Clan and State Politics in Somalia

7/23/2019 Clan and State Politics in Somalia

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International Training Programme

for Conflict Management

The ITPCM

ISSN. 2239-7949Vol. IX no. 34

InternationalCommentary

December 2013

CLAN AND STATE POLITICS

inthisissue:

SOMALIASOMALIA


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ITPCM International Commentary December 2013 ISSN. 2239-7949


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SOMALIACLAN AND STATEPOLITICS

December 2013

The ITPCM International Commentary


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Humanitarian actors strugglefor access, impartiality andengagement with armed non-state actors

by Marco Rotelli, p. 69

by Chiara Franco, p. 75

The EU cooperationwith Somalia: channels ofimplementation

by Adam Haji Ali Ahmed, p. 35

Internal and externalchallenges to peace for

Somaliland

by Fatima Jibrell, p. 25

Somali politics and powerruns over women and their

environment

by Issa Mohamud Farah, p. 47

Hydrocarbon exploration in

Puntland: who has the legalright to enter into agreements?

by Stephen Musau, p. 13

Clans and clannisms controlover weak political institutions

by Andrea de Gury, p. 57

A renewed role for the UnitedNations in Somalia?

by Emanuela Parisciani, p. 81

Is Mogadishu a viable internalprotection alternative?

by Francesca Sterzi, p. 61

Oshore Somalia: piracy,naval missionsand private security

Interview with Mohamed SaidSamantar, p. 53

Discussing the Puntlandfederal states priorities andother issues

by Abdifatah Ismael Tahir, p. 41

Does successful peacebuildinglead to successful

statebuilding?

by Gedamu Kalewongel Minale, p. 29

How did Somaliland emerge asa stable and peaceful polity?

Next Trainings in Agenda, p. 88

About the ITPCM

by Abdullahi M. Odowa, p. 19

What can current leaders in

somalia learn from their pasthistory?

by Michele Gonnelli, p. 8

Clan and State Politics - Intro

by Hussein Bulhan, p. 7

Foreword

Table of Contents


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the ITPCMInternational Commentary

Chief Director:Francesco Ceccarelli

Scientic Director:

Andrea de Gury

Editor in Chief:Michele Gonnelli

Contributors to this issue:Adam Haji Ali Ahmed,

Andrea de Gury, Issa MohamudFarah, Chiara Franco, Fatima

Jibrell, Stephen Musau,Gedamu Kalewongel Minale,

Abdullahi Mohammed Odowa,Emanuela Parisciani, Marco

Rotelli, Mohamed Said Samantar,Francesca Sterzi, Abdifatah

Ismael Tahir

Proofreading & Copy EditingThomas Taylor Di Pietro, Priya

Mathews, Charloe Reed, HelenRomito, Monica von Schlegell

Art DirectorMichele Gonnelli


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We are particularly grateful for theprecious insights given byMohamudSaid Samantar(Puntland StateUniversity) at dierent stages of thisproject, our conversations were worthmany readings.Special thanks go to Thomas Taylor DiPietro, Priya Mathews, Charloe Reed,Helen Romito, andMonica von Schlegellfor their patience and kindness inperforming the proofreading and copyediting services.

Finally, we are irremediably indebtedto all contributors, western and local,for having embarked on this projectand shared their invaluable insightsand knowledge, oen despite strenuousconditions and communicationdiculties.

ITPCM International Commentary

Thanks &Acknowledgements


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Foreword

I feel honoured to write the Forewordfor this compilation of articles wrien

by authors from diverse disciplinesand cultural backgrounds. I am alsopleased to oer, in the conventionallylimited space of a foreword, a fewcomments on some key themes thatI think the articles collectively under-score. While presenting them in a listI express myself in words which somemay consider too cynical, but with theintention of constructively highlight-ing central problems concerning So-malia.

The Somali crisis has many and com-plex aspects that no author or workcan fully discuss; therefore academ-ics, true to their trade, cautiously takeup an aspect or two of the Somali cri-sis to makes sense of it and propose asolution.

The cost of what we oen call the So-mali Crisis is so massive in scope, sodevastating to human life and mate-

rial resources that it is nothing shortof a catastrophe. However, its cease-lessness and tedious repetition in themedia for nearly a quarter of a cen-tury (1990-2013) no longer shocks oroutrages people. Somalis experienceit as an inescapable and irresolvableexistential curse. Americans and Eu-ropeans view it as a stubborn, banal,

but distant problem. Politicians whowant to project an image of eectiveand compassionate leadership nd itas an inconvenient thorn that does not

go away.

Key political actors in Somali soci-ety comprised mostly of warlordsand dollar-lords - some of them un-deservedly anointed as presidents,prime ministers, ministers, or gover-nors - do not take the kind of cautiousand deliberate thought as academicsdo. They act instinctively and quick-ly in pursuit of personal power andwealth at the expense of their peo-

ple, including members of their clanwhom they use as fodder and footsoldiers in their ascent to power. Theypractice winner-takes-all strategy and

seldom hold prisoners - they quicklykill their opponents, real or imagined.

Dierent and highly costly inter-ventions were aempted to restorepeace and order in Somalia sincethe collapse of the military regimein 1991. The United Nations and theUnited States sent peacekeeping andthen peace-enforcing forces includ-ing UNOSOM 1, Operation ProvideRelief, Operation Restore Hope, andUNOSOM II. These interventionsmostly failing and ending with frus-

tration, aention and energy shiedto reconciliation conferences. Theseconferences too did not bring aboutthe intended outcome.

These interventions did not workmainly because they relied on top-down approach. The peacekeepingor peace-making missions used for-eign forces and well equipped armiesto enforce peace and order. The rec-onciliation conferences held in plush

hotels abroad focused on reconcilingwarlords and politicians who werethe primary impediment to peace inSomalia. The peacekeeping and rec-onciliation conferences also sought tore-establish the awed, unitary, andcentral state- inherited from colonialrule, presided over by corrupt elite,and proven unsuitable to Somalis byculture and experience.

Not equal amount of investment andaention was given to boom-up ap-

proach in Somalia (i.e. the formerItalian colony). Numerous studiesand common sense arm the ecacyof solving human problems by en-couraging and building on successesand inner resources of people whilehelping those unable to aain suchsuccesses and garner their resources.Somaliland and Puntland has shownthe value of boom-up approach notonly with regard to cost eciency butalso sustainability of solution. Dura-

ble solution comes when people par-ticipate in the search for solution andown the outcome. Perhaps the Afri-can Union Mission (AMISOM) may

do beer than earlier peacekeepingeorts. But one cannot nd lastingreassurance that Al-Shabaabhas beenpushed out of Mogadishu or other ar-eas so long as we remain xated onre-inventing the awed state by su-percial change of its names (e.g. call-ing it federal when it is still unitaryand centralized) or by changing lead-ers (be they colonels, religious lead-ers, or professors) when the systemof corruption, inequity, and injusticeprevails.

The authors of the articles presentedin this issue of the International Com-mentarydescribe well these and manyother problems causing torment andturmoil in Somalia. But they go fur-ther than that: they also proposevaluable lessons and solutions to thespecic topics of their specialty andchosen topic.

Obviously, the kind of analyses andproposed solutions presented here

do not directly change the world, butthey educate and inform, seedingmore ideas, beer decisions, and serv-ing as prelude to constructive action.That in itself is a signicant contribu-tion, the best one can hope for analy-ses and recommendations. Therefore,I congratulate the authors and the in-stitution that published their valuablearticles.

Prof. Hussein A. Bulhan


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CLAN AND STATE

POLITICS INSOMALIABetween local governance and federalism, international actors and pirates.

The tree of life, long before being anAmerican lm released in 2011 fromdirector Terrence Malick, was a shortlm shot in Somalia in 1987, by So-mali writer and director Abdulka-dir Ahmed Said. The title in Somaliis Geedka nolosha. Confronted with aharsh environment, the Somali pasto-ralist nomads the great majority ofthe population - can only make theirlife sustainable and self-sucient byrespecting the load capacity of their

land. They constantly negotiate withtheir ecosystem the level of exploit-able stock on the basis of its regen-erative capacity, a shiing threshold,vertically and horizontally, that re-sults in severe diet restrictions andnomadism. The lm, environmental-ly conscious, portrays like in a loom-ing scenario, an unsustainable woodcuing practice under the pressureof only implied new stringent forces.The tree that sustains life itself, and inSomali culture represents also a sym-

bolic space for traditional powers as-sembly, is eventually chopped down.All this mercilessly leads to the deser-tication and disorientation of the no-madic culture.

In 1991, 4 years aer the release ofthe lm, Somalis experienced thecollapse of their state, the end of thedictatorship and the outbreak of oneof the most devastating civil wars theAfrican continent has ever witnessed.

In the vacuum le over by the old re-gime, warlords, clans, sub-clans andIslamist movements took to the oorin an apparently never ending ght

for power and resource control. Eve-rybody was opposed to everybodyin a looting practice and claim forlegitimacy over the remains of theState itself, its capital town and theneighbouring area. The dismissal ofa tyranny does not compare with thechopping down of a symbolic tree, allthe more if the bulwark of such state-hood laid in oppression and death.But, it is also true that the authori-tarian rule, ever since the bloodless

coup, had managed to accommodatecompeting clans claims and rivalries,or at least to constrict them at a sub-merged level. Only the Ogaden war(1977) unveiled political cleavages.

Western analysis and perceptions re-gard the collapse of Siyad Barres au-tocracy as a suitable example of statefailure. But, one should rst wonderif a functioning state, as tested againsta western model, has ever actually

been in place in Somalia. Although 21

years of rm state control can contra-dict this interpretation, the followingevents and dynamics reveal that theregime itself was siing on the lid ofa Pandoras box, whose evils existedwell before 1969. Due to irresponsi-

ble policy, power greed and corrup-tion, those plagues and diseases keptgrowing during the scientic social-isms interlude, with far-reaching con-sequences that were to be seen in theaermath of its crumble.

Ever since imperial partition, withan exception made for the Dervishstate/movement at the beginning of

the 20th century, the Somali nationhas witnessed season aer seasonof an alternation of elites in the rul-ing role over it - a common destinyfor many peoples similarly aected

by the scramble for Africa. It was theFrench, British and Italian colonialrulers rst, the Fascist state later, andthe British protectorate and the Ital-ian trust territory aer WWII. Thisforeign rule lasted until 1960, when apower transition to an indigenous oli-

garchy occurred. A new elite startedto administer the freshly independentpolity, comprised of all its inheritedinstitutions, by mimicking structuresand forms of the previous era.

Power and access to it was pursuedas an opportunity to promote, at thestate and sub-state level, the vestedinterests of the given class and/or clanto which that elite belonged. Too oc-cupied in making a living, the major-ity of Somalis kept herding livestock,

and in some cases shing/farming,far away from such practices of patri-monialism. At the central level, an al-leged representative scheme of powermanagement, in which competingclans advocated for their factionalrights, peace, or the suspension of war

between the parties, was guaranteedthrough benets, resource partition,oppression, promotions and demo-tions. Without a doubt it was a awedsystem, which has replicated itself

ever since independence. Even at thetimes of the long and inconclusivepeace conferences, which western do-nors and horn of Africa brokers have


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hosted and nanced until recently,similar methods have remained inplace.

Basically, the imported forms of gov-ernance, while in the best professedintentions of the ruling elites hop-ing to unite and overcome commonSomali issues, proved de facto instru-mental to sowing the seeds of discordand destruction. Deluded by sup-posed clan supremacy and mobilisedalong kinship and loyalty lines, So-malis have waged wars and disputedeach other for years, in an armed con-test and political competition that hasle everybody defeated.

Going back to the question raisedabove, a Somali state, or a functioning

approximation of it, has failed to exist,maybe in the rst place, in the heartsand the minds of the Somalis them-selves, at least so far. Stateness, likeany other social construction, nds incollective experience and praxis thosefounding elements that underpin its

building up process. Such process, inthe Somali case, and in dierent de-grees in many other countries, has yetto produce the expected result, pro-vided that everybody agrees with the

wished output. In this respect, severalyears of civil war, toppled by an exac-erbated clan identity, could continueto challenge the formation of a unitedpolity above and beyond clan lines.The possibility to reverse course isremote at best. At this stage of theirhistory and development, Somaliscannot disregard their ownexperienceof western state institutions. Startingagain from scratch, with a locally de-veloped polity, reecting exclusivelytraditional knowledge and character,

would be highly improbable. The ter-tium non datur, Somalis can only goforward.

Within this framework, and in theeternal present of the globalisationera, life is dominated by the Internetand mobile phones. While politics aredominated by multilateralism, press-ing state protagonism and the marketeconomy. Nomadic ways of life andtraditional forms of power adminis-

tration are dramatically confrontedwith all this. Yet, if the most remotecamel breeder checks on his smartphone the price of the meat at the lo-

cal market in Berbera, adjustmentsand compromises over economy andpolitics are already on the way.

This issue of the International Com-mentary looks into all this and ad-dresses, among others, the on-goingstates building processes within thecountry. A rst set of contributions,reecting indigenous knowledge andunderstanding, looks at Somalia as awhole. Musau takes on the challengeto tackle the pivotal role played byclans and clannism. He maintains thatstate building momentum will largelydepend on how quickly clans and tra-ditional leaders will connect and re-late to the emerging state institutions.Odowa argues that Somali politicalleaders, historically, never possessed

a balance of vision and competencethat could prompt a message of jus-tice and unity for all. Jibrell, whilehinting at the salience of urban/ruraldimensions, expresses her warningsfor environmental degradation andresources mismanagement (charcoal).Here, as well as in the political arena,womens empowerment would becrucial.

It is within this framework that the in-

stitutional experiences of Somalilandand Puntland - in which traditionalforms of governance are tentativelyabsorbed within western models -acquire relevance. Distancing them-selves from the current South-CentralSomalia stalemate, they are oen re-ferred to as examples of what the So-mali can achieve if they are le to doit [almost] their own way, as Somaliaemeritus specialist Ioan Lewis putsit. Mingales contribution looks atwhat made Somalilands political en-

terprise a success story - at least dur-ing the peace-building phase - whilepointing out the role played by tra-ditional elders. Haji debates insteadthreats and challenges with whichthis de factostate is confronted. Tahiris much more critical, he argues thatstate-building, in contrast to peace-

building, has failed to shi Somali-land from the past Somali experience,replicating old cleavages and aws.

As far as Puntland is concerned,Farah discusses who has the legalright to sign hydrocarbon and min-eral agreements with international oil

companies, by looking at the inter-play between the Federal ProvisionalConstitution and Puntlands Stateconstitution. By doing so he providesan updated account of the state ofimplementation of Federalims in So-malia. In this respect Samantar, in hisspecially released interview, expandson some of the political and economicissues that the Federal Member Stateis currently facing. Ranging from theinviability of a political party systemto Puntlands geographical advan-tage, they constitute invaluable in-sights from within a still feeble butemerging political order.

From an international perspective in-stead, Somalia acquires relevance inother regards than those thus far in-

troduced. At the United Nations andAfrican Union level, interventionsare mostly inspired by a security/waron terroragenda that oen fails to re-alise the complexities at stake. In hiscontribution de Gury, aer havingreviewed the role of international andregional organizations, calls aentionto local traditions and values, as guid-ing principles of their interventions.By the same token, piracy is anotherSomali plague whose root causes

have oen been overlooked. In hercontribution, Sterzi extensively dis-cusses counter-piracy strategies, costsand approach, as well as the legal im-plications of the so calledprivatemari-time security.

As far as the humanitarian issuesare concerned, Rotellis contributiondraws aention on aid perceived im-partiality and access issues, particu-larly in South-Central Somalia. Dis-cussing engagement dilemmas with

armed non-state actors, he argues thatUnited Nations integrated missionsas mandated and implemented inSomalia may compromise the princi-pled aid in a blurring of lines betweenpolitical and humanitarian action.

Franco expands on drivers, magni-tude and main sectors of the EU co-operation eorts, including the recentSomali Compact. Along development,humanitarian and security lines, she

also looks into the EU adopted vari-able geometry approach, which al-lows for regional and non-state actorsas interlocutors. Yet, on the internal


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front and quite contradictorily, the EUpolicy towards Somali asylum seek-ers proves more and more restrictiveon the claim of a supposed internalprotection alternative. Parisciani ar-rives to this conclusion by examiningthe recent case law from the EuropeanCourt of Human Rights and other na-tional courts.

There are some notable opinions ab-sent among the addressed topics ofthis issue. Some speak for themselves,some others reect focus and time-space constraints. From South-CentralSomalia, despite numerous aempts,potential contributors have for onereason or another declined the oerto participate in the project. A fed-eral government perspective on the

very aspects introduced so far wouldhave served to complete the picture,at least the hosted debate revolvingaround state building issues. Islam, inall its declinations and implications,also remains unaddressed, in a dedi-cated article as well as marginally. Allauthors circumvented touching uponreligious issues. Commenting on that,a reputed scholar of Somali aairsstated: the topic is for sure sensitive,mostly for fear of reprisal from two

directions: the West that looks aroundfor terrorists, real or imagine, and re-ligious zealots, who take upon them-selves the roles of morality police,

judges, and executioners.

Aware of the limits of the enterprise,this issue of the International Commen-tary tries to shed some light on theon-going rebuilding eorts in Soma-lia. In the epilogue of the lm Geedkanolosha, the young nomad, lost in a bi-ological desert, comes across a small

tree from which life will regenerate.But Somali are well beyond an insti-tutional desert. It is rather what andhow many (competing) treesthey areplanting that maers today.

Michele Gonnelli


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Contribution

spp.

12-85

Our community is of peoplesincere and with great modesty

made of silken threadthey mistreat none

they live in Allahs gracethey are vulnerable to feelings

But, mind you, fools they are not

By Mohamed Ibraahim Warsame(Hadraawi), somali poet.

Even the most religious man neverabandons his clan for paradise*

Enslavement begins in fear*Somali proverbsAll translations from Somali intoEnglish by Hussein A. Bulhan,from Politics of Cain, one hundredyears of crises in somali politics andsociety, 2008

.*

*


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SOMALIA, Buur-Hakba: In a photograph taken and released by the African Union-United Nations Information Support team 28 February 2012, an elder from the town ofBuur-Hakba gestures during a meeting with Brig. Gen. Michael Ondoga, ContingentCommander for Ugandan troops serving with the African Union Mission in Somalia(AMISOM).

Photo|Albany Associates


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CLAN MOBILISATION AND CLANNISM PRESENTS STRENUOUSCHALLENGES IN THE NASCENT SOMALIA FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.REGAINING STATE BUILDING MOMENTUM IN THE COLLAPSED STATEOF SOMALIA WILL LARGELY DEPEND ON HOW QUICKLY CLANS AND

TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES CONNECT AND RELATE TO THE EMERGINGSTATE STRUCTURES AND INSTITUTIONS.

CLANS AND

CLANNISMSCONTROL OVERWEAK POLITICALINSTITUTIONS

Consultant forHuman Rights and Institutional Building

Nairobi, Kenya

by Stephen Musau

Contextual background

Although there are more issues thatunite the Somali people than just theclan aliation, over the years, clanshave become the bane of Somalia.Clans, in Somalia, are culturally aconsensual identity inherited frompatriarchal ancestors and clannism,as a political ideology, determineseverything else in the country - pow-

er, resource distribution, expansionof territory and even recruitment to

positions of inuence.1Though clansexisted even before colonialism, thecolonial institutional legacy cementedthis through the West state import,enhancing the clan divide and ruletactics.2

It is argued that whoever can claimto represent a clan in Somalia would

1 Abdi Dirshe, Manipulating clan orethnic political identity for power, August 04,2013

2 Ibid

have the right to claim some localpower and the resources that go withit.3The biggest challenge in the coun-try is therefore, the clan identity andhow to strike a balance amongst theclan interests as a resource for politi-cal power with the calls for big pow-ers to condemn the clan-based politi-cal formula currently being framed

for the federal political system.4

With

3 Faisal A. Roble, The Culture of Poli-tics: The Somali Experience May 05, 2013

4 hp://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/


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clash of clan and political identities,almost dualistic approaches are be-ing deployed to manage the clan andstate interests. Whether the SomaliaFederal Government will surmountthese forces and endeavour towardsthe making of a Somalia state is amaer of interest to many actors.5This however, does not underrate theincreasing intermarriages amongstthe Somali people, the improved life-styles and the sense of pride associat-ed with the Somalis, which came withmodernisation just like in any otherpart of the world.

The place and role of clans in theModern SomaliaThe deep divisions amongst the So-malis started from the colonial era

where international borders greatlyinuenced internal conicts leadingto intra and interstate wars due to pri-mordial clannism and sub-clannism.6Even with these divisions, the Somaliculture is still passed down orally,and in detail, from generation to gen-eration with clans and clannism de-termining ones origin, social standingand access to territory, property, and,to a large extent, power at the societal,economic and state level. The intellect

of Somali clannism is so mighty andmysterious that it is even exercisedby seasoned scholars with loyalty7, asis observed by Dr Fatuma LamunguNur.

These divisions inform the schol-arly debate as to whether clans andclannism would end up dening theembryonic Somalia Federal Govern-ment. Those interviewed grievinglyobserved that the divisive nature ofclans in the country makes it dicult

to identify the roles and functionsof the emerging state structures andorgans through the ongoing recon-struction of the Somali state, as clans

opinion/2013/10/a-new-deal-for-somalia-how-can-it-work-20131021392150694.html [accessedon 19th November 2013]

5 Dr. Fatuma Lamungu Nur, Soma-lia: Cycles of endless clan revenge to push So-malia into a deep grave, New York, USA [email protected]

6 hp://www.freerepublic.com/focus/

bloggers/2161502/posts [accessed on 7th No-vember 2013]

7 Dr. Fatuma Lamungu Nur, Soma-lia: Cycles of endless clan revenge to push So-malia into a deep grave, New York, USA [email protected]

determine and run the private sectorand businesses.8 Up to now, Soma-lia lacks prominent local voices thatare non-clanist in nature; there areno strong civil society organisationsto champion the SFG role. All of thisworks against the genuine state mak-ing process, with no political partiesto galvanise the peoples voice.

At its best, the clan works for the so-ciety- providing the required socialsecurity welfare system, and protect-ing the society members in all aspects.However at its worst, the clan leadsto conicts, bloodsheds, xenophobia,and masculine control9. It is also theclan identity that inuences the poli-tics although by itself, the clan is notthe cause of the conicts but a com-

pelling mobilization instrument withany local political actor using this togarner their support.10 This goes along way to dene and form the So-malia state, with clans being the bed-rock of Somali identity.

With the lack of any social and eco-nomic institutions beyond the clans,the political development in the coun-try ends up being controlled by twomajor clans in Somalia, which ac-

cording to the interviewees are theHawiye and the Darod. All the otherclans rally around these two for statepower and control and are followed

by the Dir, Rahanweyn, Isaaq and theDigil.11As expounded by Afyare AbdiElmi, these clans are seen as sourcesof pride with the Hawiye, Darod, Dirand Isaaq being nomadic pastoralistsand the others agro pastoralists12.

Somali clans are grouped into clanbonds or clan alliances, formed to

8 These were interviews with variouspersons of Somali origin in Nairobi on 10th No-vember 2013. The interviews were conductedwith consideration of all social science researchethics and factors.

9 Ibid10 hp://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/22/world/africa/22iht-soma-lia.4295219.html?_r=0 [accessed on 7th Novem-ber 2013]

11 Abdi Ismail Samatar, Debating So-mali Identity in a British Tribunal: The Case ofthe BBC Somali Service.

12 Afyare Abdi Elmi, Understandingthe Somalia conagration: Identity, politicalIslam and peace building, reviewed by FarahAbdulsamed July 14, 2011

safeguard the mutual interests andprotect the members of these alli-ances. Remarkably those intervieweddiscerned that the problem in Somaliamight be an oversupply of clans andsub-clannish aitudes that strugglefor power and with the Social Con-tract or xeer being the most impor-tant component that cements togethertheir alliances.13 Those outside thesealliances are considered as marginal-ised groups and are vulnerable to at-tacks by the dominant clans.

For instance, the Hawiye, which is thebig ruling clan, have several sub-clansincluding the Abgaal, Habargedir,Hawadle, Mursade, Rahwein, Mu-rule, Ajuran, and Garre among manyothers with their sub- sub- clans as

well. On the other side, the Darodhave the Harti, Marehan, and Ogadensub-clans.14 The ri between theMarehan and Ogaden over control of

Jubaland and Kismayu demonstrateshow these sub-clans struggle for pow-er, yet both support the Darod for thelarger control of the Somalia govern-ment. It is important to note that theHarti sub-clans including the Ma-

jerten control Puntland.15

On the other hand, the Dir, largely inSomaliland, mix well with the Isaaq,the Garre and the Degodia, withcloser sub-clans being the Biyamal,Gadsan, and Werdai among others.The sub-clans closer to the Isaaq in-clude Habar Awal, Habar Jalo, HabarYunis, Edigale, and Ayub among oth-ers while those closer to the Digil arethe Geledi, Shanta Aleen, Bagadi, andGarre, among others.

While most of these clans and sub-

clans are found in Somalia, largenumbers have also moved and livein Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, Yemen,the Middle East, South Asia, USA andEurope. In fact, a Somali in todayscontext can be a potential citizen ofseveral states in the Horn of Africaincluding Ethiopia, Somalia (Somali-

13 These were social interviews withvarious persons of Somali origin in Nairobi on10th November 2013. Through the interviewsconducted, the Harti are closer to the Dhulba-hante and the Wasigil while the Marehan arecloser to the Rerahmed, Bareduwal, Helwaaand Dolow who control the Getho Province.

14 Ibid15 Ibid


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land, Puntland, Jubaland and Centralregions), Kenya and Djibouti.16

There are also the Somali Bantuswho are the minority groups. Theyare largely the Mushunguli, Benadiriand Eyle. They are distinct from otherSomalis in their ethnic identity, cul-ture and traditions, and are referredto as Jerer, which literally meansthick hair.17 There are also the whiteskinned semi Arabic Somalis includ-ing the Bajun, Barawa and Yemen.Many of these are considered out-siders unless they have patrons or apatron clan that support their causefrom the large alliances.

The Baidari group with its sub-clansoccupy the north, central, and south-

ern Somalia while the Wa Goshagroup also known as the forest peopleor the Oji, largely believed to be de-scendants from Tanzanians, Mozam-

bicans, and Malawi were taken to So-malia in the 19th century during theArab slave traders. Moreover, FaisalA. Robel notes that, the Mushunguligroup have retained their Mushungu-li language while almost all the othersmaller clans have been fully assimi-lated into the local Somali communi-

ties and speak Somali language18

.

Outside Somalia, it is quite hard toseparate these clans. Despite the pre-vailing political realities, all Somalisare allowed, especially in time of waror famine, to move in and live any-where in the Somali geography. Thismeans a Hawiya clansman eeing acivil war in Mogadishu is welcome ina Darod dominated territory, thus im-plying that the Somali identity takesprimacy over clan lineage or kinship

system. Outside Somalia, they em-phasise otherness despite their in-ternal dierences of individuals orclans.19

Political institutions and how theyrelate with the clans and state poli-ciesAs recently constituted, neither Presi-dent Hassan Sheikh Mohamud northe Prime Minister, Abdi Shirdon

16 Ibid17 Ibid18 Faisal A. Roble, The Culture of Poli-tics: The Somali Experience May 05, 2013

19 Ibid

played a major role during the pastcivil wars although there are simmer-ing tensions.20 The President is fromthe Hawiye clan and the Prime Min-ister Shirdon is from the MarehanDarod clan, with almost 60% to 40%representation respectively.21

With a bicameral parliament com-posed of an upper and lower house,with 54 and 275 representatives re-spectively, the SFGs main agenda isto advance national reconciliation,anti-corruption measures, socio-eco-nomic and security sector reformsin Somalia; although formation ofthe upper house is still pending. Theparliamentarians are nominated bythe clans themselves and are beingviewed as more representative than

the previous ones.22

Regreably, Somalia has never hadcross-board social, economic and po-litical institutions. The presidentspolitical party, the Peace and Devel-opment Party (PDP) is new and hasdicultly being marketed across thecountry with the SFG still being a pro-visional government. The SFG has ade facto control over Mogadishu andparts of the South including Baidoa,

Baladwein, Murku, Afgooye, Mercaand Barawe and it is still dependenton foreign troops to keep its enemiesat bay.23

What ought to be appreciated isthat the SFG cannot stabilise Soma-lia through military measures alonenor can it impose peace. Nationwideprocesses of negotiations with the tra-ditional authorities and clan leaders,while providing options for powersharing with other political forces,

could lead to improved governance, ifonly Somalis take lead in these proc-esses.

Even with this however, federalismwith clannism remains a hard mixwhen it comes to reconciling dierentpositions on the devolution of power

20 h t t p : / / u k . r e u t e r s . c o m / a r t i -cle/2013/11/12/uk-somalia-politics-idUKBRE-9AB11F20131112 [accessed 19th November2013]

21 These were interviews with variouspersons of Somali origin in Nairobi on 11th No-vember 2013.

22 Ibid23 Ibid

with all sub-clans ghting to be closeto either the Hawiye or Darod. Thus,political clannism still remains a de-mon that requires to be exorcised forSomalia to score high on economicdevelopment, health, education andother scientic achievements.

Clannism has also aected the re-cruitment and loyalty of the Somalisecurity forces.24 According to thelast UN report on Somalia, the forcescontinue to face signicant logisticalchallenges25. President Hassan calledon the UN to support the Somalia Na-tional Army and AMISOM as the Al-Shabaab had been driven back but isyet to be vanquished26. The involve-ment of AMISOM under the AU, theUN, IGAD, the League of Arab States,

and the World Bank among others,with no clear division of responsi-

bilities or lead actors, presents a hugechallenge and more so if they engagedierent contacts on the ground. Theoverlapping roles of AU and UN re-main unclear.

The impact of the United NationsAssistance Mission for Somalia (UN-SOM), that was formed on 3rd June2012, with a wide mandate that in-

cluded- providing policy advice tothe SFG and AMISOM on peace build-ing and state building in the areas ofgovernance, security sector reformand rule of law is yet to be felt. Theabsence of domestic political institu-tions coupled with no capacity to sup-port comprehensive transitional jus-tice processes and how these wouldrelate with the clans, is constrainingthe much-needed state building proc-ess.

A changing Somalia with unclearstate policiesWith centralists, federalists and clandivisions in Somalia, it remains di-cult to establish a unied approach togovernance. The SFG faces a myriadof challenges with minimal abilities

24 hp://www.shebacss.com/docs/poeyh001-09.pdf [accessed on 7th November2013]

25 hp://www.un.org/ga/search/view_

doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/239 [accessed on 19thNovember 2013]

26 hp://www.somalicurrent.com/2013/10/30/un-security-council-to-hold-a-special-session-on-somalia/ [accessed on 19thNovember 2013]


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to assert its monopoly of violence andtherefore its authority, hence inu-encing its state policies. The limitedpolicy options SFG has could appeardualistic or even multilateral in ap-proach, to manage those with central-ised unied interests, federal interestsand those purely protecting clan in-terests irrespective of the system ofgovernment in place.27

This has been a delicate move to en-sure that the state functions while atthe same time wooing the divergentinterests to blend and connect withthe emerging structures and policiesof the State. This presents a seriouschallenge as the lacuna, that was cre-ated since the state collapsed in 1991,led to an emergence of various clan

led structures. The clans through theirtraditional authorities organised andprovided the necessary services suchas security, devoid of the state infra-structure.

With the Hawiye clan alliances domi-nating the central, south and thegreater Mogadishu in support of aunitary Somalia, the Darod clan alli-ances, that dominate Puntland and

Jubaland (Kismayu), being strong

proponents of federalism, and the Dirdominating Somaliland and Galmu-dug regions, the uncertainty of thestate policies remain conspicuous.

These dierences are clear and denewhat Somalia is today despite the pre-vailing cyphers of tranquillity underthe SFG. Divided views still remain

between those who support a strongunitary Somalia state and those thatfear a centralised government would

be dominated by a single clan or a

group of clans.28 The impact of thisuncertainty of state policies has keptthe Somali population in conditionsof abject poverty, disease, starvationand irredeemable mental slavery, anissue that ought to be of great concernto the international community.

27 Interviews with various persons of

Somali origin in Nairobi on 11th November2013

28 hp://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/speeches/2013/hogendoorn-security-and-governance-in-somalia.aspx [ ac-cessed on 8th November 2013]

Extension of clan supremacy in theregion

In the last few months Mandera andWajir counties in Kenya have expe-rienced bloody clan wars piingthe Garre, a sub clan that supportsHawiye against Degodia, a Dir subclan, which does not support Darodor Hawiye in Somalia. Wajir has theDegodia, Ogaden and Ajuran Somalisub-clans and Mandera has the Garre,Degodia, Murule and others normallycalled the Corner Tribes.29

These clan feuds can be traced wayback to even before Kenya becamean independent state. The dominantclans in these two Kenyan counties,the Degodia in Wajir face o with the

Garre and Marehan, the dominantHawiye sub-clans in Mandera fromElwak to Liboi. The minority clansin these two Kenyan counties aredisgruntled and frustrated as the bigclans use violence to sele old scores.

It is interesting to note that, Mr.Ahmed Mohamed alias Madobe, anOgaden clan leader was elected tolead the Jubaland and is alleged to

be closer to both Ethiopian and Ken-

yan authorities than the SFG.30

One ofthose interviewed stated that Ahmedrefused to meet the SFG per an AddisAbaba Negotiation Agreement andKenya and Ethiopia are in supportof the Jubaland Ogaden leadershipdespite Ethiopia having had, whatwas seen as, a disparaging role in thegreater Somalia since 2006 leading tothe Transitional Federal Government.

Further, many Somalis do not seeOgadens as pure Somali citizens but

believe them to have strong linksand connections to the clan wars asthey seek their federal Jubaland statewithin Somalia. The Ogaden area isstill a contested region between thegreater Somalia and Ethiopia; moreso as the region has signicant secu-rity interests in Somalia, and immedi-ate neighbours like Djibouti, Ethiopiaand Kenya.

According to the UN Monitoring

29 These were interviews with variouspersons of Somali origin in Nairobi on 11th No-vember 2013.

30 Ibid

Group, and as a sign of the extensionof clan supremacy, the Kenyan-So-mali politicians and Kenyan militaryocers have allegedly been earninglarge amounts of money from trade,including illegal charcoal31, passingthrough Kismayu, although those in-terviewed could not deny or armthese allegations. Moreover, the Kis-mayu area is alleged to have oil andnatural gas deposits.

Further north in the Horn of Africa,Djibouti a former French colony is apeaceful country. The country playeda key role trying to restore the Somalistate aer the 1991 collapse and stillmaintains close ties with Somalia al-

beit with Kenyan and Ethiopian closecontacts. Also, due to the instability

that had existed in the South and Cen-tral Somalia, many Somalis moved toDjibouti from Mogadishu, Baidoa,and Beletweyne and went into busi-ness there. They remain concernedwith what happens in Somalia.32

Puntland remains an autonomousregion although it does not seek out-right independence from Somalia de-spite having its President, Abdirah-man Mohamud Farole. Some of those

interviewed alleged that PresidentHassan Sheikh Mohamud is being ac-cused of changing the provincial con-stitution in favour of centralism withPuntlands President Faroles calcula-tive inuence, an issue also alleged byFaisal A. Roble.33

It can be argued that the divisions seenamongst the clans in Somalia, just likemany other African tribes, are largelyinuenced by the close contacts somemaintain with the former colonies;

notwithstanding, external identitiesthat were imposed on the Somali na-tion since 1884s scramble for Africa.This is an issue that permanently ap-portioned dierent Somali clans andgeographies to dierent competingEuropean and Ethiopian colonial

31 hp://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/sc11121.doc.htm [accessed on 28thOctober 2013]

32 Interviews with various persons ofSomali origin in Nairobi on 10th November2013

33 Faisal A. Roble, The Culture ofPolitics: The Somali Experience, May 05, 2013(accessed on 18th November 2013)


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powers and have not changed,34henceextending to the whole region.

Options for eective management ofpublic aairs for a beer SomaliaSomalia remains a country with higheconomic potentials with its extendedcoastal strip but SFG policies remainfar removed from the people due tothe extensive divisions and interests.A lack of integration of the militiagroups and low levels of awarenesscombined with high levels of broker-age of state processes, limits the statepotentials.

Property ownership, trade and busi-nesses with the State, military andeconomic aid to the SFG regime allpresent grounds for deepened nego-

tiations with the clan and traditionalauthority leaders. The challengesfor the SFG are far too many to sur-mount, especially, as there is a lackof clear state policies and guidelineson engagements and militias still act-ing as go-betweens, specically fromMogadishu to Kismayu.

However, due to the potentials thatSomalia has, the international com-munity quickly recognised the new

government and in September 2013,the US pledged about $2.5 billion ina New Deal conditioned on greatertransparency and governance re-forms.35 If allocated eciently, thismoney could be a boon to the coun-try and its people. Nonetheless, manyalready feel le out of the state proc-esses and nd that the policies are notpermiing people to engage despitetheir wiliness to do so.

Further, a lot of taxes and fees on trade

transiting through ports and airportsin Somalia are not accounted for dueto corrupt ocials, businessmen, andthe local clan powers. Much of whatthese ports and airports generate isnot known or documented36 despiteMogadishu slowly stabilising itselfwith thousands of diaspora residentsreturning to do business.

34 Ibid35 hp://www.crisisgroup.org/en/pub -lication-type/speeches/2013/hogendoorn-secu-rity-and-governance-in-somalia.aspx [accessedon 5th November 2013]

36 ibid

The new UNSOM, working closelywith AMISOM and the Somali Na-tional Army (SNA), could transformSomalia if the clan militia are also in-tegrated, engaged and convinced ofwhy a strong Somalia is benecial toall devoid of Islamic fundamentalismespecially in Mogadishu, Afgooye,Baidoa, Merca and Kismayu.37

Many of those interviewed observedthat with this, those strong willedand bend to liberate Somalis need not

be trapped into the Hawiye clan, theDarod clan, the Dir clan, and the Isaaqor Rahanweyn clan.38 Rather, theyshould be able to nd avenues wherethe sub-clans elect their representa-tives into the SFG structures at thedistricts, divisions, locations and sub-

location levels while also integratingthe militias.

A preferred view would be what hasbeen tried and tested in Somaliland.This could as well have been triedand tested in a Somalia devoid of thetop-down centralized conceptions ofthe state. The centralised governancesystem is hard to sell in Somalia for itdoes not easily accommodate the un-centralised and localised boom-up

style which Somalis have got used toover the years.

A federal democratic style will have toemerge from the clans were decision-making processes which have beenfollowed in Somaliland, with promis-ing results so far, could as well be ap-plied, while allowing more room forhome grown paerns of governanceto emerge, hence forming the Somalistate.

ConclusionSomalia remains an extremely poor,weak and fragile country. With theSFG still generating very few of itsown resources, and with entrenchedclans and clannism in control of themeans of revenue generation, thus,the state needs continued support.Prioritisation of nation-wide nego-tiations on the type of federalismthat the SFG could implement whileaccommodating the centralists, fed-

37 Ibid38 hp://www.wardheernews.com/tribute-to-the-mighty-genius-of-somali-clann-ism/ [accessed on 8th November 2013]

eralists and clans interests would beimportant. Incongruent policies tomanage many diverse interests wont

be sustainable in the long run.

To avoid this approach, the federalsystem remains the hard path to fol-low with integration of the militiainto the state system and structures,and with the sub-clans having theirrepresentatives in the deepened andfurther devolved Federal System.The formulae to share power fromthe centre, where the presidencyand the prime ministry is, with theperipheries, where the clans and tra-ditional leaders are, should keep on

being sought; with recognition andappreciation of the divergent views

being presented by those supporting

a centralised and unied Somalia andthose supporting a federalised systemwith the recognition of the clan inter-ests, to avoid further conicts.

The long journey should be made bySomalis, with the necessary supportfrom the international community.This should be emboldened with av-enues towards national security andeconomic justice in identied areas,

both in the urban and rural areas. Of

much importance is the restructur-ing of the relationship of the rest ofSomalia with Mogadishu as the capi-tal city and creation of urban centresthat could serve as pillars of the newSomalia to aract investments and in-vestors.


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Once one of Mogadishus most luxurious hotels, the Al-Uruba lays in ruins aertwo decades of civil war. Though building work in Mogadishu is on the rise, it maystill be several years before many of the citys buildings will be restored

AU-UN IST Photo|Tobin Jones


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SOMALI LEADERS, IN ADVANCING THEIR PERSONAL INTERESTS, KEEPCREATING POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CRISES BY EXPLOITING AND MISUSINGTHE DIVISIVE FACE OF THE CLAN. POWER AND WEALTH GREEDINESS, ASULTIMATE GOALS OF POLITICAL ACTION, SEEM TO CONTINUE TO THISDAY IN SOMALIA, WITH NO LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE PAST HISTORY.

WHAT CAN

CURRENT LEADERSIN SOMALIA LEARNFROM THEIR PASTHISTORY?

DirectorObservatory of Violence and Conflict Prevention

Hargeisa, Somaliland

by Abdullahi Mohammed Odowa

Leadership in the Somali Context

Since pre-1991 history of Somaliland,

when it was tied either wholly or partiallywith the former Somali Democratic Re-public and the regions shared a commoncultural heritage, can the terms Somaliaand Somali be said to encompass bothSomaliland and Somalia.

Inspired by the Danish philosopherSoren Kierkegaar who said We un-derstood life only backwards; but itmust be lived forward and the So-mali poet Cabdiqaadir Shube who

wrote Taariikhda dib u eega waa lagadab qaataaye which when translatedreads you revisit the history as itprovides light to the way forward,

I was encouraged to look briey at

several past eras of Somali history inorder to beer understand the lessonsthat they may hold for the countrystraditional and political leaders today.In seeking to undertake any examina-tion of Somali history it is importantto keep in mind the words of Dr. Hus-sein A. Bulhan who wrote in his bookPolitics of Cain: One Hundred Yearsof Crises in Somali Politics and Soci-ety that:

Inquiry into Somali politics and history,full of peril and pain, is in some respectsakin to an onion. As you peel each layer,you shed tears. That indeed has been my

experience in writing Politics of Cain.

As I wrote about the disaster of decades,I could not help but grieve the loss of lifethat Somalis could prevent if they intel-ligently analyzed their predicament andgarnered that will to change their self-destruction behaviour.(2008 p.15)

This important work together withothers such as Cost of Dictatorship,Geing Somalia Wrong: Faith War andHope in a Shaered State, Somalia a Na-tion Without a State, Somali Phoenix

and Understanding the Somalia Cona-gration, which I read in preparationfor this paper, do much to highlightthe toxic mix of rivalry, conict, de-


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struction, displacement and faminethat have characterized recent Somalihistory in order to create what somehave described as the worst humani-tarian crises in the modern history.However, while much aention has

been given in these and other studiesto the issues of poverty, illiteracy, re-ligious extremism and clanism as theroot causes and drivers of Somaliasmisfortunes, there has been lile simi-lar aention given to the issue of lead-ership in helping to shape this history.

This article will argue that historicallySomalia and its citizens have neverhad the type of leaders who possesseda balance of vision, competence andpower to successfully promote amessage of justice, unity and hope.

Rather, the evidence will suggest thatthe experience in Somalia has beenof leaders at the local, regional andnational level frequently choosing totake advantage of opportunities toadvance personal and clan interests ina manner that has resulted in conict,corruption, weak institutions and so-cial fragmentation.

The Colonial EraBeginning in the late 19th Century,

during the Scramble for Africa fol-lowing the 1884 Berlin Conference,it is with lile surprise that interestturned towards Somalia given its stra-tegic location along the approach tothe Suez Canal. However, while pow-ers including the Ooman Empire,Egypt, Italy, France and Abyssinia alldisplayed an interest in occupying So-mali soil, it was the periodic interven-tion of the British Empire that checkedor else limited these ambitions (Lewis2002, 42).

According to Lewis this interest by theBritish in preventing the occupationof Somalia by a rival power stemmednot from any sensitivity to the desiresof the Somali people but was ratherdriven by a desire to maintain thesupply of meat from Somaliland to itsforces stationed in Aden (pp. 40-41).It was during this time that the Brit-ish Somaliland protectorate was es-tablished through a series of treaties

that included promises of protectionbetween the British Empire and localclans living in the region in order tosecure a supply market, check the

trac in slaves, and to exclude the in-terference of foreign powers. (Sama-tar 1989, p. 31)

Nevertheless, it is worth noting thateven in the event of a successful oc-cupation by these powers the im-pact on Somalia and its developmentwas in fact limited. it was during the

brief period of Egyptian rule over thecoastal towns of Somaliland, from1870-1884 that, some developmentalprojects were implemented that in-clude improvement of port facilitiesin Zeila and Berbera, erection of piersand lighthouses, restoration of theancient Dubar channel that suppliesfresh water to the town of Berbera,and the building of new mosques (pp.43-44).

Although the British presence wasminimal in Somaliland, the agree-ments it made with local leadershelped to fuel the anger of the famousSomali Dervish Mohammed Abdul-lah Hassan, who objected to any for-eign, particularly Christian, presencein Somalia. Following Dervish raidson clans in Somaliland between 1900and 1920 the British fought a series ofve military campaigns that resulted

in the destruction of the Dervish Stateand direct British rule over the region.It was the failure of traditional Somalileaders in this region, who at the timewere divided into ve major camps- Ise, Gadabursi, Habar Garhajis,Habar Awal and Habar Tol Jaalo - toeectively negotiate with the Britishcolonial to either support local socialand economic development or to al-low other foreign power to have ac-cess to Somali land and resources.They neither served as an intermedi-

ate between the British Empire andDervish insurgency nor stopped thewar and its impact.

Events thatimpacted Events Leadingto UnicationFollowing the conclusion of the Sec-ond World War, the increasing levelsof contact between Somali communi-ties across the Horn of Africa region,resulting from the travels of membersof the elite, merchants and soldiers

serving with British forces, saw thespread of nationalist thought and ide-as of pan-Somali unity (Bulhan 2008,p. 46).

In the region of British Somalilandthese ideas continued to grow anddeveloped throughout the period ofthe 1950s with the result that all reg-istered political parties were eventu-ally able to agree, in principal, to theidea of unication with the formerregion of Italian Somaliland, whichat the time was administered as aUnited Nations Trust Territory (Lewis2002, p. 155). However, even at thistime it was obvious that this enthusi-asm for unication failed to produceany meaningful debate or discussionregarding the timing and conditionsunder which this would occur.

This failure by the political and tra-ditional leadership of Somalilandwas famously discussed by Mr. Umar

Arte Qalib in an interview with theBBC Somali Service1. Mr. Qalib toldthe BBC that, in April 1960, followingthe passing of a resolution by the Leg-islative Council of British Somalilandrequesting not only independence butalso union with the Trust Territory ofSomalia.

Nevertheless, following the grantingof independence by Britain the rstmeeting of the Somaliland Legisla-

tive Council sent a telegram to theircounter-parts in the newly independ-ent Somali Republic requesting theunconditional unication of thesetwo countries. Although Abdulla Os-man, the head of the parliament ofthe Somali Republic had previouslywelcomed this very idea, there wasno ocial response to this message.Instead, a delegation led by Dr. Mo-hamed Sheikh Gabyow, at that timethe Minister of Constitutional Aairsand supported by an Italian lawyer,

was sent to Hargeisa where they metwith the Somali Ocials Union head-ed by Umar Arte.

According to Arte, the Somali O-cials Union, although not the rulingparty in Somaliland, was held in re-spect among the community as wellas the former Colonial authorities.This meeting between the delegation

1 The recorded interview of Mr. Qalib

was given to the BBC Somali Section during aBBC series of programmes featuring SomaliHistory. He gave this interview during session4 of the series that focused on the events thatled to the Unication of British Somalilandwith Italian Somaliland.


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from the Somali Republic and the So-mali Ocials Union saw a proposalput forward whereby the positions ofPresident and Prime Minister would

be shared. In other words if the Presi-dent was from Somalia, the PrimeMinster should come from Soma-liland and vice versa. Additionally,each side would be awarded equalnumbers of parliamentary seats,shared ministerial positions, sharedcontrol of the armed forces as well asan agreement that in the event thatone side had the national capital ofthe new country, the capital of theother should be host to consulatesfrom foreign countries.

However, the proposal did not lastlong and when the delegation from

the Somali Republic met with the So-maliland Parliament the members ofthis institution insisted on an immedi-ate and unconditional union of thesetwo newly independent countries.

Although it is impossible to try andpredict the outcome of future nego-tiations, had the recommendations ofthe Somali Ocials Union been sup-ported by the members of the Soma-liland Parliament, the occasion of the

union of an independent Somalilandwith the newly established Republicof Somalia, once again demonstratesa lack of foresight and unity amongleaders in Somaliland. Whatever themerits or shortcomings of the propos-al by the Somali Ocials Union therush to push for immediate unica-tion without any meaningful negotia-tions or debate within the SomalilandParliament resulted in unity on un-equal terms for Somaliland. Follow-ing unication, politicians from other

regions of Somalia worked togetherto take the positions of President andPrime Minister as well as other keycabinet positions at the expense ofrepresentation for the region of Soma-liland (Bulhan 2008, p. 59).Leadership Crises in the First Gov-ernment of Somalia (1960)The long period of colonization anddomination at the hands of foreignpowers had created a strong de-sire among all Somali people for a

strong and prosperous Greater So-malia [Somali: Soomaaliweyn] lead-ing to great expectations and hope

being placed on the newly unied

republic. However, these hopes werequickly dashed as the new politicalelite actively engaged in nepotism,corruption, injustice and the the ofgovernment resources (Elmi, 2010, p.20). With the initial wave of national-ist euphoria quickly dissipating, thefamous Somali poet Ahmed IsmailDiiriye (Qaasim) wrote:

Isma doorin Gaalkaan diriyo,daarta kii galayeDusha midabka Soomaalidaad,dugul ka mooddaayeMisna laguma diirsado qalbiga,waa dirkii Karale.

Nothing changed with thewhite man I rejected, and withthose who replaced him

In surface appearance, Soma-lis, black in color they lookBut they bring misery to theheart, being the ospring ofCarroll2

Another popular poem by the lateHaji Aadam Af-Qalooc voiced disap-pointment with the incompetence ofthe leadership of the rst Somali civil-ian government in the 1960s writing:

Halmaan bay ahayd darajaduyekuma habooneyn

It was mistake to honour them,as they are incompetent tolead3.

While it is important to recognise that

2 Ahmed Ismaiil Diiriye, also knownas Qaasim, is well-known Somali poet. Hecomposed this poem in 1964 to express hisdisappointment with the Somali post-colonialleaders and how the colonial system remainedunchanged with the exception that white co-lonial masters been replaced by local blackSomalis with a white mans mentality. Qaasimreferred in his poem to a British man calledCarroll who represented the Queen duringthe transfer of power from British authority toSomalis.

3 The original Somali poem is quotedfrom the Book entitled HOGGAAMIYE IS-BEDDEL HORSEEDA by Saciid Cali Shire,2009, Buuh Consulting LTD. Haji Aaden Af-Qaloof was a well- known Somali poet andIslamic Scholar who through his wisdom criti-cised the clanism, nepotism and bad leadership

in the Somali content. His poem underscorespublic dissatisfaction with performance of therst leaders of Somali aermath of the indepen-dence.

in the years immediately followingindependence and unication someprogress was made in terms of build-ing the state and its institutions, theseeorts were limited in their eective-ness due to the actions of leadersmore interested in enriching them-selves and spending public resourcesextravagantly rather than addressingthe growing public disappointment(Bulhan, 2008, p. 61). These problemswith corruption, as well as issues ofclan representation in politics, wouldpresent an on-going problem for theSomali Republic until Major GeneralMohamed Siad Barre overthrew it on21 October 1969, following the assas-sination of President Abdirashid AliShermarke in the town of Las Anod.

New Era of Dictatorship in Somalia(1969-1991)The assassination of President Ab-dirashid Ali Shermarke by one of his

bodyguards had the eect of creat-ing an unexpected power vacuum asthe Prime Minister was away at theUnited Nations headquarters in NewYork. The Prime Minister was help-ing to ght for the rights of the Pal-estinian people, as well as advocatingfor the membership of the Peoples

Republic of China into the interna-tional organization, despite a numberof on-going crises back home includ-ing the assassination of the Presidentand the Military plan to overthrowthe civilian government.An immediate power struggleemerged behind the scenes, withinthe government and the members ofthe Somali parliament, with many op-portunistically oering their supportto the highest bidder (Bulhan, 2008, p.167). This behaviour, scandalous as it

was at the time, helped to create theongoing popular image of a Somalipolitician, whether from Somaliland,Puntland or South-Central, as beingwilling to sell his/her vote to the high-est bidder regardless of the interestsof the public.

On 21 October 1969, a coup led byMajor General Mohamed Siad Barretook power amid genuine excite-ment by the people of Somalia, who

had grown increasingly outragedover the corruption, nepotism andinjustice perpetuated by their electedrepresentatives (Bulhan 2008, p. 168).


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In addition to the popular promisesof peace and justice, the new mili-tary government also made the taskof eradicating clanism one of its ma-

jor priorities. Although the clan had,for unknown centuries, provided themost basic social institution amongthe Somali people, this was viewedas being incompatible with social-ism and the root cause of societysproblems. Speaking as the leader ofSomalia, Siad Barre argued that [t]ribalism and nationalism cannot gohand in hand it is unfortunate thatour nation is rather too clannish; if allSomalis are to go to hell, tribalism will

be their vehicle to reach there (Lewis2002, p. 22).

While the military regime, and the

Somali Revolutionary Socialist Partyit established in 1976 as the vehicle forits rule over Somalia, ocially tran-scended clan lines and preached theneed for loyalty to the state, in real-ity the practice of clanism continued.This was evident in the original com-position of the Supreme Revolution-ary Council which took over in 1969,of which, 40 percent were Daarood,the same clan as the newly retitledPresident Siad Barre. Similarly, the

membership of the later Somali Revo-lutionary Socialist Party, which alsodrew its membership heavily frommembers of the Daarood clan, practi-cally contradicts the regimes messageof equality among Somalis despitetheir clan aliation or region of ori-gin.

This inability of the Saiad Barreregime to eectively address theclanism issue, as well as the use of itsown notorious version of the KGB, the

National Security Service, turned thecountry into one large prison camp.This undermined the popular sup-port and goodwill that the govern-ment nonetheless managed to earnthrough improvements achieved invarious elds, infrastructure, educa-tion, healthcare and national militarystrength (Bulhan 2008, p. 220).Able to maintain power through acombination of clan loyalty, fear andrepression, the rst cracks in the pow-

er of the Saiad Barre were seen fol-lowing the humiliation of Somaliasdefeat in the unnecessary and badlyhandled 1977-1978 Ogaden War with

Ethiopia and in the emergence of theIsaaq dominated Somali NationalMovement during the early 1980s.Between 1986 and 1990 the regime un-leased a reign of terror against mem-

bers of the Majeerteen, the Hawiye,and Isaaq clans, which included thedeployment of its feared Red Berets(Somali: Duub Cab). As the death tollran into the thousands, and the re-gime struggled to defeat rebel forces,its support base and military positioncollapsed when the Hawiye clan -nally rose in active rebellion.However, any hope held by the peo-ple of Somaliland and other Somalisthat the fall of the dictatorship wouldlead to a more peaceful and prosper-ous Somalia soon faded away as thecountry descended into a still yet un-

nished civil war that saw the statereplaced by warlords, clan militiaand weak authorities (Harper 2012,p. 57). In Politics of Cain Bulhan aptlydescribed the cycle of hope and disap-pointment in the Somali politics thatis now repeated itself through thecivil war saying:

Oen, the leaders and the led forget af-ter victory the rhetoric of revolution andpromises of change with which the armed

struggle for liberty started. Unantici-pated problems emerge and draw aen-tion away from the realizing the promisedchange. Gradually, the old habits of mis-rule, corruption and tyranny return inimperceptible ways until they become asblatant as practices of the earlier regime,giving rise for another call for regimechange (p. 311).

What is wrong with Somali Leadersand Politics?Aer only this brief examination of

several periods of modern Somali his-tory it is clear that the country and itspeople have failed to produce leadersgenuinely capable of rising above theissues of clanism, corruption and dis-honesty in order to successfully ad-dress the numerous political, socialand economic problems facing theircommunities, regions and nation.

While some local initiatives in areassuch as Puntland, Galmugug and Xiib

& Ximan have restored a measure ofpeace and security, these initiativeshave proven far less successful andresilient than what has been achieved

in Somaliland, even though they havebeen populated by a single clan andrelated sub-clans.

It is the opinion of the author thatwhile the clan system has providedthe bedrock of Somali society it hasalso le traditional, political and reli-gious leaders ill-equipped to respondin a unied manner to shared threatsand opportunities. Unable to under-stand or reconcile their role as bothclan leaders and actors within a na-tion state, these leaders, even at timesin Somaliland, have aempted tonurture and promote clanism believ-ing that it represents a beer means

by which they can secure their ownpersonal interests. In describing howSomali politicians have gone about

encouraging clanism Bulhan (2008)notes that, [t]hey also take from theclan systems its divisive and distort-ed aspects that satisfy their greed forpower and wealth in the midst of pov-erty and misery (p.11).The failure of traditional and politi-cal leaders has also been mirrored bythe so-called educated class which,with some notable exceptions, haveaempted to exploit clan politics toassert themselves over their illiterate

and backwards countrymen for theirown political, economic and personalambitions.

Constant misuse of clan structure anddynamics by local leaders has beenexposing the ugly and divisive faceof clan system in Somalia, making itdicult for many local and interna-tional commentators in the Somaliconict and politics to understand theextent of the role of clan and clanismin Somali way of life. These issues

aside, it must be remembered thatthis same clan system has also con-tinued to provide a source of kinship,

justice and protection in the absenceof a functioning national government.Likewise, this understanding shouldalso apply to the system of Somali tra-ditional law (Somali: xeer), which alsooers a similar paradox, in that it hasprovided the benet of a social safetynet and means of support and protec-tion for members, while simultane-

ously creating poisonous and at timesviolent relationships within commu-nities and the wider society.


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ConclusionSince the 19th century, traditional,political and religious Somali lead-ers have been handicapped by theirindividual and collective inability toovercome their failure to act in unisonto address threats and opportunitiesto the Somali people, including whenthese have involved foreign pow-ers. Instead, Somalia and the Somalipeople have failed to produce leaderscapable of rising above clan politics,even when ostensibly motivated byreligion, in a manner that is not self-serving, either politically or materi-ally. There is unfortunately no ques-tion that the actions of some Somalileaders have continued to pose a chal-lenge to the creation of a functioningand viable modern state in order to

preserve clanism as an alternativeform of governance. Somalia has seenthe institutions of the modern state of-ten used to serve personal and clan in-terests rather than those of the widercommunity, making them prizes to

be fought over and captured.

In Somaliland these historic lessonswere noted by local leaders follow-ing the violence and instability thatpreceded and then continued follow-

ing the collapse of the central govern-ment, as well as the inter-clan conictthat aected the region during theearly 1990s. Through the HargeisaNational Conference, held from Oc-tober 1996 to February 1997, not onlywas peace restored, but an active ef-fort was undertaken to incorporatetraditional Somali power structureswithin a modern state, thereby avoid-ing the toxic experience of clanismexperienced in other regions of theformer Somali state. This was most

evident in the creation of a bicamerallegislature incorporating a House ofElders (Somali: Gurti) in which rep-resentatives of the clans living in So-maliland sit in addition to the electedHouse of Representatives.Even though this hybrid system ofgovernance seems to be relativelyworking for the people of Somalilandin preventing massive conict amongvarious clans living in this part of theworld, it has failed to build function-

ing institutions and state. Even aermore than two decades of relativepeace and stability in Somaliland,there does not seem to be enough to

build a functioning and viable stateinstitution, and current institutionsare coming under increasing strainas they remain awed and dysfunc-tional.

The political and social crises thathave been created by Somali leaders

by exploiting and misusing the divi-sive face of the clan, while advanc-ing their personal interest and theirgreediness for power and wealth,seem to be continuing to this daywith no lesson learned from their pasthistory. Unless Somali leaders learnand draw lessons from the past, andpractice a new way of politics that ad-vances inclusion, justice and equalityrather than distorted clanism, nepo-tism and public fund misuse, factors

which have led to Somalias currentsituation, the misery and anarchy willcontinue.

ReferencesBulhan, A. H. (2008), Politics of Cain:One Hundred Years of Crises in SomaliPolitics and Society(1st ed.), Bethesda,MA: Tayson International Publishing.

Burns, J. M. (1978), Leadership. NewYork: Harper & Row

C. Oo Scharmer (2007), Theory U,Cambridge, Massachuses: Societyfor Organizational Learning

Elmi, A. A. (2010), Understanding theSomalia Conagration: Identity, Polit-ical Islam and Peacebuilding, Oxford:Pambazuka Press

Ghalib, J. M. (2013), Somali Phoenix,self-published.

Happer, M. (2012), Geing SomaliaWrong? Faith, War and Hope in a Shat-tered State, London: Zed Books.

Hart, B. ( Eds). (2008), Peacebuildingin Traumatized Societies, Lahman. MA:University Press of America.

Lewis, I. (2002[1980]),A Modern Histo-ry of the Somali: Nation and State in theHorn of Africa, Oxford: James Currey.

Samatar, Abdi Ismail (1989), The Stateand Rural Transformation in NorthernSomalia 1884-1986, Madison: Univer-sity of Wisconsin Press

Shire, Saciid Cali( 2009), HoggaamiyeIsbeddel Horseeda,Leicester, UK: BuuhPublications.

WSP International Somali Programme(2005). Rebuilding Somaliland, Asmara:The Red Sea Press, Inc.


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Somalia, women in the rain

Beledweyne, Hiiraan, Somalia | Photo Frank Keillor


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SOMALI POLITICS

AND POWER RUNSOVER WOMEN AND

by Fatima Jibrell

Executive Directorand co-founder at ADESO

co-founder of Sun Fire Cookingand Womens Coalition for Peace

CLAN BASED GOVERNANCE IS WHAT EMERGED OUT OF 21 YEARS OF CIVILWAR. IF IN PASTORAL CONTEXTS CLAN-SHIP TRUST IS NOT QUESTIONED,IN URBAN ONES IT IS ABUSED AND MANIPULATED BY POLITICALLYAMBITIOUS MEN. WHILE INTERNATIONALS ENTER SOMALIA WITH MANYDIVERGENT AGENDAS, THE PRODUCTION OF CHARCOAL PUTS THELIVELIHOODS OF PASTORAL COMMUNITIES AT RISK. THE EMPOWERMENTOF SOMALI WOMEN WOULD PRESERVE THE ENVIRONMENT AND IMPROVEPOLITICS.

The Context/Environment

Since time immemorial, Somalis havesurvived in the Horn of Africa byherding camels, sheep, and goats.Pastoralism is their way of life andpastoral livelihoods are tied to thewellbeing of their environment. It isthe women and children who are therst casualties of its degradation andmismanagement, the luckier ones be-ing those who do make it to urban

centers, thus, dealing with displace-ment becomes a survival mechanism.

The Environment in fact is compro-

mised in various ways. The limitedtrees and shrubs that are available inthe semi-desert, which remains a pas-toral landscape, are turned into char-coal for job creation and for prot,while puing livestock and the liveli-hoods of pastoral communities at risk.Due to the inux of pastoral IDPs (in-ternally displaced peoples), cities andtowns that do not oer healthy alter-

natives become over populated andcrime remains unaended too. Thuscities become a jungle of insecurity,substandard health and hygiene fa-

cilities. As a result, rapes and killingsare not major surprise, but habitualoccurrences.

Illegal shing is one devastating ma-rine problem along the Somali coastsfacing the Indian Ocean and the RedSea, stretching over 3330 km, the long-est coastline in Africa. For the last 23years, international shing eets have

been continuously destroying reefs,using illegal methods and tools toget as much sh as possible of highlymarketable species. By doing so they

The views expressed in this contribution reect stance and political views of Fatima Jibrell and do not pretend to consti-tute a scientic analysis on the maer.

THEIR ENVIRONMENT


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destroy all marine life that their toolscatch. Artisanal shing boats are alsoaacked and their nets cut by illegalshing boats and eets. As a result,sh factories and cooling facilities inAlula, Lasqoray and Bosaso are allclosed. Mohamed Abshir Waldo, aknown Somali researcher, estimatesthat in monetary terms the income So-malia loses on illegal shing is worthmore than all donated aid receivedfrom the international communityput together.Political LeadershipSomalia is an interesting spot for di-verse international interests. Since itsindependence in 1960, it expressed anatural interest of wanting to uniteall Somali regions in the Horn. This

was a very daring policy. It set a new-ly independent Somalia against theWorld Order led by Somalias formercolonizers. Without the political back-ing of their colonial powers, Soma-lias rst Prime Minister, AbdirashidAli Sharmarke, travelled to Moscowand made a long-term pact with theformer Soviet Union. Thereaer, So-malia has been in a foreign policythat puts most of its resources in theMinistry of Defense. Aer a few wars

with Ethiopia, the economy and for-eign policy both collapsed, aectinginternal security and creating the civilwar that set one clan against the other.

Clan based governance is whatemerged out of the 21 years of civilwar. Somaliland also, using clan poli-tics, managed to progress from clanelders politics by voting throughpolitical parties for parliamentariansand a president during the last twofree elections. The newly formed So-

malia Federal Government insteadhas gained legitimacy mainly throughsupport from International Donorsand the UN despite the fact that itcontrols less than the city of Mogad-ishu. Unfortunately, internal quarrelsand ghts between the President andhis Prime Minister escalated and dis-tracted general governance and nega-tively divided the leadership.

The constitution of Somalia is in

limbo. The cabinet and Parliament inMogadishu are busy trying to changeand revamp it without public consent.On the contrary, the majority of civil

society institutions and organizedregional authorities wish to see it im-plemented. In particular, they wantthe provision of the Federations ofStates to be realized as the Constitu-tion stipulates. Federalism is a well-liked concept which people think willgive more independence to regions.Furthermore, trust has not been nur-tured and healed through eectivereconciliation.The internationals come in with manydivergent interests. Dierent interestscome in with the conicting inuencesguiding the new Somali Government.Oil exporting and importing coun-tries are united in their interest of theSomali sea lanes to be free of pirates;whereas, Somalis are more interested

in securing the safety of their shingcommunities and sh factories to beable to function and harvest enoughto keep their shing businesses aoat.Furthermore, some Gulf countrieswant to keep Somalia out of the oiland gas competition. And some of theinterested countries, upset and sur-prise the political contestations withsudden buckets of money and buythe whole political outcome for theirfavored Somali male political candi-

dates. Unfortunately, nobody dares toask questions about corruption inict-ed onto the system and about womenin particular. A few needy women arepaid pennies so they may sing for thecorrupt leaders. Women, in general,have no power and recognition with-in clan or political/religious circles.

In reality, money coming to Soma-lia through political and aid chan-nels does not trickle down enoughto the makeshi foot soldiers who

are young, naive and from pastoralenvironments. In pastoral contextsclan-ship trust is not questioned.This clan-ship calls for total trust andwillingness from male members toeven, if needed, die for ones clan allin the name of support. This trust isabused and manipulated by urban-ized and politically ambitious men.Thus, these young men are the oneswho are disoriented, confused andin military uniforms, whom one sees

displayed on streets as governmentsecurity forces. They are usually highon the stimulant kaat/mira. They of-ten have gaunt gures with wide

eyes, suppressing their hunger anddisillusionment with this drug thatnumbs them till they die of TB, AIDs,or hepatitis and similar diseases.Clan-youth are continuously pushedto cities due to environmental de-struction. Thus, these pastoral clans-men are a ready pool for hire trick-ling to towns in search of livelihoods.

Women and their children as well asthousands of unaccompanied chil-dren, the elderly and the challengedare negatively aected by this politi-cal upheaval that created warlord-likegovernance. They are le for womento protect and fetch for. Women andthe family members under their care,in these horrible situations, are vul-nerable, scaered, exposed and ex-

perience rape over and over againdue to non-existent aention, care oreven human sympathy. They live inopen spaces or old and broken downgovernment buildings. Yet these, socalled shelters of the poor, are the rstto be pulled down by governmentforces for security or money-makingschemes, without considering thehuman lives that call these placeshome. These families are environ-mental IDPs displaced by repetitive

droughts, insecurity or due to thefact that their pastoral land is usedfor charcoal harvesting, that is in the

business of snatching limited forestsand shrubs used by livestock that sus-tained families livelihoods. Rich menin charcoal trade are shipping fromSouth Somalia and Central regions tothe Middle East, in particular Dubai.

Northern Somalia, nearly a desert, isalso crippled by charcoal harvestingfrom very limited trees and shrubs

used for cooking energy in urban cent-ers. The majority of charcoal tradersare women trying to raise their chil-dren and care for their extended fam-ilys unwanted members. These wom-en traders use pastoral youth laborthat are already internally displacedin urban centers. This activity is im-poverishing pastoral livelihoods andis creating the fastest growing desert.

Somali Women in this context

The Somali constitution stipulatesthat women must receive 30% of allpolitical and non political posts of-fered by Somali Governance at Lo-


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cal, Regional and National level. Yetwomen leadership has been derailedfrom fair political participation; eventhough, the constitution dictates thatless than 30% of women in Parliamentmakes it unconstitutional. Unfortu-nately, the United Nations PoliticalOce for Somalia, who was the mainreferee in this regard, was unable tokeep the constitutional promise. Theproportion of women members inMogadishu Parliament remains atonly 12%, less than half of their quota.

With the funding and advice of In-ternational Community, this proc-ess further developed along the em-

braced direction, with the status quoaccepted and justice compromised.The watchdogs, the Somali- political

patriarchs, exposed their intent. Theynever wanted to include women indecision making nor in managementpositions of big companies and busi-nesses, including political power thatowns and gets contracts; wheelingand dealing of power is dealt hereand only in this way. It is also dicultto nd professional women workingin other sectors including contracts,transport, communication and moneytransfers, despite the fact that women

are the biggest users of telephone com-panies and money transfer services.Women are less empowered becauseof their limited access to education,their service-giving role and lack ofcollective organizational institutionsand inputs from donor community, aswell as disinterest of highly educatedwomen to join politics. Consequently,Somali women are le being behind.

If the international communitystrengthens their support for women

and add their voices to the presentfemale campaign, that is trying their

best to achieve 30% of representativeseats, a greater number of women will

be encouraged to join, for example,the newly forming Puntland Parlia-ment. This will precipitate to other re-gional and national governments thatmay get formed and include greaterparticipation of women.

Womens groups who are interested

in political participation and advo-cacy are all nancially unable to paywhat is required to overcome thispolitical struggle such as lobbying ex-

penses including oce space, trans-port, media and most of the capitalneeded to involve the clan elders, alsoknown as Sultans, Garads, Malaaqsand so on. The selection of a parlia-mentarian is done by clan leaders andclan leaders are not given any allow-ances by known institutions, they aregenerally opportunistic and ask for ahigh price when the time comes fortheir services to be used. As a maerof fact, the President is voted for bythe members of Parliament. The Par-liament also votes for the formation ofthe Presidents Cabinet.1This is a bigopportunity for those who allow theirvote to be bought. Therefore, it is verydicult and in fact almost impos-sible for women to join such a hugeold boys club where money is eas-

ily exchanged for favors all the time.

The urgency of the interventionneeded is dire and women are dis-empowered by the fact that they arenot considered a partner or play-er by internationals or UN repre-sentatives visiting the capital cities.Why is it a dire need for Somalia toeternalize and/or institutionalizeWomen Political Participation?

For Somali Children to have cleanwater, education, and health careis a priority to women and wom-en only.

Women know that milk and meatare the main dietary require-ments for Somalis and liveli-hoods will not be compromisedthrough charcoal production, ifwomen are in political decision-making.

Women politicians are eager tomove politics towards the ballot

box as soon as possible. Somali women will work very

well with donors toward self-reliance for Somalia and re-spectful relationships and trade.

Missing this opportunity of support-ing women to empower their politicalprocess is a major failure for Soma-lia, International supporters, UN andTransparent Donors as well.

1 See International Crisis Group re-port on the formation of the current Federalgovernment.


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Hargeisa, Somaliland, bus station

Photo|Tristam Sparks


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Introduction

NOTWITHSTANDING THE CRUCIAL ROLE PLAYED BY ELDERS, PEACE ANDSTABILITY IN SOMALILAND IS AN OUTCOME OF A CONVERGENCE OFPRE-WAR AND POST WAR FACTORS. THE ABSENCE OF INTERNATIONALTECHNICAL AND FINANCIAL HELP PUSHED SOMALILANDERS TO LOOK TO

THEMSELVES AND RELY ON DOMESTIC RESOURCES.

HOW DID

SOMALILANDEMERGE AS ASTABLE ANDPEACEFUL POLITY?

PhD candidate inPolitics, Human Rights and Sustainability

Scuola Superiore SantAnna

by Gedamu Kalewongel Minale

In the backdrop of the crisis and in-ter-clan violence in the South-centralSomalia, a self proclaimed republicin the North West Somaliland hasemerged as a peaceful, functional andrelatively democratic polity in thepast two decades. In contrast to thefaction ridden and unstable territoryof much of Somalia, Somaliland, hadreinstated a functioning government

and maintained a considerable de-gree of political stability.1The country

1 Renders, Marleen and Terlinden,Ulf (2010) Negotiating Statehood in a Hybrid

is still weak and poor with very ru-dimentary infrastructure and meagerresource bas

Clan and State Politics in Somalia

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