City Life and Difference

C H A P T E R 8

City Life and Difference

The tolerance, the room for great differences among neighbors—differences that often go far deeper than differences in color—which are possible and normal in intensely urban life, but which are so foreign to suburbs and pseudosuburbs, are possible and normal only when streets of .great cities have built-in equipment allowing strangers to dwell in peace together on civilized but essentially dignified and reserved terms.

—Jane Jacobs

O N E I M P O R T A N T P U R P O S E of critical normative theory is to offer an alternat ive vis ion of social relations which , in the words of Marcuse , "conceptualizes the stuff o f w h i c h the e x p e r i e n c e d world consists . . . w i th a v i e w to its poss ibi l i t ies , in the l ight of their actual l imitation, suppress ion , and denial" (Marcuse , 1964, p . 7). Such a pos i t ive normative vis ion can inspire h o p e and imaginat ion that mot ivate action for social change . It also prov i d e s s o m e of the ref lect ive distance necessary for the criticism of exist ing social c ircumstances .

Many ph i losophers and political theorists criticize welfare capitalist soc i e ty for b e i n g atomist ic , depol i t ic ized , fostering self-regarding interest -g r o u p plural ism and bureaucratic dominat ion. T h e most c o m m o n alternat ive v is ion offered by such critics is an ideal of communi ty . Spurred by appeals to c o m m u n i t y as an alternative to liberal individual ism m a d e by Michae l Sandel , Alasdair Mac ln tyre , and others , in recent years political theorists have d e b a t e d the virtues and v ices of communitar ianism as opp o s e d to l iberal ism (Gutmann, 1985; Hirsch, 1986; Wallach, 1987; Buchanan, 1989). Many socialists, anarchists, feminists , and others critical of welfare capitalist soc ie ty formulate their vis ion of a society free from d o m ination and oppress ion in terms of an ideal of communi ty . M u c h of this d i scuss ion w o u l d lead us to think that liberal individual ism and c o m m u n i tarianism exhaust the possibi l i t ies for conce iv ing social relations.

It should b e clear from the preced ing chapters that I share many of the communi tar ian crit icisms o f welfare capitalist liberal democrat ic theory and society . I shall argue in this chapter, however , that the ideal of c o m m u n i t y fails to offer an appropriate alternative vision of a democrat ic pol-

City Life and Difference • 227

ity. T h e ideal of c o m m u n i t y exempl i f ies the logic of ident i ty I analyzed in Chapter 4. This ideal expresses a des ire for the fusion of subjects wi th o n e another wh ich in practice operates to exc lude those wi th w h o m the group does not identify. T h e ideal of c o m m u n i t y d e n i e s and represses social difference , the fact that the polity cannot b e thought of as a unity in wh ich all participants share a c o m m o n e x p e r i e n c e and c o m m o n values . In its privil eg ing of face-to-face relations, moreover , the ideal of c o m m u n i t y d e n i e s difference in the form of the temporal and spatial distancing that character izes social process .

As an alternative to the ideal of communi ty , I d e v e l o p in this chapter an ideal of city life as a vision of social relations affirming group difference. As a normat ive ideal, city life instantiates social relations of difference wi th out exclus ion. Different groups dwel l in the city a longside o n e another, of nece s s i ty interact ing in city spaces . If city polit ics is to b e democrat ic and not d o m i n a t e d by the point of v i e w of o n e group, it must b e a polit ics that takes account of and provides vo ice for the different groups that dwe l l t oge ther in the c i ty wi thout forming a communi ty .

City life as an o p e n n e s s to unass imilated o therness , h o w e v e r , represents only an unreal ized social ideal. Many social injustices exist in today's c i t ies . Ci t ies and the p e o p l e in t h e m are relatively power less before the dominat ion of corporate capital and state bureaucracy. Privatized dec i s ionmaking proces se s in cit ies and towns reproduce and exacerbate inequal i t ies and oppress ions . T h e y also produce or reinforce segregat ions and exc lus ions wi thin cit ies and b e t w e e n cit ies and towns , wh ich contribute to exploitat ion, marginalization, and cultural imperial ism.

Many democrat ic theorists respond to these ills of city life by calls for the creat ion of decentra l i zed autonomous communi t i e s w h e r e p e o p l e exerc ise local control over their l ives and ne ighborhoods on a h u m a n scale. Such calls for local autonomy, I argue in conclus ion, reproduce the probl e m s of exclusion that the ideal of c o m m u n i t y poses . I offer a conceptual dis t inct ion b e t w e e n autonomy and e m p o w e r m e n t , and sketch out s o m e parameters of democrat ic e m p o w e r m e n t in large-scale regional government .

T H E OPPOSITION BETWEEN INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMUNITY

Critics of l iberalism frequent ly invoke a concept ion of c o m m u n i t y as an alternative to the individual ism and abstract formalism they attribute to l iberal ism (cf. Wolff, 1968, chap. 5; Bay, 1981 , chap. 5). T h e y reject the i m a g e of persons as separate and self-contained atoms, each wi th the same formal rights, rights to k e e p others out, separate. For such writers , the ideal of c o m m u n i t y e v o k e s the a b s e n c e of the sel f - interested co m pet i t i v e ness of m o d e r n society . In this ideal , critics of l iberalism find an alterna-

228 • Chapter S

t ive to the abstract, formal m e t h o d o l o g y of l iberalism. Exist ing in c o m m u nity with others entai ls more than mere ly respect ing their rights; it entails a t tending to and sharing in the particularity of their n e e d s and interests .

In his rightly ce l ebra ted crit ique of Rawls, for example , Michael Sandel (1982) argues that l iberalism's emphas i s on the primacy of just ice presupposes a c o n c e p t i o n of the self as an a n t e c e d e n t unity exist ing prior to its des ires and goals , w h o l e unto itself, separated and b o u n d e d . This is an unreal and incoherent concept ion of the self, h e argues. It w o u l d b e bet ter replaced by a concept ion of the self as the product of an ident i ty it shares wi th others , of values and goals that are not external and wi l l ed , as liberalism w o u l d have it, but const i tut ive of the self. This const i tut ive c o n c e p tion of the self is expres sed by the concept of communi ty ,

Benjamin Barber (1984) also uses the idea of c o m m u n i t y to evoke a vis ion of social life that does not conce ive the person as an atomist ic , separated individual . Liberal political theory represents individuals as occupying private and separate spaces , as prope l led only by their o w n private des ires . This is a consumer-or iented concept ion of h u m a n nature, in w h i c h social and political relations can b e understood only as goods instrumenta l to the a c h i e v e m e n t of individual des ires , and not as intrinsic goods . This atomist ic concept ion generates a political theory that pres u m e s conflict and compet i t ion as characteristic m o d e s of interaction. Like Sandel , Barber appeals to an ideal of c o m m u n i t y to invoke a c o n c e p t ion of the person as socially const i tuted, actively or iented toward affirming relations of mutuality, rather than or iented solely toward satisfying private n e e d s and des ires (cf. Ackelsberg, 1988).

As earl ier chapters in this book indicate, I share these cr i t iques of l iberal ism. Liberal social onto logy, I have argued, has no place for a concept of social groups . I have characterized a social group as the relational o u t c o m e of interact ions , mean ings , and affinities according to wh ich p e o p l e identify o n e another. T h e self is i n d e e d a product of social relations in profound and often contradictory ways. A person's social group ident i t ies , moreover , are in s o m e meaningful s ense shared with others of the group.

I have also crit icized l iberalism's consumer-or iented presuppos i t ions about h u m a n nature, and agree with Barber that these lead to an instrumental is t unders tanding of the function of politics. With Barber and other n e w republ ican theorists , I too reject the privatization oi polit ics in liberal pluralist processes , and call for the institution of democrat ic publics . I think, h o w e v e r , that all these crit icisms of l iberalism can and should b e m a d e w i thout embrac ing c o m m u n i t y as a political ideal.

Too often contemporary discuss ion of these issues sets up an exhaust ive d i c h o t o m y b e t w e e n individual ism and communi ty . C o m m u n i t y appears in the oppos i t ions indiv idual i sm/community , separated self/shared self, private/publ ic . But like most such terms, individualism and c o m m u n i t y have a c o m m o n logic under ly ing their polarity, wh ich makes it poss ib le for


t h e m to def ine each o ther negat ively . Each entails a denial of difference and a des ire to bring mult ipl ic i ty and he terogene i ty into unity, though in o p p o s i n g ways . Liberal individualism d e n i e s difference by pos i t ing the self as a sol id, self-sufficient unity, not def ined by anything or anyone o ther than itself. Its formalistic ethic of rights also d e n i e s difference by br inging all such separated individuals under a c o m m o n measure of rights. Proponents of c o m m u n i t y , on the other hand, d e n y difference by pos i t ing fusion rather than separation as the social ideal. T h e y c o n c e i v e t h e social subject as a relation of unity or mutual i ty c o m p o s e d by identification and s y m m e t r y a m o n g individuals within a totality. Communi tar ian-ism represents an urge to s e e persons in unity with o n e another in a shared w h o l e .

For m a n y writers , the rejection of individualism logically entai ls the assertion of c o m m u n i t y , and converse ly any rejection of c o m m u n i t y e n tails that o n e necessari ly supports individualism. In their discussion of a d e b a t e b e t w e e n Jean Elshtain and Barbara Ehrenre i ch , for e x a m p l e , Harry Boyte and Sara Evans (1984) claim that Ehrenre ich promotes indiv idual i sm b e c a u s e she rejects the appeal to c o m m u n i t y that Elshtain makes . Recent accounts of the debate a m o n g political theorists g e n e r a t e d by communi tar ian cri t iques of Rawls all couch that debate in t erms of a d i c h o t o m y b e t w e e n liberal individualism and communi ty , sugges t ing that t h e s e two categories are i n d e e d mutual ly exclus ive and exhaust all poss i ble social onto log ies and concept ions of the self (see Hirsch, 1986; Wal-lach, 1987; Cornel l , 1987), Thus e v e n w h e n the discussants recognize the total izing and circular character of this debate , and seek to take a posi t ion outs ide its t erms , they tend to sl ide into affirming o n e or the other "side" of the d i c h o t o m y b e c a u s e that d ichotomy, like the d i cho tomy a/not-a, is c o n c e i v e d as exhaust ing all logical possibi l i t ies .

T H E ROUSSEAUIST D R E A M

T h e ideal of c o m m u n i t y submits to the logic of identity I d i scussed in Chapter 4. It expresses an urge to unity, the unity of subjects wi th o n e another. T h e ideal of c o m m u n i t y expresses a longing for harmony a m o n g persons , for consensus and mutual understanding, for what Foucault calls the Rousseauist dream of

a transparent society, visible and legible in each of its parts, the dream of there no longer existing any zones of darkness, zones established by the privileges of royal power or the prerogative of some corporation, zones ol disorder. It was the dream that each individual, whatever position he occupied, might be able to see the whole of society, that men's hearts should communicate, their vision be unobstructed by obstacles, and that the opinion of all reign over each. (Foucault, 1980, p. 152)

230 • Chapter B

W h e t h e r expres sed as shared subjectivity or c o m m o n consc iousness , on the o n e hand, or as relations of mutual i ty and reciprocity, the ideal of c o m m u n i t y d e n i e s , deva lues , or represses the ontological difference of subjects , and seeks to d isso lve social inexhaustibi l i ty into the comfort of a se l f -enc losed w h o l e .

Sandel is explicit about def ining c o m m u n i t y as shared subjectivity. T h e difference b e t w e e n his o w n const i tut ive meaning of c o m m u n i t y and the instrumental and sent imenta l meanings h e finds in Rawls is prec i se ly that in const i tut ive c o m m u n i t y subjects share a c o m m o n se l f -understanding (Sandel , 1982, pp. 6 2 - 6 3 , 173). H e is also explicit about social transpare n c y as the m e a n i n g and goal of communi ty :

And in so far as our constitutive self-understandings comprehend a wider subject than the individual alone, whether a family or tribe or city or class or nation or people, to this extent they define a community in the constitutive sense. And what marks such a community is not merely a spirit of benevolence, or the prevalence of communitarian values, or even certain shared final ends' alone, but a common vocabulary of discourse and a background of implicit practices and understandings within which the opacity of the participants is reduced if never finally dissolved. In so far as justice depends for its pre-eminence on the separatedness or boundedness of persons in the cognitive sense, its priority would diminish as that opacity faded and this community deepened. (Sandel, 1982, pp. 172-73)

Barber also takes shared subjectivity as the m e a n i n g of c o m m u n i t y . Through political participation individuals confront one another and adjust their wants and des ires , creating a " c o m m o n ordering of individual n e e d s and wants into a s ingle vision of the future in wh ich all can share." Strong d e m o c r a c y seeks to reach a "creative consensus" w h i c h through c o m m o n talk and c o m m o n work creates a "common consc iousness and political j u d g m e n t " (Barber, 1984, p. 224).

S o m e theorists of c o m m u n i t y , on the other hand, replace c o m m o n n e s s in the m e a n i n g of c o m m u n i t y wi th mutual i ty and reciprocity, the recognition by each individual of the individuality of all the others (see Cornel l , 1987). Seyla B e n h a b i b , for example , regards a standpoint that e m p h a s i z e s the c o m m o n n e s s of persons as that of an ethic of rights and just ice of the sort that Rawls represents , which she calls the standpoint of the "generali zed other." Moral theory must also express a c o m p l e m e n t a r y point of v i e w w h i c h B enhab ib calls the standpoint of the "concrete other." Benhab ib refers to this as a vision of a c o m m u n i t y of n e e d s and solidarity, in contrast to the c o m m u n i t y of rights and e n t i t l e m e n t s env i saged by l iberalism:

The standpoint of the "concrete other," by contrast, requires us to view each and every rational being as an individual with a concrete history, identity, and affective-emotional constitution. In assuming this standpoint, we abstract from


what constitutes our commonality and seek to understand the distinctiveness of the other. We seek to comprehend the needs of the other, their motivations, what they search for, and what they desire. Our relation to the other is governed by the norm of complementary reciprocity: each is entitled to expect and to assume from the other forms of behavior through which the other feels recognized and confirmed as a concrete, individual being with specific needs, talents, and capacities. . . . The moral categories that accompany such interactions are those of responsibility, bonding, and sharing. The corresponding moral feelings are those of love, care, sympathy, and solidarity, and the vision of community is one of needs and solidarity. (Benhabib, 1986, p. 341)

D e s p i t e the apparent d i v e r g e n c e of Sandel's and Barber's language of shared subject ivi ty and Benhabib's language of c o m p l e m e n t a r y rec iprocity, I think all three express a similar ideal of social relations as the copresence of subjects (cf. Derrida, 1976, pp. 137-39) . W h e t h e r exp r e s s e d as c o m m o n consc iousness or as mutual understanding, the ideal is o n e of the transparency of subjects to o n e another. In this ideal each unders tands the others and recognizes the others in the s a m e way that they unders tand t h e m s e l v e s , and all recognize that the others understand t h e m as t h e y unders tand t h e m s e l v e s . This ideal thus submits to what D e r rida calls t h e metaphys i c s of p r e s e n c e , wh ich s e e k s to col lapse t h e t e m p o ral difference inherent in language and exper ience into a totality that can b e c o m p r e h e n d e d in o n e v iew. This ideal of c o m m u n i t y d e n i e s the ontological difference wi th in and b e t w e e n subjects .

In c o m m u n i t y persons cease to b e other, opaque , not unders tood , and ins tead b e c o m e mutual ly sympathet ic , understanding o n e another as t h e y unders tand t h e m s e l v e s , fused. Such an ideal of the transparency of subjec t s to o n e another d e n i e s the difference, or basic asymmetry , of subjec t s . As H e g e l first brought out and Sartre's analysis d e e p e n e d , persons necessar i ly transcend o n e another because subjectivity is negativity. T h e regard of the other is always objectifying. Other persons n e v e r s e e the wor ld from my perspec t ive , and in wi tness ing the other's object ive grasp of m y body, act ions, and words , I am always faced with an exper i ence of myse l f different from the o n e I have.

This mutual intersubject ive t ranscendence , of course , makes sharing b e t w e e n us poss ib le , a fact that Sartre not ices less than H e g e l . The sharing, however , is n e v e r c o m p l e t e mutual understanding and reciprocity. Sharing, moreover , is fragile. At the next m o m e n t the other person may unders tand m y words differently from the way I meant t h e m , or carry m y actions to c o n s e q u e n c e s I do not intend. The same difference that makes sharing b e t w e e n us poss ib le also makes misunders tanding , reject ion, withdrawal , and conflict always poss ible condit ions of social be ing .

B e c a u s e the subject is not a unity , it cannot b e present to itself, know itself. I d o not always know what I m e a n , n e e d , want , des ire , b e c a u s e

232 • Chapter 8

mean ings , n e e d s , and des ires do not arise from an origin in s o m e transparent e g o . Often I express m y des ire in ges ture or tone of vo ice , wi thout m e a n i n g to do so. Consc iousness , s p e e c h , express iveness , are poss ib le only if the subject always surpasses itself, and is thus necessari ly unable to c o m p r e h e n d itself. Subjects all have mult ip le desires that do not cohere; they attach layers of m e a n i n g s to objects without always b e i n g aware of each layer or the connec t ions b e t w e e n t h e m . C o n s e q u e n t l y , any individual subject is a play of difference that cannot b e c o m p l e t e l y c o m p r e h e n d e d .

If the subject is h e t e r o g e n e o u s process , never fully present to itself, then it fol lows that subjects cannot make t h e m s e l v e s transparent, whol ly present to o n e another. C o n s e q u e n t l y the subject also e l u d e s sympathet ic c o m p r e h e n s i o n by others . I cannot understand others as t h e y understand t h e m s e l v e s , because they do not comple t e ly understand t h e m s e l v e s . Ind e e d , b e c a u s e the meanings and des ires they express may outrun their o w n awareness or intent ion, I may understand their words or actions more fully than they .

T h e idea] o f c o m m u n i t y expresses a des ire for socia] w h o l e n e s s , symmetry, a securi ty and solid ident i ty which is objectified because affirmed by o thers unambiguous ly . This is an understandable dream, but a dream n e v e r t h e l e s s , and, as I shall now argue, o n e with serious political conse q u e n c e s .

PRIVILEGING F A C E - T O - F A C E RELATIONS

T h e ideal of c o m m u n i t y as a pure copresence of subjects to o n e another rece ives political express ion in a vision of political life that pr iv i leges local face-to-face direct democracy . Critics of welfare capitalist soc iety repeated ly invoke such a m o d e l of small group relations as a political ideal. The anarchist tradition expresses these values most systematical ly, but they retain their form in other political soils as wel l . This mode l of polit ics as founded in face-to-facc relations poses as the alternative to the impersonality, a l ienation, commodif icat ion, and bureaucratization of governance in ex is t ing mass societ ies:

The incarnation of this project is the immediate, indeed unmediated, community that enters so profoundly into the fashioning of our humanity. This is the community in which we genuinely encounter each other, the public world that is only a bare step above our private world, in short, our towns, neighborhoods, and municipalities. (Bookchin, 1982, p. 267; cf. Manicas, 1974, pp. 246-50; Bay, 1981, chaps. Sand 6; Taylor, 1982, pp. 27-28)

Several prob lems arise w h e n a c o m m u n i t y that privi leges face-to-face relations is taken as the ideal of the polity. T h e ideal p r e s u m e s a m y t h of


u n m e d i a t e d social relations, and wrongly identifies mediat ion wi th alienation. It d e n i e s difference in the s ense of temporal and spatial distancing. It impl ies a m o d e l of the good society as consist ing o f decentral ized small units wh ich is both unrealist ic and politically undes irable , and which avoids the political ques t ion of just relations a m o n g such decentra l ized c o m m u n i t i e s .

As the above quotat ion indicates , theorists of c o m m u n i t y pr iv i lege face-to-face relations b e c a u s e they c o n c e i v e t h e m as immediate. I m m e d i a c y is b e t t e r than mediat ion because i m m e d i a t e relations have the purity and securi ty l o n g e d for in the Rousseauist dream: w e are transparent to o n e another, pure ly copresen t in the same t ime and space, c lose e n o u g h to touch, and noth ing c o m e s b e t w e e n us to obstruct our vis ion of o n e another.

This ideal of the i m m e d i a t e c o p r e s e n c e of subjects, however , is a metaphysical i l lusion. E v e n a face-to-face relation b e t w e e n two p e o p l e is m e d i ated by voice and ges ture , spacing and temporality. As soon as a third person enters the interaction the possibil i ty arises of the relation b e t w e e n the first two b e i n g media ted through the third, and so on. The mediat ion of relations a m o n g persons by the s p e e c h and actions of o ther persons is a fundamenta l condit ion of sociality. T h e richness , creativity, diversity, and potent ia l of a soc ie ty expand wi th growth in the scope and means of its m e d i a , l inking persons across t ime and distance. T h e greater the t i m e and dis tance , however , the greater the n u m b e r of persons w h o stand b e t w e e n o ther persons .

I am not arguing that there is no difference b e t w e e n small groups in w h i c h persons relate to o n e another face-to-face and other social relations, nor am I d e n y i n g a u n i q u e value to such face-to-face groups. Just as the int imacy of l iving wi th a few others in the same househo ld has un ique d i m e n s i o n s that are humanly valuable , so exist ing wi th others in c o m m u nit ies of mutual regard has specific characteristics of warmth and sharing that are humanly valuable. T h e r e is no quest ion e i ther that bureaucra-t ized capitalist patriarchal soc iety discourages and destroys such c o m m u nit ies of mutual fr iendship, just as it pressures and fragments families. A vis ion of the good society surely should include institutional arrangements that nurture the specific e x p e r i e n c e of mutual friendship wh ich only relat ive ly small groups interact ing in a plurality of contexts can produce . But recogniz ing the value and specificity of such face-to-face relations is differe n t from privi leging t h e m and posit ing them as a mode l for the institutional relations of a w h o l e society.

In m y v iew, a m o d e l of the good society as c o m p o s e d of decentra l ized , economica l ly self-sufficient face-to-face communi t i e s funct ioning as aut o n o m o u s political ent i t ies d o e s not purify polit ics, as its proponents think, but rather avoids polit ics. First, it is wi ldly Utopian. To bring it into

234 Chapter 3

b e i n g w o u l d require d ismant l ing the urban character of m o d e r n society , a gargantuan overhaul of l iving space, workplaces , places of trade and c o m m e r c e . A m o d e l of a transformed society must beg in from the material s tructures that are g iven to us at this t ime in history, and in the U n i t e d States those are large-scale industry and urban centers .

M o r e important , however , this m o d e l of the good society as usually articulated l eaves c o m p l e t e l y unaddressed the quest ion of h o w such small c o m m u n i t i e s relate to o n e another. F r e q u e n t l y the ideal projects a l eve l of self-sufficiency and decentral izat ion wh ich suggests that proponents e n vis ion few relations a m o n g these communi t i e s except occasional friendly visits. Surely it is unrealist ic , however , to as sume that such decentra l ized c o m m u n i t i e s n e e d not engage in ex tens ive relations of exchange of resources , goods , and culture .

Proponents frequent ly privi lege face-to-face relations in reaction to the al ienation and dominat ion produced by h u g e , faceless bureaucracies and corporat ions , w h o s e actions and decis ions affect most p e o p l e , but are out of their control . Appeals to c o m m u n i t y envis ion more local and direct control . A m o r e participatory democrat ic society should i n d e e d encourage act ive publ ics at the local levels of ne ighborhood and workplace . But the important political ques t ion is h o w relations a m o n g these locales can b e organized so as to foster just ice and min imize dominat ion and oppression. Invoking a mystical ideal of c o m m u n i t y does not address this ques t ion, but rather obscures it. Politics must b e conce ived as a relationship of strangers w h o do not understand o n e another in a subject ive and i m m e d i ate s ense , relat ing across t ime and distance.

UNDESIRABLE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE IDEAL OF COMMUNITY

I h a v e argued that the ideal of c o m m u n i t y den ie s the difference b e t w e e n subjects and the social differentiation of temporal and spatial distancing. T h e most ser ious political c o n s e q u e n c e of the desire for c o m m u n i t y , or for c o p r e s e n c e and mutual identification wi th others , is that it often operates to exc lude or oppress those exper i enced as different, C o m m i t m e n t to an ideal of c o m m u n i t y t ends to value and enforce h o m o g e n e i t y (cf. Hirsch, 1986).

In ordinary s p e e c h in the Uni ted States, the term c o m m u n i t y refers to the p e o p l e wi th w h o m o n e identifies in a specific locale. It refers to ne ighborhood , church , schools . It also carries connotat ions of ethnic i ty , race, and other group identif ications. For most p e o p l e , insofar as they cons ider t h e m s e l v e s m e m b e r s of c o m m u n i t i e s at all, a c o m m u n i t y is a group that shares a specific heri tage , a c o m m o n self-identification, a c o m m o n culture and set of norms. As I argued in Chapter 5, self-identification as a m e m b e r of such a c o m m u n i t y also often occurs as an opposit ional differentiation


from other groups , w h o are feared, desp i sed , or at best deva lued . Persons fee l a s e n s e of mutual identification only wi th s o m e persons , feel in c o m m u n i t y only wi th those , and fear the difference others confront t h e m with b e c a u s e they identify with a different culture , history, and point of v i e w on the world. T h e ideal of c o m m u n i t y , I suggest , validates and reinforces the fear and avers ion s o m e social groups exhibit toward others . If c o m m u nity is a pos i t ive norm, that is, if exist ing together with others in relations of mutua l unders tanding and reciprocity is the goal, then it is understandable that w e exc lude and avoid those with w h o m w e do not or cannot identify.

Richard S e n n e t t (1970, chap. 2) d iscusses h o w a "myth of c o m m u n i t y " operates perpetual ly in American society to produce and implicit ly legit imate racist and classist behavior and policy. In many towns , suburbs , and n e i g h b o r h o o d s p e o p l e do have an image of their locale as o n e in wh ich p e o p l e all know o n e another, have the same values and life style , and re late wi th feel ings of mutual i ty and love . In modern American soc ie ty such an image is a lmost always false; wh i l e there may be a dominant group wi th a dist inct set of va lues and life style, within any locale o n e can usually find deviant individuals and groups. Yet the myth of c o m m u n i t y operates strongly to produce defens ive exclusionary behavior: pressuring the Black family that buys a h o u s e on the block to leave , beat ing u p the Black youths w h o c o m e into "our" ne ighborhood , zoning against the construct ion of mul t iuni t dwel l ings .

T h e exclusionary c o n s e q u e n c e s of valuing c o m m u n i t y , moreover , are not restricted to bigots and conservat ives . Many radical political organizat ions founder on the des ire for communi ty . Too often p e o p l e in groups work ing for social change take mutual friendship to b e a goal of the group, and thus j u d g e t h e m s e l v e s want ing as a group w h e n they do not ach ieve such c o m m o n a l i t y (see Mansbr idge , 1980, chap. 21 ; Bre ines , 1982, e s p . chap. 4). Such a des ire for c o m m u n i t y often channels e n e r g y away from the political goals of the group, and also produces a c l ique a tmosphere w h i c h k e e p s groups small and turns potential m e m b e r s away. Mutual identif ication as an implicit group ideal can reproduce a h o m o g e n e i t y that usual ly conflicts w i th the organization's stated c o m m i t m e n t to diversity. In recent years most socialist and feminist organizations, for example , have taken racial, class, age, and sexual diversity as an important criterion according to wh ich the success of political organizations should b e evaluated. To the d e g r e e that they take mutual understanding and identification as a goal, t h e y may b e def lec ted from this goal of diversity.

T h e exclusionary implications of a des ire for face-to-face relations of mutual identif ication and sharing present a problem for m o v e m e n t s assert ing pos i t ive group difference, wh ich I descr ibed in Chapter 6. I arg u e d there that the effort of oppres sed groups to reclaim their group iden-

236 • Chapter 3

tity, and to form with o n e another bonds of posit ive cultural affirmation around their group specificity, const i tutes an important res is tance to the oppress ion of cultural imperial ism. It shifts the m e a n i n g of difference from otherness and exclusion to variation and specificity, and forces dominant groups to acknowledge their own group specificity. But d o e s not such affirmation of group identity itself express an ideal of c o m m u n i t y , and is it not subject to exclusionary impulses?

S o m e social m o v e m e n t s asserting posit ive group difference have found through painful confrontation that an urge to unity and mutual identification d o e s i n d e e d have exclusionary implications. Feminis t efforts to create w o m e n ' s spaces and w o m e n ' s culture , for example , have often ass u m e d the perspec t ive of only a particular subgroup of w o m e n — w h i t e , or m i d d l e class, or lesbian, or straight—thus implicit ly exc luding or rendering invis ible those w o m e n a m o n g t h e m with differing identifications and e x p e r i e n c e s (Spe lman, 1988; Phelan, 1987). Similar prob lems arise for any m o v e m e n t of group identification, because in our society most p e o p l e have mul t ip l e group identifications, and thus group differences cut across every social group.

T h e s e arguments against c o m m u n i t y are not arguments against the political project of construct ing and affirming a posit ive group ident i ty and relations of group solidarity, as a means of confronting cultural imperialism and d iscover ing things about onese l f and others with w h o m one feels affinity. Cr i t ique of the ideal of c o m m u n i t y , however , reveals that e v e n in such group-speci f ic contexts affinity cannot m e a n the transparency of se lves to o n e another. If in their zeal to affirm a posit ive meaning of group specificity p e o p l e seek or try to enforce a strong sense of mutual identification, they are l ikely to reproduce exclusions similar to those they confront. T h o s e affirming the specificity of a group affinity should at the same t i m e recogn ize and affirm the group and individual differences wi thin the group.

CITY L I F E AS A NORMATIVE IDEAL

Appeals to c o m m u n i t y are usually antiurban. Much sociological l iterature d iagnoses m o d e r n history as a m o v e m e n t to the dangerous bureaucrat ized Gesellschaft from the manageable and safe Gemeinschaft, nostalgically recons tructed as a world of lost origins (Stein, 1960; Nisbet , 1953). Many others follow Rousseau in romantic iz ing the ancient polis and the m e d i e val Swiss Burger, deplor ing the c o m m e r c e , disorder, and unmanageab le mass character of the m o d e r n city (Ell ison, 1985; cf. Sennet t , 1974, chaps. 7 -10) . Throughout the m o d e r n period, the city has often b e e n decr ied as e m b o d y i n g immoral i ty , artificiality, disorder, and danger—as the site of

City Life and Difference 237

treasonous conspiracies , illicit sex, cr ime, dev iance , and disease (Mosse , 1985 , pp . 3 2 - 3 3 , 1 3 7 - 3 8 ; Oi lman, 1985, p. 214). T h e typical image of the m o d e r n city finds it express ing all the disvalues that a reinstantiation of c o m m u n i t y w o u l d e l iminate .

Yet urbanity is the horizon of the m o d e r n , not to m e n t i o n the p o s t m o d ern , condit ion. Contemporary political theory must accept urbanity as a material g iven for those w h o l ive in advanced industrial societ ies . Urban relations def ine the l ives not only of those w h o l ive in the h u g e metropol ises , but also of those w h o l ive in suburbs and large towns . Our social life is s tructured by vast networks of temporal and spatial mediat ion a m o n g persons , so that nearly e v e r y o n e d e p e n d s on the activit ies of s e e n and u n s e e n strangers w h o med ia te b e t w e e n onese l f and one's associates , b e t w e e n o n e s e l f and one's objects of desire . Urbanites find t h e m s e l v e s relating geographical ly to increasingly large regions , thinking little of traveling s e v e n t y mi l e s to work or an hour's drive for an evening's enter ta inment . Most p e o p l e frequent ly and casually e n c o u n t e r strangers in their daily activit ies . The material surroundings and structures available to us def ine and p r e s u p p o s e urban relationships. T h e very size of populat ions in our soc ie ty and most o ther nations of the world, coup led wi th a cont inuing s e n s e of national or e thn ic ident i ty wi th mill ions of o ther p e o p l e , supports the conc lus ion that a vision of d ismant l ing the city is hope less ly Utopian.

Starting from the g iven of modern urban life is not s imply necessary , moreover ; it is desirable . E v e n for many of those w h o decry the alienat ion, bureaucratizat ion, and mass character of capitalist patriarchal socie ty , city life exerts a powerful attraction. M o d e r n literature, art, and film have ce lebrated city life, its energy , cultural diversity, technological c o m plexity, and the mult ipl ic i ty of its activities. E v e n many of the most s taunch proponent s of decentra l ized c o m m u n i t y love to s h o w visit ing friends around the Boston or San Francisco or N e w York in or near wh ich t h e y l ive, c l imbing up towers to s e e the glitter of lights and sampl ing the fare at the b e s t e thn ic restaurants.

I propose to construct a normative ideal of city life as an alternative to both t h e ideal of c o m m u n i t y and the liberal individualism it crit icizes as asocial. By "city life" I m e a n a form of social relations which I def ine as the b e i n g toge ther of strangers. In the city persons and groups interact within spaces and inst i tut ions they all e x p e r i e n c e t h e m s e l v e s as be long ing to, but w i thout those interact ions dissolv ing into unity or c o m m o n n e s s . City life is c o m p o s e d of c lusters of p e o p l e with affinities—families, social group networks , voluntary associations, ne ighborhood networks , a vast array of small "communi t i e s ." City dwel lers frequent ly venture b e y o n d such familiar enc laves , however , to the m o r e o p e n publ ic of pol it ics , c o m m e r c e , and festival, w h e r e strangers m e e t and interact (cf. Lofland, 1973). City

238 • Chapter 3

dwe l l ing situates one's o w n identity and activity in relation to a horizon of a vast variety of o ther activity, and the awareness that this u n k n o w n , unfamiliar activity affects the condit ions of one's own.

City life is a vast, e v e n infinite, e c o n o m i c network of product ion, distribut ion , transportation, exchange , communicat ion , service provis ion, and a m u s e m e n t . City dwel lers d e p e n d on the mediat ion of thousands of o ther p e o p l e and vast organizational resources in order to accompl ish their individual e n d s . City dwel l ers are thus together , b o u n d to o n e another, in what should b e and s o m e t i m e s is a s ingle polity. Their b e i n g together entails s o m e c o m m o n p r o b l e m s and c o m m o n interests , but they do not create a c o m m u n i t y of shared final e n d s , of mutual identification and reciprocity.

A normat ive ideal of city life must b e g i n wi th our g iven e x p e r i e n c e of c i t ies , and look there for the virtues of this form of social relations. Def in ing an ideal as unreal ized possibi l i t ies of the actual, I extrapolate from that e x p e r i e n c e four such virtues .

(1) Social differentiation without exclusion. City life in urban mass socie ty is not incons is tent wi th support ive social networks and subcultural c o m m u n i t i e s . I n d e e d , for m a n y it is their necessary condit ion. In the city social group differences flourish. Modernizat ion theory pred ic ted a d e c l ine in local, e thnic , and other group affiliations as universalist state institut ions touch people ' s l ives m o r e directly and as p e o p l e e n c o u n t e r many others wi th identif ications and life styles different from their own. There is cons iderab le e v i d e n c e , however , that group differences are often reinforced by city life, and that the city e v e n encourages the formation of n e w social group affinities (Fischer, 1982, pp. 2 0 6 - 3 0 ; Rothschi ld, 1981). D e v i a n t or minority groups find in the city both a cover of anonymity and a critical mass unavailable in the smaller town. It is hard to imagine the formation of gay or lesbian group affinities, for example , w i thout the condit ions of the m o d e r n city (D'Emi l io , 1983). Whi le city dwe l l ing as opp o s e d to rural life has c h a n g e d the l ives and self -concepts of Chicanos , to take another example , city life encourages group identification and a d e sire for cultural nationalism at the same t ime that it may dissolve s o m e traditional pract ices or p r o m o t e assimilation to Anglo language and values (Jankowski, 1986). In actual cit ies many p e o p l e express v io lent aversions to m e m b e r s of groups wi th wh ich they do not identify. More than those w h o l ive in small towns , however , they tend to recognize social group difference as a g iven , s o m e t h i n g they must l ive wi th (Fischer, 1982, pp. 2 0 6 - 4 0 ) .

In the ideal of city life f reedom leads to group differentiation, to the formation of affinity groups , but this social and spatial differentiation of groups is w i thout exclusion. T h e urban ideal expresses difference as I d e fined it in Chapter 6, a s ide-by-s ide particularity ne i ther reduc ib le to


ident i ty nor c o m p l e t e l y other. In this ideal groups do not stand in relat ions of inc lus ion and exclus ion, but overlap and intermingle wi thout b e c o m i n g h o m o g e n e o u s . Though city life as w e n o w e x p e r i e n c e it has m a n y borders and exclus ions , e v e n our actual exper i ence of the city also g ives hints of what differentiation wi thout exclusion can be . Many city ne ighborhoods have a dist inct e thnic identi ty , but m e m b e r s of o ther groups also dwe l l in t h e m . In the good city o n e crosses from o n e distinct ne ighborhood to another wi thout knowing precise ly w h e r e o n e e n d e d and the o ther began . In the normat ive ideal of city life, borders are o p e n and undec idab le .

(2) Variety. The interfusion of groups in the city occurs partly because of the mul t iuse differentiation of social space. What makes urban spaces interest ing , draws p e o p l e out in publ ic to t h e m , g ives p e o p l e pleasure and e x c i t e m e n t , is the diversity of activities t h e y support. W h e n stores , restaurants, bars, c lubs , parks, and offices are sprinkled a m o n g res idences , p e o p l e have a ne ighbor ly fee l ing about their ne ighborhood, they go out and e n c o u n t e r o n e another on the streets and chat. T h e y have a s ense of their n e i g h b o r h o o d as a "spot" or "place," b e c a u s e of that bar's dist inct ive c l i en te l e , or the c i tywide reputat ion of the pizza at that restaurant. Both bus ines s p e o p l e and res idents t end to have more c o m m i t m e n t to and care for such n e i g h b o r h o o d s than they do for s ingle-use ne ighborhoods . Mult i functional s treets , parks, and ne ighborhoods are also m u c h safer than sing l e - u s e funct ional ized spaces b e c a u s e p e o p l e are out on the s treets during most hours , and have c o m m i t m e n t to the place (Jacobs, 1961 , chap. 8; S e n n e t t , 1970, chap. 4; cf. W h y t e , 1988, chaps. 9, 2 2 - 2 5 ) .

(3) Eroticism. City life also instantiates difference as the erotic, in the w i d e s e n s e of an attraction to the other, the pleasure and e x c i t e m e n t of b e i n g drawn out of one's secure routine to encounter the novel , strange, and surpris ing (cf. Barthes , 1986). T h e erotic d imens ion of the city has always b e e n an aspect of its fearfulness, for it holds out the possibi l i ty that o n e wil l lose one's ident i ty , wil l fall. But w e also take p leasure in b e i n g o p e n to and in teres ted in p e o p l e w e exper i ence as different. W e s p e n d a Sunday afternoon walking through Chinatown, or check ing out this week ' s eccentr ic players in the park. W e look for restaurants, s tores , and c lubs wi th s o m e t h i n g n e w for us , a n e w e thn ic food, a different a tmos p h e r e , a different crowd of p e o p l e . W e walk through sect ions of the city that w e e x p e r i e n c e as having u n i q u e characters which are not ours, w h e r e p e o p l e from diverse places ming le and then go h o m e .

T h e erot ic attraction h e r e is prec ise ly the obverse of communi ty . In the ideal of c o m m u n i t y p e o p l e feel affirmed because those wi th w h o m they share e x p e r i e n c e s , percept ions , and goals recognize and are recognized by t h e m ; o n e s e e s o n e s e l f ref lected in the others . There is another kind of p leasure , h o w e v e r , in coming to encounter a subject ivity, a set of m e a n -

240 • Chapter 8

ings, that is different, unfamiliar. O n e takes pleasure in b e i n g drawn out of o n e s e l f to understand that there are other meanings , pract ices , perspec t ives on the city, and that o n e could learn or exper i ence s o m e t h i n g m o r e and different by interact ing with t h e m .

T h e city's erot ic ism also der ives from the aesthet ics of its material be ing: the bright and co lored lights, the grandeur of its bui ldings , the juxtaposi t ion of architecture of different t imes , styles , and purposes . City space offers de l ights and surprises. Walk around the corner, or over a few blocks , and you e n c o u n t e r a different spatial mood , a n e w play of sight and sound, and n e w interact ive m o v e m e n t . The erotic mean ing of the city arises from its social and spatial inexhaustibil ity. A place of many places , the city folds over on itself in so many layers and relationships that it is i n c o m p r e h e n s i b l e . O n e cannot "take it in," o n e never feels as though there is no th ing n e w and interest ing to explore, no n e w and interest ing p e o p l e to m e e t .

(4) Publicity. Political theorists w h o extol the value of c o m m u n i t y often construe the publ ic as a realm of unity and mutual understanding, but this d o e s not c o h e r e with our actual e x p e r i e n c e of publ ic spaces . Because by definit ion a publ ic space is a place access ible to anyone , w h e r e anyone can participate and wi tness , in enter ing the publ ic o n e always risks e n c o u n t e r wi th those w h o are different, those w h o identify wi th different groups and have different opinions or different forms o f l i f e . The group diversity of the city is most often apparent in publ ic spaces. This he lps account for their vitality and e x c i t e m e n t . Cit ies provide important publ ic s p a c e s — streets , parks, and p l a z a s — w h e r e p e o p l e stand and sit together , interact and ming le , or s imply wi tness o n e another, wi thout b e c o m i n g unified in a c o m m u n i t y of "shared final ends ."

Polit ics , the critical activity of raising issues and dec id ing h o w institutional and social relations should b e organized, crucially d e p e n d s on the e x i s t e n c e of spaces and forums to wh ich e v e r y o n e has access . In such p u b lic spaces p e o p l e e n c o u n t e r o ther p e o p l e , meanings , express ions , i ssues , which they may not understand or wi th wh ich they do not identify. T h e force of publ ic demonstrat ions , for example , often consists in bringing to p e o p l e w h o pass through publ ic spaces those i ssues , d e m a n d s , and p e o p l e they might o therwise avoid. As a normative ideal city life provides publ ic places and forums w h e r e anyone can speak and anyone can l isten.

Because city life is a be ing together of strangers, d iverse and over lapp ing ne ighbors , social just ice cannot issue from the institution of an E n l i g h t e n m e n t universal publ ic . On the contrary, social just ice in the city requires the realization of a polit ics of difference. This polit ics lays d o w n institutional and ideological means for recogniz ing and affirming diverse social groups by g iv ing political representat ion to these groups, and ce l e brating their dis t inct ive characteristics and cultures. In the unoppress ive


city p e o p l e o p e n to unass imi lated otherness . W e all have our familiar relations and affinities, the p e o p l e to w h o m w e feel c lose and wi th w h o m w c share daily life. T h e s e familial and social groups o p e n onto a publ ic in w h i c h all participate, and that publ ic must b e open and access ib le to all. Contrary to the communitar ian tradition, however , that publ ic cannot b e c o n c e i v e d as a unity transcending group differences, nor as entai l ing c o m p l e t e mutual understanding. In publ ic life the differences remain unass imi lated, but each participating group acknowledges and is o p e n to list e n i n g to the others . T h e publ ic is h e t e r o g e n e o u s , plural, and playful, a place w h e r e p e o p l e wi tness and appreciate diverse cultural express ions that t h e y do not share and do not fully understand.

CITIES AND SOCIAL INJUSTICE

An ideal can inspire action for social change only if it arises from possibi l i t ies s u g g e s t e d by actual exper ience . The ideals of city life I have proposed are real ized incidental ly and intermit tent ly in some cit ies today. There is no doubt , h o w e v e r , that many large cit ies in the U n i t e d States today are sites of decay , poverty , and crime. There is just as little doubt that the smaller t o w n s and suburbs to wh ich many p e o p l e escape from these ills are s trung along c o n g e s t e d h ighways , are h o m o g e n e o u s , segregated , and privat ized. In e i ther case, an ideal of city life as erot ic ized publ ic vitality w h e r e differences are affirmed in o p e n n e s s might s e e m laughably Utopian. For on city streets today the d e p t h of social injustice is apparent: h o m e l e s s p e o p l e ly ing in doorways , rape in parks, and co ld-b looded racist m u r d e r are the realities of city life.

In Chapter 1 I argued that a critical theory of social just ice must cons ider not only distr ibut ive patterns , but also the processes and relationships that produce and reproduce those patterns. Whi l e issues of the distr ibution of goods and resources are central to reflections on social just ice , i ssues of dec i s ionmaking p o w e r and processes , the division of labor, and cul ture are just as important . N o w h e r e is this argument bet ter i l lustrated than in the context of social injustice in the city. Inequal i t ies of distribution can b e read on the face of bui ldings , ne ighborhoods , and towns . Most c i t ies have too many places w h e r e e v e r y o n e would agree no o n e should have to l ive. T h e s e may b e a stone's throw from opulent corporate headquarters or luxury c o n d o m i n i u m s . T h e correct principles and m e t h o d s of distribution may b e a subject of controversy, but as they w a n d e r through American city s treets few w o u l d d e n y that someth ing is w r o n g wi th existing distr ibutions.

T h e social s tructures , processes , and relationships that produce and reproduce t h e s e distr ibutions, however , are not so visible on the surface of our ci t ies . Yet normat ive theory must identify and evaluate t h e m as wel l

242 • Chapter S

as their o u t c o m e s . In this sect ion I shall discuss three aspects of t h e s e processes that contr ibute to dominat ion and oppress ion: (a) central ized corporate and bureaucratic dominat ion of cit ies; (b) dec i s ionmaking structures in munic ipal i t ies and their h idden m e c h a n i s m s of redistribution; and (c) processes of segregat ion and exclusion, both within cit ies and b e t w e e n cit ies and suburbs .

(a) Corporate and city p o w e r o n c e co inc ided . F irms started in a city and explo i ted the labor of the city's populat ion, and the city grew and prosp e r e d wi th the success of its major firms. Industrial magnates ruled the c i t ies , e i ther directly as city officials, or m o r e indirectly as b e h i n d - t h e -s c e n e s framers of city policy. Having a self-serving paternal att i tude toward t h e s e c i t ies , the ruling families e n g a g e d in phi lanthropic projects , bu i ld ing m u s e u m s , l ibraries, parks, plazas, and statues as gifts to the p u b lic and m o n u m e n t s to their weal th and entrepreneuria l ingenui ty . T h e captains of industry often ruled ruthlessly, k e e p i n g the majority of p e o p l e in squalor and ignorance , but they had a s ense of place, w e r e t ied e c o n o m ically, socially, and politically to o n e or a few cities.

Today corporate capital is h o m e l e s s . T h e enterprises that rule the world e c o n o m y are larger than m a n y cit ies , s o m e larger than many nat ions , with branches dot t ing the g lobe , and no center . Mergers , interlocking directorships, ho ld ing companie s , and the dispersion of ownersh ip through securit ies and stock market speculat ion m e a n that political and e c o n o m i c p o w e r is d i s l o d g e d from place . Fast as a satell ite signal, capital travels from o n e e n d of a cont inent to the other, from o n e e n d of the world to the other. Its d irect ion d e p e n d s on the pull of profit, and its directors rarely cons ider h o w its m o v e m e n t may affect local e c o n o m i e s .

Munic ipal i t ies are d e p e n d e n t on this flighty capital for the health of their e c o n o m i c infrastructure. T h e y must sell bonds on the o p e n market to raise funds for publ ic works. Because there are no national or state pol ic ies for encourag ing i n v e s t m e n t in particular cities or regions that n e e d resources and industry for their e c o n o m i c health, cit ies must c o m p e t e wi th o n e another to provide an attractive " investment c l imate" (cf. Elkin, 1987, pp . 3 0 - 3 1 ) . T h e y d e p e n d on private capital for hous ing , office, and commerc ia l space , product ion facilities, publ ic works , and wi th all this , of course , jobs . Their publ ic funds d e p e n d on taxing the private investors do ing bus iness wi th in their borders . W h e r e cit ies o n c e at least could ho ld the carrot of lordly p o w e r and prest ige before corporate deci s ionmakers , today cit ies are reduced to lowly supplicants , wi th little leverage for bargaining.

Cit ies are also relatively power le s s before the state. Gerald F r u g (1980) relates h o w American l iberalism has always b e e n host i le to a dist inct and i n d e p e n d e n t legal status for cit ies , and h o w gradually the law has r e m o v e d


most of the p o w e r s cit ies o n c e had. Cit ies today have only those powers d e l e g a t e d to them by state g o v e r n m e n t s , and these are usually rigorously l imi ted by judicial interpretation. What dec is ionmaking authority cit ies have is restricted to matters d e e m e d entirely local, and t h e s e are increasingly few. State laws not only regulate the kind and amount of taxes cit ies can levy, t h e y also restrict the powers of cities to borrow m o n e y . Cit ies are l imi ted in the kind of laws they can pass, which are general ly restricted to "welfare improving regulatory services" (cf. Elkin, 1987, pp. 2 1 - 3 1 ) .

Not only are city legal powers restricted and regulated by the state, but cit ies have b e c o m e increasingly d e p e n d e n t on state and federal governm e n t for operat ing funds to provide their services , and increasingly c o m e u n d e r the authority of state and federal g o v e r n m e n t in the administration of serv ices . Hea l th , hous ing , and welfare services adminis tered at the city l eve l are usually regulated by state and federal bureaucracies , and cit ies d e p e n d on state and federal grants for their cont inued operat ion. Many local serv ices , "such as educat ion, transportation and health care, are prov i d e d not by cit ies but by special districts or publ ic authorities organized to cut across city boundaries and over which cit ies have no control" (Frug, 1980, p. 1065). T h e "new federal ism" of the past decade has not significantly altered the city's financial d e p e n d e n c e on larger bureaucratic ent i t ies. It has s o m e w h a t increased cities' administrative responsibi l i t ies , often w h i l e reduc ing the resources with wh ich they can administer.

T h e dominat ion of central ized bureaucracies , w h e t h e r publ ic or private, over municipal e c o n o m i e s t ends to dissociate l ived or e x p e r i e n c e d space from the commodi f i ed space of abstract planning and calculation (Gottdinger , 1985, pp. 2 9 0 - 9 7 ; Castel ls , 1983, chap. 31). Capitalist bureaucratic rationality fosters bird's-eye planning which e n c o m p a s s e s vast regions inc luding h u g e metropol i tan areas, or e v e n several states together . From this skytop vis ion, investors and planning bureaucrats d e t e r m i n e the p l a c e m e n t and des ign of h ighways , factories, shopping faci l i t ies , offices, and parks. T h e y d e c i d e the most rational and efficient i n v e s t m e n t from the point of v i e w of their portfolio and their central ized office operat ions , but not necessari ly from the point of v i e w of the locales in wh ich they invest . Too often this bureaucratic rationality and efficiency results in a d e a d e n i n g separation of functions, wi th oppress ive conse q u e n c e s that I will discuss shortly. It also often results in abrupt dis investm e n t in o n e region and mass ive disruptive speculat ion in another, each wi th significant c o n s e q u e n c e s for the welfare of p e o p l e in those locales.

T h e realization of the des igners ' plans creates an abstract space of efficiency and Cartesian rationality that often c o m e s to dominate and displace the l ived space of h u m a n m o v e m e n t and interaction:

244 • Chapter S

What tends to disappear is the meaning of places for people. Each place, each city, will receive its social meaning from its location in the hierarchy of a network whose control and rhythm will escape from each place and, even more, from the people in each place. Furthermore, people will be shifted according to the continuous restructuring of an increasingly specialized space. . . . The new space of a world capitalist system, combining the informational and the industrial modes of development, is a space of variable geometry, formed by locations hierarchically ordered in a continuously changing network of flows: flows of capital, labor, elements of production, commodities, information, decisions, and signals. The new urban meaning of the dominant class is the absence of any meaning based on experience. The abstraction of production tends to become total. The new source of power relies on the control of the entire network of information. Space is dissolved into flows: cities become shadows that explode and disappear according to decisions that their dwellers will always ignore. The outer experience is cut off from the inner experience. The new tendential urban meaning is the spatial and cultural separation of people from their production and from their history. (Castells, 1983, p. 314)

(b) T h o u g h city and town g o v e r n m e n t s are seriously constrained by the dominat ion of state and corporate imperat ives , they never the l e s s do make dec i s ions , espec ia l ly about land use and zoning. Dec i s ionmaking structures and processes at the local level , however , often tend to create and exacerbate injustice.

In Chapter 3 I d i scussed h o w pol icy formation in welfare capitalist socie ty tends to b e depol i t i c ized and operates through a relatively c losed c lub of interes t -group bargainers. Such depolit ic ization is perhaps e v e n more typical at the municipal level than at state or national l eve ls . S t e p h e n Elkin argues that in most cities land use dec is ions , the local dec is ions that most affect the spatial e n v i r o n m e n t of the city and its e c o n o m i c life, are a semipr ivate process involving a triangle of capitalist d e v e l o p e r s , city bureaucrats, and e l e c t e d city officials. The assumptions and interests of t h e s e groups set the basic parameters for such dec is ions , wh ich are rout ine , usually u n q u e s t i o n e d and rarely publicly discussed. This routine framework, Elkin argues, is usually biased toward growth and d o w n t o w n d e v e l o p m e n t , emphas i z ing big, flashy, vis ible projects. The empirical record s h o w s , however , that land use dec is ionmaking biased in these ways contr ibutes to increasing inequal i t ies (see Elkin, 1987, chap. 5; cf. Logan and Molotch , 1987, chaps. 3 and 4).

W i t h the basic resources and institutional structure already g iven , interest groups in the city v ie for and bargain over the distributive effects of city projects . Because s o m e interests are be t ter able to organize than others, have eas ier access to the major dec is ionmakers and their information, and so on, this political process usually e i ther reproduces initial distribu-


t ions or increases inequal i t ies (Harvey, 1973, pp . 7 3 - 7 9 ; Elkin, 1987, pp. 9 3 - 1 0 2 ) .

T h e framework of privatized land use dec i s ionmaking according to unq u e s t i o n e d rout ines , coup led with interest -group bargaining over the c o n s e q u e n c e s of apply ing the framework, illustrates one of several "hidden m e c h a n i s m s " that David Harvey (1973, esp . chap. 3) argues produce and reproduce social inequal i t ies and oppress ion in cit ies. Policies to improve the l ives and opportunit ies of the poor, the marginal ized, or those o t h e r w i s e d isadvantaged will have little effect unless these h i d d e n m e c h a nisms are unders tood and restructured. T w o other such m e c h a n i s m s that Harvey c i tes are location and adaptability.

T h e location of land use projects often has serious redistributional impact on res idents of a city. S o m e , usually the poor and unorganized, are d i sp laced by projects . T h e location of product ion facilities, publ ic serv i c e s , transportation facilities, hous ing , and shopping areas affects different sectors of the populat ion differently. Proximity to o n e facility may benef i t s o m e , by g iv ing them easier or less costly access to a good or activity. Proximity to another kind of facility, on the other hand, may disadvantage s o m e by impos ing i n c o n v e n i e n c e s such as dirt, noise , or envi ronmenta l danger. Al though a person's o w n material situation may remain constant , his or her life opportunit ies may never the le s s change significantly b e c a u s e of surrounding changes (Harvey, 1973, pp. 5 6 - 6 3 ) . The losses caused by urban changes may involve not only monetary burdens , i n c o n v e n i e n c e , and loss of access to resources and services , but also the loss of the very e n v i r o n m e n t that he lps def ine a person's s ense of self or a group's space and culture (Elkin, 1987, p. 90).

Another h idden m e c h a n i s m of redistribution, according to Harvey , is the different adaptabil ity of groups: s o m e groups are better able than others to adjust to change in the urban env ironment . Thus o n e group's adjustm e n t often lags b e h i n d another's , usually increasing inequal i ty b e t w e e n t h e m . S o m e t i m e s the disparity is caused by differences in initial l eve l s of material resources . Just as often, however , the differences in ability to adjust have their sources in culture or life style (Harvey, 1973, pp . 62—64). Poverty , exploitat ion, marginalization, and cultural imperial ism often d e t e r m i n e that those less able to adapt to urban changes are m o r e often required to do so (Elkin, 1987, p. 86).

(c) I have already n o t e d h o w bureaucratic rationality i m p o s e s an abstract space of order and function over the l ived space of mul t iuse interaction. T h e t w e n t i e t h century has s e e n a steady increase in the functionali-zation and segregat ion of urban space. T h e earliest separation was the creation of residential districts spatially separated from manufacturing, retail, en ter ta inment , c o m m e r c e , and government . Recent decades , however , h a v e seen a rapid increase in the spatial segregat ion of each of these

246 • Chapter B

o ther functions from o n e another. Each sort of activity occurs in its o w n wal led enc laves , dist inctly cut off from the others .

T h e separation of functions in urban space reduces the vitality of c i t ies , making city life more boring, meaning les s , and dangerous . D o w n t o w n districts bust l ing wi th p e o p l e in the day hours b e c o m e eer i ly d e s e r t e d at night , w h e n p e o p l e swarm to the indoor shopping mall, wh ich , desp i t e the best efforts of des igners , is boring and frenetic. Residential ne ighborhoods find few p e o p l e on the streets e i ther day or night, b e c a u s e there is n o w h e r e to go and not m u c h to look at wi thout appearing to encroach on the privacy of others .

This separation of functions augments oppress ion and dominat ion in several ways . T h e territorial separation of workplaces from residential c o m m u n i t i e s d iv ides the interest of working p e o p l e b e t w e e n the shop floor, on the o n e hand, and c o n s u m e r and ne ighborhood concerns , on the other. W h i l e corporate and state bureaucrats construct their bird's-eye v i e w of c i t ies and regions , c i t izens are unable to e n g a g e in significant collec t ive act ion on the same scale, because the separation of h o m e and work p r e v e n t s t h e m from construct ing a larger pattern.

Territorial separation of re s idences from shopping centers , manufacturing, publ ic plazas, and so on has specific damaging c o n s e q u e n c e s for the l ives of w o m e n , especia l ly mothers . A ful l-t ime h o m e m a k e r and mother w h o l ives in a central city apartment within walking distance of stores, restaurants, offices, parks, and social services has a life very different from that of the w o m a n w h o spends her day in a suburban house surrounded for mi les by only houses and schools . The separation of urban functions forces h o m e m a k i n g w o m e n into isolation and boredom. It also makes their w o r k — s h o p p i n g , occupy ing chi ldren, taking them to activit ies, go ing to doctors , dent i s t s , insurance agents , and so o n — m o r e difficult and t ime consuming . To the d e g r e e that they retain primary responsibi l i ty for children and o ther d e p e n d e n t family m e m b e r s , working w o m e n too suffer from the spatial separation of urban functions, w h i c h often l imits their work opportuni t i e s to the few usually low-paying clerical and service jobs c lose to res ident ial locations, or e l s e forces t h e m to traverse large spans of city space each day in a triangle or square, from h o m e to child care to work to grocery store to chi ld care to h o m e (Hayden , 1983, pp. 4 9 - 5 9 ) . The separation of functions and the c o n s e q u e n t n e e d for transportation to get to jobs and serv ices also contr ibutes directly to the increased marginality of o ld p e o p l e , poor p e o p l e , d isabled p e o p l e , and others w h o because of life s ituation as we l l as l imited access to resources are less able to m o v e i n d e p e n d e n t l y in w i d e areas.

O n e aspect of the normat ive ideal of city life, I have said, is a social differentiation wi thout exclus ion. Groups will differentiate by affinities,

•1


but the borders will b e undec idable , and there will b e m u c h overlap and intermingl ing . O n e of the most disturbing aspects of contemporary urban life is t h e d e p t h and frequency of avers ive behavior w h i c h occurs wi th in it. Group segregat ion is produced by aversive percept ions that deprecate s o m e groups , def ining t h e m as ent ire ly other, to b e s h u n n e d and avoided. Banks, real estate firms, city officials, newspapers , and res idents all prom o t e an image of ne ighborhoods as places w h e r e only certain kinds of p e o p l e b e l o n g and others do not, d e e p l y reinforcing avers ive racism and the m e c h a n i s m by w h i c h s o m e groups are constructed as the d e p i s e d Others. Zon ing regulat ion enforces class segregat ion, and to a large d e g r e e racial segregat ion as wel l , by, for example , exc luding multifamily dwel l ings from prosperous ne ighborhoods and e v e n from entire municipal i t ies . T h e s e group exc lus ions produce the condit ions for harrassment of or v iol e n c e against any persons found w h e r e they do not "belong." T h e m y t h of n e i g h b o r h o o d c o m m u n i t y , of c o m m o n values and life style , I have arg u e d , fuels such exc lus ions .

T h e separation perhaps most far reaching in its effect on social jus t i ce is the legal separation of munic ipal i t ies t h e m s e l v e s . W h i l e social and e c o n o m i c proces se s have nearly obl i terated any dist inction b e t w e e n urban and rural life, and corporate and bureaucratic planning e n c o m p a s s e s h u g e metropol i tan reg ions , these same regions include scores of legally distinct munic ipal i t ies , wi th their o w n local g o v e r n m e n t s , ordinances , and publ ic services . To avoid the ugl iness , complexi ty , and dangers of contemporary city life, and often to avoid having to interact wi th certain kinds of p e o p l e , m a n y p e o p l e seek c o m m u n i t y in the suburbs and small towns outs ide the city. T h e town's smal lness and the fact that it is legally au tonomous to make its o w n ordinances within the limits of state and federal regulation p r o d u c e t h e i l lusion of local control. In fact the separation of towns renders t h e m power l e s s against corporate and bureaucratic dominat ion .

T h e legal and social separation of city and suburbs , moreover , contributes to social injustice. A direct relation of exploitation exists b e t w e e n most large American cit ies and their suburbs. Res idents of the suburbs work in the city, u se the city's serv ices , and enjoy its life but , e x c e p t in those rare cases w h e r e there is a city income or sales tax, pay no taxes to the city. Suburban municipal i t ies usually benefit from their proximity to the city, but their legal a u t o n o m y ensures that they pay little or nothing for t h e s e benef i ts (Lowi , 1969, p. 197; Harvey, 1973, p. 94).

By m e a n s of their legal autonomy, s o m e municipal i t ies exc lude certain kinds of p e o p l e and certain kinds of activities from their borders. Because local g o v e r n m e n t s genera te funds to pay for local services by taxing resid e n t s , s o m e towns and cit ies have far bet ter schools and services than others . Because each municipal i ty runs its o w n schools , pol ice , fire d e -

248 • Chapter 8

partment , and o ther publ ic services , there is often an unjust and ineffic ient imbalance in the dens i ty and quality of services a m o n g different areas.

In the context of a large-scale and i n t e r d e p e n d e n t e c o n o m i c sys tem under the control of private capital, "autonomy b e c o m e s a lead w e i g h t for the majority of c i t ies , wi th only the most affluent towns able to create pr iv i lege from their formal i n d e p e n d e n c e . The political au tonomy of p laces , as wel l as the planning p o w e r this entails , reproduces and exaggerates the inequal i t ies b e t w e e n places rather than leve l ing t h e m " (Logan and Molotch , 1987, p. 152).

T h e s e injustices have their primary source in the structural organization of dec i s ionmaking . W h i l e all of the prob lems of city life I have disc u s s e d in this sect ion involve distributive issues , the full ex tent of oppres sion and dominat ion they involve can b e unders tood only by cons ider ing cul ture and dec i s ionmaking structures as they affect city geography, activit ies , and distributions.

EMPOWERMENT WITHOUT AUTONOMY

I have agreed wi th many participatory democrat ic theorists that democratization of governmenta l and corporate dec i s ionmaking is necessary to u n d e r m i n e dominat ion and oppress ion. Many theorists of participatory d e m o c r a c y identify such democrat izat ion with the decentral izat ion of urban dec i s ionmaking and the creation of small autonomous local c o m m u nit ies . In this conc lud ing sect ion I shall cha l lenge this m o d e l of d e m o c racy, and argue instead that social just ice involving equality a m o n g groups w h o recogn ize and affirm o n e another in their specificity can bes t b e reali zed in our society through large regional governments with m e c h a n i s m s for represen t ing i m m e d i a t e ne ighborhoods and towns .

To so lve the prob lems of the dominat ion of cities by state and corporate bureaucrac ies , Gerald Frug (1980) r e c o m m e n d s legal, e co no m i c , and social reforms that w o u l d ves t in municipal i t ies autonomous local control over most o f the activity within their borders. Decentra l i z ing p o w e r and giving real power to cit ies requires , in his v iew, the municipal izat ion of control over e c o n o m i c enterprise; the split b e t w e e n private and publ ic corporate p o w e r should b e transcended, and cit ies should have real autono m o u s control over the major product ive , financial, and commerc ia l entities within their borders. As a first s tep , Frug recommends that control over banking and insurance institutions b e turned over to c i t ies , wh ich thereby w o u l d gain real power over i n v e s t m e n t decis ions and the direction of bu i ld ing and d e v e l o p m e n t , as well as revenue sources in profit-making inst i tut ions. T h e purpose of such e c o n o m i c control, h o w e v e r , is to decentra l i ze state power , and create au tonomous political ent i t ies inter-

City Life and D i f f e r e n c e • 2 4 9

media te b e t w e e n the individual and the state, which provide individuals the opportuni ty for g e n u i n e participation and sel f -determination.

Murray Bookchin , to take another example , also calls for the municipalization of e c o n o m i c activity and the creation of small, decentra l ized , aut o n o m o u s local c o m m u n i t i e s , w h e r e p e o p l e exper i ence the rewards of citi zensh ip through face-to-face interaction, discussion, and dec is ionmaking. T h e t e n d e n c y toward urban sprawl, corporate internationalism, and political central ization and bureaucratization should be reversed. Municipal p o w e r should b e inst i tutionalized in a system of small-scale organic c o m muni t i e s l inked only by confederat ive a g r e e m e n t s , over which no central state p o w e r is sovere ign (Bookchin, 1987, pp. 2 4 5 - 7 0 ) . S o m e o ther writers do not call for c o m p l e t e l y abol ishing the state, but never the l e s s take decentra l i zed local a u t o n o m y as a priority (e .g . , Sunste in , 1989, pp . 2 4 -26; Elkin , 1987, chap. 7).

T h e r e is m u c h c o m p e l l i n g about such visions, wh ich are c o m m o n a m o n g democrat i c theorists critical of the hierarchy, expert i sm, and bureaucracy of contemporary advanced industrial society. Democrat izat ion requires the d e v e l o p m e n t of grass-roots institutions of local discussion and dec i s ionmaking . Such democrat izat ion is meaningless unless the deci s ions inc lude participation in e c o n o m i c power. Inves tment and land use will often cause or reinforce oppress ion w h e n they are dominated by private corporate interests (see Elkin, 1987, pp. 174-80) . N e v e r t h e l e s s , I wish to ques t ion the c o m m o n identification of democracy with decentral ized p o w e r v e s t e d in autonomous local communi t i e s . It is necessary to dis t inguish local e m p o w e r m e n t from local autonomy.

Writers w h o call for the creation of decentral ized municipal units with legal and e c o n o m i c a u t o n o m y rarely define precise ly what they mean by autonomy. For the sake o f this discussion I will g ive it the fol lowing strong meaning: An agent , w h e t h e r individual or col lect ive , is au tonomous to the d e g r e e that it has sole and final authority to d e c i d e on specific i ssues and act ions, and no other agent has the right to interfere. Auto no m y impl ies sovere ignty . A vision of decentra l i zed democracy c o m p o s e d of small m u nicipal it ies exercis ing autonomous local control, then, would mean at least pr ima facie that c i t izens in each municipal i ty d e c i d e their form of governm e n t , what their rules and laws are, h o w their land and e c o n o m i c resources will b e used and inves ted , the character and extent of their publ ic serv ices , and so on.

There are serious p r o b l e m s , however , with this vision o f decentra l i zed d e m o c r a c y , which e n g a g e the d e e p e s t issues of social just ice . I have already d i scussed h o w the exist ing autonomy of municipal zoning functions in many munic ipal i t ies to exc lude l o w - i n c o m e p e o p l e as we l l as the jobs they might wish to have c lose to h o m e . T h e autonomous choice by many munic ipal i t ies not to run publ ic transportation sys t ems also e x c l u d e s or

2 5 0 • C h a p t e r S

isolates poor and old p e o p l e . T h e autonomous choices of suburban c o m muni t i e s a l low those c o m m u n i t i e s to exploit the benefits of the city without provid ing anything in return.

If the w h o l e soc iety w e r e to be organized as a confederation of autonomous munic ipal i t ies , what would prevent the d e v e l o p m e n t of large-scale inequal i ty and injustice a m o n g c o m m u n i t i e s , and thereby the oppress ion of individuals w h o do not l ive in the more priv i leged or more powerful c o m m u n i t i e s ? Can an adequate level of social and welfare services b e guaranteed for all individuals , for example , if o n e increases local autono m y (cf. Frankel , 1987, pp. 34—49)? Greater local autonomy wou ld be likely to p r o d u c e e v e n m o r e exaggerated forms of the inequi t ies that current decentral izat ion produces: the concentrat ion of n e e d y p e o p l e in those locales that provide the more extens ive social and welfare services , putt ing an increased burden on them w h i c h their product ive and resource base cannot m e e t , whi l e o ther municipal i t ies turn their backs on what they do not cons ider their problem. What , moreover , is to prevent the e c o n o m i c exploitat ion of o n e municipal ity by another? II o n e municipality has a large source of water in an o therwise arid farming district, and the others have nothing that municipal ity wants in return for use of the water, they are likely to pay dearly, both in m o n e y and in political indep e n d e n c e .

T h e p r o b l e m s of a tomism are the same w h e t h e r the atoms are individuals, h o u s e h o l d s , or cit ies . At least s ince H o b b e s it has b e e n clear that wi thout a sovere ign authority to mediate and regulate relations b e t w e e n agents , there is nothing to prevent dominat ion, exploitation, and oppres sion. Bookchin's suggest ion that a set of marketl ike contracts or confeder-ative a g r e e m e n t s can prevent such dominat ion and oppress ion p r e s u m e s s o m e t h i n g e v e n less true of municipal i t ies than of individuals: that they arc equal in power , capacity, and resources . W h e r e there are d iverse and unequal ne ighborhoods , towns , and cit ies , w h o s e res idents m o v e in and out of o n e another's locales and interact in complex w e b s of exchange , on ly a sovere ign authority w h o s e jurisdict ion inc ludes them all can med i ate their relations justly.

I do not m e a n to suggest that there is no room at all for local autonomy as I have def ined it. Certainly there is reason for a w i d e latitude of individual a u t o n o m y — a sphere of dec is ions wh ich individuals have the sole right to make , wi thout interference from other agents , inc luding state authority. There is also reason for col lect ivi t ies to have such autonomy over a certain range of dec is ions and activities. Clubs , product ion facilities, stores, polit ical parties, ne ighborhood c o m m i t t e e s , and towns all should have a u t o n o m y over certain actions. For both individuals and col lect ivities o n e shou ld apply a modif ied Millian test. Agents , w h e t h e r individual or co l lec t ive , have the right to sole authority over their actions only if the


actions and their c o n s e q u e n c e s (a) do not harm others , (b) do not inhibit the ability of individuals to d e v e l o p and exercise their capacities within the l imits of mutual respect and cooperat ion, and (c) do not d e t e r m i n e condi t ions under wh ich other agents are c o m p e l l e d to act. T h e s e condit ions make the l imits of autonomy narrow indeed—narrower , I suggest , for col lect iv i t ies than for individuals . For the actions of co l lect ive agents are m o r e likely to affect o ther agents in these ways than are the actions of individuals .

T h e range of a u t o n o m o u s action defined by t h e s e condit ions is n e c e s sarily m u c h narrower than the range our current legal sys tem grants to private corporations and municipal i t ies . It is also m u c h narrower than that r e c o m m e n d e d or impl i ed by most theorists of decentra l ized democracy . Such l imitation of au tonomy n e e d not b e a limitation of f reedom or power , h o w e v e r , prov ided the bodies regulat ing the actions of individuals and col lect iv i t ies are democrat ic and participatory. The principle is s imple: w h e r e v e r actions affect a plurality of agents in the ways I have specif ied, all those agents should participate in dec id ing the actions and their condit ions.

T h e writers I have referred to call for decentral izat ion and local autono m y as a means of counteract ing hierarchical dominat ion, al ienation, and p o w e r l e s s n e s s . But it is democratizat ion that confronts those prob lems , and democrat izat ion does not entail decentral izat ion into small units of a u t o n o m o u s local control. Governmenta l authority should b e c o m e m o r e e m p o w e r i n g but also m o r e encompass ing than municipal g o v e r n m e n t is now.

A u t o n o m y is a c losed concept , wh ich emphas izes primarily exclusion, the right to k e e p others out and to prevent t h e m from interfering in deci s ions and actions. A u t o n o m y refers to privacy, in just the s ense that corporations are private in our current legal sys tem. It should b e dist ing u i s h e d from empowerment, which I define as participation of an agent in dec i s ionmaking through an effective vo ice and vote . Justice requires that each person should have the inst i tut ional ized means to participate effect ive ly in the dec i s ions that affect her or his action and the condit ions of that action. E m p o w e r m e n t is an o p e n concept , a concept of public i ty rather than privacy. Agents w h o are e m p o w e r e d with a vo ice to discuss e n d s and means of co l lec t ive life, and w h o have institutionalized m e a n s of participating in those dec i s ions , w h e t h e r directly or through representat ives , o p e n together onto a set of publ ics w h e r e none has autonomy.

E m p o w e r m e n t means , at m i n i m u m , expanding the range of dec is ions that are m a d e through democrat ic processes . E v e n if noth ing e l se c h a n g e d about the American political sys tem, for example , ex tens ive d e mocratization w o u l d occur if the regulations and policies current ly m a d e by e x e c u t i v e governmenta l authority w e r e o p e n e d to democrat ic partici-

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pation. If the use of major capital resources , to take a different example , w e r e d e c i d e d through discussion and democrat ic dec is ionmaking, this wou ld represent a major change in p o w e r relations.

D i s m a n t l i n g the bureaucratic hierarchies of governmenta l and corporate p o w e r and bringing dec is ions such as t h e s e under democrat ic control, h o w e v e r , does also m e a n that participation must b e c o m e m o r e i m m e d i ate, access ib le , and local. Theorists of decentral ized local democracy are right in their convict ion that democrat ic participation means that authority cannot b e concentrated in a center , far away from the majority of p e o ple w h o are affected by it. It does mean that there must b e local institutions, right w h e r e p e o p l e l ive and work, through which they participate in the making of regulations. Thus , along with many other theorists of participatory democracy , I imagine ne ighborhood assembl ies as a basic unit of democrat i c participation (cf. Elkin, 1987, p. 176; Bay, 1981 , pp. 1 5 2 -60; Jacobs, chap. 21), wh ich might b e c o m p o s e d of representat ives from workplaces , block counci l s , local churches and clubs, and so on as wel l as individuals . D e s p i t e my earlier criticism of his communitar ianism, I find Barber's proposals about the role and functioning of such assembl ies very good (Barber, 1984, pp. 2 6 9 - 7 2 ) . Their purpose is to d e t e r m i n e local priorities and pol icy opinions wh ich their representat ives should voice and defend in regional assembl ies . T h e jurisdict ion of ne ighborhood assemblies might correspond to exist ing municipal i t ies , and there might b e several in large metropol i tan areas. But in such a s c h e m e of restructured democracy municipal i t ies as w e n o w know them would cease to have sovere ign authority.

In order to so lve the prob lems of cities I identified in the previous section, the lowes t level of governmenta l p o w e r should b e regional (Lowi, 1969, chaps . 9 and 10; Harvey , 1973, pp. 110-11) . I c o n c e i v e a region as both an e c o n o m i c unit and a territory that p e o p l e identify as their l iving space . A region is the space across wh ich p e o p l e c o m m o n l y travel to work, s h o p , play, visit their friends, and take the chi ldren on errands, the span of a day trip. It is the range of te levis ion and radio transmission. T h e expanse of a region thus varies wi th culture, geography, e c o n o m i c base , and primary m o d e s of transportation. Regions usually have a city or c luster of c i t ies as a focus of their activity and identity, but inc lude less d e n s e l y populated suburban and rural areas. W h i l e hardly economica l ly self-sufficient, regions never the l e s s count as units of e c o n o m i c interdep e n d e n c e , the geographical territory in wh ich p e o p l e both l ive and work, in w h i c h major distribution occurs, m u c h of it of products m a d e in the region.

Not e v e n regional g o v e r n m e n t s should have c o m p l e t e autonomy, but their p o w e r w o u l d b e ex tens ive , matching or e x c e e d i n g the present p o w ers of local municipal i t ies; powers of legislation, regulation, and taxation,

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significant control over land use and capital inves tment , and control over the des ign and administration of publ ic services . Such regional governm e n t should b e c o m p o s e d of representat ives from ne ighborhood assembl ies , w h i c h hold those representat ives accountable . Ne ighborhoods and workplaces w o u l d have cons iderable powers of i m p l e m e n t i n g regional pol icy and adminis ter ing publ ic services . At the level of regional governm e n t , finally, the sys t em of representat ion for oppressed groups that I r e c o m m e n d e d in Chapter 7 wou ld operate , Workplaces , ne ighborhood a s s e m b l i e s , and o ther co l lect ives might choose to have group-based cauc u s e s , but at the regional leve l group representat ion wou ld b e guaranteed by right. T h e s e provis ions of local participation in the discussion and imp lementa t ion of pol icy wou ld e m p o w e r individuals and social groups at the same t i m e that pol icy w o u l d regulate perhaps mill ions of p e o p l e in a w i d e jurisdict ion.

This d iscuss ion of the levels and forms of g o v e r n m e n t raises the q u e s t ion of w h e t h e r state and federal g o v e r n m e n t as they currently exist in the U n i t e d States are appropriate forms. Many metropol i tan regions n o w spill into several states , and the fact that a region is ruled by different state laws often leads to contradict ion and irrationality. It wou ld take us too far afield to cons ider this ques t ion of the role or appropriateness of state and national g o v e r n m e n t . T h e arguments I have made about the dangers of aut o n o m y w o u l d s e e m to indicate, however , that several l eve ls of governm e n t are necessary to coordinate social relations and promote just ice . N e v e r t h e l e s s , jus t ice might require a fundamental reorganization of state and national g o v e r n m e n t .

B e s i d e s making rules and laws, the primary functions of regional gove r n m e n t w o u l d b e p lanning and the provision of services . Only regionally scaled p lanning and service provision can solve the problems of domination and oppress ion wh ich typify urban life today.

D e m o c r a t i z e d regional- level i n v e s t m e n t dec i s ionmaking w o u l d e n d corporate m o n o p o l y of the product ive capital of the region. W i t h control over many i n v e s t m e n t dec i s ions , regions could plan to m e e t their industrial, commerc ia l , hous ing , transportation, and recreational d e v e l o p m e n t n e e d s , not wi th an e y e to private profit for a b s e n t e e owners , but wi th an e y e to what is n e e d e d and useful. In democrat ized regional planning many d i s a g r e e m e n t s and conflicts w o u l d often no doubt occur a m o n g d iverse sectors , groups , and interests about h o w best to use large capital resources , and the dec is ions w o u l d perhaps not always b e the wises t or most rational. But it is unl ikely that w h e n a region already has five h u g e shopp ing malls , a democrat ic publ ic w o u l d d e c i d e to construct another right across the h ighway from o n e of t h e m , wi th the primary purpose of drawing bus iness away from it. Nor w o u l d democrat ic i n v e s t m e n t p lanning b e likely to result in the construct ion of additional luxury office space in a city

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wi th a surplus of offices. Broad democrat ic planning is more likely to result in rational and just distributive dec i s ions , that is, than h u n d r e d s of a u t o n o m o u s publ ic and private units a t tempt ing to maximize their perc e i v e d interests .

Regional - l eve l service provision can solve many of the prob lems of injust ice that I have identif ied as currently e n d e m i c to urban life. A primary task of regional g o v e r n m e n t would b e to provide regionally (and perhaps nationally) s tandardized services many of wh ich are n o w paid for and run by individual municipal i t ies: schools , libraries, fire and pol ice protect ion, health and welfare services , h ighways , transportation, sanitation, and so on. As I m e n t i o n e d earlier, wh i l e standards and pol icy w o u l d b e regionally based , t h e y w o u l d b e adminis tered locally. Regional standardization of serv ices w o u l d build on a trend already exempl i f ied in our society by publ ic transportation sys tems and health maintenance organizations. Regionally run publ ic services maximize efficiency in those sys tems . It is silly and artificial for fifteen small municipal i t ies to maintain their o w n fire d e p a r t m e n t s w h e n each uses its three trucks only twice a year. But the major benef i t of regionally based publ ic services is that they best p r o m o t e just ice . Regional ly standardized and regionally f inanced schools , for example , w o u l d reduce the motivation for "white flight" and the resultant degradat ion of schools in the inner city. Such regionally adminis tered schools should go toge ther wi th school counci ls that seriously e m p o w e r parents and teachers to make pol icy for their own schools (see Bastian e t al. , 1986, chap. 6). Regional democratical ly d e v e l o p e d and adminis tered transportation services w o u l d reduce the isolation of certain populat ions , and t h e r e b y r e d u c e their marginah'zation.

Regional p lanning and service provision would have to at tend to the p r o b l e m s of structural injustice that Harvey (1973) discusses: the fact that the location of facilities and services can advantage s o m e and disadvantage others; the fact that s o m e groups may b e bet ter able to adapt to urban change than others; and the fact that s o m e groups may have m o r e p o w e r and inf luence than others . W i t h traditional forms of interest -group bargaining and brokering there is no reason to think that regional pol ic ies w o u l d fare any better in counter ing structural injustices than current city pol ic ies . But wi th restructured processes of democrat ic participation that inc lude provis ion for the effective and specific representat ion of oppres sed and disadvantaged groups, such injustices wou ld b e m u c h less l ikely to b e reproduced as a matter of course.

To c o n c l u d e , cons ider s o m e principles that regional representat ives ought to follow. First, regions should promote liberty. Major capital inv e s t m e n t dec i s ions , d e v e l o p m e n t , construct ion, and planning dec is ions , I have said, should b e publ ic , democrat ic , participatory, and regional in s cope . This d o e s not prec lude any and all manner of "private enter-


pr ise"—indiv iduals and col lect ives engag ing in a diversity of activit ies of their choos ing for ends they privately d e t e r m i n e . G o v e r n m e n t at whate v e r l e v e l — w h e t h e r regional, state, or nat ional—should protect and e n courage the l iberty of individuals and co l lect ives to do what they choose wi th in the l imits of regulation and planning decis ions . Individuals and co l l ec t ives should not only b e able to do what they want, but they should b e able to do it where t h e y want , as long as their activity d o e s not harm other agents or inhibit their ability to d e v e l o p and exerc ise their capacit ies . This m e a n s a reformation in the m e a n i n g and function of zoning (cf. H a y d e n , 1983, pp . 1 7 7 - 8 2 ; Senne t t , 1970, chap. 4). T h e ideal of different iated city life m e a n s in principle that p e o p l e should not have p o w e r or authority to e x c l u d e persons or activit ies from publ ic territory. P e o p l e should b e able to set up a store or a restaurant, build whatever dwe l l ing they wish , set up a product ion facility, make a park, operate a rel igious c e n t e r or counse l ing service for any populat ion, wi thout zoning regulat ions that l imit their location choices . Potential ne ighbors must b e free to d iscourage t h e m , but they must not have the authority of law to exc lude u n w a n t e d activit ies or construct ions.

S e c o n d , as a matter of principle , regional planning dec is ions should b e a imed at min imiz ing segregat ion and functionalization, and fostering a divers i ty of groups and activit ies a longs ide of and interspersed wi th o n e another. Fos ter ing mul t iuse ne ighborhoods maximizes c o n v e n i e n t access to goods , serv ices , and publ ic spaces for res idents , and thereby m i n i m i z e s s o m e of the oppress ions of marginalization. Fostering diversity of space and land use , moreover , rather than the functionalization of space, t ends to make any facility m o r e attractive and human. A product ion facility situated near r e s i d e n c e s , a day-care center , and a publ ic park is more likely to regulate its pol lut ing effects and make its bui lding moderate ly attract ive than o n e out of s ight in a suburban industrial park, wh ich invisibly e n d a n g e r s the health of nearby res idents .

Regional ly based publ ic policy, planning, and service provis ion, finally, should b e c o m m i t t e d to fostering publ ic spaces—assembly halls, indoor and outdoor plazas, w i d e s idewalks , recreation facilities and parks. Such spaces should b e o p e n to all activit ies, except perhaps se l l ing things , and c losed to vehicular traffic. There must b e easy access to their use , wi th permi t s required only for the sake of safety and fairness, so that, for examp l e , o n e group d o e s not dominate a w h o l e park or plaza day after day, S p e e c h m a k i n g , sign-carrying, and other m o d e s of express ion should b e poss ib le at any t i m e , wi thout a permit , as should the a s sembly of small groups .

In this chapter I have crit icized a predominant t e n d e n c y in participatory democrat ic theory to d e n y or think away social difference by appeal to an

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ideal of c o m m u n i t y . I have tried to fill out the implications of a polit ics of difference by env is ion ing an ideal of city life as a b e i n g together of strangers in o p e n n e s s to group difference. This ideal cannot b e i m p l e m e n t e d as such. Social change arises from polit ics , not phi losophy. Ideals are a crucial s t ep in emancipatory polit ics , however , because t h e y d is lodge our assumpt ion that what is g iven is necessary. T h e y offer standpoints from which to crit ic ize the g i v e n , and inspiration for imagining alternatives .

City Life and Difference

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