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China’s Participation in the UN Security Council

Joel Wuthnowjrw2124@columbia.edu

Hong Kong Political Science AssociationAugust 21, 2009

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Argument

• China has become a highly engaged actor in the UN Security Council, which itself has taken a much more active role in collective security since the end of the Cold War.

• China’s positions in Council deliberations are pragmatic and instrumental, not ideological. It is especially motivated by two calculations: strategic interests and political reputation vis-à-vis the international community.

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The Post-Cold War Security Council

• Cold War: superpower contestation; frequent vetoes; few sanctions; “traditional” peacekeeping; rare invocation of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

• Post-Cold War: consensus-oriented; few vetoes; adoption of sanctions; “non-traditional peacekeeping;” frequent use of Chapter VII.

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The UNSC: Cold War vs. Post-19901946-1989 1990-2008

Security Council meetings/year

67.5 166.1

Vetoes/year 5.3 (1946-1985) 2.4 (1986-2009)

Resolutions/year 15 63.8

Chapter VII Resolutions - Total

8 423

New Sanctions Committees – Total

2 21

New Peacekeeping Operations – Total

18 45

Peacekeeping Personnel 17,900 (1989) 91,300 (2009)

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China’s Path to Engagement

• 1971-1982: Passive learner. Frequent abstentions on peacekeeping votes. Aligned with the Third World.

• 1982-1992: Increasing engagement. Begins to take initiative.

• 1992-present: Active engagement. Approval of most resolutions. Participation in PKOs.

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Voting with the Rest

1971-1981

1982-1985

1986-1990

1991-2000

2001-2008

0.00%10.00%20.00%30.00%40.00%50.00%60.00%70.00%80.00%90.00%

100.00%

voting for passed resolutions

voting for passed resolu-tions

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China’s Troop Contribution to UN Peacekeeping

2000 2002 2004 2006 20080

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

ChinaUSAFrance

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China’s Strategic Rationale

• The Security Council as a vehicle to check U.S. unilateralism.

• Building an image of a “responsible great power” that accepts pre-existing institutions and norms.

• Veto power inherent influence on a range of regional issues, from East Asia to the Middle East to Africa.

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Cooperativeness

• Post-Cold War voting record: 4 vetoes, 49 abstentions, 1149 affirmative votes. Worked to keep Iraq (2003) off the agenda.

• Contention difficult to observe, because most of it will have happened prior to the final text that is voted on.

• Nevertheless, China’s position impacts the extent to which others (e.g. the West) is able to accomplish viz. sanctions, PKO mandates.

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Chinese vetoes, 1990-2008Date Issue Effect Reason Note

1/10/1997 Guatemala Prevent military observer mission

Taiwan

2/25/1999 Macedonia Discontinue UNPREDEP mission

Taiwan

1/12/2007 Myanmar Fail to condemn Myanmar regime

jurisdiction w/ Russia

7/11/2008 Zimbabwe Fail to approve sanctions

Jurisdiction w/ Russia

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Two Logics of Action

• Logic of Appropriateness: Positions determined by consistency with prior-established norms and values. China’s positions should be based on sovereignty concerns, non-use of force.

• Logic of Consequences: Positions determined in relation to material (economic/security) interests. China should respond to two types of calculations: strategic and political.

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Cases: North Korea & Sudan

• North Korea: Nuclear detonation prompts re-evaluation of strategy support for Chapter VII resolutions, new sanctions.

• Sudan: Prospect of Western intervention and boycott of “genocide Olympics” causes PRC to pressure Sudan to allow UN-AU hybrid force.

• Both cases involve territorial security. Strategic calculations apparent, political reputation less vital. Norms as post-hoc justification.

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Cooperation Mechanisms

• When the issue at stake is central to China’s perceived interests, there is probably little its interlocutors can do to affect its position. But these issues should be relatively few.

• When the issue is more peripheral, social pressure may be employed by tying China’s reputation to cooperation. This would depend on China being highly isolated.