Soviet Strategy To DerailUS INF Deployment

An Intelligence Assessment

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAMRELEASE AS SANITIZED

1999

This assessment was prepared by, Office of Soviet Analysis.

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. SOVA.

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Soviet Strategy To DerailUS INF Deployment

Key JudgmentsIn/in-motion arailableas tif .!I rebIll0f.l . 1981was used in this rennet.

In attempting to forestall US deployments of intermediate-range nuclearforces (INF) in Europe scheduled to begin late this year, thc Soviets willcontinue a complex strategy of inducements and threats designed toinfluence NATO governments. particularly West Germany before itsMarch elections. With time growing short. thcir near-term objectiveevidently is to pressure NATO to delay the deployments and to move fromits zero option proposal.

Moscow has begun an intensive effort to brief West European governmentson the new Soviet proposal for a subcciling on missile launchers in Europe.Thc subcciling would result in substantial reductions in the number ofSoviet medium-range ballistic missile launchers opposite NATO but wouldbe linked to the number of French and 13ritish ballistic missile launchersand would preclude the deployment in Europe of US INF missiles. The So-viets have argued that their new proposal demonstrates "flexibility... insharp contrast to US "intractability" in adhering to its zero optionproposal. They also have hinted in -vague terms to Vv'est Europeangovernments of certain "concessions" they might adont at_the (NEnegotiations in return for greater US flexibility..

At the 53TC time. Moscow has warned NATO of the serious consequencesshould thc US position remain unchanged in Geneva and the United StatesProceed with its deployme.ots. Such consequences probably include: thclifting of their unilateral SS-20 moratorium. deployment of additionalSS-20s in Europe. and the development of nem: cruise and ballistic misfilesfor depl:iymcnt opposite NATO. Thus Moscow is trying to persuade theEuropeans that their security would be better served by its proposal for amissile subcciling than by US I N 1 deployments offset by correspondingSoviet counterdeploymentS

Along with these diplomatic moves. the Soviets have actively promoted thcEuropean "peace movement" through aggressive rfi-opaganda and covertactivities. They have focused their efforts primarily on those countriesscheduled to base the new NATO missiles. with thc chief emphasis onVest Germany. Thcir campaign covers a whole spectrum of activities.-

from overt efforts to create a fear of nuclear war to covert measures.including forgeries anti nicinforimoion. to put NATO governments in thewors(possible light

Si

S 83-10013.k.Febtuatt 1941

Should US dcploymcnts begin without "accr.ptablc– progrcss in the talks.the Sovicts probably would continuc to negotiate. but on a diffcrcnt basis—the Soviet side then would offcr to trade off its "ncw – symems in cxchangcfor US INF systems. Neverthelcss the Soviets probably hope that thesituation will not dctcrioratc to thc point whcrc they would find itnecessary to counter NATO's deployments with hundreds of their ownmissilcs. Having acknowledged in Geneva that they cxpcct NATO toprocccd with its plans, they must have seriously contemplated a negotiatcdoutcome in which NATO is allowed some Icvel of deployment. Given theirparticular concern over thc Pershing II, thc Soviets might continuc to callfor a ban on it, while grudgingly accepting somc level of GLCMdeployment—albeit sharply reduced from the planned 464 launchers. Inreturn, they probably would mcrcly rcitcratc their missile subccilingproposal. In fact, they could insist that any US GLCM deployment(augmenting the French and British missile launchcrsi be offset bydeployments of additional Soviet missile launchers

By late 1983 Moscow should be able to asscss whether an ( N I' agreementis possiblc. If it secs little prospect for one and is convinced that the NATOdeployments will begin- as scheduled in . Dcc .embcr 1983. it probably willbegin implementing the military countermeasures foreshadowed lastMarch by Brczhncv and more recently by Andropov. In his 21 Decemberaddrcss, the new General Secretary pledged to deploy a new long-rangecruise missile if Washington proceeds with cruise missile deployment. Thisresponse could be in the form of sea-launched cruise misstic deploy mcnt offUS shores as well as ground-launched cruise missile dcploytncnt oppositeNATO. Thc Soviets also could choose to develop a new IRBM morecapable than the SS-20 for deployment against Western Europe.

Moscow almost certainly would accompany such military moves with ash3rply increased effort in covert activitics in the five INF-basing coun-tries. It probably would feel less constrained than before in prpmotingdemonstrations and supporting radical peace groups, including some whichmight engage in sabotage against NATO facilitics. Moscow also will useprOpaganda, disinformation, and support to Communist party and frontgroups to increase the. political pain of the governments in the INF-basingcountries. It will hope that this, in turn, will cause those countries to bringpressure on the United States to acccdc to an agreement that caps NATOdcploymcnt at a low level and ',Unit-I-dm reductions in Soviet forces

iv

Ncvcrthcicss. the Sovicts rcalizc that their ovcrt "peacc — campaign inWestcrn Europe has becn their most cffcctivc tactic. They also rccognizethat the peace movcmcnt there has indigenous roots and has acquired amomentum of its own. They will do what they can to nurture it withoutappearing too hcavyhanded.

BLANK PAGE

Contents

Page

Key JudgmentsI. Moscow's View of NATO Deployment PlansII. Soviet Negotiating and Overt Political Strategy Until Now

Negotiating Strategy 2Overt Political Strategy 3

III. Soviet "Active Measures" Against IN F: The Covert Campaign 4

Use of Communist Panics and Front Organizations 4

Financial Support 5Propaganda Guidelines 6Direct Involvement in Peace Groups 6Influence Through Foreign Media and Disinformation 6Effectiveness of Soviet Efforts 7

IV. Soviet Negotiating Options in Mid-to-Late 1983 7Trade-off 7Suspension 8Walkout 8MergerBroader Context 9

V. Future Soviet Political Moves 9VI. What Type of Agreement might Moscow Accept? 9V ii...Possibte Soviet Plans if Negotiations and Political Moves Fail 10

Military Options 10Covert Measures 11

AppendixSignificant INF-Related Events 13

TableThe Missile Balance in Europe 3

vii

-- -Soviet Strategy To DerailUS INF Deployment

A key goal in Moscow's security policy since 1979 hasbeen to derail NATO's plans to deploy the Pershing 11medium-range ballistic missile (MRBMI and theground-launchcd cruise missile (GLCM). By blockingthese deployments. scheduled to begin in late 19$13.the USSR would retain its current predominaticc inintermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) as well asfurther its long-term objective of weakening NATOand dividing Western Europe from the United States.

I. N;oscove's View of NATO Deployment PlansThc Soviets see US deployment of the Pershing 11 andGLCM not only as an effort to upset the theaternuclear balance, but as an attempt to skew the globalnuclear balance in favor of the United States. In theirview, the deployment of these systems—with therange and accuracy to strike hardened targets deep inthe USSR •-wouid change the linkage between the-ater and intercontinental war to the advantage of theUnited Stales. Without resorting to usc of its centralsystems, the United States would be able to threatenthe Soviet homeland, including a portion of theUSSR's strategic forces and its command. cryttrol.and communications network (sce mato

The Soviets see the new US systems as an effectivecounter to their SS-20 1RBM farce and may believethat the scale of NATO's deployments would nullifythe advantage in escalation control that they hadplanned to secure with that force. For example.Moscow would have to consider that NATO. ifconfronted with a conventional attack by the WarsawPact, would be tempted to use its new INF systemsbefore they were destroyed. lithe Soviets believedNATO would usc these systems, they might fed evenmore compelled to launch a theater-wide preemptivestrike

The Soviets probably would expect that Pershing Ilsand GLCMs would be used concurtently and inconjunction with air- and sea-launched Cruise missilcs(ALCMs and SLCMst and strikes by tactical andstrategic aircraft in 3 full-scale nuclear attack. The.

sec the Pershing II as particularly dangerous becauseits short flight time and accuracy would make it athreat to major elements of their command structureand some. of thei .. strategic forces, which would nothave adequate warning time to react. In December

113( MOSCOU

cen..a oic ?eq./mite as the MOM serious threat to itssecurity, even more than the Minuteman Ill ICBM..because of the flight timc factor.

The Soviets probably regard the GLCM as an effec-tive complement to the Pershing II in that it could beused against strategic and tactical targets that are nottime urgent and, when used with sea-launched andair-launched cruise missiles, would severely compli-cate Soviet air defense water' s. The dcplosmcnt ofboth the Pershing 11 and the GLCM would scriousisstrain Soviet capabilities to locate and attack NATO'snuclear means in Europe early in a war. Front aStwicitargeting standpoint, the Ci I.CM would posethe greater problem because it would be dispersedamong five countries, four of them deep in N..0>TO'srear and behind NATO's air defense belt

Soviet Negotiating and Cheri Political StrategyUntil NowThe Soviets have employed a multifaceted strategs toachieve their INF arms control objectives. They clear-ly view the West Euro pean governments as the kc ) toblocking US INF deployments. While negotiatingwith the United States in Geneva. they have carriedout a propaganda and covert action offensive—pri-marily focused on the peace movement in WesternEurope—similar to the one they waged in 1971-78 tostop NATO from deploying enhanced radiation weap-ons. In this campaign the) have tried both overt andcovert means, inducements at well as threats, toexploit anti-INF sentiment in West European govern-ments. Perhaps the most heavyhanded threat intended

for thcsc governments was contained in an interviewBrezhncv had with Dee Spiegel in November 1981. •He said thit "in order to neutralize (NATO's' mobilemissiles it would he necessary Ifor Moscow] to dealretaliatory strikes of groat yield at the supposed areasof their deployment

Later that same month Presidcnt Reagan announcedhis zcro option proposal, which to the Soviets' dismaywas eagerly embraced by Western Euro pe. The tcnac-ity with which Washington adhered to this proposalduring the last negotiating round probably convincedMoscow that a ncve Soviet initiativc was needed tobring further pressure on the Unita States andNATO. Prcvious initiativc-s—fcr example, the unilat-'eral moratorium or. SS-20 dcployment in the westernUSSR and the threat to put thc United States andWestern Europe in an "analogous" position if NATOdeploys new INF systems—have not yielded measur-able results in thc negotiations or in West Europeancapitals

One of Moscow's recent threats was a warning thatNATO's IN F deploymcnt would necessitate the adop-tion of a Soviet launch-on-warning policy. This wasimplied ii . statemcnt issued by the Novosti pressagency on 30 November that apparcntly was aimed atintimidating the West Europeans. This threat. likc theothers, probably was counterproductive because manyWcst European governments saw it as a rather crudeand clumsy attempt to prcssurc them to forgo INFdcploymcnt. r..

Negotiating Strategy. Although Brczhncv had hintcdin an address last October that the SS-20 deploymentmoratorium might be lifted soon. Defense MinisterUstinov. in a 6 December interview. implied that itwai still in cffcct. Whatever the fate of the moratori-um. Moscow has other diplomatic options to cxplorc.particularly with the West Europeans. in the hopethat they will exert pressure or th .- United Statcs tochange its bargaining position C

In an address on 21 December. General SecretaryAndropov officially announced the missile subccilingproposal and emphasized the reductions that would bemade, including "tcns of the latest missiles, known inthe Wcst as SS-20s." The Soviets could reduce their

tauncners to 162 by retiring 250 SS-4s andSS-55 and 81 SS-20s (ace table). This cutback inSS-20s would amount to one-third of the force in theEuropean USSR. Although the Soviets havc thcoption. undcr their proposal, of either dismantlingtheir (scent SS-20 launchers or rerrsn.,;nR thi.24r to t hceastern USSR. thcy have hintcdtwillingness to destroy at least some of them

Tbe Missile Balance in Europe

_ .

Prcscnt Andropoc's Subeciling OM, US Zero Option Proposal

Missilcs....• Warhcads Missiles Warhcads Missile;..-....- WarheadsSoli et 493 979 162 456 0 0SS•20IRBM 243 729 162 416 0 0 -SS-4 MR1361 and SS-5 1R1361_ 250- • . _ 250 o 0 0 — 0- . --NATO 162

_ •162 162 162 162•• . 162

_

Pcrshing 11_64R1364 (US; 0 0 0 0 0- . 0-GLCM 0.1S1 0 0 0 0 0SS-) :RUM (Francel 18. •

18 18 II 18M-20 SLUM (Franctl 80 80_ 80 AO HO AOA-) S1_8611)21(1 6• 64 64 64 64 64•

hc Sovietsharc scnt briefing mcmoranda on thcir sticw of theINF negotiations to most of thc major Wcst Europeancapitals. Thcy probably belicvc thcy will have theirbcst shot at influcncing Alhcd rt,--s t t ;r•os if they appearto he flcriblc in thc ncgotiations

Ch-ert Political Strategy. 1 . tc Sovicts hastc tscgun acampaign to highlight their ncw INF intliatisc andarc intcnsifying thcir cfforts to undcrrnine the NATOdeploymcnt plan as the west Gel omit i lonl clec-tions approto . l• vl;iteit

that aPostponement of Ni bs INF deploymcnt would

. satisfy Moscow for the present. This goal becamemore cstidcnt in carly November. when Brcahncv senta lettcr to West German Chancellor Kohl requestingthat such deploymcnt not proceed automatically be-causc more timc was needcd to achieve results at theINF ncgotiations. After thc Brczhocr funeral,AndropoY madc a similar request in a meeting withWcst German Prcsidcnt Carstens

The Soviets arc directing their efforts primarily to-ward public diplomacy—to avoid risking the adversepublic reaction that would result if covert operationswere exposed: They arc emphasizing thc carrot ofMoscow's negotiating flexibility rather than thc stickof threatenin g retaliation to NATO deployments. AsGromyko% rcccnt visit to Bonn demonstrates. Mos-cow is seeking to prcscnt an image of caution andreason. presumably to !cave the door open for futurecooperation with thc Christian Democrats if thcy winthe elections, and to avoid discrediting the SocialDemocratic Party's attempts to broker an agreementon INF between the United States and the USSR

III. Soviet "'Active Measures" Against INF: TheCovert CampaignIn the past three years, in support of its directdiplomatic cfforts to block deploymcnt of US INF onWcst European soil, Moscow has conducted an ambi-tious campaign to infiltrate, manipulate. and exploitthe European peace movement. To conduct such acampaign. the Soviets rely on a full range of so-called"active mcasurcs"—a term they usc to refer to activi-ties worldwide that arc intended to promote Sovietforeign policy goals but which go beyond traditionaldiplomatic, propaganda, and military means. Many ofthe active measures currently being employed in theanti-INF campaign are adaptations of those thatproved effective in the 1977-78 campaign against the"neutron bomb.- The scope and intensity of theUSSR's public and covert campaign.s can be expectedto g row as scheduled deployment dates approach. Ithas already surpassed the scale of the anti-neutronbomb campaign

Use of Communist Pa cad -P;;;;ar Orrifcizations.Moscow has instructed West European Communistsand the leaders of pro-Soviet international organiza-tions to make the anti-INF campaign their foremostconcern and has provided funding and political guid-ance for their mace movement activity

The Soviets have dirccted West European Communistparties specifically to assume a leading role in orga-nizing antinuclear demonstrations and meetings andto coordinate their efforts with non-Communist peaceactivities. Moscow has beers most active with regardto the INF-basing countries. particularly West Ger-many, the Netherlands, and Belgium. For example:

• CT .the West German Communist Party (DKPL whichtakes direction from Moscow and East Berlin. wasinstrumental in organizing the blockage of thcNATO weapons arsenal in Eladcn-Wuerttcmbcrg on1-8 August 1982 and some subsequent dcmonstra-lions in West Germany.

the WestBerlin Comrnunisr Party (SEW) functions under theclose supervision of the East Germans. The partyhas long contributed an organizational support net-work for local peace activity that apparently wasaccepted cven by groups that are o pposed to theparty ideologically.

The Dutch Communist Party (CPN) maintains rrc-qucnt contact with Moscow and East Berlin and.

• receivesregular and detailed guidance from the Soviets andEast Germans regarding anti-INF activity.

) the hcad ofthe Bchtian Nationa■ Action Lommittec for Peaceand Development (CNIAPD) and three othcr peaceactivists visited East Berlin in latc September 1981at the invitation of thc I lcIsinki-based World Peace

Council ( W PCj. thc major Sovict-controllcd inter-national orcaniz.ation. The CNAPD head latcr dis-cussed plans for the 23 October anti-INF demon-stration in Brussels with officials of the EastGcrman Embassy.

reported that PCI officials visit-ing Moscow in Ca 1981 wcrc subjected to heavypressure to raisc strong opposition to INF andsubsequantiy urdcrod regional party secretaries tostep up anti-INF propaganda and initiatc demon-strations and mzrchcs.

The Sovicts also a rc using their international frontorganizations to initiate and dircct somc of the anti-nuclear activities in Western Europc and Wiry toattract non•Communist participants to lend credibil-ity to Soviet objectives:

The WPC is particularly active in planning andtrying to coordinate and control antinuclear activityin the West. Thc WPC's draft "action program" for1981 provides for several international conk:-cnccs--somc specifically su ggested by thc Soviets.The highlight will be the "Wortd Pcacc Assembly"planned for 15-19 June in Prague: this can bcexpected to feature thc anti-INF theme.

The Soviet-backc4 International Union of Studcntstt US)ws working in early October 1981 to attractmass participation in IUS-sponsorcd peace move-ment activitics ••

• As ca:ly as 1978. L/ the Soviets svcrc even cxploring the

or using tlic United Nations Education. Scientif-ic. and Cukural Organi7ation (UNESCO) at anunwittine front orczntion tr• fielarlte/1■,, 11, •-•,111

jaccess to broadcast scrviCci. thc availability offundinc for publications, and thc other oprx:irtuniticsa . at1able to So,ict pet-vaned wis(3 could be placed onthe %tailor the U C.SCO Information Service

. .Einar:dal Smpport. The USSR- and its East Europeanallies contribute considerable financial and materialsupport covertly to the West European peace move-ment through Communist parties and frontorganizations:

• The West German Government publicly char ged inDecember that the East Germans secretly providemorc than $2 million a month to the Wes.t GermanCommunist Party (DKP)

—•

• In October :981 thc Danish Government expelledKGB officer Vladimir Merkulov. a second secretaryin the Soviet Embassy in Copenhagen for, amongother things, using a Danish journalist agz.nt tomanipulate and fund the Danish peace movcment.

Thc World Peace Council was given an estimated$63 million by Moscow in 1980 and a:so receivedcontributions from other Communist parties. partic-ularly in Eastern Europe

Italian Communist Party officials belicvc that anindependent member of Parliament who has orga•niZed a -Group for World Peace - and publishes amagatinc. Struggle for Peace. rcccives instructionsand financial aid from thc Sovict

The Soviets also fund the peace movement openly:

• In an interview last May in the Austrian prcSS,Soviet Central Committee official vadim Zagladinprovided dctails about the "Soviet Peace lund - andits support to Western peace groups. inclitding thcViiPC and its a ((ilia tes in various Wcst EurOmancount ties.

• A former Soviet Peace Fund Chairman asserted in — mission in the Netherlands had violated-oliplomafiE.an article in thc English-language Moscow Newt in rules by getting directly involved in the peacethe spring of 1981 that his clients included "leaders movement.of the international democratic organizations work-ing for peace" and cooperated with another ostensi-bly "public" Soviet organization. the Committee forthe Defense of Peace (SCDP) to "render financialaid to organizations, movements, and personalities."

Propaganda Guide/hies. Thc Soviets have sought todirect the focus of the West European peace move-ment by providing Communist parties and front orga-nizations with propaganda themes lecycd_io localconcerns and to US and NATO policiest

aheSoviet Pc-ace Committee reportedly tried to aggravateexisting concerns that the United States would forceWestern Europe to accept more Pershing It missilesthan originally agreed.

Soviet propaganda guidance also has reflected con-cern about the growing tendency among We Euro-pean peace activists to blame the USSR as well as theUnited States for the arms race:

e the Soviets toldFinnish Communist Party officials last autumn thatthe CPSU Central Committee has issued a directiveto its departments and embassies to collect informa-tion on "anti-Soviet phenomena" in West Europeancountries for usc in the propaganda battle over INF...

. ,:e..v•i-.te reportedly told leaders of the WPC into try to limit the effectiveness of a

pr,‘" . group that had criticized Soviet policies.

Direct Involvement in Peace Gromps. Because of theurgency 'of their anti-INF campaign. the Soviets haverisked discrediting some West European peace groups

by directing diplomats and other Soviet officialsabroad to undertake covert involvement in thew:groups' activities. For example:

• On 19 November the Dutch press reported thatrepresentatives ol thc Soviet Embassy and trade

Ittflueace Tiirorgl: Foreign Media and Disittforrna-tioa. The Soviets routinely try to.cxploit the Westernpress to advance the USSR's peace movementobjectives:

The left-leaning West German magazine Der Spie-gel, for example, is a leader in publishing interviewswith the Soviets, particularly on arms control issues.

The KGB. usually through front organizations, pro-vides funding for West European media sympathet-ic to Soviet interests. For example, late last year itprovided, via a Luxembourg-based East Germanfront organization; the funding to finance the newprintin g installations of the pro-Soviet Greek Com-munist Party.

• The press organs of pro-Soviet European Commu-nist parties, although they have limited circulation,provide sympathetic coverage of the USSR's poli-cies and activities regarding antinuclear issues. Thisprevails even on the lowest level. as in thc Case or thelocal Communist party newspaper that reporteddaily on a Soviet peace delegation touring Denmarklast November::

Disinformation and forgeries arc other "active mea-sures" the Soviets and their allies are using in thecampaign against I N F basing:

• In May 1982 a forged letter, purportedly fromformer Secretary of State Haig to NATO SecretaryGeneral Luns regarding nuclear arms issues, was

6

circulated in I:legions and Luxembourg. It distortedNATO nuclear stratcgy and played on the fear ofNATO use of nuclear wcapons in a limited war.

The West German Communist Party may havebeen involved in fabricating or disseminating apurportedly official notice that was postcd in scvcralareas of Bonn in mid-November alerting citizcns tomeasures concerning the transport of nuclear andconvcntional weapons through the city. The forgeryclearly was intended to increase public concernabout a recent accidcnt involving a Pcrshing Itransporter and had no basis in fact

Effectireaess of Sorter Efforts. It is difficult to cvalu-atc the rcal effect of Soviet active measures in thcWest European peace movement. Clearly, not allopposition to NATO nuclear forccs modcrnization isSoviet inspired. There is good cvidcncc, however, thatthe Soviets have sought to exploit and manipulate themovement and that their covert support has cnablcd itto grow beyond its own capabilities. Thc most succcss-ful tactic employed by the Sovicts to date. however.probably is the incessant emphasis in public andprivate meetings with West Europeans on the USSR'sostAsible commitmcnt to dctcntc and arms control incontrast to the United States' alleged drive toward"military supremacy." This type of "political influ-encc operation- is difficult to countcr. because manyWest Europeans meet with Soviet officials and localCommunists often. 'considering this to be a legitimatemeans of obtaining Information

There has, however, been a perceptible changc recent-ly in the attitude of some non-Communist peacegroups toward Soviet and other Communist support

• In the past six to eight months the Dutch Intcr-church Peace Council tI K VI has distanccd itsclffrom the Soviet position and called more stronglyfor mutual disarmament by East and West.

•• In June 1982 the West Ocrroan "Greens" brokc

with the Communist Party over thc issues of thenccd for disarmament by both superpowers, supportlot the peace movement in East Germany. andcriticism of Sovict actions in Poland andAfghanistan.

7

The British Campaign for Srucicar Disarmament(CND) reportedly will not support the WPC's"World Peace Assembly" scheduled to be held inPrague this June "

IV. Soviet Negotiating Options in Mid-to-Late 1983Moscow will continue to assess NATO's deploymcntplans and the CS stance in the current round ofnegotiations, which will probably last until lateMarch. Although site preparation has been ander wayfor some time, the first dcliverics of INF equipmentare scheduled to arrive in West Germany. the UnitedKingdom. and Italy between April and October. If 1:1

that timc the Soviets conclude there has been insuffi-cient movement in the NATO negotiating positionand thcy arc convinced that the I Nr equipmcntdclivcrics will be made, they probabl y will 3nnounccan cnd to the SS - 20 moratorium

During tfic summer round of the INF talks severaloptions would be open to the Soviets. They could:• Shift their tactics at the INF talks by caprcssing a

willingness to trade off cruise and ballistic missilcfcurrently undcr development against thc GLCand Pershing II.

• Call for a long suspension of thc tahl.s. blaming theUnited States fur the stalemate.

• Walk cut of the talks indcfinitcly. with no date setfor resumption.

- Call for merging thc . INF talks with START.• Propose to the West Europeans that they join thc

tatks or suggest another venue for thz talks, such asthe Conference on Security and Cooperation inEurope ICSCE1

•

Ti-ode-off. Probably the Soviets' most likely optioniand one that they have suggcstctr_ •3 isproposal to trade off their future cto.te andmissiles against NATO's new systems. Thcy currcntlyhavc a number of such programs in dcyckspmcnt.some of which could be ready for deplo yment by laic

1983. In his address on 21 Dcccmbcr. Andropov -stated that the USSR was testing a long-range cruisemissilc and would deploy it lithe Unitcd Statesproceeded with rilans for cruisc missile deployment.

By matching their new ,-ystcms against NATO's. theSovicts might scck to change the v..holc focus of thenegotiations, so that the emphasis would be on limit-ing thc new systems of both sides—while protcctingtheir substantially deployed SS-20 force. That tacticalshift could keep on the table their missile subccilingproposal, with its enticement of substantial reductionsin the 55-20 forcc. They might argue then to NATOgovernments that European security would be betterserved by thc missile subcciling proposal than by USI I : deploymcnts matched by Sovict countcrdeploy-ments

The threat of such Soviet deployments, however.would not be well received in European capitals andmight even increase Allied support for INF deploy-ments. INF proponents would characterizc the threatas a Soviet effort to divide Western Europe from theUnited States an would urge their governments tofollow through with deployments. At the same timc.howcver. the West European governments would urgethe United States to perscverc at the INF talks so that

deal might still bc negotiated

Surperfsion_ Of the above options, the second seemsleast likcly. because the Soviets probably would feelthat it would not be "tough" enough. With timerunning out bcforc NATO dcploymcnt. they almostcertainly would bclicve that more dcfinitivc measureswere rcquired to impress NATO with thc gravity ofthc situation.

Walkout. If thcy chose to walk out, the Soviets mightargue in justification that until the United States isinterested in "bargaining scriously." there is no needto continue INF talks. In Novcmber they indicatcdC.

that the next round of ncgotiations ieurrcni yIls se,siont would be a watershed. They also seemed tobe laying the groundwork for an eventual publicaccounting of their "flexibility - throughout the nego-tiations. in contrast to US "intractability. - At varioust imes last fall Soviet INF delegates and party officialshinicd at a walkout if the US position remained

unchanged and Washirtgton.bc_gan INF deployments:but at the same time.r 31-they indicated ttitthey would continue negotiations even after the Unit-cd States began such deployments.

Leaving the talks clearly would be risky to thcSoviets: Western public opinion might blame them forthe collapse of the negotiations. If they (cared thispossibility. thcy could stress their willingness to con-tinue to negotiate at START but make it clear that noprogress would be possible in that forum until INFQuestions were resolved.

Merger. The idea of negotiating INF in the STARTframework might be an option Open to the Soviets. asColonel General Cheroot, of the General Staff recent.ly indicated in an interview with a Wcst Germannewspaper. At present. Chcrvov opposes thc ideabecause of the need to reach an INF settlemcmquickly and dm likelihood that combining INF talkswith START would delay an l!siF solution for manyyears. Nevertheless. the Soviets might consider thisapproach if they believed that it had West Europeansupport and could delay NATO's deployment plans.

Moscow would' be in a good position if thc talks weremerged, because it has already linked the two in itsnegotiating approach. Its reduction proposal inSTART is contingent on no US dcployment of newINF systems The call to ban long-range cruisemissiles and air-to-surfacc ballistic missiles is found inboth its INF and its START proposals. Its objectionto US proposals in bath the Its1F talks and START isthat Washington is not looking at the whole panoplyof weapon systems comprehensively, but is interestedin selectively limiting or.l■ Moacow's itrcagt its, such.as ICBMs and thc SS-20

The Soviets might well see an advantage it' ali systemswith a -strategic" mission—'including US "forward-based - systems and British and Frcrich nucica:forces'—were on the ncgotiatina table In their viewthis could open up opportunities for horse trading. \such as occurred during SALT II, and could makemore credible thc Soviet argument that there is

oveTall siratcgic parity between East and Wzsr. If bylate 198 3.Moscow saw NATO deployment as acertainty and was still interested in a negotiatedoutcome. it might believe that this advantage wouldoutweigh any disadvantage there might be in losing aseparate forum for INF. (The separate forum hasbeen useful in exerting leverage on the West Europe-ans, particularly the Germans]

Broader Currier:. Another option open to the Sovietswould be to invite thc West Europeans to join the INFtalks or propose that thc talks take place within abroader European framework, such as the CSCE.They could argue that the negotiations are of para-mount importance to Europe and that all majorpower? should be involved. There is no evidence tosuggest such a move. but it would be consistent withthe long-term Soviet strategy of capitalizing on differ-ences of view among NATO countries. The Sovietswould clearly recognize, however, the low likelihoodof acceptance by the West Europeans. particularly theFrench and British, for the reason cited above.

V. Future Soviet Political MovesThe Soviets wiil continue vigorous efforts to influencethe West G:rman position. regardless of whether theelections result in a CDU victory or return the SPD topower. They may be more willing after the electionsto offer specific inducements, such as cased emigra-tion for ethnic Germans it. the East. since they will nolonger be constrained by reluctance to help thc CDCin its campaign. At the same time, thzy may resortmore openly to intimidation. particularly if the CDCis victovious. They might stress that West Germanywould be more exposed than other West Europeancountries to Soviet retaliation in the event of a nuclearexchange, because onl y West Germany would basef'crshing

9

Throughout Western Europe the Soviets wrilttinkrisifytheir itublic-Eimpaign against CS INF deployment.These cf forts are lik-el-y_to include:

• Stepping u p contact with a broad spectrum ofEuropean politicians, media representatives, churchleaders, and student groups, with the intention ofPurveying as widely as possible an image of-Sovietreasonableness and a commitment to a negotiatedINF solution.

• Employing propaganda to arouse public alarm overalleged US intentions of making Europe the -nu-clear battlefield- of a US-Soviet conflict.

• Introducing new -peace - initiatives, such as theirlatest proposal for a tactical nuclear-free zanoinCentral Europe

VI. Wh•t Type of Agreement Might Moscow Accept?Throughout the negotiations thc Sovi•ns have insistedthat the United States forgo deployment of its ncwsystems in an INF agreement. Privately. however.they have indicated that they expect Washington toproceed with deployment. While they have not provid-ed any clues as to what level of NATO deployment,they might ultimately accept.

Gearly the Soviets would like NATO's plan to fallthrough on its own, but they cannot be confident thatthis will happen. They probably would not welcome asituation in which NATO fully deployed its systemsand they found it necessary to respond with hundredsor their own missiles. Between these extreme out-comes. they must have given considerable thought toan agreement in which NATO is permitted some levelof deployment. Given their particular concern over t hePershing It. they might continue to call for a ban onit, while grudgingly accepting some level of G LC Mdeployment—albeit sharply reduced from the planned464 launchers. In return. the Soviets probably wouldmerely reiterate their missile subcciling proposal. In

fact. they could insist that any US GI.CM dcploy-mcnt (augmenting the French and British missilelaunchers) bc offset by dcploymcnts of additionalSoviet missile launchers..

Moscow would view a negotiating outcome that killedthe Pershing:II program as a favorablc initial step.but it still would be greatly conccrncd about 'imiting.thc US cruisc missile thrcat. It could proposc addi-tional arms control measures that would scvcr 'ely limitair- and sea-launched cruise missiles. It might de-mand that ALCMs be Quantitatively limited on heavybombers (as they were in SALT III and might call forS continuation of thc ban on SLCM deployment thatwas negotiated in the now-expired SALT II Protocol.To gel Washington more interested in such measures.Moscow might want to heighten thc visibility of itsown cruise missile systems (as Andropov did in his2) Dcccmbcr addrcssy—particularly as those systemsapproach operational capability, perhaps as early aslatc this year. The Soviets probably would be willingto usc either the INF talks or START to ncgotiatchcsc measure!

VII. Possible Soviet Plans if Ne-goti•tions and Politi-cal Moves FailBy latc 1983 Moscow probably will be able to judgewhethcr an agreement is possiblc and whcther any ofthe negotiating options and political moves outlinedabove would be cffcctive in postponing or derailingNATO's deployment plans. If thc Soviets arc con-vinced that the initial deployment will occur as schcd-uled in December. thcy almost ccrtainly will takcsteps—for ir.:crnal as wcil as foreign policy masons—to implement whatever military rcsponsc they havcplanned to make once NATO's deployment actuallybegins. This response was foreshadowed in Andro•pov's 21 December addrcss and in March 1982. whcnfirczhncv threatened retaliatory measures that wouldput thc United States and its allies -in an analogousposition- if NATO deployed its new INF systcnis.

Military Options.ff.

fix Sost.;e15.-ould. tnic.• (•.i?d new cruise missiles and short-rangc ballistic

missiles opposite Europe and deploy a larger SS•20forcc.

• Station submarincsorith sca•launched auisc 1111$.

tiles ncar- US Coasts. •• install nuclear-capable offensive weapon systems in

Cuba. either overtly or covertly.

Last fall the Soviets hinted at the INF talks that theymight respond with deployment of a long-range cruisemissile or a new ballistic missile, or both. In his21 December six-cob. Andropov highlighted the Sovietlong-range cruise missile program as a counter toNATO's INF deployments, probably because thesystem is already at the flight test stage. The Sovietsrecently have modified a Y-class submarine and anumber of Bear bombcrs, apparently to serve asplatforms for a long-range cruise missile, which could

i be targeted against US territory. If they choose todevelop s new IRBM for deployment opposite Europe.it probably will be a system more capable than theSS-20 in tcrms of payload and accuracy. AnotherSovict option could be deployment of the SS-20 in thenortheastern USSR. whcre it could target the north-western United Statcs. AC- 3 Foreign ' Minis-try official mentinned this possiouity last August. anda Soviet C.. iscusscd it in October

The above options -sccm more plausible than theemplacement of Soviet missiles in Cuba. Moscow nodoubt understands that such an action could bring thesuperpowers to the brink of a nuclear confrontation. Itprobably would calculate that the political costs inEurope and the potential risk of military confronta-tion with the US administration—which has madcinitiatives in thc Caribbean Basin 3 major clement ofits foreign policy—arc not worth whatever incrcase inmilitary or political leverage they think such a movcmight providc. Moscow probably also would believethat such an action would result in the collapse not

nf the INF negotiations, but of START as well

Nonetheless, the threat of missile ernysise•-•vien■Cuba has been hinted at

I This probaoty is part of an overallstrategy to bring as much pressure as possible

to bear on the Unitcd Star-' .nd Europe to move offthc zero option position

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Cover( Measures. If the Soviets current strategy_fails.they probably will shift the focus of their activemeasures campaign. They will attempt to use.covertmeans to complement military, diplomatic. and politi-cal moves, in an effort to slow the pace of deploymentand to keep it at the !owest possible level. With theEast•Wcst atmosphere probably souring by that :ime.they might fed even less comtraint against pursuingriskier measures—such as encouraging demonstra-tions and supporting radical peace groups, some ofwhich might engage in sabotage at NATO facilities.

The Soviets aiso will usc propaganda. disinformation.and support to Communist Party and front groups toincrease the political costs to the governments of thebasing countries. They will hope that this. in turn, willcause those countries to urge the United States toaccede to .an agreement that caps NATO deployments3t a tow level and minimizes reductions in Sovietforces.

In thc Netherlands. the Soviets can be expected tointensify their active measures with the CommunistParty and its fronts in the period leading up to aDutch decision (scheduled for late 198)1 on INFdeployment. Soviet pressure on the Italian Commu-nist Party , 0 intensify support of the peace movementundoubtedly will increase as the initial GLCM equip-ment deliveries to Italy. in October draw near. TheSoviets are currently operating under a liability inItaly. however, since their public imzec there haisuffered badly as a result of allegations of Sovietinvolvc--”-nt in the attempted zssassination of thePope -

The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament has beengaining potiticals.lout in the United-Kingdom:Tee -Soviets, ability to influence it appears to be extremelylimited, but they will do Cvh-at ther-ean to support it,particularly as the projected GLCM deployment date(December) approaches. The Soviets can also be ex-pected to attempt to persuade leftist groups to throutheir support behind the CND.

The Soviets probably will bc careful. howcvcr. not togo too far with their active measures campaign. Theyarc aware that strong antinuclear movements exist inalit he INF-basing countries lexcept Italy). even with-out Soviet or Communist involvement. They alsorealize that, by treading carefully. they can profitfrom these movements, which have been aroused by-'cightened East-West tensions and greater publicawareness of nuclear weapons programs affectingWest European countries. For these reasons the Sovi-ets probably will continue to rely more on overtpolitical measures, whir'h have proved to be their muiteffective activities

BLANK PAGE

Appendix '-

Significant INF .-Related Events Scheduled for [983

27 January INF (Round lV resumes

30 January-10 February Vice President Bush's European trip begins in Bonn: includes a visit to INF andSTART negotiations

I February

14 Fcbruary

6 March

March

March

Late March

March-April

April (?)

Session of the UN Committee on Disarmament begins in Geneva

Meeting of NATO's Special Consultative Group (SCG)

Elections in West Germany

NATO Nuclear Planning Group ministerial meeting in Portugal

Williamsburg summit

I N:F (Round IVI ends

CPSU Central Committee meets

Votes on INF infrastructure funding to be held in Belgium. Denmark. and theNetherlands

April First GLCM er.;.ipment arrives in United Kingdom

9-10 June NATO Foreign Ministers' meeting in Paris

June INF (Round VI resumes

June First Pershing II equipment arrives in West Germany

August INF (Round ends

October First GLCM equipment arrives in Italy

November NATO Nuclear Planning Group ministerial meeting in Canada

4 December SPD party congress in West Germany

December NATO ministerial meetings

December Scheduled initial operational capability for Pershing II in West Germany andGLCN1 in the United Kingdom

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