Class in Britain since 1979: facts, theories and...

Hitotsubashi University Repository

TitleClass in Britain since 1979: facts, theories and

ideologies

Author(s) Westergaard, John

CitationHitotsubashi journal of social studies, 25(1): 25-

62

Issue Date 1993-07

Type Departmental Bulletin Paper

Text Version publisher

URL http://doi.org/10.15057/8387

Right

Hitotsubashi Journal of Social Studies 25 (1993) 25-62. C The Hitotsubashi Academy

CLASS IN BRITAlN SlNCE 1979 :

FACTS, THEORIES AND IDEOLOGIES

JOHN WESTERGAARD

Prefatory Note

This is a revised version of three lectures which I gave in December 1992 at Hitotsu-

bashi University, Tokyo, at the generous invitation of the University's Committee for Acad-

emic Exchange with British Universities. In revising the lectures for publication, I have added an Appendix of statistical tables;

inserted references both to these and to relevant literature in the text ; and re-arranged the

list of books and papers cited to form a bibliography at the end, though this inevitably is

only a limited selection from the large range of relevant published work. I have also made

occasional amendments to the original text, for the purpose of clarification. But these

amendments are very small, except in two or three places in the third lecture, where points

which I made orally in response to highly stimulating discussion at the time have seemed

to me worth some incorporation in the present revised text.

I hope I may use this opportunity to repeat my warm gratitiude to Hitotsubashi Uni-

versity and its Academic Exchange Committee for their great hospitality and generosity

in inviting me ; and also to express my most heartfelt appreciation to the colleagues and

students-from both Hitotsubashi and elsewhere-who turned the discussion after each of my lectures into what, for me certainly, proved an exceptionally exciting, rewarding and

challenging experience. These colleagues and students are too many to list by name here.

But my profound thanks go to all of them; and especially to one outstanding colleague and

friend whom I must name. Professor Masao Watanabe, whose personal as well as intellectual

contribution throughout was beyond measure. JHW. January 1993.

I.

Class Structure in the 1980s and '90s:

the facts of widening inequality

Theme

Let me start by outlining the theme which will run through these three lectures. That

26 HITOTSUBASHI JOURNAL OF SOCIAL STUDIES [ July

theme is about a puzzle. The puzzle is this, quite simply. Thefacts about class-in Britain

and a number of other western countries-show that inequality has widened quite drama-tically since about 1980. But, overjust this same period, fashionable theories and influential

ideologies have appeared to say almost the opposite. While rich and poor have in fact grown

further apart, predominant ideology has set out to dismiss this; and both predominant

ideology and leading social theory have come to argue that it does not matter anyway. What-

ever the facts of class inequality, so it is now fashionable to argue, such facts do not matter

much because class itself does not matter much any longer. If we are to believe the com-

mentators, the politicians and the academic theorists who have set this tone in current debate,

then class inequality has lost social force; it has lost moral force; it has lost political force.

So goes thinking ~ la mode. But I shall try to do three things in these lectures. First,

I want to challenge these class-denying theories and ideologies, by summarising the firm

facts which weigh against them. Second, I want to untangle the false assumptions which

go into those theories and which have helped, as I see it, to blind theory to fact. Third

and last, I want to consider some of the social reasons and forces behind today's class-denying

ideologies, and some of their social and political implications. But allow me to make a

few more preliminary comments before I come to these three main things.

I shall concentrate on Britain, because I know Britain best. Yet Britain is just one

example of the contrast, which is my theme, between facts about class today and leading

theories and ideologies about it. The USA could have served as another example. There,

too, divisions in fact between poverty and wealth, between concentrated power and wide-

spread lack of power, have grown wider in recent years, as economic uncertainty has set

in more deep]y. Yet there, again, the place of class has become still smaller than ever in

social theory, in prevailing ideology, and in debate about policy-this at least until last

month's election of a Democratic Party President-to-come. Or I could have gone to the

opposite end of the political range among western countries-to Scandinavia-and there

taken the example of Sweden. In Sweden, to cut a long and complex story short, only lO-15 years ago the leading question in debate-in both theoretical and practical political

debate-turned on labour movement hopes to 'socialise' the national economy, and thereby

to reduce class divisions a good deal further than social-democratic reform had managed

before. But now in Sweden, that debate seems rather a forgotten dream; while the trend of

facts suggests an incipient widening of inequalities, under a new economic and political

regime that tends to set class disparity aside as something of doubtful importance for policy

and society.

So my theme is at least western-wide, though I shall use Britain to illustrate it in detail.

Whether what I shall say may have any application to Japan is for you to judge-and I hope

for you to raise, this way or that, in discussion. As a first-time visitor to your country, I

have much to learn about it with your help; but nothing I could say before then without

appearing both ignorant and impertinent.

The concept of class

l think I need to make a preliminary comment, too, about what I shall mean by 'class.'

I take the term for my purposes here to signify a set of social divisions that arise from a

19931 CLASS IN BRITAIN SINCE 1979 : FACTS, THEORIES AND IDEOLOGIES 27

society's economic organisation. People, then, may be said to be in different classes in so

far as they occupy-and in so far as they generally continue to occupy-distinct and unequal

places in that economic organisation. And this in turn means places in the orders both

of production and of distribution. I add the latter polnt to make it clear that I am not con-

cerned here with any subtleties of conceptual distinction between, say, Karl Marx and Max

Weber. If Marx emphasized place in production, he was after all equally intent upon the

effects in distribution-this, as he saw it, by way of surplus appropriation versus labour ex-

ploitation. And if Weber emphasised place in distribution, when he wrote about the unequal

'1ife chances' of people in different classes, he also after all saw those inequalities as the result

primarily of differences of place in production. Moreover, Marx and Weber shared in es-

sence a crucial distinction between two aspects of class. This is the distinction between

class as an economic category and class as a socio-political group: between what Marx (in

The Poverty ofPhilosophy) saw as class-in-itself and class-for-itself. Though Weber coined

no set terms for the distinction, he like Marx took the logic ofclass analysis to put identifica-

tion of category by way of conditions in life before exploration of group formation to possible

political effects. I shall do the same here.

In my conception, then, class structure is first of all a matter of people's circumstances

in life as set by their unequal places in the economic order. In that sense, so I shall show,

class structure has recently hardened in Britain. Thereafter-but only thereafter-comes

the question of whether, and how, this hardening of class-as-category may translate into

sharper political or quasi-political group divisions. It will be part of my argument that

fashionable class-denying theory and ideology commits two errors, among others. It blurs

the distinction between the two issues of economic category-existence and of political group-

formation. And it naively infers, from new complexities of political group formation, an

erosion of economic-categorical class which is, quite plainly, contrary to fact.

The histol'ical background

In order to show just how contrary to fact this inference is, Iet me start with a short

sketch of the history of class inequality in Britain: before the changes from the 1980s, and

back to the 1940s. I take the 1940s to begin with, because that decade was something of

a turning point. World War 11 and its end brought a new socio-political settlement, in

Britain as in many other countries. Under first a coalition government, and then a Labour

government which at the time met only limited resistance of principle from the Conservative

opposition, policy was directed to 'social reconstruction.' This meant two things especially.

One was Keynesian-guided public management of the economy, to help growth and to keep

both business profits and labour employment high. The other was extensive reform of public welfare provision, which was intended to guarantee everybody a basic low-minimum

income, even if unemployed, slck or retired; to give all children free schooling to the best

level of their individual abilities, and help towards higher education for the most able; and.

most radically perhaps, to make medical care a free public service for all citizens. Some

bits and pieces were added to the reform package in the next three decades; a few were taken

away; and, from around 1960 especially, governments of both main parties came on the whole to take a more active part in steering the economy, by way of attempted 'corporatist'

28 HITOTSUBASHI JOURNAL OF SOCIAL STUDIES I July

cooperation with business and trade-union leaders, in the hope of sustaining economic growth

while holding back price and wage infiation. As in other countries, the ups-and-downs

in these three-cornered relationships between state, capital and labour made for tensions

of class structure, and for disputes over shares in the national economic cake. But in Brit-

ain, at least, tripartite corporatism made for no significant and lasting new change; and the

main features of the 'class compromise' of the 1940s stayed in place until the 1970s.

This was evident in the effects on patterns of class inequality. Those effects were

two-fold. One effect came at the start, in the 1940s. This was to change the pre-war shape

of things to some new advantage for ordinary workers, for the poor, and for trade unions.

Organised labour gained new muscle in the labour market, and more voice in public affairs.

Extreme poverty became rarer-and also less visible-than before the war. Inequalities of

real income between classes, and between different levels within classes, became smaller.

But the second point about the effects is that this change of balance came only once: it did

not prove a continuing trend. It came, as I have said, in the 1940s. Yet, once then set

in a new and more moderate shape than before the war, class inequalities of 'category' in

life circumstances showed no further significant compression over the 1950s, '60s and '70s.

(See in general Westergaard and Resler, 1975.) Ownership of private wealth was still highly

concentrated in the mid-'70s, for example, with just 5 ~ of the adult population holding

nearly 40~ of the full total (Table V), and very much more of personally-owned shares in

business capital. Inequalities of real income overall, and between different class- and oc-

cupational-groups, stayed fairly steady in relative terms over these three decades ; and taxa-

tion by itself did little to change the pattern, mainly because progressive income tax was

countered by regressive tax in less direct forms (Westergaard and Resler, 1975, Part 2). Wel-

fare benefits did boost real incomes proportionately more for the poor than for the rich; but

studies in 'rediscovery of poverty' from the 1960s on showed many people still living on

the margins of, or even below, the officially guaranteed minimum level (Townsend, 1979).

And the reforms of educational provision-first in the 1940s, with a second set in the 1960s

-proved, against all these continuing inequalities, to have little force to reduce class dis-

parities of individual opportunity (Halsey et al., 1980; Goldthorpe, 1987). Even differences

in the risks of death between people of different classes stayed broadly constant in relative

terms (Townsend and Davidson, ed., 1982).

The word 'relative' here is important. These thirty years or so were years, generally,

of economic growth. So the very continuity of pattern to the class structure, after the shift

in the 1940s, meant that most people had some share in this growth: most people, at all

levels, found their conditions and chances in life improving in absolute terms, at much the

same rates across the structure of class. It is on this count especially that things have

changed, and the class structure has hardened, since about 1980. On the one hand, economic

growth has faltered; and the vulnerable British economy, not least, has suffered two long

recessions in only a few more than ten years. On the other hand, class inequalities of con-

dition in Britain have actually now widened, after long previous stability. Put the two points

together; and you find, of course, many people now excluded from any significant share

in such economic growth as has still taken place. In the course of the last IC~15 years,

in summary, the pattern has shifted from constancy of inequality in a context of broadly

shared rise in living standards, to widened inequality in a context of economic growth now

far more uneven both in pace and in distribution of its benefits.

l 9931 CLASS IN BRITAIN SINCE 1979 : FACTS, THEORIES AND IDEOLOCIES 29

The shlft from about 1980: causes

I need to say just a little at this point about the causes of this dramatic change. There

are two sets of immediate causes: economic on the one hand, and political on the other.

The first set has involved a series of shifts in economic structure, world-wide and increasingly

visible since the mid-1970s. Growth has become more uneven, both over time and across

the globe. The older 'imperial' capitalist economies of the west have faced increasing

challenge from Japanese, and now also from other East-to-South East Asian, business enter-

prise. Changes have accelerated in the patterns of division in production, and in markets

for finance and services, for commodities and labour. Developments in the transnational

organisation of capital have continued to outstrip, by far, the still largely nation-bound

organisation of political processes and collective labour defences. In one form of summary:

if Kondratiev's analysis from 1925 (see Tylecote, 1992) offers any guide, much of the world

moved into the downward phase of a long-term wave from the mid- or late-1970s; and re-

covery is still uncertain.

For many and complex reasons, the British economy has been particularly exposed to

risk from all this. So reactions in British politics and policy have shown a distinctively

sharp edge of their own, though there are many parallels to draw with developments in other

western countries. It is, of course, shifts of politics and policy that make up the second-

and by far the most direct-set of causes. Those shifts were marked especially (though

not only) by the British general election of 1 979, when a government led from the radical-

right flank of the Conservative Party came to office-and has stayed in ofiice, even after a

fourth election in 1 992, and after Mrs Thatcher's replacement by Mr Major as Prime Min-

ister before then. That is why my title for these lectures sets 1979 as a watershed year.

And it was a watershed because, for the first time in some 35 years, there was now a govern-

ment seriously and openly committed to challenging the socio-political settlement of the

1940s-to taking apart the 'class compromise' associated with postwar social reconstruction.

You may ask in turn why this change took place, to government under radical-right

inspiration. There is no simple answer. But some good part of any answer must have to do, again, with economics: certainly with perceptions of economics in the eyes both of

policy-makers and of wider circles of people beyond them. Corporatist policies for growth

with low inflation had relied on a form of three-cornered association between state, capital

and labour which was always, in principle, a fragile association. This purported partner-

ship collapsed very visibly in Britain towards the end of the 1970s. There was an explosion

of wage demands and strikes on the part of workers-in the public sector especially-who

saw too little reward for the pay-restraint asked of them. Business leaders in their turn

now saw little reason to keep up accord with trade unions, both for that reason and because

rising unemployment, already, prontised another way to discipline labour. Rising unem-

ployment even before 1979 was itself a sign that corporatist policies had failed to deliver

their aim of secure economic growth. (For one digest of these events, see Westergaard et

al., 1989, chapter 1.) So, on all these counts, the door was opened to experimentation with

alternative policies. These were the policies towards free-markets which the radical right

had come to advocate with increasing strength during the years before.

There were other reasons for the political sea-change. There were sliding shifts of


class, and in perceptions of class, going on which I shall come to in a later lecture. But

the effects of the change for class structure itself proved stark. The policies instrumental

to those effects were of two kinds, to summarise simply. On the one hand, policy since 1979 has been directed to widening the scope for private business initiative in freed markets.

The main means to this have included: Iegal curbs on trade union power; thinning out pre-

vious measures for protection of low-paid labour; deregulation in other forms; privatisation

of once-public enterprises; reductions in direct taxation to foster initiative; and a general

reliance on market competition for growth and for industrial discipline. On the other

hand, and in parallel, radical-right policy has sought to hold back public expenditure-scF

in particular to trim down public welfare provision (though, significantly, not to dismantle

it wholesale) ; and to encourage use instead of private provision-hence consumer-choice

according to purse-in such fields especially as housing and retirement pensions, to a degree

also in medical care.

Testing the effects on class structure

It should be no surprise that the effects have been dramatic for class structure-that

is, I mean here again, to sharpen the pattern of class-as-category in respect of the inequalities

in people's economic circumstances of life. This should be no surprise, because policy was

now deliberately aimed to increase economic inequality. True enough, this has been an

instrumental aim rather than an end-in-itself. The ultimate ends of the shift in policy have

been to promote long-term economic growth ; and to extend individual choice and personal

responsibility. But new policy has been explicit in seeing increased disparity of individual

outcomes-increased disparity of earnings, profits, pensions, real incomes overall-as a

necessary means to those ends. And the new policy-makers have certainly been no less explicit in celebrating the wealth that has accumulated for successful enterprise in conse-

quence. What is rather surprising, however, is that the makers and apostles of this policy

have at the same time anxiously tried to deny or ignore the opposite consequence for the

many people who, by virtual necessity, have shared little or nothing from such success.

But I am now anticipating. I have first to test the arguments against the facts. The

first test, obviously, concerns what has happened to the distribution of rea/ incomes. Let

me start here with earnings from employment ; and I take wages and salaries from full-time

employment, because the figures for that are comprehensive. (See Table I.) They show that, over the ten years from 1980 to 1990, earnings among the top-tenth of white-collar

employees rose in real terms by about 40 ~･ Increases were proportionately smaller for nearly every step down the pay-ladder: for manual as well as non-manual employees, for

women as well as men. Even the best-paid tenth of blue-collar workers saw their real wages

rise at only about half the top white-collar rate. And against the latter 40% or so increase,

the blue-collar median wage rose by little more than 10~ over the full ten years; while the

poorest-paid tenth among blue-collar men gained hardly anything in real terms. These

are plainly divisions by class in a very familiar sense; and the class gaps have widened right

across the range.

Let me take next the distribution of gains and losses from changes in taxation together

with changes in public welfare benefits. A comprehensive estimate for much the same period,

1 993] CLASS IN BRITAIN SINCE 1979 : FACTS, THEORIES AND IDEOLOOIES 31

here 1979 to 1989, shows some net gains for most households. (See Table II.) But it shows

no gains for many of those households with only basic state pensions or unemployment benefit to live on; and these, of course, are people who were generally at low levels of the

labour market when, earlier, they did have work. By contrast, of the aggregate net gain

from changes in tax-and-public welfare over the ten years, nearly half the total (46 %) went

to just the richest tenth of all households. Most of the rest went to those in the next few

deciles down. And the entire 60% of households from above 'middle income' to the very

poorest got, between them all, only a 20% share in this distribution of the proceeds from

re-gearing of the public money system. One-fifth only to the poor and middling three-fifths together, Iittle short of half to the one-in-ten best-off-this, or something like it, is a

recurrent pattern of experience in the 1980s.

Now put all this, and also property-incomes, together to get a picture of what has hap-

pened to shares in real income from all sources. Estimates differ somewhat according to

details of the mode of calculation, itself a subject of much dispute. Yet the broad results

are clear. (See Table 111; also Jenkins, 1991.) During the 1980s, real incomes rose for the

richest 20% of households by about 40%･ But they rose much less for others: by only 10%, at best, even for many 'middle-income' households (the sixth decile down). And the poorest 10-20 ~ of households either gained still less, or their real incomes actually drop-

ped below the levels of the late 1970s. In summary, two facts standout. First, there has been

a sharp new polarisation of incomes. Calculated after tax, the share of the poorest one-

in-five of households in all income fell from 10~ in the late 1970s to 7 ~ in the late 1980s.

The share of the richest one-in-five grew from 37~ to 44~: now over six times the share

of the poorest, and this after adjustment for differences in household composition. (Table

rv.) But second, this did not mean that only the poorest lost out. At least right up to

'middle incomes,' as I have shown, gains in real income were small (Table IID ; and shares

in the total of real income fell (Table IV). Substantial growth of affluence has been limited

to people at or near the top. The point is important for an argument I shall come to later.

It is perhaps not surprising, then, that there has been evidence also of some widening

of relative class differences in death rates over the period (Whitehead, 1987). But for my

second main test, Iet me turn briefiy to the distribution ofproperty. Here, you might have

expected some trend the other way. For government policy has favoured wider ownership of housing, and some wider ownership of shares in business through sale of previously

public enterprises. But no : overall, stakes in private property of all kinds have in fact

become more concentrated; not less. (See Table V.) So, for example, the richest 5 % of

the adult population owned 36~ of all personal marketable wealth at the beginning of the

1980s; at the end of the '80s, their share was up to 38 %; and excluding the value of housing

their share rose from 45 % (at the turning point of a previous downward trend) to 53 ~ by

1989. Correspondingly, the tiny fraction of property owned by the poorest half of the

population dwindled to little above vanishing point.

My third test concerns individual opportunities in llfe : social mobility by another name.

The notion of free opportunity for all, according to personal talent and initiative, has cer-

tainly figured high among the aims proclaimed by radical-right government. And there

have been some changes that could seem to point in that direction. The Conservative Party's leadership itself is now drawn from lower down the social scale than before: with

32 HITOTSUEASHI JOURNAL OF SOCIAL STUDIES [ July

'petty bourgeois' family backgrounds, Mrs Thatcher and Mr Major are both examples of

this. And it may be that new recruits to some parts of the City of London's high money-spinning financial business have been rather more mixed of social origin recently than before,

though there are no statistics about this. But that, at most, is as far as it goes. Compre-

hensive studies of social mobility across the population as a whole, continued into the 1980s,

have as yet shown no significant reduction of those relative inequalities of opportunity be-

tween classes which, for long, have sat side-by-side with a good deal of movement in life,

and movement from one generation to the next. (See especially Goldthorpe, 1987.) And in one very important sense, individual opportunities have become drastically more restricted,

especially towards the lower end of the class structure. Unemployment, of course, has

been much higher in the 1980s-to-'90s than before. Measured by a common international standard, the rate in Britain was only about 5 % in the late 1970s, despite a rise already then.

It reached a first peak of around 12% in 1983/84. It fell, but still not to below 7 ~ by 1989/

90. (Social Trends 1992.) It has since risen fast again, to well over 10% now and will

rise further perhaps to the previous peak once more next year-this even though the count

now excludes many people who have been pressed into early retirement as an alternative

to recorded unemployment (cf. Westergaard et al., 1989). The unemployed, and the long-term unemployed especially, come of course in disproportionate numbers from routine-grade

and lower-paid jobs. So it is predominantly people in the downward reaches of the class

structure who, far from gaining opportunities, have very tangibly lost them.

I could go on to a fourth test. That test would concern people's power in their life

circumstances, and over those arrangements in society which help to shape both their own

and others' Iife circumstances. But that test is more complex. It is less open to quantifi-

cation. And it belongs better to my later lectures, when I shall discuss the assumptions

and associations of 'counter-class' theories. Meanwhile, I hope I have said enough for now to show, at least prima facie, that in Britain people's material means to power over their

life circumstances have in fact become more unequal, and more class-divided, in recent

years; not less so. It is from this basis that I shall follow on next.

II. Controversies about the Social Salience of Class:

revisionist theories

Class analysis in British sociology

So far, I have tried to summarise a range of evidence about the trends of class inequality

in Britain, over the 50 years or so from the 1940s to the early 1990s. I concentrated there

on 'class' as a matter, first, of divisions of economic category between people in their life

circumstances and opportunities. With this as the focus, the evidence pointed to three

phases of change or continuity. Thefirst was a phase of change : in the 1 940s, when a new

socio-political settlement helped to make for some compression of class inequalities. The second was a long phase of continuity : from the 1 950s to the '70s, when this settlement stayed

broadly in place, though with an elaboration of three-cornered corporatist policy arrange-

ments between government, business and labour. In this phase, fairly steady economic

1993] CLASS IN BRITAlN SINCE 1979 : FACTS, THEORIES AND IDEOLOGIES 33

growth continued to raise absolute levels of living for most people; and it also fairly steadily

gave more people salaried employment in white-collar careers while blue-collar wage-earning

jobs became fewer. Yet at the same time, over these 30 years, inequalities between classes

in relative terms stayed more or less constant, as they had come to be settled in the I~40s.

The third phase, however, has been a phase of change again. But now, since about 1980,

it has been change towards sharper inequality: sharper inequality of real incomes; of pri-

vate property holdings, despite policies intended to spread ownership; of health; of risks

in the labour market, as unemployment has grown high, and as protection of workers by

law and by trade unions has diminished. This change, towards a stronger configuration

of c]ass-as-category, has been associated with two things. It has been associated with

radical-right government policies to promote free-market enterprise; and with a downward

turn in the long-wave economic cycle.

It seems a paradox that such policies have attracted sufficient popular support among

voters to sustain government in this mode through four general elections. That is, at least,

one striking example of a theoretically familiar tension between class as a matter of categor-

ical economic division and class as a matter of political group mobilisation. It seems also

a paradox that, as I began by saying last time, arguments which deny the salience of class

have become prominent in social theory just when the salience of class for the sheer economic

facts of life has become more pronounced. The two apparent paradoxes are, of course,

connected; and I shall move between one and the other, in examining both, during the re-

mainder of my lectures. But before I come to that, Iet me say a little, first, about the place

which class has occupied as an issue of long standing in British sociology.

Sociology came late, and only slowly, to recognition as an academic subject in Britain.

The first professional chair designated in the discipline was established, at the London School

of Economics, in 1907. But it took over 50 years from then, and a large growth of higher

education generally in the 1960s, before the subject spread as a recognised academic dis-

cipline, from a small handful of places, to almost all universities and similar institutions in

the country as now. The spirit of radical critique which marked the 1960s no doubt did

something to give the study of class a central place in sociology, when provision grew so

greatly in that decade. But there were features to the discipline in its British development,

well before the 1960s, which had laid a firm basis for class to figure as a prominent soci-

ological issue. It is true that the line of scholarship dominant in sociology, as a formal

discipline at the LSE for some decades after 1907, did not prioritise study of class. This

was a line of scholarship, at the hands especially of L.T. Hobhouse and Morris Ginsberg,

which was devoted to broad comparative study of social institutions and processes; but it

was at the same time inspired by a liberal philosophy of progressive evolution that drew

little, for example, from Marx's concern with class division as a source of conflict and change.

･Yet there was another line of enquiry, at first outside academic sociology but increasingly influential within it. This alternative line-social scientific at large, rather than just soci-

ological-came from the long British tradition of 'political arithmetic' : a tradition of pains-

taking statistical examination and social surveying of 'the conditions of the people,' with

a view to social reform. Whatever the words used, this was, of course, de facto a tradition

of enquiry into class conditions-the conditions of the working class especially.

The long years of economic depression between the two world wars gave these issues

a sharp profile for new social research in the 1930s. Together with the international rise


of Fascism, they also made for a new radicalism of the left among academics and intellec-

tuals. One effect on British sociology-though this was still only a small enclave then-

was to begin to widen the focus of enquiry from working-class conditions to inequality more

broadly: to circumstances of class structure more explicitly. Then, with the war and its

end, came the larger stimulus of concem with 'social reconstruction.' So-at the LSE again especially, with David Glass, Tom Marshall and Richard Titmuss as the first driving

spirits, and with another line of work in industrial sociology from Liverpool University-

came a growing package of sociological enquiry around 'reconstruction.' This was research

into social mobility, and educational opportunities and handicaps; into 'middle-class' occupa-

tions and some elite groups; into political processes and class pressures involved there; into

work, work innovation and workers' roles; and into the scope and the limitations of public

welfare reform. In short, a framework of knowledge about British social structure, and

its still class-divided shape, was now built up which made a solid base for later work to

come. Let me interject two points here. First, much of the impulse to these developments

within the discipline came from outside it. The social sciences necessarily move, to fair

extent, in response to how society around them moves. I shall return to this point later.

Second, British sociology here followed a distinct-though not a unique-domestic tradi-

tion of hard-nosed empirical enquiry. Its use of theory, and its contribution to new de-

velopment of theory, was in this base-laying period certainly light; many critics, a little

later, said far too slight. But it was strong on facts; insistent on the sociological duty to

respect facts.

Still, the sociological study of class in Britain up to the 1960s was not blind to theory.

It drew eclectically on Weber and Marx ; on revisionist Marxism, too (in part on Robert

Michels, for example, in the study of political processes). And it drew on a native tradition

of labour-sympathetic research concerned to explore, expose and challenge socio-economic

inequality. British sociology already in the 1950s-to-'60s was sceptical of the AJnerican

fashion then for structural functionalism, and of the claims which Talcott Parsons and his

followers made for consensus and cohesion over conflict and division. And by the 1960s

much of the work done came to centre on a wide-ranging controversy about 'embourgeoise-

ment' and about trends in class structure at large (see e,g. Goldthorpe, Lockwood et al..

1968-69 ; also Westergaard and Resler, 1975). The outcome of that controversy-at that time, by the late 1960s into the '70s-was in effect to challenge, indeed to disprove, the no-

tions that class division was dying out, and so that 'ideology was at an end.'

By then, however, theory had come quite heavily into place. And in respect of the study of class, this was in good part neo-Marxist theory-often taken from France, in the

form of Althusser's and Poulantzas's structuralism; and to a degree also from Germany.

in the form of 'capital logic' or 'Staatsableitungs' theory. In my own view-as an older-

fashioned Marxist-there were, beside strengths (cf. e.g. Crompton and Gubbay. 1977). some basic weaknesses to this. Paradoxically, the new Marxisms of the 1960s-'70s shared

with Parsonianism both a convoluted abstraction and a dogmatic assertion of 'functional

necesslties.' Almost as paradoxically, they shared with new interactionism, and with ethno-

methodology, an excessive dislike of so-called 'positivism' which led thetn into devaluing

empirical research. (1 have commented on this elsewhere: Westergaard, 1992.) Yet there

were important achievements to the credit of the new Marxisms at the same time. In respect

1993] CLASS IN BRITAIN slNcE 1979 : rACTs, THEORIES AND IDEOLOGIES 35

of the study of class, especially, they helped much to lead the way into exploration of the

'big state' in contemporary capitalist economies; into setting new paradigms for the study

of economic development, dependency and internationalisation; and into putting power

and powerlessness-class division again-high on the agenda of a 'new criminology.' More-

over, the British empirical tradition proved strong enough to survive the 1970s fashion for

'anti-positivism' (see e.g. Halsey, 1989; University Grants Committee, 1989).

So the theme of class and its wide ramifications has been central to British sociology;

and work in this and related fields-such as political economy, industrial relations and

organisation, or a class-focussed educational sociology-has constituted a major British

input into progress ofthe discipline internationally. The history ofpostwar research on social

mobility-in a line that goes from David Glass to John Goldthorpe, with many partners

in Britain and abroad-is one prominent example. But from about 1980 an influential number of theorists and commentators, even though not a majority of academic sociologists,

have now challenged the salience hitherto given to class in British social enquiry. This is

not a wholly new phenomenon. The 1950s'-to-'60s' speculations about postulated 'em-bourgeoisement' was an earlier instance to similar effect. And the stimulus behind these

challenges to the salience of class was similar on both occasions. In the 1950s-to-'60s, as

again in the 1980s-to-'90s, the Labour Party as the formal standard-bearer of the working

class had lost three or four elections in a row. They lost in 1951, 1955 and 1959; they lost

again in 1979, 1983, 1987 and 1992. On both occasions, revisionist theorists and commen-

tators drew a similar conclusion. If Labour loses votes, they argued, it must be because

the working class is disappearing; and if the working class is disappearing, then class division

must be dissolving. This conclusion is a simplistic inversion of vulgar Marxist determinism.

Marxism in vulgar form infers 'class for itself' directly from 'class in itself.' Counter-

Marxist revisionism, just as vulgarly, infers a dissolution of 'class in itself' from what it takes

to be a disappearance of 'class for itself.' Both, equally, confuse class as division by eco-

nomic category with class as political-group mobilisation. Both are simplistic, when one

assumes that working class radicalism must follow from working class subordination; and

when the other assumes that lack of working class radicalism must reflect a disappearance

of working class subordination.

But I cannot dismiss the new revisionism merely by making this conceptual point. I

need to consider the arguments more closely and, above all. I need to consider them em-

pirically. (AS examples of recent general revisionist argument, see Bauman, 1982; and

Pahl, 1989. As counter-examples, see Marshall et a/., 1988; and Goldthorpe and Marshall,

1992.)

Demographic division

In summary, revisionist theory says that class division is fast losing salience because

other divisions now over-ride it; or because class now divides only an isolated minority of

poor people from a mass majority of affluent people. The two kinds of argument overlap and intertwine. But it will be simplest if I take the first kind first; and if I start there with

arguments that postulate new divisions which may, Ioosely, be described as 'demographic'

in kind (see especially Pahl, 1989). .


In one form, this sort of argument says that, for economic inequality, division by age

is now more important than division by class. In particular, so it is said here, old people

make up a large proportion :of the poor. The latter point is true: over 40~ of the poorest

one-in-five households in Britain, for example, comprise people retired from work (Social

Trends 1992). But the conclusion does not follow. For one thing, from the 1980s on (the

crucial perlod for the purpose of the argument), the relative share of old people in poverty

has actually fa]Ien, not risen. This is, quite simply, because the new harsh labour market

has swoilen the ag_~:regate numbers of unemployed and low-paid employed people who are

now poor. But more importantly, old age by itself does not bring poverty anyway: it does

so only in circumstances which are set by class structure. The people who risk being poor

when they are old are those, by and large, who have retired from wage-earning jobs-in Britain, often even from skilled jobs in blue-collar work, or from white-collar jobs in routine

grades-because these jobs have given them few or no pension rights on top of the low min-

imum they get from the state. By contrast, people who retire from salaried careers get

generous pensions ; and their pensions, of course, are the higher, the nearer their careers

came to the top of the occupational hierarchy. Pension arrangements remain, in fact. strongly class-divided. (See Table VI.) Class inequality after working life matches-even

tends to exceed-class inequality during working life.

So much for the argument by reference to age. Yet another argument in 'demographic'

style tries to explain much of the inequality of incomes observed between households as a

function, not of class differences, but instead of differences in household composition : so

as a reflection of different 'income needs.' In fact this argument, in simple form, has no

application to the figures I gave earlier (Table II-IV), to show a sharp growth of inequality

in household incomes from around 1980. For those figures had mostly been standardised to eliminate, precisely, the effects of differences in size of household, and in number and

ages of children, on 'income needs.' But there is still another line to this sort of argument.

That line notes the steep rise in employment of married women, which has continued now for thirty years or more-not least in Britain, where nearly three in every four wives of work-

ing age are in the labour market today. (See Table VII.) The argument then goes on to assert that inequalities of income between families come now, not so much from the 'class'

of work that earning family-members have, as from the effective number of earners in the

family. It is especially decisive, so the argument here runs, whether the wife works full-

time; or she works only part-time (as do about one half of all working wives in Britain);

or she has no paid work at ail. And, so the argument concludes, personal or family 'strat-

egies' in life are coming to displace class in determining household income. (See Pahl,

1984; and especially Pahl, 1989.)

Again, however, the conclusion does not fit with the factual evidence. Of course, the

number of earners does affect family income; but the result, if anythlng, is to strengthen

the impact of class rather than to weaken it. (See Bonney, 1988a and b; also Dex, 1985.)

First, to take the argument historically, paid employment among married women has in-

creased more in the 'middle and upper' classes than in the working class. This is mainly

because many working-class wives had some kind of paid work already earlier-at a time when most middle- and upper-class families still upheld the convention that wives ought

to stay at home (cf. Westergaard and Resler, 1975, part 2, chapter 6). So new 'dual earn-

ing' has boosted middle- and upper-class household incomes more, over time, than it has

1993] CLASS IN BRITAIN slNcE 1979 : rAcTs, THEORIES AND IDEOLOGIES 37

boosted working-class incomes. Second, the result in fact is that-unlike in the past-

dual earning is now rather more common among married couples in the middle and upper strata than among working class couples. The differences are not very great; but their

effect, once again, is to widen class disparities rather than to narrow them.

The third point is that these differences seem to reflect class disparities in opportunity.

The evidence here is softer. But it suggests-not surprisingly-that upper- and middle-

class wives are relatively well-placed to exercise some choice about whether and how to

take paid work. By contrast, when working-class wives take only part-time work or have

no employment at all, it is often because they have no realistic alternative. They have not

the means to travel far from home to work; the range of work they can find locally is limited,

and liable to be of an ill-protected part-time sort; public provision for child-minding is

scarce; and the poorer families can lose more by state-benefit cuts than they would gain

from a wife's low wage. So the very scope for personal or family 'strategies' is itself class-

dependent: it looks narrower down the class scale than up it. (Cf, also the second sub-table

in Table VII, though this identifies all women by their own occupational group, rather than

just married women by their husbands' occupational group.)

Gender division

To talk about women's employment is, of course, to begin to talk about the larger issue

of inequality by gender. I now need to address this issue more directly. For it has been

a major line of revisionist theory to postulate that class division is much less salient now.

because gender division cuts across it. Inequality between the sexes is not new, of course.

But, so the new revisionism says, gender inequality is the more visible and potent now, when

women have increasingly challenged it; and when, especially, the great majority even of

married women in Britain are in the labour market for most of their working-age lives-

and there, all the more visibly, are exposed to practices and conventions that disadvantage

women vis ~ vis men at all levels of the labour market. (For a symposium on the general

issue of gender inequality in relation to class inequality, see Crompton and Mann, eds.,

1986.) The broad facts about women's disadvantages vis ~ vis men are not in dispute for my

purposes here. One sign of them is that women, generally, have lower real and effective

incomes than men. This reflects the multiple handicaps they suffer both in the labour

market and outside it: handicaps from continuing job- and pay-restrictions, despite counter-

legislation; and from continuing conventional definitions of women's roles as private and

domestic par excellence, despite widening challenge. It also, perhaps curiously, reflects one

advantage which women have over men. Women continue to die later. So, more women than men survive into old age; and in the working class, as I said before, old age continues

to carry a high risk of poverty from lack of adequate pensions. But just as class inequality

here interacts with gender inequality, so it does more 'widely. Division by gender is

certainly a potent dimension of inequality. It is conceptually distinct from division by

class, and certainly not confined to capitalist societies. But in practice the two twine to-

gether, to reinforce the effects of class rather than to go against them.

38 HITOTSUBASHI JOURNAL OF SOCIAL STUDIBS [ July

I have already given one example. This is the fact that upper- and middle-class wives

have found rather more freedom of choice to challenge the constraints of domesticity than

their working-class 'sisters,' so-called. But let me take the point further. Once in the

labour market, women confront just the same inequalities of class as do men. Disparities

of pay and conditions of work are, by and large, as sharp among earning women as among

earning men, according to the 'class' of work done. Opportunities for advancement, and

the risks of demotion, differ at least as much among women as among men, according to the individual's level of work and point of origin in the class structure. The difference is

that, at every level, women are usually worse off than their male counterparts. Level for

level of work; their pay tends to be poorer; their pensions, if any, tend to be much lower;

their opportunities for careers are much more restricted; their confinement to routine-grade

work, and their risks of demotion, are much greater; and they are far more liable than men

to have part-time work only. (For a little of the voluminous evidence for these points,

see Tables I and VI-VIII; also Goldthorpe, 1987.) Yet none of this involves any sort of

suspension of the force of class structure on economic life. The class structure of the labour

market for women parallels that for men. It is in a sense the same structure except-cru-

cially-that women are pressed into its routine-grade slots a good deal more than are men.

To sum up, you could put the point of logic I draw from these facts like this. When

women have paid work, as most now do in Britain, they mostly find jobs well below the upper rungs of the class structure of work: still more so than do men. That signifies a con-

tinuing, though now somewhat easing, subordination of women to men. But it equally signifies a continuing structure of class. I have still, however, to put in one last link in my

chain of argument. You may ask: what if the work that married women do should, in class

terms, be unconnected with their husbands' work-or even tend to 'compensate' for it? What if wives in career posts are quite often married to men in blue-collar jobs ; or vice versa?

Then, surely, class inequalities would tend to even out, when measured by family circums-

tances?

The answer is quite simple: this can happen; but it happens only quite rarely. Thus,

some two in every three wives who have 'service class' work are married to men who them-

selves are professionals, managers or the like; hardly any have blue-collar husbands. True

enough, if you use a three-group classification of work-'service class,' intermediate and

core working class-you then find that there are many dual-earning couples of apparently

'mixed class': around 50 % of all dual-earning couples in Britain today. This may have implications for the question just where the main boundary lines fall in the class structure:

a subject I shall come to in my last lecture. But in at least some 4 in every 5 of these os-

tensibly 'mixed-class' marriages, the mixture arises only because one partner is in 'inter-

mediate-class' place-most often the wife, with a lowish-grade 'white-blouse' job of quite

limited prospects. This large routine-job category of female work draws on women married

to men in all three class groups, if with distinctions within the category which are not yet

well mapped. But marriage between partners in wholly contrasting types of work-service

versus core working class-is rare; and, in statistical terms, the employment class of wives

correlates well with that of their husbands. (For the main data summarised here, see

Goldthorpe, 1987; and Marshall et al., 1988; cf. also McRae, 1986.) There is, then, no

general breach of class division on this score. Once again, inequality by gender interacts

with inequality by class: the one has not displaced the other.

l 9931 CLASS lN BRITAIN SINCE 1979 : FACTS, THEORIES AND IDEOLOGIES 39

Other divisions

Revisionist theory points also to other divisions which are often now said to override

class. About ethnic division-division by skin colour especially-1 can be very brief here.

People of black and brown skin are indeed distinctly handicapped in Britain today: there

are new-and nasty-lines of racial inequality. But, to cut a long story short, those lines

have in no way supplanted the lines of class inequality. For one thing, despite common

discrimination against them, the 'coloured minorities' in Britain still stretch across too many

occupations to constitute a single economic category. They are also culturally divided;

and black-skinned people of Caribbean origin are more concentrated in lower-grade posi-

tions than brown-skinned people of South Asian and East African origin. For another thing, their numbers-some 5 % of the total population-are in any case too few to give the British class structure that prominent imprint of ethnic division which is distinctive,

say, of American, Iet alone of South African, class structure. (There is a large literature

on this subject. For one cogent analysis, see e.g. Solomos, 1989.)

But revisionists have postulated yet a further kind of division which, they claim, increas-

ingly puts old-style class division out of joint This is division so to s k b atterns .

of consumption. The argument here is that, from the 1980s onwards, the real contrast

in life circumstances now comes between a majority of people who have enough private

resources to give them fair power over their own lives; and, on the other hand, a minority

of people who lack such private resources, and instead have to depend on generally poor

public provision. Revisionist theory in this manner has pointed, in part, to the growth of

private pension schemes; of private health insurance on top of national health provision;

of private motor-car ownership. But they have pointed particularly to the fast growth of

private ownership of housing. (See especially Saunders, 1990; also Saunders and Harris,

1990; and Dunleavy and Husbands, 1985.)

Indeed, private ownership of housing spread still faster in the 1980s than before. To-

day in Britain, some two in every three households either fully own their own homes or are

buying them on long loans; and the figure is above 40 % even among unskilled blue-collar

workers (Table IX). Yet the conclusion does not follow, in revisionist manner, that old-

style class division is giving way to division between a majority of home-owners and a

minority of tenants (mainly tenants in public housing). After all, relatively poor home-

owners own relatively poor and low-price homes. They receive less tax-relief from the

state to help them pay for their homes in consequence (Table IX, sub-table in note). They

are at higher risk of losing their homes when, as in recession, they cannot keep up the pay-

ments. In general, 'consumer power' from private resources remains highly unequal power,

when overall private resources-that is to say, real incomes-remain highly unequal, and

have grown more unequal over the years since about 1980. Consumer power, after all, is

money power: quite simply, the rich and the confortably off have much more of it than ordinary wage earners, Iet alone the poor who are out of wage work. Ownership of housing

confers no general immunity from those wider disparities of 'consumer power'; and these

disparities in turn continue, as before, to come from the structure of economic class. (For

a study whose conclusions go against equation of home ownership with a postulated new consumer sovereignty, see Forest et a/., 1990.)


This, however, is to be very brief about something which needs fuller discussion. That

'something' is a larger argument about a postulated new general divide between-and, it

is implied, only between-a large affluent mass-majority and a residual 'underclass' minority.

This is where I intend to start next.

III. Spot-lighted Underclass and Forgotten Top-class :

tlle politica/ and ideological climate of the 1980s and '90s

Academic theory and prevailing policy moods

In my second lecture, I examined a set of theoretical propositions-some new from

the 1980s on, some revived from the 1950s-to-'60s-whose common thread is a postulate that class division is becoming less and less important in Britain (and, for that matter, in

many other western societies somewhat like Britain in the capitalist mode of their economies).

I set these propositions against that evidence about the facts and trends of economic life

which I had outlined in my first lecture. And I concluded :that this evidence stands robust

against the speculations of revisionist, class-denying theory. The class divisions of economic

life have indeed become significantly sharper over the last 10-15 years in Britain. They

have not been over-ridden by divisions of 'demographic' character, or of gender, or of eth-

nicity and skin-colour, or of 'consumer empowerment' through the spread of home-ownership

and the like. If revisionist theory is doubtful in logic, it is-in my submission so far-weak

above all in empirical fact. I say 'in my submission so far,' because I still need to look more closely at one revision-

ist proposition which has become remarkably influential. This is a view that accepts part of the evidence for increased inequality; yet at the same time it takes that increase in

inequality to signal a dissolution of old class divisions. It is a theory-or rather, a set of

otherwise rather different theories-which have in common two postulates. They postulate,

first, that a new 'underclass' is emerging, which is a minority cut off from the rest of society

either by moral depravity or by economic deprivation. They postulate or imply, second,

that the 'rest of society' increasingly now constitutes a c]assless mass-majority united in

more-or-less common experience of growing affiuence. There is one line of division left,

so conjecture in this mode says; but this is a new line, which divides only the indigent or the

poorest from everybody else. There are, according to such fashionable underclass theory,

no comparable lines left above that which will matter much over time ahead : no line of

lasting importance, for example, between regular rank-and-file wage earners and salaried

executives or professlonals in high-set careers; no line, of great concern at least, between

these categories in turn and elites right at the top by way of privilege and power.

I need to look at conjecture of this sort more closely, both because it subsumes several

of the themes in other current counter-class thinking; and because here is the point where,

most visibly perhaps, academic social theory and far more widely pervasive public com-mentary have overlapped with each other. They have overlapped, of course, in partly-

common tune with the shift of economic and political c]imate from the late 1970s. Public

commentators, media journalists, pundits of assorted kinds, necessarlly change their sights

1 993] CLASS IN BRITAIN SINCE 1979 : rACTS, THEORIES AND IDEOLOGIES 41

as policies and policy contexts change. The perspectives which such commentators pri-oritise tend to shift, as perspectives shift in the official circles on which they depend to keep

up-to-date. Thus when policy makers moved to celebrate 'free-market' enterprise, so did

the mainstream of public commentators move too. And when this celebration involved conviction or hope on the part of government that most people would benefit from free-

market enterprise, and few people would suffer if any, so similar hope or conviction became

a leading theme in mainstream media commentary.

True, over time, it proved impossible to sustain total optimism on this score. Although

government both delayed and fragmented the publication of relevant official statistics, the

figures eventually released made it clear that poverty in fact was growing. (See Table 111.)

But it was just here that 'underclass' theorising in public-commentator form came into

play. You can try to reconcile continuing faith in general benefit from free markets even

with hard evidence of growing poverty, if you say: "Ah yes. There may be more poor people. But eitller they are poor mainly through their own fault; or, in any case, they are

still very distinctly an exception. The great mass of people are growing better-off all the

time." This is just what fashionable underclass theorising says, in one version or other.

It is also how several official statistical series have first been presented. They did even-

tually show the facts of little or no growth of real incomes in the low ranges of the social

structure : because it became progressively more difficult to conceal those facts. But the

official reports tried not to show how most of the gains have been concentrated towards

the top. The key device for that purpose has been simple. In the main published series

about overall changes in household incomes, no details are now given for incomes above

low-to-modest levels (Table 111, first two columns); and the summaries underplay even

some of these. Instead comes a high-lighted global average. So, statistically-naive readers

-that is, most readers and in practice almost all commentators-have been left to infer

that, when the gross average of real incomes rose by almost 25~ during the 1980s, then

most people (the mythical 'average' household) must have gained at roughly this rate. It

takes close scrutiny of these figures, of the underlying data and of information from other

sources (e.g. Tables I and II), to show that in fact most people have not so gained: because

the wealthy have taken a lion's share of the total (Tables I, II, third column of 111, and IV).

Without such scrutiny, however, the comfortable thesis looks deceptively plausible that mass

affiuence in common growth is eroding class division, except for an isolated underclass mi-

nority.

Journalists and socio-political commentators have taken this thesis so much on board

that underclass-talk is almost routine in the press and public speeches. The thesis-the

myth, you can say-survives to quite an extent even today, when the second long recession

since 1980 has put the very notion of steadily growing affiuence in some doubt-and when

even the boom of top wealth has now probably lagged somewhat, with falling profits. But

while many public gurus have taken on the idea (see e.g. Field, 1989), why-you may well

ask-have some academic social scientists also done so? A good part of the answer is that most, in fact, have not. Certainly, most British sociologists who have engaged with

this debate are sceptical about the underclass thesis (e,g. Bagguley and Mann, 1992; Mann,

1992; Gallie, 1988; Westergaard, 1992). And the empirical tradition in British social science

has worked to sustain their scepticism, Nevertheless, some sociologists have taken to

underc]ass-talk with quite a degree of enthusiasm (e,g. Halsey, 1987). What this reflects


is, I think, a familiar dilemma for social science.

Unlike natural scientists, we as social scientists live in and live with our subject matter.

We are necessarily caught up in the shifting scenes, shifting perspectives, shifting policy

agendas and shifting ideologies of the society which is our subject matter. It is our pro-

fessional job to be alert to those shifts. And while studying the shifts requires academic

detachment, being alert to them in the first place comes easiest to those social scientists

who are also temperamentally or ideologically involved with them. In order to flourish,

therefore, any area of social science must have theoretical diversity; and that, in practice,

means also an ideological diversity which will allow new agendas to be tried out. In the

1980s, the new agendas came more from the right than from the left, because that is how

the larger social climate moved. It is, I suggest, then a sign of active academic life, and of

the controversy which is necessary to it, that there have been intellectual gadflies from the

radical right, within sociology, to set up new agendas for research to test out. It is positive,

at least, provided that the testing out involves close empirical as well as conceptual enquiry.

The fact that, by contrast with mainstream public commentators, most academic sociologists

remain sceptical about underclass theorising reflects, precisely, a reasonably encouraging

respect for facts on their part.

'Moral turpitude '

Underclass talk in the sense I have outlined comes in at least three different versions

(Westergaard, 1992). One is what I call the 'noral turpitude'version. It has long historical

roots, both in Britain and other countries. But in its present-day form, it was imported

into Britain in the later 1980s from the USA, where it remains more infiuential than east

of the Atlantic Ocean. I call it the 'moral turpitude' version because it blames poverty

on moral weakness. Poverty, this version says, is essentially a cultural phenomenon (Mur-

ray, 1990). Poverty has grown as an underclass culture has spread. The carriers of that

underclass culture are people who do not want to work : unemployment, according to this

thesis, is large]y self-chosen. They are people who choose to live outside regular marriage

-who therefore bring up their children in the poverty of lone parentage, and pass on their

irregular life style to those children. They are people prone to habits of delinquency and

criminality. They are people who have been corrupted into irresponsible dependency on public welfare provision... So the 'moral turpitude' argument tells us.

I suspect I need say little to underline the weakness of this as an explanation of poverty

and its recent growth. (See e.g. the critical responses appended in Murray, 1990; and

Walker, 1991.) There is a large array of factual evidence to show that the vast majority

of unemployed people want to have paid work, but cannot find it; that single-parenthood,

while growing, is spread across the class structure, and so has variable consequences for

family economic circumstances; that delinquency and crime have multiple causes and, while

class-skewed, tend to arise from poor material opportunities rather than to create them;

and that, when the poor depend on public welfare provision, they do so not by choice but

by force of circumstance. In short, it is both false and arbitrary to assert that unemploy-

ment, marriage instability, delinquency and subsistence on state benefits somehow make

up a single package which, in turn, constitutes a self-chosen style of life. Underclass talk

19931 CLAss IN BRrrAIN SINCE 1979 : FACTS, THl30RIES AND IDEOLOGIES 43

in this 'moral turpitude' version revives the old notion of a 'dangerous class' below respec-

table society, And in doing so, it turns a blind eye to the evident and predominant struc-

tural causes of poverty.

Outcast poverty, and underclass in rhetoric

Consequently, of course, this version has politically right-wing genesis and appeal.

Not so a quite different version of underclass theory, which I call the 'outcast poverty' version.

This, realistically, posits structural-not cultural-causation of poverty; and, in political

terms, it has centre-to-left resonance. Its underclass are poor, not by choice, but indeed by

force ofcircumstance (see e.g. Field, 1989; Halsey, 1987; Townsend, 1990). But, it says, these

people are no longer just the most deprived among a larger working class or 'proletariat.'

They are people more or less permanently excluded from the world of wage-earning work;

or they are only on the fringes of that world. They are the old who have retired from rank-

and-file jobs with only minimum state-pensions to live on; they are the unemployed, the

half-employed, the casually employed; they may also include those who, even when fully

employed, find only insecure and poorly paid work in a labour market said to be increas-

ingly segmented. They are, so this version of underclass theory runs, increasingly 'outcast'

from society because they are outside the world of dependable work; and because they have

little or no part in the growth of 'affluence' which more or less all others are said to enjoy

in common. Now, there is some good sense to these descriptions-up to a point. However you

may define poverty, the numbers of the poor have grown greatly since about 1980. Real incomes have polarised, to leave the worst-off people trailing behind. Trade union de-

fences have weakened, and measures of legal protection for labour have been eroded, to

adverse effect especially for low-grade workers in growing private service-sector work.

Part-time employment, very largely for women, has increased; while full-time employment,

for men in manufacturing industry particularly, has shrunk. Changes in the system of

taxes and benefits have further handicapped the poor. I have already outlined the solid

evidence for all this. It certainly all means that inequalities are sharper now within the

working class, as well as above it.

But it is quite another matter whether it means that what was the working class no

longer really exists, because it is now deeply split into two : on the one hand, it is said, a

distinct and growingly isolated underclass; and, on the other hand, a much larger number

of people in regular work who, even if nominally wage earners still, are seen an increasingly

'middle class' and increasingly indistinguishable from the categories once regarded as above

them. Take the first point first. It could be that people outside work or on its fringes

are now near to living in a separate, deprived and outcast world of their own. Polarisation

might come to go that far. This is a matter for empirical enquiry. But the empirical evidence hitherto tends more against the proposition than for it. Retired workers, for

example-who make up over 40 ~ of the poor by any definition of poverty-are hardly a class apart from the active but pension-poor wage earners they once were themselves (see

earlier). There is more individual movement within the working-class world than the thesis

implies : movement between unemployment and employment; between skilled and non-


skilled wage-earning work (e.g. Goldthorpe, 1987; Westergaard et al., 1989). And there is more commonality of circumstances too, at least in Britain, between skilled and non-skilled

labour (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992 ; see also Tables VI and VIII). Again, though labour

markets are to a degree segmented, recent studies show no simple pattern to such segmenta-

tion; and they show, in particular, no clear general trend to increased segmentation (e.g.

Gallie, 1988).

That part of the argument which postulates a new distinct segregation of the workless

and the poorest workers is, then, conceivable as a hypothesis. But, so far at least, it seems

not to be true in fact. Far more trouble comes, when this notion is linked to the idea that,

above the hypothetical underclass, old divisions of class now matter less and less. This

second idea has hinged especially on a belief that, under the new dispensation from about

1980, more or less all people except the poor have come to share, more or less commonly,

in growing prosperity (e,g. Halsey, 1987; Saunders, 1990). But that belief is demonstrably,

and seriously, wrong. As I showed in my first lecture, real earnings and real incomes in-

creased only quite little, during the 1980s, even for people at and around the middle of the

range. The majority of the population either actually lost out, or had just modest gains

well below the statistical average. (See again Tables 1-IV.) That average was high only

because the wealth of the prosperous-of executives, managers, well established profes-

sionals and, most of all, people in the top circles of business and finance-increased enorm-

ously. This has been the extreme, and most potent, aspect of a general polarisation in economic

class structure. In fact I can add, to my two versions of underclass theory, a third version.

This is a version which is little more than rhetorical. It is a way, for journalists and public

commentators not least, to describe the 1980s' process of polarisation in colourful shorthand.

But it is also highly misleading shorthand, when-as is very often the case-the attention

it pays to deprivation at the bottom involves relative inattention to the rest. That inatten-

tion gives leeway for the false belief that all is now pretty well for the so-called 'middling

masses' above the bottom. And it turns a blind eye, or otherwise a bland eye, to the for-

midable growth of privilege and power at the top.

Top-class priviJege and power

I have said enough already about the growth of economic privilege at the upper end

of the scale in the 1980s-for example, about the 40~ gains in real earnings and incomes

towards the top (though gains at the very peak of wealth are concealed from sight in most

comprehensive statistical series, and are known best from ad hoc reports of directors' sal-

aries, share options and the like). The contrast is glaring with only around 10% gains for

'middling' blue-collar people; and still less, if any gains at all, Iower down. But power has also grown at the top; and this not just in the sense that extra privilege can be assumed

to bring extra power with it anyway. The power of private business has grown, of course,

as free market policies have intended; and, to take just one instance, business representation

in the governance of public education at all levels has been consistently stepped up. But

also 'free' markets are in practice markets led by inexorable trends to oligopoly if not

monopoly, notwithstanding government declarations in favour of widened competition;

1993] CLASS lN BRITAIN SINCE 1979 : FACTS, THEORIES AND IDEOLOOIES 45

and sale of once-nationalised industries has, at best, converted public monopolies into private

oligopolies. Though very small enterprise did grow in the 1980s, until the current and

second recession of the new epoch, Ieading capital power is concentrated in large corpora-

tions. In Britain, it is concentrated especially in the hands of the major financial institu-

tions, centred in the City of London; and it is their activities-rather than those of the fast

declining manufacturing sector-which have yielded the richest gains in money at and near

the top.

The trade unions have been firmly ruled out of the consultative role which, though as

junior partners, they had during the period of 'tripartite corporatism.' This 'lock out' is

an inherent feature of the free-market drive against 'labour monopolies,' and against bureau-

cratic centralisation of leadership power within the unions. But, in the process, the de

facto consultative role of private business in public government has become all the greater,

ifless visible because less dependent on formal procedures. The effective :representatives of

business for this purpose are a small network of top people from top corporations and institutions.

These corporations and institutions, including insurance companies and pension funds,

are now the major first-order shareholders in private business. The power which the people

in their top circles wield comes, correspondingly, with far greater strength from the mass

of corporate assets whose strategic deployment they lead than it comes from their own per-

sonal wealth-large though that wealth is by itself, by way of high exective salaries, direc-

torial and consultant fees, dealer commissions and expense allowances, as well as substantial

private shareholdings and capital gains. Except in the case of a few 'newspaper headline'

tycoons, correspondingly in turn the power they wield-in markets frst, but through under-

standing with government too-is in large part 'anonymous.' (See especially Scott, 1982

and 1986.) Their power is also institutionally constrained: it is constrained, of course, by

the profit imperative which, whether geared to long-term or as often in Britain to more

short-term gain, is their own very raison d'etre; and it is constrained by world-wide market

forces and inter-business rivalries, over which they have influence but not decisive control.

But their power is high power nonetheless. It is power for personal and family advantage

as well as to more diffuse capital and class benefit.

It is power, moreover, quite beyond the reach of the general run of executives, managers

and professional specialists below them. The latter sorts of people exercise auxiliary con-

trol at various levels, but they exercise neither command over funding and prime asset

deployment nor significant political influence behind doors; or they hold expertise which,

when in short supply, is well-paid and helps towards some autonomy at work, but still usually

yields little share in power. They have career paths which, if less certain in private sector

than in public sector employment, may take them higher-yet take only a few of them to

the top. At their multiple levels, these managers and specialists of the business world-

together with a large diversity of officials, professionals and 'quasi-professionals' in public

and semi-public service-make up the bulk of a growing but internally heterogeneous 'service

class' so-called, who are generally distinct from rank-and-file wage earners with either 'blue

or white collars' : this by way of lifetime pay and promotion prospects, security, circum-

scribed authority, and exercise of some discretion over their work. Moreover, at and towards the upper levels of this large cluster (now in all over one quarter of the population,

on counts made uncertain by the inevitable fuzziness of class boundaries here), most of them

46 HITOTSUBASHI JOURNAL Or SOCIAL STUDIES [ July

have drawn tangible gains from the polarisation of real incomes since about 1980. Yet they are still more distinct from the very small group who combine peak privilege with peak

power right at the top.

The core of that latter tiny elite are the grand commanders in private business whom

I described before. Add to these some large rentiers who may be personally inactive in

business command ; high officials in government (central rather than local government)

who move to a degree in the worlds both of public service and private enterprise; top-estab-

lishment professionals (and even a few star-entertainers) who have acquired large wealth

and some opinion-shaping influence if hardly commensurate power-this 'top class' with their families may still number only some one per cent of the population (and would overlap

in good measure with the one per cent estimated to hold nearly a fifth of all personally owned

marketable wealth, well over a quarter of it when the value of housing is excluded : Table

V). Even add in also the c]ose auxiliaries and aspiring successors of this little group : you

will still not get up to more than just a few per cent of the population (maybe to something

like, at most, the five per cent in the second row of Table V). However you try to 'count

them, their numbers are too small, and their sources of power even more than of privilege

are too intricate, for them to be separately identified in sample surveys of the general run of

statistical series. They have always tended to vanish from sight there. Their visibility

has been still further obscured by the shift of ideological climate from the late 1970s, antL

by 'underclass' talk that turns attention from the formative top of the class structure to its

hard-beaten bottom. Yet the power concentrated at that top has grown in just the same

period; while the privilege concentrated there has grown too, in consequence rather than

as cause.

This sharpened concentration of power is evident in the machinery of policy making

too. Paradoxically perhaps, but in tune with the radical right's 'small but strong state'

authoritarianism (cf. already Gamble, 1979) which persists in practice though in softer

tone after Mrs Thatcher's departure, government has both drawn less on enquiry-before-

decision and become more centralised. Educational policy is a prime example; and local

authorities-as some limited counter-weight against central government-have had their

powers consistently trimmed down: this not least because, in many big cities and in the

North of Britain, they tehd to remain Labour Party controlled.

It is possible that some of this may change soon. There are signs, now, that the chal-

lenge of transforming recession into growth could bring some form of 'framework' economic

planning back into policy fashion. That by itself might, in the first instance, involve no

more than extending consultation between government and business, alone, to take longer-

term and broader 'whole economy' considerations on board. But it could also come to include some consultation again with organised labour-this even without any change of

government-in the hope of gaining trade union support for wage restraint against inflation.

If so, workers and their organisations might recover some part of the voice they have lost.

Yet, for the moment, this is just speculation. The reality of the 1980-90s in Britain so far

has been more concentration of power, as well as wealth, at the top. In those terms, too,

the class structure shows sharper divisions up the whole range; not only and principally, as

underclass theory implies, in the low reaches of the hierarchy.

1993] CLASS IN BRITAIN SINCE 1979 : FACTS, THEORIES AND IDEOLOGIES 47

Politics and Labour decline

I have left you still with a puzzle. Put theoretically, the puzzle is this : when class di-

vision 'in itself' has sharpened, why does class division for itself' seem to have faded? Brit-

ain, after all, has a long history of class politics, though of moderate rather than radical

character. With a labour movement well-embedded over time, and politically organised,

how has a Conservative Party led from the radical right been able to win four successive

elections, in economic and social circumstances of the kind I have described?

A small part of any answer is that the Conservatives have not, during that period, ever

won a full majority of votes: only some 44~ at most. Between them, Labour and the cen-

tre group of Liberals (with allies) have had a majority of votes. But this is only a small

part of the answer. Labour is the party, ostensibly, of the working class: and so of 'class

politics.' The Liberals and their allies are not. Yet Labour's share of the vote fell disas-

trously to 28% in 1983, this at a time of high unemployment; and, even in 1992, the figure

was up only to some 34 %, against still nearly 42 ~ for the Conservatives. One prevalent

theory, for a time, was that Labour's collapse signalled an end to class divisions in voting

patterns. This has proved misleading. Close examination of detailed survey data (espec-ially Heath et a/., 1985) has shown that, measured in relative terms, class differences have

stayed much the same as before: not so distinct as in Scandinavia, for example; but as rel-

atively distinct in Britain of the 1980s as they were in Britain of the 1950s-to-'70s. The

test case is the election of 1983, when Labour support fell to its lowest level ever since 1945.

Table X compares the pattern of class voting then with the pattern in 1966, when Labour

support was at its highest since 1945, to demonstrate the point I have just made.

So Labour's weakness has not come from a collapse of all class politics. It has come,

at next glance, rather from two processes. The first process is that, over time-now over

long time-, there are fewer blue-collar workers and more white-collar workers (Table X,

sub-table in note); and it is blue-collar workers who, historically, formed Labour's main

base. You can say that, while both economic and political divisions between classes remain

in proportionate terms at least as marked as ever, the numerical balance of the class struc-

ture has been shifting steadily to yield more people in relatively comfortable circumstances;

and fewer people in plainly subordinate circumstances.

But it is not really so simple as that. Many white-collar workers are, after all, them-

selves in 'subordinate circumstances'-in jobs with quite low pay, and of far more limited

prospects than the 'career' categories above them. The question then arises : why has the

Labour Party-even on best performance as in 1966, Iet alone at its worst in 1983-not been able to bring over a majority of this routine-grade 'white-collar working class' to its

support? Some part of the answer to this is probably that most of these people, in fact,

are white-blouse rather than white-collar workers: they are women. Quite many of these,

in turn, are women married to men in career posts (cf. Goldthorpe, 1987). They need not

vote as their husbands say. But they are likely to vote as their husbands do, because as

household members they share to a degree in their husbands' better economic fortunes.

Here, then, 'moderately mixed-class' marriages, of the sort I referred to earlier, may come

into play to reduce the political steam of sharpened economic divisions of class.

The second evident process behind Labour's weakness since the late 1970s is, however,

48 HITOTSUBASHI JOURNAL OF SOCIAL STUDIES [July

both more significant and more of a challenge for explanation. This is that votes swung

away from the party in all classes. The swing left the relative differences in Labour support

much as before; but at lower levels throughout, and drastically so in 1983. Why this general

defection from the party-from which Labour partly recovered in 1987 and 1992, yet only

partly and well short of the continuing Conservative lead? Survey evidence gives some clues to start with. It suggests that Labour lost votes most and first-in 1979 and then

badly in 1983-in good part through widespread disillusionment over its 'capacity to govern' ; over the evident failure then of corporatist economic policies ; over the eruption

of strikes to no positive effect at the tail-end of Labour's period in government office; and

over subsequent internal party disputes. (Cf, e.g. Heath et al., 1985; Dunleavy and Hus-

bands, 1985; Westergaard et a/., 1989.)

Explanation in terms of this kind, however, arguably only skims the surface. Why

in turn was Labour so greatly vulnerable to a mood of disillusionment? Why did the Liberal 'centre' gain so many new votes for a political line which at least purports to deny

class politics; gain much of that support by working-class defection from Labour; and still

retain a good slice of it in 1987 and 1992, despite decline after 1983? Why, for all the per-

sistence of relative class differences in voting patterns, did the absolute significance of class

division come to be so diminished? What, against this background, are the prospects a-

head? A rough count of the class structure's numerical balance offers one way into these

questions. (1 use the distributions by class group in Tables VIH and X, sub-table in note,

as a guide.) Leave out the few per cent made up by the top class and its immediate circle

(the pinnacle of the so-called 'service class'). Leave out the 'petty bourgeoisie,' econom-

ically vulnerable though they are : rather less than ten per cent today. Leave out, too, on

a frst count, the large 'service class' below the top circle-managers, professionals, quasi-

professionals, officials and so on, regardless of level and sector for the moment: at least

another quarter of the population. You then still have some sixty per cent who, by their

own present or past economic circumstances from work are pretty plain wage earners : manual and non-manual, but in essentially subordinate positions either way. Look a little

more closely and, of course, complexity arises. As I have said before, a good many women

in routine-grade ofiice work and the like have 'service class' career husbands. Their family

circumstances are not 'plain working class' : excluding them, the wage-earner group is re-

duced to only a rather bare majority. Moreover, the less than ten per cent category of

manual supervisors and lower grade technicians, first counted as just wage earners, have

proved 'marginal.' They are, to a degree, into 'careers'; it was they-not skilled blue-collar

workers at large-who swung hardest away from Labour in the early 1980s (Table X) ; and

many of them have still stayed away since. On the other hand, their circumstances are not far removed from those of indisputably rank-and-file workers : they were once, and

might again come, well within the prime Labour constituency. Take account now also of the further support which a radical-left party might recruit among people in the relatively

less secure echelons of the 'service class.' Many there have a vested interest in protection

of public sector employment, at least, if also in protection of their minor career privileges;

and there have been signs of some recent swing leftwards among teachers and other public

service professionals, resentful over radical-right handling of their spheres of work. Adding

such subsidiary constituencies to the prime wage-earner constituency, a prospective basis

CLASS IN BRITAIN slNcE 1979 : FAcTs, THEORIES AND IDEOLOGIES

could then be seen for a resurgence of class politics around an agenda set to challenge the

established concentration of power and privilege.

Conjectures about why Labour is not within sight of that abound. One reason, though

much disputed, may be that the party has never firmly set any such agenda: in practice it

has been far more a reformist than a radical party-as working-class parties in Western

Europe generally have become; and have become the more so as their support, too, has

tended to slip. If there are clues here, they point-in my own view-to the processes by

which class politics has become 'institutionalised'. In such processes, historically, class

conflict was formally admitted to the political scene, and came to form the recognised main

theme around which parties mobilised. But it also came to be institutionally regulated

and moderated in consequence. Compromise, first pursued as a tactic, became usually an

end almost in itself. Reform was sought because it was easier to achieve, and could bring

some tangible benefit, without head-on challenge to the established order. But as head-on

challenge dropped generally from sight, and as reform came closer to its limits without it,

the class substance of institutionalised politics tended to drain away. Rival parties con-

tested for the 'middle ground,' for 'floating voters,' still confident that they could retain

the support of their original class constituencies nonetheless. And the parties came to base

their claims increasingly on purported instrumental competence in governance, more than

on principled and long-term pursuit of class-constituency interests. So politics became,

and is now commonly seen as, 'dull' even when not mean-spirited or corrupt. And as politicians and parties have lowered their sights, voters at large have come to expect little

of them ; and to vote, when they vote, just in pragmatic manner.

To return to Britain more specifically, this has fitted quite well with one radical-right

doctrine: that governments should do much less of what they once did (and let markets do much more). The radical right has also, of course, been well placed to cash in on long-

standing Conservative claims to superior competence in governance, when governance means management of the established order: the Conservatives are, after all, the party of

'practically minded' business. True, the radical right has pursued its own brand of class

politics with much vigour, to the effect of the economic polarisation I have described; and

voters generally are well aware of this, despite Conservative disclaimers. But, through that 'institutionalisation of class politics' which I have just tried to outline, many voters

now have little faith in political opposition as a means to reverse the effect.

ldeologica/ currents : class, classlessness and opportunity

Disillusionment with politics and politicians, then, has spread wide; and opinion surveys

generally confirm this. That, in practice, has damaged Labour and the left more than Conservatives and the right, because the former have empty hands unless their politics can

effectively change the order as it is. But opinion surveys also show that support continues

to be widespread-especially in the working class, but in significant respects also among

professional if not business groups-for the kinds of principle which Labour historically

has represented : for union defence of employees against employers ; for extensive public

welfare provision; for 'fairer shares,' and progressive redistribution to curtail wealth and

power at the top. The evidence on this front is remarkable, to the effect that the radical

50 HITOTSUBASHI JOURNAL OF SOCIAL STVDIES [ Jul y

right have not won most 'hearts and minds' for their social philosophy. (See Table XI for some relevant data; see also, e.g., Westergaard et al., 1989, chapters 7 and 8).

Yet they have, after all, continued to win over 40 ~ of votes for Conservative control

of government. This, at the crucial 10% margin of votes, may be for reasons which have

rather little to do with matters of social philosophy. As I have already suggested, when

the Conservative Party won that margin again in 1992, it was probably in part because it.

as the party of business, was still-if curiously-trusted to be more competent in economic

management than Labour; in part because enough voters, who favoured higher taxes on the wealthy, were still worried that higher taxes might reach down to themselves; in larger

part yet, from disillusionment with politics as a means to progressive social change of much

effective sort. Most people appear to want to see 'fairer shares.' But too many of them

are sceptical about the means to that end.

That is the way the evidence, with some further speculation, so far seems to point. But

the evidence also points to the persistence of class divisions in politics, though more muted

of practical expression than is the persistence of class divisions in the economic circums-

tances of life. It points also very clearly to popular perceptions of class that remain quite

out of tune with the radical right's perceptions. The radical right have celebrated the pur-

suit of high wealth. But when high wealth has then come, they have, paradoxically, tried

to veil its existence, and its contrast both with growing poverty and with lagging middle-

range incomes. This has been to deny class, when the explicit thrust of policy has been to

accentuate it. There is a circle here which is patently hard to square. One ideologically

leading way of trying to square this circle has now become to say that a society is 'classless,'

if only it offers opportunity for individuals of talent or initiative to climb high in what other-

wise would be called the class structure.

This is a conception which Mr Major has tried to make 'his own,' though it was an explicit strand in radical-right thinking already before his accession to government leader-

ship. It is, in my submission however, a very limited conception when it has nothing to say about the widening gaps between life circumstances in high, intermediate and low positions. It is still the more limited, when it has little to say about the logical corollary:

that individuals without apparent talent and initiative should then fall low regardless of

class origin, This notion of 'classlessness,' as just a matter of unspecified personal oppor-

tunity, thus lacks even the concern with equal opportunities which has figured in the past

as an aspiration for policy. But larger inequality of class economic conditions almost certainly diminishes the scope to reduce inequality of class mobility opportunities (cf. Erikson

and Goldthorpe, 1992). Perhaps just this is why it is now prevailing government fashion

in Britain to celebrate individual opportunity without much reference to the issue of parity

in such opportunity.

That seems to me an empty conception of a 'classless' society. It would allow inequality

almost without limits, provided only that some visible number of people can rise from humble

to higher circumstances in life. It falls far short of an older 'radical bourgeois' ideal : the

ideal of a society where only talent and initiative decide who becomes rich and who becomes

poor, never mind the gap between the rich and the poor. This was perhaps the ideal of the French Revolution, and of the 'American dream.' But it is a sociologlcally unrealistic

and unrealisable dream, because the wider the gap between wealth and poverty-the sharper

the class structure of conditions-the harder then, by and large, will be the de facto barriers

1993] CLASS Ihl BRITAIN SlNCE 1979 : FACTS, THEORIES AND IDEOLOGIES 51

to equal individual opportunities. Patterns of mobility cannot be freed in practice from

the restraints of structure: the restraints of economic structure first, but then also of the

class-cultural divisions that follow.

To summarise, 'classlessness' envisaged as the mere presence of scope for personal

opportunity regardless of its incidence is vacuous. There has long been such scope; and

there are no signs that its incidence in Britain has become anywhere much nearer to parity.

'Classlessness' envisaged as parity of opportunity-or even as steady approximation to

more parity of opportunity-has been a frequent feature of policy ambition across the political spectrum. But it slips still further out of practical reach when the structural in-

equalities of condition increase as they have increased: hence the government's substitution

of the first, nebulous conception for the second, more generous ideal. We are then left,

I suggest, with a third and quite different conception of a 'classless' society-or rather, of

a society which would come nearest to a notion of that sort, with substance. This would

be a society, a socialist society, where inequalities of condition were minimal-where such

inequalities, if their continuation were to be accepted, would need proof either that they

were unavoidable or that they served some good agreed purpose. In such a hypothetical society of 'near-classless' conditions, individual opportunities could also come close to 'class-

less' equality. And it would matter less when they did not, because the substantive in-

equalities of individual outcome would be less.

British policy seems to have embraced the first and empty conception of 'classlessness.'

British popular opinion, by contrast, seems still to hover uncertainly around support for

the second conception; with some inchnation towards the third, in quite widespread aspira-

tions at least for 'fairer shares'-though not, it must be added, for fullblown socialist equal-

ity.

UNIVERSITY OF SHEFFIELD

52 HrTOTS(JBASHI JOURNAL OF SOCIAL STUDIES [ July

AppENDIX : STATISTICAL TABLES

All tables relate either to Great Britain (excluding Northern lreland) or to

Kingdom (including Northern lreland).

I. INCREASES lN~ REAL EARN~IN'Gs OF ADULT FULL-TlblE EMPLOYEES,

1980-1990

the United

Adult men in full-time work Adult women in full-time work

Employee category and earnings level

Weekly pay in L at 1990 value

1990

% increase 1980-90

Weekly pay in L at 1990 value

1980 1980 1990

% increase 1 980-90

NON-MANUAL EMPLO YEES Highest decile

Highest quartile

Median Lowest quartile

Lowest decile

410 312 243 191

153

S 69

415 312

232 1 72

38.

32.

28 .

21.

12.

8 8 2 O T

233

184 1 44

116

98

332

265 192

148

119

42.

43.

32.

26.

21.

3 7 9 9 8

MANUAL EMPLO YEES Highest decile

Highest quartile

Med ian Lowest quartile

Lowest decile

299 246

200 1 65

137

351 28 1

22 1

1 74

l 39

1 7.

14.

1 O.

6. 1.

4 2 6 o 8

177 1 49

123

1 03

87

216 171

137

112

93

21.

15.

11. 9. 7.

9 1 4 5 5

MEDIAN FOR ALL FULL-TIME EMPLOYEES

(NON-MANUAL AND MANUAL TOGETHER)

216 258 19. 6 138 178 28. 6

Sources :

Note :

The basic data on weekly pay (before tax, and excluding pay reduced by an employee's absence from work) are taken from the report on the official New Earnings Survey 1990 (part A, table A.15,1). I have converted the pay figures given there for 1980 to 1990 values by applying to them the changes in the Retail Price Indix (all items) between February 1980 and February 1990, the months of the New Earnings Survey figures, as calculated from relevant issues of the Monthly DI~est of Statistics. I have rounded the pay figures to the nearest whole L for simplicity of presentation, but calculated the percentage real-value increases from pay figures to one decimal

point in order to enhance their accuracy. In addition to the general polarisation of earnings over the period, it will be seen that women's

pay in full-time employment increased more at every level shown than men's; and also that the disparities in relative pay increase between top and bottom were rather smaller for women than for men. To judge from these data alone, therefore, it appears that gender inequalities in employment earnings narrowed somewhat in the 1980s ; and also that, as the very lowest levels of pay nevertheless continued to be found among women, the degree of 'class' polarisa-tion of earnings during the period would be a little less sharp overall than as suggested here

by separate presentation of the figures for men and for women. However, these data cover only people in full-time employment-that is almost all male employees

but only some 55 per cent of female employees (cf. Table VII Iater). No similarly comprehensive

information is readily available for women in part-time emp!oyment. But their numbers grew considerably during the period. As part-time work for women is disproportionately low-grade employment (see again Table VII) at low rates of pay, the effect of its growih will have been towards

more polarisation of earnings in employment altogether than appears from figures limited to full-time employment only. The contrasts visible here for either sex, between approximately 40 per cent gains at or near the top and at bcst small gains at the bottom, are in any case wholly

in line with the trends of househo/d income over much the same period (see Table 111 Iater).

1993] CLAss IN BRITAIN SINCE 1979 : FACTS, THEORIES AND IDEOLOOIES 53.

II. ESTIMATED EFFECTS OF CHANGES 1N DIRECT TAXES AND STATE BENEFITS,

1979-1989

Households according to income level before taxes and benefits

% of households for whom net effect of changes was :

Loss No change Gain

Approx. average real-term gain in

disposable income : L per week

% share of each decile in aggregate gain in disposable incomes

(total = I OO %)

Ist (richest) decile

2nd decile

3rd decile

4th decile

5th decile

6th decile

7th decile

8th decile

9th decile

10th (poorest) decile

12

10

15

14

18

22

32

32

26

22

10

lO

12

13

13

18

15

15

18

19

78

80 73

73

69

60 53

53

56

59

30

10

6112

6 4112

4 2 1

/3 ll2

2

46 15

10 9 7 6 3

<1 <l

3

Source : P. Johnson and G. Stark, Taxation and Social Security 1979~9 : the impact on household incomes, Institute of Fiscal Studies, 1989. (1 have myself added the final column by calculation from the

authors' figures,) The authors' estimates are designed to show the effects of changes in direct

taxation and benefits alone, in isolation from changes over the same period in eamings pat-tems, popu]ation composition, etc. The income measures used are 'equivalised gross incomes,' intended to eliminate assumed differences in income 'need* between households of different composition. The overal/ average weekly gain was estimated at L7 per week (approx.). This arose mainly from income tax cuts and changes in national insurance provision from 1986 to '89, to the effect of general gains in disposable income; before that, from 1979 to '85, shifts in direct taxes and benefits are estimated to have produced a net loss of disposable income on aver-

age. Over the full period 1979-89, certain categories of household either lost on the whole, or experienced no gain, contrary to the general trend : these were single people, childless un-employed couples, and retired people wholly or mainly dependent on state old-age pensions. (The estimates predate the full introduction of local community charges-the s0~)alled 'poll tax'-and their replacement, in 1993, by a less regressive local 'council tax.')

III. ALTERNATIVE ESTIMATES OF CHANGES IN REAL HOUSEHOLD INCoMES IN THE 1980s

Households according to income level

Official estimates 1979-87

Before allowance for housing costs

After all6wance for housing costs

Townsend's estimates 1 979-89

Ist (richest) quintile

6th decile (down)

7th decile (down)

8th decile (down)

9th decile (down)

10th decile (poorest)

5th (poorest) quintile

NA + I O.

+ 9. + 8. + 7. + 8.

+ 8.

1% O% 2% 8% 5%

2%

NA

+ 5.3% + 2.9% + 0.8%

- 1% - .7%

- .4%

+39, 7 %

NA NA NA NA

- .0%

~ .6% Overall mean increase in household incomes

+ 22. 9% +23. I % +23. 9 %

Sources : The ofncial estimates 1979-87 in the two first columns are taken from the Department of Sociai Security's Households Below Average Income, Government Statistical Service, 1990 (Annex l, tables Al and Dl). Those for 1979-89 in the third column are taken from P. Townsend;

54 HrrOTSUBASHI JOURNAL OF SOCIAL STuoIES [ July

The Poor Are Getting Poorer, Dept. of Social Policy and Social Planning, Bristol University, 1991. Both sets of estimates derive from data from the regular official Family Expenditure Surveys and relate to disposable real income after direct taxes and cash benefits. But they employ somewhat different assumptions and adjustments. In particular, the ofiicial estimates use measures of household income 'equivalised' with the intention to discount differences in income 'need' between households of different composition. Townsend's estirnates use no such adjustment, on the ground that 'equivalisation' involves arbitrarily variable and contest-able assumptions.

'NA'=no answer, i.e. no figure given in the published source. Neither source gives informa-tion for income levels between the richest quintile and the sixth decile down.

IV. QUINTILE SHARES OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME, 1979 AND 1988

Households according to level of disposable

income

% share of each quintile in all income after direct taxes

1979 1988

Ist (richest) quintile

2nd quintile

3rd quintile

4th quintile

5th (poorest) quintile

37

23 18

13

lO

44 22 16

11

7

All post-tax income 1 OO 1 OO

So urce : Central Statistical Offlce, Socia/ Trends 22, Governmental Statistical Service, HMSO, 1992 (table 5,19). The estimate is based on data from the regular Family Expenditure Surveys. In-come figures are 'equivalised' throughout, with the intention of discounting differences in in-come 'need' between households of different composition. (The percentages in the first column add to 101 % in consequence of rounding )

V. DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONAL OwNED PROPERTY, 1976-1989

Category of adult population (aged 1 8 or more) according to

wealth

% of marketable wealth owned by category-

Including value of dwellings Excluding value of dwellings

1976 198 1 1989 1976 1981 1989

Wealthiest

Wealthiest

Wealthiest

Poorest

1% 5% lO%

50 %

21

38

50

8

18

36

50

8

18

38

53

6

29

47 57

12

26

4s

56

13

28 53

66

6

Source : Central Statistical Office, Social Trends 22 (op. cit for Table IV above, table 5.21): as estimated

by Inland Revenue (the central tax authority) from death duty returns supplemented by other data. Previous studies have shown that the patterns of inequality are broadly similar to those presented above, when analysed separately for men and women, and for people of different age : i.e, that inequality in the distribution of property ownership cannot bc 'explained away' as a function of gender or age rather than of 'class.'

l 993] CLASS IN BRITAIN SINCE 1979 : FACTS, THEORIES AND IDEOLOCIES 55

VI. FULL-TIME EMPLOYEES' MEMBERSHIP OF EMPLOYERS' PENsloN SCHEMES,

1983 AND 1988

Full-time employees according to category of occupation

(official Socio-Economic Group classification)

% of all in category who are members of employer-run pension schemes

IAmong men Among women

1983 1988 1983 1988

Professional work

Employers, managers Intermediate non-manual work

Junior non-manual work Skilled manual and non-professional work

'on own account'

Semi-skilled manual and personal service work

Unskilled manual work

84

74

89

72

60

55

51

80 73

80

67

55

53

51

59

79

52

35

37

74

59

76

50 45

29

All full-time employees 66 64 55 54

Source .' Office of Population Censuses and Survey, General Household Survey 1988, HMSO, 1990. The information concerns membership of the occupational pension schemes provided generally by public sector employers and by many (though usua]ly not by very smau) private sector employ-ers, over and above old-age pension provision from the state. Pensions under such employer-provided schemes are generally graded according to past eamings (usually with emphasis on earnings in the later years of employment) ; and their terms may bc further 'class graded' by provisions for effective pension entitlement that vary in practice between members at different

levels of occupation. The data here do not show membership among part-time employees (mainly women in junior non-manual and still lower-grade work); but other data show low ac-cess to occupational pensions among part-time workers. The small decline in the incidence of membership among full-time employees indicated here, for 1983-88, may reflect a concomitant

government-encouraged growth of private pension provision outside the framework of employer-provided schemes, about which correspondingly detailed information is not to my knowledge yet available.

* = sample cell size too small for reliable calculation (membership apparently low),

V JI, ECONOMIC ACTIVITY OF WOMEN, l 987/89

Women aged 1 6-59 according to

paid-work status

Youngest dependent child aged-

0~ 5-9 10 and over

No depend-ent child

A]1 women 16-59

%

%

%

%

%

Full-time work

Part-time work

Unem p]oyed 'Economically inactive'

11

26 6

57

17

48 4

31

30

44 3

23

50

22 5

22

36 28 5

30

Total 100 l OO 100 l OO 1 OO

Source : Central Statistical Office, Socia/ Trends 22, Government Statistical Service, HMSO,

4.8). The same table shows the following variations in women's economic activity to their own present or previous occupational category-.

1992 (table

according

56 HrroTSUBASHI JOURNAL OF SOCIAL STUDms [ July

Woman's OWN , socio-economic , group-

Paid-work status (as above)

Professional/ managerial

Intermediate or junior

non-manual

Manual-

Skilled Semi-skilled

Unskilled

Al l

women 1 6-59

%

%

%

%

%

%

Full-time work

Part-time work

Unemployed 'Inactive'

65

16 2

16

44

27 4

24

39

28 4

28

27 31

6

34

7

59 4

31

36

28 5

30

Total 1 OO 1 OO 1 OO lOO 1 OO 1 OO

The detailed percentages in both tables sometimes add to more or less than the 100 % shown, in conse-quence of rounding. The data derive from the General Household Surveys of the years 1987-89. Note: The incidence of 'economic activity' (paid work or registered unemployment) among married

women aged 1(~59 rose over the past two decades from approx. 50% in 1971 through 60% in 1981 to approx. 70% in 1990. (Social Trends 22, chart 4.3.)

VIII. BROAD CLASS-GROUP AND GENDER DIFFERENCES IN PAY AND 'CAREER PLACEMENT' : EMPLOYEES, MID-1980s

All employees- Full-time employees only

Broad class group (Goldthorpe classification)

Pay index ~ in

'career' Approx. % distribution

Pay index % in 'career'

M F M F

M F M F

M F

(1)

( 11 )

(V)

( 111 )

(VI )

(VID

Higher grade professionals, managers, officials, etc. [including 'elite']

Lower grade professionals, managers, officials, etc.

Lower grade technicians and manual supervisors

Routine non-manual and personal service workers

Skilled manual workers

Semi- and unskilled manual workers

459

356

27 5

238

228 210

3 04

203

1 08

134

1 34

100

80

75

72

60

36

25

77

66

47

35

35 8

% 15

19

13

7

20 26

% 4

20

4

41

6

25

310

242

188

159

l 54

l 45

2 os

l 54

79

1 07

96 100

80

75

72

60

36

26

77

72

56

43

35 11

Total 1 OO l OO

So urce : G. Marshall et al., Socia/ Class in Modern Britain, Unwin Hyman, 1988 (table 4.9, p. 78, sup-plemented by table 4.6, p. 74). This reported on a nationwide interview survey in 1983/84 with a total sample of over 1700.

M= men ,' F= women. Pay index : I have calculated the two indexes, from the group means of annual pay (in Ls) pre-sented in the original, by setting the means for female non-skilled workers ( VII) at 100. (100

fcr all employees=L3,081; 100 for full-time emp[oyees only=L4,558.) These figures on pay are rough and understate disparities (cf. e.g. Table I earlier) for several reasons, including their

limitations as averages for broad groups, and on that score also differences in the patterns of

life-time earnings between 'career' occupations and lob' occupations. But I show them here, for purposes of a general sketch, because the data include rarely available information about just this distinction between 'career' posts and other work, as a complement to the pay data : see

below.

1993] CLASS IN BRITAIN SINCE l 979 : FACTS, THEORIES AND IDEOLOOIES 57

% in 'career': the percentage of employee-respondents in ,he relevant category who answered 'yes' to a question whether their present work was "a step m a recogmzed career or promotion ladder within your organization." Broad class group : the classification is a somewhat compressed version of the Goldthorpe clas-sification (devised frst for use in J.H. Goldthorpe with others, Social Mobility and Class Struc-

ture in Modern Britain. Clarendon Press, 1980). Class IV is excluded here because the table shown is confined to employees : small employers and self-employed people, assigned to class rv, comprised some 12% of men and 5 ~ of women in the full sample. (lhese correspond to the 'petty bourgeoisie' of Tables X and XI, Iater.) I have reversed the original order of class

groups 111 and V for this table because, with one exception. V ranks above lll with respect to the data presented here. (lhe exception is the low pay levels shown for female '...technicians and manual supervisors' assigned to V, whose numbers are very small.)

IX. ASPECTS OF HoUSING TENURE

% of households who occupy their homes as-

Full owners or buyers*

Tenants of public

authorities

Private or housing associ-ation tenants

Total households

Year 1971

1981

1990

49

57

68

31

31

23

20 12

9

1 OO

1 OO

100

Socio-economic group of household head 1989190

Professional, managerial, etc.

Intermediate non-manual

Junior non-manual Skilled manual

Semi-skilled manual

Unskilled manual 'Economically inactive'

90 84 69

72 54 42 50

7

19

21

35

48 39

7 9

12 7

11

10

11

1 OO

1 OO

100 1 OO

1 OO

1 OO

1 OO

So urce :

*Note :

Various issues of Social Trends (Government Statistical Service), based on data from the De-partment of Environment and the General Household Survey (which uses the official Socio-Economic Group classification, as in Table VI earlier). Except among the 'economically inactive,' most owner-occupying households are not yet full owners but are still buying, by paying off mortgages obtained on the security of their homes. Tax relief is given by the state for mortgages, with the following incidence by income-group in 1990/91 (source: Social Trends 22, tabie 8.25).

Annual taxable income of mortgage holders (single persons or couples) receiving tax relief

No. receiving tax relief

%* *

Tax relief given by state-

Average value L per year

Total cost to state

L million %

Under Ll0,000 L10,000 to under L15,000

L15,000 to under L20,000

L20,000 to under L25,000

L25,000 and over

16

22 23 16

23

590 740 800

810 1, 090

910 l, 520

1, 670

1, 240

2, 360

12

20 21

16

31

All income ranges 1 OO 820 7, 700 1 OO

*' No data in similar form are available for ready comparison with income distribution in the population at large. But in 1991/92, some 40 ~ of tax-paying individuals overall had incomes under Ll0,000 gross; while only some 10% had gross incomes of L25,000 and more. (Socia/ Trends 22, table 5.11.) Even


these figures exc]ude people too poor to pay income tax at all.

X. VOTlNG IN GENERAL ELECTIONS OF 1966 AND 1983

1966: Labour peak 1983 : Labour trough

Voters' class (sample survey data)

% voting for- % voting for-

Con Lib Lab O Con Libl

SDP Lab

Class differentials

in Labour vote

o 1966 1983

Relative fall

in Labour's share of vote,

1966-1983

Salariat Petty bourgeoisie

Routine non-manual Foremen and technicians

Manual workers

(total across= 100 %)

58 16 25 l 66 13 19 2 48 9 42 1 34 5 61 O 23 5 72 O

(total across = 100 %)

54 31 14 l 71 17 12 O 46 27 25 2 48 25 26 l 30 20 49 1

1 OO

76 1 68

244

288

l OO

86 l 79

186

350

-44% - 7 ~ -40% -57% - 2 %

All voters (ofricial results)

41. 9 8.5 48.1 l. 5

42. 4 25. 4 27. 6 4. 6

-43 %

Source : A Heath et a/.. How Britain Votes. Pergamon Press, 1985 (from tables 3.2, pp. 32-33, supple-mented by table 1.2, p. 3). Table 3.2 covers all elections 1961~1983. For simplicity. I have chosen to compare the e]ections of 1 966 and 1983 because these were, respectively, the years in which Labour has so far obtained its largest share (1966 marginally above even 1945) and its smal]est share of the total votes. Since 1983 the Labour vote has partly recovered, with the following results in 1992 across the UK-Con 41.9 %, Lib/SDP 20.1 ~, Lab 34.2%, O 3.8%-

Parties: Con=Conservatives; Lib=Liberals (allied in 1983 with SDP=Social Democrats, formed by defection from Labour) ; Lab =Labour ; O = others

Class: The classification used by the authors of this study differs significantly from the un-satisfactory A-E grading conventionally used in (and often quoted from) market re-search-inter alia, by its distinction of the 'petty bourgeoisie' (small employers and self-employed people) and 'foremen and technicians' from skilled manual workers (all or most conventionally assigned to C2). It groups all rank-and-file manual workers together regardless of skill level, because detailed analysis has shown only small dif-ferences of voting pattern within this core 'working class' group.

I have calculated the following indices (last three columns) in preference to the authors' odds

ratios-Class differentials... This index shows, for 1966 and 1983 respectively, Labour's share of the vote

in each class relative to its share among the 'salariat' (= 100).

Relative fal/... These figures show the decline to 1 983 in Labour's percentage share of the vote

in each class, expressed as a percentage of its corresponding share in 1966, the 'peak'

year. Changes in class composition of the electorate (from same source, p 36)-

Class %Mid-1960s %1983 Salariat

Petty bourgeoisie

Routine non-manual Foremen/technicians Manual workers

18 7

18

lO 47

27 8

24 7

34

Total l OO IOO

1993] CLASS IN BRITAIN SINCE 1979 : FACTS, THEORIES AND IDEOLOOIES 59

XI . SURVEY INDICATIONS OF ATTITUDES TO PUBLIC WELFARE AND REDISTRIBUTION

SOME TRENDS~ 1 98 3-1 990 Statement posed-

All respondents Wealthiest 20 per cent

Poorest 35 per cent

1983 1990 % %

1983 1990 ~ %

1983 %

1990 %

If government had to choose it should . , , .

. reduce taxes and spend less [on welfare]

, keep taxes and spending at level as now

, increase taxes and spend more [on welfare]

9

s4 32

3

37

54 32 59

NA -l 35 54

Total 1 OO I OO 100 100 1 OO 1 OO

Unemployment benefits are . . . .

, too high, and discourage job search

. neither too high, nor too low]

.too low, and cause hardship

/NA/ 37

19

44

37

19

44

34

17

49

27

20 53

Total 1 OO I OO 1 OO 100

SELEcrED ATHTUDES 1990, BY CLASS Statement posed-

% support among respondents classed as-

Salariat Petty

bourgeoisie Routine

non-manual Manual f oremen

Manual workers

Income gap high versus low is too large

Government should redistribute from the better-off to the poorer off*

79 . 42

73

41

80 46

86

57

85

60

Government should definite!y provide . . . .

. health care for the sick

. decent living standards for the old

. decent housing for people who cannot afford it

.decent living standards for the unemployed

. a job for everyone who wants one

85

71

38

25

16

78

68

36

23

17

80

77

39

26 14

91

87

52

31

39

87

83

56

38

31

Source : R. Jowell et al., ed., British Social Attitudes: the 8th report, Social and Community Planning Reseach, 1 991. With one exception the data are taken from Chapter 2, by P. Taylor-Gooby, 'Attachment to the welfare state,' The data in response to the statement marked *, in the sec-ond sub-table above, are taken from Chapter 1, by A. Heath and D. McMahon, 'Consensus and dissensus.'

Class: The classification of respondents by class is essentially the same as that used in Table X earlier and, Iike it, derives frorn the Goldthorpe schema (see Table VIII earlier).

NA=no answer, i,e. no data given in published source. Statements: I have taken only a selection of the statements for which responses are analysed

and discussed in the source papers, in order to illustrate both the wide spread (and some

growth) of pro-welfare sentiment in the 1980s and,some features of class 'consensus and dissensus' in this respect. The following points may be noted inter alia-

eThe figures in the last five rows of the second sub-table show support for the state-ments posed in a strong form-i.e, the percentages of respondents who said they regarded provision in the fields listed as 'definitely' a government responsibility. Support was substantially larger, when those respondents were added who felt that such provision should probably' be a government responsibility: thus only 2-3 points short of 100% overall in respect of health care, and decent living standards for old people ; 90 % over-

all in respect of 'decent housing...'; 77~ in respect of decent standards for the unem-ployed; and 60 % in respect of providing a job for everyone who wants one (even though unemployment was temporarily a relatively low-priority issue at the time of the survey in 1990, before new recession had begun to bite). By contrast, positive endorsement of 'radical right philosophy' in respect of welfare and drstribution was relatively rare.

60 Hn『OTSUBASHI　JOURNAL　Or　SOCIAL　STUDIES ［July

Thus，to　take　just　two　examples，some70－80％of　respondents　across　all　ciasses　ex－plicitly　opposed　the　idea　of　anジtwo－tier’health　service（as　once　suggeste（l　ffom　the

right）；and　only　some25％were　inclined　to　rule　out　govemment’s　responsibility　toreduce　income　dif輩erences（with　no　more　than10％‘de盒nite’about　rullng　this　out）．

●P．Taylor・Gooby（op．6ゴ！．above）stresses　a　contrast　betw㏄n　universalistic　servi㏄s，

such　as　heakh　care　and　retirement　pensions，which　yield　benefits　to‘middle　class’as

well　as　to　working　class　peop塁e；and　those，such　as　public　housing，unemploymentbenefit　and　job　provision，whose　benefits　are　concentrated　on　working　class　peoPle．

He　draws　attention　to　the　points　that　popular　support　is　higher（even　among　workers）

for　the　former　than　the　latter　category　of　welfare　provision；but　also　that　opinions

肛e　more　class・divided　with　regard　to　the　latter　category　than　the　fomler．σn　other

words，class　self」interest　is　a　notable　fbature．）

●The且rst　question　in　the五rst　sub－table　omitted　any　reference　to　the加‘∫46η6θof　a

hypothetical　rise　in　taxation．This　may　help　to　explain　the　apparent　lack　of　muchclass　division　in　responses　to　it．　But　the870擢’hφ5吻，oπfor　increased　taxation　and

welfare　expenditure　hっm1983to1990is　consonant　wlth　other　cvidence　to　similar　eHlect；

and　the　indication　here　of　somewhat　over50％support　for　increase（i　taxation　to　fund

increased　social　expenditure　is　broadly　in　Iine　with　the　results　of　the1992general　elec・

tion，in　so　far　as54％of　all　voters　then　supported　the　two　parties　which　advocated　such

a　shi丘（Labour34％，Liberal／SDP20％）一though，of　course，this　issue　was　only　oneof　many　lssues　contested　at　that　election．

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See　also　the　regular　annual　issues　of　So（ゴα17γθn4s（Central　Statistical　O伍ce，Government

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Class in Britain since 1979: facts, theories and...

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