G.R. No. L-48315 February 27, 1979

ATTY. DOMINADOR B. BORJEpetitioner,vs.HON. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH II, VIOLETA GALICINAO MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL WATER DISTRICT, and THE CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD,respondents.GUERRERO,J.:

Facts:Petitioner alleged that he is the counsel of the water consuming public of Ozamiz City who were against the increase of water rates imposed by Misamis Occidental Water District and who filed a case against PR (Civil Case No. 0390). After acceptance of the retainer as counsel plus the consequent representation of the consumers also in debates and discussions on the air, he allegedly received water bills from PR without indication of the meter readings, the number of cubic meters consumed and the amounts to be paid. So he refused to pay the "blank bills." P's water service was cut on February 6, 1978.

P filed a case in the resp. court (Civil Case No. OZ-686), acting as his own counsel, against PR, by reason of these acts of "harassment" resulting in his "humiliation" as well as unlawful deprivation of a life's necessity.

CFI issued an order enjoining PRs from disconnecting the water service of P. Upon learning that the same was already cut, the Court issued another order to reconnect it immediately.

PR filed a motion to dismiss on two grounds:

a) lack of jurisdiction of respondent Court allegedly because the "Main thrust of the subject and nature of the action or suit appearing in the complaint is clearly within the field of special civil action or suit action or special proceedingand

b) there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, referring to Special Civil Case No. 0390.

P filed an opposition thereto stating that the issues raised are justiciable and a court of general jurisdiction has the authority to try the case. He further contended that Special Civil Case No. 0390, which questioned the increased water rates unilaterally imposed by the MOWD, the constitutionality of P.D. No. 198 and the selection of the members of the Board of Directors, is entirely different from Civil Case No. OZ-686, which is an action for damages due to the harassment committed by private respondents on petitioner.

Hon. Melecio A. Genato, a temporary judge, dismissed the case not on the basis of the grounds alleged by PRs in their MtD but on the grounds that there was no malice or bad faith in the severance of the water of petitioner and that PR had already reconnected the same (moot and academic).

P filed an MR where he assailed the said order of dismissal for having been rendered in violation of Section 1, ROC 36, and for not being correct because although his water service has been reconnected, he has suffered damages which could be proved by him in an impartial proceeding. He also assailed the said order, denominating it as a "midnight order".

CFI denied MR stating that the P was not singled-out (3 other peoples water connection were cut) so there was no act of malice on the part of PR.

Hence, this petition for certiorari and/or mandamus with this Court.

Issue/Held:

WoN Borjes petition was properly dismissed- NO

Ratio:

P claims that said dismissal cannot be on lack of cause of action because the complaint alleged sufficient facts to show that his rights have been seriously violated by private respondents. He also argues that it cannot be a judgment on the pleadings because the facts are controverted. He thereby concludes that respondent Court has committed GAD when it dismissed the case without any evidence presented by both parties in support of their respective positions.

The court agrees with P.

First, the said order of dismissal dated March 9, 1978 is not premised on the grounds alleged by PRs in their motion to dismiss. It has been held in the case ofMalig, et al. v Bushthat dismissal of actions on grounds not alleged in the MtD is improper for in so doing, a court in effect dismisses an actionmotu propriowithout giving the plaintiffs a chance to argue the point and without receiving any arguments or evidence on the question.

Unlike in theMalig, case, which based its dismissal on the ground of prescription under Sec. 1 of ROC 16, the order herein brought for review is not based on any of them rather, resp. Court made a decision, based merely on the pleadings filed and without conducting any hearing.

In the case ofManila Herald Publishing Co., Inc, vs. Ramos, et al,where neither a MtD nor an answer had been made, the court stated that the only instance in which, according to the ROC, the court may dismiss upon the court's own motion on action is, when the "plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time or to comply with the Rules or any order of the court.

The real cause for concern, though, is not so much the dismissal of the case for lack of presentation of the requisite motion but rather the dismissal thereof without affording petitioner an opportunity to be heard despite the presence of factual issues that needed to be proved.

In the case at bar, respondents premised their right to cut off the water service connection on the violation of petitioner's water service contract, their "Notice to the Publicwhere the water consumers were likewise informed that upon failure to settle their bills within the collection period, their water service will be shut off, and a facsimile copy of the monthly billfurnished each water consumer wherein it is stated that "service may be disconnected immediately if payment of the bill is not made to the field collector after due date.

Indeed, all these empower the private respondents to disconnect the water service of the consumers upon failure to pay. But the question posed by petitioner is whether or not there is really failure to pay on his part. It is his contention that there is no failure as he was sent water bills that did not indicate the meter readings, the number of cubic meters consumed and the amount to be paid.

Inasmuch as private respondents deny these allegations of petitioner, an issue of fact exists that requires presentation of proof. If the allegations of petitioner are true: private respondents are not at all authorized to cut off his water service as the collection period as to him would not have even started yet. For an obligation to become due there must be a demand.Default generally begins from the moment the creditor demands the performance of the obligation. Without such demand, judicial or extra-judicial the effects of default will not arise.

PRs also argue that P could have paid his account when the final noticeto pay was sent him since he was then already certain of the amount of the bill. This final notice is the notice of disconnection, served on the day the service was cut off.

P, contends that this was the first time he ever came to know of the sum due from him and he claims that only the total amount due for the months of November and December, 1977 was stated. There is no specification of the amount due for each month, the meter readings and the number of cubic meters consumed, thus, leaving him uncertain as to how the amount was arrived at. Assuming the truth of these allegations, private respondents would not have been entitled still to cut off petitioner's water supply at the time they cut if off as the demand did not contain the requisite details and hence, improper. And even if the sufficiency of the demand is conceded, petitioner has still thirty days from date of such knowledge within which to pay the same in accordance with the contract and the avowed policy of the water district.

Verily, the above discussion shows the need of presentation of proof for the respective allegations of the parties. For the respondent Court to make a finding of lack of malice or bad faith on the part of private respondents from those controverted facts and then decree the dismissal of the case is, therefore, violative of due process. In view of the doubtful question of facts presented herein, respondent court, in the exercise of sound discretion, should have refused to consider and decide in a summary manner and should have allowed the parties to present proof in support of their respective stand. This is because the right to a hearing, which is the right of the parties interested or affected to present their respective cases and submit evidence in support thereof, is one of the primary cardinal rights of litigants.

InConstantine v EstenzocitingGaranciang, et al. v Garanciang, et alandBotiaga v Soler,this Court held as follows:

... Summary or outright dismissals of actions are not proper where there are factual matters in dispute which need presentation and appreciation of evidence. The demands of a fair and wise administration of justice call for faithful adherence to legal precepts on procedure which ensure to litigants the opportunity to present their evidence and secure a ruling on all the issues presented in their respective pleadings. 'Short cuts in judicial processes are to be avoided where they impede rather than promote a judicious dispensation of justice.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and/or mandamus is hereby GRANTED, the Orders dated March 9,1978 and April 18, 1978 dismissing the complaint of petitioner for damages and denying the motion for reconsideration thereof, respectively, are set aside for being null and void, and respondent Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental Branch II is hereby ordered to try the case on the merits after conducting a pre-tried conference.

Andaya v. Abadia

DAR,rep. byREG. DIR. NASER MUSALI, Petitioner, vs. HON. HAKIM ABDULWAHID, Presiding Judge, RTC,Br.XII ofZamboangaCity, andYUPANGCO COTTON MILLS, INC., Respondents (2008; CJ Puno; G.R. No. 163285)

Doctrine: The Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) is vested with primary and exclusive jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters, including all matters involving the implementation of the agrarian reform program. Thus, when a case is merely an incident involving the implementation of theComprehensive Agrarian Reform Program(CARP), then jurisdiction remains with the DARAB, and not with the regular courts. **Sorry for the long digest. I included all the cited cases in the cited case.

FACTS: On Dec, 28, 2000, Yupangco Cotton Mills, Inc. (Yupangco) filed a complaint forRecovery of Ownership and Possession, Violations of R.A. Nos. 6657 and 3844, as amended, Cancellation of Title, Reconveyance and Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Orderagainst Buenavista Yupangco Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Association, Inc. (BYARBAI), the DAR and the Land Bank of the Phils.The case was raffled to the RTC, Br. 12 of Zamboanga City.

OnJan. 26, 2001, the DAR filed a MtD on the ff. grounds: (a) Yupangcos causes of action were not within the jurisdiction of the RTC, (b) forum shopping, and (c)litis pendentia.

OnNov. 6, 2001, the RTC DENIED the MtD. RTC: Yupangcos action was within the jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Sec. 19, Chap. II ofBP Blg. 129.

DAR and BYARBAI filed a MR (DENIED for lack of merit.

OnMarch 20, 2002, DAR filed a special civil action forcertiorariunder Rule 65 with the CA.

DAR: The RTC acted with GAD amounting to lack of jurisdiction when DARs MtD was denied.

The CA sustained the RTC.

CA: The action falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts and not the DARAB because Yupangco primarily sought the recovery and possession of the subject parcel of land.

Hence this petition for review by certiorari.

DAR: The CA erred when it upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC purely on the ground that Yupangco primarily seeks the recovery of ownership and possession of subject parcel of land, jurisdiction over which is lodged with regional trial courts, not the DARAB.

ISSUE: Who has jurisdiction over the case?

RULING: DARAB. Petition granted.

1. The jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi-judicial office or government agency, over the nature and subject matter of a petition or complaint is determined by the material allegations therein and the character of the relief prayed for, irrespective of whether the petitioner or complainant is entitled to any or all of such reliefs. Also, jurisdiction should be determined by considering not only the status or relationship of the parties but also the nature of the issues or questions that is the subject of the controversy. Thus, if the issues between the parties are intertwined with the resolution of an issue within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB, such dispute must be addressed and resolved by the DARAB.

( In this case, Yupangcos complaint seems at first blush to be within the RTCs jurisdiction, as it has been denominated asRecovery of Ownership and Possession, Violations of R.A. Nos. 6657 and 3844, as amended, Cancellation of Title, Reconveyance and Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order. But as correctlypointed out by the DAR, the allegations of the complaintactually impugn the CARP coverage of the landholding involved and its redistribution to farmer beneficiaries, and seek to effect a reversion thereof to the original owner, Yupangco. Thus, the complaint filed by Yupangco alleged,inter alia, the ff.:

(a) Yupangco was the registered owner of certain parcels of land primarily devoted to coconut plantation, under the administration and supervision of plaintiff corporation with several employees and other persons hired as laborers;

(b) Sometime in 1993, the DAR placed the subject parcels of land under the CARP of the government pursuant to the provisions of RA No. 6657, and 4 TCTs over the subject land were subsequently issued in favor of BYARBAI;

(c)Yupangco vehemently objected to the coverage of the subject parcels of land by the DAR and the valuation made by LBP, by filing protest and objection with DAR and LBP;

(d) DAR, through the DAR Reg. Dir., Zamboanga City, issued the 4 questioned TCTs (or Certificates of Land Ownership Awards-- CLOAs) to BYARBAI pursuant to R.A. No. 6657, without LBP paying Yupangco the just compensation of the subject parcels of land which valuation was then being contested before the DAR Adjudication Board;

(e) Majority of the members of BYARBAI are not employees nor hired workers of Yupangco, hence, Yupangco alleged that they should not have been given preference nor be entitled as allocatees in the subject parcels of land;

(f) Soon after theCLOAs were issued to BYARBAI, the latter took possession of the subject parcels of land to the prejudice and damage of Yupangco;

(g) BYARBAIs real motive in having the land distributed to them (pending resolution of all protests with the DAR and the contested valuation made by the LBP) was to convert the land into rice production resulting in the destruction of coffee plantations and other crops, including the cutting of several hundreds of coconut trees.This conversion was illegal and in gross violation of RA No. 6657 and RA No. 3844, as amended, and other existing laws and Administrative Issuances.

Yupangco also alleged in its complaint that other acts were committedwith the purpose of land speculation, for business or industrial purpose, for immediate sale thereof for business profits and not for planting, care and tending of the coconut plantation, which would defeat the purposes and policies of the Agrarian Reform Laws and breached the conditions of the questioned award of the land, rendering the acquisition by or distribution to BYARBAI as the tenant-tillers of the land null and void, and thus reverting back the ownership and possession thereof to Yupangco.These allegations show that Yupangco sought the recovery of the subject property by disputing its inclusion in the CARP and imputing errors in the enforcement of the law pertaining to the agrarian reform. The primal issues raised in the complaint [i.e., protest against the CARP coverage, alleged breach of conditions of the DAR award under the CARP by the farmer beneficiaries resulting to forfeiture of their right as such; nonpayment of rentals by the farmers to the petitioner under R.A. No. 3844 (Agricultural Land Reform Code)] gravitate on the alleged manner the implementation of the CARP under R.A. No. 6657 was carried out.

2. Under Sec. 50 of R.A. No. 6657,all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reformare within the DARs primary, exclusive and original jurisdiction, and at the first instance, only theDARABas the DARs quasi-judicial body, can determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the CARP under R.A. No. 6657, E.O. Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, R.A. No. 3844 as amended by R.A. 6389, P.D. No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations.

( Ultimately, the complaint seeks for the RTC to cancel CLOAs issued to the beneficiaries and the TCTs issued pursuant thereto. These are reliefs which the RTC cannot grant, since the complaint essentially prays for the annulment of the coverage of the disputed property within the CARP, which is but an incident involving the implementation of the CARP.These are matters relating to terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landlord to agrarian reform beneficiaries over which DARABhas primary and exclusive original jurisdiction, pursuant to Sec. 1(f), Rule II, DARAB New Rules of Procedure.

3. The ruling in SSS vs DAR is apropos. In this case,the former landowner, SSS, made a similar attempt to circumvent the jurisdiction of the DARAB by filing a complaint for recovery of possession with the RTC (San Mateo, Rizal). When the RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, the SSS came to the SC for recourse.

In the SSS case, the SC made the ff. pronouncements:

A.) The TCTs sought to be annulled by the SSS originated from the CLOAs issued by the DAR in pursuance of, and in accordance with, the provisions of RA No. 6657, the CARP. Specifically, the SSS in its Complaint implored the trial court "to restrain the DAR from implementing RA No. 6657 and the defendants, farmers-beneficiaries from occupying/tilling, cultivating/disposing the properties."

Sec. 1, Rule II, 2002 DARAB Rules of Procedure: Primary And Exclusive Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. The board shall have primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving the implementation of the CARP... Specifically, such jurisdiction shall include but not be limited to cases involving the ff.:

a) The rights and obligations of persons, whether natural or juridical engaged in the management, cultivation and use of all agricultural lands covered by the CARP and other agrarian laws.

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Specifically, such jurisdiction shall extend over but not limited to the ff:

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f)Cases involving the issuance of Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT), Certificate of landownership Award (CLOA) and Emancipation Patent (EP) and the administrative correction thereof;

Thus, Centeno v. Centeno validated the jurisdiction of the DARAB over cases involving issuance of CLOAs, and went on further: Under Sec. 50 of R.A. No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), the DAR is vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have the exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of the agrarian reform program. The rule is that the DARAB has jurisdiction to try and decide any agrarian dispute or any incident involving the implementation of the CARP.

Sec. 1, Rule II of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the DARAB: Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. The Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board shall have primary jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the CARPB.) In Rivera v. Del Rosario, the SC reiterated that: The DARAB has exclusive original jurisdiction over cases involving the rights and obligations of persons engaged in the management, cultivation and use of all agricultural lands covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.C.) InDavid v. Rivera, this Court pointed out that the jurisdiction over agrarian reform matters is now expressly vested in the DAR through the DARAB. The SC said: Sec. 50 of R.A. No. 6657 confers on the DAR quasi-judicial powers to adjudicate agrarian reform matters. In the process of reorganizing the DAR, EO No. 129-A created the DARAB to assume the powers and functions with respect to the adjudication of agrarian reform cases.

D.) In an earlier ruling rendered in the case ofVda. de Tangub v. CA, reiterated inMorta, Sr. v. OccidentalandHeirs of the late Herman ReySantosv. CA, the SC decreed:

Sec. 17 of EO No. 229 1) vested the DAR with quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters, and2) granted it jurisdiction over all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the DENR and the Dept. of Agriculture, as well as powers to punish for contempt and to issue subpoena, subpoena duces tecum and writs to enforce its orders or decisions.

E.) InNuesa v. CA,the SC puts emphasis on the extent of the coverage of the term "agrarian dispute," thus: Under Sec. 3(d) of R.A. No. 6657, "agrarian dispute" is defined to include "(d) any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee."

REPUBLIC (represented by AMLC) v GLASGOW CREDIT AND COLLECTION SERVICES and CITYSTATE SAVINGS BANK INC

2008 || Corona, J.

FACTS

On July 18, 2003, the Republic filed a complaint in the RTC Manila for civil forfeiture of assets (with urgent plea for TRO) against the bank deposits maintained by Glasgow in CSBI. Pursuant to RA 9160 (the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001). RTC Manila issued a 72-hour TRO dated July 21, 2003. Raffled to Branch 47 and Presiding Judge Balisi-Umali issued an order granting the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. The injunctive writ was issued on August 8, 2003.Summons to Glasgow returned "unserved" as it could no longer be found at its last known address. October 8, 2003, P filed a verified omnibus motion for (a) issuance ofaliassummons and (b) leave of court to serve summons by publication. RTC directed the issuance ofaliassummons. No mention of summons by publication. January 30, 2004, RTC archived the case for P's failure to serve thealiassummons. P filed anex parteomnibus motion to (a) reinstate the case and (b) resolve its pending motion for leave of court to serve summons by publication.

May 31, 2004, RTC ordered reinstatement and directed P to serve thealiassummons within 15 days. However, it did not resolve motion for leave of court to serve summons by publication declaring that until and unless a return is made on the alias summons, any action on the motion for leave of court to serve summons by publication would be untenable if not premature.

July 12, 2004, OSG received a copy of the sheriffs return dated June 30, 2004 stating that thealiassummons was returned "unserved" as Glasgow was no longer holding office at the given address since July 2002 and left no forwarding address. August 11, 2005, P filed a manifestation andex partemotion to resolve its motion for leave of court to serve summons by publication.

August 12, 2005, OSG received a copy of Glasgows "Motion to Dismiss (By Way of Special Appearance)" dated August 11, 2005. It alleged that (1) the court had no jurisdiction over its person as summons had not yet been served on it; (2) the complaint was premature and stated no cause of action as there was still no conviction for estafa or other criminal violations implicating Glasgow and (3) there was failure to prosecute on the part of the Republic.

P opposed M2D because suit was an actionquasi in remwhere jurisdiction over the person of the defendant was not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court. It asserted that prior conviction for unlawful activity was not a precondition to the filing of a civil forfeiture case and that its complaint alleged ultimate facts sufficient to establish a cause of action. It denied that it failed to prosecute the case.

RTC dismissed the case on the following grounds: (1) improper venue as it should have been filed in the RTC of Pasig where CSBI, the depository bank of the account sought to be forfeited, was located; (2) insufficiency of the complaint in form and substance and (3) failure to prosecute. ISSUE

WON case was properly dismissed NO RULING (sinama ko na lahat, kasi yung iba past lesson, but lesson-relevant portion is last heading)Complaint was filed in proper venue

On November 15, 2005, SC issued A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC, the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture under RA 9160. Glasgow itself judicially admitted that the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture is "applicable to the instant case."

Sec. 3.Venue of cases cognizable by the regional trial court. A petition for civil forfeiture shall be filedin any regional trial court of the judicial region where the monetary instrument, property or proceeds representing, involving, or relating to an unlawful activity or to a money laundering offense are located;

Clearly, the complaint for civil forfeiture of the account may be filed in any RTC of the NCJR. Since the RTC Manila is one of the RTCs of the NCJR.Complaint Suffificient in Form and SubstanceThe test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of the complaint. Under the Rule on Procedure in Civil Forfeiture, it was enough that:The verified complaint of the Republic contained the following allegations:

(a) the name and address of the primary defendant therein, Glasgow

(b) a description of the proceeds of Glasgows unlawful activities with particularity, as well as the location thereof, account no. CA-005-10-000121-5 in the amount ofP21,301,430.28 maintained with CSBI;

(c) the acts prohibited by and the specific provisions of RA 9160, as amended, constituting the grounds for the forfeiture of the said proceeds. In particular, suspicious transaction reports showed that Glasgow engaged in unlawful activities of estafa and violation of the Securities Regulation Code (under Section 3(i)(9) and (13), RA 9160, as amended); the proceeds of the unlawful activities were transacted and deposited with CSBI in account no. CA-005-10-000121-5 thereby making them appear to have originated from legitimate sources; as such, Glasgow engaged in money laundering (under Section 4, RA 9160, as amended); and the AMLC subjected the account to freeze order and

(d) the reliefs prayed for, namely, the issuance of a TRO or writ of preliminary injunction and the forfeiture of the account in favor of the government as well as other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.

Sec 12 of RA 9160, as amended, and its implementing rules and regulations lay down two conditions when applying for civil forfeiture:

(1) when there is a suspicious transaction report or a covered transaction report deemed suspicious after investigation by the AMLC and

(2) the court has, in a petition filed for the purpose, ordered the seizure of any monetary instrument or property, in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, related to said report.

Since account no. CA-005-10-000121-5 of Glasgow in CSBI was (1) covered by several suspicious transaction reports and (2) placed under the control of the trial court upon the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, the conditions were satisfied. P properly instituted the complaint for civil forfeiture. A criminal conviction for an unlawful activity is not a prerequisite for the institution of a civil forfeiture proceeding.

No failure to prosecuteApart from all the actions stated in the facts, P continued to exert efforts to obtain information from other government agencies on the whereabouts or current status of respondent Glasgow if only to save on expenses of publication of summons. Its efforts, however, proved futile. The records on file with the Securities and Exchange Commission provided no information. Other inquiries yielded negative results. That Glasgows whereabouts could not be ascertained was not only beyond the Republics control, it was also attributable to Glasgow which left its principal office address without informing the Securities and Exchange Commission or any official regulatory body (like the Bureau of Internal Revenue or the Department of Trade and Industry) of its new address. Moreover, as early as October 8, 2003, the Republic was already seeking leave of court to serve summons by publication.

Summons may be by publication (eto na most important)InRepublic v. Sandiganbayan,SC declared that forfeiture proceedings are actionsin rem. In actionsin remorquasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to conferring jurisdiction on the court, provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over theres. Nonetheless, summons must be served upon the defendant in order to satisfy the requirements of due process.For this purpose, service may be made by publication as such mode of service is allowed in actionsin remandquasi in rem.

Section 8, Title II of the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture provides:

(a) The respondent shall be given notice of the petition in the same manner as service of summons under Rule 14 of the Rules of Court and the following rules:

1. The notice shall be served on respondent personally, or by any other means prescribed in Rule 14 of the Rules of Court;

2. The notice shall contain: (i) the title of the case; (ii) the docket number; (iii) the cause of action; and (iv) the relief prayed for; and

3. The notice shall likewise contain a proviso that, if no comment or opposition is filed within the reglementary period, the court shall hear the caseex parteand render such judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the petition and its supporting evidence.

(b) Where the respondent is designated as an unknown owner orwhenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected upon him by publication of the notice of the petition in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order. In the event that the cost of publication exceeds the value or amount of the property to be forfeited by ten percent, publication shall not be required. (emphasis supplied)NEMENCIO C. EVANGELISTA, et al., petitioners, vs. CARMELINO M. SANTIAGO, respondent.

[G.R. No. 157447. April 29, 2005]

FACTS:

Petitioners alleged that they occupied and possessed parcels of land, located in Sitio Panayawan, Barangay San Rafael, Montalban (now Rodriquez), Province of Rizal (Subject Property), by virtue of several Deeds of Assignment, dated 15 April 1994 and 02 June 1994, executed by a certain Ismael Favila y Rodriguez. According to the Deeds of Assignment, the Subject Property was part of a vast tract of land called Hacienda Quibiga, which extended to Paraaque, Las Pias, Muntinlupa, Cavite, Batangas, Pasay, Taguig, Makati, Pasig, Mandaluyong, Quezon City, Caloocan, Bulacan, and Rizal; awarded to Don Hermogenes Rodriguez by the Queen of Spain and evidenced by a Spanish title. Ismael Favila claimed to be one of the heirs and successors-in-interest of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. Acting as Attorney-in-Fact pursuant to a Special Power of Attorney executed by his mga kapatid on 25 February 1965, Ismael Favila signed the aforementioned Deeds of Assignment, assigning portions of the Subject Property to the petitioners, each portion measuring around 500 to 1,000 square meters, in exchange for the labor and work done on the Subject Property by the petitioners and their predecessors.

Petitioners came by information that respondent was planning to evict them from the Subject Property. Two of the petitioners had actually received notices to vacate. Their investigations revealed that the Subject Property was included in Transfer Certificates of Titles (TCTs), all originating from OCT No. 670, which was issued to respondents mother pursuant to a decree arising from a case in the Court of Land Registration. The mother, Isabel, executed a Deed of Donation transferring the property to her son, who subsequently registered such properties in his own name.

Petitioners filed with the trial court, an action for declaration of nullity of respondents certificates of title on the basis that OCT No. 670 was fake and spurious. As an affirmative defense, respondent claimed that the petitioners had no legal capacity to file the Complaint, and thus, the Complaint stated no cause of action. Since OCT No. 670 was genuine and authentic on its face, then OCT No. 670 and all of respondents land titles derived therefrom, are incontrovertible, indefeasible and conclusive against the petitioners and the whole world.

Respondent also raised the affirmative defense of prescription. He pointed out that any action against his certificates of title already prescribed, especially with regard to OCT No. 670, which was issued in 1913 or more than 83 years prior to the filing of the Complaint by the petitioners. At the very least, respondent contended, it must be presumed that the questioned land titles were issued by the public officials concerned in the performance of their regular duties and functions pursuant to the law.

Lastly, respondent denied knowing the petitioners, much less, threatening to evict them. In fact, petitioners were not included as defendants in Civil Case No. 783 entitled, Carmelino M. Santiago v. Remigio San Pascual, et al., which respondent instituted before the same trial court against squatters occupying the Subject Property.

During said hearing, petitioners presented their lone witness, Engineer Placido Naval, a supposed expert on land registration laws. In response to questions from Honorable Judge Francisco C. Rodriguez of the trial court, Engineer Naval answered that a parcel of land titled illegally would revert to the State if the Torrens title was cancelled, and that it was the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General, that should file for the annulment or cancellation of the title. Respondent, on the other hand, did not present any evidence but relied on all the pleadings and documents he had so far submitted to the trial court.

RTC denied petitioners petition. CA affirmed.

ISSUE: WON petitioners had legal capacity to sue

HELD: NO. But for a different reason.

Before anything else, it should be clarified that the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue and the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action are two different grounds for a motion to dismiss or are two different affirmative defenses.

Lack of legal capacity to sue means that the plaintiff is not in the exercise of his civil rights, or does not have the necessary qualification to appear in the case, or does not have the character or representation he claims. On the other hand, a case is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof that the plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, hence grounded on failure to state a cause of action. The term "lack of capacity to sue" should not be confused with the term "lack of personality to sue." While the former refers to a plaintiffs general disability to sue, such as on account of minority, insanity, incompetence, lack of juridical personality or any other general disqualifications of a party, the latter refers to the fact that the plaintiff is not the real party- in-interest. Correspondingly, the first can be a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the ground of lack of legal capacity to sue; whereas the second can be used as a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the fact that the complaint, on the face thereof, evidently states no cause of action.

In resolving whether or not the Complaint in the present case stated a cause of action, the trial court should have limited itself to examining the sufficiency of the allegations in the Complaint. It was proscribed from inquiring into the truth of the allegations in the Complaint or the authenticity of any of the documents referred or attached to the Complaint, since these are deemed hypothetically admitted by the respondent. The trial court evidently erred in making findings as to the authenticity of the Deeds of Assignment executed by Ismael Favila in favor of petitioners on 15 April 1994 and 02 June 1994; and questioning the existence and execution of the Special Power of Attorney in favor of said Ismael Favila by his siblings on 25 February 1965. These matters may only be resolved after a proper trial on the merits.

In their Complaint, petitioners never alleged that the Subject Property was part of the public domain. On the contrary, petitioners asserted title over the Subject Property by virtue of their actual, physical, open, continuous and adverse possession thereof, in the concept of owners, by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest, since time immemorial. The Deeds of Assignment executed in their favor and attached to their Complaint referred to a Spanish title granted by the Queen of Spain to their predecessor-in-interest, Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. Clearly, petitioners are asserting private title over the Subject Property, and consequently, their action could not be one for reversion.

In their instant Petition, petitioners further averred that rather than an action for nullity of respondents certificates of title, theirs was more appropriately an action to remove a cloud on or to quiet their title over the Subject Property. Even as this Court agrees with the petitioners that their action was one for removal of a cloud on or quieting of title, it does arrive at the same conclusion as the trial court and the Court of Appeals that petitioners had no personality to file the said action, not being the parties-in-interest, and their Complaint should be dismissed for not stating a cause of action. According to Article 477 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff, in an action to remove a cloud on or to quiet title, must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in, the real property which is the subject matter of the action.[32] Petitioners failed to establish in their Complaint that they had any legal or equitable title to, or legitimate interest in, the Subject Property so as to justify their right to file an action to remove a cloud on or to quiet title.

In their Complaint, petitioners claimed title to the Subject Property by virtue of their actual and continuous possession of the same since time immemorial, by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest. Yet, the Deeds of Assignment executed by Ismael Favila in their favor, attached to and an integral part of their Complaint, revealed that petitioners predecessors-in-interest based their right to the Subject Property on the Spanish title awarded to Don Hermogenes Rodriguez.

There existed a contradiction when petitioners based their claim of title to the Subject Property on their possession thereof since time immemorial, and at the same time, on the Spanish title granted to Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. Possession since time immemorial carried the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been private property even before the Spanish conquest. If the Subject Property was already private property before the Spanish conquest, then it would have been beyond the power of the Queen of Spain to award or grant to anyone.

The title to and possession of the Subject Property by petitioners predecessors-in-interest could be traced only as far back as the Spanish title of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. Petitioners, having acquired portions of the Subject Property by assignment, could acquire no better title to the said portions than their predecessors-in-interest, and hence, their title can only be based on the same Spanish title.

Therefore, without legal or equitable title to the Subject Property, the petitioners lacked the personality to file an action for removal of a cloud on, or quieting of, title and their Complaint was properly dismissed for failing to state a cause of action. In view of the dismissal of the case on this ground, it is already unnecessary for this Court to address the issue of prescription of the action.

PABLO ARCEO vs. JOSE OLIVEROS and RUFINA CABANGON

G.R. No. L-38251 | January 3, 1985 | CUEVAS,J.

Facts: Pablo and Sixta Arceo are siblings who inherited a parcel of land from their father. Sixta Arceo sold her undivided share to Oliveros & Cabangon without Pablos consent. However, there was an extrajudicial settlement between Sixta and Pablo wherein Sixta renounced her right over the disputed lot in favor of the latter. A TCT was then issued to Pablo covering the lot.2 cases filed:

A. Civil Case No. 435-G:

Plaintiffs Oliveros & Cabangon: Seeked to enforce the Deed of Absolute Sale, impugn the extrajudicial settlement between Sixta and Pablo, and annul the TCT issued to Pablo

Defendant Pablo Arceo: Sets up by way of counterclaim his right of compulsory redemption over the same lot pursuant to Sec. 119 of the Public Land Act, claiming further that the property has never been partitioned between him and her sister Sixta.B. Civil Case No. C-105 (case at bar):Plaintiff Pablo Arceo: Being a co-owner and co-heir of said Sixta Arceo, he should be allowed to redeem and repurchase the property.

Defendants Oliveros & Cabangon: MTD OTG of litis pendentia (dismissed initially, asked to file an answer, but eventually, MTD was granted)

On appeal, Arceo averred that the first case is to enforce the alleged sale, while the second is to redeem legally the controverted property. If the first litigation does not prosper and the disputed sale is voided, then this same case will become useless and moot, but in the contrary result, whereby the same sale is upheld, then the legal redemption sought in this subsequent case may lie. Hence, no litis pendentia.

Issue: W/N there is litis pendentia - YES

Ruling: Pendency of another suit between the same parties to be a ground for dismissal requires: 1) Identity of parties or at least such as representing the same interest in both actions; 2) Identity of rights asserted and prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and 3) the Identity in both cases is such that the judgment which may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount tores judicatain the other case.Civil Case No. 435-G involves the same parcel of land and similar issues as those in Civil Case No. C-105. In both cases, the parties herein are litigating over the same subject matter (the lot inherited by the Arceos from their father) and on the same issuesvalidity of the sale made by Sixta Arceo to the Oliveros spouses; and Pablo Arceo's right of compulsory redemption under Section 119 of the Public Land Act as a co-heir of his sister Sixta. The only difference being, that in Civil Case No. C-105, Pablo Arceo asserts this right of compulsory redemption as a cause of action in his complaint; whereas, in Case No. 435-G he asserts said claim by way of counterclaim, which makes no difference anyway. For whilelis pendensis normally interposed as a defense when another case is pending upon the same cause of action between the same parties in two complaints, it may also be interposed even if said claim is set forth by way of a counterclaim since the latter partakes the nature of a complaint by the defendant against the plaintiff.Hence, it has been held that to interpose a cause of action in a counterclaim and again advanced the same in a complaint against the same party, as in the case at bar, would be violative of the rule against splitting a single cause of action which is prohibited by the Rules of Court.Arceos contention that "if the first litigation does not prosper and the disputed sale is voided, then this second case will become useless and moot, but in the contrary result whereby the same sale is upheld, then the legal redemption sought in the subsequent case may lie" is mistaken. For even on the assumption that the sale by Sixta in favor of the Oliveros spouses is upheld, the second case, Civil Case No. C-105, will still be useless because he is not deprived of litigating against the Oliveros on the issue of his claimed compulsory counterclaim in Civil Case No. 435-G by reason of having set it up in his counterclaim in the said case.

Appellant cites Hongkong & Shanghai Bank vs. Aldecoa & Co. Such reliance is, however, misplaced. That case involved two actions: one for annulment of mortgage; and the other, for foreclosure of mortgage.

The right to foreclose not having been set-up or pleaded as a counterclaim in the first case, no adjudication may be had thereon, hence this pronouncement

The former suit is one to annul the mortgages. The present suit is one for the foreclosure of the mortgage. It may be conceded that if the final judgment in the former action is that the mortgages be annulled, such an adjudication will deny the right of the bank to foreclose the mortgages. But will a decree holding them valid prevent the bank from foreclosing them? Most certainly not. In such an event, the judgment would not be a bar to the prosecution of the present action. The rule is not predicated upon such a contingency. It is applicable, between the same parties, only when the judgment to be rendered in the action first instituted will be such that, regardless of which party is successful it will amount tores judicataagainst the second action. . . .

In the instant case, however, the right of compulsory redemption and the validity of the sale by a co-heir are in issue not only in Civil Case No. 435-G but also in Civil Case No. C105, and both suits are between the same parties asserting Identical rights, praying similar reliefs premised essentially on the same facts.

ROSALINA BUAN, RODOLFO TOLENTINO, TOMAS MERCADO, CECILIA MORALES, LIZA OCAMPO, Quiapo Church Vendors, for themselves and all others similarly situated as themselves, v. OFFICER-IN-CHARGE GEMILIANO C. LOPEZ, JR., OFFICE OF THE MAYOR OF MANILA

13 October 1986 | J. Narvasa

FACTS: Ps are five of about 130 licensed and duly authorized vendors of religious articles, medicine herbs & plants around the Quiapo church bringing suit for themselves and all others similarly situated. They allege that their licenses were revoked or cancelled by R Mayor Lopez for reasons unknown to them which is tantamount to deprivation of property without due process of laws, that the revocation of their licenses was beyond R Mayors competence, since Section 171 (n) of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) authorizes the same only for violation of the law or ordinances or conditions upon which they have been granted and no such violation had been committed by them; but this notwithstanding, respondent Mayor had given (them) an ultimatum of 7:00 up to 12:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 5 August 1986 to vacate the premises where their respective stalls are situated or suffer physical demolition thereof. They instituted this special civil action for prohibition to the end that R Mayor Gemilliano Lopez, Jr. be perpetually prohibited from arbitrarily, whimsically and capriciously revoking or cancelling ... their licenses or permits (as hawkers or street vendors) and threatening the physical demolition of their respective business stalls in the places specified in such licenses or permits. They also sought a temporary restraining order in view of Mayor Lopez' actual threats of physical demolition of their respective small business establishment at 12:00 noon, which the Court granted on the same day.

It appears that a special civil action of prohibition with preliminary injunction was filed in RTC Manila against Acting Manila City Mayor Gemilliano Lopez, Jr. by Samahang Kapatiran sa Hanapbuhay ng Bagong Lipunan, Inc, which was composed of some 300 individual owners & operators of separate business stalls, mostly at the periphery beyond the fence of Quiapo Church. Rosalina Buan is the president of Samahan, while Liza Ocampo is its Press Relations Officer. The three petitioners also appear to be Samahan members.

ISSUE: W/N the special civil action before the SC should be dismissed

HELD: YES. The action must in the first place be abated on the ground of lis pendens, or more correctly, auter action pendant or pendency of another action between the same parties for the same cause. The two petitions are grounded on the same facts. There exists identity of parties, or at least such parties are represent the same interests in both actions, as well as identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for (being founded on the same facts), such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration: all the requisites of auter action pendant.

Citing E. Razon, Inc., et al. vs. Philippine Port Authority, et al, G.R. No. 75197, Resolution, July 31, 1986:

The acts of petitioners constitute a clear case of forum shopping, an act of malpractice that is proscribed and condemned as trifling with the courts and abusing their processes. It is improper conduct that tends to degrade the administration of justice. The rule has been formalized in Section 17 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines issued by this Court on January 11, 1983 in connection with the implementation of the Judiciary Reorganization Act, specifically with the grant in Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129 of equal original jurisdiction to the Intermediate Appellate Court to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, etc., and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid Of its appellate jurisdiction. Thus, the cited Rule provides that no such petition may be filed in the Intermediate Appellate Court 'if another similar petition has been filed or is still pending in the Supreme Court' and vice-versa. The Rule orders that "A violation of the rule shall constitute contempt of court and shall be a cause for the summary dismissal of both petitions, without prejudice to the taking of appropriate action against the counsel or party concerned." The rule applies with equal force where the party having filed an action in the Supreme Court shops for the same remedy of prohibition and a restraining order or injunction in the regional trial court (or vice-versa).

As already observed, there is between the action at bar and RTC Case No. 86-36563, an Identity as regards parties, or interests represented, rights asserted and relief sought, as well as basis thereof, to a degree sufficient to give rise to the ground for dismissal known as auter action pendant or lis pendens. That same Identity puts into operation the sanction Of twin dismissals just mentioned. The application of this sanction will prevent any further delay in the settlement of the controversy which might ensue from attempts to seek reconsideration of or to appeal from the Order of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 86-36563 promulgated on July 15, 1986, which dismissed the petition upon grounds which appear persuasive.

June 29, 1988

INVESTORS' FINANCE CORPORATION vs.ROMEO EBARLE, HON. JOSE L. CASTIGADOR, Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. XXII, Pagadian City, The Deputy Provincial Sheriff of Zamboanga Del Sur, and the INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURTFacts:Flaviano Fucoy Jr. executed a promissory note in favor of Lido Motor Sales Ozamis in the amount of P56,976.00 which he promised to pay in 48 equal, successive, monthly installments. Jose Mariano O. Tan signed the promissory note as a co-maker. On the same day, to guarantee the payment of the promissory note in accordance with its terms, the promissors executed a chattel mortgage over the purchased car in favor of the promissee. Also, on the same date, mortgagee Lido Motor Sales Ozamis executed a Deed of Assignment of all its title, rights, equities, and interests arising out of the Deed of Chattel Mortgage with promissory note, in favor of Investors' Finance Corporation, the herein petitioner.For non-payment of 4 monthly installments the petitioner corporation, as mortgagee, filed a verified Complaint For Replevin With Damages in the then CFI Misamis Oriental (note: it is now known as RTC Cagayan de Oro, but I used Misamis for consistency) against Flaviano Fucoy Jr., Jose Mariano Tan, and a John Doe, docketed as CIVIL CASE No. 8782, with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of replevin for the seizure of the car "for the purpose of foreclosure and/or disposal in accordance with law to satisfy defendants obligation the plaintiff." The plaintiff filed a bond in the amount of P25,146.34.CFI issued the writ of replevin. The writ could not be implemented because the car was not in the possession of the mortgagors-defendants. It was only more than a year later that the car was found in the possession of the herein PR, Romeo Ebarle. Due to the difficulty of getting the car from him because of his bodyguards, Romeo Ebarle being the son of the former Provincial Governor, the petitioner filed a Motion To Deputize A Military Personnel To Serve The Alias Writ Of Replevin And Alias Summons. The trial court appointed technical Sergeant (TSgt.) Ibonia.TSgt Ibonia later seized the car and placed it in the custody of the military authorities at Lanao del Norte for safekeeping. On the following day, as a result of a written agreement between the lawyers of the petitioner and the private respondent, stipulating payment by the latter of the balance of the mortgage indebtedness incurred originally by Flaviano Fucoy Jr. and Jose Mariano Tan, the car was returned to PR.Evidently, mortgagors Flaviano Fucoy Jr. and Jose Mariano Tan transferred the possession of the car to PR Romeo Ebarle without the consent of the petitioner. Thus the car remained registered in the name Flaviano Fucoy Jr., even when it was seized by Special Deputy Sheriff Ibonia.In the second week of November, 1983, the petitioner sent to PR a computation of the unpaid balance due from the mortgagors, which turned out to be higher than the computation at Tubod Lanao del Norte. Thus, PR filed suit for Damages and Discharge of Chattel Mortgage with Preliminary Injunction in RTC, Pagadian City, docketed as Civil Case No. 2312, against the petitioner, Investors' Finance Corporation, and Special Deputy Sheriff Antonio lbonia, who enforced the writ of replevin.PR alleged that he was a well-known personality in Pagadian City, that he had paid his obligations to the petitioner but it refused to issue a receipt; and that he was humiliated and embarrassed by the seizure of his car. He prayed "(T)hat pending hearing of the main case a writ of preliminary injunction be issued against the defendants' (herein petitioner and Special Deputy Sheriff lbonia), that "the chattel mortgage of the car be discharged," and for moral and corrective damages, attorney's fees.The petitioner, one of the two defendants in Civil Case No. 2312, prayed for the dismissal of the case. Invoking Section 5 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, it moved that a preliminary hearing be had as if a MtD had been filed and prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of litis pendentia provided in Section 1(e) of the same Rule 16. RTC issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction requiring the petitioner to return the car even while its motion to dismiss had not yet been resolved. IAC dismissed P's appeal: With respect to the "motion to dismiss", We find no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent Judge for having denied the same: firstly, Civil Cases No. 2312, includes a contempt charge, one not found in Civil Case No. 8782; secondly, there is a defendant in Civil Case No. 2312, Antonio Ibonia, who is not a party in the other case. Certain requisites of litis pendentia are therefore absent. Issue: WoN IAC committed a reversible error in denying the application of the principle of lis pendens duly invoked by the petitioner.Held: Yes. An action is dismissable on the ground that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, if the following requisites concur:a)identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same interests in both actions;b)identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; andc)the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful amount to res judicata in the other. Corollary to Section 1(e) of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court is the prohibition against splitting a single cause of action. Thus, under Section 4, Rule 2, ("I)f two or more complaints are brought for different parts of a single cause of action, the filing of the first may be pleaded in abatement of the other or others, in accordance with Section 1(e) of Rule 16, and a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a bar in the others." The former is the principle of litis pendentia or lis pendens, while the latter is that of res judicata.The doctrine of res judicata requires, among others, identity of parties as an indispensable condition. However, this Identity does not mean total identity of all parties. The inclusion of new parties in the second action does not remove the case from the operation of the doctrine of res judicata if the party against whom the judgment is offered in evidence was also the party in the first action. This rule would ward off the possibility of renewing the litigation between the same parties by the mere expedient of bringing in new parties in the second action.Like res judicata as a doctrine, litis pendentia as a principle is also a sanction of the public policy against multiplicity of suits. This being so, the inclusion of another party does not by itself preclude the application of section 1(e) Rule 16 assuming that all the requisites are present. Otherwise stated, the inclusion of new parties in the second action does not remove the case from the operation of the rule of litis pendentia as long as the primary litigants are also parties in the first action. A different rule would render illusory the principle of litis pendentia. In Civil Case No. 8782 before the then CFI of Misamis Oriental, the plaintiff is the petitioner corporation and the defendants are Flaviano Fucoy Jr., Jose Mariano Tan, and a John Doe. John Doe, later, turned out to be PR Romeo Ebarle who was the unauthorized transferee but in actual possession of the car. In Civil Case No. 2312 before the RTC Pagadian City, the plaintiff is the same PR Romeo Ebarle while the defendants are the petitioner corporation and Antonio Ibonia the Special Deputy Sheriff who enforced the writ of replevin in compliance with the order of the then CFI of Misamis Oriental. It is clear that lbonia is not a real party in interest in the Pagadian case. There, the real parties in interest, the principal protagonists are Investors' Finance Corporation and Romeo Ebarle. They are the same Identical real parties in interest, the principal protagonists in the Cagayan de Oro case. This concurrence suffices to satisfy the requirement of Identity of parties in the principle of litis pendentia.We also find identity of the rights asserted in both cases.The true subject matter of the controversy is the car (Corolla, 4-door de luxe Sedan). The primary objective of the plaintiff, the petitioner herein, in the Misamis Oriental case is the enforcement of the chattel mortgage due to non-payment of the balance of the purchase price of the said car. On the other hand, the plaintiff, the private respondent herein, in the Pagadian case, seeks as his primordial relief, the discharge of the chattel mortgage over the same car due to alleged full payment of all the installments on the price of the same. By way of initial reliefs, the plaintiff in the Misamis case (defendant in the Pagadian case and petitioner herein) prayed for the issuance of a writ of replevin to take possession of the car in order to foreclose the chattel mortgage thereon as the plaintiff in the Pagadian case (defendant in the Misamis case and private respondent herein) sought an injunction to restrain the taking of the same car. The denial of the motion to dismiss filed by the herein petitioner before the Pagadian court, resulted to a chaotic as well as a ridiculous situation for the parties. To all legal intents and purposes, the Pagadian court issued a second writ of replevin to counteract and to annul the writ of replevin validly issued seven and a half months earlier by a coordinate and co-equal tribunal the Misamis court, which has already taken jurisdiction. Worse, the Pagadian court practically dismissed the case pending in the Misamis court, pronouncing that "the replevin case, Civil Case No. 8782, to all practical intents and purposes to have been terminated." SC cannot countenance the spectacle of two co-equal courts racing with each other to pre-empt judgment over the same subject matter of the two pending actions. The resulting confusion in the event that the decisions, orders, or resolutions of the two courts contradict and conflict with each other would do great damage to the administration of justice.An action for damages against the person obtaining the writ of replevin and the sheriff who enforced the writ of replevin, assuming that the seizure of the property was unlawful, should be litigated in the replevin suit and not by independent action. The doctrine is undisputed that no court has the power to interfere by injunction with the judgment or orders of another court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction having power to grant the relief sought by injunction. We take note that the filing of Civil Case No. 2312 before the Pagadian Court was a "specie of forum-shopping" considering that the private respondent is an influential person in the locality. WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court is REVERSED and Civil Case No. 2312 of the Regional Trial Court, 9th Judicial District, Branch XXII. Pagadian City is hereby ordered DISMISSED without prejudice to the prosecution of the claim for damages for wrongful replevin in Civil Case No. 8782 of the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch XVII, Cagayan de Oro City.Oropeza v. Allied Banking Corp

There are 2 Civil Cases involved in this case: 1st CIVIL CASE (CV No. 19325-88): Collection Suit with application of Writ of Preliminary Attachment (Docketed in CA as CA-GR. CV No. 419986) Parties: Allied Bank (plaintiff) v. Oropeza Mktg (OMC) and Spouses Oropeza (defendants) 2nd CIVIL CASE (CV No. 19634-89): Annulment of Deed of Sale with Assumption of mortgage Parties: Allied Bank (plaintiff) v. Spouses Oropeza (only defendant) Allied Bank (Bank) extended loan (P780,000) to OMC and Spouses Oropeza. As security, the spouses executed a Promissory Note, Continuing Guaranty/Comprehensive Surety Agreement and a Real Estate Mortage over their properties. The Spouses defaulted in their obligation. Hence, the Bank instituted the 1st Civil Case. While the application for a write was pending, the Bank discovered that the Spouses executed an Absoulte Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage in favor of a third party (Soild Gold Corpo), hence, then filed the 2nd Civil Case. Rulings on 2nd Civil Case RTC Davao: Ruled in favor of Spouses Oropeza declaring that the spouses have fully settled their debts (with their deposits and receivables) and the deed of sale was valid. CA: On appeal by the Bank dismissed the Banks complaint and affirmed RTC decision. Rulings on 1st Civil Case RTC Davao: dismissed the Banks Complaint CA: On appeal by the Bank, reversed and set aside the RTC decision. Issue/Held: Whether or not the decision of the CA in the 1st Civil Case constitute res judicata in so far as the 2nd Civil Case is concerned - (YES)Ratio:

Res judicata literally means a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment. Res judicata lays the rule that an existing final judgment or decree rendered on the merits, and without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all other actions or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit. The principle of res judicata has two aspects, namely: (a) bar by prior judgment as enunciated in Rule 39, Section 49 (b) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; and (b) conclusiveness of judgment which is contained in Rule 39, Section 47 (c). (a) bar by prior judgment: There is bar by prior judgment when, as between the first case where the judgment was rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. Otherwise put, the judgment or decree of the court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation between the parties, as well as their privies, and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of action before the same or any other tribunal. (b) conclusiveness of judgment: But where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no identity of causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved therein. Stated differently, any right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same. The elements of res judicata are:

(1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final;

(2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;

(3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and

(4) there must be as between the first and second action, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action.

The existence here of the first three requisites is not disputed. With respect to the fourth element, however, the parties disagree. Should identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action be shown in the two cases, then res judicata in its aspect as a bar by prior judgment would apply. If as between the two cases, only identity of parties can be shown, but not identical causes of action, then res judicata as conclusiveness of judgment applies. IDENTITY OF PARTIES IS PRESENT: The operation of the final judgment or order in a previous case is not altered by the fact that somebody who was not a party in the first action has been impleaded in the second case. Otherwise, litigants can always renew any litigation by the mere expediency of including new parties. Hence, the fact that , the fact that OMC was not a party in 2nd civil case (RTC and CA) does not nullify the effect of the judgments issued in these cases on the other case, (1st Civil Case). The rule on identity of parties does not require an absolute, but only a susbstantial identity of parties. IDENTITY OF CAUSES OF ACTION NOT PRESENT: With respect to identity of subject matter, this is included in identity of causes of action. When there is identity of the cause or causes of action, there is necessarily identity of subject matter. But the converse is not true, for different causes of action may exist regarding the same subject matter, in which case, the conclusiveness of judgment shall be only with regard to the questions directly and actually put in issue and decided in the first case. The legal rights asserted by the Bank in the 2 cases differ: 1st Civil Case was for the collection of the P780,000.00 loan, secured by a promissory note, which respondent Allied Bank insists remained unpaid by the spouses. In other words, it is the alleged failure of petitioners to liquidate their obligation to respondent bank, which caused Allied Banks cause of action in 1st civil case to accrue. The situation is different in the other case, 2nd case, where respondent bank asserts its right as a mortgagee to the subject property by virtue of the real estate mortgage executed by petitioner spouses in its favor. Another test to determine the identity of causes of action is to consider whether the same evidence would sustain both causes of action. We find that in 1st Civil Case, Allied Bank will have to present evidence showing the existence of the loan and petitioners failure to comply with their bounden duty to pay such loan in accordance with the terms of the promissory note executed by petitioners. However, in 2nd civil case, respondents evidence must establish and prove its allegations to the effect that: (a) petitioners secured a loan from it; (b) said loan was secured by a promissory note and a mortgage over properties owned by the Oropezas; (c) petitioners failed to pay their debt; and (d) petitioners sold the mortgaged properties wit. The evidence to support Allied Banks cause of action in 1st case is included in and forms part of the evidence needed by respondent bank to support its cause of action in 2nd case. The converse, however, not true. The evidence needed in 2nd case does not necessarily form part of the evidence needed by respondent in 1st case. Accordingly, we find that the evidence to sustain the respective causes of action in the two cases is not exactly the same. There being substantial identity of parties but no identity of causes of action, the applicable aspect of res judicata is conclusiveness of judgment. There is conclusiveness of judgment only as to the matters actually determined by the trial court in 2nd civil case, as affirmed by the CA. These include the findings that: (1) the promissory note relied upon by respondent bank is spurious; and (2) that the loan obligation of the Oropeza spouses has been settled and paid. Res judicata is founded on the principle that parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once. Hence, when a right or fact has been judicially tried and established by a court of competent jurisdiction, or an opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court - - so long as it remains unreversed - - is conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate. It having been determined with finality in CA of the 2nd civil case that the debt of the Oropezas has been settled, Allied Banks cause of action in 1st civil case must be deemed extinguishedILUMINADA CARANDANG, EDEN CARANDANG, SWANIE CARANDANG and MARILO CARANDANG,petitioners,vs.POMPOSA G. VENTURANZA, and GREGORIO VENTURANZA ,respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioners are the surviving heirs of the late ProtacioCarandang who, during his lifetime, owned and possessed together with his spouse Iluminada, a parcel of land.

A case was filed against spouses Carandang by the relatives of Protacio, allegedly co-heirs to certain hereditary shares on the land. The Carandangs sought the help of respondent Gregorio Venturanzaa long-time neighbor, lawyer and friend, who was then a Municipal Judge of Victoria, Oriental Mindoro.

Pursuant to the advice and assistance of the judge, the spouses Carandang subscribed to a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of respondent spouses Pomposa G. Venturanza and Gregorio Venturanza (their judge friend) allegedly with the specific understanding that after the relatives' claims shall have been fully settled, title to the subject land would be given back to ProtacioCarandang. Because of this, the TCT was cancelled and a new one in favor of the Venturanzas was issued.

Because of this, the relatives of Protacio filed a case in the CFI of Calapan, Oriental Mindoro for the declaration of nullity of the Deed of Sale. CFI Calapan ruled that the Deed of Sale was valid and that the Sps. Venturanza are the lawful owners and entitled to the possession of the land described in the TCT.

CA: Denied the appeal and affirmed the ruling of the CFI Calapan.

The Venturanzas refused to honor their alleged understanding with the heirs. Later on, the petitioners discovered that the land was subdivided and a new TCT was issued in the name of Pomposa. A complaint was then filed by the heirs of Protacio against respondent spouses before the CFI of Oriental Mindoro.

A motion to dismiss was interposed by the spouses Venturanza on the ground of res judicata or bar by the prior judge judgment of the same Court of First Instance in Civil Case No. 2149. The respondent court sustained the motion to dismiss.

ISSUE: WON res judicata applies in the case at bar?

HELD:

The doctrine of res judicata is an old axiom of law, dictated by wisdom and sanctified by age, and is founded on the broad principle that it is to the interest of the public that there should be an end to litigation by the same parties and their privies over a subject once fully and fairly adjudicated.

For res judicata to apply: (a) the former judgment must be final; (b) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be, between the first and second actions identity of parties, of subject matter, and of cause of action.

The existence of the first three requisites in the case at bar is not disputed. However, Anent the criterion of identity of parties, a situation obtains whereby the parties ProtacioCarandang and the spouses Venturanza, formerly co-defendants in a case brought against them, now find themselves protagonists in opposite camps. Because of such adverse relationship, the question arises whether or not the judgment in the first case in which both parties were defendants is conclusive in a subsequent litigation between the two.

We have laid down the rule in the case ofValdez v. Mendoza(89 Phil. 83) to wit:

In the United States where our theories on res judicata have originated, a judgment in favor of two or more defendants is conclusive on plaintiff as against them. "The estoppel however is raised only between those who were adverse parties in the former suit, and the judgment therein ordinarily settles nothing as to the relative rights or liabilities of the co-plaintiffs or co-defendants inter sese, unless their hostile or conflicting claim were actually brought in issue." *** "by cross-petition or separate and adverse answers" (50 C.J.S. pp. 372, 373 citing many cases) (See also 30 Am. Jur. 233).

Based on the above ruling, there can be no identity of parties between the first and second cases as to bar the latter case.

Moreover the qualifications to the above rule are, themselves, not applicable.

In the above-cited case, where this Court laid down the foregoing rule, we held that estoppel does not work against co-parties in a prior case "unless their hostile or conflicting claims were actually brought in issue" ... "by cross-petition or separate and adverse answers (50 C.J.S. 372, 373; 30 AM. Jur. 233)." No such thing appears in the records so as to bring the present case under the above qualification to the rule. The petitioners' present claims have never been set forth in Civil Case No. R-2149, nor were they litigated therein. Only insofar as the decision of the respondent court in the earlier case declares the Deed of Sale between deceased ProtacioCarandang and the spouses Venturanza valid and subsisting between them will the rule ofres judicataapply. But even if the judgment rendered upon the validity of the deed of sale between the parties in Civil Case No. 2149 is conclusive between the same parties in the subsequent action, Civil Case No. 2480 involving the same deed of sale, the petitioners' case is not anchored on this issue. This brings us to the question of identity of causes of action.

Respondents allege that the main issue in both cases is the question of ownership. They state that this question has been adjuged in their favor and they may no longer be sued by petitioners on the same cause. At first blush, the validity of such an argument appears convincing. However, a more careful study of the respective contentions of the parties inclines us to uphold the contrary. The present cause of action is not a basis for a finding of res judicata.

A comparison alone of the complaints in both cases reveals a difference in objectives. Civil Case No. R-2149 brought by Trinidad Moreno and others against the parties herein had for its purpose the annulment of the sale of the property under litigation and the recovery of hereditary rights. On the other hand, Civil Case No. R-2480 brought by the petitioners against the spouses Venturanza seeks the reconveyance of property or recovery of ownership on the basis of a trust agreement between the parties. Petitioners do not seek the annulment of the Deed of Sale which they had executed in favor of the respondents nor do they question the respondents' ownership of the property by virtue of the deed. Rather, the petitioners pray for the enforcement of the trust agreement between the parties under Article 1453 of the Civil Code to wit:

When a property is conveyed to a person in reliance upon his declared intention to hold it for, or transfer it to another or the grantor, there is an implied trust in favor of the person whose benefit is contemplated.

Thus, though the ownership of the respondents by virtue of the deed of sale executed in their favor by petitioners may have been established, the question of ownership on the basis of the trust agreement between the same parties was not adjudicated by the court in Civil Case No. R-2149. Therefore, the judgment in the earlier case cannot bar the petitioners' present cause of action which is founded on facts and law different from those of the previous case involving them. As held inHeirs of Roxas v. Galindo, et. al(108 Phil. 582) andViray v. Marinas(49 SCRA 44) "where the second action between the same parties is upon a different claim or demand, the judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel only as to those matters in issue or points controverted upon which the finding or judgment was rendered. In fine, the previous judgment is conclusive in the second case, only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved therein." This is the rule on conclusiveness of judgment embodied in Subdivision c, Section 49, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, which must be interpreted and its applicability ascertained in the case at bar and not the doctrine of res judicata, which respondent spouses invoke to bar the petitioners' claims.MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEDRO J. VELASCO, respondents.

G.R. No. L-33794 | May 31, 1982

FACTS: (This is the Petition for Review of the Nuisance case in Property Casis; remember the buzzing sound from Meralco site.) Respondent Velasco purchased 3 lots located at the corner of the then South D and South 6 Streets of Quezon City from PHHC. These lots are to be used for residential purposes only. He sold two lots to petitioner Manila Electric Company. MERALCO established a substation within the property.

Velasco wrote a letter to MERALCO stating that he and his family tried to tolerate it for a while, but the severe noise and the electrification of the ground, especially that in which the artesian well of the undersigned is located, made life of the whole family unbearable.

Thereafter, Velasco filed a complaint (the NUISANCE CASE) before the CFI praying that Meralco be ordered "to remove and abate the nuisances herein complained against," with damages. The Trial Court dismissed the complaint but, on appeal to this Court (our long property case!), the dismissal was set aside and Meralco was ordered to either transfer its sub-station or take appropriate measures to reduce its noise at the property line between the defendant company's compound and that of the plaintiff-appellant to an average of 40 to 50 decibels within 90 days from finality of the decision.

Meanwhile, Velasco instituted another complaint (the CANCELLATION CASE) for the rescission of the sale of the property to Meralco and to collect rentals for the use and occupation of the property while in the latter's possession. The complaint was dismissed by the Trial Court on the ground that two cases split Velascos cause of action such that the CANCELLATION CASE was precluded from being instituted.

CA reversed TC considering that abatement of nuisance was distinct and separate from rescission of the contract of sale.

ISSUE: Whether or not the two cases split a single cause of action

HELD: No, CA was correct in that there was no splitting of a single cause of action because the cause of action for abatement of nuisance is different from a cause of action for cancellation of contract. HOWEVER, it does not mean that a judicial proceeding cannot be barred by a previous case involving another cause of action. The principle applicable would be estoppel by judgment or, more specifically, "collateral estoppel by judgment". [Hoag v. New Jersey] A common statement of the rule of collateral estoppel is that "where a question of fact essential to the judgment is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, the determination is conclusive between the parties in a subsequent action on a different cause of action". As an aspect of the broader doctrine of res judicata, collateral estoppel is designed to eliminate the expense, vexation, waste, and possible inconsistent results of duplicatory litigation.

[Cromwell vs. Sac Country] It is a finality as to the claim or demand in controversy, concluding parties and those in privity with them, not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose.

When VELASCO instituted the NUISANCE CASE, he conceded, which he is now estopped to deny, that MERALCO had the right to establish the sub-station within the PROPERTY without violation of the restriction to "residential purposes". What he subsequently alleged, after the sub-station had become operative, was that the sub-station, because of the generated noise, had become a nuisance which should be abated. Although the propriety of the establishment of the sub-station was not a controverted matter in the NUISANCE CASE, it was a tacit admission on the part of VELASCO, which can form part of an estoppel within the NUISANCE CASE. It would not be good law to allow him now to take the position, even if he had the right of action, that the construction of the sub-station violated the restriction provided for by PHHC. If the present standpoint of VELASCO should be upheld, then the procedurally wrong result would be that, after this Court had decided that the sub-station can remain within the PROPERTY with reduction of the noise, the Appellate Tribunal, a subordinate tribunal, can subsequently nullify the decision of this Court and order the removal of the sub-station from the PROPERTY.

EXTRA ISSUES:

THE RIGHT OF ACTION.- The contract of sale between PHHC (original owner) and VELASCO provided that only constructions exclusively for "residential purposes" shall be built on the PROPERTY. That requirement, naturally, was binding on VELASCO himself, as it is also binding on MERALCO as his assignee. Be that as it may, that contract implies that it is PHHC itself which has the right of action against any assignee of VELASCO. Cancellation of the title to the PROPERTY would be by virtue of the condition imposed in the PHHC-VELASCO contract, and not by virtue of the contract between VELASCO and MERALCO.

RESIDENTIAL PURPOSES. From the PHHC, or community, point of view, the construction of an electric sub-station by the local electric public service company within the subdivision can be deemed encompassed within "residential purposes" for the simple reason that residences are expected to be furnished with electrical connection. If there is no electric current because of the lack of a sub- station, the residences within the entire subdivision area could be valueless for residential purposes.

Moreover, the authorities of Quezon City granted a permit for the construction of the sub-station, thereby conceding that a sub-station is not necessarily non-residential.

CONTRACTUAL ESTOPPEL.- Even if the requirement for "residential purposes" were a condition imposed by VELASCO himself in the contract of sale between VELASCO and MERALCO, the former can no longer cancel the contract on the alleged violation of the condition. When MERALCO erected the sub-station in September, 1953, VELASCO did not object to its construction as such. Actually, what was ultimately objected to by VELASCO was the noise of the sub-station; but there was no original and timely objection to the establishment itself of the sub-station as being not for residential purposes. If there had been no noise whatsoever from the sub-station, no controversy would have arisen.

VIRGINIA AVISADO AND JOCELYN AVISADO GARGARITA,petitioners, vs.AMOR RUMBAUA, VICTORIA C. RUMBAUA and COURT OF APPEALS,respondents.

Facts:

Respondents Abelardo Amor Rumbaua and Victoria Consengco-Rumbaua (hereafter Amor and Victoria) are husband and wife, Filipinos, residents of Jacksonville, Florida, U.S.A. On July 1, 1971, Victoria became the registered owner of a parcel of land located on Maayusin St., U.P. Village, Diliman, Quezon City. On June 28, 1971, respondents Rafael and Aurora Consengco (hereafter Rafael and Aurora) became the registered owners ofthe lot adjacent to Amor and Victorias lot.Amor, Victoria, Rafael and Aurora contend that on or about the second week ofFebruary 1973, they discovered that Abelardo and petitioner Virginia Avisado (hereafter the Avisados) were occupying both parcels of land and had built thereon a bungalow made of strong materials.Respondents demanded that the Avisados vacate the lots, to no avail.On December 3, 1977, Victoria executed a special power of attorney authorizing Rafael to:

...ask, demand, sue for, recover, extrajudicially and/or judicially, that certain real property located at Maayusin St., Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines, covered by and described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 166065 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, belonging to me solely and exclusively, my title, my title thereto being evidenced by said Transfer of Certificate Title No. 166065, in connection thereto, to represent me in the pre-trial and trial of that case which he will have to institute and file for that purpose, with full power and authority to enter into any compromise agreement with anybody under any terms and conditions which he may deem just, proper and equitable under the premises.

On November 17, 1978, Amor and Victoria, represented by Rafael (and in his own capacity as co-plaintiff) and Aurora filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch 16, Quezon City, a complaint for recovery of possession of realty with damages against the Avisados.On April 15, 1980, Rafael (in his own capacity), Amor and Victoria (through Rafael), and Aurora entered into a compromise agreement with the Avisados, stating:First, the Avisados (vendees) shall pay Amor and Victoria (vendors) the amount of seventy thousand pesos (P70,0