Secure Cities II Initiative

Countering Improvised Explosive Device Networks

Chris Hunter QGMFIExpE GCGI MCMI

Kratos Enterprises LtdCounter-IED Consultants

Counter-Terrorist Bomb Disposal

Assault IEDD

• Assault IEDD is the process in which an operator uses speedy render-safe techniques to maintain the momentum of an assaulting force in a potentially hostile environment.

Nov 26th Mumbai Attacks

C-IED Operations Northern Ireland, Iraq, Afghanistan and Colombia

Scope

• The Structure of a Terrorist Network

• Methods of attacking the network

• Challenges• Final Considerations

Leadership

• Provides direction and

policy

• Approves Goals and

Objectives

• Overarching guidance for

Operations

• Generally rise from within

ranks or establish their own

splinter groups

Operators

• Plan and execute operations

• Manage and acquire intelligence, finance, logistics and comms

• Includes bomb making and surveillance expertise

• Bomb emplacers generally not bomb makers

Operators: Cellular Foundation

• Tactical level• 3 – 4 people• Security• Difficult to infiltrate• Unaware of other cells and

their membership• Provide emotional and

social support• Leader is often only contact

with outside world

Active Supporters

Active in:• Political/Ideological

Indoctrination• Fund Raising• Information gathering• Provision of safe houses,

transportation and medical assistance

• Do not normally commit violent acts

Defeating the Terror Network at the Strategic and Operational Level

Profiling those at high risk of becoming radicalised

Targeting the Training Camps

• Assassination• Arson• Bombing• Hijacking• Hostage Taking• Kidnapping• Maiming• Raids• Seizure• Sabotage• Hoaxes• Use of CBRN weapons

Global not Regional Trend Analysis

Ramzi Yousef

Project Bojinka - 1995

Airline Bomb Plot

Money Laundering

Global Logistics and Procurement Chains (Land, Sea and Air)

Covert Operations – Letting an operation run

Disruption of Component Chain

Technical & Forensic Exploitation

Social Network Analysis

Correctly Trained Debriefing Personnel

Other Considerations

Analysis and Testing of Likely Targets

Intelligence must be multi-source:

Booby-trapped Safe-houses

Prepare for the Future: CBRN

Prepare for Future Threats: London & Glasgow Bombings 2007

Investing in protection: The Cost of Terror vs Defence Spending

• Sept 11Twin towers New York:  Cost to terrorist $500,000; Cost to America $600bn

• Madrid Bombings:  Cost to terrorist 10,000 euros; Cost to Spain 212 million euros 

• 2002: Yemen French oil tanker Limburg:  Cost to terrorist <$50,000.  Cost to Yemen $3.8m per month

The war on terror has only two outcomes: Win, or lose…and we can only win, if we stay alert…and look for

absence of the normal, and presence of the abnormal

Questions?

Chris Hunter QGMFIExpE GCGI MCMI

Director Kratos Enterprises LtdCounter-IED Consultants

www.kratosenterprises.com