Chinese Grocery’s Age Of Empires - oliverwyman.com€¦ · chinese grocery’s age of empires two...

CHINESE GROCERY’S AGE OF EMPIRESTWO GIANT GROUPINGS ARE CARVING UP THE MARKET

CHINESE GROCERY’S AGE OF EMPIRES

Chinese retail is evolving into two rival empires, each dominated by competing e-commerce

giants. One realm is centered on Alibaba, which owns two of China’s largest e-commerce

platforms, Taobao and TMall, as well as an electronic payments system, AliPay. The other is an

alliance between JD, a leading online retailer, and Tencent, an internet and digital-technology

conglomerate that owns WeChat, China’s most popular social-media app. These two empires

already own the digital lives of Chinese consumers today, where the average Chinese spends

over 60% of their mobile app usage on either ecosystem.

Now Alibaba and Tencent/JD have set their sights on physical retail, including acquiring stakes

in six of China’s top 10 hypermarkets, the country’s biggest electronics retailer, one of the largest

department stores and the largest commercial property and entertainment conglomerate.

Exhibit 1: Empire of JD/Tencent and Alibaba

SocialPhysical retail

Offline influence

Online influence

Online retail

Experiece

JD/Tencent

Alibaba Group

Mobike, QQ University, Tencent Cloud, QQ Gaming, DiDi ChuXing

Ali Health, Taobao Education, Amap.com, Xiami, Eleme, DiDi ChuXing, Ali Cloud

Vip.com, Little Red Book, YHD.com, Zhuanzhuan

Walmart, Yonghui, Wanda, Carrefour

Tencent Video, Dianping, Sogou, QQ Music, WeChat Pay

WeChat Pay, JD logistics, Meituan

WeChat, QQ, LY.com, Qzone, Pengyou.com

Intime Retail, New Huadu, Bailian, Century Mart, Sanjiang, Sun Art, Hema

MGTV, Yicai.com, 36Kr, SCMP, Alipay

YTO express, Cainiao, Alipay, Ali LST, Koubei

Etao, Taobao, Hema, Tmall, Suning.com

Sina Weibo, Momo, Qyer.com, AcFun, Youku

Source: Oliver Wyman analysis

Underlying their growing dominance is Chinese consumers’ enthusiasm for online shopping:

In 2006, just 11 percent of the population enjoyed internet access; today, more than 460 million

Chinese – one-third of the population – regularly shop online.

Exhibit 2: Number of online shoppers in China from 2006 to 2016IN MM

2006

500

0

250

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

33.6 46.4 74.0 108.0160.5 194.0

242.0301.9

361.4413.3

466.7

Source: CNNIC, Statista 2017

Copyright © 2018 Oliver Wyman 3

Unlike in Europe and North America, food shopping – the largest retail segment – is moving

online too, encouraged by densely populated cities that favor rapid, efficient home delivery.

As a result, nearly 10 percent of the Chinese population shops for groceries online, compared

to just 3 percent in the United States and 6 percent in the United Kingdom, Europe’s highest

rate. And room for expansion remains: Already, an estimated 5 percent of Chinese shoppers

buy groceries exclusively online, indicating plenty of potential growth if more people stop

shopping for food in physical stores. To gain still more customers, the e-commerce giants are

introducing new shopping formats – dubbed O2O, or online-to-offline – that blend online

shopping’s convenience and wealth of information with the social experience and physical

contact with products that people enjoy in traditional, brick-and-mortar stores.

An important foundation of the tech giants’ retail innovations is their dominance in mobile

payments, of which 97 percent are processed by either Alibaba or Tencent. Mobile payments

are already used for 35 percent of grocery purchases, and even when customers shop outside

the big e-commerce platforms, they can still be a valuable source of data. Through the

payments systems, the empires learn where, when, and what customers are buying, and

complement it with the rest of their digital ecosystem to see which websites they like to

visit, the apps they use, and whom they follow on social media.

Exhibit 3: Development of mobile payment landscape in China

MARKET SHARE BY PLAYER2017H1

MARKET SIZE OF MOBILE PAYMENT IN CHINAIN TN RMB

20

2013 2014 2015 2016 2017F

120

40

60

80

100

0 18

16

35

108

2%

65%

32%

AliPay WeChat Pay Others

202%

Source: Mobile payment association, Yiguan, Union Pay, Oliver Wyman analysis

China’s traditional supermarkets and convenience stores can’t compete with this onslaught,

and both their like-for-like sales and their margins are declining (see Exhibit 4).

But they may survive in some form with help from the online giants themselves. Both Alibaba

and JD have developed logistics systems based on centralized, large-scale networks of

warehouses, which can replace traditional distribution. For supermarkets, the online giants

can thus provide the means to deliver fresh food quick enough to satisfy demanding Chinese

home cooks. They have also developed software that helps old-fashioned corner shops more

easily access and tap into their logistics system to directly order goods.


Exhibit 4: Declining performance to traditional big box grocers

LFL REVENUE GROWTH RATE EVOLUTION BY PLAYER, 2010-2016IN %

OPERATING MARGIN BY PLAYER2012 VS. 2016IN %

San Jiang4

Yonghui

Wumart1

CRE1

2012 2016

-4.63

2.03

3.0

4.42

3.5

3.0

4.2 2.9

5

10

15

0

-5

-10

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

1. 2015 number for CRE and Wumart is as of H1 FY2015; CRE figures are based on retail segment result figure as reported in the annual report “Segment Result“, mainly consisting of CR Vanguard, Chinese Arts & Crafts, CRCare, VIVO, Pacific Coffee, etc. | 2. Based on retail segment result figure as reported in the annual report “Segment Result” representing earnings before interest income, finance costs and taxation, to which we’ve added back the annual net gain on disposal of non-core investments and valuation surplus on investment properties | 3. As of 2015 due to data availability | 4. 2011-2014 LFL not available; 2015-2016 comparison on same store revenue growth; includes convenience store etc

Source: Corporate annual reports, Investor presentations, Analyst reports, Oliver Wyman analysis

Both empires are building their O2O power through three plays, each of which blends their

online capabilities with offline stores in new ways.

Exhibit 5: Future of retail in China: Major plays by the empires

Experiments with new retail formats

1Start to open own O2O retail formats to showcase what “future” looks like

Strategic partnership with traditional big box retailers

2Strategically invest in offline giants to facilitate their transformation and realize synergy

Reinvention of traditional “mom and pop” shops

3Capture the B2B opportunity to have fewer layers, higher efficiency, and more transparency within RTM, and disrupt traditional distributors/wholesalers

Stay in the center of retail ecosystem and interact with

every stakeholder

Consumers (multiple layers of)Distributors/wholesalers

Retailers

Brands

1 2

3e-Commerce platform

Already became the largest players in China grocery market

Taobao.com, YHD.com, JD,

Tmall.com

Ali/JD’s retail

empire

Lianhua, Quik, Walmart,

Bailian, RT-Mart, Yonghui,

Carrefour

Ali LST, JD Xintonglu

Hema, 7 Fresh, JD

Convenience store, Tmall

Xiaodian

Alibaba Group, JD, Tencent



EXPERIMENTS WITH NEW RETAIL FORMATS

The first play is the development of new formats that blend digital and physical features to

create imaginative new solutions. Many large supermarkets worldwide now offer online

services, where customers can order via a website and have food delivered. But these mainly

work as parallel services to traditional shopping in physical supermarkets.

Exhibit 6: Overview of new retail format development

Fresh supermarket

Unmanned retail

Alibaba Group JD/Tencent Other players

On its own By affiliated retailers On its own By affiliated retailers

• Hema

• F2 Fast & Fresh (Hema)

• 7 Fresh (JD)

• Zhangyu (Meituan)

JD unmanned store

• Haiwuhui (New Huadu)

• RT-Fresh

• RISO

• Lianhua Jingxuan (Lianhua & Bailian)

• Bingo Box

• Super Species (Yonghui)

• Hyper-mart (Bubugao)

• Auchan Minute (Auchan)

• Suning Biu (Suning)

• Fresh Ideas (Bu Bu Gao)

• Sp@ce (Tian Hong)

• Bingo Box

• Xingbianli

Source: Analyst reports, Company annual report, Oliver Wyman analysis

At Alibaba’s Hema stores, customers don’t have to go to checkout counters; they can pay by

smartphone. Many don’t take their purchases with them; the store sends a delivery van. And

some don’t even want all their food at home; supermarket staff members cook some of it for

eating in the store.

Exhibit 7: Key features of new “O2O” stores – Hema example

ASSORTMENT AND PRODUCT DISPLAY

1. WELL PACKED HIGH QUALITY FRESH PRODUCTS

• Get assured that products are kept fresh and good quality even with packaging

• Gradually get used to it once customers build trust with Hema

2. BASKETS ON THE FLYING RAIL

• Items picked from the store and put on a flying rail to get it delivered to your home within 30 mins

• Feel comfortable and convinced that the future online order enjoy the same product quality as in o�ine stores

3. IN-STORE DINING

• Buy high quality sea food with low price

• Enjoy in-store dining together with grocery shopping

4. HEMA APP TO CHECK OUT AND ALIPAY TO PAY

• Get all purchase histories through App

• Facilitate next purchase online if customers want to buy same products

STORE SET-UP

IN-STORE EXPERIENCE

CHECK-OUT


1


Hema stores aim to give shoppers the best of both worlds: the chance to see food before

purchase combined with online shopping’s detailed product information, quick payment,

and home delivery: To ensure customers get their food fresh, it arrives at their homes within

30 minutes. JD is experimenting with unmanned stores, uses mirrors, cameras, and smart

shopping carts to see which products customers are looking at and taking from shelves.

Then the store can provide them with information – and check what they’re walking out with.

More generally, this kind of model will often feature in-house apps, digital price tags, self-

service checkouts, and automated shopping carts. In the background will be a double-duty

logistics hub that serves both the physical store and deliveries from O2O orders, whether

placed online in in-store.

Early signs indicate that O2O retail will go beyond an interesting experiment and significantly

change the retail landscape. Hema stores are already attracting young, wealthy, tech-savvy

shoppers, a coveted group. They increasingly trust the Hema brand and are more willing to buy

fresh food online.

Exhibit 8: Profile of Hema shoppers

AGE MIXWHICH AGE GROUP DO YOU BELONG TO?IN RMB

20%

Hemashoppers1

Othershoppers2

40%

60%

80%

100%

0%

INCOME MIXWHAT IS YOUR MONTHLY HOUSE-HOLD INCOME? AFTER-TAX IN RMB

Hemashoppers

Othershoppers2

ONLINE SHOPPING (FMCG ONLY)DO YOU HAVE EXPERIENCE SHOPPING ONLINE FOR FMCG PRODUCTS?IN RMB

Hemashoppers

Othershoppers2

5,000 and below

4%8%

34%

54%37%

45%

13%

5%

6%

19%

34%

41%

19%

11%

50%

19%

69%

31%38%

62%

10,000 - 19,999

5,000 - 9,999

20,000 - and above

30 and below

41-50

31-40

51 and above

NoYes

Hema Shoppers show more interest in online shopping for FMCG products

Hema shoppers have higher income level than other consumers

Hema shoppers are younger than other consumers

1. Incl. all shoppers w/different shopping frequency in Hema | 2. Refer to those consumers who are aware of these new concept stores in the catchment, but never visited it

Source: Consumer survey (N=656,Oct 26-Nov 1, 2017), Oliver Wyman analysis


We estimate that O2O – that is, sales via the app for home delivery, rather than products

checked out in the traditional way – contributes as much as 60 percent of Hema revenues.

Though stores with O2O features have been expensive to set up and their initial running

costs are high, the O2O contribution has boosted productivity, thus keeping losses marginal.

With further maturity and greater scale, they should soon be able to break even. We believe

there is potential for at least 1,000 stores in prime locations in major cities with total revenues

of 200 billion yuan.

Exhibit 9: P&L estimate of a Hema store

A MATURE STANDARD HEMA STORE AT 4,000 SQMAS % OF STORE REVENUE

Gross margin

25

5

10

15

20

-5

23-24

Markdown Storerental

In-storeoverhead

Homedelivery

overhead

Logistics Other Operatingprofit

0

5

3-5

c.4

c.3

5-7

3-4c.-3%

(on avg.)

Source: Store visits, Primary research, Research reports, Oliver Wyman analysis


STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP WITH TRADITIONAL BIG BOX RETAILERS

The second major strategic play consists of partnerships between online stores and large,

traditional supermarkets. Big-box retailers have tried their own O2O and online shopping

services in the past. Hypermarket chain RT-mart launched B2C online platform Feiniu.com

in 2014, while Carrefour China tried a similar system a year later in Shanghai. But these and

other initiatives have failed.

One reason for such failures is that traditional retailers lack distribution capabilities of their

own: Fresh food typically requires 30-minute delivery, which is only possible with a logistics

operation that is complex, sophisticated, and large-scale. Another is that they do not naturally

generate O2O traffic. This is something that internet and e-commerce companies do through

their contact at multiple touch points in customers’ daily lives, such as payment services, social

media, and e-commerce purchases. So, traditional retailers have little option but to join one

of the tech empires.

A number of alliances have been announced in the past few years. The most recent came in

January 2018, when Tencent and YongHui Superstores agreed to take a stake in Carrefour

China, as part of a plan to work on smart retail, mobile payments, and data analysis.

Exhibit 10: Key M&A/partnership deals in China grocery retail

2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Today

March

Tencent invested 214 million USD to become 3rd largest shareholder of JD at that time

JD, Tencent

June – December

Walmart bought c.10% of JD public shares and became 3rd largest shareholder of JD at that time

Walmart, JD

January

Tencent and Yonghui agreed to take a stake in Carrefour China business

Tencent, YongHui, Carrefour

November

Ali acquired 32% shares of Sanjiang Group – the largest grocery chain in Zhejiang

Alibaba, SanJiang

August

JD acquired 10% stake in Yonghui and formed strategic partnership

JD, Yonghui

May

Ali acquired 18% public shares of Lianhua supermarket and became 2nd largest shareholder

Alibaba, LianHua

November

Ali invested 2.9 billion USD in Sun Art Retail Group and formed strategic partnership

Alibaba, Sun Art


2


These partnerships show early signs of success thanks to complementary strengths, as

technology from the online retailers helps the brick-and-mortar stores generate incremental

revenue. For example, Alibaba installed shelves from its Tmall Supermarket online grocery

service in RT-mart branches and started to offer one-hour home delivery for products on

these shelves. Next, Alibaba is likely to help RT-mart optimize its in-store O2O infrastructure

through an improved app, greater integration with backend, traffic help from Taobao and

TMall, and support for delivery. In turn, RT-mart could strengthen Alibaba’s grocery supplier

management and store operation capabilities. It could also provide valuable data to Alibaba

on customers’ buying habits.

Exhibit 11: O2O business contribution in major grocery retailers

% OF ORDERS/PURCHASES PER DAY1

Carrefour(before recent

acquisition)

100

20

40

60

80

Walmart Sanjiang1 RT-mart3

0

O2O

In-store

c.99 >95 90-95 85-90 c.85

c. 1<5 5-10 10-15 10-15

Super Species2

O2O order #per day

O2Oplatforms

EcommercePartner

Format

c.50 c.100 150-200 c.300 c.800

Hyper Hyper Super Super Hyper

None JD Alibaba JD Alibaba

Carrefour/Meituan

JD Daojiamainly

Meituanmainly

Yonghui/JD Daojia

RT-mart/Meituan

Level of change

W/o eCommerce partner

W/ eCommerce partner but no store upgrade

W/ eCommerce partner and store upgrade

1. Not all stores operate O2O | 2. The online order # only accounts for c.5% in Yonghui Bravo Luban Rd. Store in Shanghai | 3. A new format store located in Yangpu, Shanghai

Source: Primary research, Store visits, Desktop research, Oliver Wyman analysis

Walmart has a strategic partnership with JD which is using its O2O unit JD Daojia as the service

platform for more than 150 Walmart stores in order to attract online traffic. Walmart is currently

planning to upgrade its stores in China to support O2O services, for example by adding picking

areas in store warehouses.


REINVENTION OF TRADITIONAL “MOM AND POP” SHOPS

The third strategic play is to reinvent small, family stores. Traditional stores still account for

half the sales of fast-moving consumer goods in China, much of them going through the

more than 7 million family-run stores that dominate retail outside big cities. Since early

2017, JD and Alibaba have been converting these into franchises. These stores are rebranded

under the Tmall/JD umbrella and offer new services, such as bill-paying. In addition, each

store is unique in its product offerings, as store owners receive data-based curation advice

so that they stock the optimal product selection based on its neighborhood: infant milk in

a neighborhood with lots of babies and pet supplies if many residents keep dogs or cats.

Stores’ procurement processes also improve dramatically. Small stores have traditionally

been served by a network of multi-layered distributors and wholesalers, which often come

with troublesome requirements such as minimum purchase quantities. The two e-commerce

giants have developed ordering systems that store owners can operate on their martphones:

Alibaba’s Ling Shou Tong (LST) system and JD’s Xin Tong Lu (XTL). Goods arrive from centralized

warehouses in less than three days and often on the day the order is placed – in contrast to

delays of weeks with traditional wholesalers. The scale of the alliances gives them leverage over

the product brands, resulting in better margins both for the stores and for JD and Alibaba.

Exhibit 12: Disruption of traditional distribution model with B2B ordering tools

Brands

Tier 1 distributors

Wholesalers/low tier

distributors(gradually phase out)

Less in # and layer

B2B ordering tools (mainly

Ali and JD ecosystem)

Chained retailers Independent retailers

JD Xintonglu, Ali LST


3


Exhibit 13: JD Xin Tong Lu vs. Alibaba Ling Shou Tong

DIGITAL SELF-OPERATED RESELLER: JD XIN TONG LU DIGITAL PLATFORM: ALIBABA LING SHOU TONG

Alibaba’s warehouse

Deliver product via

Internet B2B players’

warehouse

3b

Alibaba

2Place order1

Small retailers

JD’s warehouse

Brands

Deliver products

Sell products and send

products to warehouse

03

JD

Arrange delivery2

Brands’ warehouse

Inform brands of the

order details

3a Deliver product via

brands own warehouse

Regardless where inventory is,

brands own the inventory

Very small proportion of the business for now

Information flow Product flow

MAJOR DIFFERENCE OF TWO MODELS

Stock ownership (working capital management)

Level of transaction visibility to brands

Decision power of assortment and pricing

JD

Small retailers

Place order1

Brands

Mid-depending on JD’ willingness to share information

JD to decide

High

Brands to decide

Brands/distributors

Source: Primary Research, Oliver Wyman analysis

Tmall was planning on 10,000 such franchises in 2017, while JD has said it is aiming for one

million by 2021. In addition to the customer data and insights they can capture from these

expansions, Alibaba and JD are likely to dominate the growing market for ordering systems,

which could be worth around 400 billion yuan over the next five years.

Exhibit 14: Number of registered shops

0.4

0.8

2016 2017

0

0.2

0.5

2016 2017

0.1

0.7

JD XIN TONG LUIN MM

ALIBABA LING SHOU TONG



CONCLUDING REMARKS

As O2O becomes the new normal in retail, the two alliances will act as both players in and

facilitators of these new models. Traditional retailers may start to test dark stores in selected

regions, and even the smallest stores are using the giants’ ordering systems.

To facilitate these combinations of e-commerce and traditional retail, a wave of acquisitions and

partnerships has taken place over the past four years. Alibaba has made strategic investments

totaling $21 billion in retail alone in just the past two years. The two empires already account

for around a tenth of grocery retail, and these plays will attract more consumers through

different activities and channels. Their share of grocery shopping could increase to around

30 percent over the next five years, when it could be worth around 4,000 billion yuan in gross

merchandise value.

Exhibit 15: GMV projection in the long-term (FMCG)

IN BN RMB

e-Commerce platforms2 (FMCG)

“New concept” O2O retailers3+B2B initiatives+Total GMV=

Alibaba Group JD/Tencent

c.1,800 in GMVTaobao.com, Tmall.com

c.500 in GMVJD

c.1,000 in GMVHema, Sun Art, New Huadu, Bailian, Sanjiang

c.300 in GMVYonghui Superstores, 7 Fresh, Walmart, Carrefour

c.200 in GMVAli LST

c.200 in GMVJD Xintonglu

c.3,000 c.1,000

1. 5 years’ projection; for the GMV of Hema, Ali LST, JD XTL, “theoretical” full potential is used for this calculation | 2. Ali current FMCG GMV is c.410 bn, JD current FMCG GMV is c.100 bn; assume c.30% CAGR for both players in FMCG categories in the next five years; for JD, YHD GMV is excluded as it remains a very small proportion (<5%) of JD’s FMCG GMV and is likely to shrink over the years | 3. Grocery retail only; for Ali system, assume 40% stores will be turned into Hema stores; rest of the offline GMV may grow at the same rate of RT Mart (4%); in addition, all stores have c.50% sales uplift from O2O

Source: Analyst reports, Oliver Wyman analysis

Independent supermarkets and hypermarkets will find the new environment hard. They

typically operate under franchise models that are ineffective due to a lack of centralized control

over store operations and products. Survival will call for drastic change, but we believe this is

unlikely under their current setup. Most already operate with thin or negative margins and may

not have sufficient funds to invest.

Some leading convenience stores should be able to survive on their own in the short term.

7-11 and Lawson, for instance, will continue to benefit from impulse buying. Moreover, they

still have room for expansion to meet unfulfilled demand in lower-tier cities. But over the

long term, growth will stagnate even in these convenience stores, and they will come under

threat from the revival of family-run stores under the JD and Alibaba franchise networks.


So, retailers need to plan for how to function in a world dominated by the two empires. The

first step is to build a clear plan for strategic alliances that leverage the empires’ tools and

strengths. These include online traffic resources, technology capabilities that make better

use of physical retailers’ customer transaction data to inform buying and merchandising

decisions, and the integration of online and offline aspects of their business. In the case of

sub-scale smaller stores and chains that are rapidly losing their ability to compete, the online

platforms may prove to be of help in areas where physical hypermarkets traditionally had

an advantage, such as product assortment, procurement, and supply chain management.

However, if a store is not be viable even after these potential improvements, its owners should

consider switching to another business model, reducing size, or simply shutting down.

Brands, too, need to figure out the best ways to engage the new tech empires. Just as anchor

tenants in malls get preferential treatment thanks to their role in attracting shoppers,

brands should establish themselves as part of store networks’ core propositions, so that

they benefit from prominent display and favorable financial terms. They should work with

the tech giants to make distribution more efficient, while also maintaining relationships

with other distributors – if these survive – to avoid being completely dependent on the

e-commerce giants.

It is inevitable that the shape and future of the supermarket and hypermarket industry will be

strongly influenced by the tech empires. To survive and thrive, incumbent retailers need to

find ways to partner or co-exist.

Copyright © 2018 Oliver Wyman

All rights reserved. This report may not be reproduced or redistributed, in whole or in part, without the written permission of Oliver Wyman and Oliver Wyman accepts no liability whatsoever for the actions of third parties in this respect.

The information and opinions in this report were prepared by Oliver Wyman. This report is not investment advice and should not be relied on for such advice or as a substitute for consultation with professional accountants, tax, legal or financial advisors. Oliver Wyman has made every effort to use reliable, up-to-date and comprehensive information and analysis, but all information is provided without warranty of any kind, express or implied. Oliver Wyman disclaims any responsibility to update the information or conclusions in this report. Oliver Wyman accepts no liability for any loss arising from any action taken or refrained from as a result of information contained in this report or any reports or sources of information referred to herein, or for any consequential, special or similar damages even if advised of the possibility of such damages. The report is not an offer to buy or sell securities or a solicitation of an offer to buy or sell securities. This report may not be sold without the written consent of Oliver Wyman. 14

Copyright © 2018 Oliver Wyman

AUTHORS WAI-CHAN CHAN Global Consumer Goods Practice Leader Oliver Wyman [email protected] +852 2201 1702 RICHARD MCKENZIE Partner, Oliver Wyman Retail & Consumer Goods [email protected] +852 2201 1703 JAMES YANG Principal, Oliver Wyman Retail & Consumer Goods [email protected] +852 2201 1715

JOHN HO Janchor [email protected] +852 3665 8823 SHEN LI Janchor [email protected] +852 3665 8823 YUBO GONG Janchor [email protected] +852 3665 8823

ABOUT OLIVER WYMAN Oliver Wyman is a global leader in management consulting that combines deep industry knowledge with specialized expertise in strategy, operations, risk management, and organization transformation. Oliver Wyman’s global Operations Practice specializes in end-to-end operations transformation capabilities to address costs, risks, efficiency and effectiveness. Our global team offers a comprehensive and expert set of functional capabilities and high-impact solutions to address the key issues faced by Chief Operating Officers and Chief Procurement Officers across industries. In the Distribution and Wholesale practice, we draw on unrivaled customer and strategic insight and state-of-the-art analytical techniques to deliver better results for our clients. We understand what it takes to win in distribution and wholesale: an obsession with attracting, serving, and growing customers, constant dedication to operational excellence, and a relentless drive to improve capabilities. We have a track record of helping clients win in this environment, creating real competitive advantage and driving significant growth. We believe our hands-on approach to making change happen is truly unique – and over the last 25 years, we’ve built our business by helping distributors and wholesalers build theirs. Oliver Wyman is a strategic advisor to the NAW and sponsors a number of NAW roundtable events for companies with revenues $1 BN+. www.oliverwyman.com

ABOUT JANCHOR Established in 2009, Janchor Partners takes a long-term industrialist mindset in investing in companies that have superior business models, favorable growth prospects and the potential to take advantage of long-term positive structural dynamics of Asia countries and economies. Janchor Partners’ ability to invest for the long-term is strengthened by its investment partners, comprising high quality global institutional investors including family offices, university endowments, foundations and pension funds, who commit their capital to Janchor Partners for multi-year periods. This in turn enables Janchor Partners to build strong and meaningful relationships with its investee companies. www.janchorpartners.com

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