Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 163515 October 31, 2008ISIDRO T. PAJARILLAGA,Petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS and THOMAS T. KALANGEG,Respondents.D E C I S I O NQUISUMBING, Acting C.J.:This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1dated January 26, 2004 and the Resolution2dated May 14, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47526. The appellate court affirmed the Orders3dated January 29, 1998 and March 26, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bontoc, Mt. Province, Branch 36, which had denied petitioners Motion for Leave of Court to Take the Deposition of the Defendant Upon Written Interrogatories.The antecedent facts are as follows:On November 24, 1995, private respondent Thomas T. Kalangeg filed with the RTC of Bontoc, Mt. Province, Branch 36, a complaint4for a sum of money with damages against petitioner Isidro T. Pajarillaga.Since the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement, trial on the merits ensued. On March 10, 1997, private respondent presented his first witness. At the next scheduled hearing on August 8, 1997, neither petitioner nor his counsel appeared despite notice. Upon private respondents motion, the trial court allowed him to present his remaining two witnesses subject to petitioners cross-examination on the next scheduled hearing on September 2, 1997. But when the case was called on that date, petitioner and his counsel were again absent. Upon private respondents motion, the trial court declared petitioner to have waived his right of cross-examination and allowed private respondent to make a formal offer of evidence.In an Order dated October 8, 1997, the trial court admitted all the exhibits formally offered by private respondent. It also scheduled petitioners presentation of evidence on October 28, 29 and 30, 1997.Petitioner moved to reset the hearing to November 17, 1997. The trial court granted his motion and reset the hearing to December 15, 1997.On December 10, 1997, however, petitioner filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Take the Deposition of the Defendant Upon Written Interrogatories5on the grounds that: (1) petitioner resides in Manila which is more than four hundred (400) kilometers from Bontoc, Mt. Province; and (2) petitioner is suffering from an illness which prohibits him from doing strenuous activities.Private respondent opposed the motion. On December 15, 1997, neither petitioner nor his counsel again appeared. Nonetheless, the trial court reset the case to January 12, 1998 for the presentation of petitioners evidence. What transpired on said date, however, is not disclosed by the records before this Court.In an Order6dated January 29, 1998, the trial court denied petitioners motion, in this wise:Considering that the above-entitled case has been pending since November 24, 1995, and hearings thereof have been delayed almost always at the instance of the defendant, the latters motion for leave of Court to take said defendants deposition upon written interrogatories at this late stage of the proceedings is hereby denied.Wherefore, in the interest of justice defendant is granted one more chance to adduce his evidence on February 18, 1998, at 8:30 oclock in the morning. Otherwise, he shall be deemed to have waived his right thereto.SO ORDERED.Petitioner moved for reconsideration which the trial court denied. It also reset the hearing to April 20, 1998.7Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court. In affirming the trial courts orders, the appellate court ruled that: First, the denial of petitioners motion was not tainted with grave abuse of discretion since the trial court gave petitioner full opportunity to present his evidence. Second, petitioners motion came much too late in the proceedings since private respondent has already rested his case. Third, the medical certificate which petitioner submitted to validate his allegation of illness merely contained a remark that the "patient is advised to avoid strenuous activity." It did not state that the travel from Manila to Mt. Province for the scheduled hearings was too strenuous to endanger petitioners health. Fourth, the threats to petitioners life by private respondents relatives were belatedly alleged only in his motion for reconsideration.Dissatisfied, petitioner appealed to this Court on the ground that the Court of Appeals erred in: DENYING PETITIONERS PRAYER THAT HIS DEPOSITION BE TAKEN THROUGH WRITTEN INTERROGATORIES IN CONNECTION WITH A CASE WHICH IS BEING HEARD BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF BONTOC, MT. PROVINCE THAT CAN BE REACHED AFTER A GRUELLING SEVEN (7) HOUR RIDE TRAVERSING VERY ROUGH AND RUGGED ROADS.8Simply stated, the issue is whether the taking of petitioners deposition by written interrogatories is proper under the circumstances obtaining in this case.Petitioner asserts that the trial court should have allowed the taking of his deposition through written interrogatories since: (1) this discovery measure may be availed of by a party as a matter of right; (2) he has good reasons for invoking his right to this discovery measure, i.e., he resides in Manila which is more than four hundred (400) kilometers from Bontoc, Mt. Province and he is suffering from an illness which prohibits him from doing strenuous activities. Petitioner adds that there are serious threats to his life by private respondents relatives.Private respondent counters that petitioner could no longer avail of this discovery measure since the trial court has already given him sufficient time to present his evidence and yet he failed to do so. Private respondent adds that petitioners motion was made purposely to further delay the resolution of the case as it was invoked during the late stage of the proceedings. Private respondent also avers that the medical certificate submitted to show petitioners illness does not contain any statement that he could not travel from Manila to Mt. Province for the scheduled hearings. In fact, the medical certificate was not even notarized.After considering the contentions and submissions of the parties, we are in agreement that the petition lacks merit.Deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery, the primary function of which is to supplement the pleadings for the purpose of disclosing the real points of dispute between the parties and affording an adequate factual basis during the preparation for trial.9It should be allowed absent any showing that taking it would prejudice any party. It is accorded a broad and liberal treatment and the liberty of a party to make discovery is well-nigh unrestricted if the matters inquired into are otherwise relevant and not privileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and within the bounds of law. It is allowed as a departure from the accepted and usual judicial proceedings of examining witnesses in open court where their demeanor could be observed by the trial judge, consistent with the principle of promoting just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding; and provided it is taken in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court, i.e., with leave of court if summons have been served, and without such leave if an answer has been submitted; and provided further that a circumstance for its admissibility exists.10There is nothing in the Rules of Court or in jurisprudence which restricts a deposition to the sole function of being a mode of discovery before trial. Under certain conditions and for certain limited purposes, it may be taken even after trial has commenced and may be used without the deponent being actually called to the witness stand.11There is no rule that limits deposition-taking only to the period of pre-trial or before it; no prohibition exists against the taking of depositions after pre-trial. There can be no valid objection to allowing them during the process of executing final and executory judgments, when the material issues of fact have become numerous or complicated.12Such being the case, there is really nothing objectionable, per se, with petitioner availing of this discovery measure after private respondent has rested his case and prior to petitioners presentation of evidence. To reiterate, depositions may be taken at any time after the institution of any action, whenever necessary or convenient.But when viewed vis the several postponements made by petitioner for the initial presentation of his evidence, we are of the view that his timing is, in fact, suspect. The records before us show that petitioner stopped attending the hearings after private respondent presented his first witness. Petitioner offered no excuse for his and his counsels absences. Moreover, the trial court has set four (4) hearing dates for the initial presentation of his evidence. But he merely moved for its resetting without invoking the grounds which he now presents before us.Besides, even as we scrutinize petitioners arguments, we think that he has not sufficiently shown an "exceptional" or "unusual" case for us to grant leave and reverse the trial and appellate courts.Under Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, depositions may be used for the trial or for the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding, under the following circumstances:SEC. 4. Use of depositions. x x x x(c) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party for any purpose if the court finds: (1) that the witness is dead; or (2) that the witness resides at a distance more than one hundred (100) kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it appears that his absence was procured by the party offering the deposition; or (3) that the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment; or (4) that the party offering the deposition has been unable to procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena; or (5) upon application and notice, that such exceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the interest of justice and with due regard to the importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to allow the deposition to be used; andx x x x13In this case, petitioner invokes distance and illness to avail of the discovery measure.1avvphi1We agree with private respondent that the matter of distance could have been settled had petitioner requested for a change of venue earlier in the proceedings. Petitioner has attended the pre-trial and the hearing where private respondent presented his first witness. He need not await his turn to present evidence before realizing the great inconvenience caused by the enormous distance between his place of residence and the place of hearing.Nor are we inclined to accept petitioners claim of illness. As aptly observed by the Court of Appeals, the medical certificate submitted by petitioner merely contained a remark that the "patient is advised to avoid strenuous activity." It was not alleged that the travel from Manila to Mt. Province for the scheduled hearings was too strenuous to endanger petitioners health.We also agree with the Court of Appeals that the threats to petitioners life by private respondents relatives appear to be a mere afterthought since it was raised only in petitioners motion for reconsideration of the trial courts denial of his motion for leave. We also note that the incident which gave rise to the alleged threats took place prior to the pre-trial. Surely, petitioner could have informed the trial court of this incident had there been truth to, and serious implication of, his allegation.Finally, we must emphasize that while the rules on discovery are liberally constructed so as to ascertain truth and to expedite the disposal of cases, the trial court may disallow a deposition if there are valid reasons for so ruling.14Here, we find the protracted delay in the litigation at petitioners instance coupled with the belated and unsubstantiated allegations of illness and threats to petitioners life, more than sufficient reasons for the trial court to deny petitioners motion.WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated January 26, 2004 and the Resolution dated May 14, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47526, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.SO ORDERED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaTHIRD DIVISIONG.R. No. 148021 December 6, 2006SIME DARBY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, OSCAR E. PACIS, RAMON C. REYES, FRANCISCO R. REY, ROLITO C. MARTIREZ, RAUL E. BARDE, HELINO A. TIAMSON, JOSE G. AQUINO, ESTANILO M. SAMSON, CELESTINO A. SANTOS, REYNALDO MENDOZA, RAMON A. CIPRIANO, R. CAJAYON, EMMANUEL M. PALIS, JOSELITO DE PAZ, ARNOLD J. DE GUZMAN, BENJAMIN C. DELA PAZ, JR., FERDINAND R. SACLUTI, LAMBERTO S. LOPEZ, JR., GAVINO T. REFUERZO, ORLANDO B. PATENIA, EDWIN H. GULAPA, RUBEN G. CRUZ, REYNALDO E. ATANACIO, CONRADO D. FRANCISCO, JR., CRESENCIO Q. TABADAY, ERNESTO A. IGNACIO, ISAGANI A. RAMOS, DENNIS V. CABUSLAY, SAMUEL G. MAMARADLO, ALANO R. VENTURA, JR., ANGELINO B. HERMONO, MIGUEL K. LUNA, CELEDONIO B. FRONDA, PATRICIO P. ARANTE III, ARSENIO D. CRUZ, LEOCADIO M. CANDELARIA, ARNALDO R. AUREADA, DANILO F. SAN DIEGO, ALEXANDER G. CUEVAS, ROLANDO G. SANTOS, ISABELO V. ANDRES, JR., ARTURO M. LORENZO, JERRY F. SANTIAGO, ARMAND G. MARIANO, REYNALDO YBANEZ, ROSUARDO S. CONDEZ, DINDO CRUZ LAUREANO, ROY A. DE GUZMAN, FICOMEDES P. CALUGAY, RANDOLPH P. RAAGAS, PEDRO A. MAGNO, BENJAMIN P. DELLOMAS, ENRIQUE B. TAMAYO, FERNANDO C. LOPEZ, ROMAN P. NABONG, JULIETO P. DIZON, ROMEO E. SANTOS, PABLO P. CABRERA, JR., NELSON D. ANGELES, RICARDO P. CANLAS, REY L. DE GUZMAN, TANGLAW E. DELA PAZ, LUDIVICO C. LACUNA, ALEXANDER D. PUA, JUANITO L. SANTOS, EDGARDO B. VERZOSA, HILARIO S. MALINAG, ANDRES C. SANTIAGO, DANILO S. MENDOZA, JOSE J. CASTILLO, EDUARDO F. CAYABYAB, EDGARDO C. FLORENCIO, LARRY DELA CRUZ, RODOLFO B. MARIANO, VIRGILIO C. VERGARA, JESUS B. BERNAS, FELICIANO R. PERALTA, HANNIE C. REJUSO, RODELIO L. SATOS, JUAN MATA, EDGARDO A. JOSEF, REYNALDO V. SIMON, JUANITO T. GINEZ, DONARDO C. EVANGELISTA, JUAN ESTAQUIO, RAMON C. MANUEL, EFREN D. GONZALES, DOMINADOR S. HERNANDEZ, MARIO C. DIAZ, JAIME DAVID, REMEGIO T. GAJAYON, JORDAN ALBA V. JIMENEZ, LUCIO I. CAPCO, FRANCISCO FRANCISCO, ALFREDO E. ESTEL, REYNALDO P. MENDOZA, JOEL G. DIZON, ADOLFO J. SANTOS, ROBERTO C. PECSON, JOSE B. GARCIA, GEORGE A. NAGMA, DOMINGO S. CUEVAS, JR., RAMON A. CIPRIANO, ROBERTO A. BUENCONSEJO, VICTOR H. VIZMONTE, EDWARD L. GARCIA, RODRIGO S. MAGBALOT, EMELITO R. DELA PAZ, CARLOS O. RIEGO, REYNALDO MAGALLON, BENJAMIN C. GERON, RODRIGO C. LABRO, EDUARDO N. PAPA, CENON J. CUMAL, EDDIE P. ESPINASE, REYNALDO S. DIAMANTE, RODELIO C. DERPO, VIRGILIO A. SICAT, FELIX G. MARIANO, ARTURO R. APOSTOL, BONIFACIO V. POLICINA, EDIZER R. ALCAIDE, ROLANDO G. SANTOS, MELCHOR A. SAN PASCUAL, ROLANDO FRONDA, SALVADOR B. COPINO, JR., VILLAMOR VELASCO, ARTURO CASILANG, MACARIO S. BERSOLA, LESLIE CASTOR, RAFAEL V. ALANO, ROMEO DE ASIS, RAMILO R. DELA PAZ, JOVENTINO C. OLBIS, RODOLFO M. CERES, ARMANDO C. LLENADO, EDUARDO A. SALVADOR, APOLINARIO F. GAYO, ARNOLD Z. MAXIMO, FLORANTE R. PADIERNOS, DANILO M. EUSEBIO, NOEL D. JEGIRA, NESTOR J. QUIMSON, ANTONIO VILLAMOR, BENITO D. ARIOLA, JOSE D. MALLARI, BRAULIO S. TOLENTINO, JUANITO D. BUNGAY, ARNIEL R. DOMINGO, JESUS V. ESCOTO, MIGUEL L. LIBAO, RODOLFO G. NAYCALO, JR., GREGORIO E. UMARAN. ROMULO J. VILLARAZA, APOLINARIO S. VILLENA, ROLANDO R. LOPEZ, ERNESTO VALEROS, ESTELITO E. DE GUZMAN, ROLANDO F. ADUNA, RONNIE S. MANUEL, MAXIMO B. GRAFIL, TEODORO V. HENSON, ABELARDO P. TORRES, RENATO C. MEDINA, ELDER M. CASIS, LOPE L. MAY, ARMANDO R. LATI, RICARDO C. CASTILLO, ARCADIO C. DELA CRUZ, BAYANI S. DE GUZMAN, BUENAVENTURA D. VILLALON, ESTELITO B. MARQUEZ, JR., DOMINGO L. CECILIO, NOEL A. NEPOMUCENO, GAMIE S. VILLANUEVA, HILARION B. GUTOMAN, NORBERTO H. MURILLO, EFREN I. JACINTO, CEZAR DE JESUS, EDGARDO B. CORONADO, FERNANDO P. DELA CRUZ, CESAR D. AGUIRRE, ELMER S. LITUANIA, RAINIER M. TIAMZON, MARIO M. TIMOTEO, ARMANDO SIGUENZA, AURELIO A. GRIT, ALEJANDRO LIBAO, RONALDO A. BAUTISTA, SERAFINO B. SANTOS, JR., MARIO M. DONEZA, JR., ROMULO F. REVILLA, FERNANDO B. FAUSTO, ROMEO A. IGNACIO, MARIO C. TAYOAN, REYNALDO P. ESGUERRA, MANUEL A. DE GUZMAN, ROBERTO F. VICENTE, HONORIO B. LIGONES, REYNALDO V. FELIPE, CONSTANTINO F. TALAN, FLORENCIO S. ANDRES, MARIO S. ENRIQUEZ, RICARDO M. JOCSON, JR., GIL L. LACSINA, HERNANI C. LINGA, ELMER L. SANTOS, ROBERTO A. BAYLOSIS, ROBERT G. CHRISTENSEN, CESAR APOSTOL, ROBERTO T. CRUZ, CLEMENTE TAGABI, GIL; BARION, NOEL SEGISMUNDO, ROSAURO D. TOPACIO, ET AL.,petitioners,vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, (THIRD DIVISION), COMMISSIONERS IRENEO B. BERNARDO, LOURDES C. JAVIER, and TITO F. GENILO, SIME DARBY PILIPINAS, INC., SEAN T. OKELLY, RICARDO J. ROMULO, VICENTE PATERNO, LUIS LORENZO, RICARDO ANONAS, ELSIE MAGLAYA, EMMANUEL TAMAYO, RAUL PANLASIGUI, MARTIN S. BERRY, NIK MOHAMED BIN NIK YHAKOB, MOHAMED JAFAR BIN ABDUL and TUNKU TAN SRIDATO SERI AHMAD BIN TUNKU YAHAYA, SD RETREAD SYSTEMS, INC., ET AL.,respondents.

D E C I S I O N

TINGA,J.:For the Courts adjudication is a petition for review under Rule 45, seeking to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 54424, which affirmed the 30 April 1999 Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC NCR-CNS. 00-09-06571-95, 00-11-07577-95, 00-01-00284-96, CA No. 017268-98.1The facts of the case, as culled from the findings of the Court of appeals follow.Sometime in October 1995, Sime Darby Employees Association (the Union) submitted its proposal to Sime Darby Pilipinas, Inc. (the Company) for the remaining two (2) years of their then existing Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). The company gave its counter-proposal, but the parties failed to reach a mutual settlement. Thus, in a letter to the union president, the company declared a deadlock in the negotiations. Subsequently, the company sought the intervention of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) by filing a Notice of CBA Deadlock and Request for Preventive Mediation.2Such action did not sit well with the union, which objected to the deadlock. It also filed its opposition to the Assumption of Jurisdiction/Certification to Arbitration.The company filed a Notice of Lockout on 21 June 1995, on the ground of deadlock in the collective bargaining negotiations, docketed as NCMB-NCR-NL-06-013-95, and sent a Notice of Lock Out Vote3dated 24 July 1995 to the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). On the other hand, the union conducted its strike vote referendum on 23 June 1995, and filed its Strike Vote Result Report4to NCMB also on 24 July 1995, and docketed as NCMB-NCR-NS-Case No. 06-265-95.On 06 August 1995, the company declared and implemented a lockout against all the hourly employees of its tire factory on the ground of sabotage5and work slowdown. On September 1995, the Union filed a complaint for illegal lockout before the DOLE-NLRC, docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 00-09-06517-95.Meanwhile, on 19 October 1995, the stockholders of the company approved the sale of the companys tire manufacturing assets and business operation. The company issued a memorandum dated 20 October 1995 informing all its employees of the plan to sell the tire manufacturing assets and operations. Consequently, on 27 October 1995, the company filed with the DOLE a Closure and Sale of Tire Manufacturing Operation.On 15 November 1995, the company individually served notices of termination to all the employees, including the individual petitioners.6On account of the lockout, the employees were barred from entering company premises, and were only allowed to enter to get their personal belongings and their earned benefits on 21-22 November 1995. During said dates, the employees likewise received their separation pay equivalent to 150% of the base rate for every year of credited service; they also signed and executed individual quitclaims and releases. On 24 November 1995, the company filed with the DOLE a Notice of Termination of Employees dated 17 November 1995, covering all its employees in the tire manufacturing and support operations effective 15 December 1995.7In November 1995, petitioners filed a complaint for Illegal Dismissal before the DOLE, docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 00-11-07577-95.8In January of the following year, petitioners filed a complaint for Unfair Labor Practice (ULP), docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-01-00284-96. The cases for illegal dismissal, illegal lockout and unfair labor practice were then consolidated and eventually assigned to Labor Arbiter Enrico Portillo.On 24 April 1996, the company sold its tire manufacturing plant and facilities to Goodyear Philippines, Inc. (Goodyear) under a Memorandum of Agreement of even date.On 20 August 1996, the company and its officers filed a motion to conduct ocular inspection of the tire factory premises to establish that it was sold to Goodyear.9The motion was opposed by the union.On 14 July 1998, the company filed a motion for the return of the separation pay received by the complainants, pending the resolution of the case.On 25 August 1998, Labor Arbiter Enrico Angelo C. Portillo issued an Order,10the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the respondents instant motion11shall be treated in the resolution of the above-caption cases on the merits. In lieu of the continuation of the trial, the parties are hereby given the opportunity to submit their respective memorandum within ten (10) days from receipt hereof, and thereafter the instant cases shall be deemed submitted for resolution without further notice.SO ORDERED.12On 26 October 1998, the Union, without filing the memorandum as ordered by the labor arbiter, filed an Appeal Memorandum with a petition for injunction and/or a temporary restraining order before the NLRC.On 29 October 1998, the labor arbiter rendered his Decision in the consolidated cases, dismissing for lack of merit petitioners complaints against the company for illegal lockout, illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice. The labor arbiter found the lockout valid and legal, and justified by the incidents of continued work slowdown, mass absences, and consistent low production output, high rate of waste and scrap tires and machine breakdown. Likewise, the consequent mass termination of all the employees was declared to be a valid and authorized termination of employment due to closure of the establishment, the company having complied with the requirements laid down by Article 283 of the Labor Code, i.e., written notice of termination to the employees concerned, a report to the DOLE, and payment of the prescribed separation pay. He added that the companys decision to sell all of its assets was a valid and legitimate exercise of its management prerogative. Anent the claim of unfair labor practice, the labor arbiter found no evidence to substantiate the same, and that the records merely showed that the closure of and eventual cessation from business was justified by the circumstances in order to protect the companys investments and assets. Furthermore, the labor arbiter ruled that the quitclaims and receipts signed by petitioners were voluntarily signed, indicating that the settlement reached by petitioners and the company was just and reasonable. Finally, the labor arbiter declared that the motions for ocular inspection and return of separation pay field by the company are rendered moot and academic in view of said Decision.13The labor arbiter thus adjudicated:WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the consolidated complaints for illegal lockout, illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The complaint against respondent SD Retread System, is likewise ordered dismissed for failure of the complainants to sufficiently establish and substantiate their claim that the latter and respondent Sime Darby are one and the same company, and for lack of employer-employee relationship.SO ORDERED.14Petitioners appealed the labor arbiters Decision to the NLRC on 01 December 1998.15Said appeal, however, was dismissed on 30 April 1999 for lack of merit.16The NLRC affirmeden totothe labor arbiters Decision. In addition, it ruled that that the labor arbiter could not have lost jurisdiction over the case when petitioners appealed his 25 August 1998 Order since the Order was interlocutory in nature and cannot be appealed separately. Thus, the labor arbiter still had jurisdiction over the consolidated complaints when he issued his Decision. Petitioners prayer for damages and attorneys fees was also struck down by the NLRC, holding that petitioners are not entitled thereto considering that it was not shown that the dismissal was done in a wanton and oppressive manner.17Petitioners motion for reconsideration was also denied, prompting them to file a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, claiming grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC.The Court of Appeals denied the petition for lack of merit and affirmed the Decision of the NLRC.18The appellate court declared that the labor arbiters was not divested of its jurisdiction over the consolidated cases when petitioners filed their appeal memorandum on 26 October 1998 since the Order dated 25 August 1998 which they sought to appeal is interlocutory in nature. Thus, the labor arbiters Decision. Thus, the labor arbiters Decision has the force and effect of a valid judgment.19Finding that said Decision was supported by substantial evidence, the appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the complaints against SD Retread System for failure of the petitioners to substantiate the claim of the existence of employer-employee relationship.20Petitioners sought reconsideration of the Court of Appeals Decision, but their motion was denied for lack of merit.21In the instant petition, petitioners reiterate that they were denied due process when they were dismissed right on the day they were handed down their termination letters, without the benefit of the thirty (30)-day notice as required by law, and invoke the Courts ruling inSerrano v. NLRC22They deny having executed quitclaims in favor of the company. Furthermore, petitioners insist that the labor arbiter had lost jurisdictional competence to issue his 29 October 1998 Decision since they have already perfected their appeal on 26 October 1998, making said Decision voidab initio. They likewise claim that the labor arbiter erred when it failed to consider as admitted the matters contained in their Request for Admission after respondents failed to file a sworn answer thereto. Finally, they allege that the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the NLRC lacked evidentiary support.On the other hand, the company asserts that it complied with the 30-day notice requirement under Art. 283 of the Labor Code when it notified the employees on 15 November 1995 that their termination was to take effect on 15 December 1995. In any case, the alleged violation of the thirty (30) day notice requirement was never raised in the proceedings below, except in petitioners supplemental motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals Decision. This being the case, the issue of failure to abide by the 30-day notice rule can no longer be raised for the first time on appeal.23The company points out that the ruling inSerrano24does not apply to this case sinceSerranoinvolved the retrenchment of only one employee, Ruben Serrano, from an establishment which remained and continued in business, while in the present scenario, the companys business operation ceased for good, and the employees were furnished individual termination notices thirty (30) days before the actual date of separation.25The company maintains that the 25 August 1995 Order, being in the nature of an interlocutory order, is unappealable hence, the labor arbiter retained its jurisdiction over the cases even after the Order was "appealed" to the NLRC. It maintains that the decisions of the labor arbiter and the NLRC and the Court of Appeals are supported by substantial evidence. Furthermore, it insists on the legality of the lockout and termination of employment, and denies having committed an unfair labor practice.26For its part, respondent SD Retread Systems, Inc. argues that it has a separate and distinct entity from Sime Darby Pilipinas, Inc., and hence, denies the existence of an employer-employee relationship with petitioners.27The petition is bereft of merit.Despite petitioners attempt to phrase its issues to show apparent questions of law, it is obvious that the petition raises mostly factual issues, which are not proper in a petition for review. Rule 45 of the Rules of Court limits the function of the Court to the review or revision of errors of law and not to a second analysis of the evidence. The Court observes that petitioners come to this Court with the same arguments it presented in the proceedings below, which have been competently discussed and disposed of by the appellate court and the labor tribunals.However, the petition presents two (2) questions of law which need to be addressed, to wit: (i) the alleged loss of jurisdictional competence on the part of the labor arbiter to issue his Decision after petitioners appealed his 25 August 1995 Order, and (ii) that petitioners Request for Admission should have been granted and the evidence included therein should have been admitted since respondents reply/objection thereto were not made under oath.28The 25 August 1998 Order of the labor arbiter partakes the nature of an interlocutory order, or one which refers to something between the commencement and end of the suit which decides some point or matter but it is not the final decision of the whole controversy.29An interlocutory order is not appealable until after the rendition of the judgment on the merits for a contrary rule would delay the administration of justice and unduly burden the courts.30The 25 August 1998 Order merely terminated formal trial of the consolidated cases, declared that the motion for inspection will be dealt with in the resolution of the case, and ordered the submission of the parties respective memoranda after which the case shall be submitted for resolution. It did not put an end to the issues of illegal lockout, ULP, and illegal dismissal.Being interlocutory in nature, the 25 August 1998 Order could not have been validly appealed such that it would divest the labor arbiter of his jurisdiction over the consolidated cases. This being the case, the labor arbiter still had jurisdiction when he rendered his Decision.Even if petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari, which would have been the proper remedy, the same would still fail. The Court finds that the labor arbiter did not commit any grave abuse of discretion when he issued the 25 August 1998 Order. For one, the holding of an adversarial trial is discretionary on the labor arbiter and the parties cannot demand it as a matter of right.31Section 4, Rule V of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC32grants a labor arbiter wide latitude to determine, after the submission by the parties of their position papers/memoranda, whether there is need for a formal trial or hearing.33As this court has so often held, a formal type or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential to due process the requirements of which are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of controversy.34In one case, this Court held that a party has no vested right to a formal hearing simply and merely because the labor arbiter granted its motion and set the case for hearing.35Related to the issue of jurisdiction is the allegation that the decisions of the Court of Appeals, the NLRC and the labor arbiter are without evidentiary support since the respondent was not able to present a single evidence due to the 25 August 1998 Order of the labor arbiter terminating the trial of the cases and requiring submission of the parties memoranda, and ordaining at the end of the memorandum period the submission of the cases for decision.Petitioners argument that had the labor arbiter allowed respondents to present their evidence during the formal trial, the Decision would have been different, cannot be sustained. As previously stated, the labor arbiter enjoys wide discretion in determining whether there is a need for a formal hearing in a given case, and he or she may use all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of each case without regard to technicalities. With or without a formal hearing, the labor arbiter may still adequately decide the case since he can resolve the issues on the basis of the pleadings and other documentary evidence previously submitted. When the parties submitted their position papers and other pertinent pleadings to the labor arbiter, it is understood/given/deemed that they have included therein all the pieces of evidence needed to establish their respective cases. The rationale for this rule is explained by the Court in one case, thus:(P)etitioner believes that had there been a formal hearing, the arbiters alleged mistaken reliance on some of the documentary evidence submitted by parties would have been cured and remedied by them, presumably through the presentation of controverting evidence. Evidently, this postulate is not in consonance with the need for speedy disposition of labor cases, for the parties may then willfully withhold their evidence and disclose the same only during the formal hearing, thus creating surprises which could merely complicate the issues and prolong the trial. There is a dire need to lessen technicalities in the process of settling labor disputes."36Elementary is the principle that this court is not a trier of facts. Judicial review of labor cases does not go beyond the evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which its labor officials findings rest.37As such, the findings of facts and conclusion of the NLRC are generally accorded not only great weight and respect but even clothed with finality and deemed binding on this Court as long as they are supported by substantial evidence. In the instant case, the Court finds that the labor arbiters decision, which was affirmed by both the NLRC and the Court of Appeals cite as basis thereof the evidence presented by both the petitioners and respondents in their pleadings. It is no longer the Courts function to assess and evaluate all over again the evidence, testimonial and documentary, adduced by the parties to an appeal, particularly where the findings of both the labor arbiter, the NLRC and the appellate court trial court on the matter coincide, as in this case at bar.38The submission that petitioners Request for Admission should have been deemed admitted in their favor after respondents had failed to file a sworn reply or objection thereto cannot be sustained.A request for admission is a remedy provided by Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, which allows a party to file and serve upon any other party a written request for the admission of : (i) the genuineness of any material and relevant document described in and exhibited with the request; or (ii) the truth of any material and relevant matter of fact set forth in the request. Said request must be answered under oath within the period indicated in the request, otherwise the matters of which admission were requested should be deemed admitted. Petitioners claim that respondents, instead of filing an answer under oath, filed an unsworn reply/objection thereto. Thus, the admissions should be deemed admitted in their favor.Petitioners Request for Admission does not fall under Rule 26 of the Rules of Court. A review of said Request for Admission shows that it contained matters which are precisely the issues in the consolidated cases, and/or irrelevant matters; for example, the reasons behind the lockout, the companys motive in the CBA negotiations, lack of notice of dismissal, the validity of the release and quitclaim, etc.39Rule 26 as a mode of discovery contemplates of interrogatoriesthat would clarify and tend to shed light on the truth or falsity of the allegations in a pleading. That is its primary function. It does not refer to a mere reiteration of what has already been alleged in the pleadings.40Otherwise stated, petitioner's request constitutes "an utter redundancy and a useless, pointless process which the respondent should not be subjected to." The rule on admission as a mode of discovery is intended "to expedite trial and to relieve parties of the costs of proving facts which will not be disputed on trial and the truth of which can be ascertained by reasonable inquiry." Thus, if the request for admission only serves to delay the proceedings by abetting redundancy in the pleadings, the intended purpose for the rule will certainly be defeated.41More importantly, well-settled is the rule that hearings and resolutions of labor disputes are not governed by the strict and technical rules of evidence and procedure observed in the regular courts of law. Technical rules of procedure are not applicable in labor cases, but may apply only by analogy or in a suppletory character, for instance, when there is a need to attain substantial justice and an expeditious, practical and convenient solution to a labor problem.42In view of the nature of the matters requested for admission by the petitioners, their request for admission would have only served to delay the proceedings.One final note.Petitioners claim that the alleged failure of the company to notify them of their termination renders their dismissal illegal, and thus they should be reinstated and paid with full backwages or given separation pay, following the Courts ruling inSerrano v. Court of Appeals.The argument does not hold. The ruling inSerranohasalready been superseded by the case ofAgabon v. National Labor Relation Commission.43TheAgabonenunciates the new doctrine that if the dismissal is for just cause but statutory due process was not observed, the dismissal should be upheld. While the procedural infirmity cannot be cured, it should not invalidate the dismissal. However, the employer should be held liable for non-compliance with the procedural requirements of due process.44But in any case, the issue of illegal dismissal had already been resolved by the NLRC and the Court of Appeals, which both found that the company had an authorized cause and had complied with the requirements of due process when it dismissed petitioners.WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision dated 31 July 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 54424 is AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.Quisumbing, J., Chairperson, Carpio, Carpio Morales, and Velasco, Jr, JJ.,concur.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. 90478 November 21, 1991REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT),petitioner,vs.SANDIGANBAYAN, BIENVENIDO R. TANTOCO, JR. and DOMINADOR R. SANTIAGO,respondents.Dominador R. Santiago for and in his own behalf and as counsel for respondent Tantoco, Jr.NARVASA,J.:pPrivate respondents Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Jr. and Dominador R. Santiago together with Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Sr., Gliceria R. Tantoco, and Maria Lourdes Tantoco-Pineda-are defendants in Civil Case No. 0008 of the Sandiganbayan. The case was commenced on July 21, 1987 by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. The complaint which initiated the action was denominated one "for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages," and was avowedly filed pursuant to Executive Order No. 14 of President Corazon C. Aquino.After having been served with summons, Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago, instead of filing their answer, jointly filed a "MOTION TO STRIKE OUT SOME PORTIONS OF THE COMPLAINT AND FOR BILL OF PARTICULARS OF OTHER PORTIONS" dated Nov. 3, 1987.1The PCGG filed an opposition thereto,2and the movants, a reply to the opposition.3By order dated January 29, 1988, the Sandiganbayan, in order to expedite proceedings and accommodate the defendants, gave the PCGG forty-five (45) days to expand its complaint to make more specific certain allegations.4Tantoco and Santiago then presented a "motion for leave to file interrogatories under Rule 25 of the Rules of Court" dated February 1, 1988, and "Interrogatories under Rule 25."5Basically, they sought an answer to the question: "Who were the Commissioners of the PCGG (aside from its Chairman, Hon. Ramon Diaz, who verified the complaint) who approved or authorized the inclusion of Messrs. Bienvenido R.Tantoco, Jr.and Dominador R. Santiago as defendants in the..case?"6The PCGG responded by filing a motion dated February 9, 1988 to strike out said motion and interrogatories as being impertinent, "queer," "weird," or "procedurally bizarre as the purpose thereof lacks merit as it is improper, impertinent and irrelevant under anyguise."7On March 18, 1988, in compliance with the Order of January 29, 1988, the PCGG filed an Expanded Complaint.8As this expanded complaint, Tantoco and Santiago reiterated their motion for bill of particulars, through a Manifestation dated April 11, 1988.9Afterwards, by Resolution dated July 4, 1988,10the Sandiganbayan denied the motion to strike out, for bill of particulars, and for leave to file interrogatories, holding them to be without legal and factual basis. Also denied was the PCGG's motion to strike out impertinent pleading dated February 9, 1988. The Sandiganbayan declaredinter aliathe complaint to be "sufficiently definite and clear enough," there are adequate allegations . . which clearly portray the supposed involvement and/or alleged participation of defendants-movants in the transactions described in detail in said Complaint," and "the other matters sought for particularization are evidentiary in nature which should be ventilated in the pre-trial or trial proper . ." It also opined that "(s)ervice of interrogatories before joinder of issue and without leave of court is premature . . (absent) any special or extraordinary circumstances . . which would justify . . (the same)."Tantoco and Santiago then filed an Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim under date of July 18, 1988.11In response, the PCGG presented a "Reply to Answer with Motion to Dismiss Compulsory Counterclaim "12The case was set for pre-trial on July 31, 1989.13On July 25, 1989, the PCGG submitted its PRE-TRIAL.14The pre-trial was however reset to September 11, 1989, and all other parties were required to submit pre-trial briefs on or before that date.15On July 27, 1989 Tantoco and Santiago filed with the Sandiganbayan a pleading denominated "Interrogatories to Plaintiff,"16and on August 2, 1989, an "Amended Interrogatories to Plaintiff"'17as well as a Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents.18The amended interrogatories chiefly sought factual details relative to specific averments of PCGG's amended complaint, through such questions, for instance, as1. In connection with the allegations . . in paragraph 1 . .,what specific property or properties does the plaintiff claim it has the right to recover from defendants Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago for being ill-gotten?3. In connection with the allegations . . in paragraph 10 (a) . .what specific act or acts . . were committed by defendants Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago in "concert with" defendant Ferdinand Marcos and in furtherance or pursuit, of the alleged systematic plan of said defendant Marcos to accumulate ill-gotten wealth?"5. In connection with . . paragraph 13 . .,what specific act or acts of the defendants Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago. .were committed by said defendants as part, or in furtherance, of the alleged plan to conceal assets of defendants Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos?7. In connection with . . paragraph 15(c) . .is it plaintiff's position or theory of the case that Tourist Duty Free Shops, Inc., including all the assets of said corporation, are beneficially owned by either or both defendants Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos and that the defendants Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago, as well as, the other stockholders of record of the same corporation are mere "dummies" of said defendants Ferdinand and /or Imelda R. Marcos?On the other hand, the motion for production and inspection of documents prayed for examination and copying of1) the "official records and other evidence" on the basis of which the verification of the Amended Complaint asserted that the allegations thereof are "true and correct;"2) the documents listed in PCGG's Pre-Trial Brief as those "intended to be presented and . . marked as exhibits for the plaintiff;" and3) "the minutes of the meeting of the PCGG which chronicles the discussion (if any) and the decision (of the Chairman and members) to file the complaint" in the case at bar.By Resolutions dated August 21, 1989 and August 25, 1989, the Sandiganbayan admitted the Amended Interrogatories and granted the motion for production and inspection of documents (production being scheduled on September 14 and 15, 1989), respectively.On September 1, 1989, the PCGG filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of August 25, 1989 (allowing production and inspection of documents). It argued that1) since the documents subject thereof would be marked as exhibits during the pre-trial on September 11, 1989 anyway, the order for "their production and inspection on September 14 and 15, are purposeless and unnecessary;"2) movants already know of the existence and contents of the document which "are clearly described . . (in) plaintiff's Pre-Trial Brief;"3) the documents are "privileged in character" since they are intended to be used against the PCGG and/or its Commissioners in violation of Section 4, Executive Order No. 1,viz.:(a) No civil action shall lie against the Commission or any member thereof for anything done or omitted in the discharge of the task contemplated by this Order.(b) No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative, or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.It also filed on September 4, 1989 an opposition to the Amended Interrogatories,19which the Sandiganbayan treated as a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution of August 21, 1989 (admitting the Amended Interrogatories). The opposition alleged that 1) the interrogatories "are not specific and do not name the person to whom they are propounded . .," or "who in the PCGG, in particular, . . (should) answer the interrogatories;"2) the interrogatories delve into "factual matters which had already been decreed . . as part of the proof of the Complaint upon trial . .;"3) the interrogatories "are frivolous" since they inquire about "matters of fact . . which defendants . . sought to . . (extract) through their aborted Motion for Bill of Particulars;"4) the interrogatories "are really in the nature of a deposition, which is prematurely filed and irregularly utilized . . (since) the order of trial calls for plaintiff to first present its evidence."Tantoco and Santiago filed a reply and opposition on September 18, 1989.After hearing, the Sandiganbayan promulgated two (2) Resolutions on September 29, 1989, the first, denying reconsideration (of the Resolution allowing production of documents), and the second, reiterating by implication the permission to serve the amended interrogatories on the plaintiff (PCGG).20Hence, this petition forcertiorari.The PCGG contends that said orders, both dated September 29, 1989, should be nullified because rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. More particularly, it claims a) as regards the order allowing the amended interrogatories to the plaintiff PCGG:1) that said interrogatories are not specific and do not name the particular individuals to whom they are propounded, being addressed only to the PCGG;2) that the interrogatories deal with factual matters which the Sandiganbayan (in denying the movants' motion for bill of particulars) had already declared to be part of the PCGG's proof upon trial; and3) that the interrogatories would make PCGG Commissioners and officers witnesses, in contravention of Executive Order No. 14 and related issuances; andb) as regards the order granting the motion for production of documents:1) that movants had not shown any good cause therefor;2) that some documents sought to be produced and inspected had already been presented in Court and marked preliminarily as PCGG's exhibits, and the movants had viewed, scrutinized and even offered objections thereto and made comments thereon; and3) that the other documents sought to be produced are either (a) privileged in character or confidential in nature and their use is proscribed by the immunity provisions of Executive Order No. 1, or(b) non-existent, or mere products of the movants' suspicion and fear.This Court issued a temporary restraining order on October 27, 1989, directing the Sandiganbayan to desist from enforcing its questioned resolutions of September 29, 1989 in Civil Case No. 0008.21After the issues were delineated and argued at no little length by the parties, the Solicitor General withdrew "as counsel for plaintiff . . with the reservation, however, conformably with Presidential Decree No. 478, the provisions of Executive Order No. 292, as well as the decisional law of 'Orbos v. Civil Service Commission, et al.,' (G.R. No. 92561, September 12, 1990)22to submit his comment/observation on incidents/matters pending with this . . Court if called for by circumstances in the interest of the Government or if he is so required by the Court."23This, the Court allowed by Resolution dated January 21, 1991.24Subsequently, PCGG Commissioner Maximo A. Maceren advised the Court that the cases from which the Solicitor General had withdrawn would henceforth be under his (Maceren's) charge "and/or any of the following private attorneys: Eliseo B. Alampay, Jr., Mario E. Ongkiko, Mario Jalandoni and such other attorneys as it may later authorize."25The facts not being in dispute, and it appearing that the parties have fully ventilated their respective positions, the Court now proceeds to decide the case.Involved in the present proceedings are two of the modes of discovery provided in the Rules of Court: interrogatories to parties ,26and production and inspection of documents and things.27Now, it appears to the Court that among far too many lawyers (and not a few judges), there is, if not a regrettable unfamiliarity and even outright ignorance about the nature, purposes and operation of the modes of discovery, at least a strong yet unreasoned and unreasonable disinclination to resort to them which is a great pity for the intelligent and adequate use of the deposition-discovery mechanism, coupled with pre-trial procedure, could, as the experience of other jurisdictions convincingly demonstrates, effectively shorten the period of litigation and speed up adjudication.28Hence, a few words about these remedies is not at all inappropriate.The resolution of controversies is, as everyone knows, theraison d'etreof courts. This essential function is accomplished byfirst, the ascertainment of all the material and relevant facts from the pleadings and from the evidence adduced by the parties, andsecond, after that determination of the facts has been completed, by the application of the law thereto to the end that the controversy may be settled authoritatively, definitely and finally.It is for this reason that a substantial part of the adjective law in this jurisdiction is occupied with assuring that all the facts are indeed presented to the Court; for obviously, to the extent that adjudication is made on the basis of incomplete facts, to that extent there is faultiness in the approximation of objective justice. It is thus the obligation of lawyers no less than of judges to see that this objective is attained; that is to say, that there no suppression, obscuration, misrepresentation or distortion of the facts; and that no party be unaware of any fact material a relevant to the action, or surprised by any factual detail suddenly brought to his attention during the trial.29Seventy-one years ago, inAlonso v. Villamor,30this Court described the nature and object of litigation and in the process laid down the standards by which judicial contests are to be conducted in this jurisdiction. It said:A litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more deeply schooled and skilled in the subtle art of movement and position, entraps and destroys the other. It is, rather a contest in whicheach contending party fully and fairly lays before the court the facts in issue and then brushing aside as wholly trivial and indecisive all imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure, asks that justice be done on the merits. Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier's thrust. Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts. There should be no vested right in technicalities. . . .The message is plain. It is the duty of each contending party to lay before the court the facts in issue-fully and fairly;i.e., to present to the courtallthe material and relevant facts known to him, suppressing or concealing nothing, nor preventing another party, by clever and adroit manipulation of the technical rules of pleading and evidence, from also presenting all the facts within his knowledge.Initially, that undertaking of laying the facts before the court is accomplished by the pleadings filed by the parties; but that, only in a very general way. Only "ultimate facts" are set forth in the pleadings; hence, only the barest outline of the facfual basis of a party's claims or defenses is limned in his pleadings. The law says that every pleading "shall contain in a methodical and logical form, a plain, concise and direct statement of theultimate factson which the party pleading relies for his claim or defense, as the case may be, omitting the statement of mere evidentiary facts."31Parenthetically, if this requirement is not observed,i.e., the ultimate facts are alleged too generally or "not averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable . . (an adverse party) properly to prepare his responsive pleading or to prepare for trial," a bill of particulars seeking a "more definite statement" may be ordered by the court on motion of a party. The office of a bill of particulars is, however, limited to making more particular or definite theultimate factsin a pleading It is not its office to supply evidentiary matters. And the common perception is that said evidentiary details are made known to the parties and the court only during the trial, when proof is adduced on the issues of fact arising from the pleadings.The truth is that "evidentiary matters" may be inquired into and learned by the parties before the trial. Indeed, it is the purpose and policy of the law that the parties before the trial if not indeed even before the pre-trial should discover or inform themselves of all the facts relevant to the action, not only those known to them individually, but also those known to adversaries; in other words, thedesideratumis that civil trials should not be carried on in the dark; and the Rules of Court make this ideal possible through the deposition-discovery mechanism set forth in Rules 24 to 29. The experience in other jurisdictions has been that ample discovery before trial, under proper regulation, accomplished one of the most necessary of modern procedure: it not only eliminates unessential issue from trials thereby shortening them considerably, but also requires parties to play the game with the cards on the table so that the possibility of fair settlement before trial is measurably increased. . ."32As just intimated, the deposition-discovery procedure was designed to remedy the conceded inadequacy and cumbersomeness of the pre-trial functions of notice-giving, issue-formulation and fact revelation theretofore performed primarily by the pleadings.The various modes or instruments of discovery are meant to serve (1) as a device, along with the pre-trial hearing under Rule 20, to narrow and clarify the basic issues between the parties, and (2) as a device for ascertaining the facts relative to those issues. The evident purpose is, to repeat, to enable parties, consistent with recognized privileges, to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before trials and thus prevent that said trials are carried on in the dark.33To this end, the field of inquiry that may be covered by depositions or interrogatories is as broad as when the interrogated party is called as a witness to testify orally at trial. The inquiry extends to all facts which are relevant, whether they be ultimate or evidentiary, excepting only those matters which are privileged. The objective is as much to give every party the fullest possible information of all the relevant facts before the trial as to obtain evidence for use upon said trial. The principle is reflected in Section 2, Rule 24 (governing depositions)34which generally allows the examination of a deponent 1) "regardingany matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject of the pending action, whether relating to the claim or defense of any other party;"2) as well as:(a) "the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things" and(b) "the identity and location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts."What is chiefly contemplated is the discovery of every bit of information which may be useful in the preparation for trial, such as the identity and location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts; those relevant facts themselves; and the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things. Hence, "the deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment. No longer can the time-honored cry of "fishing expedition" serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent's case. Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation. To that end, either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession. The deposition-discovery procedure simply advances the stage at which the disclosure can be compelled from the time of trial to the period preceding it, thus reducing the possibility, of surprise, . . .35In line with this principle of according liberal treatment to the deposition-discovery mechanism, such modes of discovery as (a) depositions (whether by oral examination or written interrogatories) under Rule 24, (b) interrogatories to parties under Rule 25, and (c) requests for admissions under Rule 26, may be availed of without leave of court, and generally, without court intervention. The Rules of Court explicitly provide that leave of court is not necessary to avail of said modes of discovery after an answer to the complaint has been served.36It is only when an answer has not yet been filed (but after jurisdiction has been obtained over the defendant or property subject of the action) that prior leave of court is needed to avail of these modes of discovery, the reason being that at that time the issues are not yet joined and the disputed facts are not clear.37On the other hand, leave of court is required as regards discovery by (a) production or inspection of documents or things in accordance with Rule 27, or (b) physical and mental examination of persons under Rule 28, which may be granted upon due application and a showing of due cause.To ensure that availment of the modes of discovery is otherwise untrammeled and efficacious, the law imposes serious sanctions on the party who refuses to make discovery, such as dismissing the action or proceeding or part thereof, or rendering judgment by default against the disobedient party; contempt of court, or arrest of the party or agent of the party; payment of the amount of reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining a court order to compel discovery; taking the matters inquired into as established in accordance with the claim of the party seeking discovery; refusal to allow the disobedient party support or oppose designated claims or defenses; striking out pleadings or parts thereof; staying further proceedings.38Of course, there are limitations to discovery, even when permitted to be undertaken without leave and without judicial intervention. "As indicated by (the) Rules . . ., limitations inevitably arise when it can be shown that the examination is being conducted in bad faith or in such a manner as to annoy, embarass, or oppress the person subject to the inquiry.39And . . . further limitations come into existence when the inquiry touches upon the irrelevant or encroaches upon the recognized domains of privilege."40In fine, the liberty of a party to make discovery is well nigh unrestricted if the matters inquired into are otherwise relevant and not privileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and within the bounds of the law.It is in light of these broad principles underlying the deposition-discovery mechanism, in relation of course to the particular rules directly involved, that the issues in this case will now be resolved.The petitioner's objections to the interrogatories served on it in accordance with Rule 25 of the Rules of Court cannot be sustained.It should initially be pointed out as regards the private respondents "Motion for Leave to File Interrogatories" dated February 1, 198841 that it was correct for them to seek leave to serve interrogatories, because discovery was being availed ofbeforean answer had been served. In such a situation,i.e., "after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over property subject of the action" but before answer, Section 1 of Rule 24 (treating of depositions), in relation to Section 1 of Rule 25 (dealing with interrogatories to parties) explicitly requires "leave of court."42But there was no need for the private respondents to seek such leave to serve their "Amended Interrogatories to Plaintiff" (dated August 2, 198943) after they had filed their answer to the PCGG's complaint, just as there was no need for the Sandiganbayan to act thereon.1. The petitioner's first contention that the interrogatories in question are defective because they (a) do not name the particular individuals to whom they are propounded, being addressed only to the PCGG, and (b) are "fundamentallythe same matters . .(private respondents) sought to be clarified through their aborted Motion . . for Bill of Particulars" are untenable and quickly disposed of.The first part of petitioner's submission is adequately confuted by Section 1, Rule 25 which states that if the party served with interrogatories is a juridical entity such as "a public or private corporation or a partnership or association," the same shall be "answered . . by any officer thereof competent to testify in its behalf." There is absolutely no reason why this proposition should not be applied by analogy to the interrogatories served on the PCGG. That the interrogatories are addressed only to the PCGG, without naming any specific commissioner o officer thereof, is utterly of no consequence, and may not be invoked as a reason to refuse to answer. As the rule states, the interrogatories shall be answered "by any officer thereof competent to testify in its behalf."That the matters on which discovery is desired are the same matters subject of a prior motion for bill of particulars addressed to the PCGG's amended complaint and denied for lack of merit is beside the point. Indeed, as already pointed out above, a bill of particulars may elicit onlyultimatefacts, not so-calledevidentiaryfacts. The latter are without doubt proper subject of discovery.44Neither may it be validly argued that the amended interrogatories lack specificity. The merest glance at them disproves the argument. The interrogatories are made to relate to individual paragraphs of the PCGG's expanded complaint and inquire about details of the ultimate facts therein alleged. What the PCGG may properly do is to object to specific items of the interrogatories, on the ground of lack of relevancy, or privilege, or that the inquiries are being made in bad faith, or simply to embarass or oppress it.45But until such an objection is presented and sustained, the obligation to answer subsists.2. That the interrogatories deal with factual matters which will be part of the PCGG's proof upon trial, is not ground for suppressing them either. As already pointed out, it is the precise purpose of discovery to ensure mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts on the part of all parties even before trial, this being deemed essential to proper litigation. This is why either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession; and the stage at which disclosure of evidence is made is advanced from the time of trial to the period preceding it.3. Also unmeritorious is the objection that the interrogatories would make PCGG Commissioners and officers witnesses, in contravention of Executive Order No. 14 and related issuances. In the first place, there is nothing at all wrong in a party's making his adversary his witness .46This is expressly allowed by Section 6, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,viz.:Sec. 6. Direct examination of unwilling or hostile witnesses. A party may . . . call an adverse party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a public or private corporation or of a partnership or association which is an adverse party, and interrogate him by leading questions and contradict and impeach him in all respects as if he had been called by the adverse party, and the witness thus called may be contradicted and impeached by or on behalf of the adverse party also, and may be cross-examined by the adverse party only upon the subject-matter of his examination in chief.The PCGG insinuates that the private respondents are engaged on a "fishing expedition," apart from the fact that the information sought is immaterial since they are evidently meant to establish a claim against PCGG officers who are not parties to the action. It suffices to point out that "fishing expeditions" are precisely permitted through the modes of discovery.47Moreover, a defendant who files a counterclaim against the plaintiff is allowed by the Rules to implead persons (therefore strangers to the action) as additional defendants on said counterclaim. This may be done pursuant to Section 14, Rule 6 of the Rules, to wit:Sec. 14. Bringing new parties. When the presence of parties other than those to the original action is required for the granting of complete relief in the determination of acounterclaimor cross-claim, the court shall order them to be brought in as defendants, if jurisdiction over them can be obtained."The PCGG's assertion that it or its members are not amenable to any civil action "for anything done or omitted in the discharge of the task contemplated by . . (Executive) Order (No. 1)," is not a ground to refuse to answer the interrogatories. The disclosure of facto relevant to the action and which are not self-incriminatory or otherwise privileged is one thing; the matter of whether or not liability may arise from the facts disclosed in light of Executive OrderNo. 1, is another. No doubt, the latter proposition may properly be set up by way of defense in the action.The apprehension has been expressed that the answers to the interrogatories may be utilized as foundation for a counterclaim against the PCGG or its members and officers. They will be. The private respondents have made no secret that this is in fact their intention. Withal, the Court is unable to uphold the proposition that while the PCGG obviously feels itself at liberty to bring actions on the basis of its study and appreciation of the evidence in its possession, the parties sued should not be free to file counterclaims in the same actions against the PCGG or its officers for gross neglect or ignorance, if not downright bad faith or malice in the commencement or initiation of such judicial proceedings, or that in the actions that it may bring, the PCGG may opt not to be bound by rule applicable to the parties it has sued, e.g., the rules of discovery.So, too, the PCGG's postulation that none of its members may be "required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial . . proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance," has no application to a judicial proceeding it has itself initiated. As just suggested, the act of bringing suit must entail a waiver of the exemption from giving evidence; by bringing suit it brings itself within the operation and scope of all the rules governing civil actions, including the rights and duties under the rules of discovery. Otherwise, the absurd would have to be conceded, that while the parties it has impleaded as defendants may be required to "disgorge all the facts" within their knowledge and in their possession, it may not itself be subject to a like compulsion.The State is, of course, immune from suit in the sense that it cannot, as a rule, be sued without its consent. But it is axiomatic that in filing an action, it divests itself of its sovereign character and sheds its immunity from suit, descending to the level of an ordinary litigant. The PCGG cannot claim a superior or preferred status to the State, even while assuming to represent or act for the State.48The suggestion49that the State makes no implied waiver of immunity by filing suit except when in so doing it acts in, or in matters concerning, its proprietary or non-governmental capacity, is unacceptable; it attempts a distinction without support in principle or precedent. On the contrary The consent of the State to be sued may be given expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be manifested either through a general law or a special law. Implied consent is givenwhen the State itself commences litigationor when it enters into a contract.50The immunity of the State from suits does not deprive it of the right to sue private parties in its own courts. The state as plaintiff may avail itself of the different forms of actions open to private litigants. In short, by taking the initiative in an action against the private parties, the state surrenders its privileged position and comes down to the level of the defendant. The latter automatically acquires, within certain limits, the right to set up whatever claims and other defenses he might have against the state. . . . (Sinco, Philippine Political Law, Tenth E., pp. 36-37,citingU.S. vs. Ringgold, 8 Pet. 150, 8 L. ed. 899)"51It can hardly be doubted that in exercising the right of eminent domain, the State exercises itsjus imperii,as distinguished from its proprietary rights orjus gestionis. Yet, even in that area, it has been held that where private property has been taken in expropriation without just compensation being paid, the defense of immunity from suit cannot be set up by the State against an action for payment by the owner.52The Court also finds itself unable to sustain the PCGG's other principal contention, of the nullity of the Sandiganbayan's Order for the production and inspection of specified documents and things allegedly in its possession.The Court gives short shrift to the argument that some documents sought to be produced and inspected had already been presented in Court and marked preliminarily as PCGG's exhibits, the movants having in fact viewed, scrutinized and even offered objections thereto and made comments thereon. Obviously, there is nothing secret or confidential about these documents. No serious objection can therefore be presented to the desire of the private respondents to have copies of those documents in order to study them some more or otherwise use them during the trial for any purpose allowed by law.The PCGG says that some of the documents are non-existent. This it can allege in response to the corresponding question in the interrogatories, and it will incur no sanction for doing so unless it is subsequently established that the denial is false.The claim that use of the documents is proscribed by Executive Order No. 1 has already been dealt with. The PCGG is however at liberty to allege and prove that said documents fall within some other privilege, constitutional or statutory.The Court finally finds that, contrary to the petitioner's theory, there is good cause for the production and inspection of the documents subject of the motion dated August 3, 1989.53Some of the documents are, according to the verification of the amended complaint, the basis of several of the material allegations of said complaint. Others, admittedly, are to be used in evidence by the plaintiff. It is matters such as these into which inquiry is precisely allowed by the rules of discovery, to the end that the parties may adequately prepare for pre-trial and trial. The only other documents sought to be produced are needed in relation to the allegations of the counterclaim. Their relevance is indisputable; their disclosure may not be opposed.One last word. Due no doubt to the deplorable unfamiliarity respecting the nature, purposes and operation of the modes of discovery earliermentioned,54there also appears to be a widely entertained idea that application of said modes is a complicated matter, unduly expensive and dilatory. Nothing could be farther from the truth. For example, as will already have been noted from the preceding discussion, all that is entailed to activate or put in motion the process of discovery by interrogatories to parties under Rule 25 of the Rules of Court, is simply the delivery directly to a party of a letter setting forth a list of least questions with the request that they be answered individually.55That is all. The service of such a communication on the party has the effect of imposing on him the obligation of answering the questions "separately and fully in writing underoath," and serving "a copy of the answers on the party submitting the interrogatories within fifteen (15) days after service of the interrogatories . . ."56The sanctions for refusing to make discovery have already been mentioned.57So, too, discovery under Rule 26 is begun by nothing more complex than the service on a party of a letter or other written communication containing a request that specific facts therein set forth and/or particular documents copies of which are thereto appended, be admitted in writing.58That is all. Again, the receipt of such a communication by the party has the effect of imposing on him the obligation of serving the party requesting admission with "a sworn statement either denying specifically the matters of which an admission is requested or setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny those matters," failing in which "(e)ach of the matters of which admission is requested shall be deemed admitted."59The taking of depositions in accordance with Rule 24 (either on oral examination or by written interrogatories) while somewhat less simple, is nonetheless by no means as complicated as seems to be the lamentably extensive notion.WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, without pronouncement as to costs. The temporary restraining order issued on October 27, 1989 is hereby LIFTED AND SET ASIDE.SO ORDERED.Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.Melencio-Herrera, J., I also join Justice Cruz's concurrence.Romero, J., took no part.Separate OpinionsCRUZ,J.,concurring:I am delighted to concurr with Mr. Justice Andres R. Narvasa in his scholarlyponenciawhich, besides reaching a conclusion sustained by the applicable law and jurisprudence, makes for reading both pleasurable and instructive. One function of the court not generally appreciated is to educate the reader on the intricacies and even the mustique of the law. The opinion performs this function with impressive expertise and makes the modes of discovery less esoteric or inaccessible to many members of the bar.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 108229 August 24, 1993DASMARIAS GARMENTS, INC.,petitioner,vs.HON. RUBEN T. REYES, Judge, Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 50, and AMERICAN PRESIDENT LINES, LTD.,respondents.Sobrevias, Diaz, Haudini & Bodegon Law Offices for petitioner.Tan, Manzano & Velez Law Offices for private respondent.R E S O L U T I O NNARVASA,C.J.:Sometime in September, 1987, in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, the American President Lines, Ltd. sued Dasmarias Garments, Inc. to recover the sum of US $53,228.45 as well as an amount equivalent to twenty-five percent (25%) thereof as attorney's fees and litigation expenses.In its answer dated December 1, 1987, Dasmarias Garments, Inc. (hereafter, simply Dasmarias) specifically denied any liability to the plaintiff (hereafter simply APL), and set up compulsory counterclaims against it.The case was in due course scheduled for trial on April 27, 1988. On that date APL presented its first witness whose testimony was completed on November 12, 1988. The case was reset to May 3, 1989 for reception of the testimony of two (2) more witnesses in APL's behalf.At the hearing of May 3, 1989, instead of presenting its witnesses, APL filed a motion praying that it intended to take the depositions of H. Lee and Yeong Fang Yeh in Taipei, Taiwan and prayed that for this purpose, a "commission or letters rogatory be issued addressed to the consul, vice-consul or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines in Taipei . . . " Five (5) days later APL filed an amended motion stating that since the Philippine Government has no consulate office in Taiwan in view of its "one China policy," there being in lieu thereof an office set up by the President "presently occupied by Director Joaquin Roces which is the Asia Exchange Center, Inc.," it was necessary and it therefore prayed "that commission or letters rogatory be issued addressed to Director Joaquin Roces, Executive Director, Asian Executive Exchange Center, Inc., Room 901, 112 Chunghsiao, E. Road, Section 1, Taipe, Republic of China, to hear and take the oral deposition of the aforenamed persons . . . ."The motion was opposed by Dasmarias. It contended that (a) the motion was "fatally defective in that it does not seek . . . that a foreign court examine a person within its jurisdiction;" (b) issuance of letters rogatory was unnecessary because the witnesses "can be examined before the Philippine Court;" and(c) the Rules of Court "expressly require that the testimony of a witness must be taken orally in open court and not by deposition."Extensive argument on the matter thereafter followed, through various pleadings filed by the parties, in the course of which APL submitted to the Trial Court (a) the letter received by its counsel from Director Joaquin R. Roces of the Asian Exchange Center, Inc., dated November 20, 1989, advising that "this Office can only take deposition upon previous authority from the Department of Foreign Affairs," this being "in consonance with the Supreme Court Administrative Order requiring courts or judicial bodies to course their requests through the Department of Foreign Affairs;" and (b) a letter sent by "fax" to the same counsel by a law firm in Taipei, Lin & Associates Maritime Law Office, transmitting informationinter aliaof the mode by which, under the "ROC Civil Procedure Code," "a copy or an abridged copy" of documents on file with a Taiwan Court may be obtained.By Order dated March 15, 1991, the Trial Court resolved the incident in favor of APL, disposing as follows:ACCORDINGLY, the motion to take testimonies of plaintiff's Taiwanese witnesses, Kenneth H. Lee and Yeong Fah Yeh, by deposition (upon written interrogatories) is hereby GRANTED. The Asian Exchange Center, Inc. thru Director Joaquin R. Roces is hereby COMMISSIONED to take down the deposition. Compliance with the Rules on the taking of testimony by deposition upon written interrogatories under Sections 25-29 of Rule 24, Rules of Court is enjoined.Let this Order be coursed through the Department of Foreign Affairs, Manila, pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 4 dated April 6, 1987.The Court opined that "the Asian Exchange Center, Inc. being the authorized Philippine representative in Taiwan, may take the testimonies of plaintiff's witnesses residing there by deposition, butonly upon written interrogatoriesso as to give defendant the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses by serving cross-examination."Dasmarias sought reconsideration by motion filed June 25, 1991 on the following grounds: (1) authority of the Asian Exchange Center, Inc. (AECI) to take depositions has not been established, it not being one of those so authorized by the Rules of Court to take depositions in a foreign state; (2) AECI's articles of incorporation show that it is not vested with any such authority; (3) to permit deposition-taking by commission without the authority of the foreign state in which deposition is taken constitutes infringement of judicial sovereignty; and (4) depositions by written interrogatories have inherent limitations and are not suitable to matters dependent on the credibility of witnesses; oral testimony in open court remains the "most satisfactory method of investigation of facts'" and "'affords the greatest protection to the rights and liberties of citizens."By Order dated July 5, 1991, the motion for reconsideration was denied because "filed out of time" and being a mere rehash of arguments already passed upon. In the same Order, APL was directed "to take the necessary steps to implement the order authorizing the . . . (deposition-taking) of its witnesses not later than the end of this month, otherwise the Court will consider inaction or lack of interest as waiver to adduce additional evidence by deposition."Dasmarias instituted a special civil action ofcertiorariin the Court of Appeals to nullify the orders of the Trial Court just described. Said Appellate Court restrained enforcement of the orders of March 15, 1991 and July 5, 1991 "in order to maintain thestatus quoand to prevent the infliction of irreparable damage and injury upon the petitioner."After due proceedings, the Court of Appeals (Third Division) rendered judgment on September 23, 1992 denying Dasmarias petition forcertiorariand upholding the challenged orders of the Trial Court. Once again, Dasmarias sought reconsideration of an adverse disposition, and once again, was rebuffed. Its motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated December 11, 1992.Once again Dasmarias has availed of the remedy of appeal. It has come to this Court and prays for the reversal of the Appellate Court's Decision of September 23, 1992 and Resolution dated December 11, 1992. Once again, it will fail.Dasmarias ascribes to the Court of Appeals the following errors, to wit:1) "in holding that a party could, during the trial of the case, present its evidence by taking the deposition of its witnesses in a foreign jurisdiction before a private entity not authorized by law to take depositions in lieu of their oral examination in open Court considering that:a) the taking of deposition is a mode of pretrial discovery to be availed of before the action comes to trial;b) no urgent or compelling reason has been shown to justify the departure from the accepted and usual judicial proceedings of examining witnesses in open court where their demeanor could be observed by the trial judge;"2) "in disregarding the inherently unfair situation in allowing private respondent, a foreign entity suing in the Philippines, to present its evidence by mere deposition of its witnesses away from the 'penetrating scrutiny' of the trial Judge while petitioner is obligated to bring and present its witnesses in open court subject to the prying eyes and probing questions of the Judge;" and3) "in sanctioning the deposition taking of . . . (APL's) witnesses in Taipei, Taiwan, a foreign jurisdiction not recognized by the Philippines in view of its 'one-China policy,' before the AECI, a private entity not authorized by law to take depositions."Depositions are chiefly a mode of discovery. They are intended as a means to compel disclosure of facts resting in the knowledge of a party or other person which are relevant in some suit or proceeding in court. Depositions, and the other modes of discovery (interrogatories to parties; requests for admission by adverse party; production or inspection of documents or things; physical and mental examination of persons) are meant to enable a party to learn all the material and relevant facts, not only known to him and his witnesses but also those known to the adverse party and the latter's own witnesses. In fine, the object of discovery is to make it possible for all the parties to a case to learn all the material and relevant facts, from whoever may have knowledge thereof, to the end that their pleadings or motions may not suffer from inadequacy of factual foundation, and all the relevant facts may be clearly and completely laid before the Court, without omission or suppression.Depositions are principally made available by law to the parties as a means of informing themselves of all the relevant facts; they are not therefore generally meant to be a substitute for the actual testimony in open court of a party or witness. The deponent must as a rule be presented for oral examination in open court at the trial or hearing. This is a requirement of the rules of evidence. Section 1, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:Sec. 1. Examination to be done in open court. The examination of witnesses presented in a trial or hearing shall be done in open court, and under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall be given orally.Indeed, any deposition offered to prove the facts therein set out during a trial or hearing, in lieu of the actual oral testimony of the deponent in open court, may be opposed and excluded on the ground that it is hearsay; the party against whom it is offered has no opportunity to cross-examine the deponent at the time that his testimony is offered. It matters not that that opportunity for cross-examination was afforded during the taking of the deposition; for normally, the opportunity for cross-examination must be accorded a party at the time that the testimonial evidence is actually presented against him during the trial or hearing.However, depositions may be used without the deponent being actually called to the witness stand by the proponent, under certain conditions and for certain limited purposes. These exceptional situations are governed by Section 4, Rule 24 of the Rules of Court.Sec. 4. Use of depositions. At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion of an interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence, may be used against any party who was present or represented at the taking of the deposition or who had due notice thereof, in accordance with any of the following provisions:(a) Any deposition may be used by any party for the purpose of contradicting or impeaching the testimony of deponent as a witness;(b) The deposition of a party or of any one who at the time of taking the deposition was an officer, director, or managing agent of a public or private corporation, partnership, or association which is a party may be used by an adverse party for any purpose;(c) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party for any purpose if the court finds: (1) that the witness is dead; or (2) that the witness if out of the province and at a greater distance than fifty (50) kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it appears that his absence was procured by the party offering the deposition; or (3) that the witness is unable to attend to testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment; or (4) that the party offering the deposition has been unable to procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena; or (5) upon application and notice, that such exceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the interest of justice and with due regard to the importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to allow the deposition to be used;(d) If only part of a deposition is offered in evidence by a party, the adverse party may require him to introduce all of it which is relevant to the part introduced, and any party may introduce any other parts.The principle conceding admissibility to a deposition when the deponent is dead, out of the Philippines, or otherwise unable to come to court to testify, is consistent with another rule of evidence, found in Section 47, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.Sec. 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examin