Chouinard.fincher - Critique of Structural Marxism and Human Geography

A Critique of "Structural Marxism and Human Geography"Author(s): Vera Chouinard, Ruth Fincher, James Duncan and David LeySource: Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Vol. 73, No. 1 (Mar., 1983), pp.137-150Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. on behalf of the Association of American GeographersStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2569351 .

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Commentary

A Critique of "Structural Marxism and Human Geography"

IN their article, "Structural Marxism and Hu- man Geography," James Duncan and

David Ley draw upon an impressive range of philosophical sources in order to advance a critique of Marxist work by geographers (Duncan and Ley 1982). The authors' objective is to show that Marxist work in geography obscures social processes by imposing rigid theoretical concepts upon a complex reality (p. 31). Toward this end, it is argued that Marx- ist geographers (like "structural" Marxists in general) attribute causal power to conceptual entities (e.g., "capital") that are abstracted from human experience and practice (pp. 31-44). According to the authors, this tendency toward "reification" derives in part from a continued adherence to Hegelian idealism by political economists (pp. 54-55).

It is our view that Duncan and Ley have failed to make a convincing case for this assessment of Marxist geographical work and political economy. The reasons for this are threefold. First, the authors' account of various "traditions" in Marxist social science ignores such important matters as the development of a variety of approaches since the mid-1970s. Secondly, the arguments advanced with regard to Marxist theory, method, and philosophy suffer from logical gaps and insufficient substantiation. And finally, by failing to specify their own epistemological and theoretical alternative to a Marxist approach in human geography, the authors have foreclosed constructive debate on the issues raised. Our commentary will consider each of these shortcomings in turn.

Errors of Omission in the Portrayal of Marxist "Traditions"

A central proposition in Duncan and Ley's critique of Marxist geography and social sci-

ence generally is that the majority of Marxist "traditions" share the philosophical and theoretical limitations of "structural Marx- ism." But the precise meaning of such "traditions" as "political economy" or "structural Marxism" is not specified. There are assertions that the "theoretical treatment of political economy" may be distinguished from "concrete historiographic study" and that "historiographic work" challenges the "structural tradition" (p. 31), which imply that the defining characteristic of both political economy and "structural Marxism" is that they are not "concrete." So, in subsequent discussion of reification as "misplaced concreteness" (p. 37), Duncan and Ley treat Marx- ian theoretical concepts such as "mode of production" and "class" as "reified supra- individual entities" (p. 36). Moreover, as the idealist flaws associated with Althusser's "extreme version of structuralism" (p. 35) are attributed not only to work in the political economy tradition, but also to that of Marxist geographers, it would appear that the authors regard this criterion of "concreteness" as sufficient to characterize the various "traditions" in Marxist social science. We object to this superficial distinction between structuralism, political economy, and Marxist geography on the one hand, and historical studies on the other because it is based on major errors of omission in Duncan and Ley's account of Marxist social science.

The authors' distinction between historical and other Marxist "traditions" ignores the analyses of those who have followed neither Thompson (1978) to his extreme disavowal of Marxist social theory, nor Althusser (1976) to his self-professed "theoreticism" or extreme idealist abstractions. By failing to discuss the work of those Marxists who insist that the ap- plication of concepts like "capital accumulation" requires detailed historical study of how

Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 73(1), 1983, pp. 137-150 ? Copyright 1983 by Association of American Geographers

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138 Chouinard and Fincher

human practices give rise to specific social relations and conditions (e.g., Foster 1977; Corrigan 1980; Rose 1981), Duncan and Ley give the false impression that a dichotomy exists between theoretical and empirical or "concrete" Marxist work.

Duncan and Ley fail to consider whether or not it is valid to treat Marxist concepts as if they refer solely to material objects or entities and so are led to an erroneous conflation of the use of theoretical concepts with reification. Thus, despite their recognition that Marx was in fact critical of analyses that treat social relations as relations between things (p. 35), the authors treat the concepts employed by Marxist geographers as self-evidently "reified" (pp. 36-37). A related error is that it is the language instead of the import of Marx- ist analyses which is subjected to criticism. Good examples of this practice may be found on page 38, where statements by David Har- vey are twice quoted out of the context of their theoretical meaning and then given the particular "objectified" interpretation favored in the critique. The inadequacy of this form of criticism is revealed when one considers that a distinctive feature of Marxist concepts is that they refer to both specific social relations (such as that between capitalists and wage- laborers) and the "objectified" forms in which these relations are experienced in capitalist societies (as in the exchange of money-wages for labor-power) (see Marx 1976, Ch. 1; Sweezy 1968; Geras 1972; Rubin 1975). This dual quality of materialist concepts means that one cannot simply presume that an analyst such as Harvey is referring to a reified entity when he uses such concepts as "capital accumulation" (p. 38). On the contrary, it was precisely such a singular meaning that Duncan and Ley needed to demonstrate in their critique of Marxist geography.

Another omission in Duncan and Ley's characterization of Marxist "traditions" is that they do not specify the historical significance and context of "structural Marxism." The treatment of structuralism and "theoretical political economy" as virtually synony- mous (p. 31) gives the false impression of identical characteristics and development. In fact, as an examination of the history of Marx- ism readily shows, the "structuralist school" is a recent (early 1960s) and quite distinctive addition to the "traditions" of Marxist political economy (Althusser 1969; Anderson 1976,

1980; Larrain 1979). The failure to consider this history of "structural Marxism" leads the authors to further errors of omission in their account of Marxist geography and political economy. In their critique of "economism" or "the overdependence on economic categories" in Marxist geographical work (p. 45), for example, Duncan and Ley allege that "structural Marxism" is so economistic that it constitutes "a mirror image of the equally extreme neoclassical concept of consumer sovereignty" (p. 46). This is a curious charge because, like other "Western Marxist" traditions, structuralism emphasized philosophical and cultural concerns instead of focusing on the "classical" (pre-1920) economic problems of Marxist analysis (Anderson 1976). Indeed, it has been argued that a major contribution of "structural Marxism" to Marx- ist social science was to stress cultural and ideological aspects of the state and politics (Clarke, Connell, and McDonough 1978; Hol- loway and Picciottio 1978). At the very least then, the charge that the structuralist influence in Marxist geography leads to economism requires demonstration rather than assumption. Similarly, it is not obvious that "structural Marxism" owes its idealism to Hegel (p. 49), as the nonmaterialist philosophical principles used by Althusser and his followers derive from Spinoza (Althusser 1976; Anderson 1976).

The neglect of the history of "structural Marxism" also leads Duncan and Ley to ignore the historical context of the Marxist geographical items selected for comment. Had it been pointed out that the early 1970s was the time when the writings of the so-called "French structural Marxists" were first being published in English, then it might have been clearer that the geographical work selected by Duncan and Ley (written in the mid-1970s for the most part) was a contribution to the ensuing debate. At least the authors might then have begun to provide an historical explanation for the alleged "continuity" between Marxist geography and the "extreme version of structuralism" established by Al- thusser (p. 35).

In condemning Marxist work in human geography, Duncan and Ley not only ignore the history of Marxist geography but also fail to specify the limits that they assign to Marxist geographical work. This latter omission is a serious one, as researchers not labeled



Commentary 139

"geographers" conduct work on geographic topics: Lebas notes the prominence of spatial problems in the Marxist research of the mid- to late 1970s (Harloe and Lebas 1981, xi), an interest that has been pursued by sociolo- gists, economists, political scientists, ur- banists, regional planners, and others. More- over, geographers publish work from a Marxist perspective in less-than-obviously geographic outlets (e.g., Overton 1978; Walker 1978; Rose 1980; Harmon 1981a). In order to generalize about the nature of Marxist geographic work and Marxist work in human geography it is necessary, therefore, to define and identify relevant geographic work carefully. The lack of such rigor in Duncan and Ley's review renders their generalizations about Marxist geography suspect.

Another serious omission in Duncan and Ley's treatment of Marxist geography and social science is that they ignore the "poststructuralist" debates that have come to dominate Marxism since the mid-1970s. Con- trary to the impression of conceptual "stasis" and "ossification" left by the authors (pp. 44-56), there have been many efforts to re- fine and broaden Marxist social analysis. These includes recent work by geographers on the development of capitalism as a mode of production (e.g., Smith 1982; Boddy 1981; Massey 1978) and advances in Marxist social science such as the following: work on the production and experience of culture (Barrett et al. 1979; Williams 1981); feminist studies of capitalism (Fox 1980); Gramscian analyses of political institutions, struggles, and forms of consciousness (Laclau 1977; Mouffe 1979); and various advances in the study of ideology (Sumner 1979; Larrain 1979). The participation of geographers in these innovations can be seen in such collections as Dear and Scott (1981) and Harloe and Lebas (1981), in jour- nals like Antipode and the International Jour- nal of Urban and Regional Research, and in recent efforts to tackle the analysis of subjective experience from within a Marxist geographic perspective (Harvey 1978a; Peet 1980; Harman 1981b; Eyles 1981).

It is only by ignoring recent developments in Marxist social science, then, that Duncan and Ley can reduce the meaning of the Marx- ist concept of "ideology" to "habituation" (p. 40) and assert that Marxist geographers are unwilling "to deal with the admittedly difficult questions of the empirical reality of re-

lations between consciousness and structure" (p. 41). A more balanced assessment would at least acknowledge the facts that: Marxist geographers have made preliminary efforts to join recent debates on ideology; a "diminished" or less-than-perfect concept of consciousness is not peculiar to Marxist social science (see the excellent discussion by Larrain 1979); and far from Marxists ignoring "social psychology" (p. 41), some of the most innovative work in contemporary Marxist social analysis centers on precisely this problem (Hall et al. 1978; Grayson 1980). Similarly, the authors' treatment of the Marxist concept of "class" as an example of "ossification" in- explicably ignores recent efforts to enhance the flexibility of this Marxist theoretical cate- gory. Examples include Wright's (1979) use of the concept of "contradictory class loca- tions" and Burawoy's (1981) consideration of the implications of job stratification for struggles within the workplace and political arena. If one judges the contributions by geographers to these advances as meager in number, one should also recall that much of this work originates in disciplines other than geography (e.g., sociology and political science) and has only recently been available in published form. Geographers have just begun to explore these new perspectives and to acquaint themselves with associated research topics.

The most serious silence in Duncan and Ley's critique is that they fail to specify the philosophical bases of various "traditions" in Marxist social science. In view of the authors' focus on philosophical issues (p. 31), it is little short of astonishing that nowhere in the critique is the philosophy of historical materialism even acknowledged, let alone assessed. This is no minor lapse, as Duncan and Ley's argument that nonhistoriographic Marxist "traditions" suffer from the philosophical and theoretical limitations of "structural Marx- ism" depends upon demonstrating the per- vasive influence of Hegelian idealism throughout the history of Marxist studies (pp. 33- 38). And as geographers such as Gregory (1978, p. 110) have observed of Marx's relation to Hegel:

But Marx was led to the opposite conclusion, namely "that legal relations as well as forms of state are to be understood neither in themselves nor from the so-called general development of the human mind, but rather have their roots in




the material conditions of life." Essence and phenomena were transposed and idealism was replaced by materialism.

If Duncan and Ley have an argument as to why idealism and historical materialism can be treated as equivalent philosophies, then their critique demands that this be presented, especially because there are many who do not share such a view (Marx and Engels 1846; Marcuse 1960; Keat and Urry 1975; Sayer 1979; Collier 1979a). If they do not have such a case, then they presumably also have not considered such pertinent questions as whether or not it is defensible to treat historical materialism as an "holistic philosophy" (p. 31). We would argue that it is not, and that it was precisely Marx's achievement to found a philosophy that avoided the opposite ex- tremes of "atomism" and "holism" (Collier 1979b). By treating the "individual" as an historical, social being, it was possible to regard social relations and institutions as the products of human practice without thereby falling into either the individualist fallacy of unconstrained agency, or the holist fallacy of a transcendental "motor of history" (p. 33). Or, as Marx (1852) put it, "Men make their own history, but not of their own free will, not under circumstances they themselves have chosen but under the given and inherited circumstances with which they are confronted."

We feel that these major omissions in Dun- can and Ley's paper render their account of structural Marxism, Marxist geography, and Marxist social science irresponsible. It is quite insufficient, in our view, to make a brief exonerating statement ("while we do not mean to imply that Marxist geographers are all to be associated with Althusser's extreme version of structuralism," p. 35) and then to treat all Marxist work in geography and much of social science generally as if it were "guilty" of the extreme problems of idealism associated with Althusserian abstraction. As indicated above, this seriously misrepresents the contemporary development of Marxist social science. And as Duncan and Ley have refused to excuse Harvey (1978b) for in- adequacies in his paper that he attributed to lack of time or space (p. 51), we think it only fair that they not be permitted the same excuse for these major silences in their critique.

Logical Errors in the Critique of Marxist Theory, Method, and Philosophy

A second source of misrepresentation in Duncan and Ley's critique is that their arguments concerning Marxist theory, method, and philosophy advance through logical leaps that are difficult to justify in light of the evidence presented. To illustrate this problem, we shall assess the logic and substance of the following central propositions in Duncan and Ley's critique: that Marxist theory suffers from conceptual "ossification" and is therefore inadequate for social explanation; that the use of Marxist theory involves a rejection of the view that people shape history; that the Marxist method of abstraction is necessarily idealist; that the Marxist method of analysis is inherently "economistic"; and finally that a Marxist epistemology entails a commitment to "objective" science, the literal use of theory, and "empirical confusion."

Duncan and Ley begin their argument that Marxist theory is inadequate for social explanation with the assertion that the broad "range of what currently passes for Marxist analysis" renders "the Marxian designation imprecise, if not self-contradictory" (p. 31). Although this statement is offered as evidence that it is difficult to criticize Marxist work, it also serves as the basis for a "functionalist" critique of Marxist theory and analysis: evidence that accords with the authors' a priori assessment of Marxism (such as Althusserian abstraction) functions as the substantive basis of the critique, while contrary evidence (such as the broad scope of Marxist study) is rendered functional to the critique by treating it as if it were necessarily a flaw or "contradiction" within Marxist social science (cf. Duncan and Ley 1982, 41-44). Thus despite the fact that a broad "spectrum of published work" provides evidence con- tradicting Duncan and Ley's claim that Marx- ist theory in geography, (as well as in classical and structural "traditions" (pp. 47-49)) suffers from "conceptual and theoretical stasis," the functionalist logic of the critique permits such evidence to be ignored. The ad- vantage of this form of criticism is that Marx- ist analysts cannot refute the authors' claims about Marxist theory: if they demonstrate



Commentary 141

conceptual flexibility in research, then their field is incoherent; if, on the other hand, they fail to develop theoretical innovations, then they are guilty of "conceptual ossification."

In addition to their illogical exclusion of contrary evidence, Duncan and Ley also pro- tect their claims for the conceptual inadequacy of Marxist theory from "empirical" re- futation by ignoring recent debates in Marxist social science, and by implicitly advocating theoretical eclecticism. The authors' charge that Marxist theory is conceptually limited implies that the range of social questions ad- dressed by Marxist concepts cannot be ex- tended. Yet extensions to the purview of Marx- ist theory such as Wright's (1979) work on contradictory class positions, and analyses of the production and experience of culture (Barrett et al. 1979), have been prominent in contemporary Marxist debates. And insofar as Duncan and Ley's argument that "to the extent that Marxist geographers believe capitalism to be a determining force, other types of explanation are believed unneces- sary, and many important explanatory factors are precluded from the analysis" (p. 37) constitutes a call for a theoretically eclectic alternative to Marxism, it must be deemed a logically inconsistent basis for the rejection of Marxist (and other) social theories. Unless one endorses a theory of the absolute ran- domness of social reality, one's social theory must involve some conception of determina- tion (be it focused on "capitalism," "liber- alism," the individual psyche, or some more complex combination). Every theory has fundamental premises that would be con- tradicted were the premises of other theories to be combined with them. So, for example, it would be inconsistent to attempt to main- tain both that the mode of production of material life establishes ultimate limits to the individual's practical opportunities and experiences and that the individual psyche is the final determinant of human practice (see Keat 1981 on this problem with regard to Habermas's attempt to develop a materialist- psychoanalytic theory of societal development). It is for this reason that we regard Duncan and Ley's implicit advocacy of theoretical eclecticism as an argument against the consistent use of all social theory. And we therefore reject the claim that the

conceptual limitations of Marxist theory render it inadequate for social analysis on the grounds that this proposition rests on the exclusion of relevant evidence and on a logically inconsistent theoretical alternative.

A second proposition in Duncan and Ley's critique of Marxist theory is that the use of Marxist concepts commits one to the view that history and classes have logics or "missions" that have "nothing to do with people's con- sciously trying to 'shape history' " (p. 43). The logical error in this case is that evolutionary terminology is equated with "teleological explanation," where "some Rationality ... is guiding events in the world to some preor- dained goal" (p. 43). Dun1.an and Ley ob- serve, for example, that Marxist geographers have used such phrases as "capitalism ma- tures" in their discussions of the historical development of capitalist societies (p. 43). But the way that their argument is advanced from this observation about language to the conclusion that Marxist explanation in geography ignores human practice is by failing to mention that Marxists regard struggle between classes as the primary source of historical change (Esping-Andersen, Friedland, and Wright 1976). And contrary to the impression created by the authors that most Marxist "traditions" regard class struggles as some- how independent of individual practices, it was by making social practices the fundamental basis of his theory of history that Marx was able to break with the extreme "atomis- tic" or "individualistic" version of materialism espoused by Feuerbach (Suchting 1979). Given the long-standing Marxist emphasis upon human actions in the production of historical outcomes, we regard the posing by Duncan and Ley of terms like "capital" or " potent abstract structures" (p. 55) as "reified entities" with causal power over individual actions, as a fundamental misrepresentation of the place of human agency in Marxist geography and theory generally. The literature that can be cited to refute such an assessment includes recent work by geographers on how class struggle shapes the organization of state institutions and different branches of capitalist industry (e.g., Fincher 1981; Rose 1981; Beamish 1981; Storper and Walker 1980).

A central proposition in Duncan and Ley's critique of the methodology of most Marxist




"traditions" is that Marxist abstraction is idealist. The authors' arguments for this claim, however, involve another logical gap. Be- cause the question of whether or not idealist and materialist forms of abstraction are sig- nificantly different is not considered, the reader is left with the impression that all abstraction is idealist. If this is indeed the case, then substantial justification for this stance is required because (as noted above) there are those who regard concepts abstracted from the material conditions of life as nonidealist (e.g., Zietlin 1981). Moreover, the related charge that Marxists have been unable to overcome the problem of moving between various levels of abstraction and empirical "reality" (pp. 47-50) is advanced not only without assessing relevant Marxist work (Mollenkopf 1981; Gibson 1981), but also without considering whether or not this problem is unique to the Marxist method of abstraction. The latter question is especially important because, without a specific critique of Marxist or structural Marxist abstraction, Duncan and Ley have criticized nonempiricist methodologies generally rather than "structural Marxism and human geography."

A second proposition in Duncan and Ley's critique of Marxist methodology in geography and social science generally is that it is inherently "economistic." We noted above that in order to bring this charge of "economism" against "structuralists in geography" (p. 47) and "Marxian analysis" in general (p. 46) it is necessary to ignore recent analyses of the state (Jessop 1977); of women and the family (Zaretsky 1973); of capitalist culture (Williams 1973, 1981); and of various questions about subjective experience under capitalism (Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies 1978). The logical question raised by these developments, and persistently ignored by Duncan and Ley, is whether or not there is an important difference between materialist and economistic methods of social analysis. We would argue that the strength of Marx's materialist analysis of capitalism was that it de- manded the questioning of capitalist society as a material way of life, and not simply as a type of economy. It was for this reason that Marx hoped to supplement his economic work with a separate analysis of political institutions (see Rodolsky 1977). And it is for the same reason that contemporary historical

materialists are now tackling such difficult questions as the development and human experience of capitalist law (Cotterrell 1981) and the role of scientific practices in the economic, political, and cultural development of capitalist societies (Rose and Rose 1976).

Duncan and Ley's philosophical case against a Marxist approach in human geography rests upon the proposition that a Marx- ist epistemology commits one to a "conventional" or elitist belief in the "objectivity" of scientific knowledge (p. 44), and to the defense of a priori social knowledge (owing to the literal use of theory and lack of empirical "validation" (pp. 54-56)). Once again, the arguments advanced to support this claim suffer from gaps in logic and substantiation. For example, both positivism and structural Marx- ism are condemned for their claims to be "objective" science, and yet no effort is made to examine the very different meanings of "objectivity" in each epistemology. Accord- ing to positivist philosophy, scientific objectivity is achieved when the investigator maintains "value-neutrality" in his/her obser- vations and attempts to invalidate hypotheses by testing them against empirical data. For those who accept a Marxist philosophy, on the other hand, "objectivity" entails a recognition of the antagonistic relations upon which class societies are based and a "value-laden" commitment to test the validity of historical materialist theory in practical struggle (on this topic see Easlea (1973)). Similarly, the authors' argument that "empirical confusion" is the necessary result of the use of structural Marxist theory, because concepts are literally "imposed" on empirical reality (pp. 50-52), fails to consider the contemporary "post- empiricist" understanding that data never test theory and that theory always "appropri- ates" or defines data relevant to it (Laclau 1977; Sayer 1979; Hesse 1980). By ignoring such important differences between positivist and nonpositivist epistemologies, Duncan and Ley commit the logical fallacy of criticiz- ing nonempiricist epistemologies for being nonempiricist (i.e., for having validation procedures that differ from those of empiricist science). The authors further confuse the issue by claiming that "structural Marxism does not always engage in conventional validation procedures" (p. 54) without specifying either the meaning of "conventional," or



Commentary 143

those occasions when "structural Marxism" could be said to engage in such procedures. In view of these weaknesses in their philosophical arguments, we find Duncan and Ley's characterization of contemporary Marx- ism as bedeviled by a "conventional" view of scientific knowledge and a "crisis" of theoretical "literalism" and empirical "hetero- doxy" (pp. 49-50) very unpersuasive indeed.

On the Lack of Clear Alternatives to a Marxist Approach in Geography

A third major shortcoming in Duncan and Ley's critique of Marxist geography and social science is that it fails to specify a clear alternative to Marxist theory, method, and philosophy. This means that the claim that if structural Marxist theory is dispensable, then "a distinctively Marxist identity to empirical study has been severely challenged" (p. 54) remains unsubstantiated. For there are two conditions that would sustain the logic of this argument and yet neither is considered by the authors. First, if "structural theory" ex- hausted Marxist theory in general, then it would necessarily follow that to discard the former would be to abandon a Marxist interpretation of empirical facts. However, as argued above, structural theory does not exhaust Marxist theory in general. Therefore, we are left with a second possibility: if it were shown that the "dispensability" of structural Marxist theory derives from the fact that there exists a theoretical, methodological, and epistemological alternative that is demonstra- bly superior to all Marxist approaches, then a rejection of "structural Marxism" could constitute a severe challenge to Marxist "empirical study." Unfortunately, Duncan and Ley do not provide either a clear alternative or a demonstration of its superiority. It is to the implications of this silence in their critique of Marxist work that we now turn.

At the outset of their discussion, Duncan and Ley suggest that "some might see this paper as an ungracious response to Peet's invitation 'to see radical geography system- atically evaluated for what it has to offer' " (p. 31). As indicated above, we regard their treatment of Marxist geography and social science not as "ungracious," but as mis- leading and irresponsible. What is equally disturbing, in our view, is not that the authors

failed to include supportive comments about Marxist work, but that they did not offer constructive criticisms with regard to such issues as the relationship between "agency and structure" (pp. 38-41). By this we mean that after having rejected Marxist "solutions" to epistemological and theoretical problems as hopelessly inadequate, the authors never explicitly propose and justify an alternative that would resolve the stated difficulties. There are hints, here and there, of the characteristics of a theory that Duncan and Ley would prefer to their interpretation of structural Marxism. It seems to be the case, for example, that the authors are prepared to reject materialist abstraction as too "idealist" and that they advocate a type of theory that is more "empirically testable" (p. 55). A more eclectic conceptual approach seems preferred to the theoretical "closure" attributed to Marxist work (p. 55). Greater consideration of "social" and "psychological" factors (p. 54), and especially of the behavior of individuals (p. 46), seems to be strongly advocated. How- ever, and quite apart from the fact that it is erroneous to criticize Marxism for not possessing these characteristics (because Marx- ism does not claim to have them in the first place), Duncan and Ley do not specify why a theory with these properties would be an im- provement over Marxist social science.

We not only reject those aspects of an alternative approach to human geography that could be distilled from Duncan and Ley's "hints" (i.e., empiricist validation procedures, direct correspondence between theoretical categories and empirical data, theoretical eclecticism, and a focus on psychological and behavioral factors as primary in historical explanation), but we also find that the inadequacy with which their alternative is proposed and justified stifles constructive debate with the authors. If constructive communication is an important element of "more satisfactory scholarship" (p. 31), then it is difficult to un- derstand how scholarship can be advanced without explicit discussion of the alternative(s) to an approach that has been severely criticized.

Conclusion

Three general shortcomings in Duncan and Ley's review of Marxist geography and social




science have been noted in this critique. These are errors of omission in the characterization of "traditions" in Marxist social science; logical inconsistencies in the critique of Marxist theory, method, and philosophy; and the lack of an explicit alternative to a Marxist approach in human geography. We have noted the following vital omissions in the authors' treatment of Marxist "traditions:"

(1) The work of those Marxists who have followed neither the structural nor the historiographic "traditions" is not discussed.

(2) The question of whether or not it is valid to treat Marxist concepts as if they refer solely to material objects is not considered.

(3) The historical significance and context of "structural Marxism" is not specified.

(4) Relevant aspects of the history of Marx- ist geographical work are ignored.

(5) The limits assigned to Marxist geographical work are not specified.

(6) Nonstructuralist approaches in Marxist social science and the participation of geographers in these developments are not considered.

(7) They fail to specify the philosophical bases of Marxist "traditions" and, in particular, to acknowledge the philosophy of historical materialism.

It has been argued that these major omissions lead Duncan and Ley to a superficial characterization of Marxist "traditions" and to an irresponsible account of structural Marxism, Marxist geography, and Marxist social science.

Logical inconsistencies identified in the authors' critique of Marxist theory, method, and philosophy include:

(1) a functionalist interpretation of evidence contrary to their a priori assessment of Marxist theory,

(2) an implicit advocacy of theoretical eclecticism,

(3) misrepresentation of human agency in Marxist theory by ignoring the centrality of class struggle in Marxist explanation,

(4) the conflation of idealist with materialist abstraction,

(5) the conflation of materialist and economistic methods of social analysis, and

(6) the failure to distinguish between positivist and nonpositivist epistemologies.

We have argued that these gaps in logic and substantiation undermine Duncan and Ley's propositions about the theory, method, and philosophy of Marxism. And in the last part of our commentary we have suggested that the authors' failure to propose and justify a clear alternative to Marxist geography has discour- aged constructive debate on the issues raised in their critique.

These shortcomings encourage us to reject Duncan and Ley's pessimistic assessment of Marxist geography and social science. And although we are certainly prepared to agree that there is much challenging work still to be done in developing Marxist social science, especially with regard to ideology, culture, and the importance of political institutions, we prefer to explore new possibilities for a sophisticated, materialist explanation of these phenomena in capitalism. We do not expect our critics to endorse this decision, but we would hope that future "critical analyses" of Marxist work in geography might offer more opportunities for a constructive exchange of ideas between social theorists.

Vera Chouinard and Ruth Fincher, Department of Geography, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ont., L8S 4K1.

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Comment in Reply

CHOUINARD and Fincher have chosen a diversionary procedure to level their

critique. First they spend the bulk of their commentary arguing that we should have written our paper on something other than structural Marxism, and second they make almost no attempt to defend the research of the geographers that we criticized. It would seem they are unwilling or unable to defend this work.

Let us first set out once again what our paper is and is not about. Its title, "Structural Marxism and Human Geography," directs the reader to geographers whose work fits into a structural Marxist perspective. Throughout the paper we make it clear that this is the body of work that we are critiquing. Yet Chouinard and Fincher have chosen to over- look this fact. Throughout their commentary they claim that rather than analyzing structural Marxism in geography we are in fact analyzing all of Marxist geography or even "the contemporary development of Marxist

social science." Having claimed that this is what we are doing, they then take us to task for (a) not analyzing "poststructuralist" Marx- ist geography and (b) not analyzing nonstructuralist Marxist social science. It would at present be a simple enough task to analyze poststructural Marxist geography, for there is so little of it. A handful of articles by geographers are cited, some of which were published after we submitted our paper to the Annals. In fact, Chouinard and Fincher admit that there is very little poststructural work to analyze, even two years after we submitted our final draft, when they write, "If one judges the contributions by geographers to these advances meager in number, one should also recall that much of this work originates in disciplines other than geography (e.g., sociology and political science) and has only recently been available in published form. Geographers have just begun to explore these new perspectives and to acquaint themselves with associated research topics."



Commentary 147

Again, we could hardly have analyzed what geographers have just now "begun to explore." Perhaps it is this very poverty of nonstructural geographic work that leads Chouinard and Fincher to state that our paper is really about Marxist social science in general, a claim they make repeatedly throughout the paper. Having stated that this is our goal, they proceed to admonish us for not having discussed the work of nonstructural Marxists who are not geographers. Having found little in geography to contradict our view, they try fishing in better-stocked waters. We would not be so bold as to undertake an assessment of all Marxian social science. Rather it seemed quite enough to examine the dominant mode of Marxist explanation in geography.

Having restated the focus of our paper, let us now turn to a related issue raised by Chouinard and Fincher. They claim that "by failing to specify their own epistemological and theoretical alternative to a Marxist approach in human geography, the authors have foreclosed constructive debate on the issues raised.". There is some confusion here about the nature of academic criticism. An individual or group of scholars puts forward a theoretical position either in papers explicitly devoted to this task or implicitly in empirical reports. Others who find fault with the particular theory criticize it in terms of such criteria as its model of man, its internal logical con- sistency, its ability to shed light on human action, and so on. Those who hold the theory should be able to defend it on these grounds, and if they are unable to do so, then they should give some thought to its modification. In other words, a theory should be able to withstand this sort of test on its own. The idea that this is not possible and that constructive debate about the merits of a theory can take place only if a kind of comparison test is performed is an elusive suggestion. The comparison test will not necessarily tell one whether a theory is flawed or not. For example, one might put forward two theories for comparison, both of which are severely flawed. Only by submitting a theory to close scrutiny and letting it stand or fall on its own merits can one ascertain its worth. However, if one does not choose to defend the merits of a position, then a debating technique is to shift the attack from one's own position to that of one's critics. What usually happens

here is that each position is attacked and neither thoroughly defended. In fact, it is Chinouard and Fincher's unwillingness to defend structural Marxism in geography that "forecloses constructive debate."

Chouinard and Fincher's ambivalence about the structural work that we criticize emerges, curiously enough, in an attack on us rather than on the geographers who put forward the structural theory. They suggest that we have misguided notions about the nature of Marxism when we are simply quoting the structural geographers. For example, they claim that we are wrong in associating a holistic philosophy with Marxism; if so, what do they make of the explicit claims that Marx- ism is holistic that are made by Harvey, An- derson, Santos, and Walker (Duncan and Ley 1982, 35)? They claim that we should not as- sociate teleology with Marxism and yet, as we demonstrate (Duncan and Ley 1982, 42-43), it is the Marxists themselves who argue such a teleological position. To try, as Chouinard and Fincher do, to separate evolutionism from teleology is unacceptable. Evolutionism is simply a type of teleology propounded by Darwin. Applying this particular version of teleology to society is as suspect a form of explanation as are other forms of teleological explanation (see Giddens 1981).

Our critics state that the structural geographers that we cite do not engage in reified explanation, even though we demonstrate that they do, drawing examples from their work (Duncan and Ley 1980, 35-44). They claim that although these geographers' ex- planations might appear reified, they could not be because Marxism draws upon a relational view. But as we have shown (pp. 33-34), Hegel, from whom Marx received his relational view, treated relations in a reified manner (i.e., all things are internally related to Geist). Contrary to what Chouinard and Fincher believe, therefore, a relational view does not necessarily guarantee that reification is absent. Therefore, whereas a relational view does not necessarily entail reification, we have shown that in the case of the structural geographers it may and indeed often does so.

Similarly, they argue that because structural Marxist geographers talk about class struggle, they could not be engaging in reification. However, this is no guard against



148 Duncan and Ley

reification. The question is not whether actors act, clearly they do, but why do they act? What are the driving forces behind, for example, class struggle? Are these actions con- ceived of as highly determined by a reified, supra-individual system, or is a degree of individual volition to be included in the model of man? We have argued that the structural geographers have a reified and overdeter- mined view which does not grant the degree of individual volition that in fact exists, and we have supported our argument with quota- tions from authors like Harvey, who writes, "Yet this historical mission does not stem from the inherent greed of the capitalist; it arises, rather, out of forces entirely independent of the capitalist's individual will" (Dun- can and Ley 1982, 39). The author is stating that a "historical mission" is being driven by forces entirely independent of individual will. We are simply left to wonder what these supra-individual and, we might add, teleological "forces" might be. And why is there no treatment of individual or group volition or creativity in this model? Surprisingly, Chou- inard and Fincher later in their paper suggest an answer. In discussing what they surmise to be our alternative to structural Marxism they write, "Greater consideration of 'social' and 'psychological' factors, and especially of the behavior of individuals, seems to be strongly advocated. However ... it is erroneous to criticise Marxism for not possessing these characteristics (because Marxism does not claim to have them in the first place)." Our authors have surely erred in suggesting that there are no variants of Marxism that would include any social-psychological factors or would have a concern for the behavior of individuals. Clearly such themes are integral to the writing of such scholars as Raymond Williams or E. P. Thompson. However, we would argue that structural Marxism lacks these characteristics, and it is precisely this which makes it such an impoverished theory. Given this admitted failure to consider individual behavior, or social and psychological factors, it is little wonder that even as seemingly active an endeavor as class struggle should be reified?

A related issue concerns skepticism that we could link idealism to a position that is avow- edly materialist, for it is argued that the two concepts are antithetical. We would respond

by saying that a crude materialism which posits an inert subject of necessity falls back upon idealism to drive that subject. We can scarcely take credit for this insight, for, among others, the link between mechanical materialism and idealism was pointed out by Marx in his critique of Feuerbach.

The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism-that of Feuerbach included-is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is con- ceived only in the form of the object or of con- templation, but not as human sensuous activity, practice, not subjectively. Hence it happened that the active side, in contradistinction to materialism was developed by idealism-but only abstractly, since, of course, idealism does not know real, sensuous activity as such (Marx 1972, 107).

If actors are seen as "mere bearers," abstracted agents of structures, if it is asserted that there is no place in Marxism for "social" or "psychological" factors, nor for the behavior of individuals, then surely Marx would have concluded, as he did upon seeing these same shortcomings in Feuerbach, that under- lying an impoverished materialism is the driving force of idealism, developed "abstractly" as it is in structural Marxism. It was precisely for this reason that the Marxian historian E. P. Thompson argued that it is structural Marxism which Marx "would have recognized instantly as an idealism" (Thompson 1978, 205). As a result of Chouinard and Fincher's in-

troducing the diversions of a literature we did not claim to address, the criticisms we raised against a structural Marxist tradition in geography remain intact and scarcely challenged. The challenges the commentators do raise are not substantial and commonly appear as language games, allowing assertions and nominalism to take the place of real argument. For example, they simply assert that there is no problematic relation between theoretical abstraction and empirical work. This is no answer to a closely documented six-page discussion in our paper, which includes Harvey's (1975) more perceptive remark that "we have to force an intersection between the theoretical abstractions, on the one hand, and the materialist investigations of actual historical configurations on the other" (our emphasis). It was this task, moreover, of "transformation from the general to the concrete which comprised the



Commentary 149

central thrust of Marx's unfinished work." Chouinard and Fincher clearly disagree with Harvey and many other social theorists (e.g., Gouldner 1980) in failing to perceive serious unresolved problems in forcing the intersection.

Perhaps they might respond that it is not what they write but what they mean that should be examined (as they state at one point in defense of structuralist work), but such linguistic dexterity raises the suspicion that semantic obfuscation is a shelter to con- ceal fuzzy thinking. In this context a major theme of their essay is that we do not treat historical materialism as such. Conveniently, however, in place of itemizing the differences between historical materialism and the literature we criticize, Chouinard and Fincher primarily refer the reader to a reading list. This overlooks the point that a number of authors whom we cite refer to their own work as materialist, including Harvey (as is exem- plified in his quotation above). Thus once again there is an internal and unresolved contradiction in the authors' commentary. Moreover, merely to cite historical materialism as a label is no argument. Though such nominalism is not uncommon among Marxist geographers, it is no substitute for a real argument, which would need to address certain weaknesses of the position (Giddens 1981). One of the key weaknesses is a dif- fuseness, which can embrace authors as disparate as Harvey and J. B. Jackson (Punter 1982), or Raymond Williams and Vidal de la Blache (Gregory 1981). So much elasticity has been introduced in such a perspective ("vac- uous pluralism," as one commentator has termed it) that it is difficult to see that it has theoretical edge and specificity (Ley 1982). Historical materialism in these terms seems more of a linguistic construction than a theoretically integrated position.

This is one example of a tendency by Chouinard and Fincher to skate over difficult problems with a jejeune optimism that does not acknowledge the existence of such problems. They are critical that our paper does not cover the whole range of Marxist traditions, yet they fail to appreciate that the very existence of these traditions with their acute internal disputes points to serious unresolved contradictions within the Marxist paradigm (and also Marxist practice), contradictions that some authors (Thompson

1978; Gouldner 1980) see as of crisis propor- tion. Symptomatic is their deflection of economism as a serious charge. We cited no fewer than six contemporary authorities fa- vorably disposed to Marxist analysis who identified the abiding centrality of this problem in Marxist scholarship, and a number of examples from the geographical literature. But for our authors economism is a non- issue, either a charge that has not been sub- stantiated or else a problem that has now been resolved. It is worth recalling Stedman Jones's more accurate remark that "they (Marx and Engels) did not resolve the problem, any more than we have" (Stedman Jones 1979).

A related point concerns the authors' views on conceptual flexibility. If developed by Marx- ists it is theoretically innovative, if suggested by us it is theoretically eclectic. Aside from the imposition of bald value judgments, there is a more important issue at stake. First, the point at debate is not one of theoretical eclecticism but of theoretical adequacy; indeed, to many people Marx's own attempted synthesis of British political economy, French socialism, and German social philosophy would appear highly eclectic. Such is often the norm with creative thinkers. Our paper demonstrates why the literature we examine is not theoretically adequate. One objection in our argument is directed against its reductionism, and an attraction toward reductionism seems to be espoused by Chouinard and Fincher in their preference for social theory that "establishes ultimate limits" and poses a "final determinant." Some very difficult questions are engaged here, for although reductionism in the social sciences may be logically correct it is commonly simplistic in an explanatory sense. On the other hand, analysis that is more consistent with empirical circumstances normally intro- duces explanatory contingencies that fall outside the range of reductionist theory. In- cumbent upon our authors is to demonstrate how their materialism simultaneously retains a specific theoretical identity and is adequate at the level of historical explanation. An alternative position following such varied authors as Giddens (1979) or Thompson (1978) would make lesser claims for their theoretical structure, treating theory as contingent or even as a heuristic (in a noninstrumental



150 Duncan and Ley

sense) in order to provide more adequate explanation.

But Chouinard and Fincher have closed off this option for themselves through their ideological commitment. For in a revealing passage they acknowledge that objectivity for Marxists entails "a 'value-laden' commitment to test the validity of historical materialist theory in practical struggle." Theoretical reductionism is thereby ultimately a political necessity, not an empirical one. So, too, verification of a theoretical position must be political rather than empirical. Indeed, following the neo-Kantians, facts are discounted as a mere construction of theory. There are two final points to be made here. First, if empirical validation is discounted, what are we to make of the commentators' repeated allusions to "evidence" in challenging our critique? At one point they use the arguments of "evidence" five times in two consecutive sen- tences. This sounds like a less lofty and more defensible usage than their own ideological

standard for testing the truth-value of propositions against empirical data. But Marxist theory, they argue, must not be tested in such a manner. Instead, it must meet the judgment of history as a source of liberating practice. E. P. Thompson has cited history's negative verdict against this form of validation of theoretical Marxism: "The greatest ideal ob- stacle has been the caricature of socialism presented by the fact of socialist states" (Thompson 1978, 169). For Thompson this represents a political crisis that he copes with through a romantic utopianism for the future (pp. 169-71). But for Chouinard and Fincher (unlike Thompson) the historical record poses both an intellectual and a political crisis, for political change is set up as the guarantor of valid theory. Utopianism may be a solace in politics; it is far less easy to justify within the realm of scientific discourse. The absence of an adequate verification procedure remains as a crippling problem.

James Duncan and David Ley, Department of Geography, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia V6T 1 W5

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Chouinard.fincher - Critique of Structural Marxism and Human Geography

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