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G.R. No. L-66620 September 24, 1986

REMEDIO V. FLORES,

petitioner,

vs.HON. JUDGE HEILIA S. MALLARE-PHILLIPPS, IGNACIO BINONGCAL & FERNANDO

CALION,

respondents.

The Court rules that the application of the totality rule under Section 33(l) of Batas PambansaBlg. 129 and Section 11 of the Interim Rules is subject to the requirements for the permissivejoinder of parties under Section 6 of Rule 3 which provides as follows:

Permissive joinder of parties.-All persons in whom or against whom anyright to relief in respect to or arising out of the same transaction or seriesof transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in thealternative, may, except as otherwise provided in these rules, join asplaintiffs or be joined as defendants in one complaint, where any questionof law or fact common to all such plaintiffs or to all such defendants mayarise in the action; but the court may make such orders as may be just toprevent any plaintiff or defendant from being embarrassed or put to

expense in connection with any proceedings in which he may have nointerest.

Petitioner has appealed by certiorari from the order of Judge Heilia S. Mallare-Phillipps of theRegional Trial Court of Baguio City and Benguet Province which dismissed his complaint forlack of jurisdiction. Petitioner did not attach to his petition a copy of his complaint in theerroneous belief that the entire original record of the case shall be transmitted to this Court

pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 39 of BP129. This provision applies only toordinary appeals from the regional trial court to the Court of Appeals (Section 20 of the InterimRules). Appeals to this Court by petition for review on certiorari are governed by Rule 45 ofthe Rules of Court (Section 25 of the Interim Rules).

However, the order appealed from states that the first cause of action alleged in the complaintwas against respondent Ignacio Binongcal for refusing to pay the amount of P11,643.00representing cost of truck tires which he purchased on credit from petitioner on variousoccasions from August to October, 1981; and the second cause of action was againstrespondent Fernando Calion for allegedly refusing to pay the amount of P10,212.00representing cost of truck tires which he purchased on credit from petitioner on severaloccasions from March, 1981 to January, 1982.

On December 15, 1983, counsel for respondent Binongcal filed a Motion to Dismiss on theground of lack of jurisdiction since the amount of the demand against said respondent wasonly P11,643.00, and under Section 19(8) of BP129 the regional trial court shall exerciseexclusive original jurisdiction if the amount of the demand is more than twenty thousand pesos

(P20,000.00). It was further averred in said motion that although another person, FernandoCalion, was allegedly indebted to petitioner in the amount of P10,212.00, his obligation was

separate and distinct from that of the other respondent. At the hearing of said Motion toDismiss, counsel for respondent Calion joined in moving for the dismissal of the complaint onthe ground of lack of jurisdiction. Counsel for petitioner opposed the Motion to Dismiss. Asabove stated, the trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

Petitioner maintains that the lower court has jurisdiction over the case following the "novel"totality rule introduced in Section 33(l) of BP129 and Section 11 of the Interim Rules.

The pertinent portion of Section 33(l) of BP129 reads as follows:

... Provided,That where there are several claims or causes of actionbetween the same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint,the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all thecauses of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out ofthe same or different transactions. ...

Section 11 of the Interim Rules provides thus:

Application of the totality rule.-In actions where the jurisdiction of the courtis dependent on the amount involved, the test of jurisdiction shall be the

aggregate sum of all the money demands, exclusive only of interest andcosts, irrespective of whether or not the separate claims are owned by ordue to different parties. If any demand is for damages in a civil action, theamount thereof must be specifically alleged.

Petitioner compares the above-quoted provisions with the pertinent portion of the former ruleunder Section 88 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as amended which reads as follows:

... Where there are several claims or causes of action between the sameparties embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shallbe the totality of the demand in all the causes of action, irrespective ofwhether the causes of action arose out of the same or different

transactions; but where the claims or causes of action joined in a singlecomplaint are separately owned by or due to different parties, eachseparate claim shall furnish the jurisdictional test. ...

and argues that with the deletion of the proviso in the former rule, the totality rule was reducedto clarity and brevity and the jurisdictional test is the totality of the claims in all, not in each, ofthe causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same ordifferent transactions.

This argument is partly correct. There is no difference between the former and present rules incases where a plaintiff sues a defendant on two or more separate causes of action. In suchcases, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action

irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions. Ifthe total demand exceeds twenty thousand pesos, then the regional trial court has jurisdiction.

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Needless to state, if the causes of action are separate and independent, their joinder in onecomplaint is permissive and not mandatory, and any cause of action where the amount of thedemand is twenty thousand pesos or less may be the subject of a separate complaint filedwith a metropolitan or municipal trial court.

On the other hand, there is a difference between the former and present rules in cases wheretwo or more plaintiffs having separate causes of action against a defendant join in a singlecomplaint. Under the former rule, "where the claims or causes of action joined in a single

complaint are separately owned by or due to different parties, each separate claim shall

furnish the jurisdictional test" (Section 88 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as amended, supra).This was based on the ruling in the case of Vda. de Rosario vs. Justice of the Peace, 99 Phil.693. As worded, the former rule applied only to cases of permissive joinder of parties plaintiff.However, it was also applicable to cases of permissive joinder of parties defendant, as may bededuced from the ruling in the case ofBrillo vs. Buklatan, thus:

Furthermore, the first cause of action is composed of separate claimsagainst several defendants of different amounts each of which is not morethan P2,000 and falls under the jurisdiction of the justice of the peacecourt under section 88 of Republic Act No, 296. The several claims do notseem to arise from the same transaction or series of transactions and

there seem to be no questions of law or of fact common to all thedefendants as may warrant their joinder under Rule 3, section 6.Therefore, if new complaints are to be filed in the name of the real party ininterest they should be filed in the justice of the peace court. (87 Phil. 519,520, reiterated in Gacula vs. Martinez, 88 Phil. 142, 146)

Under the present law, the totality rule is applied also to cases where two or more plaintiffshaving separate causes of action against a defendant join in a single complaint, as well as to

cases where a plaintiff has separate causes of action against two or more defendants joinedin a single complaint. However, the causes of action in favor of the two or more plaintiffs oragainst the two or more defendants should arise out of the same transaction or series oftransactions and there should be a common question of law or fact, as provided in Section 6of Rule 3.

The difference between the former and present rules in cases of permissive joinder of partiesmay be illustrated by the two cases which were cited in the case of Vda. de Rosario vs.Justice of the Peace (supra) as exceptions to the totality rule. In the case of Soriano y Cia vs.Jose (86 Phil. 523), where twenty-nine dismissed employees joined in a complaint against thedefendant to collect their respective claims, each of which was within the jurisdiction of themunicipal court although the total exceeded the jurisdictional amount, this Court held thatunder the law then the municipal court had jurisdiction. In said case, although the plaintiffs'demands were separate, distinct and independent of one another, their joint suit wasauthorized under Section 6 of Rule 3 and each separate claim furnished the jurisdictional test.

In the case of International Colleges, Inc. vs. Argonza (90 Phil. 470), where twenty-fivedismissed teachers jointly sued the defendant for unpaid salaries, this Court also held that themunicipal court had jurisdiction because the amount of each claim was within, although the

total exceeded, its jurisdiction and it was a case of permissive joinder of parties plaintiff underSection 6 of Rule 3.

Under the present law, the two cases above cited (assuming they do not fall under the LaborCode) would be under the jurisdiction of the regional trial court. Similarly, in the abovecitedcases of Brillo vs. Buklatan and Gacula vs. Martinez (supra), if the separate claims against theseveral defendants arose out of the same transaction or series of transactions and there is acommon question of law or fact, they would now be under the jurisdiction of the regional trial

court.

In other words, in cases of permissive joinder of parties, whether as plaintiffs or asdefendants, under Section 6 of Rule 3, the total of all the claims shall now furnish thejurisdictional test. Needless to state also, if instead of joining or being joined in one complaint

separate actions are filed by or against the parties, the amount demanded in each complaintshall furnish the jurisdictional test.

In the case at bar, the lower court correctly held that the jurisdictional test is subject to therules on joinder of parties pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 2 and Section 6 of Rule 3 of the Rules

of Court and that, after a careful scrutiny of the complaint, it appears that there is a misjoinderof parties for the reason that the claims against respondents Binongcal and Calion are

separate and distinct and neither of which falls within its jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-32030 July 2, 1930

SOFIA LAVARRO, ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellants, vs. REGINA LABITORIA, ETAL., Defendants-Appellants.

Anastacio Labitoria, who died over thirty years ago, was the original owner of a tract of land

divided into three parcels and situated in the barrio of Mangilag, municipality of Candelaria,Province of Tayabas. He left four children, Francisco, Liberata, Tirso, and Eustacio Labitoria.Francisco acquired the shares of Tirso and Eustacio together with the greater part of that ofLiberata, and thus became the owner o f nearly all of the land. After his death, his children,Macario and Regina Labitoria, became the owners of his interest in the land.. .

Sofia Lavarro is the daughter of Liberata Labitoria, and in or about the year 1897, her firsthusband, Crispulo Alcantara, borrowed P330 from Francisco Labitoria on the condition thatAlcantara should plant 3,300 coconut palms on the land to be divided in equal shares betweenthe parties, the loan to be paid back by turning over to the creditor 330 coconut palms out ofthe share of Alcantara and Sofia. Under this agreement, about 1,700 palms were planted byAlcantara, but later on, further plantings were made by his wife, Sofia Lavarro.. .

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In July, 1916, the land was registered in the names of Macario Labitoria, Regina Labitoria,Bernardo Labitoria, Vidal Labitoria, Ariston Lavarro, Sofia Lavarro, and Isidro Lavaris. Nothingseems to have been said about the improvements on the land and no special mention of themappears in the certificate of title. Neither were the respective shares of the persons to whomthe land was adjudicated definitely determined.. .

On October 31, 1916, Macario, Regina, and Bernardo Labitoria and Ariston Lavarro broughtan action against Sofia Lavarro and her then husband, Emeterio Pureza, for the partition of

the land with its improvements. The action is civil case No. 351 of the Court of First Instanceof Tayabas. In her answer in that case, Sofia Lavarro set up a cross-complaint alleging,among other things, that she was a coowner of the land and was entitled to a large proportionof the coconut palms thereon. The prayer of the cross-complaint reads as follows:

Wherefore, by this cross-complaint Sofia Lavarro and Emeterio Pureza, through theirundersigned attorney, pray the court to decree the partition of the three parcels of landdescribed above, with all the improvements thereon, allotting to Sofia Lavarro and EmeterioPureza their rightful portion, and ordering Macario Labitoria to render the proper accounts,and to deliver to his coheirs their proportionate part of the fruits and products of said lands,with costs against the cross-complaint defendants. (Emphasis supplied.)

Upon trial partition was ordered, and Sofia Lavarro was awarded 520 coconut trees and43,391 square meters of land. She thereupon appealed to the Supreme Court, and a decisionwas rendered by that court on March 24, 1927,1 in which it was held that Sofia Lavarro wasentitled to 1/28 of the land. In all the respects, the decision of the Court of First Instances wasaffirmed. The partition seems to have been carried out in conformity with the decision of theSupreme Court, and Sofia was awarded 6 hectares, 88 ares, and 77 centiares of land,together with 850 coconut palms instead of 520.. .

The present action was initiated by Sofia Lavarro and her daughters, Apolonia and IsabelAlcantara, on August 15, 1927, against Regina Labitoria and Marciano Labitoria, the latter asadministrator of the estate of the deceased Macario Labitoria. In their amended complaint, theplaintiffs allege that on or about the year 1897, Sofia Lavarro and her husband, Crispulo

Alcantara, planted 2,850 coconut palms on the land above-mentioned, of which 1,970 treeswere actually alive and bearing fruit; that after the death of Crispulo Alcantara in the year1910, Sofia Lavarro, being then a widow, planted 2,200 coconut palms on the same tract ofland, 2,000 palms being still in existence and the greater part of them bearing fruit; that fromthe year 1897, the plaintiffs had been in possession of the above-mentioned plantings andhad collected the fruits, but that the defendants were now endeavoring to take possession ofsaid coconut palms; and that each coconut palm was worth P12. The plaintiffs thereforeprayed that unless the defendants paid to the plaintiffs the sum of P47,640, the value of the3,970 palms planted, it be ordered that said plaintiffs be allowed to continue in possession ofsaid coconut palms in accordance with the law.. .

In their answer to the complaint, the defendants set up as special defenses res judicata andprescription.. .

Upon trial, the court below, basing its decision on the case of Bautista vs. Jimenez (24 Phil.,111), and article 361 of the Civil Code, ordered the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the sum ofP4,820 for 1,205 coconut palms or to require the plaintiffs to purchase the land, the plaintiffsto retain the coconut palms until the aforesaid sum was paid. From this judgment both theplaintiffs and defendants appealed.. .

It is very obvious that the court below erred in rendering judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.This is an action for compensation for improvements alleged to have been made by the

plaintiffs on the land awarded to the defendants and is brought notwithstanding the fact thatthe question of improvements was put in issue in case No. 351 and that the portion of landdue Sofia Lavarro, and the improvements as well, were determined and adjudicated by thecourt in that case. Her rights in regard to the improvements are consequently res judicata.. .

But it is intimated that, while in the earlier case the issues related to the ownership of theimprovements, the issue here is only a question of money payment and that therefore thecauses of action are different. Assuming, without conceding, that such is the case, the resultwould be the same. The issues in both cases arose from the same source or transactions andshould have been determined in the same case (sec. 97, Code of Civil Procedure). Ajudgment upon the merits bars a subsequent suit upon the same cause, though brought in adifferent form of action. (White vs. Martin, 1 Port. [Ala.], 215.) "The principle is firmly

established that a party will not be permitted to split up a single cause of action and make itthe basis for several suits. If several suits be brought for different parts of such a claim, thependency of the first may be pleaded in abatement of the others, and a recovery of any part ofthe cause of action will be a bar to an action brought upon the other part. Not only is it a bar tosuit, but the plaintiff in the former action cannot subsequently avail himself of the residue byway of offset in an action against him by the opposite party." (15 R. C. L., 965) In passing, itmay be noted that a close examination of the facts in the case of Bautista vs. Jimenez (24Phil., 111), will show that it differs materially from the present case; the case of Berses vs.Villanueva (25 Phil., 473), is more in point.. .

As to the other plaintiffs, Apolonia and Isabel Alcantara, it is sufficient to say that if they hadany claim to the property or improvements, such claims should have been presented in the

registration proceedings in 1916; trees and plants annexed to the land are parts thereof andunless rights or interests in such trees or plants are claimed in the registration proceedings byothers, they become the property of the persons to whom the land is adjudicated. By timelyproceedings in equity, matters of that character, if fraudulent, may sometimes be corrected,but in the present case, the plaintiffs Apolonia and Isabel Alcantara did not prosecute theiralleged rights until eleven years after the registration of the property, and it is obvious thatwhatever rights they may have had are now lost by prescription.. .

The judgment of the court below is therefore reversed, and the case is dismissed with thecosts in both instances against the plaintiffs, jointly and severally. So ordered.

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G.R. No. 121251. June 26, 1998

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK,Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ROMEOBARILEA, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

May a complaint for damages arising from an alleged premature foreclosure of mortgage, with

prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, be dismissed on the ground that the foreclosuresought to be enjoined is already a fait accompli?

On 12 November 1991 private respondent Romeo Barilea filed a complaint for damages withthe Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental with a prayer for the issuance of a temporaryrestraining order and writ of preliminary injunction against petitioner Philippine National Bank(PNB) and the Provincial Sheriff of Negros Occidental.

The complaint allegedthat: defendant Barilea (private respondent herein) obtained sugar croploans with petitioner at its Victoria Branch to finance his sugarcane plantation in Sagay,Negros Occidental; he was granted a crop loan ofP208,300.00 and, thereafter, another loan

of P40,000.00 which would fall due on 31 August 1991 and 31 August 1992, respectively; thecrop loans were secured by a mortgage on Barileas parcel of land with an area of 2,804square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-12217 of the Register ofDeeds of Cadiz City. Private respondent also alleged that on 29 September 1991, while hewas harvesting and cutting canes for the purpose of milling the same, petitioner filed a petitionfor the sale of the mortgaged property under Act No. 3135 as amended with the ProvincialSheriff of Negros Occidental, and that, consequently, on 7 October 1991 the latter issued aNotice of Extrajudicial Sale by public auction of private respondents property on 18 November1991.

The complaint further stated that in October 1991 private respondent had partially harvestedand milled his sugarcane at a sugar central after which quedans were prepared; that when

private respondent was about to withdraw the quedans, he was informed that they were takenby petitioner. Private respondent contended that in filing the petition for the sale of themortgaged property with the provincial sheriff, petitioner acted with malice and bad faith inorder to embarrass him; that the petition was premature because the crop loans had not yetfallen due; and, that because of petitioners malicious acts in filing the petition, privaterespondent suffered sleepless nights, mental torture, anxiety, public humiliation and publicridicule, thus entitling him to moral and exemplary damages

in addition to the actual expenses incurred for which petitioner should be ordered to pay.Private respondent also prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and writ ofpreliminary injunction to enjoin petitioner and the Provincial Sheriff from conducting the saleby public auction scheduled on 18 November 1991.1

Instead of filing an answer to the complaint, petitioner filed on 17 January 1991 a motion todismiss2 alleging that: petitioner had not acted maliciously and prematurely in filing the petitionfor foreclosure of mortgage; private respondent was granted four (4) loan accomodations bypetitioner three (3) of which had already fallen due; because of the past due accounts ofprivate respondent petitioner had the right to institute foreclosure proceedings; and, the otherreliefs prayed for by private respondent, i.e., issuance of a restraining order and writ ofpreliminary injunction, had been rendered moot and academic by the holding of the auctionsale on 7 November 1991.

On 18 February 1992 private respondent filed an amended complaint increasing the amountsprayed for as moral damages and attorneys fees.

On 10 March 1992 the trial court issued an order dismissing the case for being moot andacademic because the sale sought to be en joined had already been conducted on 7November 1991.3 The motion for reconsideration by private respondent was denied.

Private respondent appealed the order of dismissal to the Court of Appeals. In its decision4of28 June 1995, the Court of Appeals set aside the order dismissing the case. The appellatecourt found that the complaint of private respondent sought the payment of moral andexemplary damages on the ground that petitioner was actuated with malice and bad faith in

filing the petition with the sheriff for the sale of the mortgaged property even if the crop loanof P40,000.00 had not yet matured. It also ruled that the issuance of a temporary restrainingorder and a writ of preliminary injunction was only a provisional remedy, and consequently,the foreclosure sale on 7 November 1991 did not render the case moot since the principalaction for payment of damages still had to be litigated. The Court of Appeals remanded thecase back to the trial court for proper proceedings.

Hence this petition alleging that the Court of Appeals erroneously failed to hold that (a) thedismissal of the case by the trial court was justified after it had become moot and academicwith the foreclosure sale; (b) denial of the ancillary remedy of temporary restraining order wasproper; and, (c) the foreclosure of the mortgage was valid in view of the contract between theparties and conformably with the mandatory requirements of PD No. 385.

The principal issue to be resolved is whether the complaint for damages based on theforeclosure of mortgage should now be dismissed in view of the foreclosure sale. The otherissues raised by petitioner, i.e., whether the foreclosure sale was valid, and whether the claimof private respondent for damages was proper, are factual

matters well within the domain of the trial court - and not of this Court.

The petition must fail. The Court of Appeals was correct in ruling that the dismissal of thecomplaint of private respondent by the trial court was not valid.

In a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action, the questionto be resolved by the trial court is whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to

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constitute a cause of action and not whether the allegations of fact are true as the latter arehypothetically admitted.5 Hence, a complaint sufficiently states a cause of action when thefollowing questions are answered in the affirmative: (a) Does the complaint show the plaintiffhas suffered an injury? (b) Is it an injury which the law recognizes as a wrong and for which itprovides a remedy? (c) Is the defendant liable for the alleged wrong done? and, (d) If thedefendant is liable, is there a legal remedy for such injury?6

Applying these criteria to the complaint of private respondent, the same alleged facts are

sufficient to state a cause of action for damages. The complaint alleged that privaterespondent suffered actual expenses, moral anxiety and public humiliation, among others, asa result of the alleged premature and malicious filing of the petition for foreclosure of mortgageover private respondents property; hence, the prayer for damages and attorneys fees.

In its motion to dismiss, petitioners allegation that private respondent had no basis to claim fordamages amounted to failure to state a cause of action. Since the allegations in the complaintfurnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not havebeen dismissed regardless of the defense that may be raised by petitioner as defendantbefore the trial court.7

In the instant case, aside from the principal action for damages, private respondent sought the

issuance of a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin theforeclosure sale in order to prevent an alleged irreparable injury to private respondent. It issettled that these injunctive reliefs are preservative remedies for the protection of substantiverights and interests. Injunction is not a cause of action in itself but merely a provisionalremedy, an adjunct to a main suit. When the act sought to be enjoined had become faitaccompli, only the prayer for provisional remedy should be denied. However, the trial courtshould still proceed with the determination of the principal action so that an adjudication of therights of the parties can be had.

It was grave error for the trial court to dismiss the case simply because the basis for theissuance of the writ of injunction is no longer existent and thus moot and academic. A casebecomes moot and academic when there is no more actual controversy between the

parties8or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits.9 The foregoingcircumstances do not obtain in the instant

case. The holding of the extrajudicial sale did not in any way render the case moot andacademic. As found by the Court of Appeals, there still remained for the resolution of the trialcourt the issue of whether private respondent is entitled to damages prayed for as a result ofpetitioners act in filing a petition to foreclose the mortgage. Whether the filing of the petition forforeclosure was proper and whether private respondent suffered damages resulting frompetitioners acts are still unanswered questions which have to be determined and passed uponby the trial court after hearing the evidence of both parties in accordance with due process.

It is a rule of universal application that courts of justice are constituted to adjudicatesubstantive rights. While courts should consider public policy and necessity in putting an end

to litigations speedily they must nevertheless harmonize such necessity with the fundamentalright of litigants to an opportunity to be heard.10

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated 28 June1995 is AFFIRMED. The records of this case are remanded to the trial court with a directive toproceed and dispose of this case expeditiously.

SO ORDERED.

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