Classical Review -'the Athenian Cavalry in the Peloponnesian War and at Amphipolis' by J. MacInnes

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The Athenian Cavalry in the Peloponnesian War and at Amphipolis

Author(s): J. MacInnesSource: The Classical Review, Vol. 25, No. 7 (Nov., 1911), pp. 193-195Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Classical AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/696042 .

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T h e Classical ReviewNOVEMBER 1911

ORIGINAL CONTRIBUTIONSTHE ATHENIAN CAVALRY IN THE PELOPONNESIAN WARAND AT AMPHIPOLIS.

AN interesting feature of the Pelo-ponnesian War as recorded by Thucy-dides, to which, as far as I know,attention has not been directed, is thetreatment by the Athenians of theircavalry, especially in the Sicilian ex-pedition.Before the Sicilian expedition wasresolved upon, Nicias informed theAthenians of their inferiority in cavalry(Thuc. VI. 20, 22). So well known wasthis weakness that in VI. 37 Athena-goras is represented as saying in Syra-cuse: ' I know that they will not bringcavalry with them, and they will findnone here.' When the expedition didstart, it comprised 5,100 hoplites and asingle horse transport with 30 horsemen(VI. 43). During the siege of Syracuse,the Athenians were grievously harassedby the Syracusan cavalry, whichamounted to 1,200 (VI. 66, 68, 70). Atthe end of 415 B.C. the generals senthome for money and cavalry (VI. 74,93), and in 414 B.C. 250 horsemenarrived, expecting to procure horses onthe spot (VI. 94)- With local additionsthe Athenian cavalry now amounted to650, but still these were too few againstthe Syracusans (VII. 4, 6, 13). Yetwhen further reinforcements of 5,000hoplites and numerous light - armedtroops were sent from Athens, no cavalrywere added (VII. 20, 42). It is truethat cavalry were needed to makedescents upon Decelea (VII. 27). But

even if it could be shown that the needof them to act against Decelea wasgreater than the need of them againstSyracuse, why were cavalry not sent toSicily at the outset, before danger fromDecelea was apprehended ? It was notbecause the Athenians were withoutmeans of training men or horses, forpresumably they could not then havesupported cavalry from 431 to 421, asthey did.These are the cavalry contingentsas given by Thucydides up to the timeof the Sicilian expedition: In 431B.C. the Athenian forces numbered13,000 hoplites for foreign service and1,200 cavalry (II. 13). In 430 B.C.Pericles invaded the Peloponnesus with4,000 hoplites and 300 cavalry (II. 56).In 429 Athens sent an expedition againstthe Chalcidians of Thrace, consisting of2,000 hoplites and 200 cavalry (II. 79)-In 425 against the Corinthians theyemployed 2,000 hoplites and 200 cavalry(IV. 42); in 424 against the Megarians,4,000 hoplites and 600 cavalry (IV. 68) ;at Delium in the same year against theBoeotians, who had 7,000 hoplites,10,000 light-armed, 1,000 cavalry, Athenshad 7,000 hoplites and a large number ofirregulars; 300 cavalry were protectingDelium, but perhaps the Athenianscould spare none for the battle, in whichtheir defeat was due to the Boeotiancavalry (IV. 93, 94). Excluding theforces of Cleon at Amphipolis, of whichNO. CCXXI. VOL. XXV. N

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194 THE CLASSICAL REVIEWI shall speak presently, we find that in418 the Athenians sent a reinforcementto Argos of ,000ooohoplites and 300cavalry (V. 61); in 416 they sent toMethone 'cavalry of their own' (VI. 7);in their last efforts in Sicily they lost70 horse before Syracuse (VII. 51), andall the remainder at the Assinarus(VII. 75). In Book VIII. there seemsto be no mention of any cavalry force(see ch. 25).Consider now the exceptional case ofCleon's force at Amphipolis in 422. Hisforces showed unusual proportions:I,2oo Athenian hoplites, 300 Atheniancavalry, and numerous allies1 (V. 2).Brasidas had 2,000 hoplites, more thani,ooo light-armed, and 300 Helleniccavalry (V. 6). It will be noticed thatno other force sent from Athens fordistant operations had so many cavalryin proportion to foot. The fact thatBrasidas also had 300 cavalry is in itselfnot sufficient to explain the pheno-menon, for (i) in the previous yearNicias had acted without cavalry againstBrasidas (IV. 129); (2) if the object ofthe expedition was the recovery ofAmphipolis, cavalry were unsuitable forthe country around and for a siegesuch as might be anticipated. But itmay be that Athens expected troublefrom Macedonian cavalry (cp. I. 60).Whatever the reason for the presence ofso many aristocratically-inclined iwrwrek,it was disastrous. For while bothgenerals hesitated to engage. 'Cleon wassoon compelled to do what Brasidas ex-pected' (V. 7). 'The soldiers, disgustedat their inaction, drew comparisonsbetween the generals, reflecting howignorant and cowardly Cleon was, howexperienced and courageous his op-ponent. Theyremembered owunwillinglythey hadfollowed Cleonfrom home.' HereThucydides quotes with obvious ap-proval a most unfair and disloyalopinion. Cleon was justified in waiting

for the reinforcements from nativeprinces, which he had required of themin accordance with the terms of theiralliance. To prove his ignorance andcowardice we have only the biassedstatements of Thucydides and Aristo-phanes, which attribute to him suchcontradictory qualities as ignorance andastuteness, cowardice and recklessness.2The result of this insubordination iswell known. According to Thucydides,Cleon noticed this murmuring, and inorder to check the depression, went out'to have a look at the place' (Ica'raeav) ; when he was so imprudent as tomarch past the gates of Amphipolis,Brasidas made a sortie and routed theAthenians, Cleon and he being killed.Among other strange features ofThucydides' account, critics havepointed to the statement that the feetof many horses and men about to sallyforth were visible under the gate. Butno mention is made of either Lacede-monian or Athenian cavalry in theengagement. When Cleon determinedto retreat, says Thucydides, he orderedhis forces to retire slowly on the leftwing. They appearedto linger,3 where-upon he caused his own right wing toface round. When the unexpectedattack came, the right wing on whichCleon and the hoplites had been sta-tioned stood its ground; the left brokeoff and instantly fled.Now it is almost certain that on theleft wing was stationed the cavalry. Itwould have to be on one wing or theother. At Solygea in 425 the Atheniancavalry was on the left (IV. 43-4); atMantinea the Athenians were on the leftwing, and were supported by theircavalry; the Lacedemonian cavalry wasplaced on both wings (V. 67); theBoeotian cavalry also was placed onboth wings at Delium (IV. 93).

1 This force was packed into 30 ships, thoughPericles' force of 4,ooo hoplites and 300 cavalrywent forth in Ioo ships (II. 56). In IV. 42 weread of 2,00oo hoplites and 200 horse in 80 ships;in VI. 43 of 5,ooohoplites and 1,300light-armedin 134; in VI. 42 of 5,000 hoplites and numerouslight-armed in 73 ; in VIII. 25 of 2,500 hoplitesand I,ooo allies in 48 ships. Obviously thetightness of packing varied.

2 If Thucydides had applied the same pre-judice to the actions of Nicias, '6 LEXXovLKLCOV(Aristoph. Birds, 640), how would Nicias' weak-ness have come out ! Cleon is too oftencredited,by analogy with modern days, with ignoranceand ill-breeding arising from want of a 'liberaleducation.' But we have no proof that Niciasor Alcibiades were better trained than Cleon.See on this point Holm's History of Greece,II.ch. ii. n. I, ch. xxviii. n. 8.3 I read aXoXi cp. III. 46.



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THE CLASSICAL REVIEW 195Two inferences may be drawn. First,that Thucydides got his account of thebattle from one of the irr6rrF, whosaved themselves disgracefully; his biasagainst Cleon kept him from mode-rating in a critical spirit the partisanaccount of his informant. Second, thatthe Athenian democracy, indignant atthe insubordination and cowardice of the

lorev, avoided using them afterwardsunless in operations very near Athens,as against Decelea, or in conjunctionwith a democracy such as Argos. Totheir political fears they sacrificed even

great military advantage. This latterinference finds support in Aristophanes.In Wasps 288 (produced 422 B.C.), weread: 'There will come along a richman, one of those who are betrayingChalcidice'; in 1.475 Bdelycleon, repre-sentative of young aristocratic Athens,is described as vvaovBpaao-1a; in thePeace (421 B.C.)1. 640 the charge is saidto have been brought against any aris-tocrats among the allies 4 (povoZ TaBpao-'8,ov. J. MACINNES.The University of Manchester.

THE SIN OF OEDIPUS.(A defence of Professor Murray'stranslationof Sophocles' Oedipus Tyrannus, 11.1183-I185.)

a dbO, reXLeTvratov poo-3,X8atut v^v,0o0-t1E aro-aat c 7r' 4' ov ov Xppv,Obv oV07r'ot dXplv XCOv," IT1'oZ e Iavv.

THE Spectator for May 13, 1911, con-tains a review of Professor Murray'snew translation of the Oedipus Tyran-nus,l in which exception is taken tohis rendering of the above lines.'Thou Light,neveragainMay I behold thee, I in the eyes of menMadenaked,howfromsinmy beinggrew,In sin I weddedand in sin I slew.'

' The attribution of sin to Oedipus,'says the reviewer, 'destroys at oncethe entire interest of the drama. Theidea of "sin " essentially involves thatof moral guilt, and from moral guilt heis throughout absolutely free. Thefact of his freedom is the very thingthat makes his fate so tragic, and toput into his lips words which are anopen confession of crime is to mar thewhole effect of a great and almoststupendous work.'This criticism makes somewhatlightly two large assumptions: (i) ThatOedipus is'absolutely free from moralguilt '; (2) that the idea of 'sin' isequivalent to that of 'crime.' In hisfirst assumption the critic seems tohave ignored the important allusion

to the case of Oedipus in Aristotle'sPoetics, c. xiii., where the philosopherdiscusses the character of the idealtragic hero. We must not be pre-sented with the spectacle of virtuousmen (robs d7ErrLIEgLvSpa9) broughtfrom prosperity to adversity, ' oi ypo0/Epoy V o,8 'XeeLvYv 70)o70 hXXa /papovEdo-~7.' In the view of Aristotle thecharacter of the ideal tragic hero shouldlie between the two extremes of perfectuprightness and utter villainy:

eoT U To70Lov70 /t7'7e ape &jappwcvKal 8tKatoo-vdv/7 8th ,ax'av ,ca po-XSnpalav /e7a3aXXov els 7 8vo-vTvxlavcaXXa &' aaprTav rvaC~CoV ev LE7aXy

In an essay appended to his editionof the Poetics,2 the late ProfessorButcher has exhaustively discussed thepossible range of meaning which theterm Aptaprt'a, especially as used byAristotle, can cover. He finds Aris-totelian authority for the use of theterm qtapap? in four distinct senses.(i) An error due to unavoidable ignor-ance of circumstances. (2) An errordue to ignorance of circumstanceswhich might have been known, andtherefore to some degree morallyculpable. Both of these would beclassed as cases of " ,aO' e"cao-ra,

1 Oedipus, King of Thebes. Translated byGilbert Murray,D.Litt., LL.D. London: Geo.Allen and Sons. 2 Aristotle's Theoryof Poetry and Fine Art.By S. H. Butcher. Second edition, pp. 310-15.


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