Constitutional Law: Taada vs. Tuvera 136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985) 146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)

TAADA VS. TUVERA 136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985) Publication in the Official Gazette (Enforceability of a Statute) FACTS: Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations and administrative orders. The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition. ISSUE: Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes valid and enforceable. HELD: Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official Gazette. The word shall therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be given substance and validity. The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of general application which have not been published have no force and effect. TAADA VS. TUVERA 146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986) FACTS: This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not as to their publication; 2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation. HELD: The clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its previous publication. Laws should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole. All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of the law. Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical. The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible. J. Cruz: Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.

G.R. No. 80718 January 29, 1988

FELIZA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO RAMOS, petitioners,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS BERNAL, SR., GLENIA BERNAL, LUIS BERNAL, JR.,

HEIRS OF MARISSA BERNAL, namely, GLICERIA DELA CRUZ BERNAL and LUIS

BERNAL, SR., respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N

CORTES, J.:

This special civil action for certiorari seeks to declare null and void two (2) resolutions of the

Special First Division of the Court of Appeals in the case of Luis Bernal, Sr., et al. v. Felisa

Perdosa De Roy, et al., CA-G.R. CV No. 07286. The first resolution promulgated on 30

September 1987 denied petitioners motion for extension of time to file a motion for

reconsideration and directed entry of judgment since the decision in said case had become

final; and the second Resolution dated 27 October 1987 denied petitioners motion for

reconsideration for having been filed out of time.

At the outset, this Court could have denied the petition outright for not being verified as

required by Rule 65 section 1 of the Rules of Court. However, even if the instant petition did

not suffer from this defect, this Court, on procedural and substantive grounds, would still

resolve to deny it.

The facts of the case are undisputed. The firewall of a burned-out building owned by

petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of private

respondents, resulting in injuries to private respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a

daughter. Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of

its proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed to do so. On the basis of the foregoing

facts, the Regional Trial Court. First Judicial Region, Branch XXXVIII, presided by the Hon.

Antonio M. Belen, rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross negligence and

awarding damages to private respondents. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was

affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in a decision promulgated on August 17, 1987, a copy

of which was received by petitioners on August 25, 1987. On September 9, 1987, the last day

of the fifteen-day period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to file

a motion for reconsideration, which was eventually denied by the appellate court in the

Resolution of September 30, 1987. Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration on

September 24, 1987 but this was denied in the Resolution of October 27, 1987.

This Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of discretion when it

denied petitioners motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, directed

entry of judgment and denied their motion for reconsideration. It correctly applied the rule laid

down in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, [G.R. No. 70895, August 5, 1985,138 SCRA

461, that the fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot

be extended. In its Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, promulgated on July

30, 1986 (142 SCRA 208), this Court en banc restated and clarified the rule, to wit:

Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly

enforced that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration may be filed

with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the

Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with the

Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant or

deny the extension requested. (at p. 212)

Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No.

73146-53, August 26, 1986, 143 SCRA 643], reiterated the rule and went further to restate

and clarify the modes and periods of appeal.

Bacaya v. Intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 74824, Sept. 15, 1986,144 SCRA

161],stressed the prospective application of said rule, and explained the operation of the

grace period, to wit:

In other words, there is a one-month grace period from the promulgation on May 30, 1986 of

the Courts Resolution in the clarificatory Habaluyas case, or up to June 30, 1986, within

which the rule barring extensions of time to file motions for new trial or reconsideration is, as

yet, not strictly enforceable.

Since petitioners herein filed their motion for extension on February 27, 1986, it is still within

the grace period, which expired on June 30, 1986, and may still be allowed.

This grace period was also applied in Mission v. Intermediate Appellate Court [G.R. No.

73669, October 28, 1986, 145 SCRA 306].]

In the instant case, however, petitioners motion for extension of time was filed on September

9, 1987, more than a year after the expiration of the grace period on June 30, 1986. Hence,

it is no longer within the coverage of the grace period. Considering the length of time from the

expiration of the grace period to the promulgation of the decision of the Court of Appeals on

August 25, 1987, petitioners cannot seek refuge in the ignorance of their counsel regarding

said rule for their failure to file a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period.

Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be made to

apply to the case at bar owing to the non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official

Gazette as of the time the subject decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated. Contrary

to petitioners view, there is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in

the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective.

It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions

of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated,

and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G. R. s) and in such

publications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.

This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of discretion in

affirming the trial courts decision holding petitioner liable under Article 2190 of the Civil Code,

which provides that the proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damage

resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs.

Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument that private respondents had the last

clear chance to avoid the accident if only they heeded the. warning to vacate the tailoring

shop and , therefore, petitioners prior negligence should be disregarded, since the doctrine

of last clear chance, which has been applied to vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this

case.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court Resolved to DENY the instant petition for

lack of merit.

Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.

DIGEST: he firewall of a burned out building owned by Felisa De Roy collapsed and

destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of Luis Bernal resulting in injuries and

even to the death of Bernals daughter. De Roy claimed that Bernal had been warned prior

hand but that she was ignored.

In the RTC, De Roy was found guilty of gross negligence. She appealed but the Court of

Appeals affirmed the RTC. On the last day of filing a motion for reconsideration, De Roys

counsel filed a motion for extension. It was denied by the CA. The CA ruled that pursuant to

the case of Habaluyas Enterprises vs Japzon (August 1985), the fifteen-day period for

appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended.

De Roys counsel however argued that the Habaluyas case should not be applicable because

said ruling was never published in the Official Gazette.

ISSUE: Whether or not Supreme Court decisions must be published in the Official Gazette

before they can be binding.

HELD: No. There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decision in the Official

Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is

bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the

Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated and

published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions and in such publications as the

SCRA and law journals.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION G.R. No. 158761

ADMINISTRATION,

Petitioner, Present:

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

CARPIO,

- versus - CARPIO MORALES,

TINGA, and

VELASCO, JR., JJ.

VICTORIANO B. GONZAGA, Promulgated:

Respondent.

December 4, 2007

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

D E C I S I O N

VELASCO, JR., J.:

For review under Rule 45 are the March 6, 2003 Decision[1] and June 10, 2003

Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 68769, which

dismissed petitioners appeal of the July 23, 2001 Order[3] of the Pagadian City

Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 21 in Civil Case No. 4282-2K, and denied

petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, respectively.

On November 13, 2000, respondent Victoriano B. Gonzaga filed his

Certificate of Candidacy for membership in the Board of Directors of Zamboanga

del Sur II Electric Cooperative, Inc., District II (ZAMSURECO). Later that day, the

screening committee resolved to disqualify respondent because his spouse was an

incumbent member of theSangguniang Bayan of Diplahan, Zamboanga del

Sur. Based on the Electric Cooperative Election Code (ECEC), promulgated by

petitioner National Electrification Administration (NEA), a candidate whose spouse

occupies an elective government position higher than Barangay Captain is prohibited

to run as director of an electric cooperative. ZAMSURECOs by-laws, however, do

not provide for such ground for disqualification.[4]

On November 21, 2000, respondent filed a Petition for Prohibition and

Damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 4282-2K with the Pagadian City RTC.

ZAMSURECO filed a Motion to Dismiss and Answer on November 24, 2000,

which the RTC denied. However, it issued a temporary restraining order, ordering

ZAMSURECOs officials to refrain from conducting the election for directorship set

on December 2, 2000.

The RTC said that the petition was dismissible because of the failure of

respondent to exhaust all administrative remedies, as required by Section 2, 2.C of

the ECEC Guidelines on the Conduct of District Elections for Electric Cooperative.

The section required that a protest arising from disqualification shall be filed with

the screening committeein not less than FIVE (5) days before the election. The

screening committee shall decide the protest within FORTY-EIGHT (48) hours from

receipt thereof. Failure of the applicant to file his/her protest within the above-cited

period shall be deemed a waiver of his right to protest.[5]

As observed by the RTC, respondent had urgently filed the petition

on November 21, 2000 because the election sought to be restrained was going to be

held on December 2, 2000 and November 20 was a holiday. Under the

circumstances, respondent had little time to exhaust the remedy in Sec. 2 of the

Guidelines, such that an exception could be made. More importantly, according to

the RTC, the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies cannot be invoked in the

instant case since the guidelines prescribing the administrative remedy is a subject

matter of the ECEC, which is at issue, and is exactly what is being sought to be

invalidated.[6]

On December 12, 2000, respondent filed a motion to withdraw the amended

petition, and to admit a second amended petition that impleaded NEA as

indispensable party.Respondent also averred that the ECEC was null and void

because it had not been published. On December 20, 2000, the RTC admitted the

second amended petition, issued a writ of preliminary injunction to prevent the

conduct of election for directorship, issued summons to NEA, and required NEA to

comment if the ECEC was published in any newspaper of general circulation.[7]

On January 29, 2001, NEA filed a motion for extension of time to file an

answer, and subsequently on April 10, 2001, a Motion for Leave to Admit Pleading

to which a Motion to Dismiss was attached. NEA questioned the jurisdiction of the

RTC and alleged that respondent failed to exhaust administrative remedies.[8]

In its July 23, 2001 Order,[9] the RTC denied petitioners Motion to Dismiss

for being filed out of time. More importantly, it noted NEAs failure to state whether

the ECEC was indeed published in a newspaper of general circulation as required by

the New Civil Code and the Administrative Code of 1987. The RTC said the failure

rendered the ECEC null and void. As regards the lack of jurisdiction and non-

exhaustion of administrative remedies, the RTC noted that NEA erroneously relied

on Sec. 59 of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 269 and misapplied the cases it cited.

According to the RTC, Sec. 59 of PD 269 refers to order, ruling or decision

of the NEA in the exercise of NEAs quasi-judicial functions. And the RTC noted

that Secs. 51 to 58 refer to hearings, investigations, and procedures. On the other

hand, the validity of the ECEC, subject of the instant petition, was an exercise of

NEAs quasi-legislative function or rule-making authority.

Further, according to the RTC, NEA took Sec. 58 of PD 269 out of context

when it said Sec. 58 dealt with the administrative remedy available to petitioner. It

said that Sec. 58 presupposed a ruling or decision of the NEA and there was none in

the case before it. The RTC ruled in favor of Gonzaga, and ordered ZAMSURECO

to accept Gonzagas certificate of candidacy for director.[10] The RTC denied NEAs

motion for reconsideration.

The CA Ruled that the Courts Have Jurisdiction Over

Issues on Legality of Codes

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA. The CA denied due course and

dismissed the petition. It said that NEA was not exercising its quasi-judicial powers

but its rule-making authority. In the case before the trial court, the CA stressed that

the issue involved the interpretation of the ECEC, and to this extent, NEA had no

jurisdiction because the issue is within the province of the courts.

The CA denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in its June 10,

2003 Resolution. Hence, we have this petition.

The Issues

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT APPLYING

SECTION 59 OF P.D. 269

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING

THE TRIAL COURTS NULLIFICATION OF THE ECEC

Issues Involving NEAs Rule-Making Authority

Are Cognizable by Regular Courts

The petition has no merit.

Sec. 59 of PD 269 provides:

SEC. 59. Court Review.The Supreme Court is hereby given jurisdiction to

review any order, ruling or decision of the NEA and to modify or set aside such

order, ruling or decision when it clearly appears that there is no evidence before the

NEA to support reasonably such order, ruling or decision, or that the same is

contrary to law, or that it was without the jurisdiction of the NEA. The evidence

presented to the NEA, together with the record of the proceedings before the NEA,

shall be certified by the NEA to the Supreme Court. Any order, ruling or decision

of the NEA may likewise be reviewed by the Supreme Court upon writ of certiorari

in proper case. The procedure for review, except as herein provided, shall be

presented by rules of the Supreme Court. Any order or decision of the NEA may

be reviewed on the application of any person or public service entity aggrieved

thereby and who was a party in the subject proceeding, by certiorari in appropriate

cases or by a petition for review, which shall be filed within thirty (30) days from

the notification of the NEA order, decision or ruling on reconsideration. Said

petition shall be placed on file in the office of the Clerk for the Supreme Court who

shall furnish copies thereof to the NEA and other interested parties.

Petitioner argues that based on the foregoing provision, only the Supreme

Court has the authority to review the acts of NEA as an administrative body with

adjudicative and rule-making power. It cited NEA v. Mendoza, using the Courts

pronouncement that:

[T]he power of judicial review of NEAs order or decision pertains to the Supreme Court as decreed in Section 59 of P.D. 269 which vests specifically on the Supreme

Court the jurisdiction to review any order, ruling or decision of the NEA and to

modify or set aside such orders, rulings or decisions.[11]

It is obvious that Sec. 59 of PD 269 refers to order, ruling or decision of NEA.

What is being challenged in this case is the decision of the screening committee of

ZAMSURECO to disqualify respondent. Likewise assailed is the validity of the

ECEC, particularly, whether the requirement of publication was complied with. The

ECEC was issued by NEA pursuant to its rule-making authority, not its quasi-

judicial function. Hence, the issue regarding the controversy over respondents

disqualification and the question on the ECECs validity are within the inherent

jurisdiction of regular courts to review. Petitioners reliance on NEA is

misplaced. The subject in that case was the electricity rates charged by a cooperative,

a matter which is clearly within NEAs jurisdiction. The issue in the present petition,

however, centers on the validity of NEAs rules in light of the publication

requirements of the Administrative Code and New Civil Code. The present issue is

cognizable by regular courts.

With regard to the second issue, we find no error in the appellate and trial

courts nullification of the ECEC. The CA correctly observed that while

ZAMSURECO complied with the requirements of filing the code with the

University of the Philippines Law Center, it offered no proof of publication in

the Official Gazette nor in a newspaper of general circulation. Without compliance

with the requirement of publication, the rules and regulations contained in the ECEC

cannot be enforced and implemented.

Article 2 of the New Civil Code provides that laws shall take effect after

fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the Official

Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is

otherwise provided.

Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of

1987, reinforced the requirement of publication and outlined the procedure, as

follows:

Sec. 3. Filing. (1) Every Agency shall file with the University of

the Philippines Law Center three (3) Certified copies of every rule adopted by

it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within

three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction

against any party or persons.

(2) The Records Officer of the agency, or his equivalent functionary, shall

carry out the requirements of this section under pain of disciplinary action.

(3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing agency and

shall be open to public inspection.

Sec. 4. Effectivity In addition to other rule-making requirements provided

by law not inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15)

days from the date of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by

law, or specified in this rule.

Sec. 18. When Laws Take Effect Laws shall take effect after Fifteen (15)

days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a

newspaper of general circulation, unless it is otherwise provided.

We have already emphasized and clarified the requirement of publication in

this Courts Resolution in Taada v. Tuvera:

We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private

laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity which shall begin fifteen

(15) days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the

legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by

the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly

delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the

Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if

their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid

delegation.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating

only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be

published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions

issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed

by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. (Emphasis supplied.) [12]

The aforequoted ruling was reiterated in Dadole v. Commission on

Audit,[13] De Jesus v. Commission on Audit,[14] and Philippine International Trading

Corporation v. Commission on Audit.[15]

In the case at bar, the ECEC was issued by petitioner pursuant to its rule-

making authority provided in PD 269, as amended, particularly Sec. 24:

Section 24. Board of Directors. (a) The Management of a Cooperative shall

be vested in its Board, subject to the supervision and control of NEA which shall

have the right to be represented and to participate in all Board meetings and

deliberations and to approve all policies and resolutions.

The composition, qualifications, the manner of elections and filling of

vacancies, the procedures for holding meetings and other similar provisions shall

be defined in the By-laws of the Cooperative subject to NEA policies, rules and

regulations x x x.

The ECEC applies to all electric cooperatives in the country. It is not a mere

internal memorandum, interpretative regulation, or instruction to

subordinates. Thus, the ECEC should comply with the requirements of the Civil

Code and the Administrative Code of 1987. In previous cases involving the election

of directors for electric cooperatives, the validity of the ECEC was not put in

issue. The ECEC then enjoyed the presumption of validity. In this case, however,

respondent directly questioned the validity of the ECEC in his second amended

petition. The trial court thus required petitioner to show proof of publication of the

ECEC. Petitioner could have easily provided such proof had the ECEC actually been

published in the Official Gazette or newspaper of general circulation in the

country. This simple proof could have immediately laid this case to rest. Petitioners

failure to do so only implies that the ECEC was not published accordingly, a fact

supported by the certification from the National Printing Office.

Lastly, petitioner avers that a petition for mandamus and prohibition should

not have been resorted to by respondent. The proper recourse, according to

petitioner, is a petition for declaratory relief. Petitioner miserably errs on this

point. Rule 63 on declaratory relief states:

Section 1. Who may file petition.Any person interested under a deed, will,

contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute,

executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation

may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional

Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a

declaration of his rights or duties thereunder.

As stated above, a requirement under Rule 63 is that the petition for

declaratory relief must be filed before any breach or violation the questioned

document may cause. In the instant case, it cannot be gainsaid that a breach has not

yet occurred since an actual dispute has already arisen between ZAMSURECO and

respondentthe screening committee of the cooperative on the erroneous

implementation of a code whose legality and implementation is being questioned.

On the other hand, it is familiar and fundamental doctrine that a writ of

prohibition or mandamus may issue when x x x a board unlawfully excludes another

from x x x enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled x x x.[16]

Considering that the screening committee of the board has excluded

respondent from being elected as board member of ZAMSURECO because of the

latters improper implementation of the code, a petition for mandamus and

prohibition is the proper recourse.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition, and AFFIRM IN TOTO the March

6, 2003 Decision and June 10, 2003 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 68769. Costs

against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

Associate Justice

Chairperson

ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice

A T T E S T A T I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation

before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

Associate Justice

Chairperson

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division

Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had

been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion

of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

[1] Rollo, pp. 34-39. Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices

Portia Alio-Hormachuelos and Amelita G. Tolentino. [2] Id. at 40. [3] Id. at 41-49. [4] Id. at 45. Art. 2, Sec. 7 of the ECEC specifically provides:

8. He/she does not hold an elective office in the government nor appointed to an elective position

above the level of a Barangay Captain.

x x x x

12. His/her spouse is not disqualified under Nos. 6, 7 and 8.

x x x x

14. Any bonafide member seeking election or re-election and any incumbent director shall satisfy

all of the above-mentioned qualifications. Non-compliance with any single item shall mean

disqualification or termination. [5] Id. at 43-44.

[6] Id. [7] Id. at 41. [8] Id. at 21, 41-42. [9] Supra note 3. [10] Id. at 42-44. [11] No. L-62038, September 25, 1985, 138 SCRA 632, 637. [12] No. L-63915, December 29, 1986, 146 SCRA 446, 453-454. [13] G.R. No. 125350, December 3, 2002, 393 SCRA 262. [14] G.R. No. 109023, August 12, 1998, 294 SCRA 152. [15] G.R. No. 132593, June 25, 1999, 309 SCRA 177. [16] RULES OF COURT, Rule 65, Sec. 2. Petition for prohibition.When the proceedings of any tribunal,

corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without

or in excess of his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy,

and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the

proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to

desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs

as law and justice may acquire. x x x x

SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus.When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the

performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station,

or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled,

and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby

may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered

commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to

be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the

wrongful acts of the respondent. (Emphasis supplied.)

GARCILLANO vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, et.al G.R. No. 170338 December 23, 2008

Facts:

Tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversation purportedly between the President of the

Philippines and a high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced. The tapes,

notoriously referred to as the "Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly contained the Presidents instructions to

COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential

elections. These recordings were to become the subject of heated legislative hearings conducted

separately by committees of both Houses of Congress.

Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process considering that he is summoned to attend

the Senate hearings without being apprised not only of his rights therein through the publication of the

Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, but also of the intended legislation

which underpins the investigation. He further intervenes as a taxpayer bewailing the useless and

wasteful expenditure of public funds involved in the conduct of the questioned hearings.

The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the Senate

Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers of

general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. With respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress,

however, of which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was

undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first opened their session.

Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that

the rules have never been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet form

available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the Senates internet web page.

Issue:

Whether or not publication of the Rules of Procedures Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation through

the Senates website, satisfies the due process requirement of law.

Held:

The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate, or in pamphlet form available at

the Senate, is not sufficient under the Taada v. Tuvera ruling which requires publication either in the

Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The Rules of Procedure even provide that the

rules "shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation,"

precluding any other form of publication. Publication in accordance with Taada is mandatory to comply

with the due process requirement because the Rules of Procedure put a persons liberty at risk. A person

who violates the Rules of Procedure could be arrested and detained by the Senate.

The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic

Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through the internet is all the more

incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional

equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary purposes. In other words, the law merely

recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data messages and/or

electronic documents. It does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and

regulations.

Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the

Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The

conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the

publication of the rules, because it can do so only "in accordance with its duly published rules of

procedure."

Manzano vs Sanchez

Manzano vs. Sanchez

AM No. MTJ-001329, March 8, 2001

FACTS:

Herminia Borja-Manzano was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano having been married on May

21, 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish in Caloocan. They had four children. On March 22, 1993, her

husband contracted another marriage with Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. The marriage

contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were separated thus, respondent Judge ought to

know that the marriage was void and bigamous. He claims that when he officiated the marriage of

David and Payao, he knew that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years as

manifested in their joint affidavit that they both left their families and had never cohabit or

communicated with their spouses due to constant quarrels.

ISSUE: Whether the solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who both have an

existing marriage can contract marriage if they have been cohabitating for 5 years under Article 34 of

Family Code.

HELD:

Among the requisites of Article 34 is that parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other.

Considering that both parties has a subsisting marriage, as indicated in their marriage contract that they

are both separated is an impediment that would make their subsequent marriage null and void. Just

like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least 5 years does not severe

the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Clearly, respondent Judge Sanchez demonstrated gross

ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.

G.R. No. 10010, Chu Jan v. Bernas, 34 Phil. 631

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

August 1, 1916

G.R. No. 10010

CHU JAN, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

LUCIO BERNAS, defendant-appellant.

Sulpicio V. Cea for appellant.

ARAULLO, J.:

On the afternoon of June 26, 1913, a match was held in the cockpit of the municipality

of Tabaco, Albay, between two cocks belonging to the plaintiff and to the defendant

respectively. Each of said persons had put up a wager of P160; and as the referee of

the cockpit had declared the defendant's cock the winner in the bout, the plaintiff

brought suit against the defendant in the justice of the peace court of the said pueblo,

asking that his own rooster be declared the winner. The justice of the peace court

decided that the bout was a draw. From this judgment the defendant appealed to the

Court of First Instance of the province. For the purposes of the appeal, the plaintiff

filed his complaint and prayed this court to render judgment ordering the defendant to

abide by and comply with the rules and regulations governing cockfights, to pay the

stipulated wager of P160; to return the other like amount (both sums of wager being

held for safe-keeping by the cockpit owner, Tomas Almonte) and to assess the costs

of both instances against the defendant.

The defendant denied each and all of the allegations of the complaint and moved to

dismiss with the costs against the plaintiff. On September 11, 1913, the said Court of

First Instance rendered judgment dismissing the appeal without special finding as to

costs. The defendant excepted to this judgment as well as to an order dictated by the

same court on November 8th of the same year, on the plaintiff's motion, ordering the

provincial treasurer of Albay and, if necessary, the municipal treasurer of Tabaco of

the same province, to release the deposit of P160 and return it to its owner, the

plaintiff Chinaman, Chu Jan. These proceedings have come before us on appeal by

means of the proper bill of exceptions.

The grounds for the dismissal pronounced by the lower court in the judgment

appealed from ere that the court has always dismissed cases of this nature, that he is

not familiar with the rules governing cockfights and the duties of referees thereof; that

he does not know where to find the law on the subject and, finally, that he knows of

no law whatever that governs the rights to the plaintiff and the defendant in questions

concerning cockfights.

The ignorance of the court or his lack of knowledge regarding the law applicable to a

case submitted to him for decision, the fact that the court does not know the rules

applicable to a certain matter that is the subject of an appeal which must be decided by

him and his not knowing where to find the law relative to the case, are not reasons that

can serve to excuse the court for terminating the proceedings by dismissing them

without deciding the issues. Such an excuse is the less acceptable because, foreseeing

that a case might arise to which no law would be exactly applicable, the Civil Code, in

the second paragraph of article 6, provides that the customs of the place shall be

observed, and, in the absence thereof, the general principles of law.

Therefore the judgment and the order appealed from, hereinbefore mentioned, are

reversed and to record of the proceedings shall remanded to the court from whence

they came for due trial and judgment as provided by law. No special finding is made

with regard to costs. So ordered.

Arellano, C. J., Torres, Johnson, and Trent, JJ., concur.

Moreland, J., took no part.

G.R. No. 119987-88, People v. Veneracion et al., 249 SCRA

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

DECISION

October 12, 1995

G.R. No. 119987-88 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.

HON. LORENZO B. VENERACION, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial

Region, Branch 47, Manila, HENRY LAGARTO y PETILLA and ERNESTO CORDERO, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:The sole issue in the case at bench involves a question of law. After finding that an accused

individual in a criminal case has, on the occasion of Rape, committed Homicide, is the judge allowed any

discretion in imposing either the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua or Death?

, J.:

The sole issue in the case at bench involves a question of law. After finding that an accused individual in

a criminal case has, on the occasion of Rape, committed Homicide, is the judge allowed any discretion in

imposing either the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua or Death?

The facts antecedent to the case before this Court, as narrated by petitioner, 1 involve the perpetration

of acts so bizarre and devoid of humanity as to horrify and numb the senses of all civilized men:

On August 2, 1994, the cadaver of a young girl, later identified as Angel Alquiza wrapped in a sack and

yellow table cloth tied with a nylon cord with both feet and left hand protruding from it was seen

floating along Del Pan St. near the corner of Lavesares St., Binondo, Manila.

When untied and removed from its cover, the lifeless body of the victim was seen clad only in a light

colored duster without her panties, with gaping wounds on the left side of the face, the left chin, left

ear, lacerations on her genitalia, and with her head bashed in.

On the basis of sworn statements of witnesses, booking sheets, arrest reports and the necropsy report

of the victim, Abundio Lagunday, a.k.a. Jr. Jeofrey of no fixed address, and Henry Lagarto y Petilla, of 288

Area H. Parola Compound, Tondo, Manila were later charged with the crime of Rape with Homicide in

an Information dated August 8, 1994 filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, National Capital

Judicial Region. Said Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 94-138071, reads:

That on or about August 2, 1994, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and

confederating together with one alias "LANDO" and other persons whose true names, identifies and

present whereabouts are still unknown and helping one another, with treachery, taking advantage of

their superior strength and nocturnity, and ignominy, and with the use of force and violence, that is, by

taking ANGEL ALQUIZA y LAGMAN into a warehouse, covering her mouth, slashing her vagina, hitting

her head with a thick piece of wood and stabbing her neck did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and

feloniously have carnal knowledge of the person of said ANGEL ALQUIZA y LAGMAN, a minor, seven (7)

years of age, against the latter's will and consent and on said occasion the said ABUNDIO LAGUNDAY,

a.k.a. "LANDO" and others, caused her fatal injuries which were the direct cause of her death

immediately thereafter.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Subsequently thereafter, Ernesto Cordero y Maristela, a.k.a. "Booster," of 1198 Sunflower St., Tondo,

Manila, Rolando Manlangit y Mamerta, a.k.a. "Lando," of 1274 Kagitingan St., Tondo, Manila, Richard

Baltazar y Alino, a.k.a. "Curimao," also of 1274 Kagitingan St., Tondo, Manila, and Catalino Yaon y

Aberin, a.k.a. "Joel," of 1282 Lualhati St., Tondo, Manila were accused of the same crime of Rape with

Homicide in an Information dated August 11, 1994, docketed as Criminal Case No. 94-138138, allegedly

committed as follows:

That on or about the 2nd day of August, 1994, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused

conspiring and confederating with ABUNDIO LAGUNDAY Alias "JR," JEOFREY and HENRY LAGARTO y

PETILLA who have already been charged in the Regional Trial Court of Manila of the same offense under

Criminal Case No. 94-138071, and helping one another, with treachery, taking advantage of their

superior strength and nocturnity and ignominy, and with the use of force and violence, that is, by taking

ANGEL ALQUIZA y LAGMAN into a pedicab, and once helpless, forcibly bringing her to a nearby

warehouse, covering her mouth, slashing her vagina, hitting her head with a thick piece of wood and

stabbing her neck, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the

person of said ANGEL ALQUIZA y LAGMAN, a minor, seven (7) years of age, against the latter's will and

consent and on said occasion the said accused together with their confederates ABUNDIO LAGARTO y

PETILLA caused her fatal injuries which were the direct cause of her death immediately thereafter.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The two criminal cases were consolidated to Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, presided

over by respondent Judge.

Duly arraigned, all the accused, except Abundio Lagunday who was already dead, (allegedly shot by

police escorts after attempting to fire a gun he was able to grab from SPO1 D. Vidad on August 12,

1994), pleaded "Not Guilty." Abundio Lagunday was dropped from the Information.

After trial and presentation of the evidence of the prosecution and the defense, the trial court rendered

a decision 2 on January 31, 1995 finding the defendants Henry Lagarto y Petilla and Ernesto Cordero y

Maristela guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide and sentenced both

accused with the "penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessories provided for by law." 3

Disagreeing with the sentence imposed, the City Prosecutor of Manila on February 8, 1995, filed a

Motion for Reconsideration, praying that the Decision be "modified in that the penalty of death be

imposed" against respondents Lagarto and Cordero, in place of the original penalty (reclusion perpetua).

Refusing to act on the merits of the said Motion for Reconsideration, respondent Judge, on February 10,

1995, issued an Order denying the same for lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent portion reads:

The Court believes that in the above-entitled cases, the accused Lagarto and Cordero have complied

with the legal requirements for the perfection of an appeal. Consequently, for lack of jurisdiction, this

Court cannot take cognizance of the Motion for Reconsideration of the Public Prosecutor of Manila.

WHEREFORE, the order earlier issued by this Court regarding the Notices of Appeal filed by both herein

accused is hereby reiterated.

The Clerk of this Court is hereby directed to transmit the complete records of these cases, together with

the notices of appeal, to the Honorable Supreme Court, in accordance with Sec. 8, Rule 122 of the

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, the instant petition.

The trial court's finding of guilt is not at issue in the case at bench. The basis of the trial court's

determination of guilt and its conclusions will only be subject to our scrutiny at an appropriate time on

appeal. We have thus clinically limited our narration of events to those cold facts antecedent to the

instant case relevant to the determination of the legal question at hand, i.e., whether or not the

respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of jurisdiction when he failed

and/or refused to impose the mandatory penalty of death under Republic Act No. 7659, after finding the

accused guilty of the crime of Rape with Homicide.

We find for petitioner.

Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If judges, under the guise of

religious or political beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are

required by law to exercise the duties of their office, then law becomes meaningless. A government of

laws, not of men excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by those acting under its

authority. Under this system, judges are guided by the Rule of Law, and ought "to protect and enforce it

without fear or favor," 4 resist encroachments by governments, political parties, 5 or even the

interference of their own personal beliefs.

In the case at bench, respondent judge, after weighing the evidence of the prosecution and the

defendant at trial found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with

Homicide. Since the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime for which respondent judge

found the accused guilty was Republic Act No. 7659, he was bound by its provisions.

Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659 provides:

Sec. 11. Article 335 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:

Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a

woman under any of the following circumstances:

1. By using force or intimidation.

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons,

the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be

death.

When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion

thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death. . . .

6

Clearly, under the law, the penalty imposable for the crime of Rape with Homicide is not Reclusion

Perpetua but Death. While Republic Act 7659 punishes cases of ordinary rape with the penalty of

Reclusion Perpetua, it allows judges the discretion - depending on the existence of circumstances

modifying the offense committed - to impose the penalty of either Reclusion Perpetua only in the three

instances mentioned therein. Rape with homicide is not one of these three instances. The law plainly

and unequivocably provides that "[w]hen by reason or on the occasion of rape, a homicide is

committed, the penalty shall be death." The provision leaves no room for the exercise of discretion on

the part of the trial judge to impose a penalty under the circumstances described, other than a sentence

of death.

We are aware of the trial judge's misgivings in imposing the death sentence because of his religious

convictions. While this Court sympathizes with his predicament, it is its bounden duty to emphasize that

a court of law is no place for a protracted debate on the morality or propriety of the sentence, where

the law itself provides for the sentence of death as a penalty in specific and well-defined instances. The

discomfort faced by those forced by law to impose the death penalty is an ancient one, but it is a matter

upon which judges have no choice. Courts are not concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or morality of

laws. In People vs. Limaco 7 we held that:

[W]hen . . . private opinions not only form part of their decision but constitute a decisive factor in

arriving at a conclusion and determination of a case or the penalty imposed, resulting in an illegality and

reversible error, then we are constrained to state our opinion, not only to correct the error but for the

guidance of the courts. We have no quarrel with the trial judge or with anyone else, layman or jurist as

to the wisdom or folly of the death penalty. Today there are quite a number of people who honestly

believe that the supreme penalty is either morally wrong or unwise or ineffective. However, as long as

that penalty remains in the statute books, and as long as our criminal law provides for its imposition in

certain cases, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law regardless of their private

opinions. It is a well settled rule that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or morality

of laws. That question falls exclusively within the province of the Legislature which enacts them and the

Chief Executive who approves or vetoes them. The only function of the judiciary is to interpret the laws

and, if not in disharmony with the Constitution, to apply them. And for the guidance of the members of

the judiciary we feel it incumbent upon us to state that while they as citizens or as judges may regard a

certain law as harsh, unwise or morally wrong, and may recommend to the authority or department

concerned, its amendment, modification, or repeal, still, as long as said law is in force, they must apply it

and give it effect as decreed by the law-making body. 8

Finally, the Rules of Court mandates that after an adjudication of guilt, the judge should impose "the

proper penalty and civil liability provided for by the law on the accused." 9 This is not a case of a

magistrate ignorant of the law. This is a case in which a judge, fully aware of the appropriate provisions

of the law, refuses to impose a penalty to which he disagrees. In so doing, respondent judge acted

without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack of

jurisdiction in imposing the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua where the law clearly imposes the penalty of

Death.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is GRANTED. The case is hereby REMANDED

to the Regional Trial Court for the imposition of the penalty of death upon private respondents in

consonance with respondent judge's finding that the private respondents in the instant case had

committed the crime of Rape with Homicide under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended

by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659, subject to automatic review by this Court of the decision

imposing the death penalty.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Padilla, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Mendoza, Francisco and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

NARVASA, C.J., concurring:

I concur with the conclusions and dispositions set forth in the opinion of Mr. Justice Kapunan. I draw up

this separate opinion merely to address a question which may be raised in relation to the appeal taken

by the accused from the judgment of conviction rendered by respondent Judge. It will be recalled that

respondent Judge declined to act on the merits of motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecution -

praying that his decision sentencing both accused to suffer reclusion perpetua be "modified in that the

penalty of death be imposed" - for the reason that since the accused had already "complied with the

legal requirements for the perfection of an appeal," the Trial Court had lost jurisdiction over the cases. It

was precisely that refusal that prompted the institution in this Court of the special civil action of

certiorari at bar.

It is indeed axiomatic that once an appeal is perfected from a judgment, jurisdiction is lost by the court

rendering the judgment; and jurisdiction over the case passes to the appellate tribunal. This proposition

considered, and following respondent Judge's reasoning, this Court's directive for the remand of the

case "to the Regional Trial Court for the imposition of the penalty of death upon private respondents,"

might appear to be open to question, since it would require the Trial Court to act in cases over which it

had lost jurisdiction. Such a conclusion is not warranted.

The judgment in question is void, and has been annulled and set aside by this Court, because rendered

"without or in excess of . . . jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of

jurisdiction," in so far as it imposes, in light of the facts found to have been proven beyond reasonable

doubt, a penalty other than that peremptorily prescribed by law. The judgment being void, the appeal

attempted to be taken therefrom is inefficacious. The Trial Court may not be deemed to have thereby

lost jurisdiction of the cases. It cannot thus be said that it is being required by this Court to act in cases

over which it has already lost jurisdiction. There exists no legal obstacle to the remand of the cases to it

and its modification of the judgment so that it may comply with the mandatory prescription of the law.

REGALADO, J., concurring:

I concur without reservation in the ponencia in this case and its directive that the court a quo impose

the correct penalty of death as provided by law and consequent to its findings of guilt on the part of

private respondents. Indeed, this separate opinion which explicates my conformity with the procedure

adopted and the mandate thereof would not have been necessary were it not for the contrary

observations that the petition herein should either have been dismissed or consolidated with the

criminal case elevated on appeal by private respondents.

Such digression from the judgment unconditionally accepted by the other members of the Court does

not impress me as being concordant with the Rules of Court and decisional law. What is before us in the

case at bar is an original civil action invoking the extraordinary writ of certiorari for the imposition of the

correct penalty specified by law, which legal duty respondent judge refused to comply with in grave

abuse of his judicial discretion. 1 On the other hand, the criminal case with which it is sought to be

consolidated is an appellate recourse wherein the relief sought is primarily the reversal of the finding of

guilt and the absolution of private respondents.

Evidently, the determinative issues involved and the limited relief sought in the present special civil

action are entirely different from the issues for resolution and the modificatory judgment desired in the

appealed criminal case. The basic rule in consolidation of cases in civil procedure 2 requires, among

others, the same subject matter and the existence of a common question of law or fact. This is

essentially the same as the rule on consolidation in criminal procedure 3 which contemplates charges

for offenses founded on the same facts, or forming part of a series of offenses of similar character.

Also, these reglementary requisites for consolidation require two or more ordinary civil or criminal

actions, and not a special civil action in combination with the former. The impropriety of the latter

situation is specially underscored where the resolution of the controversy in the special civil action is a

pre-judicial matter in the appealed criminal case. These considerations apply to both the trial courts in

the exercise of original jurisdiction and to the appellate courts in the implementation of revisory power.

The purpose of the present original action for certiorari is to have the erroneous judgment of

respondent judge - erroneous because he imposed the wrong penalty - corrected on that score in the

first instance. After such correction shall have been effected, then the appeal from his judgment shall

proceed for the desired review by this Court to determine the guilt or innocence of appellants. The

corrective action must proceed first and the resultant amended judgment containing the proper penalty

shall be the basis for the review as to whether appellants are truly guilty and have to be meted that

ultimate penalty. To have the certiorari action proceed simultaneously and in unification with the

appellate proceeding strikes me as an aberrant procedure. While it does not exactly square with the

figurative posture of putting the cart before the horse, it does result in the same absurdity of both the

horse and the cart moving abreast at the same time along the same judicial path.

It would even be worse if, as suggested, this certiorari action should be dismissed and the appellate

review be conducted with the judgment containing an unauthorized penalty as the basis therefor, with

this Court closing its eyes to such a flagrant mistake. This time the cart precedes the horse. True, an

appeal throws the judgment a quo open for review and the Court may raise the penalty to the

appropriate punitive level. But, as the People pertinently observes, what is there to prevent appellants

from withdrawing their appeal upon sensing from the arguments that, instead of the acquittal or

reduced penalty aspired for, the ultimate denouement would be the death sentence?

Jurisprudence tells us that before the case is submitted for decision, an appellant may withdraw his

appeal in the appellate court. 4 Generally, the withdrawal of an appeal before the filing of the appellee's

brief in this Court is permitted. 5 Assuming that the Court denies the withdrawal of the appeal in order

that the mistake in the penalty imposed may be corrected in the judgment of the case on the merits, 6

why should the appellate course of the proceedings still have to be subject to such contingencies - with

the inevitable waste of time and effort in the formulation of alternative theories in two sets of pleadings

by both parties - when with the decisive sweep of the adjudgment here the doubts are dissipated and

the real areas of contention are laid bare?

Nor is that all. Appellants have come to this Court through the medium of an appeal by writ of error

from a judgment of the trial court imposing the wrong penalty of reclusion perpetua. If the mistake in

the penalty is now rectified with the death sentence being substituted therefor, as undeniably it should

be, then the case will consequently be before this Court on automatic review. That provision calling for

automatic review when capital punishment is inflicted 7 serves equally the interests of both the defense

and the prosecution through protective features established by case law.

Thus, even if the accused had unnecessarily appealed from the judgment imposing the penalty of death

and he thereafter withdraws his appeal, the automatic review of the case shall nonetheless proceed,

albeit without the benefit of briefs or arguments from the accused. 8 The automatic review of the case

shall proceed even if the death convict shall escape, 9 as an exception to the provisions of Section 8,

Rule 124, and such automatic review cannot be waived. 10 The aforementioned beneficial effects are

not provided for and may not be availed of by the accused in an ordinary appeal to this Court.

The automatic review of the death sentence ensures the right of the condemned person to procedural

due process on appeal, and safeguards the interests of the State by exacting the corresponding penal

sanction decreed by law. The disposition adopted by the Court in this case subserves the ends of these

fundamental policies, hence my unqualified assent thereto.

VITUG, J., dissenting:

The ponencia itself indicates that the case against the convicted accused is already on appeal before this

Court. Thus, the instant petition, in my view, has become academic since an appeal brings the case wide

open for review and consideration. A ruling on the petition would be precipitate and might be so

perceived as peremptory on the imposition of the death penalty.

With all due respect, it is my personal view that if the Court is not disposed to dismiss the petition, it

should at the very least be consolidated with the appealed case.

Accordingly, I am constrained, at this time, to vote for the dismissal of the petition.

Davide, Jr., J. concurs.

Separate Opinions

NARVASA, C.J., concurring:

I concur with the conclusions and dispositions set forth in the opinion of Mr. Justice Kapunan. I draw up

this separate opinion merely to address a question which may be raised in relation to the appeal taken

by the accused from the judgment of conviction rendered by respondent Judge. It will be recalled that

respondent Judge declined to act on the merits of motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecution -

praying that his decision sentencing both accused to suffer reclusion perpetua be "modified in that the

penalty of death be imposed" - for the reason that since the accused had already "complied with the

legal requirements for the perfection of an appeal," the Trial Court had lost jurisdiction over the cases. It

was precisely that refusal that prompted the institution in this Court of the special civil action of

certiorari at bar.

It is indeed axiomatic that once an appeal is perfected from a judgment, jurisdiction is lost by the court

rendering the judgment; and jurisdiction over the case passes to the appellate tribunal. This proposition

considered, and following respondent Judge's reasoning, this Court's directive for the remand of the

case "to the Regional Trial Court for the imposition of the penalty of death upon private respondents,"

might appear to be open to question, since it would require the Trial Court to act in cases over which it

had lost jurisdiction. Such a conclusion is not warranted.

The judgment in question is void, and has been annulled and set aside by this Court, because rendered

"without or in excess of . . . jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of

jurisdiction," in so far as it imposes, in light of the facts found to have been proven beyond reasonable

doubt, a penalty other than that peremptorily prescribed by law. The judgment being void, the appeal

attempted to be taken therefrom is inefficacious. The Trial Court may not be deemed to have thereby

lost jurisdiction of the cases. It cannot thus be said that it is being required by this Court to act in cases

over which it has already lost jurisdiction. There exists no legal obstacle to the remand of the cases to it

and its modification of the judgment so that it may comply with the mandatory prescription of the law.

REGALADO, J., concurring:

I concur without reservation in the ponencia in this case and its directive that the court a quo impose

the correct penalty of death as provided by law and consequent to its findings of guilt on the part of

private respondents. Indeed, this separate opinion which explicates my conformity with the procedure

adopted and the mandate thereof would not have been necessary were it not for the contrary

observations that the petition herein should either have been dismissed or consolidated with the

criminal case elevated on appeal by private respondents.

Such digression from the judgment unconditionally accepted by the other members of the Court does

not impress me as being concordant with the Rules of Court and decisional law. What is before us in the

case at bar is an original civil action invoking the extraordinary writ of certiorari for the imposition of the

correct penalty specified by law, which legal duty respondent judge refused to comply with in grave

abuse of his judicial discretion. 1 On the other hand, the criminal case with which it is sought to be

consolidated is an appellate recourse wherein the relief sought is primarily the reversal of the finding of

guilt and the absolution of private respondents.

Evidently, the determinative issues involved and the limited relief sought in the present special civil

action are entirely different from the issues for resolution and the modificatory judgment desired in the

appealed criminal case. The basic rule in consolidation of cases in civil procedure 2 requires, among

others, the same subject matter and the existence of a common question of law or fact. This is

essentially the same as the rule on consolidation in criminal procedure 3 which contemplates charges

for offenses founded on the same facts, or forming part of a series of offenses of similar character.

Also, these reglementary requisites for consolidation require two or more ordinary civil or criminal

actions, and not a special civil action in combination with the former. The impropriety of the latter

situation is specially underscored where the resolution of the controversy in the special civil action is a

pre-judicial matter in the appealed criminal case. These considerations apply to both the trial courts in

the exercise of original jurisdiction and to the appellate courts in the implementation of revisory power.

The purpose of the present original action for certiorari is to have the erroneous judgment of

respondent judge - erroneous because he imposed the wrong penalty - corrected on that score in the

first instance. After such correction shall have been effected, then the appeal from his judgment shall

proceed for the desired review by this Court to determine the guilt or innocence of appellants. The

corrective action must proceed first and the resultant amended judgment containing the proper penalty

shall be the basis for the review as to whether appellants are truly guilty and have to be meted that

ultimate penalty. To have the certiorari action proceed simultaneously and in unification with the

appellate proceeding strikes me as an aberrant procedure. While it does not exactly square with the

figurative posture of putting the cart before the horse, it does result in the same absurdity of both the

horse and the cart moving abreast at the same time along the same judicial path.

It would even be worse if, as suggested, this certiorari action should be dismissed and the appellate

review be conducted with the judgment containing an unauthorized penalty as the basis therefor, with

this Court closing its eyes to such a flagrant mistake. This time the cart precedes the horse. True, an

appeal throws the judgment a quo open for review and the Court may raise the penalty to the

appropriate punitive level. But, as the People pertinently observes, what is there to prevent appellants

from withdrawing their appeal upon sensing from the arguments that, instead of the acquittal or

reduced penalty aspired for, the ultimate denouement would be the death sentence?

Jurisprudence tells us that before the case is submitted for decision, an appellant may withdraw his

appeal in the appellate court. 4 Generally, the withdrawal of an appeal before the filing of the appellee's

brief in this Court is permitted. 5 Assuming that the Court denies the withdrawal of the appeal in order

that the mistake in the penalty imposed may be corrected in the judgment of the case on the merits, 6

why should the appellate course of the proceedings still have to be subject to such contingencies - with

the inevitable waste of time and effort in the formulation of alternative theories in two sets of pleadings

by both parties - when with the decisive sweep of the adjudgment here the doubts are dissipated and

the real areas of contention are laid bare?

Nor is that all. Appellants have come to this Court through the medium of an appeal by writ of error

from a judgment of the trial court imposing the wrong penalty of reclusion perpetua. If the mistake in

the penalty is now rectified with the death sentence being substituted therefor, as undeniably it should

be, then the case will consequently be before this Court on automatic review. That provision calling for

automatic review when capital punishment is inflicted 7 serves equally the interests of both the defense

and the prosecution through protective features established by case law.

Thus, even if the accused had unnecessarily appealed from the judgment imposing the penalty of death

and he thereafter withdraws his appeal, the automatic review of the case shall nonetheless proceed,

albeit without the benefit of briefs or arguments from the accused. 8 The automatic review of the case

shall proceed even if the death convict shall escape, 9 as an exception to the provisions of Section 8,

Rule 124, and such automatic review cannot be waived. 10 The aforementioned beneficial effects are

not provided for and may not be availed of by the accused in an ordinary appeal to this Court.

The automatic review of the death sentence ensures the right of the condemned person to procedural

due process on appeal, and safeguards the interests of the State by exacting the corresponding penal

sanction decreed by law. The disposition adopted by the Court in this case subserves the ends of these

fundamental policies, hence my unqualified assent thereto.

VITUG, J., dissenting:

The ponencia itself indicates that the case against the convicted accused is already on appeal before this

Court. Thus, the instant petition, in my view, has become academic since an appeal brings the case wide

open for review and consideration. A ruling on the petition would be precipitate and might be so

perceived as peremptory on the imposition of the death penalty.

With all due respect, it is my personal view that if the Court is not disposed to dismiss the petition, it

should at the very least be consolidated with the appealed case.

Accordingly, I am constrained, at this time, to vote for the dismissal of the petition.

Davide, Jr., J. concurs.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, p. 4, Except as to the penalty imposed, petitioner and respondent court are in agreement as to

the essential facts of the case.

2 Rollo, pp. 24-51.

3 Rollo, p. 28, The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered judgment is hereby rendered, dismissing the information as against

ROLANDO MANLANGIT for lack of evidence, and finding both accused HENRY LAGARTO y PETILLA and

ERNESTO CORDERO y MARISTELA "guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE WITH

HOMICIDE charged in the Information of these cases, and sentencing both accused the penalty of

reclusion perpetua with all the accessories provided for by law."

Said accused are further ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally, the private complainant the sum of

P100,000 for the death of the victim, ANGEL ALQUIZA; the sum of P500,000 for moral damages, and the

amount of P52,000.00 for actual damages representing expenses incurred for the wake and funeral of

the victim. They are further ordered to pay the costs of these suits.

SO ORDERED. (ANNEX 'A', Petition)

4 Act of Athens (1955).

5 Id.

6 Emphasis supplied.

7 88 Phil. 36 [1951]. 8 Id. at 43-44. 9 Rule 120, sec. 1. REGALADO, concurring: 1 People vs. Olaes, 105

Phil. 502 (1959); People vs. Limaco, 88 Phil. 35 (1951); People vs. Carillo, et al., 85 Phil. 611 (1950). 2

Section 1, Rule 31. 3 Section 14, Rule 119. 4 U.S. vs. Sotto, 38 Phil. 666 (1918). 5 People vs. Mendoza, 93

Phil. 581 (1953). 6 See People vs. Roque, G.R. No. 53470, June 26, 1981, 105 SCRA 117. 7 Sec. 10, Rule

122. 8 People vs. Villanueva, 93 Phil. 927 (1953). 9 People vs. Vallente, L-37937, September 30, 1986,

144 SCRA 495; People vs. Cornelio, et al., L-1289, June 10, 1971, 39 SCRA 435. 10 People vs. Daban, L-

31429, January 31, 1972, 43 SCRA 185.

Case Digest, People vs. Purisima, No. L -47757-61, January 28, 1980

FACTS: Informations were filed to 26 individuals from Manila and Samar, individually and separately,

before the Courts of First Instance of Manila and Samar for illegal possession of deadly weapon or

violation of Presidential Decree No. 9 pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated Sept 21 and 23, 1973.

On the motion to quash by the accused, the three respondent judges: Judge Purisima and Judge

Macaren, both of CFI of Manila; and Judge Polo of CFI of Samar, issued in the respective cases filed

before them an order to quash or dismiss the informations on a common ground Lack of essential

elements to constitute an offense penalized by PD No. 9. The respondent judges stated that to

constitute the said offense, two elements must be present; (1) possession of any bladed, blunt or

pointed weapon outside of residence as stated in par 3; (2) and intended to use it to commit or abet

subversion, rebellion, etc as stated in the preamble of the said PD. The People, as petitioners, thru the

Solicitor General, contended that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities and the

intent of the accused are irrelevant since its is a statutory offense and punishing the possession of such

deadly weapon is not only to eradicate subversive acts but also criminality in general. The petitioners

also argued that the preamble is not an essential part of an act and cannot prevail over the text of the

law itself.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners arguments as to the intention and scope of PD No. 9 (3) correct?

HELD: NO. The Supreme Court says that the intention of PD No. 9 (3) is to penalize the acts which are

those related to the desired result of Proc. No. 1081 and Gen. Orders Nos. 6 and 7 which are to suppress

those who commit or abet lawlessness, rebellion, subversive acts and the like. The preamble of PD No. 9

also clearly concurs to that, though the preamble is not a part of the statute, it is the key to determine

what is the intent and spirit of the decree and determine what acts fall within the purview of a penal

statute.

Martinez v. Van Buskirk, 18 Phil. 79

FACTS: On Spetember 11, 1908, Martinez was riding a carromata in Ermita along the left side of the

street when a delivery wagon belonging to the defendant to which a pair of horses was attached came

along the street in the opposite direction at great speed. The horses ran into the carromata and

wounded Martinez servely. The defendant presented evidence that the cochero was a good servant and

a reliable and safe cochero. And that he was delivering stuff so he tied the driving lines of the horses to

the front end of the delivery wagon and went inside the wagon to unload the stuff to be delivered. But

while unloading, another vehicle drove by whose driver cracked a whip and made some noises which

frightened the horses and which made it ran away. The cochero was thrown from the inside of the

wagon and was unable to stop the horses. The horses collided with the carromata.

ISSUE: W/N the employer is liable for the negligence of his cochero

HELD: No. Defendant not liable. Cochero was not negligent. What happened was an accident. It has

been a custom or a matter of common knowledge and universal practice of merchants to leave horses in

the manner which the cochero left it during the accident. This is the custom in all cities. The public,

finding itself unprejudiced by such practice has acquiesced for years.

Van Dorn vs Romillo

Van Dorn vs. Romillo

139 SCRA 139

FACTS:

Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino Citizen and private respondent, Richard Upton, a US citizen, was married

in Hong Kong in 1979. They established their residence in the Philippines and had 2 children. They were

divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982 and petitioner remarried, this time with Theodore Van Dorn. A suit

against petitioner was filed on June 8, 1983, stating that petitioners business in Ermita Manila, the

Galleon Shop, is a conjugal property with Upton and prayed therein that Alice be ordered to render an

accounting of the business and he be declared as the administrator of the said property.

ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private respondent in Nevada is

binding in the Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino citizen.

HELD:

Private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He would have no standing to sue

petitioner to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is estopped by his own representation before the

court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. Furthermore, aliens may obtain

divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their

national law. Petitioner is not bound to her marital obligations to respondent by virtue of her

nationality laws. She should not be discriminated against her own country if the end of justice is to be

served.

G.R. No. 37048, Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 58 Phil. 67

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

March 7, 1933

G.R. No. 37048

MANUELA BARRETTO GONZALEZ, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

AUGUSTO C. GONZALEZ, defendant-appellant.

AUGUSTO C. GONZALEZ, Jr., ET AL., intervenors-appellees.

Quintin Paredes and Barrera and Reyes for appellant.

DeWitt, Perkins and Brady for plaintiff-appellee.

Camus and Delgado for intervenors-appellees.

HULL, J.:

Plaintiff and defendant are citizens of the Philippine Islands and at present residents of the City of

Manila. They were married in the City of Manila on January 19, 1919, and lived together as man and

wife in the Philippine Islands until the spring of 1926. They voluntarily separated and since that time

have not lived together as man and wife. Of this union four children were born who are now 11, 10, 8

and 6 years of age. Negotiations between the parties, both being represented by attorneys, continued

for several months, whereupon it was mutually agreed to allow the plaintiff for her support and that of

her children, five hundred pesos (P500) monthly; this amount to be increased in case of illness or

necessity, and the title of certain properties to be put in her name. Shortly after this agreement the

husband left the Island