China’s Information Requirements for its Burgeoning Anti-Access/Area Denial Capabilities

Corey Velgersdyk

IAFF 6186.20: The Chinese Military

Professor Roy Kamphausen

April 26, 2011

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The modernization of China’s military, and the decades of explosive economic growth

that have made it possible, has attracted a lot of attention in both the policy and academic worlds.

One aspect of China’s modernization that has garnered considerable amounts of consideration is

the development of its anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities. A report by the Center for

Strategic and Budgetary Assessments defines anti-access as actions that inhibit an adversary’s

military movement into a theater of operations, and it defines area-denial as actions that deny or

limit an adversary’s freedom of action within a given area.1

The implications of an operational A2/AD system for any neighboring state that is within

range of that system are immense, but this burgeoning capability is also concerning to the United

States given its active role in East. As a result, there has been a great deal of discussion about the

components of China’s A2/AD and the potential threat they represent to U.S. power projection.2

Despite all of the consideration China’s A2/AD has received, little has been said about

some of the challenges that remain for China before it can boast a fully operation A2/AD system,

including the information requirements of an effective A2/AD system. Broadly speaking, an

A2/AD system requires accurate information about the location, movement, and capabilities of

the adversary’s forces. For this paper, the potential adversary will be the United States as it

represents the greatest challenge to China’s A2/AD system; furthermore, A2/AD is frequently

designed as an asymmetric strategy to challenge a technologically superior adversary, so U.S.

military forces seem an appropriate potential adversary to consider. The People’s Liberation

Army (PLA) will need an advanced and well-integrated C4ISTAR (command, control,

communications, computers, information, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance)

system capable of meeting these information requirements.

1 Krepinevich, Andrew, Barry Watts, and Robert Work. Meeting the Anti-Access and Area-Denial Challenge. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2003. ii2 Ibid. i

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Anti-Access/Area Denial Capabilities

Before delving into the information requirements of China’s A2/AD, it will be necessary

to examine what specific capabilities make up the component parts of the system. Depending on

the platform, the information requirements that need to be met will be more or less stringent. For

example, while both a submarine and a jet fighter can be used to attack an enemy ship, the much

more limited fuel and higher exposure of the fighter make providing it with accurate and up-to-

date information more necessary for it to be successful; the submarine, on the other hand, by

nature of its stealth and endurance can patrol for days or weeks for a target. China’s A2/AD

system is a range of weapons platforms including ballistic missiles, submarines, surface ships, air

defense, aircraft, anti-satellite, and cyber warfare capabilities. The robustness of China’s A2/AD

system depends less on the effectiveness of any single capability, but rather on the integration of

the capabilities to form a cohesive A2/AD threat.3

Ballistic and Cruise Missiles

In an A2/AD role, ballistic and cruise missiles can be divided into land-attack and anti-

ship. Both land-attack and anti-ship missiles will require information about the location of the

target. However, fulfilling this requirement for land-attack missiles will likely be far easier as

many land-attack targets are likely to be fixed positions. Primary U.S. targets would be the air

and naval bases located at Okinawa, South Korea, and Guam.4 China is estimated to have over

1,000 of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) that can deliver a variety of warheads useful for

A2/AD, including submunition warheads that can be used to damage airfields. The PLA also has

medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) with a range that envelops the first island chain and

even a limited ability to reach the second island chain, which includes Guam. Land-attack cruise

3 McCarthy, Christopher J. "Anti-Access/Area Denial: The Evolution of Modern Warfare." Naval War College, May 3, 2010. 24 Ibid. 3

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missiles, depending on whether they are air or ground-launched, can deliver precision strikes

throughout China’s periphery out to the second island chain.5

Many of the attractive targets, such as airfields, hangars, and refueling facilities, are fixed

targets making the information requirements virtually time insensitive. Meeting these

requirements is unlikely to be challenging for the PLA. Reconnaissance aircraft or satellite

imagery prior to a conflict would remain accurate for fixed targets. Not all targets of land-attack

missiles will be fixed targets however. In the event of a conflict with the United States, the PLA

would be eager to destroy or damage U.S. aircraft. This would be more challenging because

some of the aircraft, primarily fighters, would be kept in hardened shelters which would require

precision-guided munitions capable of penetrating the concrete shelter. Nevertheless, most

aircraft would be vulnerable to land-attack missiles.6

Anti-ship missiles have much stricter information requirements by nature of their targets

smaller size and mobility. Targeting ships will require real-time information about target location

and movement. To meet this requirement, China would use a sensor network comprised of

surveillance and reconnaissance satellites, communications satellites, over-the-horizon (OTH)

radars, and ground stations linked to both the launch units and the operations command center.7

Both anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) and anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) require

terminal guidance in order to successfully strike their targets; ASBMs would also need to have a

maneuverable reentry vehicle (MaRV) so that updated target information can be used to adjust

the trajectory of the missile. Real-time information and the capacity to upload that information

5 Department of Defense. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2010. 2010. 1-2, 30-26 Cliff, Roger, Mark Burles, Michael S. Chase, Derek Eaton, and Kevin L. Pollpeter. Entering the Dragon's Lair: Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and Their Implications for the United States. Santa Monica, Cal.: RAND Corporation, 2007. 107-107 Erickson, Andrew, and Gabe Collins. "China Deploys World’s First Long- Range, Land-‐ Based ‘Carrier Killer’: DF-‐ ‐21D Anti- Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) Reaches “Initial Operational Capability” (IOC)."‐ China SignPost, December 26, 2010. 14-5

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directly to the reentry vehicle will necessary for ASBMs to be effective. This will require an

advanced C4ISR system that can communicate between the surveillance platforms, the command

center, and the missile.8

Figure 1-1: An ASBM flight trajectory with mid-point and terminal guidance demonstrates the need for real-time information to allow for accuracy.Source: Department of Defense. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2010. 2010. 30

Submarines

Submarines have three roles in the PLA’s A2/AD strategy: launching ASCMs, laying

mines, and ambushing carrier battle groups with torpedoes. China boasts a large submarine fleet.

Although some of these submarines are too slow or noisy to be effective ship killers, China is

modernizing the fleet and more and more are equipped to carry ASCMs which have an effective

range of over 20 nautical miles. In the case of both ASCMs and torpedo ambushes, the

8 Department of Defense. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2010. 2010. 1-2, 29-30

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submarines will need target location information. This can be supplied through the information

gathered by China’s sensor network and by the submarines’ own sensory equipment.9

Mine-laying operations face much easier tactical information requirements in that targets

like ports, harbors, and critical sea lanes are fixed and already apparent to the PLA Navy. There

is, however, a difficult strategic dilemma that must be addressed, namely that there are too few

ships and mines to cover the numerous potential targets. This is particularly the case with sea

lanes as they entail vast expanses of ocean. China’s military leadership will be forced to

determine which targets are the most valuable. This question is not easily answerable as it will

depend on a variety of factors including the condition of U.S. bases, estimations of the U.S.

Navy’s behavior, international law, etc. Unlike many of the other information requirements

which will depend on China’s C4ISR system, this question will rely on analysis and the

judgment of military leadership.10

Surface Ships

The surface fleet of the PLA Navy primarily operates in the China’s littoral; the notable

exception is its anti-piracy operation in the Gulf of Aden. Nevertheless, it has a role in China’s

A2/AD strategy. Guided-missile destroyers and frigates capable of launching both ASCMs and

SAMs as well as fast-attack patrol craft designed as ASCM platforms create another means of

attacking carrier battle groups. The destroyers and frigates can provide ISR capabilities using

OTH radars in conjunction with satellites to meet their information requirements.11 The Houbei-

class fast attack ships also have limited sensory equipment meant to provide line-of-sight

targeting; moreover, these ships have small crews that likely prevent extensive on ship target

9 Cliff, Roger, Mark Burles, Michael S. Chase, Derek Eaton, and Kevin L. Pollpeter. Entering the Dragon's Lair: Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and Their Implications for the United States. 73-4, 9110 Ibid. 66-7011 Department of Defense. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2010. 2010. 3

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acquisition activities. It does, however, possess considerable of data link connectivity and

appears to be designed with the intent of receiving target information from China’s other ISR

systems.12

Air Defense

There are two main components of China’s air defense system: advanced SAM batteries

and fighter aircraft supported by airborne early warning & control (AEW&C) aircraft.13 The PLA

has deployed Russian S-300s and indigenously produced variants that have a range that manages

to reach across the entire Taiwan Strait and cover a small portion of Taiwan itself. Moreover,

China is working on acquiring S-400s either through purchases from Russia or indigenous

design; the S-400s would effectively double the SAM network’s range and cover virtually all of

Taiwan.14 If the SAM batteries are deployed with overlapping ranges and are successfully

integrated, they could severely limit the utility of all U.S. fighters and bombers except the B-2

Spirit and the F-22 Raptor.15 The target location information necessary for the SAM network is

met by the radar capabilities the system possesses. Integration between SAM batteries and

defensive fighters will be crucial for the air defense system to function well and will depend on

China’s C4ISR network.16

The PLA Air Force, like the rest of the PLA, undergoing a modernization of capabilities.

The PLA Air Force has begun to field fighters with advanced avionics and data link connectivity

with AEW&C aircraft. Integration with AEW&C aircraft and radar stations, in addition to their

12 Patch, John. "A Thoroughbred Ship-killer." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 136, no. 4 (2010): 48-5313 Department of Defense. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2010. 2010. 414 McCarthy, Christopher J. "Anti-Access/Area Denial: The Evolution of Modern Warfare." Naval War College, May 3, 2010. 3-415 McCarthy, Christopher J. "Anti-Access/Area Denial: The Evolution of Modern Warfare." Naval War College, May 3, 2010. 3-416 Hagen, Jeff. "Potential Effects of Chinese Aerospace Capabilities on U.S. Air Force Operations." RAND Corporation. 4

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own sensory equipment, provides the fighters with the necessary target information. Advanced

capabilities such as its nascent aerial refueling and air-to-air missiles with extended beyond-

visual-range allow these fighters to extend China’s aerial defense range beyond its immediate air

space.17

Anti-Satellite

In January of 2007, China successfully destroyed a weather satellite with a ballistic

missile creating a cloud of debris that threatens numerous spacecraft. This was the last of four

tests and the only one that was successful. The kinetic-kill vehicle and warhead were guided to

the satellite by ground-based radars. Several limitations exist for this particular anti-satellite

(ASAT) platform: targets must be in a low earth orbit, must be high inclination polar-orbiting to

remain in range, and orbit must not be too elliptical because the satellite will only be in range

during its perigee phase and then it will likely be moving too fast for direct-ascent or co-orbital

weapons. 18

Other potential ASAT platforms include radio frequency and laser weapons systems,

which have the added advantage of supporting continual use until successfully destroying a

target, unlike the one-shot kinetic kill methods. The latter methods also rely on the PLA’s ability

to track targeted satellites and face the same conditions regarding high inclination orbits and the

target must be within range and moving slow enough to be tracked. A possible way to overcome

this is for China to destroy its own satellites and use the resulting debris field as means to either

damage targeted satellites or at least force the United States to adjust their orbits around the

17 Flaherty, Michael P. "Red Wings Ascendant: The Chinese Air Force Contribution to Anti-access." Joint Force Quarterly (2011): 95-101.18 Ball, Desmond. "Assessing China's ASAT Program." Nautilus Institute.

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debris field. Much like the SAM network, integration of tracking, launching, and command

facilities will be crucial for the system to function well.19

Cyber Warfare/Computer Network Operations

Computer Network Operations (CNOs) are an appealing capability for China’s A2/AD

system for two reasons. First, CNOs have unlimited range and provide a way for the PLA to

“reach out and touch” U.S. forces. In particular, logistics networks are targeted as a potential

way to disrupt U.S. force deployments. The great distances that must be dealt with in the Pacific

Theater make operations, including deployments, dependent on computer networks for

coordination. The logistics network is unclassified and globally accessible making it susceptible

to penetration.20

Second, CNOs can provide valuable intelligence about U.S. forces such as deployment

information, readiness status, locations, and rendezvous schedules. This information would help

direct other information gathering efforts, such as surveillance and reconnaissance, by revealing

what and where the PLA should be searching.21

Information Requirements

China is developing a wide range of capabilities to fulfill the A2/AD mission. The

weapons platforms themselves, however, will not be effective without significant support and

integration. Moreover, these capabilities have particular information requirements needed to not

only operate the weapons but also for China’s military leadership to make prudent decisions of

how to use the various capabilities. ASBMs, submarines, and aircraft all possess the capability to

sink an aircraft carrier, for instance, but deciding which capabilities to use when and where

19 Ibid.20 Mulvenon, James C. “PLA Computer Network Operations: Scenarios, Doctrine, Organizations and Capability” in Beyond the Strait: PLA Missions Other Than Taiwan, Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Andrew Scobell (eds.), Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2009. 269-7121 Ibid.

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requires information about U.S. forces, successful target acquisition, and an advanced C4ISR

network.

U.S. Forces

A2/AD is specifically designed to counter and frustrate an adversary’s capabilities, so it

is obviously crucial for China to have accurate and extensive information of the forces and

capabilities the United States has in East Asia. Three general information requirements will need

to be met: force deployments, force capabilities, and behavior and tactics. This information

would also need to be updated frequently. China’s A2/AD system development is not occurring

in a vacuum; China’s neighbors and the United States have and will continue observe and adjust

to China’s military modernization.22 Staying informed what changes in capabilities the United

States makes will be essential to ensuring that the A2/AD remains effective.

Much of the U.S. force deployment information can be inferred from open sources,

although this has been less the case since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.23 To

overcome the information gap, vigilant surveillance will be necessary. A particularly effective

platform for maritime surveillance is electrical intelligence (ELINT) satellites, which include the

Yaogan series of satellite constellations.24 CNOs that penetrate logistics networks could also

potentially supply the information, but this route is less likely given the great risks involved with

potential discovery.25

Information about the capabilities of U.S. forces is important because of the implications

it has for the decision-making of the PLA leadership. The attrition rates of the various A2/AD

22 Cliff, Roger, Mark Burles, Michael S. Chase, Derek Eaton, and Kevin L. Pollpeter. Entering the Dragon's Lair: Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and Their Implications for the United States. 95-10423 Mulvenon, James C. “PLA Computer Network Operations: Scenarios, Doctrine, Organizations and Capability” in Beyond the Strait: PLA Missions Other Than Taiwan. 27024 Easton, Ian, and Mark A. Stokes. "China’s Electronic Intelligence Satellite Developments: Implications for U.S. Air and Naval Operations." Project 2049 Institute. 1-2, 11-325 Mulvenon, James C. “PLA Computer Network Operations: Scenarios, Doctrine, Organizations and Capability” in Beyond the Strait: PLA Missions Other Than Taiwan. 270

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capabilities vis-à-vis the targets will need to be considered when determining what capabilities

and in what numbers to commit to missions. For instance, how many escort ships there are in a

carrier battle group and how many of them are Aegis-equipped will influence the number of

missiles launched against that particular target.26

Of special concern will be U.S. platforms and defensive measures that can counter

China’s A2/AD capabilities. Defensive measures like hardened aircraft shelters, reinforced

runways, underground refueling facilities, hydrophones (used to detect submarines), and frequent

underwater mapping of harbors to detect mines all mitigate or even undermine aspects of China’s

A2/AD system and could be difficult to uncover. Weapons platforms such as Aegis-equipped

destroyers and cruisers, fighter aircraft, and the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) air-

defense system will mitigate the damage the PLA can inflict with ballistic missiles, cruise

missiles, and fighters. In the event of a conflict, the efficacy of China’s A2/AD system may

depend on the ability of the PLA to locate and destroy air-defense measures either by directly

attacking these platforms or through indirect means such as damaging runways or disrupting the

U.S. C4ISR system.27 Once again, vigilant surveillance will be necessary to stay appraised of

new deployments of these air defense measures.

The last information requirement concerning U.S. forces is in the spirit of the adage

coined by Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke, “No battle plan survives contact with the

enemy.”28 Where and what forces are deployed will not be the only adjustment the United States

would make during a conflict. Behavior and tactics would also adapt to the threat of A2/AD. For

example, if A2/AD capabilities proved fairly successful at limiting U.S. operations out of the

26 Cliff, Roger, Mark Burles, Michael S. Chase, Derek Eaton, and Kevin L. Pollpeter. Entering the Dragon's Lair: Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and Their Implications for the United States. 97-927 Ibid.28 Detzer, David. Donnybrook: The Battle of Bull Run, 1861. Orlando, Fla.: Hardcourt Books, 2004. 233

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base located at Okinawa, the United States would likely diversify its basing options for aircraft.

Another possibility would be to forward deploy additional forces, possibly even an aircraft

carrier, so that in the event of a conflict the damage caused by preemption and surprise is

reduced.29 As U.S. forces adapt to the threat of A2/AD, the PLA will want to be aware of what

actions U.S. forces are taking and try to counteract them.

Target Acquisition

Target acquisition depending on the platform may differ little from the surveillance and

reconnaissance missions mentioned above. Whether or not mines acquire targets is dependent on

where and how they were laid and on their target’s misfortune.30 Somewhat similarly, SAM

systems are partially dependent on where and how they are deployed; SAM systems are most

effective when integrated with overlapping ranges. The specific targeting of enemy aircraft can

be provided solely by the SAM’s own radar or with the assistance of the C4ISR network.31

ASBMs and ASCMs target acquisition is primarily fulfilled in by surveillance and

reconnaissance; the caveat is that the terminal guidance aspect is often fulfilled by some sort of

seeker device, such as radar or infrared-homing devices.32 Regardless of the platform, target

acquisition is of course informed by surveillance and reconnaissance.

Other platforms, such as submarines and aircraft, require more active target acquisition.

Like SAM systems, submarines and aircraft are capable of organic target acquisition using their

own sensory equipment such as radars, sonar, and radio frequency sensors. However, these

platforms will also be cued to targets by AEW&C aircraft and OTH radar stations via data link

29 Cliff, Roger, Mark Burles, Michael S. Chase, Derek Eaton, and Kevin L. Pollpeter. Entering the Dragon's Lair: Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and Their Implications for the United States. 99-10030 Ibid. 6631 McCarthy, Christopher J. "Anti-Access/Area Denial: The Evolution of Modern Warfare." 3-432 Erickson, Andrew. "China’s Evolving Anti-Access Approach: “Where’s the Nearest (U.S.) Carrier?”." China Brief X, no. 18 (2010): 5-8.

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connectivity.33 Chinese fighters will also be able to take advantage of advanced air-to-air missiles

with an extended beyond-visual-range capability when targeting other aircraft.34

One important aspect of target acquisition that China is developing is simply to extend its

range. AEW&C aircraft allow China to extend its target acquisition well beyond its territorial

waters. If China is successful in deploying S-400 SAM systems, its effective range will include

virtually all of Taiwan. OTH radar targeting capabilities are also being improved so that OTH

radars can be used in combination with imagery satellites via Sky Wave and Surface Wave OTH

radars.35 Extending target acquisition capabilities acts as a force multiplier of sorts because it

increases the area that China’s A2/AD system can effectively defend.

C4ISR

The last, and in many ways ultimate, factor in China’s A2/AD system is the C4ISR

network that allows the PLA to employ, integrate, and inform its various capabilities. The PLA

appears to be well aware of the importance of C4ISR considering the development of “local wars

under informationalized conditions” doctrine and modernization of its capabilities.36 For

analytical simplicity, the C4ISR system can be divided into three subcomponents: command and

control, communication and computers, and lastly intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

Although part of the purpose of an advanced C4ISR system is that these various pieces be

integrated into a single well-connected network, these subcomponents fulfill a particular aspect

of C4ISR’s role. Command and control is responsible for employing various A2/AD capabilities.

Communications and computers are responsible for relaying information and integrating the

33 Department of Defense. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2010. 2010.2-434 Flaherty, Michael P. "Red Wings Ascendant: The Chinese Air Force Contribution to Anti-access." 9935 Department of Defense. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2010. 2010. 2-436 Cooper, Cortez A. "The PLA Navy’s “New Historic Missions”: Expanding Capabilities for a Re-emergent Maritime Power." RAND Corporation. 2-4

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entire A2/AD system. Lastly, ISR is responsible for fulfilling the information requirements of

A2/AD.37

Following the first Gulf War, Chinese analysts came to the conclusion that China was ill-

prepared to fight an adversary with advanced capabilities, especially in the context of a fast-

paced limited war. Previous to then, the PLA geared towards fighting a total war in which it

could take advantage of China’s immense population and geography to provide strategic depth.

Of particular note was the United States’ ability to paralyze Iraqi forces by destroying command-

and-control nodes. Weapons, advanced or not, do little good if military leadership is blind and

cut off from its forces.38

Another lesson taken from the first Gulf War was the value of joint operations, a

challenge for a command-and-control system that has kept the different services of the PLA

separate. To overcome this challenge, the various services have begun focusing on joint

operations training to improve the command-and-control system’s ability to coordinate and

employ the PLA’s different capabilities.39

China has bolstered its communications capabilities in several ways. First, it has

built an extensive fiber optic grid. A fiber optics grid is valuable for military communications

because of their high bandwidth and their security from an adversary’s remote signals

intelligence collection as well as from electromagnetic and radio frequency attacks. Enhancing

the value of the fiber optic grid are the tropospheric scatter (troposcatter) systems that China now

utilizes. Troposcatters provide connectivity to the fiber optic grid up to a range of 150 miles

without relying on satellites or airborne relay stations. This allows Chinese forces to maintain

37 Kopp, Carlo. "Advances in PLA C4ISR Capabilities." China Brief X, no. 4 (2010): 5-8.38 Cliff, Roger, Mark Burles, Michael S. Chase, Derek Eaton, and Kevin L. Pollpeter. Entering the Dragon's Lair: Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and Their Implications for the United States. 20-339 Department of Defense. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2010. 2010. 3-4

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high bandwidth connectivity to the C4ISR network even when satellite or relay station

connections are unavailable or infeasible.40

China has also been continuously developing and deploying communications satellites in

order to create a strong network capable of transmitting voice, imagery, and numerical data

rapidly. China has even begun launching data relay satellites that can fill in missing links in the

communications network. Satellite communications are essential for China’s other space-based

capabilities, most notably surveillance and reconnaissance satellites, to be effective.41 In order to

expand its satellite capabilities, China is fostering a robust space industry that can mass-produce

satellites of high quality to create a reliable satellite communications system.42

Computers are ubiquitous in the C4ISR system, but that does not make analyzing the

PLA’s computer capabilities an easy task. First, much of these capabilities fall under the “dual-

use” designation and it can difficult to determine where the civilian aspects end and military

aspects begin. Second, in terms of CNOs, it is difficult to attribute actions to the correct actor.

Past CNOs could have been executed by PLA operators or private individuals that reside in

China. The “patriotic hacker” phenomenon in China has led to a debate about whether these

individuals are sanctioned by the government or simply tolerated for being somewhat helpful.43

China’s military modernization has extended to its ISR system. Advanced OTH radars

and an increasingly large and advanced number of satellites have been the two primary areas of

development. Surface Wave, Sky Wave, and Backscatter radars provide immense ISR

capabilities to locate surface ships and aircraft, although these systems lack the accuracy to

40 Kopp, Carlo. "Advances in PLA C4ISR Capabilities." 5-841 Mulvenon, James C. “PLA Computer Network Operations: Scenarios, Doctrine, Organizations and Capability.” 226-742 Easton, Ian, and Mark A. Stokes. "China’s Electronic Intelligence Satellite Developments: Implications for U.S. Air and Naval Operations." 9-1043 Mulvenon, James C. “PLA Computer Network Operations: Scenarios, Doctrine, Organizations and Capability.” 226-8

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provide target acquisition. Nevertheless, they represent a significant improvement over the

coastal microwave radars China had deployed.44

Satellites are an advantageous platform for ISR due to their wide field of view and broad

geographical range. They also offer a variety of ways to detect targets such as electro-optical,

synthetic radar aperture, and electronic reconnaissance.45 Currently China’s satellite capabilities

still suffer from significant coverage gaps, but the rapid pace at which China is producing and

launching satellites should greatly reduce the gap within the next decade. China launched 15

surveillance satellites in 2008 alone.46

Imagery satellites represent the strongest aspect of China’s ISR-capable satellites. It has

several Jianbing synthetic radar aperture satellites already in the sky. China can also rely on

several dual-use satellites, such as weather satellites, for additional imagery data. In 2002, China

launched its first Haiyang-series maritime surveillance satellite with a follow up satellite launch

in 2007 which had twice the data capacity of the first. 15 more Haiyang satellites with a variety

of sensory equipment will be launched during the next decade.47 Further improving ISR

capability is the integration that is possible between China’s Surface Wave, Sky Wave, and

Backscatter OTH radars with its imagery satellites. The combined data can provide target

location information usable to direct precision-guided weapons.48

Electronic reconnaissance satellites provide a means of detecting an adversary’s

electronic capabilities. Successfully following radar emissions and other transmissions back to

the location of the emitter provides an excellent means of locating a variety of valuable targets

for the A2/AD system, including carrier battle groups and radar stations associated with air

44 Kopp, Carlo. "Advances in PLA C4ISR Capabilities." 5-845 Easton, Ian, and Mark A. Stokes. "China’s Electronic Intelligence Satellite Developments: Implications for U.S. Air and Naval Operations." 146 Erickson, Andrew "Eyes in the Sky." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 136, no. 4 (April 2010): 36-41.47 Ibid.48 Department of Defense. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2010. 2

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defense systems like the PAC-3. Electronic reconnaissance satellites can also confirm targets

located via other ISR capabilities, which is valuable for overcoming A2/AD countermeasures.49

Currently, China’s electronic reconnaissance satellites are unable to meet the information

demand of the various intelligence clients. A study on electronic reconnaissance satellites

explains the problem:

The military applications [of electronic reconnaissance satellites] are very numerous.

Although the numbers of electronic reconnaissance satellites are increasing, they are still

far from meeting various departments’ needs for electronic reconnaissance. The limited

numbers of satellite resources are extremely valuable. Thus we need to conduct research

on how to optimize electronic reconnaissance satellites’ broad-area coverage planning

systems in order to optimize target reconnaissance to the greatest extent possible and

maximize satellite efficiency.50

One possibility of overcoming the shortage of electronic reconnaissance satellites being

considered is attaching electronic reconnaissance equipment onto imagery and communications

satellites. These piggybacked satellites could help meet intelligence clients’ demand. Another

possibility is switching from the more typical three-satellite constellation to a two-satellite

constellation. While the processing challenge this causes is not insignificant and as yet has not

been overcome, reducing the number of satellites needed for each constellation by a third

drastically increases the number of constellations available.51

Conclusion

49 Easton, Ian, and Mark A. Stokes. "China’s Electronic Intelligence Satellite Developments: Implications for U.S. Air and Naval Operations." 1, 450 Ibid. 851 Ibid. 8-10

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China’s A2/AD system has a great deal of potential in offsetting the disadvantages of

facing a more technologically advanced adversary. The variety of capabilities provides multiple

avenues of attack and makes countering A2/AD much more complicated for adversaries.

However, there are considerable challenges and questions that must be addressed by PLA

military thinkers for A2/AD to be effective. One of the most significant is how to fulfill the many

information requirements of A2/AD. Meeting these requirements will require a C4ISR system at

least as complex as the A2/AD system itself.

Several platforms are being developed to create a C4ISR system capable of coordinating

the A2/AD system. AEW&C, OTH radars, satellites, and fiber optics grids are some of the

components of this system. Integrating this system with China’s military will be one of the most

significant achievements of China’s military modernization, if it can be done successfully. China

watchers would do well to consider that while ASBMs and aircraft carriers make eye-catching

headlines; these platforms mean little without an advanced C4ISR system capable of fulfilling

the information requirements of the A2/AD system.

Velgersdyk 19

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