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Civil–Military Cooperation

in ConfliCt and post-ConfliCt

operations: learning froM the lithuanian,

slovenian and estonian experienCes

Civil–Military Cooperation

in ConfliCt and post-ConfliCt

operations: learning froM the lithuanian,

slovenian and estonian experienCes

2012VILNIUS, LITHUANIA

Aleksandr DusmanUgnė Petrauskaitė

Asta RinkevičiūtėLina Strupinskienė

Rok Zupančič

ISBN 978-9955-33-670-9

© Aleksandr Dusman, 2012© Ugnė Petrauskaitė, 2012© Asta Rinkevičiūtė, 2012© Lina Strupinskienė, 2012© Rok Zupančič, 2012

UDK 327.5(474.5:497.12:474.2) Ci287

The sponsor of the publicationU. S. Department of State

C ontent s

List of Figures 6

List of Tables 6

Acknowledgements 9

Abbreviations 10

introduCtion 11

Methodology 13

Team of Researchers 15

Outline of the Publication 16

Part ItheoretiCal approaCh 19

1. Civil–Military Cooperation in the Modern Era: An Inevitable Tool for Successful Post-Conflict Stabilization 20 ROK ZUPANČIČ

Part IICase studies 29

2. Managing the Civil–Military Cooperation in Conflict and Post-conflict Zones: The Case Study of the Republic of Lithuania 30

LINA STRUPINSKIENĖ, UGNĖ PETRAUSKAITĖ, ASTA RINKEVIČIŪTĖ

3. Relationship Between Civilian Functional Experts and Armed Forces “On the Battlefield”: The Case Study of Slovenia 51 ROK ZUPANČIČ

4. Managing the Civil–Military Cooperation in Conflict and Post-conflict Zones: The Case Study of the Republic of Estonia 65

ALEKSANDR DUSMAN

Part IIIConClusions and reCoMMendations 77

LINA STRUPINSKIENĖ, UGNĖ PETRAUSKAITĖ,

ASTA RINKEVIČIŪTĖ

Common Challenges 78

Best Practices 80

Way Ahead 81

list of figures

FIGURE 1.1: Approaches to CIMIC 26

list of tables

TABLE 2.1: Effectiveness and frequency of civil–military cooperation 41

TABLE 2.2: Pre-mission plans, procedures and training 42

TABLE 2.3: Level of assistance and protection 43





TABLE 4.3: Level of assistance and protection 72

aCknowledgeMents

Special acknowledgements and gratitude are due to several institutions, friends and colleagues who helped and supported us in writing about civil–military cooperation in conflict and post-conflict zones. This research project couldn’t have come to being without the Young Leaders Dialogue with America program, the continuous support of the Institute of International Education, and funding granted by the US Department of State. For the latter, we are especially grateful to Nancy Overholt, Mike McCartt, Ron Hawkins, and Eric B. Johnson. Thank you once again for your dedication, support and good spirits!

Special thanks to everyone who filled in the survey questionnaires, agreed to be interviewed and took part in the focus group discussions. Without your insights and kind cooperation this study wouldn’t have been possible.

We would also like to thank the Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Estonia, the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Slovenia, and the Baltic Defence College for assistance us in gathering the necessary data.

Gratitude is also due to Živilė Dambrauskaitė for all the help with the initial research proposal. Thank you, Živile, for your most valuable insights and constant support!

abbreviations

CIMIC – Civil–military cooperation subjected to the military goals of a mission

ECE – Eastern and Central European EU – European UnionEU BGs – European Union Battle GroupsISAF – International Security Assistance ForceMilHQ – Military HeadquartersNATO – North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationNGO – Non-Governmental OrganizationPRT – Provincial Reconstruction Team

introduCtion

l i na s t ru p i n s k i e n ė

In the Western imagination, soldiers and civilians are categorical opposites; traditionally, soldiers ‘break things and kill people’ while civilians, especially those engaged in humanitarian work, dedicate themselves to healing and building. It should not be surprising, then, that activities which are seen to rely on a high degree of interdependence between these camps are controversial

(Ankersen, 2008).

increasingly complex post-conflict operations require joint efforts of a variety of actors: military, international governmental organizations,

NGOs, various foreign and local government agencies, business, etc. These different entities have different responsibilities and comparative advantages in post-conflict stabilization, rehabilitation, reconstruction and development operations. However, their actions ought to be well coordinated to contribute to an effective conflict resolution. Yet, in most cases problems in these relationships are prevalent.

Different modes of organization, for example, the horizontal meth-ods of coordination in the non-governmental sector versus the hierar-chic coordination of the military, often impede the efficient interaction between the two sectors. Mutual inflexibility results, in some cases, in an overall elimination of the non-governmental sector from the post-conflict stabilization efforts. A similar effect might also be produced by

12 INTRODUCTION

differences in agendas of the civil and military sectors. For example, the civilian sector tends to focus on the development projects that are long-term, and the military usually work on short-term containment issues. The lack of coordination between the varied agendas and goals may re-sult in additional tensions between the civilian (both governmental and non-governmental) and the military actors present in conflict and post-conflict zones and sometimes undermine the overall efficiency of the mission.

These and similar challenges are mainly rooted in a poor exchange of best practices among different actors and countries. Afghanistan could be a good and up-to-date example. Before the transition period, there were twenty-seven PRTs in Afghanistan, commanded by more than ten states participating in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Afghanistan. Each of the countries has a slightly different pattern of conducting civil–military cooperation and the exchange of information on most common challenges of civil–military cooperation and best practices remains very limited. Whereas countries with previous experience can at least use their own institutional experience, newcomers cannot do so.

Therefore, the overall objective of this project is to create a dialogue between the Central and Eastern European nations to learn the best practices of dealing with challenges and thus to promote a more effective civil–military cooperation for peace and conflict resolution. The specific objectives of this project are the following:

i. To research and identify the problems and best practices with regard to civil–military cooperation. The research will cover the experience of three Eastern and Central European states (Lithuania, Estonia, and Slovenia) starting with the 1990s.

ii. To create a dialogue between the civilian and the military actors present in conflict and post-conflict zones.

iii. To inform relevant parties of problems, best practices and recommendations to make civil–military cooperation more effective in areas in need of conflict resolution.

INTRODUCTION 13

This publication strives to have a user-friendly language and structure; therefore it, is limited in scope and aims at providing reasonable recommendations for action at both governmental and individual levels. Expert discussions to present and debate the results of the study will be organized in the represented countries, thus informing the relevant stakeholders about the results.

Methodology

The research starts with a careful investigation of the academic literature analysing the phenomenon of civil–military cooperation in conflict and post-conflict zones. The conclusions drawn from literature analysis are then used as a starting point for the collection of reliable data on the most common challenges in the sphere of civil–military cooperation for peace and conflict resolution and the methods of coping with them at the national level. The collection of data consists of several stages. First, surveying of the relevant individuals at the national level is conducted. Representatives of the military, members of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs or National Defence as well as experts from the non-governmental sector were the primary target groups for the initial surveys. All the surveys were conducted at the national level, using a uniformed questionnaire. Second, the data were complemented from various other sources. For example, the Slovenian data were complemented with additional in-depth interviews conducted with civil and military experts; Lithuanian data – with detailed information regarding certain problematic points extracted during the focus group discussions; Estonian data – with information from previously conducted researches.

The survey questionnaire was prepared in English and was the same for all the countries under investigation. Small variations existed between the questionnaires given to the civilian and the military experts. Though the essence of the questions was the same, small

14 INTRODUCTION

alterations were made in the precise formulations of certain questions. For example, the military respondents had to provide information regarding their rank, and civilian experts regarding their position in the mission concerned.

The questionnaire comprised several sections, such as: 1) background information on the respondent; 2) information regarding the preparation for a particular mission; 3) information regarding the implementation of a particular mission; 4) open-ended questions regarding the perception of civil–military cooperation and thoughts on comparative advantages possessed by the civilians and the military.

Responses to the questions regarding the background information provided us with data on the personal experience with international missions and other military operations, age and position of the respondents. These particular data were used to shed light on the development of various cooperation practices through time as well as on how the perceptions depend on the position or rank of an expert in the field. Responses to the questions related to preparation for a particular mission helped to identify the major problems regarding civil–military cooperation in the preparatory phase of a mission, such as the lack of joint planning or pre-set rules and procedures for future cooperation. The data gathered from the section on the implementation of a particular mission were used for understanding the problems as well as the best practices of civil–military cooperation while in the field. Responses to open-ended questions yielded interesting results regarding the personal perceptions of civil–military cooperation and provided detailed information on the challenges of joint efforts.

The selection of the exact respondents was made using the snowballing sampling strategy, when having contacted the heads of current civilian and military components of particular missions we received recommendations regarding whom to contact next. The response rate of the military personnel was significantly lower in comparison to the response rate of the civilian experts; this points to

INTRODUCTION 15

a classical problem of interviewing military respondents, experienced by many researchers, when military officers are reluctant to talk due to fear of breaching their duty of confidentiality. It seems that the culture of secrecy in the army still exists and makes the inquiry particularly difficult for a civilian social researcher (Deschaux-Beaume, 2012). However, despite the low response rate, answers received from military officers follow the same lines of argumentation and tackle very similar problems; therefore, we do not believe that a limited number of respondents undermines the overall validity of the study.

The second stage of data collection was aimed at extracting more detailed information regarding certain challenges and best practices of civil–military cooperation themes discussed in the questionnaires. As mentioned before, different country studies have been conducted using a slightly different method of gathering qualitative data, thus, a more elaborate explanation on the methodology used can be found in the individual country sections.

the team of researchers

The idea of conducting a research on the practices of civil–military cooperation in different countries came to being during a Young Leaders Dialogue with America (YLDA) conference, where members of a discussion group on “Civil-military cooperation for peace and conflict resolution” decided to engage in this challenging endeavour. The YLDA conference brought together academics, policy experts, representatives of the military and civil sector who all had direct experience in the issues of conflict resolution and civil–military cooperation. Members of the project team are: Rok Zupančič – a researcher and a teaching-assistant at the Defence Research Centre (University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Sciences), Lina Strupinskienė – a researcher and a lecturer at the Institute of International Relations and Political Science (Vilnius University), Ugnė Petrauskaitė – a legal advisor at the

16 INTRODUCTION

International Relations and Operations Department at the Ministry of National Defence (Lithuania), Asta Rinkevičiūtė – a senior officer at the Minister’s office at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Lithuania), and Aleksandr Dusman – a sociologist at Ida-Virumaa Integration centre (Estonia).

Our different yet related experience allowed developing a project idea that brings together our academic and professional interests and addresses the substantial problems of civil–military cooperation.

outline of the publication

The publication is broken into three parts. Part I (Chapter 1) contains a theoretical study which aims to define and explain the concept of civil–military cooperation, either by examining it as a partnership or by exploring its objectives. Part II (Chapters 2–4) are case studies of particular countries. They show how certain civilian and military experts in the countries of interest (Lithuania, Slovenia, and Estonia) approach the civil–military cooperation and examine the thinking behind the doctrine as well as identify the most common challenges and the best practices with regard to civil–military cooperation. Part III (Chapter 5) compares and evaluates the national practices, suggesting ways in which it could be improved.

In Chapter 1, Rok Zupančič discusses the changing concept of security in the Post-Cold War geopolitical environment, which puts political, economic, social, ecological and other aspects of security at the same level of importance as that of military security. He, therefore, sees civil–military cooperation as a way of finding synergy in post- conflict environments. In this chapter, he also provides a definition of civil–military cooperation, which will be used for the purpose of this particular research.

In Chapter 2, Lina Strupinskienė, Ugnė Petrauskaitė, and Asta Rin-kevičiūtė discuss Lithuania’s experience in civil–military cooperation.

INTRODUCTION 17

Starting with delineating the country’s history of participation in in-ternational missions and military operations, they continue discussing the legal framework relevant for cooperation issues and move towards presenting the results of an investigative study aimed at exploring the thinking behind the civil–military cooperation issues of Lithuanian civil and military experts.

In Chapter 3, Rok Zupančič presents the results of another study dealing with the perceptions of civil–military cooperation issues in Slovenia. Drawing on the results of a survey as well as in-depth interviews with a number of civilian functional experts, he analyzes the Slovenian experience in civil–military cooperation and identifies the issues of relevance for improving civil–military cooperation in general as well as guidelines for the further scientific inquiry.

In Chapter 4, Aleksandr Dusman focuses on civil–military cooperation in Estonia. By discussing the Estonian experience in several international missions and providing the results of a survey of civil and military experts, he draws conclusions concerning the most problematic areas of cooperation and differences in how civil–military cooperation is perceived by different stakeholders involved in the creation of sustainable peace in conflict and post-conflict zones.

In Chapter 5, Lina Strupinskienė, Ugnė Petrauskaitė, and Asta Rinkevičiūtė present conclusions regarding the most common challenges experienced by and the best practices identified in the countries under investigation. Furthermore, the recommendations on how to improve civil–military cooperation practices are presented, drawing on the comparative analysis of the Lithuanian, Estonian, and Slovenian experiences.

18 INTRODUCTION

referenCes

Ankersen, C. (Ed.). (2008). Civil–Military Cooperation in Post-conflict Operations. Emerging theory and Practice. New York: Routledge.

Deschaux-Beaume (2012). Investigating the military field: Qualitative research strategy and interviewing in the defence networks. Current Sociology, 60(1), pp. 101–117.

P A R T I

THEORETICAL APPROACH

C H A P T E R 1

Civil–Military Cooperation in the Modern era: an inevitable tool for suCCessful post-ConfliCt stabilization

R O K Z U PA N Č I Č

introduction: Changing role of armed forces in the new geopolitical environment

The end of the Cold War brought certain changes to the international environment. Among others, it also caused changes in the understand-ing of the security paradigm. In its framework, national security can-not be perceived as an isolated issue (of a single state), but is under-stood as indispensably connected to global/international security (on international level) as well as to human security (state institutions have the responsibility not only to protect its citizens from a foreign threat, but also to protect an individual from eventual dangerous or devastat-ing effects arising from the state itself).

Modern states, which perceive security as an indivisible concept described above, contribute to the international peace and security in various forms: from donations to a third country, bilateral development, economic and other programmes/aid, as well as with sending the troops to conflict zones. The latter should be taken into consideration carefully; namely, it is necessary to differentiate between the deployment of troops in a (multilateral) peacekeeping mission and ‘the deployment’ aimed at occupying a foreign country.

Cases of benevolent contribution of a country to international peace and security are often reflected in modern (multilateral) peacekeep-

ROK ZUPANČIČ. Civil-Military Cooperation in the Modern Era... 21

ing operations which are nowadays usually mandated with the tasks of achieving durable peace and stability. The changed security paradigm after the Cold War also brought certain aspects of security (that have been neglected during ‘the bipolar state of international relations’) at the forefront: political, economic, social, ecological and some other as-pects of security are now becoming at least as important as military security. If not even more!

Having said that, it means that the list of roles the military forces have been ascribed to has been significantly extended in the modern era or, as Batistelli (1997) argues, the tasks the military has to perform nowadays are becoming postmodern. ‘Traditional tasks’ of armed forces – that is protecting the homeland against foreign enemy – does remain on the ‘do-list’, but they are losing relative importance against the new challenges, which were previously unknown to the armed forces (e. g., monitoring, policing, fighting against criminal activities, rescue missions, assisting in humanitarian crises, support to international and non-governmental organizations, etc.).

Civil–Military Cooperation as a Means of finding synergy in a post-Conflict environment

Military forces of modern countries are generally aware of the fact that it is difficult for them to perform ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ tasks at the same time, since providing security and safety to the local population is only one aspect of the modern approach to peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction. For performing certain tasks in a conflict zone, which are not of a strictly ‘military nature’, non-military (civilian) actors are better equipped and trained, and generally more appropriate: a platoon of heavily armed soldiers shouting orders to the local population from tanks’ turrets will most probably receive a more cold-hearted welcome in a remote village than a bunch of civilians arriving in ordinary cars with some necessary equipment to dig a well.

22 PART I • THEORETICAL APPROACH

The latter example may be exaggerated a bit, but it symbolises why the concept of civil–military cooperation has emerged. The te r m ( d e f i n i t i on ) civil–military cooperation is often used to refer generally to interaction between civilian and military actors, which can be misleading. Confusion arises between a specific military use of the term, which relates it to military objectives, and its more general use which relates to forms of interaction between armed forces and civil entities. The UN, for example, uses the term ‘Civil Military Coordination’, while the ICRC refers to civil–military relations. In practice, whether one is referring to the narrow or the broad interpretation of the term, the actual activities and ways of working may be similar (Brett, 2009, 11).

Although the concept of civil–military cooperation is understood and conducted differently in various international organizations and states, generally speaking, it promotes a deep and thorough coordination among parties concerned to achieve common goals, i. e. the long-term stabilization of a country. What further complicates the terminology is the common use of the abbreviation CIMIC, which usually stands for civil–military cooperation. However, in this publication we use the term CIMIC only when referring to civil–military cooperation within NATO, which actually introduced this term and uses it widely.

For the purpose of our research, we understand civ i l–militar y cooperation in conf l ic t and post-conf l ic t zones as any form of interaction between member(s) of armed forces and civilian actors with the aim to contribute to conflict resolution and sustainable peace in a country.

In recent years, civil–military cooperation has become recognized as a central activity in peace support operations, post-conflict recon-struction and humanitarian crises. Some experts (see, for example, Jenkins, 2003) even argue that in the last decade civil–military coop-eration has moved from being a side issue of civil–military affairs to being recognized as a core function in peace support operations.


Arising from the needs and priorities, civil–military cooperation can be tasked with very different assignments on the ground. Jenkins (2003) lists the following examples:

• emergency life support (made up of sub-aspects): health, food and water issues, fire-fighting, sanitation, housing, power;

• infrastructure systems: public transport, waterways, road and rail networks, telecoms, air-fields;

• humanitarian support: providing shelter and civilian freedom of movement, demining, humanitarian assistance, minority treatment, building and/or running camps for displaced persons;

• civil administration: judiciary, local authorities, borders and customs, detention facilities, public records, law enforcement, banking and economy.

The international organizations, such as NATO, may not have extensive information about certain developments, perhaps because staff is ‘spread too thinly’ to have completely surveyed the area, perhaps because certain regions are thought to be reluctant to cooperate with foreign military forces – and that is where the niche for civilians is. Thus, civil–military cooperation needs also to seek our data on its own. Once on the ground, the staff included in civil–military cooperation will form the major conduit of information and low-level decision- making between the civilian population and local civilian authorities, the international organizations, the NGOs and the military contingent. This interaction makes the experts engaged in civil–military cooperation major recipients of open intelligence about the community and the country. One sign of successful civil–military cooperation projects is the amount of intelligence received from the local people. If the people can be won over, they are more likely to volunteer information to the task force, including information that may save the lives of soldiers. A friendly local population is also likely to result in fewer security incidents and


attacks directed against the military, thus making operations easier. As one brigade commander put it, “no one likes having his house searched, no matter how polite the soldiers are, but if the home owner sees that those same soldiers also provide running water for his village, he may be more cooperative” (Peabody, 2006).

The personnel engaged in civil–military cooperation is usually tasked to find out as much as possible about the geography and climate, society (including language, religion, and culture), current events in economy, government and civilian problems (e. g., displaced persons). Much of this information is of a non-secret nature and openly available from a number of sources, including especially the international organizations and NGOs which are often on the ground before the military arrive.

Main actors of Civil–Military Cooperation: states and international organizations

At the level of i nte r nat i ona l org an i z at i ons , NATO has prob-ably developed the most elaborated and detailed approach to civil–military cooperation (within NATO, the term CIMIC is used when referring to civil–military cooperation). NATO established the Civil–Military Co-operation Centre of Excellence (CCOE), based in Ensch-ede (the Netherlands), to address tasks such as bringing awareness to commanders about the importance of civil–military cooperation to operations. NATO has also asked CCOE the creation of CIMIC doc-trine and related curriculum to have unified efforts on goals regard-ing civil–military cooperation. The rapid growth and development of the CIMIC doctrine in NATO is nicely reflected in Admiral Leighton Smith’s comment:

“In November (1995), we had never heard of CIMIC, we had no idea what you did … now (April 1996) we can’t live without you” (Jenkins, 2003, 128).


The NATO Military Policy on Civil–Military Cooperation (MC411) from July 2001 takes a strictly militaristic view of civil–military cooperation, with the central tenet that ‘CIMIC is a command function in support of the mission’ (see Jenkins, 2003, for more information about the development of CIMIC within NATO). Defining all civil–military cooperation activities to be in support of the commander and the mission, nevertheless, provides a focus without being unreasonably restrictive. According to the NATO definition, CIMIC is:

“the coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies” (NATO, 2001).

As already mentioned, civil–military cooperation is not restricted to NATO (or other international organizations) only. Namely, certain c ou nt r i e s are becoming aware of the necessity to combine civilian with military efforts, and thus, they began developing their own approaches towards civilian-military cooperation. In the paragraphs below, we are briefly describing a few examples (for more, see Stepputat, 2009), while in-depth analyses of our case studies (Lithuania, Estonia, Slovenia and the US) are synthesized in the following chapters of this publication.

Conclusion

The role of civil–military cooperation in a harsh security environment is not just civil affairs, but developing an appreciation of the whole ‘grass roots’ situation of the post-conflict zone. This can only happen once it is accepted that while, in modern warfare, battles last hours, the post-conflict reconstruction missions last years. In any village that does not have the beginnings of some (rebuilt) government and social fabric, there is likely to be on-going stress between individuals


Figure 1.1: Approaches to CiMiC

The Danish approach

The UK approach

The Dutch approach

in March 2004, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence issued the joint paper Concerted Planning and Action of civilian and military efforts in international operations. The concept aimed at supporting stabilization and normalization in the areas of Danish military deployment by increasing synergies through the concentration and coordinated planning and implementation of all civilian and military activities in these areas ‘whatever the security situation’. Thus, in the absence of civilian organizations, the army may temporarily have to facilitate humanitarian work and the reestablishment of infrastructure, local administration and other improvements for local population. One of more interesting points of the Danish approach could be described as Quick Impact Projects;1 a positive aspect of these projects is that small projects up to 50.000$ can be approved by the commander upon consultation with the development advisor. Another positive aspect of the Danish approach is the joint trainings and education for CiMiC officers.

The uK Whole of government Approach has developed around the issue of security-sector reform as well as NATO/Coalition-led military operations. The government has set up inter-departmental funds and bodies to facilitate coordination of the three key departments and to fill in the gaps in activities that none of them can fill independently. The Stabilisation unit has increased operational capacity and functions, as well as becoming a repository of expertise in terms of both institutional memory and human resources.

The Netherlands’ integrated Approach has developed alongside the military engagements in NATO and Coalition-led military operations, but the security sector reform has been an important element as well. integration is pursued through a series of instruments, including exchanges of advisors, inter-departmental funds and steering committees. But even though the ambition is to enhance the integrated approach, other ministries (besides the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) have not been involved in the process.

1 Quick Impact Projects are meant to achieve quick results on the ground. Examples of Quick Impact Projects are: refurbishment of school playground and drinking water supplies, that are designed to meet a local need and ‘win hearts and minds’ among the local population (Brett, 2009, 11).


and a likelihood of crime. In the worst-case scenario, it can also turn into a (renewed) civil war. Also civilians working in the post-conflict environment must understand that they cannot do the work alone and that the military forces do possess certain comparative advantages that are (or may be) useful.

It is of vital importance to establish the highest common denomi-nator of the harmonising and synchronizing actions of all internation-al actors in a post-conflict environment (international organizations, NGOs, countries’ own projects, etc.). Furthermore, the future endeav-ours should, as Jackson and Gordon (2007, 660) argue, “concentrate on creating a culture in which various government departments are used to working together and favouring solution-oriented strategies rather than departmental prerogatives.” To bureaucrats in many countries it seems that their real adversaries do not come from ‘a remote mountainous place from overseas’ – but from the ‘ministry from the opposite side of the road’.

referenCes

Battistelli, F. (1997). Peacekeeping and the Postmodern Soldier. Armed Forces and Society 23 (3): 467–484.

Brett, J. (2009). Recent Experience with Comprehensive Civil and Military Approaches in International Operations. DIIS Report 2009 (9). Köbenhavn: Danish Institute for International Studies.

Jackson, M., and Stuart, G. (2007). Rewiring interventions? UK provincial reconstruction teams and ‘stabilization’. International Peacekeeping 14 (5): 647–661.

Jenkins, L. (2003). A CIMIC Contribution to Assessing Progress in Peace Support Operations. International Peacekeeping 10 (3): 121–136.

NATO (2001). MC 411/1. NATO Military Policy on Civil–Military Co-opera-tion. Available at: http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/mc411-1-e.htm (2 January 2011).

Peabody, D. (2006). The challenges of doing good work: the development of Canadian forces CIMIC capability and NGOs. Journal of Military and Strategic

Studies, 8 (3). Available at: http://www.jmss.org/jmss/index.php/jmss/article/download/130/146 (Accessed 14th January 2012).

Stepputat, F. (2009). Synthesis Report: Civil-military Relations in International Relations. A Danish Perspective (DIIS Report 2009: 16). Köbenhavn: Danish Institute for International Studies.

28 Part I THEORETICAL APPROACH

P A R T I I

CASE STUDIES

C H A P T E R 2

Managing the Civil–Military Cooperation in ConfliCt and post-ConfliCt zones: the Case study of the republiC of lithuania

L I N A S T R U P I N S K I E N Ė , U G N Ė P E T R AU S K A I T Ė ,

A S TA R I N K E V I Č I Ū T Ė

1. background

On 11 March 1990, the sovereignty of Lithuania, abolished by a foreign force in 1940 (in June 1940 the Soviet Union occupied and annexed Lithuania in accordance to secret protocols of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact), was restored, and Lithuania was declared an independent state, becoming the first Soviet republic to do so. The Soviet Union attempted to suppress the secession by imposing an economic blockade. Soviet troops also attacked the TV Tower in the capital Vilnius and killed 14 and injured around 700 Lithuanian civilians on the night of 13 January 1991. However, on 4 February 1991, Iceland became the first country to recognise Lithuanian independence. After that, Lithuania received a wide official recognition and joined the United Nations on 17 September 1991. The new Constitution was adopted by citizens of the Republic of Lithuania in the referendum of 25 October 1992. The last Soviet troops left the territory of the Republic of Lithuania on 31 August 1993. Lithuania, seeking closer ties with the West, applied for NATO membership in 1994. Lithuania became a full member of NATO and the European Union in the spring of 2004.

During the early years of the re-established independence, Lithuania was striving to set up a new structure of national armed forces and to

31LINA STRUPINSKIENĖ, UGNĖ PETRAUSKAITĖ, ASTA RINKEVIČIŪTĖ. Managing the Civil-Military Cooperation in Conflict and post-conflict zones...

develop a military capability in order to be able to ensure the territorial defence of the country. The newly born armed forces gained confidence and international recognition after their first mission abroad in 1994, when a platoon served as part of the UN protection force in Croatia (About Lithuanian Armed Forces, 2009). Currently Lithuania takes part in multinational missions according to various collective defence and security treaties. By fulfilling such commitments Lithuania contributes to the international community’s efforts to increase security and promote sustainable peace worldwide.

Lithuania’s contributions to international military operations and missions fall into three broad categories: 1) participation in international military operations ran by NATO, UN, EU and OSCE; 2) de-velopment of useful niche capabilities within its armed forces, and 3) regional cooperation initiatives (Lansford, Tashev, 2004, p. 164). So far Lithuania’s military personnel were deployed in Afghanistan, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Iraq, Kosovo, and Mace-donia (On International Cooperation, 2012).

2. legal framework

The law on international operations, military exercises and other military co-operation events establishes that the Republic of Lithuania, in recognition of its international obligations can deploy its national military personnel in various international military operations abroad. According to the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania (1992) and the law on international operations, military exercises and other military co-operation events, the decision on the deployment of national military personnel to international military operations is taken by the Parliament upon the recommendation of the President after the proposal of the Minister of National Defence and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. In urgent cases such as when the Parliament is prorogued, in the event of an armed attack against the Republic

32 PART I I • CASE STUDIES

of Lithuania or against other states-parties to the collective defence treaty, the decision will be taken by the President and then submitted to the Parliament (in case the decision has to be adopted while the Parliament is prorogued, the President may call an extraordinary sitting of the Parliament). Parliament’s decision (mandate) sets forth: the maximum number of the national military personnel able to take part in the international military operations; the maximum duration of involvement; and the geographical location (permissible places of deployment). In accordance with the mandate granted by the Parliament, the Minister of National Defence takes decisions on allocating the troops for an exact operation; his decision sets forth: the exact number of national military personnel to be deployed; the defined time period of deployment; the exact place of deployment (where operations will take place).

In addition, there is a possibility to deploy national military personnel to international military operations called a blanket procedure. The blanket procedure is applicable only to the national military personnel deployed in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Response Forces (NRF), European Union (EU) Battle Groups (EU BGs) and NATO / EU military headquarters (MilHQ). According to the procedure, the decision to deploy national military personnel comes from NATO / EU. The national Parliament then takes a general decision indicating: the maximum number of the national military personnel who could be deployed; the maximum time limit; and in certain cases – an indication of the possible places for deployment.

The law on international operations, military exercises and other military co-operation events, adopted on 19 June 1994, was one of the first documents regulating the involvement of the civilian personnel in international operations, exercises and other military co-operation events as well as the involvement of foreign military and civilian personnel in international operations, exercises and other military cooperation events conducted in the territory of the Republic of


Lithuania. Other fundamental documents regulating the deployment of civilians in conflict and post-conflict zones are: the Government decree “Regarding the activities of the diplomatic service of the Republic of Lithuania”, adopted on 19 July 2002, the law on secondment of persons to international and EU institutions or foreign institutions,

adopted on 4 July 2007, and the Government decree “Regarding the service conditions of professional military servants and civil servants from Ministry of Defence while deployed in the Lithuanian diplomatic representations abroad, representations to international organizations, foreign and international military forces or defense institutions”, adopted on 19 July 2002. The activities of police officers deployed in conflict or post-conflict zones are not regulated separately; normally, police officers are temporarily assigned to Lithuanian armed forces and are bound by the documents regulating the activities of the military.

3. experience of lithuania in Civil–Military Cooperation in Conflict and post-Conflict areas

Currently Lithuanian military and civilian personnel participate in three NATO and EU-led international military operations and missions:

3.1. NATO-led International Military Operation in AfghanistanInternational Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan was created in accordance with the agreements made during the Bonn Conference in December 2001. The UN-mandated international force was created to assist the newly established Afghan Transitional Authority to guarantee a secure environment in and around Kabul and support the reconstruction of Afghanistan. On 11 August 2003, NATO assumed the leadership of the ISAF operation (About ISAF: History). Prior to joining NATO (since 2002), Lithuania participated in the US-led antiterrorist operation “Enduring Freedom”. Staff officers of the


Special Operations Unit of the Lithuanian Armed Forces, military medics, logistics and heavy loads experts, and other specialists served in various regions of Afghanistan under the supervision of NATO countries.

3.1.1. l i t h u a n i a n - l e d p r t

In 2005, Lithuania started considering the possibility of taking the responsibility for one of ISAF’s provincial reconstruction teams (PRT) in Afghanistan. Following the heated debate between different institutional bodies, responsible for diverse foreign and security policy aspects in Lithuania, it was conditionally agreed to take the lead on a provincial reconstruction, thus starting Lithuania’s most significant and largest foreign military and civilian involvement since the reestablishment of its independence in 1990. Together with Lithuanian military and civilian personnel, PRT includes representatives of Denmark, Georgia, Japan, the USA, Croatia, Romania, and Ukraine.

With its limited diplomatic and military capabilities, coupled with never having fielded a civil–military operation in a foreign country, Lithuania did not have institutional knowledge to leverage during the initial planning for the PRT mission. Policy developed prior to the PRT’s deployment in the summer of 2005 focused around creating structures that would allow a civil–military organization to function effectively in a remote environment (MacPherson et al., 2008). In accordance with the British model (Eronen, 2008, p. 20) from the NATO PRT handbook (ISAF PRT Handbook, ed. 4), it was decided that operations would have a separate military and civilian element. A joint order of the Foreign Minister and Defence Minister, issued before the PRT’s initial deployment, sets forth that the PRT Commander would be in charge of security, whereas the civilian leader would be responsible for civil projects, such as reconstruction, development work, and good governance, making this another example of how “these domains remain frustratingly separated in the institutional bodies


and organizational structures designed to “provide development” and “ensure security” (Stern, Ojendal, 2010, 7).

The main functions of the military element are to create a safe and stable environment, monitor and assess the security situation, according to the needs and capabilities, support the implementation of development cooperation programmes of the civilian element. The PRT military element also seeks a better relationship between the international peacekeepers and the local population through implementing various quick impact projects. Assistance is rendered to the local population, governmental institutions, or to the representatives of religious communities, as well as to anyone in need of support with food, clothing, motorcycles, carpets, etc. (About Afghanistan, 2011). From the beginning of 2012 around 150 Lithuanian troops are working in Ghor (another hundred is being deployed in other regions of Afghanistan).

The first shift of Lithuania’s civilian element was sent to Ghor in 2005, and since then the number of civilian personnel has increased notably. The main functions of the civilian element are to provide assistance to the local government and administration in extending its authority, stimulate the interaction between central and local authorities, support the public administration capacity-building initiatives in order to foster good governance and the rule of law, assist the provincial government in creating conditions allowing UN agencies, international governmental and non-governmental organizations to carry out reconstruction and development activities and implement development cooperation projects. Development cooperation projects are coordinated with the provincial governor and other local administrative institutions, Afghan “ownership” principle being observed. In 2011, Lithuania together with its partners implemented about 80 major projects in the region.

The majority of the civilian staff (mostly political and development advisors) of the PRT are civilian personnel from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Development Cooperation and Democracy Promotion


Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for the implementation and coordination of Lithuania’s Development Cooperation Policy (About Lithuanian Development Cooperation, General Information, 2008), which is an integral part of foreign and security policy of developed countries. Lithuania is supporting Afghanistan1 on a bilateral basis.

3.1.2. l i t h u a n i a’s s p e c i a l M i s s i o n i n a f g h a n i s t a n

Shortly after re-establishing diplomatic relations with Afghanistan, on 30 June 2005, Lithuania established a Special Mission (Government of the Republic of Lithuania’s decision No. 732, 30 June 2005) in Afghanistan, its capital city of Kabul. The Mission employs four civilian Lithuanian representatives: Head of the Special Mission and his Assistant are based in the capital Kabul, while the Deputy Head of the Special Mission (being also the head of the civilian element of the PRT) and the Development Advisor work at the PRT base. The Special Mission coordinates the completion of civilian tasks of the PRT, plans and implements social, economic, agricultural, and other projects financed by the Development Assistance Fund of Lithuania. In addition, it encourages international donors to support the province of Ghor.

The provisions concerning civil – military cooperation within the Lithuanian-led PRT are stipulated in the PRT internal regulations, a specific Annex to the Operational Order issued by the Chief of Defence, and in the Description of Regulations for interaction between the military element and the civilian element participating in the PRT activities. These documents define their activities, responsibilities, rights and duties, instructions and tasks, interaction, training, logistic support, financial aspects, etc. The concerned personnel also follow the NATO CIMIC doctrine.

1 On a bilateral basis, Lithuania also provides support to Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and Palestine.


While initiating proposals and planning development cooperation projects, the civilian element considers the information regarding the security situation and the need of stabilization measures provided by the military element. Upon assessing the security situation and the operational needs in the province, the Military Commander has a right to limit the outside movement of personnel adhered to the PRT. The Civilian Element follows the orders (only related to the compliance with security regulations) of the Military Commander or his (her) authorized personnel.

Other civilian personnel, while contributing to the implementation of PRT activities, carry out functions in accordance with bilateral or other agreements and/or arrangements between Lithuania and the other country or the institution delegating its personnel to the PRT.

3.2. the EU-led Police Mission in AfghanistanIn 2007, the European Union’s Police Mission (EUPOL) was launched to advise, mentor and supervise the development of the Afghan National Police Force (ANA); it also contributes to the investigation of criminal offences, improvement of surveillance, fighting against corruption, and strengthening the police force. At first Lithuania delegated four officers to work at the EUPOL in Chaghcharan.

In November 2010, Lithuanian-led Police Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (POMLT) began operating in Ghor province together with PRT-12. The first rotation of POMLT included 20 members – 12 US troops and 8 Lithuanians – Military Police and Public Security Service officers. The main task of POMLT is training, advising and enhancing the capacity of the Afghan National Police Force.

Early in 2011, a Lithuanian-led Air Mentoring Team (AMT) was sent to the multinational mission in Afghanistan to provide assistance in training soldiers of the Air Unit of the Air Corps of the Afghan National Forces (About Afghanistan, 2011).


3.3. the EU-led Operation ATALANTA in Somalia

The operation ATALANTA was launched by the European Union in response to upsurge piracy acts off the coast of Somalia in the end of 2008 (EU NANFOR Somalia, Mission). The operation attempts to deter, prevent and repress acts of piracy and armed robbery in the region, to protect vulnerable shipping and contribute to the monitoring of fishing activities off the coast of Somalia.

The current Parliament’s mandate, dated 19 November 2009, sets forth the following permissible places of deployment of Lithuanian military and civilian personnel: Balkans, Central and South Asia, South Caucasus, and the Persian Gulf. Taking into consideration that the African coast is not listed in the mandate of January 2011, Lithuania cannot deploy officers to Somalia. However, one staff officer of the Lithuanian Naval Force was deployed to the ATALANTA Operation Headquarters in Great Britain.

ATALANTA had developed several mechanisms involving civilian and military actors and has established the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction Meeting (SHADE) conducting informal discussions and deconflict the activities of those nations and organisations involved in military counter-piracy operations in the region, the forum being open to civilian authorities (Bauza, 2010, 15).

4. Methodology

In order to explore the relationship between the Lithuanian civilians and the military in conflict and post-conflict zones, an initial literature study was conducted. It revealed that the topic is severely under-researched in Lithuania, as there are virtually no studies conducted and the current knowledge on the subject is limited to a few short articles and several Bachelor or Master level theses. To get detailed information regarding the civilian-military cooperation, 12 respondents were


surveyed2. The respondents were the key persons of Lithuanian-led PRT and the Special Mission in Afghanistan as well as their civilian counterparts.

Even though some of the respondents had previous experience in other missions than Afghanistan, the majority of them chose to focus on Afghanistan due to the fact that this is the biggest and the most recent Lithuanian mission abroad. In addition, the mission in Afghanistan is an example of the current thinking regarding the civil–military cooperation, and lessons learned from it may be important for planning future missions. Therefore, this research focuses mainly on Afghanistan and investigates the civil–military cooperation among members of the Lithuanian-led PRT and the Special Mission if Afghanistan as well as members of the non-governmental organizations that have been active in the area.

Since 2005, the Lithuanian Special Mission if Afghanistan consists of four Lithuanian civilian representatives: Head of the Special Mission and his advisor operating in Kabul, Deputy Head of the Special Mission (at the same time Head of the PRT civilian component) and the development adviser acting in Ghor. The civilian rotation is approximately nine months. Four former Deputy Heads of the Special Mission and one its former Head were interviewed. Two former development advisors refused to fill in the questionnaire. Five CIMIC officers of the Lithuanian-led PRT military element agreed to share their experience, four of them were in high positions of power (commanders, chiefs). In addition, two civilian experts from non-governmental organizations, working on increasing the project management capabilities of local authorities and NGOs in Ghor Province, were surveyed.

2 For more information regarding the content of the questionnaire, see the introductory chapter.


In total, seven civilian and five military experts returned the questionnaires, providing information regarding 18 different missions (16 in Afghanistan, one in Kosovo and one UNPROFOR in the territory of Former Yugoslavia). Most of the military respondents were male (four males and one female) reflecting the overall gender disparity in the Lithuanian military. The average age of the civilian respondents was 33.8 and of the military respondents 33.2 years.

Upon analysing the responses provided in the questionnaires and identifying the most important issues regarding the civil–military cooperation, a focus group was organized. Civilian experts from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of National Defence, as well as their colleagues from non-governmental organizations were invited to comment on the most problematic issues and give additional information regarding certain aspects of civil–military cooperation in conflict and post-conflict zones. The focus group was comprised of six participants and lasted for approximately two hours.

5. results

Compared with military respondents, civilian functional experts are generally more positive regarding the overall perception of the effective-ness of the mission; on a scale from 1 to 5, military commanders value the effectiveness of the mission at 3.43, whereas civilian experts place the value at 3.9. As for the effectiveness of civil–military cooperation in a particular mission, there is a non-significant difference in answers between the two groups: both the civilians and the military perceive the effectiveness of civil–military cooperation mostly as good, but not excellent (3.86 among military commanders and 4.0 among civilian experts; a scale from 1 to 5).

The difference in the overall perception of the effectiveness of the mission between civilian experts and military commanders may be explained by the difference in the goals of missions. While civilians


tend to assess the success of their mission by the extent to which the goals of their specific project have been achieved, the military most often have the overarching goal of creating stability in the region, which requires long-term efforts and cannot be achieved during their time of deployment.

In addition, the fact that civilians see the effectiveness of the civilian-military cooperation as slightly more effective can be explained by the professionalism of the Lithuanian military forces. During the focus group discussion, all civilian experts have expressed their gratitude to and appreciation of the military and claimed to value their efforts to assist in achieving the goals of civilian missions. Even though they saw cooperation as something that could be more efficient, given the complicated context of post-conflict zones, they perceived the work of the military as good.

TABle 2.1: effectiveness and frequency of civil–military cooperation (values = means)

general Civilian Military

effectiveness of the mission 3.71 3.9 3.43

effectiveness of civil–military cooperation in the mission 3.94 4.0 3.86

Frequency of joint (civil–military) actions 3.88 3.6 4.29

As for the pre-mission civil–military cooperation planning, analysis of qualitative and quantitative data shows that the first missions where the civilian experts were deployed did not have explicit rules and regulations or a proper pre-mission planning regarding civil–military cooperation, since the system of joint action had only been introduced. The subsequent missions have taken this into account and have introduced clear civil–military cooperation procedures that were strictly followed during the mission: 91% of the civilian experts stated that the procedures were set, and 100% of them believed that they


were followed during the mission. However, the data show that the civil–military cooperation remains largely unplanned, at least in the civilian sector. It is interesting to see that that the respondents from the non-governmental sector have the cooperation rather well planned, in comparison to little or no planning on the side of the governmental institutions and the civil experts they deploy.

The responses of military commanders show a strong adherence to cooperation procedures: 100% of them have stated that the civil–military cooperation procedures were clearly set and followed during the mission. The strong adherence to the cooperation procedures can be explained by the explicit chain of command in the military and strong hierarchic ties.

It is worth noting that the level of pre-mission trainings is significantly lower when it comes to the civilian experts. All the military respondents have claimed to have had civil–military cooperation trainings prior to their deployment, whereas only 36% of civilian respondents have had such trainings. In addition, 75% of civilian experts have also claimed that the trainings were not joint. However, all the respondents have stated that pre-mission trainings were useful. This particular finding is important for the future project planning, as it clearly shows that trainings are viewed as a necessary and useful part of pre-mission planning activities.

TABle 2.2: Pre-mission plans, procedures and training (values = %)

general Civilian MilitaryYes No Yes No Yes No

Was there a civil–military cooperation plan? 67 33 64 36 71 29

Was it followed? 92 8 86 14 100

Were there cooperation procedures? 93 7 91 9 100

Were they followed? 100 100 100

Was there pre-mission training? 61 39 36 64 100

Was the training joint? 45 55 25 75 57 43

Was the training useful? 100 100 100


Another interesting aspect concerns the perception of the level of military assistance within civil–military cooperation. Military commanders estimate the level of military assistance significantly lower (3.14 on a scale from 1 to 5) than do civilian experts who perceive the level of military assistance to be much higher (4.18 on a scale from 1 to 5). Moreover, civilian experts assess their abil-ity to act independently as average (2.55 on the scale from 1 to 5), whereas military commanders estimate it as good (3.5 on a scale from 1 to 5).

There are no significant differences between the normative perceptions regarding the overall need for military assistance to the humanitarian efforts or the importance of civilian agencies for military activities. In general, both the military and the civilians see each other as valued partners. Therefore, we can conclude that even though both sides treat each other’s presence as important for the achievement of the goals of their missions, the military commanders don’t think that their contribution to the work of civilian functional experts takes a lot of their resources and requires deep levels of engagement.

TABle 2.3: level of assistance and protection (values = means)


Need for military assistance to the humanitarian efforts 3.31 3.36 3.20

level of military assistance during CiMiC 3.78 4.18 3.14

importance of military protection for civilian agencies 3.91 3.91 N/A

importance of civilian agencies for your activities 3.57 N/A 3.57

Ability of civilians to act independently N/A 2.55 3.50

The analysis of the open-ended questions revealed important dif-ferences in the ways civilians and military commanders perceive civil–military cooperation. Whereas the perception of the military is pre-dominantly military-centric, meaning that civilian assistance is viewed as one of the resources the commander may use for implementating


the goals of the mission, the perception of civilian actors follows the lines of “joint goals”. For example, one of the military respondents claimed that:

“Civil-military cooperation is a military commander’s tool to implement his military objectives through:

1. understanding the social-civil background of his area of responsibility;

2. interaction with local governmental authorities, local and international NGOs, local religious leaders;

3. communication with the local population.” (Survey, November 9, 2011).

A remark from a different military respondent further illustrates the point:

“Civil-military cooperation is an active cooperation among civilian and military actors in the area of operation in order to:

1. Reach military commander’s tasks with minimum use of military assets.

2. <…>” (Survey, November 9, 2011).

Certain differences can be observed among the surveyed civilians, where the representatives of NGOs view the cooperation as “a necessary evil rather than a productive synergy” (survey, January 27, 2012) and where the civil servants (heads of the civilian element of the PRT) and diplomats see it as “pooling of resources and sharing strategic objectives” (survey, February 2, 2012). In addition, most of the civil servants see civil–military cooperation as two-fold: on the one hand, it is a cooperation with the local population, and on the other hand, it is a cooperation inside the unit between its civilian and military components. As one of the former heads of the civilian element at the Lithuanian-led PRT in Afghanistan put it:


“there are at least two types of civil–military cooperation: 1) military unit’s communication with the local population in the area of responsibility, and 2) the cooperation between civilian and military personnel inside the unit. (Survey, November 29, 2011).

Another interesting point can be made regarding the perceptions of comparative advantages employed by the civilians and the military. Civilian experts mostly believe that their strength lies in the ability to successfully communicate with the local civilian counterparts. Due to the fact that they are unarmed and not wearing uniforms, the local population sees them as trustworthy and impartial. As one civil expert put it,

“people tend to be more responsive and participate better in trainings held by civilians, without the presence of military personnel in the audience; they respond well to the possibility of having people-to-people partnerships with the lecturers after the project ends, which adds to the sustainability of the project” (Survey, February 10, 2012).

Some civilian experts were linking the contacts they have with the local or international NGOs (also UN agencies) with the possibility of receiving a better financing and implementing medium or long-term stabilization projects. In addition, civilian respondents thought that the comparative advantage they had over the military was the specific expertise, for example:

“Civilian component can be composed of specialists from various sectors – administrative, agricultural, rule of law, public information, engineering, human rights, cultural, medical, etc.” (Survey, November 29, 2011).

Due to the specific knowledge regarding development, the civilian component of a mission is also thought to be involved in the (strategic)


decision-making process, together with higher local authorities in which military representatives do not participate. Moreover, the fact that civilian experts usually stay longer in a particular conflict or post-conflict zone than the military, who are being rotated every six months, adds to their involvement in the activities of the local population and their increased ability to build trust.

The analysis of responses to open-ended questions given by the military commanders reveals that they also see impartiality as the major strength of the civilians. In addition, they see such factors as flexibility, mobility, dedication and financial resources to be the comparative advantage of civilian experts. During the focus group discussion, however, civilian experts have claimed to be more dependent on funding than the military, and claimed to receive fewer funds for their activities.

The military commanders perceive the ability to provide security in the area of responsibility and the logistic capabilities to be their comparative advantages. As one of the respondents put it,

“We can be there where there is no safety for the civilian component. (Survey, February 24, 2012).

This is also supported by the data extracted from the questionnaires answered by civilian experts. Most of them agree that the military have an overwhelming superiority when it comes to the ability to assure security and provide logistic support. This is one of the reasons why some of the civilian respondents see themselves as completely dependent on the military, for no movement on the ground can be made without their assistance. In addition, the civilian respondents also claim that the military have the possibility to deliver aid, medical support or humanitarian supplies to more remote areas, which also enables them to better understand the needs of the locals (especially those in more distant areas of the country).


Most of the civilian respondents also mentioned the Quick Impact Projects through which the military can promptly react and provide support to the local population, such as food, clothes or other things needed after a natural disaster or other incidents. Other comparative advantages mentioned were the better culture of planning and a greater manpower.

According to the data gathered during the focus group discussion, civil–military cooperation becomes more and more important in the contemporary military operations. PRTs that encompass both civil and military components are the best examples of such cooperation. The discussants, however, claimed that a number of activities have no clear lines of responsibilities and are performed by both the military and the civilian components of the mission. Despite differences in ex-pertise and certain comparative advantages, both the military and the civilians are involved in police trainings, local population trainings of mine awareness, delivery of emergency aid, and small reconstruc-tion projects. Therefore, various frictions arise during the mission. It is worth noting, that the participants of the focus group strongly stressed the importance of personal relations not only with the local population or the civilians and the military in general, but also between members of the civilian and military components of the mission. According to the discussants, personal character, individual values and views have an important influence on how certain cooperation procedures are being interpreted and implemented. The less regulations (planning, cooperation procedures) there are regarding the civil–military coop-eration, the more space there is for personal initiative. Even though sometimes it can open up new avenues for productive cooperation, it can also disrupt the joint activities and undermine the overall success of the mission.


6. Conclusions

Upon analyzing the quantitative and qualitative data, we can conclude that Lithuania fits rather well the theoretical framework of the geneal-ogy of civil–military cooperation in conflict and post-conflict zones. Initially, the international operations and missions were exclusively composed of the military men, and the recent years have witnessed increased attempts to coordinate civilian and military efforts in bring-ing about sustainable peace in volatile regions. Current international operations and missions have both the civilian and the military com-ponents and strive to make their cooperation as effective as possible.

Both of the groups see each other as a valuable partner and understand the purpose of joint activities. In addition, they agree on the comparative advantages of each other, meaning that both the civilians and the military are consistent in identifying each other’s strengths and weaknesses.

However, the data point to the fact that the cooperation efforts remain largely unplanned and rely on common cooperation procedures. Even though the degree of compliance with these procedures is very high, the civilians and the military both agree that there is an urgent need for a better pre-mission planning, which could be organized jointly. This, however, applies to members of the civilian component of the international operation or mission and is almost impossible to implement with civilians coming from the non-governmental sector.

In addition, the focus group discussion has shown that the success of civil–military cooperation largely depends upon the personal quali-ties and initiative of people in the positions of power (military com-manders or heads of civilian missions). The cooperation procedures set prior to an international operation or mission set the rules of the game; however, the exact areas of cooperation, the frequency of meet-ings and the overall intensity / level of cooperation are subject to the interpretation and ad hoc decisions of those in charge.


The discussed differences in the perception of civil–military cooperation, especially on the part of military commanders, imply that a few conservative narratives and a certain level of mistrust are still present. Hopefully, better trainings and the joint planning of activities may prove to be useful in countering these prejudices.

referenCes

Abbaszadeh, N., Crow, M., El-Khoury, M., Gandomi, J., Kuwayama, D., MacPherson, C., Nutting, M., Parker, N., Weiss, T. (2008, January). Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Lessons and Recommendations. Retrieved from http://wws.princeton.edu/research/pwreports_f07/wws591b.pdf

About Afghanistan (2011). Retrieved from http://www.kariuomene.kam.lt/en/international_operations1446/central_and_south_asia_regon.html

About History (n. d.). Retreived from http://www.isaf.nato.int/history.html

About International Cooperation (2012). Retreived from http://www.policija.lt/index.php?id=3329

About Lithuanian Armed Forces (2009). Retrieved from http://kariuomene.kam.lt/en/military_ins ignia.html

About Lithuanian Development Cooperation. In Lithuanian Development Cooperation. Retrieved from http://www.orangeprojects.lt/site/?page=10

About Mission (n. d.). In EU NANFOR Somalia. Retrieved from http://www.eunavfor.eu/about-us/mission/

Bauza, B. (2010). Bridging efforts: Connecting civilian security and military capability development. EDA Special Bulletin: Bridging Efforts.

Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania (1992). Retrieved from http://www3.lrs.lt/ home/Konstitucija/Constitution.htm

Eronen, O. (2008). PRT models in Afghanistan: Approaches to civil–military integration. Finland Civilian Crisis Management Studies, 1 (5).

Government of the Republic of Lithuania Decree (2011) regarding the service conditions of professional military servants and civil servants from Ministry of Defence while deployed in the Lithuanian diplomatic representations abroad, representations to international organizations, foreign and international


military forces or defense institutions. Retrieved from http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter3/dokpaieska.showdoc_l?p_id=391723&p_query=&p_tr2=2

ISAF Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Handbook (Edition 4). Retrieved from http://info.publicintelligence.net/ISAF-PRThandbook.pdf

Lansford, T., Tashev, B. (eds.). (2004). Old Europe, New Europe And the US: Renegotiating Transatlantic Security In the Post 9/11 Era. Ashgate Pub. Ltd.

Law of the Republic of Lithuania on International Operations, Military Exercies and other Military Co-operation Events (2002). Retrieved from http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter3/ dokpaieska.showdoc_l?p_id=161209

Law on delegating persons to the European Union or other international institutions as well as other foreign national institutions (2009). Retreived from http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter3/dokpaieska.showdoc_l?p_id=349850

Law on the amendment of the law on international operations, military exercises and other military events (2004). Retrieved from http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter3/dokpaieska.showdoc_l?p_id=247223

Stern, M., Ojendal, J. (2010). Mapping the security—development nexus: Conflict, complexity, cacophony, convergence? Security Dialogue, 41 (1), 5–29. doi: 10.1177/0967010609357041

C H A P T E R 3

relationship between Civilian funCtional experts and arMed forCes “on the battlefield”: the Case study of slovenia

R O K Z U PA N Č I Č

1. introduction and background

The Republic of Slovenia declared independence from the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia on the 25th June 1991. A day later, on the 26th June 1991, the Yugoslav People’s Army started a military intervention aimed at occupying the border crossings of Slovenia, thus preventing the new-born country from controlling its territory (Prebilič, Guštin, 2010). Armed hostilities followed for a couple of days, and on the ninth day of the war the two sides disengaged. Slovenian forces took control of all of the country’s border crossings, and the Yugoslav People’s Army units were allowed to withdraw peacefully to the barracks and to cross the border to Croatia. The Ten-day War, as it is publicly known among Slovenians, formally ended on the next day with the signing of the Brioni Accords.1 Upon the signing of the accords, the Territorial Defence, which was responsible for (together with the Police Force) the majority of the resistance operations against the Yugoslav People’s Army, controlled the entire territory of Slovenia.2

1 The terms were distinctly favourable to Slovenia; a three-month moratorium on Slovenian independence was agreed — which in practical terms had little real impact — and the Slovenian police and armed forces were recognized as sovereign on their territory. It was also agreed that all Yugoslav military units would leave Slovenia.

2 In 1968, when the countries of the Warsaw Pact attacked Czechoslovakia, the Yugoslav political and military authorities concluded that Yugoslavia needed more effective armed


During the 10-day conflict, 45 members of the Yugoslav People’s Army and 19 Slovenians were killed.

One of the important tasks of the newly independent country was the establishment of modern armed forces. In 1993, following a reorganization of the Territorial Defence, the Slovenian Armed Forces (SAF) were formally established. A vast majority of Slovenes shared the wish to integrate the country into the European security architecture, which was later on confirmed by the referendum. Slovenian political elites were aware that if the country wished to be part of the “modern world”, it had to become a security-provider and, according to their possibilities, contribute to the world’s peace (Istenič, 2008; Grizold, 2005). In May 1997, the SAF deployed its service members to a crisis response operation for the first time. The first unit deployed to the humanitarian operation Alba in Albania was a medical unit accompanied by four liaison officers.

Joining the European Union and NATO in 2004 brought additional international obligations and commitments for Slovenia. In February 2007, for the first time in its participation in peacekeeping efforts, the SAF deployed an entire battalion-level unit (to Kosovo). The SAF were then for the first time in charge of their own area of responsibility and in command of foreign troops from a NATO country. Currently the SAF’s peacekeeping efforts are focused on multinational operations in Afghanistan (ISAF) and Kosovo (KFOR), while Slovenian troops are also present in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Lebanon, Syria, Serbia and Macedonia.

forces. Therefore, the General People’s Defence doctrine was adopted and the Territorial Defence of the republics and provinces was established. On the basis of lessons learned during World War II, the Territorial Defence was organized mainly in the form of detachments. Within the organization of the armed forces, the Territorial Defence acted as the Yugoslav People’s Army’s auxiliary force. Members of the Territorial Defence felt like Slovenian soldiers and were perceived as such by the local population (Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Slovenia, 2012).

ROK ZUPANČIČ. relationship between civilian functional experts and ... 53

2. a need for Civilian functional experts and experiences of slovenia in Civil–Military Cooperation in Conflict and post-Conflict areas

After the Cold War, new challenges arising from an increasingly complex international community triggered the re-thinking of the roles countries can play in international relations. For the countries, it was not merely the question of survival anymore (and deciding to which of the security-political alliances the country should turn to in order to be appropriately protected from possible threats), but they have started to seek how they can fill certain ‘international niches’ and become credible subjects of international relations.

Slovenia was not an exception in that respect, and more decisive steps of the country in the international arena were favoured by Slov-enian citizens, too. For example, a public opinion survey has shown 31.4% of Slovenians to believe that Slovenia could contribute to con-flict prevention throughout the world by sending troops to peace-keeping operations; another 44.8% of Slovenians believe that Slovenia could contribute to conflict prevention relying on diplomatic activities of the country (preventive diplomacy). In addition, Slovenians over-whelmingly agree with the participation of the SAF in humanitarian and post-conflict recovery operations abroad without using weapons, with the support ranging from 83.4 to 87.3 % from 2001 to 2009.3

Nevertheless, deploying the troops abroad could only insufficiently address the rising complexity of volatile regions. The request for con-tributing civilian functional experts, who possess certain comparative advantages comparing to the military, came from NATO (Vuga, 2006, 7), which has been developing the system of civil–military cooperation

3 Meanwhile, public support for military actions that include use of force is significantly lower. All the data are obtained from the public opinion survey Slovensko javno mnenje (2009), conducted in coordination of the Defence Research Centre and the Public Opinion and Mass Communication Research Centre, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana.


since the midst of the 1990s (Jenkins, 2003, 128). The Slo venian politi-cal elites, relying on the aforementioned support of the public and the NATO’s request, agreed to supplement the endeavours of NATO by al-lowing Slovenian civilian functional experts to take part in the stabili-zation processes in conflict and post-conflict regions. Since 2007, some of the Slovenian civilian functional experts have been integrated in the contingents of the SAF and deployed to volatile regions together with the troops, jointly implementing various stabilization tasks. Further-more, a small number of civilian functional experts have performed tasks within the frameworks of allied contingents or command struc-tures, too.

In 2007, the first important test of civil–military cooperation in practice took place in the framework of the NATO-led operation Joint Enterprise in Kosovo, into which first Slovenian civilian functional experts were deployed to. The particularity of the Slovenian approach towards civil–military cooperation in the post-conflict zones is that civilian functional experts cannot work completely on their own, but are always subordinated to the military commander of the contingent, who has a final say on all the activities of the civilian functional experts.

From February 2007, when the first civilian functional expert was deployed to the conflict or post-conflict zones, till 2010, 18 civilian functional experts were deployed: 8 to Kosovo in the framework of Slovenian KFOR contingents (KFOR 15-20), 4 to NATO Civilian Advisory Team in Kosovo, and 8 to PRTs in Farah and Herat (Afghanistan) (Pipenbaher, 2012, 10–11). They implemented various projects aimed at improving the living conditions in the conflict and post-conflict environment. For example, they were training the Afghani troops how to connect better with the civilian environment, how to do basic veterinarian work and conduct zoonosis prevention (two Slovenian veterinarians were responsible for the vaccination of nomads’ herds and could also give advice to farmers, which was broadcasted on


the radio). In addition, they assisted establishing a local radio in Herat (Afghanistan), functioned as intermediaries planning the cooperation between universities in Ljubljana and Herat, and assisted with other humanitarian issues. In Kosovo, they were building roads, wells and other infrastructure, also gave advice to the accountancy departments, etc. (Slovenian Press Agency, 2009; Pipenbaher, 2009b). The main difference between the participation of Slovenian civilian functional experts in Kosovo and Afghanistan is that those in Afghanistan are part of the PRT CIMIC Centres, while those in Kosovo were directly subordinated to the military commander of the contingent.

3. legal framework

The Government of the Republic of Slovenia began considering the deployment of civilian functional experts to conflict and post-conflict zones as early as in 2000, after the adoption of the obligation (in the framework of the Partnership for Peace Agreement) to establish a group of 10 civilian experts that would be, after a proper training, included in the contingents of the SAF deployed abroad and in the contingents of other coalition forces (see Pipenbaher, 2009b, 43). The Secondment of Personnel to International Civilian Missions and International Organizations Act,4 adopted by the National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia in 2006, and the Decree on the participation of Civilian Experts and capacities in international missions in the defence sector, 5 adopted in 2006, are the fundamental documents that provide the legal framework for the deployment of Slovenian civilian functional experts abroad. On the level of the SAF, civil–military cooperation is also regulated by the Military Doctrine of the SAF (2006) and the Doctrine

4 Zakon o napotitvi oseb v mednarodne civilne misije in mednarodne organizacije (ZNOMCMO).

5 Uredba o sodelovanju civilnih strokovnjakov in zmogljivosti v mednarodnih operacijah na obrambnem področju (Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, 75/2006).


of Civil Defence (2002). Based on these documents, the Slovenian government adopts specific and detailed decrees on the deployment of civilian functional experts to particular stabilization missions.6

The formal requirements which one should fulfil to become a civil functional expert are: the university degree, age criterion (from 30 to 55 years), appropriate health condition, security clearance, the solid command of English, working experience from the area, in which he/she will work as a civilian functional expert. After that, certain courses in which necessary knowledge and skills are obtained have to be taken by the candidate (Pipenbaher in Vuga, 2006, 40).

The Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs coordinate recruitment and carry out all the necessary procedures regarding the deployment of civilian functional experts. Other ministries are also free to contribute their civil functional experts. Financing the projects with “civilian participation” is provided by the Ministry of Defence, which approves the projects and financial framework for their implementation on a case-by-case basis.

4. survey Methodology

In the period from 2007 till 2011, 18 Slovenian civilian functional experts took part in the two stabilization missions: KFOR in Kosovo (11 experts) and ISAF in Afghanistan (7 experts). For the purpose of our research, the contact information of all the civilian functional experts who participated in the SAF contingents was obtained with the assistance of the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Slovenia.7 At that point, it is necessary to mention that various other Slovenian ‘civilian experts’ participated in other conflict and post-conflict zones

6 See, for example, the Decree on the Deployment of the Group of Civil Functional Experts to SIKON KFOR 15, adopted by the Government of the Republic of Slovenia (2006).

7 We are thankful to the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Slovenia, esp. Mrs. Urša Kodrič and Mr. Srečko Zajc, for assistance in that particular respect.


(e. g., policemen in Georgia, etc.), but they were not included in the analysis, which focused on ‘civilian functional experts’ integrated in the military structures of the SAF only.

A questionnaire comprised of questions regarding their personal experience with civil–military cooperation was sent out to each of them.8 Ten civilian functional experts returned their answers (the others did not reply or were not willing to participate in the survey). A response rate of 56% provides with a representative sample and a seemingly good starting point for the analysis.

Subsequently, the questionnaires were sent out to the military commanders who had these civilian functional experts integrated in their contingents (according to Slovenian laws and decrees, civilian functional experts are directly subordinated to the commander of the contingent). Comparing with the civilian functional experts, the response rate of military commanders was lower: only five commanders of the SAF contingents in Kosovo and Afghanistan participated in the survey. After the initial scepsis, this, at the very end, turned out to be not problematic, as the answers provided by the military commanders were quite similar, or at least were pointing out the same problems and challenges. On that basis, we may conclude that additional answers (questionnaires), if obtained, would not significantly change the results.

5. results

As compared with the military commanders, the civilian functional experts are generally more critical regarding the overall perception of the effectiveness of the mission; on a scale from 1 to 5, military commanders value the effectiveness of the mission they were commanding at 4.7,

8 For more information on the methodology, the content of questionnaire, etc., see the introductory part of the book.


and civilian functional experts at 3.6. As for the effectiveness of civil–military cooperation in a particular mission, there is a non-significant difference in answers between the two groups: civilian functional experts and military commanders perceive the effectiveness of civil–military cooperation mostly as good, but not excellent (3.9 among civilian functional experts, and 4.1 among military commanders; the scale from 1 to 5).



effectiveness of the mission 4.15 3.6 4.7

effectiveness of civil–military cooperation in the mission

4.1 3.9 4.3

Frequency of joint (civil–military) action 3.85 3.6 4.1

As for the pre-mission CIMIC training, the analysis of qualitative and quantitative data shows that the first contingents into which civilian functional experts were integrated did not have specific rules and good trainings, since the system of civilian functional experts operating at conflict and post-conflict zones had only been introduced. In the subsequent years, it is not surprising that further steps have been taken in that respect, and that nowadays civilian functional experts, according to their perception, receive good training and background about civil–military cooperation in the field prior to their deployment. This finding is important for projecting the further civil–military cooperation in the field, because it tells that the trainings, as they are performed, are a good and necessary contribution to “avoiding surprises and not meeting expectations from the other side” in the field.




Yes No Yes No Yes No

Was there a CiMiC plan? 81 19 82 18 80 20

Was it followed? 82 18 78 22 87 13

Were there CiMiC procedures? 71 29 64 36 80 20

Were they followed? 100 100 100

Was there pre-mission training? 86 14 82 18 90 10

Was the training joint? 89 11 89 11 89 11

Was the training useful? 100 100 100

Another interesting aspect concerns the perception of the level of military assistance within civil–military cooperation. Military com-manders, who have the right to endorse or reject any kind of military assistance needed for implementing the projects of civilian functional experts (e. g., transportation, logistics, etc.), estimate the level of mili-tary assistance significantly lower (3.2) than do civilian functional ex-perts who perceive and value the level of military assistance very high (4.5 on a scale from 1 to 5). This is an interesting finding, too, since it shows that the military does not think that their contribution to the work of civilian functional experts takes a lot of its resources.

Analysis of open-ended questions (qualitative analysis) further illustrates the challenges within civil–military cooperation between the SAF and Slovenian civilian functional experts. As for the comparative advantages, both of the analysed groups generally agree that civilian functional experts can have an important role in establishing good relations with the civilian population in conflict or post-conflict zones or, in the words of one of the military commanders, civilian functional experts serve as a channel that enables the commander’s dialogue and communication with the host nation, its representatives and key leaders (Survey, 23 January 2012). Perceiving the role of civil military experts among military commanders can go even further; some of


them perceive that civilian functional experts should be utilised as a tool of the military commander and should never act independently. As one of the military commanders put it,

“there should be no civilians out of the control of the commander. If there are civilian functional experts in the military contingent, they should be an asset of the commander. they cannot have a separate mission. If they are humanitarian assistants, they should work in other agencies” (Survey, 23 January 2012).

Civilian functional experts believe that they possess an important comparative advantage in achieving results on the ground because of “… not complicating where and when it is not necessary” (Interview, 5 January 2012). This especially corresponds with the rules of procedure the military personnel usually strictly adhere to. In that respect, civilian functional experts mostly perceive themselves as less bureaucratized and less handicapped by the need to respond to a higher authority. In other words, civilian functional experts believe that they can ‘think out of the box’ and, therefore, have a better understanding of the needs of the local population; on the other hand, military commanders believe that the army’s comparative advantage is order and organization, which contribute to the efficient conduct of tasks. Civilian functional experts also believe that they are better suited for easing the tensions among the local people, though, on the other hand, civilian functional experts may be (occasionally) perceived less seriously by the locals (the latter example was evident in the case of Kosovo where, in the words of one of the civilian functional experts, ‘the respect for the uniform is high’; Interview, 5 January 2012).

On the other hand, the military as a hierarchically organized and relatively resourceful organization possesses certain comparative advantages in the field of civil–military cooperation. Both analysed groups mostly agree that the logistical means the military possess are


essential for any sort of implementation of civilian projects. The civilian functional experts acknowledge that they could not have completed or even initiated certain projects if not for the logistical (and, connected to that, financial) support from the military. In contrast, certain military commanders recognize that civilian functional experts possess the knowledge and skills in the specific fields that the army does not have at their disposal ‘to win the hearts and minds of the local population’ (e. g., civil engineering, road construction, building wells, vaccination of animals, assisting in establishing local media, etc.). Further on, in highly volatile regions (conflict zones), especially in Kosovo, the need for providing security of civilian functional experts by the military was acknowledged by both of the analysed groups.

6. Conclusions

On the basis of the analysis we can conclude that Slovenia fits well in the theory of civil–military cooperation in conflict and post-conflict regions. If the military commanders were initially, when civilian functional experts had been integrated in the structure of military contingents on the ground for the very first time somehow reluctant towards ‘having unorganized civilians on board’, the concept of civil–military cooperation has gradually evolved (when civilian functional experts were deployed for the first time (Kosovo), some of the officers of the SAF did not even know that they would have a single civilian functional expert in their military structures – and not to even mention the question of officers ‘what to do with them’).

Nowadays, both groups mostly recognize the comparative advantages of the other group. The latter is especially evident among civilian functional experts who would have their hands mostly tied in the absence of support from the military in performing certain tasks (logistics, transport, sometimes also financial resources, providing security in highly volatile regions). Namely, only joint efforts of civilians


and military can have an effect in this kind of environment, as one of the respondents put it. On the other hand, a small minority of military commanders share the perception that civilian functional experts should be more ‘respectful and obedient’ to their rules and orders and not act too independently. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that, as one respondent has put it, relying on civil functional experts on the mission is heavily dependent on the military commander’s perception of the role of civilian functional experts. Thus, the question of how to institutionalize and formalise their role within the contingents should be further discussed, in order not to be dependent on the ‘mood and perceptions of a single person’.

Howsoever, we did not find major differences between the two groups in terms of understanding civil–military cooperation on the ground. This is probably also a result of the relatively good training received prior to the deployment to volatile regions, which decreases the possibility of different perceptions of the role of civilian functional experts (the concept of joint trainings has evolved fairly well, so both groups have a possibility to get acquainted with the nature of the work of the other group).

Last but not least, there are certain ‘grey areas’ within civil–military cooperation of the SAF and Slovenian civilian functional experts, which were not analysed in detail in this chapter and could have an important contribution for a more successful cooperation. One of them is undoubtedly the question why there is such a disparity in numbers between civilian functional experts sent to the volatile regions from the Ministry of Defence and the civilian functional experts abroad from the other ministries or governmental agencies. Another question is why only experts from the governmental structures are invited to participate in such missions, and not “outsiders” who may possess knowledge, skills and certain comparative advantages. Furthermore, it is also questionable why the number of Slovenian civilian functional experts deployed to volatile regions is that low as compared with


the other NATO countries. Last but not least, in the times when the legitimacy of the armed forces is being repeatedly challenged (particularly in Slovenia, especially in relation to the deployment of the SAF in Afghanistan), it would be interesting for the general public (taxpayers) to hear and see that their money is being spent on “visible and feasible” (quick-impact) projects, e. g., building roads and schools, developing civil society, etc. that directly help the people in need, and not only on (questionably) such idealistic and immeasurable goals as “bringing peace and stability under Hindukush”.

referenCes

Grizold, A. (2005). Slovenija v spremenjenem varnostnem okolju: k razvoju obrambno zaščitnega sistema: izzivi in spodbude. Ljubljana: Faculty of Social Sciences.

Istenič, S. (2008). Slovenia on the global stage: A role in the Taiwan Strait conflict? Issues & Studies 44 (4): 129-166.

Jenkins, L. (2003). A CIMIC contribution to assessing progress in peace support operations. International Peacekeeping, 10 (3): 121–136.

Kodrič, U. (2011). Email from Urša Kodrič (the Defence Planning Unit; Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Slovenia) to Rok Zupančič, 16 December 2011.

Military Doctrine of the SAF (2006). Retrieved from http://www.mo.gov.si/fileadmin/mo.gov.si/pageuploads/pdf/ministrstvo/vojd2006_eng.pdf (7th Feb-ruary 2012).

Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Slovenia (2012). History. Retrieved from http://www.slovenskavojska.si/en/about-the-slovenian-armed-forces/history/ (7th February 2012).

Pipenbaher, B. (2009a). Civilno-voja ko sodelovanje – geneza, teorija in praksa (Civil-military cooperation – genesis, theory and practice). In Cena (ne)v(®)ednosti – Mirovne operacije – teorija in praksa sodelovanja civilnih zmogljivosti v okviru mednarodnih sil, ed. B. Pipenbaher, pp. 11–33. Ljubljana: Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Slovenia.


Pipenbaher, B. (2009b). Slovenske civilne zmogljivosti za sodelovanje v mednarodnih operacijah na obrambnem področju (Civilian capacities of Slovenia for participation in international operations in the defence sector). In Cena (ne)v(®)ednosti – Mirovne operacije – teorija in praksa sodelovanja civilnih zmogljivosti v okviru mednarodnih sil, ed. B. Pipenbaher, pp. 35–65. Ljubljana: Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Slovenia.

Pipenbaher, B. (2012). Civilni funkcionalni strokovnjaki in druge civilne zmogljivosti v MOM (Civilian functional experts and other civilian capacities in peacekeeping operations and missions). Slovenska vojska, 20 (7): 10–11.

Prebilič, V. & Guštin D. (2010). Warfare lessons learned: the treatment of prisoners of war by the Republic of Slovenia during the Slovenian independence war in 1991. Studia Historica Slovenica, 10 (1): 181–200.

Slovenia War of Independence (2010). Retrieved from http://www.ljubljana-life.com/ljubljana/ten-day-war (6th February 2011).

Slovenian Press Agency (2009). Civilian Experts Joining Military Instructors in Afghanistan (feature). Retrieved from http://www.sta.si/vest.php?s=s&id=1563791 (Accessed on 6 February 2011).

the Decree on the Deployment of the Group of Civil Functional Experts to SIKON KFOR 15 (2006). Adopted by the Government of the Republic of Slovenia.

Vuga, J. (2006). Civilni funkcionalni strokovnjaki v operacijah v podporo miru. Diplomsko delo. Ljubljana: Faculty of Social Sciences.

C H A P T E R 4

Managing the Civil–Military Cooperation in ConfliCt and post-ConfliCt zones: the Case study of the republiC of estonia

A L E K S A N D R D U S M A N

1. introduction and background

Estonia has reclaimed its independence on 20 August 1991 with a declaration of restoring the independent state, issued by the Supreme Council of Estonian Parliament. Despite the initial tension with the rapidly disintegrating Soviet Union, the process of transition from the Soviet occupation, which lasted since 1940, went peacefully and no blood was shed. Iceland was the first country to recognize Estonian independence on August 22. Estonia joined the United Nations on 17 September 1991 (Estonia in the United Nations, 2011). After a national referendum was held on 28 June 1992, Constitution of the Republic of Estonia was adopted. First post-Soviet elections of a new legislature, Riigikogu, on 20 September 1992 concluded the transitional period, and the legal continuity of the Republic of Estonia was fully restored.

Modernization of Estonian armed forces naturally followed. Restoring defense capabilities was of major importance as it helped to solidify the restored status of an independent nation. Along with other Baltic states, finding strong western allies was vital in this process of “return to the West”. Development and maintenance of the transatlantic cooperation was, and still, is viewed as an integral part of national security (Kasekamp, A., Veebel, V. 2007). Joining NATO on 29 March 2004 and the European Union on 1 May 2004 was a logical conclusion of this process.


In order to test and prove its readiness to contribute to international efforts of military cooperation for global security, Estonia has demon-strated its eagerness to participate in international peacekeeping and peace enforcing missions fairly early in its post-Soviet history. In 1995, Estonian infantry platoons (ESTPLA) served as a part of batallion from Denmark in the UN-coordinated mission in Croatia (UNPROFOR). In 1996, a company-sized unit was fielded for the first time in Lebanon du-ring the UNIFIL mission (Estonia in the United Nations, 2011).

Since 1995, Estonian troops participated in numerous international peacekeeping and peacenforcing missions, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Iraq and Afghanistan. Presently, Estonia has military units stationed in Afghanistan, which is by far the biggest Estonian military contribution to international peacekeeping consisting of up to 165 troops. A vessel protection detachment of 10 troops participates in the ATALANTA operation organized by the European Union in Somalia; 50 troops remain in high-readiness as part of the European Union Nordic Battlegroup. Estonia also contributes staff officers and military observers to Kosovo Force (KFOR), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Middle East and NATO Training Mission in Iraq (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 2011).

2. legal framework

Participation of Estonian Defense Forces in international missions has to be approved by a mandate from the Parliament (Riigikogu). Legal Acts and Resolutions that regulate national security and defense are being drafted by the National Defense Commitee (Estonian National Defense Commitee, 2012). It works in close cooperation with the Foreign Affairs Commitee. The Parliament adops laws and ratifies international agreeements. The President of the Republic can make proposals to the Parliament to declare war or state of emergency and suggest an appointment of Chief of Defense. The President is advised

ALEKSANDR DUSMAN. Managing the Civil-Military Cooperation in Conflict and ... 67

by The Narional Defense Council. The Government initiates work on legislation related to national defense. The practical implementation of national defense policy is delegated to the Ministry of Defense.

Among Acts and Regulations that address the participation of Estonian military troops and civilian experts in international missions, some are more general, covering the overall structure and functions of national defense forces and international military cooperation, such as Peace-time National Defense Act (6 February 1995 and 12 June 2002), National Security Concept of the Republic of Estonia (12 May 2010) and International Military Cooperation Act (12 February 2003). Others are more specific when all conditions of a single peacekeeping or peacenforcing mission have to be clearly set and described, such as Resolution of the Riigikogu on the Use of the Estonian Defense Forces Unit in Performance of International Obligations of the Estonian State under the International Peacekeeping Mission in Afghanistan (22 January 2003). Participation of civilian experts in international missions is regulated by Participation in International Civilian Missions Act (9 February 2011).

3. experience of estonia in Civil–Military Cooperation in Conflict and post-Conflict areas

Participation in the International Security Assistance Force in Afgha-nistan (ISAF) is not only a military priority for Estonian internatio-nal peacekeeping efforts, but also the only real current opportunity to deploy numerous civilian experts in a conflict zone where they have an opportunity to experience civil–military cooperation.

The basis for this oppurtinity exists in the form of Provincial Reconstruction Teams. Although being a relatively new approach in international peacekeeping, they provide a perfect platform for prac-tice in civil–military cooperation. Th e main goal of PRTs is to pro-The main goal of PRTs is to pro-vide a transitional civil–military structure for recovering post-conflict


regions, which improves additional security and boosts its reconstruc-tion and economic development (Nima Abbaszadeh et al, 2008). Both components of PRT’s, civilian and military, are integral. The military component provides security and contributes to reconstruction proj-ects, but it is often limited in scope and longevity. The civilian com-ponent has more resources to spend long-term, but it often requires constant support and protection, especially in those regions of Af-ghanistan where the security situation is more unstable. Estonia cur-rently participates in the UK-led PRT located in Helmand Province in southern Afghanistan.

The first civilian expert from Estonia arrived in Afghanistan in Sep-tember 2006, tasked with establishing the Estonian diplomatic represen-tation in Afghanistan and working as a member of PRT located in Lash-kar Gah, the capital of Helmand Province. In 2007, the Estonian special mission was established in Kabul, and another civilian expert – security advisor from the Ministry of Defense – was sent to contribute to the USA Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC-A). It later got transformed into the the NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan (NTM-A), and Estonia continues to contribute its security advisors who help with overseeing training and equipping Afghan forces.

Estonia also contributes police officers to the NATO Training Mission to help train the local police force and the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL), which is also aimed at improving the interior security of the country via building up the police system of Afghanistan. In those two civil missions there are currently up to 8 police officers stationed in Afghanistan simultaneously (Estonia and Afghanistan, 2012).

Apart from contributing its experience of police work, Estonia also focuses its civilian efforts in the area of health care. Since March 2008, Estonian health care expert has participated in the British-led PRT in Helmand Province as a Health Thematic Head. His task is to advise the local government on the development of health care


system in Helmand Province (Estonia’s contribution to rebuilding Afghanistan, 2012). In 2011, a 5-member team of Estonian reservist military surgeons went to the Camp Bastion field hospital in Southern Afghanistan for a 3-month period to gain the experience of working in field conditions. Previously, Estonian medics were stationed in Camp Bastion one at a time.

In addition to continuing participation in civil–military projects in Afghanistan, in 2003 Estonia contributed staff officers as civil–military cooperation experts to the Operation Concordia in Macedonia and Kosovo Force (KFOR). Estonia continues to participate in the civilian mission EULEX in Kosovo with six civilian experts (Estonia and Kosovo, 2012).

4. survey Methodology

In order to obtain data from respondents having first-hand experience in civil–military cooperation, survey questionnaires were sent out to civilian experts and military officers who participated in international peacekeeping and peace enforcing missions. Ten filled questionnaires were returned. The Estonian general sample consists of eight civilian and two military respondents. Unfortunately, the response rate of military respondents turned out to be inadequate, thus rendering any statistical comparisons between two groups impossible. Qualitative data received from open-ended questions, however, will be used in Results section from military respondents as well.

The civilian sample consists of eight filled questionnaires that cover 10 international peacekeeping missions. After filtering out two missions that took place over fifteen years ago (in 1995 and 1996), the final civil-ian sample includes eight missions of eight respondents ranging from 2005 to 2012. Even though it is very important to trace the dynamics of changes in civil–military cooperation over the years, the sample size of older missions is not enough to warrant a comparative analysis.


Among eight civilian respondents, there are six males and two females. Average age is 38.9 years. The location of the missions varies, but Afghanistan is the most prominent – 4 missions out of 8. Two missions are in Georgia, one in Kosovo and one Moldova. This reflects the current priorities of Estonia in international peacekeeping, as Afghanistan is by far its most important area of focus. The occupation of respondents also reflects the Estonian experience of participation in PRTs and experience sharing projects in its main areas of expertise – local police and health care. Both military officers are males with a recent deployment experience in Kosovo and Afghanistan.1

5. results

Estonian civilian experts rated the overall effectiveness of missions they participated in as rather average. “Overall perceived effectiveness of the Mission” was rated 3.13 (mean value among all eight respondents on a scale from 1 to 5). the effectiveness of civil–military cooperation in a particular mission was rated 3.75, which can be classified as good, but not excellent.

the frequency of joint civil–military action was rated 3.87. This indicates that civilian experts interacted with their military counterparts and participated in the same projects as the military on a regular basis.


effectiveness of the mission 3.13

effectiveness of civil–military cooperation in the mission 3.75

Frequency of joint (civil–military) action 3.87

1 For more information regarding the content of the questionnaire, see the introductory chapter of the publication.


The pre-mission planning and training are vital for ensuring that the link between civilian and military elements of the mission will function properly. Of the respondents, 71% indicated that there was a civil–military cooperation plan prepared before the start of the mission. When the plan was set in place, it was always followed during the mission.

Civil-military cooperation procedures, however, were set only in 43% cases, but when set were also always followed; 50% of civilian experts went through civil–military training prior to mission. In all cases it was a joint one (civilian experts and military personnel), and all respondents indicated that it was useful.


Yes No

Was there a civil–military cooperation plan? 71 29

Was it followed? 100

Were there cooperation procedures? 43 57

Were they followed? 100

Was there pre-mission training? 50 50

Was the training joint? 100

Was the training useful? 100

The next set of questions analyzed the dependence of civilian experts and local civilian population on military support and its effectiveness. the need for military assistance to the humanitarian efforts and the level of military assistance during civil–military cooperation were rated high (3.50 and 3.75), while the importance of military protection for civilian agencies, though lower (3.38), was also rated above the average.

The only variable in this section, that rated below average (2.50) was the ability of civilians to act independently, which shows that, from the civilian point of view, a close cooperation with the military in conflict and post-conflict zones is not only appreciated but also inevitable as civilians lack the ability to act without support / supervision from the military.


TABle 4.3: level of assistance and protection (values = means)

Need for military assistance to humanitarian efforts 3.50

level of military assistance during CiMiC 3.75

importance of military protection for civilian agencies 3.38

Ability of civilians to act independently 2.50

Open-ended questions have demonstrated that there is a wide range of opinions regarding the nature and structure of civil–military cooperation. When asked to define what is civil–military cooperation, military commanders focused more on aspects directly related to a successful execution of the military mission and interaction with local civilian population:

“Assistance to civilian population in order to help them to manage with basic needs for living” (Survey, April 2012).

“the interaction between Alliance forces and the civil environment (both governmental and non-governmental) in which they operate is crucial for the success of operations (or, as we can say in other words, for successfully achieving the military commander’s end state!)” (Survey, April 2012).

Civilian experts focused more on the concept of joint effort:

“Joint efforts from civilian and military side to fulfil the mission mandate/tasks” (Survey, April 2012).

“Military support to civilian activities as well as joint planning, information sharing, etc.” (Survey, April 2012).

“Disaster relief, where Civil-Mil contribute and make a joint effort” (Survey, April 2012).

Another civilian expert with a military background highlighted this difference in definitions as an inevitable outcome of different perspectives and objectives of actors in the field of civil–military cooperation:


“the term “civil–military cooperation” is designed by the people who think that they are obliged to manipulate the conflict from aside. Before you ask you have to decide on which side you are. the adversaries and the mediators of the conflict describe the term “civil–military cooperation” very differently, depending on the situation and on their objectives” (Survey, April 2012).

Discussing comparative advantages of civilians in conflict and post-conflict zones, civilian experts highlighted their flexibility as compared with the military, rebuilding and stabilizing regions after the military achieved their goals, as well as focused professionalism in specific fields:

“If to consider police as civilian, then our advantage is our specific field knowledge. More detailed levels of police/border guard work can only be assisted and advised by specialists and experts in this field (in some areas military experience might though be helpful)” (Survey, April 2012).

“Civilians (also police) might be a bit more flexible than the military, mainly due to different legal aspects of their work” (Survey, April 2012).

“After military has done its job civilian powers have to stabilize the region. In general military is giving its responsibilities over to civilians step by step” (Survey, April 2012).

Comparative advantages of the military included: training of local defense forces, organization, providing security of the area, air support and medical evaluation (Medevac). These advantages become more prominent if the military is active in the area. The division of tasks in conflict and post-conflict zones is a dynamic process, which often depends on security situation. As one military commander has put it,

“less security – more military. More security – less military” (Survey, April 2012).


6. Conclusions

The results demonstrate that civil / military cooperation in modern conflict and post-conflict zones occurs on a regular basis. Quantitative data based on responses of civilian experts shows that modern civil–military cooperation is not only frequent, but also effective, even if not always perfect. Joint civil–military action is one of the important indicators which show that during modern peacekeeping missions the military and civilian experts no longer function in isolation but actively merge their efforts to bring peace and stability into conflict and post-conflict zones.

The very definition and understanding of the term “civil–military cooperation”, however, may differ for military commanders and civil-ian experts. It is noticeable that while civilian experts regularly use the word “joint” when describing the process of civil / military coopera-“joint” when describing the process of civil / military coopera-tion, respondents from the military prefer terms like “assistance” and “interaction”. It is possible to suggest that while the frequency and ef-fectiveness of this process increases, the military side still sees itself as a leading partner. The limited ability of civilians to act independently is also an important factor. Security conditions may vary drastically from one region / mission to another, and to perfectly capture the moment of transition from “more military – less civilians” to “less military – more civilians” is not an easy task.

From the practical point of view, pre-mission training is an aspect that definitely has a potential for improvement. There is a clear deficit of a joint preparation and development of pre-mission procedures. The positive side is that when a proper preparation takes place, it is always followed during the mission.


referenCes

Estonia and Afghanistan. Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2012). Retrieved from http://www.vm.ee/?q=en/node/7997

Estonia and Kosovo (2012). Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Retrieved from http://www.vm.ee/?q=en/node/8017

Estonia’s contribution to rebuilding Afghanistan (2012). Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Retrieved from http://www.vm.ee/&q=en/node/4080

Estonia in the United Nations (2011). Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Retrieved from http://www.vm.ee/?q=en/node/4088

Eesti kaitseväe üksuse kasutamine Eesti riigi rahvusvaheliste kohustuste täitmisel rahvusvahelisel rahutagamismissioonil Afganistanis (2003). Resolution of the Riigikogu on the Use of the Estonian Defense Forces Unit in Performance of International Obligations of the Estonian State under the International Peacekeeping Mission in Afghanistan. Riigi Teataja, January 2003.

Estonian National Defense Committee (2012). Retrieved from http://www.riigikogu.ee/index.php?id=35293

Eesti Julgeolekupoliitika alused (2010). National Security Concept of the Republic of Estonia. Retrieved from http://www.vm.ee/sites/default/files/JPA_2010.pdf

Information Exchange on the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (2011). Retrieved from http://www.osce.org/fsc/77820

Kasekamp, A., Veebel, V. (2007). Overcoming doubts: The Baltic States and European Security and Defence Policy. The Estonian Foreign Policy Yearbook.

Nima Abbaszadeh et al, Provincial Reconstruction Teams, Lessons and Recommendations, Woodrow Wilson School of Public & International Affairs, Princeton University, January 2008.

Rahuaja riigikaitse seadus (2002). Peace-time National Defense Act. Retrieved from https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/12751452

Rahvusvahelise sõjalise koostöö seadus (2003). International Military Cooperation Act. Retrieved from https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/12751458

Rahvusvahelisel tsiviilmissioonil osalemise seadus (2011). Participation in International Civilian Missions Act. Retrieved from https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/RTsMS

P A R T I I I

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

C H A P T E R 5

ConClusions and reCoMMendations

L I N A S T R U P I N S K I E N Ė , U G N Ė P E T R AU S K A I T Ė , A S TA R I N K E V I Č I Ū T Ė

Common Challenges

All three Eastern and Central European nations have relatively little experience when it comes to participation in international operations or other military missions, therefore, in civil–military cooperation in general. Thus, the challenges they face are very similar.

All of the countries investigated have started participating in conflict resolution efforts in the beginning of the 1990s and since then have been slowly developing civil–military cooperation procedures. At first, only the military component of the mission was deployed to conflict and post-conflict zones, and the civilian component was introduced later. From no to relatively little planning and regulating the cooperation issues all these countries went to rather well developed civil–military cooperation doctrines.

However, certain problems still prevail and are common for Lithuania, Estonia and Slovenia. To begin with, the initial pre-mission planning remains limited to the military sector. Most often the civilian actors present in the field do not engage in an elaborate pre-mission planning of the future cooperation with the military while in the field. Surprisingly, this is not true for non-governmental agencies, especially for those coming from Lithuania.

Secondly, the pre-mission trainings are also less common in the civilian sector. Less than half of the civilian functional experts have

. 79LINA STRUPINSKIENĖ, UGNĖ PETRAUSKAITĖ, ASTA RINKEVIČIŪTĖ. Conclusions and recommendations

undergone pre-mission trainings in all of the ECE countries, versus the overwhelming majority of the military officers.

Thirdly, despite the fact that the cooperation procedures are normally set prior to (less so in Estonia) and strictly followed during the mission, they fail to regulate all avenues of possible interaction, leaving room for personal improvisation and interpretation of regulations. The lack of explicit regulations contributes to the fact that civil–military cooperation remains largely dependent upon the personal initiative of those in the position of power. It is also important to note that the decision makers may find themselves in a different starting position due to certain changes in budgetary allocations, strategic priorities or the level of involvement of the local population, which occur during their particular rotations.

The responses reveal also the overall inability of civilians to act in-dependently in conflict and post-conflict zones. Due to the overarch-ing superiority of the military in terms of men-power, security and logistics expertise, the civilian actors rely on them for guaranteeing security and enabling them to move around in the area. This under-lines the particular vulnerability of the civilian actors, especially in situations where an assigned military commander is skeptical regard-ing their capabilities or the importance of their activities for achieving the goals of the mission.

Finally, the analysis of responses to open-ended questions reveals very similar patterns in perceiving civil–military cooperation. Military commanders tend to think of cooperation in terms of “assistance” and “support”, whereas civilian actors define it in terms of “synergy”, “joint efforts”, “common goals”, etc. In Slovenia, this trend is less visible, probably because of the more developed pre-mission training system.

80 PART I I I • CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

best practices

Despite the remaining challenges, civil–military cooperation is becoming increasingly more frequent; therefore, it is becoming an educational experience for both the civilians and the military. Judging from the responses of informants from Lithuania, Estonia, and Slovenia, the majority of experts currently deployed in conflict and post-conflict zones are able to recognize each other’s strengths and weaknesses and can accurately identify the comparative advantages possessed by both the military and civilian actors, which was not the case at the beginning of civil–military cooperation when the military did not know how to employ civilian experts efficiently for contributing to the conflict and post-conflict stabilization. The responses of all informants were absolutely consistent in describing the comparative advantages possessed by military and civilian actors in all three countries. Therefore, we can conclude that a shared understanding of each other’s roles and potential does exist. This can be attributed to increasingly frequent interactions, experience of joint activities as well as pre-mission trainings.

All the respondents agree that the pre-mission trainings on civil–military cooperation were particularly useful. Most of those who haven’t had any training also claim that trainings would be very welcome and would contribute to the overall effectiveness of civil–military cooperation and thus to the effectiveness of the mission in general. Slovenia has a well developed training system; most of the civilian and military experts deployed have to undergo them. It also worth noting that these trainings are conducted jointly. The positive impact of such trainings can be observed as a relatively little “mistrust” exhibited by military commanders towards the civilians and the positive attitude of civil experts towards the military. On the other hand, it should be noted that the current pre-mission training system is a result of a long-term commitment and collaboration of certain individuals employed


at the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Slovenia, who believed that such an approach in managing modern operations in conflict and post-conflict zones can make an important contribution to the effectiveness of the stabilization efforts of war-torn societies. Without their dedication and willingness to take professionally risky decisions, this would not have been possible.

Moreover, all the three countries have set clear civil–military coop-eration procedures. Despite the fact that these procedures may some-times not cover all the possible avenues of interaction, the respondents from all these countries were consistent in claiming that the proce-dures were set prior to their deployment and were strictly followed while in the field. This is a strong indicator that adherence to the rules is plausible in conflict and post-conflict zones. Therefore, explicit co-operation procedures could be used for regulating the civil–military relations and for opening up new avenues for cooperation. Interest-ingly, in Estonia, cooperation procedures were sometimes replaced by a careful pre-mission planning that clearly delineated the rules of joint activities and identified the roles to be played by the military and civil-ian actors.

way ahead

Drawing on the common challenges and the best practices of civil–military cooperation in Lithuania, Estonia, and Slovenia, certain recommendations can be outlined. To begin with, we witnessed an overwhelming support for the pre-mission trainings on civil–military cooperation coming from both the civilian and the military sectors. Therefore, states sending their military and civilian personnel to in-ternational military operations and missions are strongly advised to commit to training and deployment of an adequate number of appro-priately qualified specialists. The training and selection of civilian and military cooperation specialists should meet high quality standards.


In addition, the trainings could be organized jointly in order to create a much needed dialogue between the civilians and the military and counter the existent prejudices and stereotypes.

Also, taking into account that respondents from all three countries were consistent in claiming that careful pre-mission planning, clearly delineated rules of joint activities, and the defined roles of the military and civilian actors were extremely helpful in achieving the common goals – as clear as possible cooperation regulations should be set prior to the deployment. Civilian and military cooperation should be able to understand the civil–military cooperation as based on equal partnership, complementarity, and a clear separation of functions.

Moreover, all informants underlined the importance of the ability to recognize each other’s strengths and weaknesses; therefore, the civilian actors should acquire an understanding of the military’s interests and objectives, and vice versa. The military should not independently commit itself to the projects that require a specific expertise of the civilians, and the civilians should properly assess the security threats and the level of assistance that they might need while implementing the objectives of their particular missions. It is important that all actors increase the insight into the differences and similarities of each other’s approaches to cooperation. The better understanding would make the cooperation more fluid and effective.

A number of recommendations can be made regarding the informal civil–military cooperation issues that emerged during the focus group discussions. Firstly, a careful pre-mission planning delineating the specific instances of cooperation that have to be achieved may prevent inaction from the part of those in a position of power. Secondly, a careful selection procedure of civilian experts or military commanders should ensure that their understanding of civil–military cooperation is in accordance with the civil–military cooperation doctrine followed by the country in question. Thirdly, a well designed training system that would introduce the persons deployed to international military


operations and missions to the civil–military cooperation practices and underline the importance of joint activities could contribute to decreasing the reluctance to cooperate on the personal level. All in all, whenever certain behavioral aspects of the actors are not mandated by law or regulated by official procedures, it becomes crucially important to converge the preferences of different agents, so that they would result in cooperative ventures. Thus, the informal sphere of civil–military affairs should be understood as a highly influential factor and seriously taken into account by both parties as well as scholars investigating the civil–military cooperation.

Civil-military cooperation should always be a deliberative process involving a continuous dialogue regarding the interests, objectives and instruments employed by all the stakeholders, and it should not be used as a vehicle for asserting the objectives of the military or the civilians alone. Civilian and military actors should keep each other informed at all levels and at all stages – from the decision-making to implementation of specific activities – about their objectives and intentions, and coordinate their approaches. This should generate additional safeguards and result in a higher interdependence between the members of the alliances and shield them from hidden agendas and opportunistic behavior.

Several interviewees have mentioned that the local community is the best reflection of the effectiveness of civil–military cooperation. Lack of attention to the involvement of the local population and the overall reputation of the mission within it may result in a decreased level of sustainability of the mission. Consequently, it is recommended to proceed with a joint public relations strategy aiming to inform the local community about the civil–military cooperation in the area. The most visible civil–military cooperation projects, such as digging wells, building roads or repairing the infrastructure, are generally highly sup-ported by the locals and are only rarely perceived as a political means to achieve other (political, economic or military) goals. However, the


joint public relations strategy should be conducted with great caution (and not enforced, if it is not supported by the local population), espe-cially when conducted in the name of an actor (whether a state or an organization) which does not have a complete legitimacy or a positive image in the area.

A firm recommendation to improve civil–military cooperation in any conflict or post-conflict area should be the call for opening new avenues for joint efforts in fighting against corruption and for gender equality, ensuring the implementation of human rights, impartiality and neutrality in the whole range of activities. In addition, other non-state actors could significantly contribute to civil–military cooperation, especially in the era of austerity measures when defence budgets are constantly facing severe cuts. Hence, one of the most pressing challenges for civil–military cooperation remains an efficient engagement of the private sector in the stabilization processes in conflict and post-conflict zones.

To sum up, the effectiveness of international military operations and missions heavily depends on the ability to coordinate the activities of civilians and the military into a coherent, comprehensive strategy and practice. An effective cooperation maximizes the use of military and civilian assets, increases the security of the military, and facilitates a more rapid transfer of responsibility to local civilian authorities. Therefore, it is necessary to keep structuring the cooperation and liaison processes on a regular basis, searching for the best partnership models in response to the most recent and specific needs on the mission field.

This project is a good example of how important it is to analyze and evaluate different civil–military cooperation experiences. Strategic developments should not be limited to technocratic quick-fix decisions but should be founded on both theoretical and empirical grounds. Thus, civil–military cooperation can make an effective contribution only if it is embedded in a sound political strategy which takes into account the ideas, capacities and resources of all relevant actors


engaged in conflict and post-conflict stabilization efforts and aims to fulfil viable, though still ambitious, goals. To this end, a precise analysis of the causes of the conflict is needed from the very beginning in order to find proper solutions (in coordination with the local community), followed by the constant assessment of the developments on the ground, and consequent adjustments of the strategies and actions to the new realities are necessary, too.

This paper is a modest attempt to delineate the common challenges and best practices of the civil–military cooperation coming from the Central and Eastern European nations. Comprehensive and innovative research that would cover more states would be of particular impor-tance in achieving an effective civil–military cooperation for peace and conflict resolution worldwide.

Civil–Military Cooperation in ConfliCt

and post-ConfliCt operations:

learning froM the lithuanian, slovenian and estonian

experienCes

English language editor Lina Strupinskienė Designer Audronė Uzielaitė Layout Vida Vaidakavičienė

3.3 author’s sheets; 5.5 printer’s sheets Print run 200 copies

Published by VšĮ AKADEMINĖ LEIDYBATauro Str. 5, Vilnius, Lithuania

Printed by UAB „Petro ofsetas“Savanorių pr. 174D, Vilnius, Lithuania

Ci287 Civil–Military Cooperation in Conflict and post-Conflict operations: learning from the lithuanian, slovenian and estonian experiences. – Vilnius: Akademinė leidyba, 2012. – 88 p.

ISBN 978-9955-33-670-9

This book analyzes the Lithuanian, Slovenian and Estonian experiences with civil–military cooperation in conflict and post-conflict zones. Drawing on the analysis of the most common challenges and the best practices of the recent civil–military cooperation (in the Balkans and Afghanistan), it aims to provide recom-mendations for scholars, practitioners, and decision-makers.

UDK 327.5(474.5:497.12:474.2)

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