Christiano - Is the Participation Argument Self-Defeating

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Is the Participation Argument Self-Defeating?Author(s): Thomas ChristianoReviewed work(s):Source: Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the AnalyticTradition, Vol. 82, No. 1 (Apr., 1996), pp. 1-12Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4320661 .

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THOMASCHRISTIANO

IS THE PARTICIPATIONRGUMENTSELF-DEFEATING?

(Received25 July 1994)

Oneprominent rgumentordemocracy mphasizes he educativeeffectson citizens of participating n democratic decision making.The par-ticipation argument nvokes the idea thatdemocraticdeliberationanddecisionmaking producescharacter raitsin the participantswhich arehighly desirableor even essentialto some intrinsicallygood featureofpersons.' Rousseau states that the passage into a democraticsocietyproducesa remarkable hangein man,"insteadof a stupidandunimag-inativeanimal, [it] madehim an intelligent being and a man."2Manyhave argued hatthis educative effect of democracyis an independentand main argument n favor of choosing democraticinstitutionsovernon-democratic nstitutionswhich are not thought to produce thesedesirablecharacter raits.This argumenthas come under severe criti-cism recently.3Theobjection s thattheparticipation rgument equiresa self-defeatingattitudeon the partof citizens so it cannotbe a freestanding argument or democracy.They arguethatonly if democracyis more efficacious thanotherpolitical systems in producinggood leg-islation will citizens have the motives for participatingn democraticgovernment.Only if democracyis efficaciousby some standardotherthan ts educativeeffects will it have themat all. Therefore, hey argue,the educationargument an, at best, be only a secondaryargument ordemocracy.As a mainargumentordemocracy t is self-defeating.I shall show that this objection fails and that we ought to lookmore closely at the participationargument.In what follows, I shalloutline an idealized version of the participationargumentand I willdescribe the self-defeatingnessargument.Finally I will show that theself-defeatingnessargument ails inavarietyof importantways tounder-mine theparticipationist efense of democracy.PhilosophicalStudies 82: 1-12, 1996.? 1996 KluwerAcademicPublishers.Printed in theNetherlands.

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2 THOMASCHRISTIANOTHEPARTICIPATIONRGUMENT

The participationists laim that democraticparticipation s likely toenhancethe autonomy,rationalityand moralityof citizens as well asincreasetheirknowledgeof theirown andothers' interests.Since thesefeaturesof personsareindependentlyvaluable,theyargue,thefactthatdemocraticparticipation roducesthem is a free standingargumentordemocracyas a methodof collective decisionmaking.Democraticparticipationnvolves engagingin discussionwithothermembersof the communityabouthow best to promotethe commongood as well as whether aws and policies arejust or not. In this kindof context, citizens must explain andjustify theirviews to others aswell as listen with an open mind to the argumentsof others if theyare to make any headwaywithin the democraticprocess.Democraticparticipationalso includes citizens' organizingthemselves andothersto articulateanddefend theirinterests n the society.It invites them tounderstand nd to be sensitive to thecomplexities of theirown interestsaswell as thecommonalitiesof interestsamongcitizens. Anditrequiresthem to take an active stance in articulatingand defendingtheirownconvictionsandinterestswhile encouragingthemto be tolerantof theopposinginterestsandopinions of others.These activities of rational and moral justification,openmindedlistening, toleration as well as the pursuit of self-knowledge and theactiverole a citizenmustplay in political life areessentialto doing wellin a democraticsociety. The supportingcharacter raits are thereforehighly functionalfor a personin a democraticenvironment.Participa-tiondemands hatcitizens be ableto activelyreflecton,andstandupfor,theirinterests as well as what they believe to be just. Only those whohave these capacities will achieve their aims in a democraticsociety.It is highly functionalbecause in a democraticsociety whatgets donedependson the actionsof all the citizens. Moreover, he more one par-ticipates,the more one is likely to have an influenceon the outcomesandthe higherqualityof one's participation s likely to give one moreof an influence.Hence in a democracy,citizenshavereason to developthese abilities.



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IS THE PARTICIPATIONRGUMENTSELF-DEFEATING? 3Furthermoreheir exercise strengthenscitizens' abilities to justifythemselvesto others,to be open to a multiplicityof pointsof view, and

to take otherpersons' pointsof view seriously enoughto accommodatethem. These are charactertraits that individualsacquirefrom beingactive citizens and which they acquirebecause they work well in thedemocratic environment.4Also, the more one is successful in one'sparticipation, he more one is likely to have a sense of efficacy withregard o political decisionsand the more one is likely to be encouragedin thedevelopmentof ones abilities.5In addition, as others participateand develop these capacities,citizens' activitiesmutuallysupporteach others'concerns,enhancetheself-esteem andsense of efficacyof each and so providefurthercondi-tions underwhich these traitsareencouraged.6 nTocqueville'swords:"Feelingsand ideas arerenewed,the heartenlargedandtheunderstand-ing developedonly by thereciprocalaction of men one uponanother."7Hence,democraticparticipation roducestraitsof rationality, hought-fulness,morality,openmindedness,an activedispositionto standupfor

oneself andwhat one believes as well as a betterknowledgeof oneselfand one's interests.In short,it appearsto make citizens autonomous,rationalandmoral.These kinds of psychological state are not as likely to occur inauthoritarianrcompletelyanarchic ocietiesbecausethetraits nvolvedarenot as highly functional n those contexts.I amnot as likely to takeanactive interest notherpersons'well beingorindebateanddiscussionwith others f no one careswhatI thinkanyway andespecially if I couldwell be punishedif I begin to thinkand expresssubversivethoughts.The same might well be true for the dispositions to understandmyown interests and how I sharethem with others.These traitsare notfunctional in an environmentwhere a person or distinct group rule intheirown interestsandaccording o theirown judgments.Nor aretheyparticularly unctional in a society where collective action is rarelyundertakenuccessfully.Hence, in these othersocieties, people arelesslikely to developthem.These traits are highly desirable.They contribute o the happinessof individuals n the society since theyenableindividuals o learnwhattheirinterests are andthey contribute o the moralityof theiractions.



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Some even claim that these traitsareintrinsicallygood. They advocateideals of autonomy,rationalityand moralityin personsfor theirownsakes. The fact that these are good traitsof charactersuggests thatthose conditions which uniquelycontribute o the formation of thesetraitsof characterare themselves at least instrumentallygood in thisrespect. Some have gone so far as to say that the principalvirtue ofdemocracy s thatit producesthese traitsof character.They arguethateven if democracydoes not produceother good consequences asidefrom these, these consequences are sufficient to argue thatdemocracyis a superior orm of government.Indeed, they could arguethatevenif democracy were worse in certainrespects (it tendedto produce essprosperous societies or even less just societies), the good charactertraitsthat it produced n citizens might outweighthe negative effects.Inany case, the idea is that the participation rgument s a free standingargumentn the sense that t provides ndependentgrounds orthinkingthatdemocracy s desirable.This argumentought to be distinguished rom an important nstru-mentalistargument.Manyparticipationistsreprimarily oncernedwithshowing thatparticipatorynstitutionswould not have the deleteriouseffect on collective decision making that theoristssuch as Schumpeterclaimedtheywould have.8They arguethatthe more individualspartic-ipatein decision making, the more adept they will become at doing soand that the net effect on collective decision making would actually bean improvementn the outcomes of decisionmakingover a less partic-ipatorydecision making process. That argumentwould indeedrequirethe independent ruthof the thesis that democracy is a good form ofgovernment.The argument have been discussing above suggeststhatthe beneficial effects on character hat such institutions promoteareindependent easons for thinking hatdemocracy s desirable.

THESELF-DEFEATINGNESS BJECTION

Jon Elster claims that such "arguments or political institutionsandconstitutionsare self-defeatingsince they justify the arrangementsnquestion by effects that are essentially by-products."9A by-product



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IS THEPARTICIPATION RGUMENTSELF-DEFEATING? 5for Elster is a result of an activity which one cannot intentionallyorintelligentlybring aboutby thatactivity.The paradigmexamplesaresleep, belief andpleasure.We cannotintentionallyanddirectlyaim atfalling asleep withoutunderminingour plan to fall asleep. What wedo when we try to fall asleep is aim at somethingelse like countingbackwards rom one hundred n orderto fall asleep. We mightnot beable to fall asleep if we intentionallyaim at sleeping. But we can fallasleep sometimesif we do not aim at it. In this sense falling asleep isessentially a by-productof action and not an aim of action since wecannotproduce he stateby aimingat it. To aimdirectlyatfallingasleepwouldthereforebe self-defeating.Similarargumentshave been proposedagainstthe thesis of psycho-logical hedonism. Psychological hedonism states that all actions areaimed at achieving happiness for the agent. Many philosophershavenotedhowever thatsuch a thesis is deeply paradoxical.Joel Feinbergarguespersuasively hat"thesingle-mindedpursuitof happiness s nec-essarilyself-defeating,for the way to get happiness s to forgetit ... Toderivesatisfaction,one mustordinarily irstdesiresomethingother hansatisfaction,andthenfind hemeans to get whatonedesires."10Thebestway to achievehappiness s to get involvedin thepursuitsof friendshipandartand so on;happinesswill resultfromthesepursuitsbut it cannotgenerallybe attainedbypursuingt directly.InElster'sterms,happinessis essentially a by-product.Similarly,Elsterstatesthatthe mainbenefitorpurposeof a politicalsystem cannot be found in the educativeeffects it has on the citizens.He claimsthatif democracy s not superior o othersystems of decisionmaking in terms of the justice or efficiency of its decisions, then itcannot be publicly advocatedfor its educativeeffect. This is becausethe educative effect of democracyis a by-product.One cannot aimdirectlyatbecomingeducated.One mustaim at othergoals which onebelieves arelikely to be achievedin a democracyandwhichone thinksare valuable in orderto become educated in the process. Hence, onemust already thinkthatdemocracyhas an independentvalue in orderfor the educativeeffect to be produced.Therefore,Elsterargues,theeducativeeffect cannot be the main basis for advocatingdemocraticinstitutions f we areto avoid self-defeat.



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6 THOMASCHRISTIANOTHE REFUTATIONOFTHESELF-DEFEATINGNESS BJECTION

But there is an importantambiguity in Elster's argument.One wayto understandhis point is thatjust as happinesscannotbe attainedbyaimingat it inone'sactionsso thedevelopmentof characterraitscannotbe attainedby aimingat it in one's actions. And this claim seems quiteplausible.After all, whenI engage in discussionwith a personI amnotaiming at developing my mentalcapacities,I am thenaimingat devel-oping the points I am making. Indeed,I may hampermy participationin discussionif I am directly aimingatdeveloping my capacities.Andthusmy participatingn a discussionwiththesole aim of developing mymentalcapacities may be self-defeating.This much seems rightaboutElster's claim. Herehe is attackingwhat we mightcall the individual-psychological version of the participation rgumentby sayingthat it isself-defeating.A secondwayof statinghispointis thatapolitical systemcannotbe advocatedby its membersexclusively on the groundsthatithasaneducativeeffecton its members.Hencehe says that f "thedemo-craticmethodwere introduced olely because of its side effects ... andno one believedin itonany othergrounds, t would not produce hem."1'What Elster s suggesting s that f the membersof a democraticsocietyknow that the only reasonfor preferingdemocracyto other methods istheeducative effect on themof theirparticipation,henthey wouldnotbe able to participaten a way that makes the educativeeffect possible.They would not participateor discuss or organize.They would not dothese thingsor at least they would not do themwell because theyknewthat these were advocated solely on the basis of the educative effectstheseactivities have. Instead,he thinks,the only basison which citizenswill participates if theyalreadybelieve thatthe democratic ystem willproduceresults superior o those of other political systems.This is theonlykindof aimthatwill make the educativeby-productpossible. Thusthe systemcannot be advocatedon the basis of its educativeeffects, itmustbe advocatedon thebasis of the superior esultsthatsuch a systemof decisionmakinghas,resultswhich the citizens can aimat. HereElsteris attacking he social-normativeversion of the participation rgument.Elsteris concernedwith the social-normativeargumentand clearlythe participation rgument outlined above is a social-normativeargu-



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IS THEPARTICIPATIONRGUMENTELF-DEFEATING? 7ment. His objection depends on there being a close parallel to theindividual-psychologicalone. It is clearly a self-defeating argument.So, if the parallelis a strongone then Elster's argumentagainst theparticipationist ositionwill succeed.The parallel is quite weak. There are two importantdifferencesbetweenthe social-normative ndtheindividual-psychologicalersionswhich undermine he objectionto the participation rgument.First,thesocial-normativeversionof the participationargument or democracyrelates o advocacyandvaluationof, orreasonsfordemocracygroundedin its educativeeffects. It states somethingabout what is good aboutdemocracy.The individual-psychologicalversion relates to aiming atone's own developmentor pleasureor sleep throughone's actions;it isnot aboutadvocacyat all but the structure f action.It is a psychologicalfactaboutme thatIcannotsuccessfullyaimdirectlyatmy happinessandachieve it. This says nothingabout whetherthe reason for my engag-ing in variouspursuits s thatmy happinessresultsfrom those pursuits.Psychologicalhedonism s not a normative hesis or even a thesis aboutwhat norms people have. It is a thesis about what people aim at. Boththe truthandfalsity of psychologicalhedonismareconsistentwith thethought hat the ultimatevalue in my life is my own happiness.The second difference is that the social-normativeversion of theparticipationargumentthat Elster objects to does not claim that weact so as to produceeducative effects for ourselvesas the individual-psychological version does; it states that we ought to have certainpolitical institutions because within the context of those institutionswe have reason to act or are even forcedto act in such a way thatpro-duces certaincharacter raits.The supposedparallel in psychologicalhedonism concernsmy own action and theaim that I now have for thisaction.Itdoes not say anythingaboutthecontext of my actionnor doesit say anythingabout the effects of thatcontext on my motivation.Amore genuine parallelto the participationargumentwould be thatthejustification or my strikingup a friendshipwith someone is thehappi-nessIwouldgetout of it. I mightreasonalongthe following lines.WhenI strikeup a friendshipwith anotherperson,I am naturally nclinedtodo things, desire things, learnthings and share things with my friendthatultimatelymake me happy;I also become happy because of the



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things my friend does for me. Hence, I maychoose the relationshipoffriendshipbecauseit will makeme happy.WhenI am in thatcontext,I will not be directlyaiming at my happinesssince so aiming wouldprobablydestroy the friendshipand thusdestroy my happiness.MostlyI will act for my friend'swell-being,but the overalleffect of being inthatrelationshipwill be my happinessandthatmay be my reasonforhaving thefriendship.12Both of thesedistinctionsvitiate Elster'sargument.The firstdistinc-tion shows that Elster confuses the structure f valuing thingswith thestructure f action.To show thisI need merely repeatthe pointthat thefalsity of psychological hedonismdoes not entail the falsity of ethicalhedonism.The fact thatI mustdesireandpursuefriendshipandartinorderto be happydoes not imply thatmy happinesscannot be my ulti-mate and only reason forpursuing hesethings.Eventhoughhappinessis a by-product, t does not follow that it is not the chief justificationfor everythingI do. To make such an inference would be merely toconfuse the aim of action with a justificationof action.Indeedwhat Iaim at may be of little or no importance o me. Considerthe exampleof playingtennis.Why do I play tennis?I may aim at winningwhile Iam playing tennis andhavingthat aim may be essential to my playingwell, but the reasonsfor my playing tennis areto get exercise, improvemy health, relieve stressor merelyto-enjoy ively activity,all of whichareessentiallyby-products.Thesethingsare moreimportanto me thanwinning whichis my aimwhile I amplaying. ThoughI cannotdirectlyaimatimprovingmyhealth, t is certainlymyreasonforplayingand it ismuchmoreimportant o me thanwinning a game of tennis.WhatI aimat in my actionneed not have much to do withthe reason for engagingin that action.Obviously the aimsof political actionareimportant,butit need not be the case that the method by which we realizethese aimsis justified by referenceto whetherthose concernsthemselvesare bestsatisfied. Ourreason for the method may be the educative side effectsof the methodeven though the aim of participatingn the method maybe to satisfytheconcerns.The second distinctionalso undernines Elster's argument.Elsterstates thatwe cannotadvocatedemocracymerely on the groundsthatit has an educative effect on the participants.Why not? There are two



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IS THEPARTICIPATIONRGUMENTELF-DEFEATING? 9possibilitieshere. First,those actionswhich constitute headvocacyandestablishmentof democracycannotby themselvesaim directly only atthe developmentof the characters f those who participate n themforobviousreasons.One's character annotbedeveloped f onemerelyaimsatdevelopingit. At mostit is developedas aby-product f attemptingoestablisha democraticsystem.But surelyno participationists arguingotherwise.The participationists arguing hat the reason for setting updemocratic institutionsis that when they are established,individualswill have to act in ways that will have the side effect of developingcharacter.Thedevelopmentof character s theaim of the establishmentof theinstitutionsnotin thesense that he act of establishingwill developcharacterbutonly in the sense that once the institutionsare establishedindividualswill be constrained o act in such a way that theircharacterswill develop. We, as framers,cannow see thatwe, when we participatewithin the proposedframework,will have to act in such a way thatwilldevelopour characters.Our actions now aim at setting up a context inwhich our actions later will tend to improve our characters.The by-productwe wantwill come later.And there is no problemwith aimingattheby-productn this sense.Wouldit make sense to establisha democraticconstitution or thisreason even if one thought that democracy was not superior in otherways to non-democratic ontexts?Surely it might. Participationists anagree with Brian Barry that, "politics is a serious business" and thatthe actualsubstanceof political decision making is important.Peoplemust be fed, groups must be organized, liberty must be secured andfor all these purposes laws must be made and complied with. Theparticipationist heses are concerned with how one should go aboutmaking those decisions. It is perfectly coherentto claim that politicaldecisions are of fundamentalsignificance for people while assertingthatwhatmakesdemocracypreferable o othermethodsof makingsuchdecisions is its educativeeffect. Thisrationaleneed in no way underminethe seriousnessof citizenswhen they confront he hard ssues of politicsin a democraticcontext.Indeed,we might thinkof democratic nstitutionsas regulatingtheprocessof decision making and, to use Elster's term, a kind of indirecttechnology for the productionof desirable character raits in citizens.



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10 THOMAS HRISTIANODemocracy might do this by requiringcitizens to participate n orderto get the outcomes they desire. As I observedabove, it makes whathappensdependon all the citizens' participation nd favors those whoparticipatemore. The issues of politics are serious so each will see alot at stake in participating.Thus individualshave some incentiveforparticipatingnasmuch as moreparticipationwill help them get moreof what they wantor think desirable.Fromthis we can see that DavidEstlund's objectionfails to undermine he participationargument.Hearguesthat:Self-educativeparticipation oes seem to dependon whatmightbe calledsystembasedhope, the hope that one's highest aim mightbe well servedby thesystemin which oneparticipates. f a personhas no basis for hope thathis or her aims will be well servedby the political system, then one is not likely to have a basis for hopethatone's agencyas a participantn thatsystem will serve those aim well either. As a result, importantcharacter ffects will be missed.13

This argumentseems to be based on a fallacy of division. Estlundmisses the fact thatanindividualcanhavegood reasonforparticipatingin a political system because,given that the system is inplace his or herparticipationwill improveoutcomesover whatthey mighthave been ifhe or she had notparticipated.Thus the hopes anindividualhas for thesuccess of his or herown participationneed not dependon the relativesuccess of the system. Thus it is not clear why any charactereffectswill be missed. Democracygives individuals incentives and motivesfor participating ven if they areless likely to get whatthey want in ademocracythanin some otherregime.As long as the democracy s inplace,they mustparticipatenorder o make adifference or themselves.Most individuals are more likely to achieve outcomes they prefer ifthey pursue them within a democracythan if they try to overthrowthe democracy and bring about some otherpolitical arrangement.Thedifficulties andcosts involved in attempting o bring about large scaleinstitutionalchange are too great. Thus even if an individualbelievesthathe couldget moreof whathe wanted wereanotherpolitical systemin place, he still has an incentive to do what he can to get what hewants in the democracyhe actually lives in. Inasmuchas participationproducesgood character raits, the democraticarrangements an betrusted to producethese beneficial effects on charactereven if they



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IS THEPARTICIPATIONRGUMENTELF-DEFEATING? 1 1produce egislativeoutcomes hat are worse thanthoseproduced yother ystems.

Therefore,he wocrucial ifferenceshow hatwhile he ndividual-psychologicalrgumentsself-defeating,hesocial-normativergumentis not.And it is thelatter hat hepartipationists offering.Even if ademocracys less efficientnproducingesirable utcomes orpartici-pants,t canstillproduce esirableharacterraitsnindividuals ecausethese individuals tillhavereason o pursue heirends in the society.And f thesecharacterraits resufficiently aluableheymaybeworththe loss in othergoodsthatmightresult.Thusthe self-defeatingnessargumentails to underminehe thought hatdemocracys valuablebecauseof the educative ffects t has.

CONCLUSIONThe incoherence rgument oes not workagainst he participationistdefenseofdemocracy.tremainso be seenwhetherheparticipationistarguments successful. n order o assess hisargument emustdeter-minethe worthof the traitsof characterhatare assumed o resultfromparticipationn democraticnstitutionsndhow theirworth om-pares o thatof other mportantspectsof political ystems.Also, thefactual claims assertedby the participationistsmust be assessed. It isthese issues that mustbe addressedby advocatesand opponentsof theparticipationrgument.

NOTES1 See HannahArendt On Revolution(Harrnondsworth:enguinBooks, 1973); Aris-totle, Politics, Book I, 1253al-40; CarolGould,RethinkingDemocracy(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1988)John StuartMill, ConsiderationsonRepresentativeGovernmentBuffalo,NY:PrometheusBooks, 1991), p. 40 for some amongmany ver-sions of this kind of argument.The argument outline in whatfollows is anidealizationandcollection of some of these differentarguments.2 JeanJacquesRousseau TheSocial Contractand Discourses (trans,G. H. D. Cole)(London:J. M. Dent, 1973),pp. 195-196.3 Jon Elster Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversionof Rationality (Cambridge:



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CambridgeUniversityPress, 1983); see also, David Estlund"MakingTruthSafe forDemocracy," n The Idea of Democracy, ed. David Coop, Jean Hamptonand JohnRoemer (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1993), pp. 71-100 see esp. pp. 83-84. The argumenthas been very brieflycriticisedby me in my "Freedom,Consensusand Equality n Collective Decision Making,"Ethics,October 1990, pp. 151-181, esp.p. 155.4 CarolGould,RethinkingDemocracy, pp. 79, 291.S See Carole Pateman,Participationand Democratic Theory Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1970) for some empiricalargumentsor these conclusions.Therehasbeen an enormousamountof controversyon theempiricalsupport or these claimsbutI shall discuss themheresince my focus is onone more narrow et of arguments gainstparticipationism.6 Carol Gould, RethinkingDemocracy,p. 73.7 Alexis de Tocqueville,Democracy in America (GardenCity, NY: Anchor Books,1969) trans. George Lawrence;ed. J. P. Mayer, p. 515. See also John StuartMill,ConsiderationsonRepresentativeGovernment London:J. M. Dent, 1958).8 JosephSchumpeter,Capitalism,Socialism and Democracy (New York:HarperandRow, 1956). For the counterargumentsee CarolePateman,ParticipationandDemo-cratic Theoryas well as PeterBacharachThe Theoryof DemocraticElitism (Boston:Little Brown, 1967).9 JonElster,Sour Grapes, p. 92.10 "Psychological Egoism," in Reason and Responsibility sixth edition, ed. JoelFeinberg Belmont, CA:WadsworthPublishingCo., 1985), pp. 480-490, esp. p. 484.1l JonElster,SourGrapes, p. 96.12 See JuliaAnnasTheMoralityofHappiness(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1993),pp. 249-262, for an accountalong these lines of Aristotle'sconceptionof the relationof friendship o self-love.13 David Estlund,"Making ruthsafe for democracy,"pp. 83-84.

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Christiano - Is the Participation Argument Self-Defeating

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