributory negligence, the testimony of the appellant Hope was in the nature of an admission against interest. 

     Dlgosz v. Exchange Mutual Insurance Company, 176 A.D.2d 1011, 574 N.Y.S.2d      864 (3d Dep’t 1991). Plaintiff contends that the examination under oath of      plaintiff and her husband were erroneously received in evidence. We disagree.      Plaintiffʹs and her husbandʹs transcripts were admissible both as statements of a      party to the lawsuit and as extrajudicial admissions of a party (see, Richardson,  

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    Evidence §§209, 210, at 187 [Prince 10th ed.] ). The husband was an extra insured      under the policy. Plaintiffʹs and her husbandʹs examinations contained        inconsistent statements and were, therefore, admissible as evidence (see, Hayes v.      Henault, 131 A.D.2d 930, 932‐933, 516 N.Y.S.2d 798). 

 e) Admissions made by agents of a party  

    Loschiavo v. Port Authority of New York,  58 N.Y.2d 1040, 448 N.E.2d 1351, 462      N.Y.S.2d 440 (1983). [T]he hearsay statement of an agent is admissible against his      employer under the admissions exception to the hearsay rule only if the making      of the statement is an  activity within the scope of his authority.      Candela v. City of New York,  778 N.Y.S.2d 31, 2004 N.Y. Slip Op. 04760     (1st Dep’t, 2004). On appeal, plaintiff argues that Badinskyʹs statements should      have been admitted under the speaking agent hearsay exception and that such      statements, once admitted, were sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to      defendantsʹ actual notice of the defective window condition. We agree.       Our precedents support the conclusion that the breadth of Badinskyʹs authority      was sufficient to bind his principals to his  admissions. For instance, in Browne v.      Prime Contracting Design Corp., 308 A.D.2d 372, 764 N.Y.S.2d 269, lv. denied 2      N.Y.3d 702, ‐‐‐ N.Y.S.2d ‐‐‐‐, ‐‐‐ N.E.2d ‐‐‐‐, 2004 N.Y. LEXIS 549, we held that the      hearsay statements of the defendant‐contractorʹs ʺfield supervisorʺ regarding his      knowledge of the hazardous condition of a parapet wall were admissible against      the contractor under the ʺspeaking agentʺ exception to the hearsay rule.        Similarly, in  Navedo v. 250 Willis Avenue Supermarket, 290 A.D.2d 246, 247, 735      N.Y.S.2d 132, we reversed the trial courtʹs holding that a post‐accident statement      by a store manager acknowledging that he had instructed an employee to clean a     puddle in the store ʺawhile agoʺ was inadmissible hearsay. In ruling that the      evidence should have been admitted against the defendant store on the issue of      notice, we stated that ʺ[a] [store] manager has the authority to bind its employer      by an admission made as agent on behalf of the employerʺ (id.). The record      demonstrates that Badinsky possessed broad authority to act on behalf of       defendants. Although TDX was originally hired as a consultant to the project,      delays on the project necessitated that TDX, and more particularly Badinsky, take     on an increased role. Indeed, prior to the accident, Badinsky had become the      ʺproject managerʺ for the site, with equal responsibility with the general        contractor, and was given general supervisory responsibility over all of the      trades and work done by the subcontractors. In addition, after the accident, it      was Badinsky who interviewed plaintiff and ultimately sent him to the hospital.      Consistent with his supervisory authority, he also inspected and photographed      the area where plaintiff had been injured, directed other workers to check every      window at the site to determine if they were inoperable and mandated other  

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    remedial measures, and prepared a written report on the accident.     In light of these broad duties encompassing supervision over the construction      work, safety measures and preparing incident reports, we find that Badinsky      was far more than a mere employee, and that he clearly had the authority to      speak on behalf of defendants (see Spett v. President Monroe Bldg. & Mfg. Corp., 19      N.Y.2d 203, 206, 278 N.Y.S.2d 826, 225 N.E.2d 527; Johnson v. Hallam Enterpr., Ltd.,     208 A.D.2d 1110, 1111, 617 N.Y.S.2d 405; Kasper v. Buffalo Bills of Western New      York, 42 A.D.2d 87, 91‐92, 345 N.Y.S.2d 244; cf. Pascarella v. Sears, Roebuck and Co.,      280 A.D.2d 279, 720 N.Y.S.2d 461).      Laguesse v. Storytown U.S.A. Inc., 296 A.D.2d 798, 745 N.Y.S.2d 323 (3d Dep’t,      2002).   [D]efendants argue that Supreme Court committed reversible error by      admitting hearsay evidence at trial on the issue of defendantsʹ notice of the      alleged unreasonably unsafe condition. Plaintiff testified that after she was      struck, she left the exhibit with the assistance of her husband and immediately      stopped two park employees and described the accident to them. Over        defendantsʹ objection, Supreme Court permitted plaintiff to testify further that,      after the employees inspected the jailhouse, one of them told plaintiff that a      screw had broken. Defendants also objected to testimony given by plaintiffʹs      husband to the effect that, at the first aid station just a few minutes after the      accident, one of the employees told him that they had tried to fix the grate the      day before but it had broken again.       ʺ[T]he hearsay statement of an agent is admissible against his [or her] employer      under the admissions exception to the hearsay rule only if the making of the      statement is an activity within the scope of his [or her] authorityʺ (Loschiavo v.      Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 58 N.Y.2d 1040, 1041, 462 N.Y.S.2d 440, 448 N.E.2d 1351;      see, Tyrrell v. Wal‐Mart Stores, supra, at 652, 737 N.Y.S.2d 43, 762 N.E.2d 921; Grant     v. Radamar Meat, 294 A.D.2d 398, 399, 742 N.Y.S.2d 349, 350; Tkach v. Golub Corp.,      265 A.D.2d 632, 634, 696 N.Y.S.2d 289). Here, plaintiffs allege that the employees      were maintenance workers, but did not ascertain their identities, much less      demonstrate that they were authorized by defendants to make the statements 

    f)  Conduct as an admission: Examples: flight; failure to call a witness; failure to      produce evidence; obstruction of justice; failure to reply to a written        communication; adoptive admissions. 

    g)  Instances of inadmissible admissions: offers in compromise (CPLR §4547);      post accident design modification or safety measures when made by defendant;      recall notices(split of authority); payment of medical and similar expenses by the      defendant. 

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    Watson v. FHE Services, Inc., 257 A.D.2d 618, 684 N.Y.S.2d 283(2d Dep’t, 1999).      The Supreme Court erred in ordering the defendant to disclose records of repairs     made to the elevator in which the plaintiff was allegedly injured, subsequent to      the date of the subject accident. It is well settled that ʺ[e]vidence of subsequent      repairs * * * is not discoverable or admissible in a negligence case unless there is      an issue of maintenance or controlʺ (Cleland v. 60‐02 Woodside Corp., 221 A.D.2d      307, 308, 633 N.Y.S.2d 529; see, Niemann v. Luca, 214 A.D.2d 658, 625 N.Y.S.2d 267;     Klatz v. Armor El. Co., 93 A.D.2d 633, 462 N.Y.S.2d 677).       Barash v. Waldorf‐Astoria, 2003 WL 1793065 (N.Y.Sup.), 2003 N.Y. Slip Op.      50642(U) (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co., 2003). For future reference, the court notes that      Petitioner has not set forth any basis for the pre‐action discovery of subsequent      repair records for the door. Even after the commencement of the action, the      plaintiff will have to provide a legal and factual basis sufficient to justify this      disclosure request. See Mercado v. St. Andrews Housing Development Fund Co., Inc.,      289 A.D.2d 148, 734 N.Y.S.2d 436 (1st Dept.2001) (subsequent repair records      discoverable although inadmissible only because no other means of proving      condition of the sidewalk on the date of accident); Watson v. FHE Serv., Inc., 257      A.D.2d 618, 684 N.Y.S.2d 283 (2nd Dept.1999) (subject elevatorʹs subsequent      repair records not discoverable where ownership and control not at issue). But      see Longo v. Armor Elevator Co., Inc., 278 A.D.2d 127, 720 N.Y.S.2d 443 (1st        Dept.2000) (discovery of elevator repair records allowed).  

CRAMER  v. KUHNS, 213 A.D.2d 131, 630 N.Y.S.2d 128 (3d Dep’t 1995)  Inasmuch as we are remitting this matter for a new trial, we deem it advisable to address one other issue raised by Harley. Harley contends that Supreme Court erred in refusing to strike evidence of Harleyʹs postmanufacture side stand design change. As a general rule, evidence of postmanufacture design modifications is admissible in a products liability action only to prove a manufacturing defect (see, Cover v. Cohen, 61 N.Y.2d 261, 270, 473 N.Y.S.2d 378, 461 N.E.2d 864). Inasmuch as Supreme Court dismissed plaintiffʹs manufacturing defect claim at the close of the evidence, Harley asserts that Supreme Court erred in denying its motion to strike the evidence of its design modification. Plaintiff, on the other hand, urges that the evidence is relevant to Harleyʹs continuing duty to warn. Indeed, where a plaintiff is able to show that the manufacturer had knowledge of a defect prior to an accident, evidence of subsequent design changes is admissible (see, Haran v. Union Carbide Corp., 68 N.Y.2d 710, 711‐712, 506 N.Y.S.2d 311, 497 N.E.2d 678).  

      

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    f)  Excited Utterance: The criteria for admissibility of a statement as a        spontaneous declaration or excited utterance are (1) the existence of an exciting      event, and (2) whether it was prompted thereby without time to reflect, that is      whether it was dominated by the nervous excitement of the event (Murphy Auto      Parts v. Ball, 101 U.S.App.D.C. 416, 249 F.2d 508, cert. den. 355 U.S. 932, 78 S.Ct.      413, 2 L.Ed.2d 415; cf. People v. Del Vermo, 192 N.Y. 470, 85 N.E. 690, Supra;      People v. Hughes, 56 A.D.2d 954, 393 N.Y.S.2d 96; Fisch, New York Evidence (2d      ed.), s 1000; 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law s 662(3)). 

PEOPLE v. BROWN, 80 N.Y.2d 729, 610 N.E.2d 369, 594 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1993).  

In defendantʹs trial on burglary and other charges, recordings of two 911 transmissions describing the events in progress were received in evidence against him. His appeal presents a question of first impression in our Court: whether such evidence may properly be admitted under the present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule. For reasons to be explained, we hold that the present sense impression exception is the law in this State and that it was properly applied by the courts below in holding the evidence admissible.  

 At about 6:00 A.M. on  July 12, 1987,  the police  received a 911  call  reporting a burglary in progress. The caller, who identified himself as ʺHenryʺ, said that he was observing  the break‐in  from his apartment across  the  street. He described the perpetrators as ʺone male black and one male white, wearing a blue t‐shirtʺ . The  police,  responding  to  the  reported  burglary  approximately  three minutes after the initial 911 transmission, observed two persons run out of the restaurant through  a  broken  glass  door  and  climb  up  on  the  roof.  One  of  the  officers apprehended a ʺmale black, later identified as defendant, Michael Brown, hiding underneath  an  air‐conditioning  duct  located  on  the  roofʺ   Police  communications  received  another  911  call  from  ʺHenryʺ  reporting  ʺthat one man had been caught but  ʹthe white guy  [was still] on  the roofʹ  ʺ and  ʺthat police backup was needed  to catch himʺ. The other suspect, a white male, was found on the roof and arrested. He was wearing a blue t‐shirt.  As generally  stated,  the present  sense  impression  exception permits  a  court  to admit  hearsay  testimony  of  a  statement  describing  or  explaining  an  event  or condition made while  the declarant was perceiving  the  event  or  condition,  or immediately  thereafter  (see,  e.g.,  Fed.Rules  Evid.,  rule  803[1];  Proposed  N.Y. Code  of  Evidence  §  804[b][1]  [1982]  ).  The  theory  of  the  exception  is  that  a statement  describing  an  event when  or  immediately  after  it  occurs  is  reliable because  the  contemporaneity of  the  event observed and  the hearsay  statement describing  it  leaves  no  time  for  reflection.  Thus,  the  likelihood  of  deliberate 

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misrepresentation or faulty recollection is eliminated (see, Comment of N.Y. Law Rev. Commn.,  reprinted  in Proposed N.Y. Code  of Evidence  §  804,  at  211‐212 [1982]; 4 Weinstein and Berger, Weinsteinʹs Evidence, ¶ 803[1][01]  ). Moreover, such statements are often made under circumstances where some witness has an opportunity  to  observe  and  verify  all  or  part  of  the  event  described  (see, Comment of N.Y. Law Rev. Commn., op. cit., at 211‐212 [1982]; 4 Weinstein and Berger, op. cit., ¶ 803 [1][01] ). 

 

Our Court has not adopted the exception and, until the opinions of the courts below in this case, only three New York courts have discussed the issue in reported decisions (see, People v. Watson, 100 A.D.2d 452, 474 N.Y.S.2d 978; People v. Luke, supra; People v. Jardin, 154 Misc.2d 172, 584 N.Y.S.2d 732). [FN2] The rule, however, has been accepted in some form by the majority of States and has now been widely approved by legal commentators (see, e.g., 4 Weinstein and Berger, op. cit., ¶ 803[1][01]; Waltz, The Present Sense Impression Exception to the Rule Against Hearsay: Origins and Attributes, 66 Iowa L.Rev. 869 [1981]; Wohlsen, The Present Sense Impression Exception to the Hearsay Rule: Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1), 81 Dick L.Rev. 347 [1977]; Richardson, Evidence § 285‐A, at 125‐ 126 [Prince 10th ed., 1972‐1985 Cum.Supp.]; McCormick, Evidence § 298, at 860 [3d ed.] ). A notable exception to this general acceptance by legal scholars is the contrary view of Dean Wigmore (see, 6 Wigmore, Evidence § 1757, at 236‐ 240 [Chadbourn rev. ed. 1976] ). Dean Wigmore, a proponent of the excited utterance doctrine, opposed the present sense impression rule because, in his view, only a startling event would guarantee trustworthiness; spontaneity and contemporaneity of the declaration, without the shock or excitement from the event, are not sufficient (id., § 1757, at 238; see also, Wohlsen, op. cit., at 351). Defendant notes that this Court, in developing its excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, has accepted Dean Wigmoreʹs analysis (see, e.g., People v. Brown, 70 N.Y.2d 513, 518, 522 N.Y.S.2d 837, 517 N.E.2d 515; People v. Marks, 6 N.Y.2d 67, 71‐72, 188 N.Y.S.2d 465, 160 N.E.2d 26). He argues, therefore, that to be consistent we should follow Wigmore in rejecting the present sense impression exception upon the ground that spontaneity and contemporaneity, without stress of nervous excitement, do not produce the requisite reliability (see, People v. Marks, supra, at 71‐72, 188 N.Y.S.2d 465, 160 N.E.2d 26). 

The argument is not persuasive. Simply because we have adhered to Dean Wigmoreʹs analysis of the excited utterance exception does not mean that we must endorse his views on other matters. We agree with Professor McCormick and other commentators that shock and excitement from a sudden occurrence should not be the only criteria of admissibility and that a present sense impression exception rule may be devised with sufficient safeguards to assure reliability (see, McCormick, op. cit., § 298, at 860; Wohlsen, op. cit., at 351; Morgan, A Suggested Classification of Utterances Admissible as Res Gestae, 31 

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Yale L.J. 229, 236 [1922] ). Accordingly, we hold that spontaneous descriptions of events made substantially contemporaneously with the observations are admissible if the descriptions are sufficiently corroborated by other evidence. (Emphasis added.) Further, such statements may be admitted even though the declarant is not a participant in the events and is an unidentified bystander (see, 4 Weinstein and Berger, op. cit., ¶ 803 [1][01], at 803‐77). The remaining questions concern the nature and extent of the corroboration required to assure reliability. To be sure, some textual versions of the present sense impression exception rule require no corroboration at all (see, e.g., Fed.Rules Evid., rule 803[1]; Proposed N.Y. Code of Evidence § 804 [b] [1] [1982]; Model Code of Evidence, rule 512[a] [1942]; State v. Flesher, 286 N.W.2d 215, 218 [Iowa 1979] [holding that corroboration, or the lack of it, will affect the weight given to the declaration but not its admissibility] ). The proponents of this view maintain that the exception itself ʺoffers sufficient assurances of reliability without the superaddition of a further requirement of corroborationʺ (McCormick, op. cit., § 298, at 862).     What corroboration is sufficient will depend on the particular circumstances of each case and must be left largely to the sound discretion of the trial court. But before present sense impression testimony is received there must be some evidence in addition to the statements themselves to assure the court that the statements sought to be admitted were made spontaneously and contemporaneously with the events described. 

    g) Declaration against interest 

          1)Elements 

        a)  Declarant is unavailable; 

        b)  Declaration when made is against the pecuniary, penal or            proprietary interests of the declarant; 

        c)  Declarant had competent knowledge of the facts; and 

        d)  No probable motive to misrepresent the facts. 

         2) Exculpatory statements are not admissible       Cover v. Cohen, 61 N.Y.2d 261, 461 N.E.2d 864, 473 N.Y.S.2d 378 (1984).        Prejudice resulted from the erroneous admission of Officer Hlinkoʹs testimony      and his accident report of Irving Cohenʹs statement that ʺhis accelerator stuck on      him.ʺ That evidence was admitted on the basis that defendant had a duty to      report to the officer and that his statement was a declaration against interest. But  

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    the statement was exculpatory rather than inculpatory and, therefore, cannot      qualify as a declaration against interest (Mahon v. Giordano, 30 A.D.2d 792, 291      N.Y.S.2d 854; see Secor v. Kohl, 67 A.D.2d 358, 363, 415 N.Y.S.2d 434) and it,      therefore, cannot be said that there was no motive to falsify (see Richardson,      Evidence [Prince, 10th ed.], § 262).  

    h ) Past Recollection Recorded 

      1)Elements 

        a)  Witness must have observed the matter recorded; 

        b)  The witness’ recollection must have been fairly fresh when          recorded or adopted;  

        c)  The witness can presently testify that the record correctly          represented his knowledge and recollection when made; and 

        d)  The witness must lack sufficient present recollection of the          recorded information. 

    Wright v. National Amusements, Inc.,  2003 WL 22700686 (N.Y.Sup.), 2003 N.Y.      Slip Op. 51390(U) Oct. 21, 2003. The foundational requirements for admitting a      memorandum into evidence as a witnessʹs past recollection recorded are: (1) the      witness must have observed the matter recorded; (2) the witnessʹs recollection      must have been fairly fresh when recorded or adopted; (3) the witness can      presently testify that the record correctly represented his knowledge and       recollection when made; and (4) the witness must lack sufficient present        recollection of the recorded information. People v. Taylor, 80 N.Y.2d 1, at 9, 586      N.Y.S.2d 545, 598 N.E.2d 693; People v. Raja, supr a, 77 A.D.2d 322, 433 N.Y.S.2d      200.     ***While the memoranda were actually prepared by someone other than the      witnesses who observed the events, the respective memoranda became the      statements of the particular witnesses when they reviewed their contents and      manifested the adoption of their contents by signing it. See, People v. Dillenbeck,      115 A.D.2d 331, 496 N.Y.S.2d 159 (4th Dept.1985) (statement recorded by police      admitted when signed by witness); People v. Raja, 77 A.D.2d 322, 433 N.Y.S.2d 200     (same).     *** A memorandum is not admissible as past recollection recorded unless the      witness has impaired memory of the underlying event. See, People v. Taylor, 80      N.Y.2d at 5, 586 N.Y.S.2d 545, 598 N.E.2d 693. However, the memory loss need      not be total. For example in People v. Briggs, the Court rejected defendantʹs      argument that the memorandum was inadmissible because the witness recalled  

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    some of the events set forth therein. The Court concluded that ʺalthough the      witness had some general memory of the events, he was unable to remember a      number of facts recited therein and therefore, the memorandum was properly      admitted to augment his memory as past recollection recorded. 190 A.D.2d 995,      593 N.Y.S.2d 622 (4th Dept.1993); see also, People v. Lewis, 232 A.D.2d 239, 648      N.Y.S.2d 544 (1st Dept.1996) (ʺThat doctrine did not require that the officer have      no recollection of the facts surrounding defendantʹs arrest, but only that he      lacked sufficient present recollection of relevant recorded informationʺ).        ***Thirdly, this Court is satisfied that the memoranda were made while the      events were ʺfairly freshʺ in the witnessesʹ memory. There is no talismanic time      period for determining when a record is sufficiently contemporaneous with the      event to satisfy the hearsay exception. For instance, in People v. Caprio, 25 A.D.2d      145, 268 N.Y.S.2d 70 (2nd Dept.1966), the Court held that a record prepared 28      hours after the event was sufficiently contemporaneous. Conversely, in Calandra      v. Norwood, 81 A.D.2d 650, 438 N.Y.S.2d 381 (2nd Dept.1981), the Court held that      a lapse of more than four months was too long for the record to qualify. In this      case, the gap between the date of the accident and the date of the making of the      statements was not too great (one month) to significantly diminish the apparent      trustworthiness of the statements. Significantly, the event in question was not so      unusual and dramatic that it would have been likely to fade the memory in one      monthʹs time. Cf. People v. Dillenbeck, 115 A.D.2d 159, 495 N.Y.S.2d 498 (4th      Dept.1985).     *** Fourthly and lastly, the record satisfies the requirement that the witnesses can     presently certify that the memoranda correctly represent their knowledge and      recollection when made. See, People v. Taylor, supra; 3 Wigmore, Evidence, § 747 at     97 (1980); People v. Gomez, 266 A.D.2d 54, 699 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1st Dept.1999). For      instance, Ms. Sellecchia vouched for the accuracy of the memorandum when she      asserted she must have read the memorandum before signing it because she      never signs anything before reading it and she remembered that she was as      truthful and accurate as she could have been regarding the details of her        observation of the slip and fall. 

     Smith v. Miller,  4 A.D.3d 697, 772 N.Y.S.2d 742 (3d Dep’t, 2004). Family Court      properly excluded the motherʹs journal from evidence. Despite attempts to admit     it as a past recollection recorded, her own attorney earlier objected to its        disclosure as a document prepared for litigation. Additionally, the document      included hearsay, the mother admitted that some entries were not made        contemporaneously with the events in question, and she had the opportunity to      refresh her recollection from it as often as she wished during the hearing.  

   

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     i)  Reputation – Even if the Bishop’s out‐of‐court statement is inadmissible,      gossip is.            People v. Berge, 103 A.D.2d 1041, 478 N.Y.S.2d 433 (4th Dep’t, 1984). The court      properly refused to allow defendant to introduce character evidence showing      that he had a reputation for not being a drug user or seller. The proper method of     proving character is by testimony of defendantʹs reputation in the community for     the particular trait relating to and controverting the crime charged, such as      honesty, veracity, peacefulness, or a law‐abiding nature (People v. Van Gaasbeck,      189 N.Y. 408, 82 N.E. 718; Hack v. United States, 445 A.2d 634, 642 [D.C.App.];      Richardson on Evidence, [10th ed.] 8 151), not his reputation for committing the       specific act constituting the crime. Thus, the character witness may not testify to      the defendantʹs reputation for illegally possessing a still (Moss v. State, 209 Ala. 3,      96 So. 450); for jumping on people and hitting them with a stick (Singley v. State,      256 Ala. 56, 53 So.2d 729); and, as here, for use or sale of drugs (Hack v. United      States, 445 A.2d 634, supra; see, also, People v. Calvano, 30 N.Y.2d 199, 206‐207, 331     N.Y.S.2d 430, 282 N.E.2d 322).  

    (j)  Pedigree        1)  Elements 

        a)  Declarant is dead;         b)  Declarant was related by blood or affinity to the family about         which he speaks; and         c)  The statement was made before the controversy giving rise to          the litigation in which the statement is offered. 

                 In re Powers’ Estate,  96 N.Y.S.2d 25 (Sur. Ct., N.Y. Co., 1950). It was alleged by      the objectant, Hollis Powers Gale, that in addition to the five persons above      named, Emory Powers and Hannah King Powers had two other children who      died in infancy. No proof was offered to substantiate the contention that either of     these children ever existed. In the petition for probate of the will of Hollis Lyman     Powers (2), verified February 20th, 1886 by his brother, Ellis King Powers, the      father of the decedent, and filed in this Court February 27th, 1886, the decedentʹs      father, who later died on November 29th, 1888 in New York City, listed himself      and his sister, Maranda P. Gale (Hannah Maranda Powers (1)) as the sole next of      kin of Hollis Lyman Powers. Neither of the unnamed children was listed or      referred to in the petition. The petition was received in evidence as a proper      pedigree statement. Pedigree is the lineage, descent and succession of families. In     an issue with respect to descent or relationship, particular facts, such as births,      marriages and deaths, may be proved by hearsay evidence, consisting of    

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    declarations of persons who from their situation were likely to know, and such      statements are admissible when the person making the declarations is dead.      Washington v. Bank for Savings in City of New York, 171 N.Y. 166, 173, 63 N.E.      831, 833, 89 Am.St.Rep. 800.      (k)  Public documents      People v. Baker, 183 Misc.2d 650, 705 N.Y.S.2d 846 (County Ct., Oneida Co.,      2000). A Department of Motor Vehicles abstract that is properly authenticated      (CPLR 4540) and that meets the several requirements of the statute may be used      to provide competent proof of prior convictions of the named defendant (see      People v. Michaels, 174 Misc.2d 982, 667 N.Y.S.2d 646 [1997]; People v. Carlsons, 171      Misc.2d 943, 656 N.Y.S.2d 116 [1997]; People v. Pabon, 167 Misc.2d 214, 640       N.Y.S.2d 421 [1995]; People v. Meyer, 177 Misc.2d 537, 679 N.Y.S.2d 497, lv. denied      92 N.Y.2d 901, 680 N.Y.S.2d 65, 702 N.E.2d 850). Admissibility ʺ... is as much      dependent upon authentication as is admissibility under the common‐law public     documents exception to the hearsay ruleʺ  * (People v. Garneau, 120 A.D.2d 112,      116, 507 N.Y.S.2d 931 [Fourth Dept.1986], lv. denied 69 N.Y.2d 880, 515 N.Y.S.2d      1028, 507 N.E.2d 1098).      A third exception, the common law public document exception, provides that      when a public officer is  required or authorized statutorily or by the nature of his      or her official duties to keep records of transactions occurring in the course of      such duties, the records made by or under the supervision of the public officer      are admissible (People v. Minck, 21 N.Y. 539, 1860 WL 7869; Prince, Richardson on     Evidence, § 8‐1101 [Farrell 11th ed.] ). When the document is offered under this      exception to the hearsay rule, proper authentication is nonetheless required      (People v. Garneau, supra; CPLR 4540). The Department of Motor Vehicles abstract      is not an original document, and is a copy that still requires certification or      attestation (People v. Smith, 258 A.D.2d 245, 697 N.Y.S.2d 783 [Fourth Dept.], lv.      denied, 94 N.Y.2d 829, 702 N.Y.S.2d 600, 724 N.E.2d 392 [1999] ).          Authentication under either the statutory or common‐law public document      exception is a two‐step process. If the document  * is attested as correct by the      official or deputy having legal custody of it, it becomes ʺ... prima facie evidence      of such recordʺ (CPLR 4540(a)). Attestation involves a comparison of the copy      with the original and a statement of the accuracy of the copy. The additional      standard to be satisfied for proper authentication is compliance with one of the      three allowable methods of certification (CPLR 4540 (b)). In connection with      Department of Motor Vehicles abstracts, use of ʺ... a facsimile of the signature of,      the officer having legal custody of the original ... with his official seal affixed ...ʺ      (CPLR 4540(b)) is a common method.  

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    A ʺDriver License Suspension Orderʺ issued by the Commissioner of Motor      Vehicles was felt to be properly authenticated when there was a certification that      it was a true and complete copy of a record on file in the Department, and the      certification contained a reproduction of the Commissionerʹs signature (People v.      Pabon, 167 Misc.2d 214, 640 N.Y.S.2d 421). A Department of Motor Vehicles      abstract certified with the facsimile signature of the Commissioner of Motor      Vehicles was admitted into evidence by a trial court in the absence of testimony      that there was improper certification (People v. Meyer, supra; contrast People v.      Smith, 258 A.D.2d 245, 697 N.Y.S.2d 783, supra ). The Department of Motor      Vehicles abstract was allowed into evidence at trial as properly authenticated,      where it contained the seal of the state, the appropriate certification language,      and a facsimile signature of the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles (People v.      Michaels, supra ). A Department of Motor Vehicles abstract of defendantʹs driving      record, offered to establish a prior suspension, was also admitted by a trial court      under both the statutory and common‐law public records exceptions, taking into      account Vehicle & Traffic Law § 354 (People v. Kollore, 151 Misc.2d 384, 573      N.Y.S.2d 357).      On the other hand, a trial order of dismissal was granted when the Department      of Motor Vehicles abstract was concededly a blank form that contained the      attestation and seal on it prior to impressing any driving record information      thereon (People v. Watson, 167 Misc.2d 441, 634 N.Y.S.2d 634). Failure to properly      attest a Department of Motor Vehicles abstract prevents its use by the Grand Jury     because of the improper authentication (People v. Carlsons, supra ). Also, placing      defendantʹs driving record on the document after the seal and certification had      already been affixed on the blank document is fatal to the admissibility of the      Department of Motor Vehicles abstract (People v. Smith, 258 A.D.2d 245, 697      N.Y.S.2d 783, supra; see also People v. Garneau, supra ).                              

                           CRAMER  v. KUHNS ,213 A.D.2d 131, 630 N.Y.S.2d 128 (3d Dep’t 1995).      

  On May 24, 1987, plaintiff was a passenger on a 1982 Harley Davidson Roadster motorcycle operated by defendant Mark W. Kuhns. While making a sweeping left‐ hand turn at approximately 50 miles per hour, plaintiff and Kuhns heard a scraping sound at which time the motorcycle, instead of continuing the turn, went straight ahead into the guardrail. An investigation following the accident revealed a long scrape in the pavement beginning where the motorcycle went out of control and ending where it collided with the guardrail. As a consequence of the accident, plaintiffʹs foot was nearly severed at the ankle and her arm was nearly severed at the elbow, rendering her permanently disabled. 

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 Plaintiff commenced this personal injury action seeking $2 million in damages. The complaint alleged that Kuhns negligently operated the motorcycle, that defendant Harley Davidson Motor Company Inc. (hereinafter Harley) negligently designed, manufactured and sold the motorcycle, and that Harley was strictly liable for the defective design and manufacture of the motorcycle and for failing to warn of its defect. The alleged design defect was the motorcycleʹs side stand, which either dropped down or was left down by Kuhns and failed to retract upon impact with the pavement.***The most compelling argument made by Harley is its contention that Supreme Court erred in admitting into evidence a study undertaken by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (hereinafter NHTSA) in 1984 examining side stand retraction on 1975 to 1982 model motorcycles manufactured by five companies, one of which was Harley. The study contained, inter alia, the results of tests conducted by Dynamic Science Inc. on the side stand apparatus of 14 models of motorcycles, including a 1981 Harley model, and the results of a mail survey conducted by NHTSA, wherein owners of models manufactured by the five companies studied responded to questions about their experiences with side stands contacting the ground. Finally, the study contained reports of accidents allegedly caused by side stand failures** 

As a starting point, the study itself was hearsay and, as such, needed to fall within a recognized exception to the hearsay doctrine in order to be admissible. In this regard, we note that inasmuch as no one from the NHTSA testified at trial, the study could not have been admitted as a business record (see, CPLR 4518). As to whether the study could have been admitted under the public document exception (see, CPLR 4520), we note that the admissibility of a government investigative report under this provision has not been definitively addressed in this State (see, Alexander, Practice Commentaries, McKinneyʹs Cons.Laws of N.Y., Book 7B, CPLR C4520:3, at 245‐247). 

It has been suggested, however, that we might derive some guidance on this point from examining the judicial treatment accorded to the Federal counterpart to CPLR 4520, Federal Rules of Evidence, rule 803(8)(C), which ʺprovides for the *136 admission in evidence, in civil actions, of government agency reports which otherwise would be excludable as hearsay, if those reports constitute ʹfactual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthinessʹ ʺ (City of New York v. Pullman Inc., 662 F.2d 910, 914 (2d Cir.1981), cert. denied sub nom. Rockwell Intl. Corp. v. City of New York, 454 U.S. 1164, 102 S.Ct. 1038, 71 L.Ed.2d 320, quoting Fed.Rules Evid., rule 803[8][C] ). The admission of a government report under this provision is committed to the trial courtʹs sound discretion and will hinge upon ʺwhether the hearsay document offered in evidence has sufficient independent indicia of reliability to justify its admissionʺ (id., at 914). To that end, it has been suggested that factors 

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to be weighed in determining the documentʹs trustworthiness and reliability, among other things, might include (1) the timeliness of the investigation, (2) the skill and/or experience of the investigator, (3) whether the report was based upon testimony adduced at a hearing, and (4) the possibility of bias (see, Alexander, Practice Commentaries, McKinneyʹs Cons.Laws of N.Y., Book 7B, CPLR C4520:3, at 246). 

Applying this analysis to the document before us, we are of the view that the NHTSA study does not fall within the scope of the public document exception contemplated by CPLR 4520. The study itself was preliminary in nature; no public findings were released and no recalls were issued. Additionally, the study was exceedingly brief in nature, and there was very little detail provided as to the actual tests conducted upon the various motorcycle models. Finally, the ʺobservationsʺ contained in the study were based, in part, upon the owner surveys and accident reports, neither of which were admissible, [FN1] and such observations were presented in a most conclusory fashion. Such deficiencies, coupled with the absence of testimony from anyone actually involved in the study, persuade *137 us that the study and the accompanying videotape should not have been admitted into evidence. 

FN1. We note that the owner surveys are rank hearsay, and we are aware of no exception to the hearsay doctrine that would permit the results of such surveys to be received into evidence. Additionally, with respect to reports of prior accidents, such evidence would be admissible ʺonly upon a showing that the relevant conditions of the subject accident and the previous one[s] were substantially the sameʺ (Hyde v. County of Rensselaer, 51 N.Y.2d 927, 929, 434 N.Y.S.2d 984, 415 N.E.2d 972). No such showing has been made on this record and, in view of the limited information contained in the NHTSA study, it does not appear that such a showing could be made. Accordingly, the NHTSAʹs reliance upon such information in making its observations only serves to further undermine the studyʹs level of trustworthiness and reliability. 

     (l)  Expert witness reports may not be based on hearsay, unless the hearsay      information is material generally accepted as reliable in the area of expertise.      Erosa v. Rinaldi, 270 A.D.2d 384, 704 N.Y.S.2d 891 (2d Dep’t, 2000). ʺIt is settled      and unquestioned law that opinion evidence must be based on facts in the      record or personally known to the witnessʺ (Cassano v. Hagstrom, 5 N.Y.2d 643,      646, 187N.Y.S.2d 1, 159 N.E.2d 348; see also, Arce v. New York City Housing Auth.,      265 A.D.2d 281, 696 N.Y.S.2d 67). Limited exceptions to this rule permit expert      witnesses to base their opinions upon materials accepted in their profession as      reliable, or upon information  provided by other witnesses who are subject to full      cross‐examination at trial (see, People  v. Sugden, 35 N.Y.2d 453, 460‐461, 363  

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    N.Y.S.2d 923, 323 N.E.2d 169). However, expert witnesses may not rely upon out‐     of‐court materials which have not been established to be reliable (see, Hambsch v.      New York City Tr. Auth., 63 N.Y.2d 723, 480 N.Y.S.2d 195, 469 N.E.2d 516), or base     their conclusions upon the opinions of physicians who did not   testify at trial      (see, OʹShea v. Sarro, 106 A.D.2d 435, 482 N.Y.S.2d 529; Borden v. Brady, 92  A.D.2d     983, 984, 461 N.Y.S.2d 497) Here, the defendantʹs expert medical witness, who      did not examine the plaintiff, based his opinion largely upon the defendantʹs      office   records, operative report, and post‐operative X‐rays. The defendantʹs      expert also relied, inter alia, on reports prepared by four other physicians who      examined the plaintiff. Although the court  * agreed, over objection, to allow the      defendantʹs expert to testify ʺsubject to connectionʺ, the defendant doctor did not     take the stand himself, and his office records, operative report, and post‐       operative X‐rays were never admitted into   evidence. Furthermore, only two of      the four physicians who conducted physical examinations of the plaintiff       testified at trial. Under these circumstances, the defendant  failed to establish an      adequate factual basis for the admission of the opinion testimony  of his sole      expert witness (see, Hambsch v. New York City Tr. Auth., supra; Nuzzo v.        Castellano, 254 A.D.2d 265, 678 N.Y.S.2d 118; OʹShea v. Sarro, supra), and a new      trial is  warranted.      Ames Department Stores Inc. v. Assessor of the Town of Greenport,                               276 A.D.2d 890, 714 N.Y.S.2d 362 (3d Dep’t, 2000). An expert cannot reach a      conclusion by assuming material facts not supported by evidence (see, Cassano v.      Hagstrom, 5 N.Y.2d 643, 646, 187 N.Y.S.2d 1, 159 N.E.2d 348). Here, however,      petitionerʹs appraiser relied upon information from a verified statement   of      income and expenses which, by failing to timely request an audit, respondents      effectively conceded was accurate and reliable. Petitionerʹs appraiser also relied      on information contained in a lease abstract. An expert may rely on material      which is of a kind accepted in the profession as reliable (see, Hambsch v. New York      City Tr. Auth., 63 N.Y.2d 723, 726, 480 N.Y.S.2d 195, 469 N.E.2d 516) and Supreme     Court acknowledged  that petitionerʹs appraiser, who was stipulated to be an      expert, customarily based his conclusions on the type of information that formed      the basis of his opinions in this case.  In addition, it is apparent from respondentsʹ     appraisal report that respondentsʹ appraiser relied on the same information      utilized by petitionerʹs expert, including the lease abstract.    

HORNBROOK v. GREEK PEAK/PEAK RESORTS, INC. Supreme Court, Tompkins County, New York. 

2002 WL 1967928 (N.Y.Sup.), 2002 N.Y. Slip Op. 40348(U), May 29, 2002.  This is a motion in limine. Plaintiff, at trial, will seek to prove that a ski lift injury sustained on January 24, 1997 resulted in an injury to the left femur, chronic pain and a 

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permanent partial disability. Defendant ski operator will contest that causal connection. Since January 1997 plaintiff has been treated by no less than five physicians and surgeons and has undergone three surgeries. However, none of these treating doctors will be called by the plaintiff to give testimony and none have been deposed. Instead, plaintiff proposes to call a single medical expert witness, an orthopod, who saw the plaintiff only once on February 18, 2002, five years after the injury. The expert, Dr. Maloney, has read the written evaluations of Doctors Anderson, Racker, Garner, Damron and Weiner and is prepared to testify to the findings, diagnoses, operative procedures, results and prognoses found in the notes and written reports of these treating doctors. 

 We assume that the notes and records routinely kept by the treating doctors in the course of their practice will be produced and identified at trial and will be authenticated by a witness with personal knowledge of such record keeping matters. Certified hospital records, presumably, will also be produced. Business entries of this kind are admissible in evidence for the truth of the matters asserted in such records. (CPLR §§2306, 4518 (c) and 4532‐a; Wilson v. Bodian, 130 A.D.2d 221, 519 N.Y.S.2d 126).  Assuming that no such foundation is laid, however, a much different issue may arise. The Court of Appeals, in People v. Stone, 35 N.Y.2d 69, 358 N.Y.S.2d 737 and People v. Sugden, 35 N.Y.2d 453, 363 N.Y.S.2d 923, 323 N.E.2d 169, relaxed the rule which required that an expert witness must render an opinion based only upon facts personally known by the witness or facts supported by evidence in the trial record. Dr. Maloney, of course, has no personal knowledge of the treatment rendered to plaintiff by the other doctors whose records he reviewed. Absent a proper foundation, the other records would not be in evidence.  The enlarged rule, in Stone and Sugden, supra, permits the expert, in addition to facts in evidence, to ʺrely on material, albeit of out‐of‐court origin, if it is of a kind accepted in the profession as reliable in forming a professional opinion...ʺ (35 N.Y.2d at 460‐461, 363 N.Y.S.2d 923, 323 N.E.2d 169). This open door was narrowed, however, in Hambsch v. New York City Transit Authority, 63 N.Y.2d 723, 480 N.Y.S.2d 195, 469 N.E.2d 516, which added an important caveat. The proponent must produce evidence that the hearsay record or statement is reliable. ʺIt is not enough merely to ... show that other experts rely on the same type of materials in forming similar opinionsʺ (New York Evidence Handbook §7.3.3 at p. 676). Moreover, it has been held that the out‐of‐court material relied upon by the expert, however reliable, must not be the ʺprincipal basisʺ for an opinion on the ultimate issue in the case, rather than merely forming a link in the chain of data which led the expert to the opinion (Borden v. Brady, 92 A.D.2d 983, 461 N.Y.S.2d 497). That issue, we gather, is whether the fall from the ski lift caused a fracture which, in turn, awakened the latent femoral lesion, thus causing the chronic pain and permanent partial disability of the left leg. 

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 More fundamentally, the courts of New York have been reluctant to permit any but a treating physician to rely upon the ʺaccepted or reliableʺ exception to the rule against hearsay. The reason is plain. The exception, in respect to medical opinions, is grounded upon the universal understanding that doctors make life and death decisions in reliance upon ʺinformation from numerous sources and considerable variety, including statements by patients and relatives, reports and opinions from nurses, technicians and other doctors, hospital records and x‐raysʺ. (Advisory Committee Note, §703, Federal Rules of Evidence). Information of this kind, by its nature, is inherently reliable. Where the out‐of‐court information is not used for the purpose of treatment, by a doctor who has the actual care of the patient, there is no such assurance of reliability.  ʺA report used only for testimony obviously lacks the guarantees of reliability found in a report actually relied upon for treatment decisions affecting a patientʹs health. Not surprisingly, therefore, the case law consistently holds that a non‐treating expert may not testify based on the report of another physician, where the report is not independently admitted and the other physician is not a witness at trial.ʺ (ʺNeed for a Testifying Physician To Rely on Reports by a Non‐Testifying Physician Poses Evidentiary Problemsʺ, Friedman, N.Y.S. Bar Journal, Nov‐Dec 2001, p. 28 at 29).  Where a treating doctor refers a patient to a consulting doctor for evaluation and the resulting report is used by the referring doctor in order to treat the patient, the reliability of the report is evident. Here, the out‐of‐court materials were generated by a series of treating doctors but were not used by the testifying doctor to treat the patient. Hence, it is not the reliability of the out‐of‐court materials that gives pause but the use to which these records and reports will be put by the testifying but non‐treating expert.  Dr. Maloneyʹs report to plaintiffʹs counsel appears to have winnowed through what may be a great mass of material from a series of reports by treating doctors. His report quotes or paraphrases isolated comments, observations and conclusions from those reports to generate an opinion on some of the ultimate issues in the case. These include the causal connection between the fall at the ski lift and the fracture and the course of subsequent chronic pain treatment and surgical interventions. The opinion connects the injury to the fall and finds that this is the injury which has resulted in a permanent partial disability. Maloney also implicitly opines that hardware implant, installed by one of the treating surgeons, did not cause an additional bone fracture of the femur as the result of malpractice.  Justice Friedman notes, in her New York State Bar Journal article (supra) that: ʺ... the reliability of the out‐of‐court material is not the only factor the courts must consider in determining the permissible basis for an expert opinion. The interest of the opposing party in confronting witnesses on crucial issues in the case must also be taken into account. A compelling argument may be made that this interest is unfairly overlooked 

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by an evidentiary rule that would permit even a treating doctor either to base an opinion about a crucial issue ... primarily upon another doctorʹs report, or to testify about the contents of the other doctorʹs report when the other doctor is not subject to cross examination.ʺ  This issue, as Justice Friedman points out, has not been expressly discussed in prior opinions but ʺmay explain why the Borden v. Brady majority opinion remains good lawʺ. Even assuming the Borden minority view ultimately prevails, which would permit an expert opinion on the ultimate issue, the circumstances of the case at bar strongly suggest that the People v. Sugden exception is not broad enough to permit Dr. Maloney to express an opinion based upon selected excerpts from the records accumulated over several years by treating doctors, none of whom will be called to testify at trial and none of whom have been deposed under oath. The defendantʹs confrontation interests are squarely implicated when the complete and authenticated records of the treating doctors are not offered and received in evidence and a non‐treating expert is permitted to render opinions based upon selected excerpts. 

 Concededly, authority may be found to condone the use of unadmitted x‐rays and similar out‐of‐court test results by a non‐treating expert witness (Pegg v. Shahin, 237 A.D.2d 271, 654 N.Y.S.2d 395; Karayianakis v L & E Grommery, Inc., 141 A.D.2d 610, 529 N.Y.S.2d 358). However, these opinions emphasize that the out‐of‐court materials merely served to confirm the conclusions drawn by the testifying expert based upon the expertʹs independent examination and findings. Notably, the unadmitted reports involved objective test results which, presumably, were available to defendants and could not be easily misrepresented. Here, Dr. Maloney may be used as a mere conduit by which to funnel out‐of‐court material into evidence, much of it dealing with non‐objective diagnostic and prognostic impressions of considerable subtlety. His selective characterizations of these materials may suggest conclusions not intended by the authors. Under these circumstances, the plaintiff will have failed to establish an adequate basis for the admission of opinion testimony based on these out‐of‐court materials (Erosa v. Rinaldi, 270 A.D.2d 384 at 385, 704 N.Y.S.2d 891). 

 An exception broad enough to accommodate Dr. Maloneyʹs opinion evidence would transform our adversary system into what has been described as ʺtrial by dossierʺ. The reluctance of our courts to permit that trend is seen in Brown v. County of Albany, 271 A.D.2d 819, 706 N.Y.S.2d 261, lv. den. 95 N.Y.2d 767, 717 N.Y.S.2d 547, 740 N.E.2d 653, in which the defendantʹs right to cross examine the doctor whose records were admitted in evidence, but who did not appear at trial, seems to have been a paramount factor in excluding such material.  Dr. Maloneyʹs expert testimony, therefore, must be limited to his own physical examination and any diagnosis/prognosis he may be able to form based upon his own findings. He may rely upon certified out‐of‐court x‐rays, bone scan or MRI reports 

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providing such objective test results are used as part of the data and information he employed to reach his own opinion. He may not rely upon the out‐of‐court records, opinions or impressions of treating doctors which are not admitted in evidence under an independent exception to the rule against hearsay. These materials, we emphasize, were not used by Dr. Maloney for purposes of treatment but only for the purpose of developing opinion evidence to be used in support of plaintiffʹs personal injury litigation.  

2.  Statutory Exceptions to the Rule Against Hearsay 

(A) Civil Practice Law and Rules  § 4508. Social worker  (a) Confidential information privileged. A person duly registered as a certified social worker under the provisions of article one hundred fifty‐four of the education law shall not be required to disclose a communication made by his client to him, or his advice given thereon, in the course of his professional employment, nor shall any clerk, stenographer or other person working for the same employer as the certified social worker or for the certified social worker be allowed to disclose any such communication or advice given thereon; except  3. where the client is a child under the age of sixteen and the information acquired by the certified social worker indicates that the client has been the victim or subject of a crime, the certified social worker may be required to testify fully in relation thereto upon any examination, trial or other proceeding in which the commission of such crime is a subject of inquiry;  Rule 4515. Form of expert opinion  Unless the court orders otherwise, questions calling for the opinion of an expert witness need not be hypothetical in form, and the witness may state his opinion and reasons without first specifying the data upon which it is based. Upon cross‐examination, he may be required to specify the data and other criteria supporting the opinion.  Rule 4517. Prior testimony in a civil action  (a) Impeachment of witnesses; parties; unavailable witness. In a civil action, at the trial or upon the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding, all or any part of the testimony of a witness that was taken at a prior trial in the same action or at a prior trial involving the same parties or their representatives and arising from the same subject matter, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence, may be used in accordance with any of the following provisions:   

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1. any such testimony may be used by any party for the purpose of contradicting or impeaching the testimony of the same witness;   2. the prior trial testimony of a party or of any person who was a party when the testimony was given or of any person who at the time the testimony was given was an officer, director, member, employee, or managing or authorized agent of a party, may be used for any purpose by any party who is adversely interested when the prior testimony is offered in evidence;  3. the prior trial testimony of any person may be used by any party for any purpose against any other party, provided the court finds:     (i) that the witness is dead; or    (ii) that the witness is at a greater distance than one hundred miles from the place of trial   or is out of the state, unless it appears that the absence of the witness was procured by   the party offering the testimony; or    (iii) that the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or   imprisonment; or    (iv) that the party offering the testimony has been unable to procure the attendance of   the witness by diligent efforts; or    (v) upon motion on notice, that such exceptional circumstances exist as to make its use   desirable, in the interest of justice and with due regard to the importance of presenting   the testimony of witnesses orally in open court;  4. the prior trial testimony of a person authorized to practice medicine may be used by any party without the necessity of showing unavailability or special circumstances subject to the right of any party to move for preclusion upon the ground that admission of the prior testimony would be prejudicial under the circumstances.  (b) Use of part of the prior trial testimony of a witness. If only part of the prior trial testimony of a witness is read at the trial by a party, any other party may read any other part of the prior testimony of that witness that ought in fairness to be considered in connection with the part read.  (c) Substitution of parties; prior actions. Substitution of parties does not affect the right to use testimony previously taken at trial.   

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 Rule 4518. Business records  (a) Generally. Any writing or record, whether in the form of an entry in a book or otherwise, made as a memorandum or record of any act, transaction, occurrence or event, shall be admissible in evidence in proof of that act, transaction, occurrence or event, if the judge finds that it was made in the regular course of any business and that it was the regular course of such business to make it, at the time of the act, transaction, occurrence or event, or within a reasonable time thereafter. An electronic record, as defined in section one hundred two of the state technology law, used or stored as such a memorandum or record, shall be admissible in a tangible exhibit that is a true and accurate representation of such electronic record. The court may consider the method or manner by which the electronic record was stored, maintained or retrieved in determining whether the exhibit is a true and accurate representation of such electronic record. All other circumstances of the making of the memorandum or record, including lack of personal knowledge by the maker, may be proved to affect its weight, but they shall not affect its admissibility. The term business includes a business, profession, occupation and calling of every kind.   (b) Hospital bills. A hospital bill is admissible in evidence under this rule and is prima facie evidence of the facts contained, provided it bears a certification by the head of the hospital or by a responsible employee in the controllerʹs or accounting office that the bill is correct, that each of the items was necessarily supplied and that the amount charged is reasonable. This subdivision shall not apply to any proceeding in a surrogateʹs court nor in any action instituted by or on behalf of a hospital to recover payment for accommodations or supplies furnished or for services rendered by or in such hospital, except that in a proceeding pursuant to section one hundred eighty‐nine of the lien law to determine the validity and extent of the lien of a hospital, such certified hospital bills are prima facie evidence of the fact of services and of the reasonableness of any charges which do not exceed the comparable charges made by the hospital in the care of workmenʹs compensation patients.   (c) Other records. All records, writings and other things referred to in sections 2306 and 2307 are admissible in evidence under this rule and are prima facie evidence of the facts contained, provided they bear a certification or authentication by the head of the hospital, laboratory, department or bureau of a municipal corporation or of the state, or by an employee delegated for that purpose or by a qualified physician. Where a hospital record is in the custody of a warehouse, or ʺwarehousemanʺ as that term is defined by paragraph (h) of subdivision one of section 7‐102 of the uniform commercial code, pursuant to a plan approved in writing by the state commissioner of health, admissibility under this subdivision may be established by a certification made by the manager of the warehouse that sets forth (i) the authority by which the record is held, including but not limited to a court order, order of the commissioner, or order or resolution of the governing body or official of the hospital, and (ii) that the record has been in 

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the exclusive custody of such warehouse or warehousemen since its receipt from the hospital or, if another has had access to it, the name and address of such person and the date on which and the circumstances under which such access was had. Any warehouseman providing a certification as required by this subdivision shall have no liability for acts or omissions relating thereto, except for intentional misconduct, and the warehouseman is authorized to assess and collect a reasonable charge for providing the certification described by this subdivision.  (d) Any records or reports relating to the administration and analysis of a genetic marker or DNA test, including records or reports of the costs of such tests, administered pursuant to sections four hundred eighteen and five hundred thirty‐two of the family court act or section one hundred eleven‐k of the social services law are admissible in evidence under this rule and are prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein provided they bear a certification or authentication by the head of the hospital, laboratory, department or bureau of a municipal corporation or the state or by an employee delegated for that purpose, or by a qualified physician. If such record or report relating to the administration and analysis of a genetic marker test or DNA test or tests administered pursuant to sections four hundred eighteen and five hundred thirty‐two of the family court act or section one hundred eleven‐k of the social services law indicates at least a ninety‐five percent probability of paternity, the admission of such record or report shall create a rebuttable presumption of paternity, and shall, if unrebutted, establish the paternity of and liability for the support of a child pursuant to articles four and five of the family court act.  (e) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a record or report relating to the administration and analysis of a genetic marker test or DNA test certified in accordance with subdivision (d) of this rule and administered pursuant to sections four hundred eighteen and five hundred thirty‐two of the family court act or section one hundred eleven‐k of the social services law is admissible in evidence under this rule without the need for foundation testimony or further proof of authenticity or accuracy unless objections to the record or report are made in writing no later than twenty days before a hearing at which the record or report may be introduced into evidence or thirty days after receipt of the test results, whichever is earlier.  (f) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, records or reports of support payments and disbursements maintained pursuant to title six‐A of article three of the social services law by the department of social services or the fiscal agent under contract to the department for the provision of centralized collection and disbursement functions are admissible in evidence under this rule, provided that they bear a certification by an official of a social services district attesting to the accuracy of the content of the record or report of support payments and that in attesting to the accuracy of the record or report such official has received confirmation from the department of social services or the fiscal agent under contract to the department for the provision of centralized collection and disbursement functions pursuant to section one hundred eleven‐h of the social services law that the record or report of support payments reflects the processing of all support payments in the possession of the department or the fiscal agent as of a specified date, and that the document is a record or report of support payments maintained 

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pursuant to title six‐A of article three of the social services law. If so certified, such record or report shall be admitted into evidence under this rule without the need for additional foundation testimony. Such records shall be the basis for a permissive inference of the facts contained therein unless the trier of fact finds good cause not to draw such inference.   (g) Pregnancy and childbirth costs. Any hospital bills or records relating to the costs of pregnancy or birth of a child for whom proceedings to establish paternity, pursuant to sections four hundred eighteen and five hundred thirty‐two of the family court act or section one hundred eleven‐k of the social services law have been or are being undertaken, are admissible in evidence under this rule and are prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein, provided they bear a certification or authentication by the head of the hospital, laboratory, department or bureau of a municipal corporation or the state or by an employee designated for that purpose, or by a qualified physician.   Rule 4520. Certificate or affidavit of public officer  Where a public officer is required or authorized, by special provision of law, to make a certificate or an affidavit to a fact ascertained, or an act performed, by him in the course of his official duty, and to file or deposit it in a public office of the state, the certificate or affidavit so filed or deposited is prima facie evidence of the facts stated.  Rule 4521. Lack of record  A statement signed by an officer or a deputy of an officer having legal custody of specified official records of the United States or of any state, territory or jurisdiction of the United States, or of any court thereof, or kept in any public office thereof, that he has made diligent search of the records and has found no record or entry of a specified nature, is prima facie evidence that the records contain no such record or entry, provided that the statement is accompanied by a certificate that legal custody of the specified official records belongs to such person, which certificate shall be made by a person described in rule 4540.  Rule 4522. Ancient filed maps, surveys and records affecting real property  All maps, surveys and official records affecting real property, which have been on file in the state in the office of the register of any county, any county clerk, any court of record or any department of the city of New York for more than ten years, are prima facie evidence of their contents.     

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 Rule 4523. Search by title insurance or abstract company  A search affecting real property, when made and certified to by a title insurance, abstract or searching company, organized under the laws of this state, may be used in place of, and with the same legal effect as, an official search.  Rule 4524. Conveyance of real property without the state  A record of a conveyance of real property situated within another state, territory or jurisdiction of the United States, recorded therein pursuant to its laws, is prima facie evidence of conveyance and of due execution.  Rule 4525. Copies of statements under article nine of the uniform commercial code  A copy of a statement which is noted or certified by a filing officer pursuant to section 9‐523 of the uniform commercial code and which states that the copy is a true copy is prima facie evidence of the facts stated in the notation or certification and that the copy is a true copy of a statement filed in the office of the filing officer.  Rule 4526. Marriage certificate  An original certificate of a marriage made by the person by whom it was solemnized within the state, or the original entry thereof made pursuant to law in the office of the clerk of a city or a town within the state, is prima facie evidence of the marriage.  § 4527. Death or other status of missing person  (a) Presumed death. A written finding of presumed death, made by any person authorized to make such findings by the federal missing persons act is prima facie evidence of the death, and the date, circumstances and place of disappearance. In the case of a merchant seaman, a written finding of presumed death, made by the maritime war emergency board or by the war shipping administration or the successors or assigns of such board or administration in connection with war risk insurance is prima facie evidence of the death, and the date, circumstances and place of disappearance.  (b) Death, internment, capture and other status. An official written report or record that a person is missing, missing in action, interned in a neutral country, or beleaguered, besieged or captured by an enemy, or is dead, or is alive, made by an officer or employee of the United States authorized by law of the United States to make it is prima facie evidence of such fact.    

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 Rule 4528. Weather conditions  Any record of the observations of the weather, taken under the direction of the United States weather bureau, is prima facie evidence of the facts stated.  Rule 4529. Inspection certificate issued by United States department of agriculture  An inspection certificate issued by the authorized agents of the United States department of agriculture on file with the United States secretary of agriculture is prima facie evidence of the facts stated.  § 4530. Certificate of population  (a) Prima facie evidence. A certificate of the officer in charge of the census of the United States, attested by the United States secretary of commerce, giving the result of the census is, except as hereinafter provided, prima facie evidence of such result.  (b) Conclusive evidence. Where the population of the state or a subdivision, or a portion of a subdivision of the state is required to be determined according to the federal or state census or enumeration last preceding a particular time, a certificate of the officer in charge of the census of the United States, attested by the United States secretary of commerce, as to such population as shown by such federal census, or a certificate of the secretary of state as to such population as shown by such state enumeration, is conclusive evidence of such population.  § 4530. Certificate of population  (a) Prima facie evidence. A certificate of the officer in charge of the census of the United States, attested by the United States secretary of commerce, giving the result of the census is, except as hereinafter provided, prima facie evidence of such result.  (b) Conclusive evidence. Where the population of the state or a subdivision, or a portion of a subdivision of the state is required to be determined according to the federal or state census or enumeration last preceding a particular time, a certificate of the officer in charge of the census of the United States, attested by the United States secretary of commerce, as to such population as shown by such federal census, or a certificate of the secretary of state as to such population as shown by such state enumeration, is conclusive evidence of such population.  Rule 4532. Self‐authentication of newspapers and periodicals of general circulation  Extrinsic evidence of authenticity as a condition precedent to admissibility is not required with respect to printed materials purporting to be newspapers or periodicals of general circulation; provided however, nothing herein shall be deemed to preclude or limit the right of a party to 

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challenge the authenticity of such printed material, by extrinsic evidence or otherwise, prior to admission by the court or to raise the issue of authenticity as an issue of fact.  Rule 4532‐a. Admissibility of graphic, numerical, symbolic or pictorial representations of medical or diagnostic tests in personal injury actions  In an action in which a claim for personal injuries is asserted, a graphic, numerical, symbolic or pictorial representation of the results of a medical or diagnostic procedure or test taken of a patient by a medical practitioner or medical facility is admissible in evidence provided:  (1) that there is inscribed on such graphic, numerical, symbolic or pictorial representation, the name of the injured party, the date when the information constituting the graphic, numerical, symbolic or pictorial representation was taken, the identifying number thereof, and the name and address of the physician under whose supervision the same was taken;  (2) in the event said exhibit has not previously been examined by the party or parties against whom it is offered, that at least ten days before the date of trial of the action, the attorney for the party intending to offer such graphic, numerical, symbolic or pictorial representation as a proposed exhibit serves upon the attorney or attorneys for the party or parties against whom said proposed exhibit is to be offered, a notice of his or her intention to offer such proposed exhibit in evidence during the trial and that the same is available for inspection at his or her office; and  (3) that the notice aforesaid is accompanied by an affidavit or affirmation of such physician identifying such graphic, numerical, symbolic or pictorial representation and attesting to the information inscribed thereon, and further attesting that, if called as a witness in the action, he or she would so testify.  Nothing contained in this section, however, shall prohibit the admissibility of a graphic, numerical, symbolic or pictorial representation in evidence in a personal injury action where otherwise admissible.    Rule 4533. Market reports  A report of a regularly organized stock or commodity market published in a newspaper or periodical of general circulation or in an official publication or trade journal is admissible in evidence to prove the market price or value of any article regularly sold or dealt in on such market. The circumstances of the preparation of such a report may be shown to affect its weight, but they shall not affect its admissibility.   

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 Rule 4533‐a. Prima facie proof of damages  An itemized bill or invoice, receipted or marked paid, for services or repairs of an amount not in excess of two thousand dollars is admissible in evidence and is prima facie evidence of the reasonable value and necessity of such services or repairs itemized therein in any civil action provided it bears a certification by the person, firm or corporation, or an authorized agent or employee thereof, rendering such services or making such repairs and charging for the same, and contains a verified statement that no part of the payment received therefor will be refunded to the debtor, and that the amounts itemized therein are the usual and customary rates charged for such services or repairs by the affiant or his employer; and provided further that a true copy of such itemized bill or invoice together with a notice of intention to introduce such bill or invoice into evidence pursuant to this rule is served upon each party at least ten days before the trial. No more than one bill or invoice from the same person, firm or corporation to the same debtor shall be admissible in evidence under this rule in the same action.  Rule 4534. Standard of measurement used by surveyor  An official certificate of any state, county, city, village or town sealer elected or appointed pursuant to the laws of the state, or the statement under oath of a surveyor, that the chain or measure used by him conformed to the state standard at the time a survey was made is prima facie evidence of conformity, and an official certificate made by any sealer that the implement used in measuring such chain or other measure was the one provided the sealer pursuant to the provisions of the laws of the state is prima facie evidence of that fact.  Rule 4538. Acknowledged, proved or certified writing; conveyance of real property without the state  Certification of the acknowledgment or proof of a writing, except a will, in the manner prescribed by law for taking and certifying the acknowledgment or proof of a conveyance of real property within the state is prima facie evidence that it was executed by the person who purported to do so. A conveyance of real property, situated within another state, territory or jurisdiction of the United States, which has been duly authenticated, according to the laws of that state, territory or jurisdiction, so as to be read in evidence in the courts thereof, is admissible in evidence in the state.  Rule 4539. Reproductions of original  (a) If any business, institution, or member of a profession or calling, in the regular course of business or activity has made, kept or recorded any writing, entry, print or representation and in the regular course of business has recorded, copied, or reproduced it by any process, including reproduction, which accurately reproduces or forms a durable medium for reproducing the original, such reproduction, when satisfactorily identified, is as admissible in 

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evidence as the original, whether the original is in existence or not, and an enlargement or facsimile of such reproduction is admissible in evidence if the original reproduction is in existence and available for inspection under direction of the court. The introduction of a reproduction does not preclude admission of the original. (b) A reproduction created by any process which stores an image of any writing, entry, print or representation and which does not permit additions, deletions, or changes without leaving a record of such additions, deletions, or changes, when authenticated by competent testimony or affidavit which shall include the manner or method by which tampering or degradation of the reproduction is prevented, shall be as admissible in evidence as the original.  Rule 4540. Authentication of official record of court or government office in the United States  (a) Copies permitted. An official publication, or a copy attested as correct by an officer or a deputy of an officer having legal custody of an official record of the United States or of any state, territory or jurisdiction of the United States, or of any of its courts, legislature, offices, public bodies or boards is prima facie evidence of such record.  (b) Certificate of officer of the state. Where the copy is attested by an officer of the state, it shall be accompanied by a certificate signed by, or with a facsimile of the signature of, the clerk of a court having legal custody of the record, and, except where the copy is used in the same court or before one of its officers, with the seal of the court affixed; or signed by, or with a facsimile of the signature of, the officer having legal custody of the original, or his deputy or clerk, with his official seal affixed; or signed by, or with a facsimile of the signature of, the presiding officer, secretary or clerk of the public body or board and, except where it is certified by the clerk or secretary of either house of the legislature, with the seal of the body or board affixed. If the certificate is made by a county clerk, the county seal shall be affixed.  (c) Certificate of officer of another jurisdiction. Where the copy is attested by an officer of another jurisdiction, it shall be accompanied by a certificate that such officer has legal custody of the record, and that his signature is believed to be genuine, which certificate shall be made by a judge of a court of record of the district or political subdivision in which the record is kept, with the seal of the court affixed; or by and public officer having a seal of office and having official duties in that district or political subdivision with respect to the subject matter of the record, with the seal of his office affixed.  (d) Printed tariff or classification subject to public service commission, commissioner of transportation or interstate commerce commission. A printed copy of a tariff or classification which shows a public service commission or commissioner of transportation number of this state and an effective date, or a printed copy of a tariff or classification which shows an interstate commerce commission number and an effective date, is admissible in evidence, without certification, and is prima facie evidence of the filed original tariff or classification.   

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 Rule 4542. Proof of foreign records and documents  (a) Foreign record. A foreign official record, or an entry therein, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof; or a copy thereof, attested by a person authorized to make the attestation, and accompanied by a final certification as to the genuineness of the signature and official position    1. of the attesting person, or    2. of any foreign official whose certificate of genuineness of signature and official   position  

      (i) relates to the attestation, or       (ii) is in a chain of certificates of genuineness of signature and official position      relating to the attestation.  (b) Final certification. A final certification may be made by a secretary of an embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent of the United States, or a diplomatic or consular official of the foreign country assigned or accredited to the United States. If reasonable opportunity has been given to all parties to investigate the authenticity and accuracy of the documents, the court may, for good cause shown, admit an attested copy without final certification, or permit the foreign official record to be evidenced by an attested summary with or without a final certification.  (c) Lack of record. A written statement that after diligent search no record or entry of a specified tenor was found to exist in the foreign records designated by the statement, authenticated in compliance with the requirements set forth in subdivisions (a) and (b) for a copy of a foreign record is admissible as evidence that the records contain no such record or entry.  § 4543. Proof of facts or writing by methods other than those authorized in this article  Nothing in this article prevents the proof of a fact or a writing by any method authorized by any applicable statute or by the rules of evidence at common law.         

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 (B)  Criminal Procedure Law  § 60.10 Rules of evidence; in general  Unless otherwise provided by statute or by judicially established rules of evidence applicable to criminal cases, the rules of evidence applicable to civil cases are, where appropriate, also applicable to criminal proceedings.  § 60.35 Rules of evidence; impeachment of own witness by proof of prior contradictory statement  1. When, upon examination by the party who called him, a witness in a criminal proceeding gives testimony upon a material issue of the case which tends to disprove the position of such party, such party may introduce evidence that such witness has previously made either a written statement signed by him or an oral statement under oath contradictory to such testimony.  2. Evidence concerning a prior contradictory statement introduced pursuant to subdivision one may be received only for the purpose of impeaching the credibility of the witness with respect to his testimony upon the subject, and does not constitute evidence in chief. Upon receiving such evidence at a jury trial, the court must so instruct the jury.  3. When a witness has made a prior signed or sworn statement contradictory to his testimony in a criminal proceeding upon a material issue of the case, but his testimony does not tend to disprove the position of the party who called him and elicited such testimony, evidence that the witness made such prior statement is not admissible, and such party may not use such prior statement for the purpose of refreshing the recollection of the witness in a manner that discloses its contents to the trier of the facts.  3.  Hearsay within Hearsay  Even though a certain piece of evidence may be admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule, it may nevertheless be excludible—or subject to redaction—if it contains multiple layers of hearsay.     (A)  Medical Records      People v. Jackson, 124 A.D.2d 975, 509 N.Y.S.2d 230 (4th Depʹt 1986). Defendant appeals   from his conviction after a jury trial of two counts of rape in the first degree and one   count of sodomy in the first degree. At the hospital following the commission of the   crime, claimant gave a history which included a detailed description of the events   leading up to the rape and sodomy. Further, in this history the claimant identified by 

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  name her assailants. This hospital record was introduced into evidence over objection by   defense counsel. On appeal defendant contends that this record was inadmissible   hearsay and improperly bolstered Ms. Scottʹs testimony, and therefore reversible error.   We agree.    Hospital records generally are admissible under the business record exception to the   hearsay rule (CPLR 4518). However, this admissibility is limited to the extent the entries   relate to the diagnosis and treatment of the patient (People v. Davis, 95 A.D.2d 837, 463   N.Y.S.2d 876). The history portion of the hospital record as it relates to acts and   occurrences not relevant to diagnosis or treatment of the patient are inadmissible   (Williams v. Alexander, 309 N.Y. 283, 287, 129 N.E.2d 417; J. Prince, Richardson on   Evidence, Section 302, p. 277 [10th ed. 1973] ). This hospital record is not admissible   under the hearsay exception allowing testimony of a prompt complaint by the victim of   the injury, as this report is not merely confined to the victimʹs timely complaint, but   rather provides a detailed report of the incident (People v. Vicaretti, 54 A.D.2d 236, 244,   388 N.Y.S.2d 410). The history portion of the hospital record was therefore inadmissible   and improperly bolstered the complainantʹs testimony by showing that the witness had   made previous similar statements (see, People v. Wooden, 66 A.D.2d 1004, 1005, 411   N.Y.S.2d 759). This error cannot be deemed harmless as the sole direct evidence   implicating defendant was the testimony of the complainant (see, People v. Crimmins, 36   N.Y.2d 230, 241, 367 N.Y.S.2d 213, 326 N.E.2d 787; Gunn v. City of New York, 104 A.D.2d   848, 480 N.Y.S.2d 365).  

4. Recent developments 

2006

DAVIS v. WASHINGTON, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006).

Victim's statements in response to 911 operator's interrogation were not testimonial, and therefore, were not subject to Confrontation Clause, and domestic battery victim's written statements in affidavit given to police officer were testimonial, and therefore, were subject to Confrontation Clause. Held: 1. The Confrontation Clause bars “admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177. These cases require the Court to determine which police “interrogations” produce statements that fall within this prohibition. Without attempting to produce an exhaustive classification of all conceivable statements as either testimonial or nontestimonial, it suffices to decide the present cases to hold that statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of

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interrogation is to enable*2269 police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution. Pp. 2273 - 2274. 2. McCottry's statements identifying Davis as her assailant were not testimonial. Pp. 2274 - 2278. (a) This case requires the Court to decide whether the Confrontation Clause applies only to testimonial hearsay, and, if so, whether the 911 recording qualifies. Crawford suggested the answer to the first question, noting that “the Confrontation Clause ··· applies to ‘witnesses' against the accused-in other words, those who ‘bear testimony.’ ” Only “testimonial statements” cause a declarant to be a witness. The Court is unaware of any early American case invoking the Confrontation Clause or the common-law right to confrontation that did not involve testimony as thus defined. Well into the 20th century, this Court's jurisprudence was carefully applied only in the testimonial context, and its later cases never in practice dispensed with the Confrontation Clause requirements of unavailability and prior cross-examination in cases involving testimonial hearsay. Pp. 2274 - 2276. (b) The question in Davis, therefore, is whether, objectively considered, the interrogation during the 911 call produced testimonial statements. In contrast to Crawford, where the interrogation took place at a police station and was directed solely at establishing a past crime, a 911 call is ordinarily designed primarily to describe current circumstances requiring police assistance. The difference is apparent here. McCottry was speaking of events as they were actually happening, while Crawford's interrogation took place hours after the events occurred. Moreover, McCottry was facing an ongoing emergency. Further, the statements elicited were necessary to enable the police to resolve the present emergency rather than simply to learn what had happened in the past. Finally, the difference in the level of formality is striking. Crawford calmly answered questions at a station house, with an officer-interrogator taping and taking notes, while McCottry's frantic answers were provided over the phone, in an environment that was not tranquil, or even safe. Thus, the circumstances of her interrogation objectively indicate that its primary purpose was to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. She was not acting as a witness or testifying. Pp. 2276 - 2278. 3. Amy Hammon's statements were testimonial. They were not much different from those in Crawford. It is clear from the circumstances that Amy's interrogation was part of an investigation into possibly criminal past conduct. There was no emergency in progress, she told the police when they arrived that things were fine, and the officer questioning her was seeking to determine not what was happening but what had happened. Objectively viewed, the primary, if not sole, purpose of the investigation was to investigate a possible crime. While the formal features of Crawford's interrogation strengthened her statements' testimonial aspect, such features were not essential to the point. In both cases, the declarants were separated from the defendants, the statements recounted how potentially criminal past events began and progressed, and the interrogation took place some time after the events were over. For the same reasons the comparison to Crawford is compelling, the comparison to Davis is unpersuasive. The statements in Davis were taken when McCottry was alone, unprotected by police, and apparently in immediate danger *2270 from Davis. She was seeking aid, not telling a story about the past. Pp. 2278 - 2279. 4. The Indiana courts may determine on remand whether a claim of forfeiture by wrongdoing-under which one who obtains a witness's absence by wrongdoing forfeits the constitutional right

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to confrontation-is properly raised in Hammon, and, if so, whether it is meritorious. Absent such a finding, the Sixth Amendment operates to exclude Amy Hammon's affidavit. Pp. 2279 - 2280. No. 05-5224, 154 Wash.2d 291, 111 P.3d 844, affirmed; No. 05-5705, 829 N.E.2d 444, reversed and remanded. These cases require us to determine when statements made to law enforcement personnel during a 911 call or at a crime scene are “testimonial” and thus subject to the requirements of the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause.  

I  

A  The relevant statements in Davis v. Washington, No. 05‐5224, were made to a 911 emergency operator on February 1, 2001. When the operator answered the initial call, the connection terminated before anyone spoke. She reversed the call, *2271 and Michelle McCottry answered. In the ensuing conversation, the operator ascertained that McCottry was involved in a domestic disturbance with her former boyfriend Adrian Davis, the petitioner in this case:  “911 Operator: Hello.  “Complainant: Hello.  “911 Operator: Whatʹs going on?  “Complainant: Heʹs here jumpinʹ on me again.  “911 Operator: Okay. Listen to me carefully. Are you in a house or an apartment?  “Complainant: Iʹm in a house.  “911 Operator: Are there any weapons?  “Complainant: No. Heʹs usinʹ his fists.  “911 Operator: Okay. Has he been drinking?  “Complainant: No.  “911 Operator: Okay, sweetie. Iʹve got help started. Stay on the line with me, okay?  “Complainant: Iʹm on the line.  

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“911 Operator: Listen to me carefully. Do you know his last name?  “Complainant: Itʹs Davis.  “911 Operator: Davis? Okay, whatʹs his first name?  “Complainant: Adrian  “911 Operator: What is it?  “Complainant: Adrian.  “911 Operator: Adrian?  “Complainant: Yeah.  “911 Operator: Okay. Whatʹs his middle initial?  “Complainant: Martell. Heʹs runninʹ now.” App. in No. 05‐5224, pp. 8‐9.  As the conversation continued, the operator learned that Davis had “just r [un] out the door” after hitting McCottry, and that he was leaving in a car with someone else. Id., at 9‐10. McCottry started talking, but the operator cut her off, saying, “Stop talking and answer my questions.” Id., at 10. She then gathered more information about Davis (including his birthday), and learned that Davis had told McCottry that his purpose in coming to the house was “to get his stuff,” since McCottry was moving. Id., at 11‐12. McCottry described the context of the assault, id., at 12, after which the operator told her that the police were on their way. “Theyʹre gonna check the area for him first,” the operator said, “and then theyʹre gonna come talk to you.” Id., at 12‐13.  The police arrived within four minutes of the 911 call and observed McCottryʹs shaken state, the “fresh injuries on her forearm and her face,” and her “frantic efforts to gather her belongings and her children so that they could leave the residence.” 154 Wash.2d 291, 296, 111 P.3d 844, 847 (2005) (en banc).  The State charged Davis with felony violation of a domestic no‐contact order. “The Stateʹs only witnesses were the two police officers who responded to the 911 call. Both officers testified that McCottry exhibited injuries that appeared to be recent, but neither officer could testify as to the cause of the injuries.” Ibid. McCottry presumably could have testified as to whether Davis was her assailant, but she did not appear. Over Davisʹs objection, based on the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, the trial court admitted the recording of her exchange with the 911 operator, and the jury convicted him. The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed, 116 Wash.App. 81, 64 P.3d 661 (2003). The Supreme Court of Washington, with one dissenting justice, also affirmed, concluding that the portion of the 911 conversation in which McCottry 

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identified Davis was not testimonial, and that if other portions of the conversation were testimonial, *2272 admitting them was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 154 Wash.2d, at 305, 111 P.3d, at 851. We granted certiorari. 546 U.S. ‐‐‐‐, 126 S.Ct. 552, 163 L.Ed.2d 459 (2005).  

B  In Hammon v. Indiana, No. 05‐5705, police responded late on the night of February 26, 2003, to a “reported domestic disturbance” at the home of Hershel and Amy Hammon. 829 N.E.2d 444, 446 (Ind.2005). They found Amy alone on the front porch, appearing “ ‘somewhat frightened,’ ” but she told them that “ ‘nothing was the matter,’ ” id., at 446, 447. She gave them permission to enter the house, where an officer saw “a gas heating unit in the corner of the living room” that had “flames coming out of the ∙∙∙ partial glass front. There were pieces of glass on the ground in front of it and there was flame emitting from the front of the heating unit.” App. in No. 05‐5705, p. 16.  Hershel, meanwhile, was in the kitchen. He told the police “that he and his wife had ‘been in an argument’ but ‘everything was fine now’ and the argument ‘never became physical.’ ” 829 N.E.2d, at 447. By this point Amy had come back inside. One of the officers remained with Hershel; the other went to the living room to talk with Amy, and “again asked [her] what had occurred.” Ibid.; App. in No. 05‐5705, at 17, 32. Hershel made several attempts to participate in Amyʹs conversation with the police, see id., at 32, but was rebuffed. The officer later testified that Hershel “became angry when I insisted that [he] stay separated from Mrs. Hammon so that we can investigate what had happened.” Id., at 34. After hearing Amyʹs account, the officer “had her fill out and sign a battery affidavit.” Id., at 18. Amy handwrote the following: “Broke our Furnace & shoved me down on the floor into the broken glass. Hit me in the chest and threw me down. Broke our lamps & phone. Tore up my van where I couldnʹt leave the house. Attacked my daughter.” Id., at 2.  The State charged Hershel with domestic battery and with violating his probation. Amy was subpoenaed, but she did not appear at his subsequent bench trial. The State called the officer who had questioned Amy, and asked him to recount what Amy told him and to authenticate the affidavit. Hershelʹs counsel repeatedly objected to the admission of this evidence. See id., at 11, 12, 13, 17, 19, 20, 21. At one point, after hearing the prosecutor defend the affidavit because it was made “under oath,” defense counsel said, “That doesnʹt give us the opportunity to cross examine [the] person who allegedly drafted it. Makes me mad.” Id., at 19. Nonetheless, the trial court admitted the affidavit as a “present sense impression,” id., at 20, and Amyʹs statements as “excited utterances” that “are expressly permitted in these kinds of cases even if the declarant is not available to testify.” Id., at 40. The officer thus testified that Amy  “informed me that she and Hershel had been in an argument. That he became irrate [sic] over the fact of their daughter going to a boyfriendʹs house. The argument became ∙∙∙ physical after being verbal and she informed me that Mr. Hammon, during the verbal part of the argument 

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was breaking things in the living room and I believe she stated he broke the phone, broke the lamp, broke the front of the heater. When it became physical he threw her down into the glass of the heater.  .∙∙∙∙  “She informed me Mr. Hammon had pushed her onto the ground, had shoved her head into the broken glass of the *2273 heater and that he had punched her in the chest twice I believe.” Id., at 17‐18.  The trial judge found Hershel guilty on both charges, id., at 40, and the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed in relevant part, 809 N.E.2d 945 (2004). The Indiana Supreme Court also affirmed, concluding that Amyʹs statement was admissible for state‐law purposes as an excited utterance, 829 N.E.2d, at 449; that “a ‘testimonial’ statement is one given or taken in significant part for purposes of preserving it for potential future use in legal proceedings,” where “the motivations of the questioner and declarant are the central concerns,” id., at 456, 457; and that Amyʹs oral statement was not “testimonial” under these standards, id., at 458. It also concluded that, although the affidavit was testimonial and thus wrongly admitted, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, largely because the trial was to the bench. Id., at 458‐459. We granted certiorari. 546 U.S. ‐‐‐‐, 126 S.Ct. 552, 163 L.Ed.2d 459 (2005).  

II  The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ∙∙∙ to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53‐54, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), we held that this provision bars “admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross‐examination.” A critical portion of this holding, and the portion central to resolution of the two cases now before us, is the phrase “testimonial statements.” Only statements of this sort cause the declarant to be a “witness” within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause. See id., at 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354. It is the testimonial character of the statement that separates it from other hearsay that, while subject to traditional limitations upon hearsay evidence, is not subject to the Confrontation Clause.  Our opinion in Crawford set forth “[v]arious formulations” of the core class of “ ‘testimonial’ ” statements, ibid., but found it unnecessary to endorse any of them, because “some statements qualify under any definition,” id., at 52, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Among those, we said, were “[s]tatements taken by police officers in the course of interrogations,” ibid.; see also id., at 53, 124 S.Ct. 1354. The questioning that generated the deponentʹs statement in Crawford‐which was made and recorded while she was in police custody, after having been given Miranda warnings as a possible suspect herself‐“qualifies under any conceivable definition” of an “ ‘interrogation,’ 

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” 541 U.S., at 53, n. 4, 124 S.Ct. 1354. We therefore did not define that term, except to say that “[w]e use [it] ∙∙∙ in its colloquial, rather than any technical legal, sense,” and that “one can imagine various definitions ∙∙∙, and we need not select among them in this case.” Ibid. The character of the statements in the present cases is not as clear, and these cases require us to determine more precisely which police interrogations produce testimony.  Without attempting to produce an exhaustive classification of all conceivable statements‐or even all conceivable statements in response to police interrogation‐as either testimonial or nontestimonial, it suffices to decide the present cases to hold as follows: Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no *2274 such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.FN1 

 III 

 

A  In Crawford, it sufficed for resolution of the case before us to determine that “even if the Sixth Amendment is not solely concerned with testimonial hearsay, that is its primary object, and interrogations by law enforcement officers fall squarely within that class.” Id., at 53, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Moreover, as we have just described, the facts of that case spared us the need to define what we meant by “interrogations.” The Davis case today does not permit us this luxury of indecision. The inquiries of a police operator in the course of a 911 call FN2 are an interrogation in one sense, but not in a sense that “qualifies under any conceivable definition.” We must decide, therefore, whether the Confrontation Clause applies only to testimonial hearsay; and, if so, whether the recording of a 911 call qualifies. 

  We are not aware of any early American case invoking the Confrontation Clause or the common‐law right to confrontation that did not clearly involve testimony as thus defined.FN3 Well into the 20th century, our *2275 own Confrontation Clause jurisprudence was carefully applied only in the testimonial context. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1879) (testimony at prior trial was subject to the Confrontation Clause, but petitioner had forfeited that right by procuring witnessʹs absence); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 240‐244, 15 S.Ct. 337, 39 L.Ed. 409 (1895) (prior trial testimony of deceased witnesses admitted because subject to cross‐examination); Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55‐56, 19 S.Ct. 574, 43 L.Ed. 890 (1899) (guilty pleas and jury conviction of others could not be admitted to show that property defendant received from them was stolen); Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458, 467, 470‐471, 20 S.Ct. 993, 44 L.Ed. 1150 (1900) (written deposition subject to cross‐examination was 

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not admissible because witness was available); Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325, 330‐331, 31 S.Ct. 590, 55 L.Ed. 753 (1911) (facts regarding conduct of prior trial certified to by the judge, the clerk of court, and the official reporter did not relate to defendantsʹ guilt or innocence and hence were not statements of “witnesses” under the Confrontation Clause). 

FN3. See, e.g., State v. Webb, 2 N.C. 103, 103‐104, 1794 WL 98 (Super. L. & Eq. 1794) (per curiam) (excluding deposition taken in absence of the accused); State v. Atkins, 1 Tenn. 229, 1807 WL 107 (Super. L. & Eq. 1807) (per curiam) (excluding prior testimony of deceased witness); Johnston v. State, 10 Tenn. 58, 59, 1821 WL 401 (Err. & App. 1821) (admitting written deposition of deceased deponent, because defendant had the opportunity to cross‐examine); Finn v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. 701, 707‐708, 1827 WL 1081 (1827) (excluding prior testimony of a witness still alive, though outside the jurisdiction); State v. Hill, 20 S.C.L. 607, 1835 WL 1416 (App.1835) (excluding deposition of deceased victim taken in absence of the accused); Commonwealth v. Richards, 35 Mass. 434, 436‐439, 1836 WL 2491 (1837) (excluding preliminary examination testimony of deceased witness because the witnessʹs precise words were not available); Bostick v. State, 22 Tenn. 344, 1842 WL 1948 (1842) (admitting deposition of deceased where defendant declined opportunity to cross‐examine); People v. Newman, 5 Hill 295, 1843 WL 4534 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1843) (per curiam) (excluding prior trial testimony of witness who was still alive); State v. Campbell, 30 S.C.L. 124, 125, 1844 WL 2558 (App.L.1844) (excluding deposition taken in absence of the accused); State v. Valentine, 29 N.C. 225, 1847 WL 1081 (1847) (per curiam) (admitting preliminary examination testimony of decedent where defendant had opportunity to cross‐examine); Kendrick v. State, 29 Tenn. 479, 491, 1850 WL 2014 (1850) (admitting testimony of deceased witness at defendantʹs prior trial); State v. Houser, 26 Mo. 431, 439‐441, 1858 WL 5832 (1858) (excluding deposition of deponent who was still alive). 

Even our later cases, conforming to the reasoning of Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980),FN4 never in practice dispensed with the Confrontation Clause requirements of unavailability and prior cross‐examination in cases that involved testimonial hearsay, see Crawford, 541 U.S., at 57‐59, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (citing cases), with one arguable exception, see id., at 58, n. 8, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (discussing White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 112 S.Ct. 736, 116 L.Ed.2d 848 (1992)). Where our cases did dispense with those requirements‐even under the Roberts approach‐the statements at issue were clearly nontestimonial. See, e.g., Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 181‐184, 107 S.Ct. 2775, 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987) (statements made unwittingly to a Government informant); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 87‐89, 91 S.Ct. 210, 27 L.Ed.2d 213 (1970) (plurality opinion) (statements from one prisoner to another). 

FN4. “ Roberts condition[ed] the admissibility of all hearsay evidence on whether it falls under a ‘firmly rooted hearsay exception’ or bears ‘particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.’ ” Crawford, 541 U.S., at 60, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S., at 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531). We overruled Roberts in Crawford by restoring the unavailability and cross‐examination requirements. 

  

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The question before us in Davis, then, is whether, objectively considered, the interrogation that took place in the course of the 911 call produced testimonial statements. When we said in Crawford, supra, at 53, 124 S.Ct. 1354, that “interrogations by law enforcement officers fall squarely within [the] class” of testimonial hearsay, we had immediately in mind (for that was the case before us) interrogations solely directed at establishing the facts of a past crime, in order to identify (or provide evidence to convict) the perpetrator. The product of such interrogation, whether reduced to a writing signed by the declarant or embedded in the memory (and perhaps notes) of the interrogating officer, is testimonial. It is, in the terms of the 1828 American dictionary quoted in Crawford, “ ‘[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.’ ” 541 U.S., at 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354. (The solemnity of even an oral declaration of relevant past fact to an investigating officer is well enough established by the severe consequences that can attend a deliberate falsehood. See, e.g., United States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273, 288 (C.A.2 2006) (false statements made to federal investigators violate 18 U.S.C. § 1001); State v. Reed, 2005 WI 53, ¶ 30, 280 Wis.2d 68, 695 N.W.2d 315, 323 (state criminal offense to “knowingly giv[e] false information to [an] officer with [the] intent to mislead the officer in the performance of his or her duty”).) A 911 call, on the other hand, and at least the initial interrogation conducted in connection with a 911 call, is ordinarily not designed primarily to “establis[h] or prov [e]” some past fact, but to describe current circumstances requiring police assistance.  The difference between the interrogation in Davis and the one in Crawford is apparent on the face of things. In Davis, McCottry was speaking about events as they were actually happening, rather than “describ [ing] past events,” Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 137, 119 S.Ct. 1887, 144 L.Ed.2d 117 (1999) (plurality opinion). Sylvia Crawfordʹs interrogation, on the other hand, took place hours after the events she described had occurred. Moreover, any reasonable listener would recognize that McCottry (unlike Sylvia Crawford) was facing an ongoing emergency. Although one might call 911 to provide a narrative report of a crime absent any imminent danger, McCottryʹs call was plainly a call for help against bona fide physical threat. Third, the nature of what was asked and answered in Davis, again viewed objectively, was such that the elicited statements were necessary to be able to resolve the present emergency, rather than simply to learn (as in Crawford ) what had happened in the past. That is true even of the operatorʹs effort to establish the identity of the assailant, so that the dispatched officers might know whether they would be encountering a violent felon. See, e.g., Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., Humboldt Cty., 542 U.S. 177, 186, 124 S.Ct. 2451, 159 L.Ed.2d 292 (2004). And finally, the difference in the *2277 level of formality between the two interviews is striking. Crawford was responding calmly, at the station house, to a series of questions, with the officer‐interrogator taping and making notes of her answers; McCottryʹs frantic answers were provided over the phone, in an environment that was not tranquil, or even (as far as any reasonable 911 operator could make out) safe.  We conclude from all this that the circumstances of McCottryʹs interrogation objectively indicate its primary purpose was to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. She simply was not acting as a witness; she was not testifying. What she said was not “a weaker 

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substitute for live testimony” at trial, United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394, 106 S.Ct. 1121, 89 L.Ed.2d 390 (1986), like Lord Cobhamʹs statements in Raleighʹs Case, 2 How. St. Tr. 1 (1603), or Jane Dinglerʹs ex parte statements against her husband in King v. Dingler, 2 Leach 561, 168 Eng. Rep. 383 (1791), or Sylvia Crawfordʹs statement in Crawford. In each of those cases, the ex parte actors and the evidentiary products of the ex parte communication aligned perfectly with their courtroom analogues. McCottryʹs emergency statement does not. No “witness” goes into court to proclaim an emergency and seek help.  Davis seeks to cast McCottry in the unlikely role of a witness by pointing to English cases. None of them involves statements made during an ongoing emergency. In King v. Brasier, 1 Leach 199, 168 Eng. Rep. 202 (1779), for example, a young rape victim, “immediately on her coming home, told all the circumstances of the injury” to her mother. Id., at 200, 168 Eng. Rep., at 202. The case would be helpful to Davis if the relevant statement had been the girlʹs screams for aid as she was being chased by her assailant. But by the time the victim got home, her story was an account of past events.  This is not to say that a conversation which begins as an interrogation to determine the need for emergency assistance cannot, as the Indiana Supreme Court put it, “evolve into testimonial statements,” 829 N.E.2d, at 457, once that purpose has been achieved. In this case, for example, after the operator gained the information needed to address the exigency of the moment, the emergency appears to have ended (when Davis drove away from the premises). The operator then told McCottry to be quiet, and proceeded to pose a battery of questions. It could readily be maintained that, from that point on, McCottryʹs statements were testimonial, not unlike the “structured police questioning” that occurred in Crawford, 541 U.S., at 53, n. 4, 124 S.Ct. 1354. This presents no great problem. Just as, for Fifth Amendment purposes, “police officers can and will distinguish almost instinctively between questions necessary to secure their own safety or the safety of the public and questions designed solely to elicit testimonial evidence from a suspect,” New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 658‐659, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 81 L.Ed.2d 550 (1984), trial courts will recognize the point at which, for Sixth Amendment purposes, statements in response to interrogations become testimonial. Through in limine procedure, they should redact or exclude the portions of any statement that have become testimonial, as they do, for example, with unduly prejudicial portions of otherwise admissible evidence. Davisʹs jury did not hear the complete 911 call, although it may well have heard some testimonial portions. We were asked to classify only McCottryʹs early statements identifying Davis as her assailant, and we agree with the Washington Supreme Court that they were not testimonial. That court *2278 also concluded that, even if later parts of the call were testimonial, their admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Davis does not challenge that holding, and we therefore assume it to be correct.  

B Determining the testimonial or nontestimonial character of the statements that were the product of the interrogation in Hammon is a much easier task, since they were not much different from 

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the statements we found to be testimonial in Crawford. It is entirely clear from the circumstances that the interrogation was part of an investigation into possibly criminal past conduct‐as, indeed, the testifying officer expressly acknowledged, App. in No. 05‐5705, at 25, 32, 34. There was no emergency in progress; the interrogating officer testified that he had heard no arguments or crashing and saw no one throw or break anything, id., at 25. When the officers first arrived, Amy told them that things were fine, id., at 14, and there was no immediate threat to her person. When the officer questioned Amy for the second time, and elicited the challenged statements, he was not seeking to determine (as in Davis ) “what is happening,” but rather “what happened.” Objectively viewed, the primary, if not indeed the sole, purpose of the interrogation was to investigate a possible crime‐which is, of course, precisely what the officer should have done.  It is true that the Crawford interrogation was more formal. It followed a Miranda warning, was tape‐recorded, and took place at the station house, see 541 U.S., at 53, n. 4, 124 S.Ct. 1354. While these features certainly strengthened the statementsʹ testimonial aspect‐made it more objectively apparent, that is, that the purpose of the exercise was to nail down the truth about past criminal events‐none was essential to the point. It was formal enough that Amyʹs interrogation was conducted in a separate room, away from her husband (who tried to intervene), with the officer receiving her replies for use in his “investigat[ion].” App. in No. 05‐5705, at 34. What we called the “striking resemblance” of the Crawford statement to civil‐law ex parte examinations, 541 U.S., at 52, 124 S.Ct. 1354, is shared by Amyʹs statement here. Both declarants were actively separated from the defendant‐officers forcibly prevented Hershel from participating in the interrogation. Both statements deliberately recounted, in response to police questioning, how potentially criminal past events began and progressed. And both took place some time after the events described were over. Such statements under official interrogation are an obvious substitute for live testimony, because they do precisely what a witness does on direct examination; they are inherently testimonial.FN5 

FN5. The dissent criticizes our test for being “neither workable nor a targeted attempt to reach the abuses forbidden by the [Confrontation] Clause,” post, at 2285 (opinion of THOMAS, J.). As to the former: We have acknowledged that our holding is not an “exhaustive classification of all conceivable statements‐or even all conceivable statements in response to police interrogation,” supra, at 2273, but rather a resolution of the cases before us and those like them. For those cases, the test is objective and quite “workable.” The dissent, in attempting to formulate an exhaustive classification of its own, has not provided anything that deserves the description “workable”‐unless one thinks that the distinction between “formal” and “informal” statements, see post, at 2282 ‐ 2283, qualifies. And the dissent even qualifies that vague distinction by acknowledging that the Confrontation Clause “also reaches the use of technically informal statements when used to evade the formalized process,” post, at 2283, and cautioning that the Clause would stop the State from “us [ing] out‐of‐court statements as a means of circumventing the literal right of confrontation,” post, at 2283. It is hard to see this as much more “predictable,” ibid., than the rule we adopt for the narrow situations we address. (Indeed, under the dissentʹs approach it is eminently arguable that the dissent should agree, rather than disagree, with our disposition in 

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Hammon v. Indiana, No. 05‐5705 .)  As for the charge that our holding is not a “targeted attempt to reach the abuses forbidden by the [Confrontation] Clause,” which the dissent describes as the depositions taken by Marian magistrates, characterized by a high degree of formality, see post, at 2281 ‐ 2282: We do not dispute that formality is indeed essential to testimonial utterance. But we no longer have examining Marian magistrates; and we do have, as our 18th‐century forebears did not, examining police officers, see L. Friedman, Crime and Punishment in American History 67‐68 (1993)‐who perform investigative and testimonial functions once performed by examining Marian magistrates, see J. Langbein, The Origins of Adversary Criminal Trial 41 (2003). It imports sufficient formality, in our view, that lies to such officers are criminal offenses. Restricting the Confrontation Clause to the precise forms against which it was originally directed is a recipe for its extinction. Cf. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 121 S.Ct. 2038, 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001). 

*2279 Both Indiana and the United States as amicus curiae argue that this case should be resolved much like Davis. For the reasons we find the comparison to Crawford compelling, we find the comparison to Davis unpersuasive. The statements in Davis were taken when McCottry was alone, not only unprotected by police (as Amy Hammon was protected), but apparently in immediate danger from Davis. She was seeking aid, not telling a story about the past. McCottryʹs present‐tense statements showed immediacy; Amyʹs narrative of past events was delivered at some remove in time from the danger she described. And after Amy answered the officerʹs questions, he had her execute an affidavit, in order, he testified, “[t]o establish events that have occurred previously.” App. in No. 05‐5705, at 18.  Although we necessarily reject the Indiana Supreme Courtʹs implication that virtually any “initial inquiries” at the crime scene will not be testimonial, see 829 N.E.2d, at 453, 457, we do not hold the opposite‐that no questions at the scene will yield nontestimonial answers. We have already observed of domestic disputes that “[o]fficers called to investigate ∙∙∙ need to know whom they are dealing with in order to assess the situation, the threat to their own safety, and possible danger to the potential victim.” Hiibel, 542 U.S., at 186, 124 S.Ct. 2451. Such exigencies may often mean that “initial inquiries” produce nontestimonial statements. But in cases like this one, where Amyʹs statements were neither a cry for help nor the provision of information enabling officers immediately to end a threatening situation, the fact that they were given at an alleged crime scene and were “initial inquiries” is immaterial. Cf. Crawford, supra, at 52, n. 3, 124 S.Ct. 1354.FN6 

FN6. Police investigations themselves are, of course, in no way impugned by our characterization of their fruits as testimonial. Investigations of past crimes prevent future harms and lead to necessary arrests. While prosecutors may hope that inculpatory “nontestimonial” evidence is gathered, this is essentially beyond police control. Their saying that an emergency exists cannot make it be so. The Confrontation Clause in no way governs police conduct, because it is the trial use of, not the investigatory collection of, ex parte testimonial statements 

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which offends that provision. But neither can police conduct govern the Confrontation Clause; testimonial statements are what they are. 

 IV 

 Respondents in both cases, joined by a number of their amici, contend that the nature of the offenses charged in these two cases‐domestic violence‐requires greater flexibility in the use of testimonial evidence. This particular type of crime is *2280 notoriously susceptible to intimidation or coercion of the victim to ensure that she does not testify at trial. When this occurs, the Confrontation Clause gives the criminal a windfall. We may not, however, vitiate constitutional guarantees when they have the effect of allowing the guilty to go free. Cf. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 121 S.Ct. 2038, 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001) (suppressing evidence from an illegal search). But when defendants seek to undermine the judicial process by procuring or coercing silence from witnesses and victims, the Sixth Amendment does not require courts to acquiesce. While defendants have no duty to assist the State in proving their guilt, they do have the duty to refrain from acting in ways that destroy the integrity of the criminal‐trial system. We reiterate what we said in Crawford: that “the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing ∙∙∙ extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds.” 541 U.S., at 62, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (citing Reynolds, 98 U.S., at 158‐159). That is, one who obtains the absence of a witness by wrongdoing forfeits the constitutional right to confrontation.  We take no position on the standards necessary to demonstrate such forfeiture, but federal courts using Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6), which codifies the forfeiture doctrine, have generally held the Government to the preponderance‐of‐the‐evidence standard, see, e.g., United States v. Scott, 284 F.3d 758, 762 (C.A.7 2002). State courts tend to follow the same practice, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Edwards, 444 Mass. 526, 542, 830 N.E.2d 158, 172 (2005). Moreover, if a hearing on forfeiture is required, Edwards, for instance, observed that “hearsay evidence, including the unavailable witnessʹs out‐of‐court statements, may be considered.” Id., at 545, 830 N.E.2d, at 174. The Roberts approach to the Confrontation Clause undoubtedly made recourse to this doctrine less necessary, because prosecutors could show the “reliability” of ex parte statements more easily than they could show the defendantʹs procurement of the witnessʹs absence. Crawford, in overruling Roberts, did not destroy the ability of courts to protect the integrity of their proceedings.  We have determined that, absent a finding of forfeiture by wrongdoing, the Sixth Amendment operates to exclude Amy Hammonʹs affidavit. The Indiana courts may (if they are asked) determine on remand whether such a claim of forfeiture is properly raised and, if so, whether it is meritorious.  

* * * 

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 We affirm the judgment of the Supreme Court of Washington in No. 05‐5224. We reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of Indiana in No. 05‐5705, and remand the case to that Court for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.  It is so ordered.  Justice Thomas’ dissent omitted. 

PEOPLE v. ORTIZ, 822 N.Y.S.2d 327, 2006 N.Y. Slip Op. 07522 (3d Dep’t 2006). 

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Schenectady County (Catena, J.), rendered November 7, 2002, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crime of assault in the second degree.  As the result of a violent altercation that caused the victimʹs hospitalization with a broken nose and subdural hematoma, defendant was indicted for the crimes of assault in the first degree, reckless endangerment in the first degree and menacing in the second degree. Following a trial during which he claimed self‐defense, defendant was found guilty of assault in the second degree.  Defendantʹs sole contention on appeal is that the testimony by a police officer concerning a statement made to him was hearsay that should not have been admitted under the present sense impression exception. The officer testified that, shortly after an adult eyewitness had called 911 to report the altercation, he questioned a “group of kids” who told him that defendant had chased the victim down the street. We are persuaded by defendantʹs argument that the youthsʹ statement did not satisfy the requirement that “the description of events must be made ‘substantially contemporaneously’ with the observations” ( People v. Vasquez, 88 N.Y.2d 561, 575, 647 N.Y.S.2d 697, 670 N.E.2d 1328 [1996], quoting People v. Brown, 80 N.Y.2d 729, 734, 594 N.Y.S.2d 696, 610 N.E.2d 369 [1993] ). Inasmuch as at least seven minutes had elapsed between the time of the event described and the officerʹs conversation with the youths, the reported statement was not sufficiently contemporaneous with the observation.   

PEOPLE v. ALLER, 821 N.Y.S.2d 657, 2006 N.Y. Slip Op. 07174 (2d Dep’t 2006). 

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Katz, J.), rendered March 24, 2004, convicting him of rape in the first degree, sodomy in the first degree (two counts), sexual abuse in the first degree (four counts), robbery in the third degree, and unlawful imprisonment in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.  The trial court properly permitted the complainant to testify, under the “prompt outcry” 

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exception to the hearsay rule, that she told her mother that the defendant had attacked her. The statement was made no more than 12 hours following the attack, and the complainant proffered a sufficient explanation for failing to speak out sooner ( see People v. Shelton, 1 N.Y.3d 614, 777 N.Y.S.2d 9, 808 N.E.2d 1268; People v. McDaniel, 81 N.Y.2d 10, 16, 595 N.Y.S.2d 364, 611 N.E.2d 265; People v. Salazar, 234 A.D.2d 322, 650 N.Y.S.2d 1002; People v. Vanterpool, 214 A.D.2d 429, 625 N.Y.S.2d 38).   PEOPLE v. ROSEBORO, 32 A.D.3d 1288, 822 N.Y.S.2d 221, 2006 N.Y. Slip Op. 06976 (4th Dep’t 

2006). 

Res Gestae; Excited Utterances   The officer testified that defendant was brought to the hospital for a showup identification procedure and that, when the victim saw defendant, she identified him without being asked any questions. That identification by the victim was admissible under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, i.e., it was “made under the stress of excitement caused by an external event, and not the product of studied reflection and possible fabrication” ( People v. Johnson, 1 N.Y.3d 302, 306, 772 N.Y.S.2d 238, 804 N.E.2d 402). Contrary to defendantʹs further contentions, the evidence is legally sufficient to support the conviction of sodomy ( see generally People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672), and the sentence is not unduly harsh or severe.    PEOPLE v. GROGAN, 28 A.D.3d 579, 816 N.Y.S.2d 93 (2d Dep’t 2006). The court also admitted, as a business record, a DNA report prepared on the defendant's blood. This sample was taken at the instigation of the New York City Police Department and the Office of the Kings County District Attorney after the defendant was identified by the earlier DNA report and after he was indicted. This sample was then sent to OCME for preparation of a DNA profile, so that it could be compared with the DNA profile produced from the rape kit. This DNA report prepared from the defendant's blood was introduced through the testimony of the OCME criminalist. With respect to the report of the DNA test performed on the defendant's blood taken after his indictment, we disagree with the defendant's contention that it was not admissible as a business record because it was prepared in anticipation of litigation ( cf. People v. Rogers, 8 A.D.3d 888, 780 N.Y.S.2d 393). As the Court of Appeals has said, “[t]he People have no power to dictate the contents of practices within OCME ··· [and] Medical Examiners have no authority to gather evidence with an eye toward prosecuting a perpetrator” **96 ( People v. Washington, 86 N.Y.2d 189, 193, 630 N.Y.S.2d 693, 654 N.E.2d 967). Moreover, the defendant was afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the OCME criminalist as to the preparation, authenticity, and methodology of the testing and the result ( see People v. Atkins, 273 A.D.2d 11, 12, 709 N.Y.S.2d 39; People v. Driscoll, 251 A.D.2d 759, 675 N.Y.S.2d 151). 

 

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PEOPLE v. PACER, 6 N.Y.3d 504, 847 N.E.2d 1149, 814 N.Y.S.2d 575 (2006).  

The appeal before us presents a Confrontation Clause issue under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 [2004]. Defendant was charged with aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the first degree (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 511[3][a] ) and related offenses. At trial, to prove that defendant knew his driving privileges had been revoked and was thus guilty of an aggravated offense, the prosecution introduced an affidavit prepared by a Department of Motor Vehicles official in 2003 describing the agencyʹs revocation and mailing procedures, and averring that on information and belief they were satisfied. The Appellate Division correctly ruled that, under Crawford, the trial court should not have admitted the affidavit.  

The felony offense of first‐degree aggravated unlicensed operation has a mens rea element. To be convicted, a defendant must know or have reason to know that his driving privileges have been ***577 revoked, suspended or otherwise withdrawn by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles.FN1 Defendants who drive without a **1151 license but who neither know nor have reason to know that their driving privileges have been terminated commit a violation (  

*509 Here, defendant testified he never learned that his New York State driving privileges had been revoked. The defense argued that his move to Georgia around the same time as the 1987 proceedings may have prevented notice from reaching him. As their sole proof that defendant knew or had reason to know his privileges were revoked, the People introduced an August 13, 2003 document titled “Affidavit of Regularity/Proof of Mailing” from a Department of Motor Vehicles official, purporting to explain the Departmentʹs ordinary mailing procedures for revocation notices. The affidavit contained a statement, on the officialʹs “information and belief,” that the ordinary procedures described in the affidavit had been followed in defendantʹs case. FN2 

FN2. The affidavit was prepared under the statutory authorization in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 214, which provides:  “The production of a copy of a notice or order issued by the department, together with an electronically‐generated record of entry of such order or notice upon the appropriate driverʹs license or registration file of the department and an affidavit by an employee designated by the commissioner as having responsibility for the issuance of such order or notice issued by the department setting forth the procedure for the issuance and the mailing of such notice or order shall be presumptive evidence that such notice of suspension, revocation or order was produced and mailed in accordance with such procedures. The foregoing procedure shall not preclude the use of an affidavit of service by mail, a certificate of mailing or proof of certified or registered mail as proof of mailing of any such order or notice.” 

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Defendant did not object to admission of the underlying certificate of revocation. He did, however, object on Sixth Amendment grounds to the admission of the affidavit.FN3 County Court overruled the objection. 

The People concede that the affidavit is a sworn document prepared by a government official specifically for use by the prosecution at trial. They further concede that defendant never had a chance to cross‐examine the affiant and that the prosecution produced no evidence that the affiant was unavailable to testify. The People argue, however, that the affidavit was admissible as a business record or public record, and thus outside the scope of the Confrontation Clause.  We begin our analysis with the Supreme Courtʹs discussion of the Confrontation Clause in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 [2004]. [which held that] “testimonial” statements not previously subjected to cross‐examination are inadmissible against a criminal defendant. The Court did not fully spell out what is “ testimonial,” but offered some guidance. It referred to “[v]arious formulations” of the “core class of ‘testimonial’ statements,” including:  “ ‘ ex parte in‐court testimony or its functional equivalent that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross‐examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially,’ ∙∙∙ ‘extrajudicial statements ∙∙∙ contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions,’ [and] ‘statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.’ ” ( Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51‐52, 124 S.Ct. 1354 [citations omitted].)  Although Crawford repeatedly describes affidavits as typically being testimonial, not all affidavits are inadmissible. The Crawford court concluded that business records would not have been considered testimonial at the time the Confrontation Clause was adopted (541 U.S. at 56, 124 S.Ct. 1354).  Claiming that the challenged affidavit is not “accusatory,” the People argue that the affidavit is more like an ordinary business record or public record than a testimonial statement. To make their point, they cite 18th‐century English cases showing that hearsay from accusers‐like hearsay from direct victims of crime or other witnesses‐was barred under English common law. It does not follow, however, that the challenged affidavit is admissible as nonaccusatory hearsay.  For one thing, and contrary to the Peopleʹs suggestion, the government agent who swore out the affidavit is not a “neutral” officer. The officialʹs assertion of her “information and belief” that the ordinary mailing procedures were carried out in defendantʹs case is a direct accusation of an essential element of the crime, that defendant knew or should have known of the revocation. 

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   In United States v. Cervantes‐Flores, 421 F.3d 825 [9th Cir.2005], the Ninth Circuit ruled that an affidavit from an immigration officer certifying the absence of a record in the immigration agencyʹs files was admissible as nontestimonial under Crawford. The court reasoned that the record itself, if present, would have been admissible as one maintained in the ordinary course of agency business; its absence was similarly admissible. Here, **1153 in contrast, the challenged affidavit does not merely assert that the Department had a certificate showing that defendantʹs license had been revoked. It goes well beyond that, and alleges that the agency took a specific action against defendant based on that revocation‐namely, mailing the notice.  Similarly, in United States v. Rueda‐Rivera, 396 F.3d 678 [5th Cir.2005], the Fifth Circuit held that a certificate of nonexistence of an immigration record was admissible as a nontestimonial business record, even though the certificate was sworn and created by a government agent for use at trial. In the case before us, however, the prosecution introduced the challenged affidavit to establish that the agency actually mailed out notice to defendant in 1987; it did not merely reveal the ongoing presence or absence of an agency record.  In United States v. Cantellano, 430 F.3d 1142 [11th Cir.2005], the Government sought to prove that the defendant had reentered the country after being deported. This required proof that he had actually left the country after the original deportation. An immigration enforcement agent submitted a “warrant *512 of deportation” attesting that he saw Cantellano leave the United States. The court admitted the warrant without testimony from the agent. The 11th Circuit held the sworn declaration nontestimonial, and hence admissible under Crawford, because it was not prepared specifically for the prosecution, but rather was a contemporaneous document recorded as part of the routine duties of border agents who see deportees leave the country. Here, however, the challenged affidavit was admittedly prepared at the Peopleʹs request for use at trial.  United States v. Bahena‐Cardenas, 411 F.3d 1067, 1074 [9th Cir.2005] also concerns a deportation warrant prepared at the time of deportation and admitted at the defendantʹs later trial for reentry. Because it was prepared as part of the immigration agentʹs routine duties and not in preparation for trial, the document differs from the affidavit before us.  Here, the affiantʹs sworn statement‐that she had information causing her to believe that the Department actually mailed notice of revocation to defendant‐was crucial to the Peopleʹs case.FN5 Faced with evidence of this type, defendants have no means of challenging the Peopleʹs proof on a critical element. Without an opportunity to cross‐examine the affiant, defendant had no chance to inquire about the basis for the affiantʹs “information and belief” that the Department mailed the notice. Defendant had no chance to inquire whether the Department sometimes makes mistakes in mailing revocation notices; whether there were other drivers in the Departmentʹs database with the same  name as defendant to whom the Department might have mailed the notice; to what address the affiant believed, based on her information, the 

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Department had mailed the notice; whether the notice might have been returned undelivered; or whether the affiant could testify reliably about procedures as they existed 16 years earlier. In short, the lack of a live witness to confront eliminated defendantʹs opportunity to contest a decisive piece of evidence against him. This is exactly the evil the Confrontation Clause was designed to prevent. 

HINLICKY v. DREYFUSS, 6 N.Y.3d 636, 848 N.E.2d 1285, 815 N.Y.S.2d 908 (2006). 

Private Writings and Publications : clinical practice guidelines published by medical association and used by anesthesiologist to evaluate patientʹs preoperative need for cardiac evaluation were admissible for defense as non‐hearsay demonstrative aid.  At the nine‐day jury trial 16 witnesses testified: plaintiff and his brother; three nurses and a nonparty doctor who attended to Mrs. Hinlicky at the hospital; the three treating physicians; and seven medical expert witnesses. One question predominated: were defendants negligent in not obtaining a preoperative cardiac evaluation to insure that Mrs. Hinlickyʹs heart could tolerate the surgery? Dr. Gregory Ilioff, an anesthesiologist affiliated with Riverside, was the third of her physicians to testify as part of plaintiffʹs case‐in‐chief. During his cross‐examination, Dr. Ilioff claimed he had followed a flow chart, or algorithm, in deciding to allow the surgery without the cardiac evaluation. The issue now before us is whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion in admitting the algorithm into evidence. We agree with the Appellate Division that it did.  After testifying at length concerning the steps leading to his decision not to refer Mrs. Hinlicky for preoperative cardiac testing, Dr. Ilioff noted that he had followed a set of clinical guidelines published in 1996 by the American Heart Association (AHA) in association with the American College of Cardiology (ACC). He testified without objection that he incorporated the guidelines into his practice shortly after they were published, because they helped physicians decide “which patient needs to go for a cardiac evaluation ∙∙∙ and which patient can proceed to the operating room,” and he identified proposed “Exhibit C” as the AHA/ACC “flow diagram that [he] used and continued to use to evaluate patients for pre‐operative need for cardiac evaluation.” (Neither of the physician defendants who testified before Dr. Ilioff, in describing the basis for their decision not to refer Mrs. Hinlicky for preoperative cardiac testing, mentioned the algorithm.)  When defense counsel asked Dr. Ilioff for background on the guidelines, plaintiff objected to any testimony that would “involve a discussion of what others have stated or what others have done. That is clearly hearsay.” The trial court speculated as to whether “we need to get into the basis for the program he followed. It would involve other testimony by other experts and perhaps the objection is well founded in that regard.” This colloquy ensued:   

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Dr. Ilioff then testified that the chart provided a list of variables, the presence or absence of each variable pointing toward surgery or cardiac evaluation. The witness explained that he went through each step of the chart and, based on his assessment of the variables, concluded that there was no need for a cardiac evaluation. He did not consider factors that were not on the chart, because in his opinion, such factors do not “make a difference in the patientʹs outcome.”    

The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed, holding that the trial court properly admitted the algorithm into evidence because it was offered not for its truth, and “not to establish a per se standard of care but for the nonhearsay purpose of illustrating a physicianʹs decision‐making methodology” (18 A.D.3d 18, 21, 791 N.Y.S.2d 221 [3d Dept.2005] ). We now affirm.  

In New York, scientific works generally are excluded as hearsay when offered for their truth ( see People v. Riccardi, 285 N.Y. 21, 32 N.E.2d 776 [1941] ).FN4 For well over a decade, commentators have debated whether clinical practice guidelines such as those engendering the algorithm should be admissible for their “truth” as evidence of the standard of care ( see e.g., Mello, Of Swords and Shields: The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 645 [2001]; Williams, Evidence‐Based Medicine in the Law Beyond Clinical Practice Guidelines: What Effect Will EBM Have on the Standard of Care?, 61 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 479 [2004] ).FN5 

While it is true that the algorithm is an extrajudicial statement, it would only be “classic” hearsay if offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted therein. Defense counsel, in cross‐examining his client, sought to admit the algorithm on the ground that “as Dr. Ilioff has indicated that he utilized these guidelines himself, I believe it would be pertinent at this time to  review those with him and thatʹs what Iʹm attempting to do, to lay the foundation with respect to those guidelines.” The witness testified that he used a “flow diagram” as an aid to determine which patients would be likely to benefit from a cardiac workup before surgery and which would not. He explained that “it helps us in a decision making process. Helps us decide what patients to send to the operating room, what patients to send to the cardiologist.” Without objection, he testified that the process he used was consistent with a set of “clinical guidelines” recommended by the AHA and the ACC, that the “flow diagram” had been published prior to the surgery and that he had incorporated the process into his practice.  Thus, counsel offered the algorithm as a demonstrative aid for the jury in understanding the process his client had followed. Indeed, the trial court stated that it was admitting the algorithm to illustrate Dr. Ilioffʹs evaluation process:  “It is a document, as I understand it, which does not purport to resolve any crucial issue in the case. Itʹs to be used only to explain an evaluation procedure [ ] which a treating doctor used, as merely one link in the chain [ ] which he relied upon to reach a conclusion.” 

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  Defendants additionally maintain that the algorithm was properly admitted under the professional reliability exception to the hearsay rule, which enables an expert witness to provide opinion evidence based on otherwise inadmissible hearsay, provided it is demonstrated to be the type of material commonly relied on in the profession ( see e.g., Hambsch v. New York City Tr. Auth., 63 N.Y.2d 723, 726, 480 N.Y.S.2d 195, 469 N.E.2d 516 [1984]; see also Prince, Richardson on Evidence § 7‐311 [Farrell 11th ed.] ). Because the trial courtʹs proper basis for admitting the algorithm was demonstrative and plaintiff made no request for clarification or limiting instructions, we need not reach this issue. We note only that whether evidence may become admissible solely because of its use as a basis for expert testimony remains an open question in New York ( see People v. Goldstein, 6 N.Y.3d 119, 126‐127, 810 N.Y.S.2d 100, 843 N.E.2d 727 [2005] [concerning out‐of‐court factual statements] ). While some jurisdictions allow otherwise inadmissible materials relied upon by an expert witness to reach the jury for nonhearsay purposes, we have acknowledged the need for limits on admitting**1292 the basis of an expertʹs opinion to avoid providing a “conduit for hearsay” ( id. at 126, 810 N.Y.S.2d 100, 843 N.E.2d 727).FN6 Absent timely objection by plaintiff, however, we need not decide whether in this instance the trial court applied proper limits in allowing the algorithm to be viewed by the jury to evaluate the expertsʹ opinions or for some other nonhearsay purpose. 

PEOPLE v. EVES, 28 A.D.3d 1231, 815 N.Y.S.2d 389 (4th Dep’t  2006). 

Present Sense Impression 

Contrary to defendantʹs contention, County Court properly admitted a bystanderʹs statement in evidence under the present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule ( see generally People v. Buie, 86 N.Y.2d 501, 505‐509, 634 N.Y.S.2d 415, 658 N.E.2d 192; People v. Dann, 17 A.D.3d 1152, 793 N.Y.S.2d 852, lv. denied 5 N.Y.3d 761, 801 N.Y.S.2d 255, 834 N.E.2d 1265; People v. Ortiz, 1 A.D.3d 1017, 1018, 767 N.Y.S.2d 361, lv. denied 1 N.Y.3d 632, 777 N.Y.S.2d 30, 808 N.E.2d 1289). “There was sufficient corroboration, by means of independent proof, of both the contemporaneity and reliability of the out‐of‐court declaration” ( Ortiz, 1 A.D.3d at 1018, 767 N.Y.S.2d 361; see generally People v. Vasquez, 88 N.Y.2d 561, 574‐575, 647 N.Y.S.2d 697, 670 N.E.2d 1328; People v. Brown, 80 N.Y.2d 729, 734‐736, 594 N.Y.S.2d 696, 610 N.E.2d 369).    PEOPLE v. RODRIGUEZ, 28 A.D.3d 496, 816 N.Y.S.2d 79, (2d Dep’t 2006). 

Right of Accused to Confront Witnesses: defendantʹs confrontation rights were not violated by introduction of detectiveʹs testimony about knowledge he derived from other persons for non‐hearsay purpose of rebutting defense argument that detective had fabricated portions of defendantʹs second written statement.  the prosecution was properly permitted to question Detective Kevin Smith about the knowledge he derived from other persons for the non‐hearsay purpose of rebutting the defense argument that the detective had fabricated portions of the defendantʹs second written statement 

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( see Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 414, 105 S.Ct. 2078, 85 L.Ed.2d 425; People v. Reynoso, 309 A.D.2d 769, 770‐771, 765 N.Y.S.2d 54, affd. 2 N.Y.3d 820, 781 N.Y.S.2d 284, 814 N.E.2d 456;  

PEOPLE v. PERKINS, 27 A.D.3d 890, 810 N.Y.S.2d 596 (3d Dep’t 2006). 

Complaints and Declarations of Female  

We further reject defendantʹs argument that County Court improperly concluded that the prompt outcry exception permitted admission of the testimony of Nicole Garrison, a friend of one of the victims. Garrison testified that the victim complained that defendant had sexually assaulted her the day after the incident occurred and at the victimʹs first opportunity. While such out‐of‐court statements are generally inadmissible to bolster a witnessʹs testimony, “evidence that a victim of sexual assault promptly complained about the incident is admissible to corroborate the allegation that an assault took place” ( People v. McDaniel, 81 N.Y.2d 10, 16, 595 N.Y.S.2d 364, 611 N.E.2d 265 [1993]; see People v. Allen, 13 A.D.3d 892, 894, 787 N.Y.S.2d 417 [2004], lv. denied 4 N.Y.3d 883, 798 N.Y.S.2d 728, 831 N.E.2d 973 [2005] ). Inasmuch as the victimʹs disclosure was made at the first suitable opportunity and less than 24 hours after the incident occurred, we agree with County Court that it was promptly made and the testimony at issue was properly admitted ( see People v. Shelton, 307 A.D.2d 370, 371, 763 N.Y.S.2d 79 [2003], affd. 1 N.Y.3d 614, 777 N.Y.S.2d 9, 808 N.E.2d 1268 [2004]; see also Matter of Gregory AA., 20 A.D.3d 726, 727‐728, 799 N.Y.S.2d 830 [2005]; cf. People v. Allen, supra at 895‐896, 787 N.Y.S.2d 417 [2004] ).    2005/04 

 CRAWFORD v. WASHINGTON, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004).  Our case law has been largely consistent with these two principles. Our leading early decision, for example, involved a deceased witnessʹs prior trial testimony. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 15 S.Ct. 337, 39 L.Ed. 409 (1895). In allowing the statement to be admitted, we relied on the fact that the defendant had had, at the first trial, an adequate opportunity to confront the witness: ʺThe substance of the constitutional protection is preserved to the prisoner in the advantage he has once had of seeing the witness face to face, and of subjecting him to the ordeal of a cross‐examination. This, the law says, he shall under no circumstances be deprived of ....ʺ Id., at 244, 15 S.Ct. 337.  Our later cases conform to Mattoxʹs holding that prior trial or preliminary hearing testimony is admissible only if the defendant had an adequate opportunity to cross‐examine. See Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213‐216, 92 S.Ct. 2308, 33 L.Ed.2d 293 (1972); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165‐168, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S., at 406‐408, 85 S.Ct. 

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1065; cf. Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55‐61, 19 S.Ct. 574, 43 L.Ed. 890 (1899). Even where the defendant had such an opportunity,  we excluded the testimony where the government had not established unavailability of the witness. See Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 722‐725, 88 S.Ct. 1318, 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1968); cf. Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458, 470‐471, 20 S.Ct. 993, 44 L.Ed. 1150 (1900). We similarly excluded accomplice confessions where the defendant had no opportunity to cross‐examine. See Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293, 294‐ 295, 88 S.Ct. 1921, 20 L.Ed.2d 1100 (1968) (per curiam); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 126‐128, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418‐420, 85 S.Ct. 1074, 13 L.Ed.2d 934 (1965). In contrast, we considered reliability factors beyond prior opportunity for cross‐examination when the hearsay statement at issue was not testimonial. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S., at 87‐89, 91 S.Ct. 210 (plurality opinion). Even our recent cases, in their outcomes, hew closely to the traditional line. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S., at 67‐70, 100 S.Ct. 2531, admitted testimony from a preliminary hearing at which the defendant had examined the witness. Lilly v. Virginia, supra, excluded testimonial statements that the defendant had had no opportunity to test by cross‐examination. And Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 181‐184, 107 S.Ct. 2775, 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987), admitted statements made unwittingly to an FBI informant after applying a more general test that did not make prior cross‐examination an indispensable requirement. d.2d 162 (1987).   Our cases have thus remained faithful to the Framersʹ understanding: Testimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial have been admitted only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross‐examine.  Finally, we reiterate that, when the declarant appears for cross‐examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial statements. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 162, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970). It is therefore irrelevant that the reliability of some out‐of‐court statements ʺ ʹcannot be replicated, even if the declarant testifies to the same matters in court.ʹ ʺ Post, at 1377 (quoting United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 395, 106 S.Ct. 1121, 89 L.Ed.2d 390 (1986)). The Clause does not bar admission of a statement so long as the declarant is present at trial to defend or explain it. (The Clause also does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of  the matter asserted. See Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 414, 105 S.Ct. 2078, 85 L.Ed.2d 425 (1985).)  

* * * Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with the Framersʹ design to afford the States flexibility in their development of hearsay law‐‐as does Roberts, and as would an approach that exempted such statements from Confrontation Clause scrutiny altogether. Where testimonial evidence is at issue, however, the Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross‐examination. We leave for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of ʺtestimonial. Whatever else the term covers, it applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a 

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grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations. These are the modern practices with closest kinship to the abuses at which the Confrontation Clause was directed. 

   III. STRATEGIES FOR ADDRESSING HEARSAY PROOF  1.  Statutory Aids  CPLR Rule 3122‐a. Certification of business records  (a) Business records produced pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum under rule 3120 shall be accompanied by a certification, sworn in the form of an affidavit and subscribed by the custodian or other qualified witness charged with responsibility of maintaining the records, stating in substance each of the following:  1. The affiant is the duly authorized custodian or other qualified witness and has authority to make the certification;  2. To the best of the affiantʹs knowledge, after reasonable inquiry, the records or copies thereof are accurate versions of the documents described in the subpoena duces tecum that are in the possession, custody, or control of the person receiving the subpoena;  3. To the best of the affiantʹs knowledge, after reasonable inquiry, the records or copies produced represent all the documents described in the subpoena duces tecum, or if they do not represent a complete set of the documents subpoenaed, an explanation of which documents are missing and a reason for their absence is provided; and  4. The records or copies produced were made by the personnel or staff of the business, or persons acting under their control, in the regular course of business, at the time of the act, transaction, occurrence or event recorded therein, or within a reasonable time thereafter, and that it was the regular course of business to make such records. (b) A certification made in compliance with subdivision (a) is admissible as to the matters set forth therein and as to such matters shall be presumed true. When more than one person has knowledge of the facts, more than one certification may be made.  (c) A party intending to offer at a trial or hearing business records authenticated by certification subscribed pursuant to this rule shall, at least thirty days before the trial or hearing, give notice of such intent and specify the place where such records may be inspected at reasonable times. No later than ten days before the trial or hearing, a party upon whom such notice is served may object to the offer of business records by certification stating the grounds for the objection. Such objection may be asserted in any instance and shall not be subject to imposition of any penalty 

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or sanction. Unless objection is made pursuant to this subdivision, or is made at trial based upon evidence which could not have been discovered by the exercise of due diligence prior to the time for objection otherwise required by this subdivision, business records certified in accordance with this rule shall be deemed to have satisfied the requirements of subdivision (a) of rule 4518. Notwithstanding the issuance of such notice or objection to same, a party may subpoena the custodian to appear and testify and require the production of original business records at the trial or hearing.  CPLR § 3123. Admissions as to matters of fact, papers, documents and photographs  (a) Notice to admit; admission unless denied or denial excused. At any time after service of the answer or after the expiration of twenty days from service of the summons, whichever is sooner, and not later than twenty days before the trial, a party may serve upon any other party a written request for admission by the latter of the genuineness of any papers or documents, or the correctness or fairness of representation of any photographs, described in and served with the request, or of the truth of any matters of fact set forth in the request, as to which the party requesting the admission reasonably believes there can be no substantial dispute at the trial and which are within the knowledge of such other party or can be ascertained by him upon reasonable inquiry. Copies of the papers, documents or photographs shall be served with the request unless copies have already been furnished. Each of the matters of which an admission is requested shall be deemed admitted unless within twenty days after service thereof or within such further time as the court may allow, the party to whom the request is directed serves upon the party requesting the admission a sworn statement either denying specifically the matters of which an admission is requested or setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny those matters. If the matters of which an admission is requested cannot be fairly admitted without some material qualification or explanation, or if the matters constitute a trade secret or such party would be privileged or disqualified from testifying as a witness concerning them, such party may, in lieu of a denial or statement, serve a sworn statement setting forth in detail his claim and, if the claim is that the matters cannot be fairly admitted without some material qualification or explanation, admitting the matters with such qualification or explanation.  (b) Effect of admission. Any admission made, or deemed to be made, by a party pursuant to a request made under this rule is for the purpose of the pending action only and does not constitute an admission by him for any other purpose nor may it be used against him in any other proceeding; and the court, at any time, may allow a party to amend or withdraw any admission on such terms as may be just. Any admission shall be subject to all pertinent objections to admissibility which may be interposed at the trial.  (c) Penalty for unreasonable denial. If a party, after being served with a request under subdivision (a) does not admit and if the party requesting the admission thereafter proves the genuineness of any such paper or document, or the correctness or fairness of representation of any such photograph, or the truth of any such matter of fact, he may move at or immediately 

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following the trial for an order requiring the other party to pay him the reasonable expenses incurred in making such proof, including reasonable attorneyʹs fees. Unless the court finds that there were good reasons for the denial or the refusal otherwise to admit or that the admissions sought were of no substantial importance, the order shall be made irrespective of the result of the action. Upon a trial by jury, the motion for such an order shall be determined by the court outside the presence of the jury.  CPLR Rule 3116. Signing deposition; physical preparation; copies  (a) Signing. The deposition shall be submitted to the witness for examination and shall be read to or by him or her, and any changes in form or substance which the witness desires to make shall be entered at the end of the deposition with a statement of the reasons given by the witness for making them. The deposition shall then be signed by the witness before any officer authorized to administer an oath. If the witness fails to sign and return the deposition within sixty days, it may be used as fully as though signed. No changes to the transcript may be made by the witness more than sixty days after submission to the witness for examination.  CPLR Rule 3117. Use of depositions  (a) Impeachment of witnesses; parties; unavailable witness. At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence, may be used in accordance with any of the following provisions:  1. any deposition may be used by any party for the purpose of contradicting or impeaching the testimony of the deponent as a witness;  2. the deposition testimony of a party or of any person who was a party when the testimony was given or of any person who at the time the testimony was given was an officer, director, member, employee or managing or authorized agent of a party, may be used for any purpose by any party who was adversely interested when the deposition testimony was given or who is adversely interested when the deposition testimony is offered in evidence;  3. the deposition of any person may be used by any party for any purpose against any other party who was present or represented at the taking of the deposition or who had the notice required under these rules, provided the court finds:    (i) that the witness is dead; or    (ii) that the witness is at a greater distance than one hundred miles from the place of trial   or is out of the state, unless it appears that the absence of the witness was procured by   the party offering the deposition; or  

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  (iii) that the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or   imprisonment; or    (iv) that the party offering the deposition has been unable to procure the attendance of   the witness by diligent efforts; or    (v) upon motion or notice, that such exceptional circumstances exist as to make its use   desirable, in the interest of justice and with due regard to the importance of presenting   the testimony of witnesses orally in open court;  4. the deposition of a person authorized to practice medicine may be used by any party without the necessity of showing unavailability or special circumstances, subject to the right of any party to move pursuant to section 3103 to prevent abuse.  2.  Crafting Discovery    (1) 

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PRACTICAL COURTROOM EVIDENCE/DIRECT AND CROSS-EXAMINATION

Prepared and Presented by:PETER J. MOSCHETTI, JR.ANDERSON, MOSCHETTI

& TAFFANY, PLLC

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REAL EVIDENCE FOR THE TRIALPRACTITIONER IN NEW YORK

Practical Courtroom Evidence Direct/Cross-Examination

I. Proper Form of Questions

A. Direct Examination

1. General Rule: Leading questions are not to be used. Leading questions suggest the answer.

Yes or no questions are not necessarily leading. Intonation can be determinative, but is the sounddiscretion of the Court that rules.

How, where, what and when, but not necessarily why (callsfor a conclusion).

Avoid the narrative (too many objections).

2. Exceptions to the General Rule

Introductory matters, calling witness’ attention to the subjectof the testimony such as time, date, place or occurrence.

To jog the memory of a witness whose recollection isexhausted.

To use with witnesses whose mental capacity requires it,such as children, the infirmed, the elderly, etc.

Hostile, adverse, or reluctant witnesses.

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3. Opinion Evidence by Lay Witnesses

Permissible as to ordinary perceptions such as weight,height, color, etc.

Foundation for the speed of a car, intoxication of anindividual, etc.

Description of smell, taste (i.e., smelled like ‘alcohol’ or‘gasoline’).

Emotional state of a witness, such as anger or nervousness.

No “special” form needed for this type of question (i.e.,you have an opinion based on a reasonable degree…).

4. Refreshing Recollection

Past recollection refreshed. First you must establish that thewitnesses’ memory is exhausted. You may use any type ofdocument or material to refresh the witnesses’ memory.

Past Recollection Recorded. Hearsay exception: the writingitself is admissible. You must show the witness hadknowledge of the contents of the writing, the writing wasprepared by or at the direction of the witness, the writing wasprepared close in time to the event and the witness intendedthe writing to be accurate.

5. Redirect

Limited to matters raised on cross-examination.

Used to rehabilitate impeached witnesses.

“Supposed” to use non-leading questions.

B. Cross-Examination

1. General rule is leading questions are allowed(encouraged).

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Wigmore: “Cross-examination is the greatest legal engineever invented for the discovery of truth”.

Questions suggesting the answer are fine.

So are questions requiring a yes or no answer.

2. Compound questions are objectionable.

Break each question down, take your time and enjoy it.

Avoid argumentative questions (i.e., if you say “A” and theysay “B”, they must be “lying”; you are a “liar”).

3. Asked and Answered

Applies only to questions you have asked; just because itwasbrought up on direct, doesn’t mean you can’t ask it again oncross-examination

II. Documentary and Demonstrative Evidence

A. Documentary Evidence

1. Non-business documents

If the witness observed the signing of the document, he cantestify to that for purpose of admission.

When, where, who and how lay the proper foundation.

If the witness did not observe the execution, but recognizesthe handwriting or signature, the document may beadmissible.

Of course, you can use an expert document examiner(CPLR Section 4536). You need known exemplars,a competent expert and comparison to the questioneddocument.

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2. Business Records

CPLR Section 4518(a) applies.

You need to establish the document was made in the regularcourse of business, made at or near the time of the event andis part of the record keeping of the business.

For admissibility, you need to establish one of the following;the record maker had personal knowledge of the matterrecorded; the record maker relied upon information suppliedby a person with a business duty to supply accurateinformation; or the statement recorded is not hearsay or is anexception to the hearsay rule (i.e., an admission by a party).

Hospital records and bills are covered by CPLR Sections4518(b), 2306(a) and 2307(b). They are self-authenticated ifcertified. No live testimony is needed.

With respect to hospital records, only information necessaryfor diagnosis and treatment is admissible. Williams v.Alexander, 309 N.Y.2d 283.

Physician’s office records are admissible under CPLRSection 4518(a) with the proper foundation. Wilson v.Bodian, 130 A.D.2d 221.

3. Public Records

CPLR Section 4518(c) covers library records and recordsfrom municipal or state departments.

Marriage Certificates are covered by CPLR Section 4526. Birth and death certificates are covered by Public HealthLaw, Section 4103.

Weather Records are covered by CPLR Section 4528. Records of the U.S. Weather Bureau are admissible as primafacie evidence.

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B. Demonstrative Evidence

Anything that illustrates or demonstrates a witness’ testimonyabout the issue at hand (i.e., a model of a body part; a diagram ofan accident scene).

The evidence is intended to help the fact finder understand theissues.

Admission rests largely within the discretion of the trial judge.

Demonstrations under conditions virtually identical to thosepresent at the time of the incident are admissible.

Nominal differences in conditions or items should not renderdemonstrative evidence inadmissible. Bolm v. Triumph Corp., 71A.D.2d 429.

Variations will affect the weight, but not necessarily theadmissibility.

Diagrams, to scale and not to scale. If to scale, admissible asevidence in chief with the proper foundation; if not to scale, wouldbe admitted for illustrious purposes only.

Use of “blackboard” by witness are admissible as realevidence. Remember, photograph it for appeal.

III. Scope of Cross-Examination

Cross-examination in New York is limited to matters covered on direct,inferences drawn therefrom, and the credibility of the witness.

Questioning on new matters makes the witness your own. The court maypreclude the use of leading questions and impeachment of the witness.

Exception: CPLR Section 4514 allows a party to show any witness hasmade statements that are inconsistent with his trial testimony. You mustestablish an inconsistency in either a statement made in writing and signedor made under oath.

However, if the witness is an adverse party, then he can be impeached by

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any type of inconsistent statement that constitutes an admission.

IV. Cross-Examination on Collateral Matters

Beware of cross-examination on collateral matters.

General rule: the cross-examiner is bound by the answers to the questionson collateral matters inquired into solely to effect credibility.

The witness cannot be impeached by calling other witnesses or producingextrinsic evidence.

Exception: bias, interest, or hostility of a witness will not be consideredcollateral.

V. Impeachment of a Non-Expert Witness

A. Impeaching of a witness by showing he has made statements inthe past which are inconsistent with his trial testimony.

If the witness is a non-party and has made an inconsistent oralstatement, you must lay a foundation, asking the witness if thestatement was made, the time and place it was made, and the personto whom it was made.

No such foundation is required if the witness is an adverse party.

If the witness denies making the statement or says he cannotremember making such a statement, you may call a witness that hasheard the statement to testify about it.

If the inconsistent statement is written and the witness admits thestatement or signature, it can be offered into evidence. Thestatement cannot be read from until it is entered into evidence.

The contents of the statement that are not inconsistent must beexcluded or redacted.

If the witness does not admit the signing of the document, you mustestablish the genuineness of the statement by other means.

Non-party inconsistent statements can only be offered for thepurposes of attacking credibility and not as evidence-in-chief.

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Deposition testimony is the easiest form of inconsistent statementwith which to impeach. CPLR Section 3117.

B. Establishing the Witnesses’ General Bad Reputation WithRespect to Truth and Veracity

A witness may be impeached by evidence of a bad reputationfor truth and voracity. People v. Pabao, 59 N.Y.2d 282.

A party has a right to call a witness to testify if the witness has a badreputation in the community for truthfulness and veracity.

The witness is not allowed to testify to specific acts of dishonesty orexpress his own opinion of the witness’ veracity.

C. Immoral, Vicious or Criminal Acts

All witnesses may be cross-examined about any immoral, vicious orcriminal act which may reflect on their own character or honesty.

You must have a good faith basis to ask these types of questions.

However, beware of the collateral matter rule: if the witness deniescommitting the act, you are bound by his answer and cannot refutethe answer by extrinsic evidence.

D. Conviction of a Crime

Generally, the conviction must be for a misdemeanor or a felony.

Juvenile delinquency or youthful offender adjudication cannot beestablished. However, you can question on the underlying conductgiving rise to the adjudication.

A conviction can be shown by an admission by the witness or by a certified record of the conviction. CPLR Section 4513.

Even if the witness admits the conviction, you may still enter intoevidence the certificate of conviction.

You can, and should, go into the underlying facts of the conviction.

You cannot ask a witness whether he/she has been arrested or

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indicted.

However, you can question the witness as to the underlying factsthat gave rise to the arrest or the indictment.

E. Bias, Hostility or Interest of the Witness

Evidence of bias, hostility or interest is an appropriate ground forcross-examination. It is not subject to the collateral matterlimitation.

Bias can be demonstrated by evidence of family, business or socialrelationships.

A co-defendant that settles with the plaintiff and is called to testifyby the plaintiff is subject to cross-examination regarding thesettlement and the amount so as to impeach his/her credibility. CPLR Section 4533; Pretto v. Leiwart, 80 A.D.2d 579.

Hostility towards the party against whom a witness is testifying maybe demonstrated by cross-examination or by the testimony of others.

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! NOTES ! NOTES ! NOTES ! NOTES !