China & Technical Global Internet Governance: From Norm-Taker to Norm-Maker?

by

Tristan Galloway L.L.B(Hons)/B.A.(Hons) Deakin University

Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Deakin University

July, 2015

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Acknowledgements

My sincere thanks to Prof Baogang He, my principal supervisor, for his excellent advice and tireless support, without which the completion of this dissertation

would have been impossible.

I would also like to express my thanks to my associate supervisors, Prof Wanlei Zhou and Dr Xiangshu Fang, for their advice and support, and to other staff at

Deakin University that have provided me with feedback, including but not limited to Dr Chengxin Pan and Dr David Hundt. I am grateful for the further feedback or

insight received on elements of my dissertation by numerous academics at academic conferences, seminars and through academic journal peer review

processes. I thank the staff and reviewers at China: An International Journal, for their feedback and advice on the joint article submitted by Prof Baogang He and

myself that was published in late 2014; while the content and research of the dissertation’s chapters 7 & 8 are primarily attributable to the author, their quality has been improved by this feedback and through collaboration between myself

and Prof Baogang He. Elements of the research in these two chapters, and elements of the dissertation’s arguments related to its theoretical perspective, have also been informed by the author’s Honours thesis, submitted to Deakin

University in 2010.

A professional editing service, The Expert Editor, provided copyediting and proofreading services for the dissertation, according to the guidelines laid out in the university-endorsed national ‘Guidelines for Editing Research Theses’. All

remaining grammatical and stylistic errors are attributable to the author.

I am grateful to Deakin University and the Australian Government for the doctoral candidature and scholarship extended to me, and to Deakin University

for the additional financial support that enabled me to conduct research in Beijing, China, attend a number of international academic conferences, and observe the conduct of internet governance first-hand at the APrIGF 2013 in

Seoul, South Korea and at the IGF 2013 in Bali, Indonesia.

I am deeply thankful for the support and advice given to me by my friends and family. Thanks in particular to my parents, Louise and Stuart, and my sister Hannah for their support, and especially to my partner Taia who has been a

constant source of encouragement.

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China & Technical Global Internet Governance: From Norm-Taker to Norm-Maker?

Abstract

This dissertation analyses Chinese engagement with the core norms regulating technical global internet governance, namely those related to: US government

authority, privatized governance, multi-stakeholder governance, and state actors’ authority. It seeks to determine if China has been a norm-maker or norm-taker

towards these norms, and whether it wants to – or can – reshape internet governance. To answer these questions, a qualitative analysis of historical and contemporary Chinese state and non-state actor engagement with core internet

governance norms in domestic Chinese internet governance and across key global and regional internet governance organizations is conducted. The roles China has adopted towards these norms are analysed across their lifecycles and described

using the dissertation’s own synthesized framework of four potential roles: norm-entrepreneur, norm-taker, norm-maker and norm-supporter. Explanations of

Chinese, and other actors’, behaviour within internet governance, and predictions about future behaviour, are guided by a rationalist, multi-causal theoretical

perspective loosely based on liberal international relations theory. The dissertation argues that China has largely been a norm-taker at the global level of

internet governance, but more of a norm-maker at the regional and domestic levels. It has also attempted to establish a norm of greater government authority

within internet governance. The roles China has adopted suggests that it does want to change some aspects of the current internet governance regime, seeking to remove US government authority and limit non-state actor authority over the

technical internet but is otherwise satisfied with the multi-stakeholder character of internet governance and the authority of non-state actors below the global level. China is nevertheless unable to implement the changes that it wishes to make,

because other states and non-state actors do not share its interests sufficiently, and because China does not have the material power or ideational appeal necessary to

impose its preferences in this area.

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Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations, Figures, Tables & Appendices vii

1. Introduction 1 2. Literature Review 9

a. English Literature 9 b. Chinese Literature 12

3. Methodology & Methods 15 a. A Multi-Causal Theoretical Perspective 15 b. The Dynamics of Global Governance Norms 18 c. State Roles Towards Global Governance Norms 23 d. Methods 29

4. The Technical Internet, Its History & Governance 34 a. Internet Governance 34 b. The Technical Internet 35 c. A Brief History of the Technical Internet 37

& Its Governance d. The Technical Internet Governance Regime 41

5. Core Technical Internet Governance Norms 52 a. The US Authority Norm 52 b. The Privatized Governance Norm 55 c. The Multi-Stakeholder Governance Norm 59 d. The State Authority Norm 62

6. Domestic Chinese Internet Governance 64 a. China’s Early Engagement with 64

the Technical Internet b. The Chinese Government’s Role 65

in Domestic Governance c. Chinese Administrative Organizations 69 d. Chinese Policy Organizations 71

7. Chinese Engagement with Administrative Organizations 73 a. The IETF & Internet Standards 73 b. ICANN & IPS/DNS Governance 79

8. Chinese Engagement with Policy Organizations 97 a. The WSIS 97 b. The IGF 104 c. The UN, The ITU & NETMundial 111

9. China & The US Authority Norm 114 10. China & The Privatized Governance Norm 122 11. China & The Multi-Stakeholder Governance Norm 134 12. China & The State Authority Norm 140 13. Conclusion 146

Appendices 1 – 6 (see below, page 8) 156 Reference List 236

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List of Abbreviations, Figures & Appendices

a. List of Abbreviations ALAC – At-Large Advisory Committee ALS – At-Large Structures APEC – Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation APIA – Asia-Pacific Internet Association APNIC – Asia-Pacific Network Information Centre APRALO – Asia-Pacific Regional At-Large Organization APrIGF – Asia-Pacific Regional Internet Governance Forum APT – Asia-Pacific Telecommunity APTLD – Asia-Pacific Top-Level Domain Association AS – Autonomous System ASO – Address Supporting Organization CAS – Chinese Academy of Sciences CASS – Chinese Academy of Social Sciences CAST – China Association for Science and Technology CATR – China Academy of Telecommunications Research of MIIT CCP – Chinese Communist Party ccNSO – Country-Code Name Supporting Organization ccTLD – Country-Code Top-Level Domain CDNC – Chinese Domain Name Consortium CERNET – China Education and Research Network CNNIC – China Network Information Center CONAC – China Organizational Name Administration Center DNS – Domain Name System ECOSOC – Economic and Social Council GAC – Governmental Advisory Committee GNSO – Generic Name Supporting Organization gTLD – Generic Top-level Domain IAB – Internet Architecture Board IAHC – International Ad-Hoc Committee IANA – Internet Assigned Numbers Authority IATLD – International Association of Top-Level Domains ICANN – Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers IDN – Internationalized Domain Name IGF – Internet Governance Forum IESG – Internet Engineering Steering Group IETF – Internet Engineering Task Force IP – Internet Protocol IPS – Internet Protocol System IPv6 – Internet Protocol Version Six IRTF – Internet Research Task Force ISC – Internet Society of China ISOC – Internet Society ISP – Internet Service Provider ITR – International Telecommunications Regulations ITU – International Telecommunications Union LIR – Local Internet Registry

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MAG – Multi-Stakeholder Advisory Group MIIT – Ministry of Industry & Information Technology MINC – Multilingual Internet Names Consortium NIC – Network Information Centre NIR – National Internet Registry NRO – Number Resource Organization NTIA – National Telecommunications and Information

Administration RALO – Regional At-Large Organization RFC – Request For Comments RIR – Regional Internet Registry RSSAC – Root Server System Advisory Committee SSAC – Security and Stability Advisory Committee TCP/IP – Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol TLG – Technical Liaison Group UN – United Nations UNCSTD – United Nations Commission on Science and Technology

for Development UNGA – United Nations General Assembly US – United States WCIT – World Conference on International Telecommunications WGIG – Working Group on Internet Governance WSIS – World Summit on the Information Society

b. List of Figures Figure 1: The Norm Life Cycle Model Pg. 21

Figure 2: The Norm Lifecycle Model Pg. 23 & Theoretical Drivers of Change

Figure 3: The Norm Lifecycle Model Pg. 27 & State Roles Towards Norms

Figure 4: Technical Internet Architecture & Operation Pg. 37

Figure 5: ICANN’s Organizational Structure Pg. 46

Figure 6: Total Chinese Attendance Pg. 74 at IETF Meetings 1986 – 2014

Figure 7: Chinese Attendance at IETF Meetings Pg. 74 by Stakeholder Group 1994 – 2014

Figure 8: Comparison of Country Contributions Pg. 75 to RFC Authorship

Figure 9: Author Numbers by Country of IETF Documents Pg. 75 (RFCs & Other Working Documents)

Figure 10: Chinese RFC Authorship by Year Pg. 76

Figure 11: Total Chinese Attendance at ICANN Meetings Pg. 80 1999 – 2014 (exc. ICANN 46)

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Figure 12: Chinese Attendance at ICANN Meetings Pg. 80 by Stakeholder Group 1999 – 2014 (exc. ICANN 46)

Figure 13: Active Chinese Participation at ICANN Meetings Pg. 81 by Stakeholder Group 1999 - 2014

Figure 14: Chinese Attendance at APTLD Meetings Pg. 91 by Stakeholder Group 1998 - 2014

Figure 15: Total Chinese Attendance at APNIC Conferences Pg. 94 1999 - 2014

Figure 16: Chinese Attendance at APNIC Conferences Pg. 94 by Stakeholder Group 1999 - 2014

Figure 17: Active Chinese Participation at APNIC Conferences Pg. 95 by Stakeholder Group 1999 - 2014

Figure 18: Model One of the WGIG’s Four Proposed Reforms Pg. 102

Figure 19: Total Chinese Attendance at the IGF 2006 – 2014 Pg. 105

Figure 20: Chinese Attendance at the IGF Pg. 105 by Stakeholder Group 2006 - 2014

Figure 21: Active Chinese Participation at the IGF Pg. 106 by Stakeholder Group 2006 - 2014

c. List of Tables

Table 1: Chinese IETF Working Group Chairs Pg. 76

Table 2: Summary of Chinese RFC Contributors Pg. 77 by Stakeholder Group

d. List of Appendices

Appendix 1: Chinese Participation in IETF Meetings Pg. 156

Appendix 2: Chinese Authored RFCs & Chinese Pg. 159 Contributors to IETF Documents

Appendix 3: Chinese Involvement in ICANN Meetings Pg. 165

Appendix 4: Chinese Participation in APTLD Meetings Pg. 196

Appendix 5: Chinese Involvement in APNIC Meetings Pg. 202

Appendix 6: Chinese Involvement in the IGF Pg. 217

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1. Introduction

Over the past few decades the People's Republic of China (China) has steadily improved its relative power position within the international system. Rapid and sustained economic growth has propelled it to a leading position in the global economy and contributed to the strengthening of China’s diplomatic influence and strategic capabilities. Concurrently, China’s pragmatic and generally non-confrontational approach to foreign policy in the post-Mao era has improved its foreign relations and accelerated Chinese integration into regional and global society. The rise of China in the international system and within international society has come with a corresponding increase in attention paid to China’s potential impact on contemporary international relations. An intriguing aspect of China’s rise is the question of what it will do with its reclaimed great power status; a question eloquently framed by James Reilly (2011, p. 71) who asked:

“As China emerges as a global power, is it more likely to accommodate itself to the existing systems and norms; or will the Chinese government insist that the international system be reshaped more in its own image and reflecting China’s own national interests?”

The answer to this question is important to contemporary global politics because of China's growing relative power and influence, which may motivate or facilitate Chinese attempts at restructuring elements of the international order that the Chinese government or people are dissatisfied with (Buzan 2010; Ross & Zhu 2008, ch. 12). The consequences of China’s rise affects fundamental issues in international relations, such as whether a looming power transition between the United States (US) and China will trigger global conflict, or whether China will seek to overturn the contemporary liberal world order (Foot 2006; Ikenberry 2008; Shambaugh 2013, ch. 7). However, it also touches upon more narrowly defined, specific issues. China’s increasing influence on the world stage means that it is critical to the success of global governance processes across a variety of specific issue areas as diverse as climate change, development aid, global trade governance, and global peacekeeping (Gao 2011a; Gu, Humphrey & Messner 2008; Hurrell & Sengupta 2012; Li 2011; Reilly 2011). As one core element of its rising global power, China's current and potential ability to reshape the structure of global governance, as well as its desire to do so, is an important aspect of understanding the significance and implications of its rise (Legro 2007; Wang & Rosenau 2009). Mirroring the modern resurgence of China, the internet has become an increasingly important technology over the past few decades. From its humble beginnings as an experimental research network, the internet has grown into the most significant extant information and communication technology, and is increasingly important in virtually all aspects of human interaction – from private, interpersonal communication through to the conduct of high politics amongst great powers (Diamond 2010; DiMaggio et al. 2001; Farrell 2012; Keohane & Nye Jr 1998; Lessig 1999). The internet’s centrality to global telecommunications renders it a significant factor in the protection of national security, the operation of the global economy, and within many other issues in contemporary

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international relations (Ball 2011; Chadwick & Howard 2010; Lindsay 2013; Vu 2011). The internet exerts a wide-ranging influence over global politics, yet its technological characteristics are shaped by, and its global reach and continued operation depend upon, the global governance of its technical architecture. The conduct of technical global internet governance (internet governance) is thus an important element of modern international relations. This dissertation aims to contribute to the literature on China’s rise and its implications for international relations by examining Chinese engagement with this specific aspect of world politics: the global governance of the technical internet. It does not focus on the details of Chinese policy towards the technical internet, but instead aims to develop an understanding of China’s broader role in the governance of the global internet and its preferences towards the conduct of that governance. Specifically, it aims to answer two related questions: 'Has China been a norm-maker or a norm-taker in internet governance?'; and 'If it wants to, can it reshape the structure of internet governance?'. To answer these questions, the dissertation analyses the roles China has adopted towards four core norms that either regulate the conduct of internet governance or influence its future evolution. Three of these norms are historically and currently dominant in regulating the conduct of internet governance, while the fourth is an emerging norm that challenges the current structure of internet governance. These three core norms are: (1) the norm of US government supervisory authority over internet governance (the US authority norm); (2) the norm of non-state actors enjoying authority over internet governance (the privatized governance norm); and, (3) the norm of multiple stakeholder rights to participate in internet governance (the multi-stakeholder governance norm). The one emerging norm examined by the dissertation is the norm of sovereign state authority over the internet’s global governance (the state authority norm). China's engagement with core internet governance norms is a significant topic for a few key reasons. As noted, China is a rising great power with the potential to reshape global politics and the conduct of global governance. Similarly, the internet is a politically influential technology, and its global governance is, therefore, an important issue area. Aside from the internet’s general significance, however, the technical internet’s global governance is shaped by some unusual norms which reflect US predominance in world politics, and embody liberal, democratic ideals (Drezner 2004; Mueller, Mathiason & Klein 2007). This makes China's engagement with this issue area of particular relevance to the implications of China's rise, as it provides an opportunity to explore Chinese engagement with emerging global governance norms that do not necessarily reflect the preferences of the Chinese state or its government. Finally, little existing research addresses this topic, thus examining it contributes to the development of empirical literature on China, the internet and global governance. Overall, the dissertation contributes to knowledge in three ways. Firstly, it contributes to empirical knowledge about Chinese engagement with internet governance through its original research on this subject, which centers on a detailed analysis of Chinese involvement with key internet governance organizations at the global level and at the Asia-Pacific regional level, in particular the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), the Internet Corporation

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for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) and its subsidiary bodies and related regional organizations such as the Asia-Pacific Network Information Centre (APNIC), and with United Nations-sponsored organizations such as the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) and the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) and related bodies. Secondly, it contributes to knowledge of Chinese roles towards core internet governance norms, and to our understanding of China’s preferences towards, and capacity to reform, contemporary internet governance. This greater understanding is provided by theoretically-informed analysis of both the dissertation’s own original research and pre-existing empirical knowledge of China and technical internet governance. Thirdly, the dissertation contributes to knowledge by providing a modest theoretical improvement to the frameworks used to describe state roles towards global governance norms. It develops a set of four potential state roles towards these norms: norm-entrepreneur, norm-maker, norm-supporter and norm-taker. This is done by reviewing the norm-maker/norm-taker framework and its related literature, identifying innovations within this body of literature, and then using this knowledge to synthesize a new framework that is structured around Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) norm lifecycle model (norm lifecycle model). This theoretical contribution also constitutes the first of the dissertation's three broad sets of arguments; that is, the first argument made by the dissertation is that its synthesized suite of four potential state political roles towards global governance norms is a modest improvement to existing approaches. This is because it more accurately describes state behavior by acknowledging the roles states adopt in the process of global governance norms’ lifecycles, in contrast to the more outcome-oriented focus of existing approaches. The second set of arguments relate to the political roles China has adopted towards core internet governance norms across the lifecycle of these norms. At the global level, China has been norm-taker, but it has also been a norm-entrepreneur and norm-maker at lower regional and domestic levels of internet governance – with its roles varying across sub-issues in internet governance and across different governance levels. The third set of arguments relate to the theoretical factors that have caused China's historical and contemporary roles towards core internet governance norms, which are argued to have arisen from Chinese actors’ pursuit of their material and ideational interests, and by material and ideational structural factors that have alternately facilitated or constrained this pursuit. To answer its two primary research questions, the dissertation develops a methodology comprised of three separate, but related, components – a multi-causal theoretical perspective, a framework for understanding normative change in global governance, and a framework for describing state roles towards global governance norms. The dissertation’s theoretical perspective is rationalist and multi-causal, deriving from liberal international relations theory but supplemented by insights from realist and constructivist schools. It frames global politics as a bottom-up, interest-driven process conducted by primarily rational state and non-state actors – who derive their interests both from power and survival concerns as well as ideational beliefs and values – operating in an environment in which the global distribution of material power and ideational beliefs facilitates or constrains their behavior. This theoretical perspective is used by the dissertation to explain state and other actors’ behavior, as well as the

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structural factors that facilitate or constrain these actors’ behavioural choices. As a result, it fundamentally shapes the remainder of the dissertation’s methodology, its substantive analysis, and its ultimate conclusions. As its second methodological component, the dissertation employs the norm lifecycle model to describe normative change in global governance. This conceives of global governance norms as arising from the actions of norm entrepreneurs that persuade or coerce others into accepting behavioural standards. When a sufficient number are accepted in this manner, a tipping point is reached and norms begin to ‘cascade’ through international society, achieving greater acceptance and potentially internalizing or acquiring a ‘taken for granted’ quality that makes conformity to them an unconscious action. Over time, new norms arise from new ideas or from the advocacy of newly empowered norm-entrepreneurs, and the process begins again. Use of the norm lifecycle model is supplemented by Acharya’s (2004) localization concept, which explains how norms internalize within existing normative frameworks – being rejected, subordinated to, or becoming dominant over existing norms in a given setting. The dissertation uses the norm lifecycle model to explain how core internet governance norms arose, how they influence different aspects of internet governance, and to assess whether they have permeated domestic Chinese internet governance or Chinese actors’ beliefs. The norm lifecycle model also shapes the dissertation’s third methodological component, influencing its synthesis of a framework for describing state roles towards global governance norms. This framework adds process-oriented roles to the more outcome-oriented norm-maker/norm-taker framework, which generally designates states as norm-makers or norm-takers based on whether or not they have the requisite material power to persuade or coerce other states into accepting norms. The dissertation supplements this approach by incorporating a process-oriented role of norm-entrepreneur into the framework, recognizing that states may be as-yet-unsuccessful norm-makers. It also proposes a fourth role of norm-supporter, to acknowledge that states may actively oppose the norm-entrepreneurship of others. The dissertation argues that the inclusion of these two additional roles to the norm-maker/taker framework, and the framework’s reformulation as a suite of four potential political roles that are explicitly linked to the norm lifecycle model, are a more accurate yet still acceptably parsimonious method of describing state engagement with global governance norms. This framework is used to guide analysis of, and describe, the roles China has adopted towards core internet governance norms. The dissertation’s methodology is used to analyze the development of core internet governance norms and the roles China has adopted towards them, but qualitative documentary analysis is the primary method by which the dissertation generates data on, and a narrative for, the internet governance regime and China’s involvement with it. Basic numerical data on China’s involvement in internet governance organizations is also provided where possible. Similarly, the identification of facts relevant to the dissertation’s analysis is guided by the structured approaches within the norm-maker/norm-taker and compliance literatures – which identify both the sub-national and international or transnational actions and statements of state and non-state actors as important. As

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a result, the dissertation analyses Chinese engagement with internet governance across the domestic, regional and global levels, and across three stakeholder groups of the Chinese government, private sector and civil society. It analyses the conduct of domestic Chinese internet governance and Chinese participation in internet governance organizations at both the global and regional levels. Given this approach, it is important to note that in the categorization of Chinese actors, serious doubt can be cast on the independence of Chinese private sector and civil society actors from the Chinese government. This is due to China's status as an authoritarian one-party state and the history of its domestic state-society structure, which grants the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) a strong influence both within Chinese organizations and over the political lives of individuals that represent them (Saich 2004, ch. 5, 8, 9; Yang 2003; Zhang 2003, p. 3, 4, 12). Despite this ambiguity, the dissertation analyses the empirical engagement of the Chinese government, private sector and civil society with internet governance as if these actors were relatively unambiguous categories. This is done to enable a more nuanced determination of China's engagement with core internet governance norms. Nevertheless, the dissertation recognizes that the independence of some nominally non-state Chinese actors is debatable and acknowledges this in its final analysis and ultimate conclusions. In its specific response to its research questions, the dissertation argues that China has been a norm-taker in relation to the US authority norm but has become a clearly dissatisfied one since 2001. Unsurprisingly, there is no evidence that Chinese actors have internalized this norm and it does not directly influence domestic Chinese internet governance. A range of materially and ideationally derived interests in gaining access to the internet are posited as the primary driver of China's norm-taker role towards the US authority norm. These interests include: gaining internet access, advancing China's scientific, technological and economic development, improving China's international reputation, and, facilitating Chinese computer scientists' open access to information. Structural factors also constrain China's ability to advance any alternative to the US authority norm, namely, US (and Western) control of global telecommunications, China's general relative power position, and ideational structural constraints arising from China's illiberal political reputation. China's continuing norm-taker role is due to an enduring interest in internet access and structural constraints preventing it from abolishing this norm. A more complex set of roles has been adopted by China in relation to the privatized governance norm. At the global level, and similarly to the US authority norm, China had been a norm-taker in relation to the norm within internet protocol and domain name system governance, but became a clearly dissatisfied one in 2001. Yet unlike Chinese opposition to the US government authority, China is more accepting of non-state actor authority in this context – especially with respect to Chinese non-state actors. China's norm-taker status is due to similar factors to those guiding China's norm-taker role towards the US authority norm; the primary difference being that Chinese non-state actors' interests do not align with the Chinese government here, with the privatized governance norm in this context being in their material – and arguably their ideational – interests. Conversely, in relation to internet standards governance, China has been a norm-

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taker and almost entirely internalized the privatized governance norm's application to this governance issue. China's norm-taker status towards the norm in internet standards governance is argued to result from the Chinese government having no strong preference towards the norm in this context, and arguably having accepted its appropriateness. For Chinese non-state actors, the privatized governance norm is in their material interests, and arguably in their ideational interests as well. At the regional level, China has been a norm-entrepreneur – and eventually a norm-maker – in relation to non-state actor authority in internet protocol system governance, and a norm-taker with respect to domain name system governance, having internalized the appropriateness of the norm in these contexts. The same theoretical factors explain China's various roles towards the privatized governance norm in regional internet protocol and domain name system governance. For the Chinese government, it simply does not have a strong preference towards how this governance is conducted at the regional level, although structural factors also constrain Beijing here. For Chinese non-state actors, non-state actor authority is in their material interests, and arguably in their ideational interests as well. Domestically, China has been both a norm-entrepreneur and eventually a norm-maker in regard to the privatized governance norm in domestic internet protocol system and domain name system governance – although it has localized non-state actor authority to China’s domestic circumstances by subordinating non-state actor authority to that of the Chinese government. In these roles, China has been reasonably satisfied. Domestically, China's satisfaction results from the privatized governance norm being in the material interests of both the Chinese government and non-state actors – at least in its weakened, localized form. China roles towards the multi-stakeholder governance norm are less complex. At the global level, China has been a norm-taker. At the regional level, China has been a norm-entrepreneur and later a norm-maker in relation to internet protocol system governance, and a norm-taker in regard to domain name system governance. Domestically, China has been a norm-entrepreneur and then a norm-maker. In relation to multi-stakeholder governance, the various roles adopted by China at the global, regional and domestic levels are explained according to the same set of factors. This is because the different roles China has adopted towards multi-stakeholder governance result primarily from differences in the timing of Chinese engagement with internet governance, rather than due to shifting interest assessments and changing structural conditions. Both the Chinese government and Chinese non-state actors consider the multi-stakeholder governance norm to be in their material and ideational interests. The sustained level of support for multi-stakeholder governance from the (albeit unenthusiastic) Chinese government, and from Chinese non-state actors, suggest that China has internalized this norm to a substantial degree. Due to Chinese dissatisfaction with the US government authority and the privatized governance norm in global level internet protocol and domain name system governance, China has attempted to replace and/or weaken these norms via implementation of the state authority norm. However, its lack of success in triggering the state authority norm’s global tipping point means that it can only be

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described as a norm-entrepreneur, despite its success in establishing the norm in domestic Chinese internet governance. China's norm-entrepreneur role in regards to the state authority norm is due to the Chinese government's clear material and ideational interest in strong state authority over internet governance, which became a higher priority for Beijing as circumstances changed. Once China secured internet access, the major inhibitor of Chinese resistance to US government and non-state actor authority was removed, allowing Beijing to advance its interest in greater state authority. Similarly, China's growing relative material power, and better knowledge of other states' beliefs about the US authority and state authority norms, facilitated its norm-entrepreneurship. Nevertheless, China's ongoing relative material weakness precludes Chinese success in securing the establishment of greater state authority above the national level. Although seeking to provide a thorough response to its research questions, there are a number of limitations to the dissertation. The author’s imperfect knowledge of the Chinese language inhibits the dissertation’s analysis of both domestic Chinese internet governance and existing Chinese language research on this topic. In addition, despite a relatively comprehensive examination of Chinese engagement with many internet governance organizations, some do not have publicly available records or maintain only partially reliable records – limiting the depth of the dissertation’s analysis. Similarly, the dissertation does not analyse Chinese engagement with all relevant organizations, instead focusing upon those it identifies as the most significant. Further insight could be gained from a more extensive analysis of Chinese participation in global and regional level organizations, and from Chinese participation in multi-lateral or bilateral internet governance processes. The dissertation also narrowly focuses its analysis upon Chinese engagement with four core internet governance norms, ignoring others that are less associated with authority – such as norms related to accountability or transparency – and overlooking specific Chinese policy preferences towards technical internet governance issues. Further studies could thus enhance the breadth of our knowledge on China and technical internet governance. The dissertation’s response to its research questions is presented across thirteen distinct chapters, of which this introduction constitutes the first. A literature review is provided in the next chapter and it illustrates the current gap in the literature on Chinese engagement with internet governance. Chapter 2 provides a narrow review that concentrates solely on the literature on China and technical internet governance, with a view to justifying the dissertation’s focus. It argues that existing literature does not examine this topic in sufficient empirical detail and does not expressly analyse Chinese engagement with internet governance’s broader normative framework. A broader review of theoretical and methodological issues is conducted within chapter 3, the dissertation’s methodology chapter. This is done to ensure the reader can better understand the justifications for the dissertation’s selection of its methodological approach – as briefly introduced above. Subsequently, chapter 4 provides important background information on the technical internet and its governance, defining internet governance, analyzing its history and outlining the structure of the contemporary internet governance

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regime. Chapter 5 follows with a substantive analysis of core internet governance norms, which identifies them and outlines their lifecycles. It draws upon the preceding chapters’ analysis to identify the four core internet governance norms the dissertation examines Chinese engagement with. Although existing studies of, and commentary on, internet governance norms guides the dissertation’s conception of the internet governance regime’s normative structure, the four core norms identified in this chapter represent the author’s own perception of which norms are the most critical to the overarching character of contemporary internet governance: namely, norms related to US government authority, privatized governance, multi-stakeholder governance, and general state actor authority. Chapters 6, 7 and 8 then present the dissertation’s empirical analysis of Chinese engagement with internet governance, with Chinese actors categorized as falling within one of three stakeholder groups of the government, private sector and civil society. Chapter 6 analyzes domestic Chinese internet governance, considering how its historical development and contemporary conduct indicates Chinese relationships with core internet governance norms. Chapter 7 then examines Chinese engagement with the central administrative organizations within the internet governance regime, particularly those related to the IETF and ICANN across the global and regional levels. Chapter 8 then completes the dissertation’s empirically-oriented analysis of Chinese engagement with internet governance by analyzing the involvement of Chinese actors in prominent global or regional level organizations that contribute to internet governance policy or which shape the evolution of its conduct, such as the WSIS and IGF. Following this, chapters 9, 10, 11 and 12 provide direct theoretical analysis of China’s roles towards the four core internet governance norms identified by the dissertation, with each chapter focusing on China’s roles towards a single one of these norms across their lifecycles. These chapters also engage in analysis and argument related to the theoretical factors that have shaped China’s various roles towards each of these four core internet governance norms. Chapter 13 then concludes the dissertation. It briefly summarizes its scope and structure, then provides a more detailed summary of its primary arguments. Chapter 13 itself concludes with discussion of the dissertation’s overall significance, contributions and limitations. Finally, following this concluding chapter, a series of six Appendices are presented which contain the raw data that constitutes much of the dissertation’s original research and upon which much of its analysis is based.

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2. Literature Review

This literature review examines existing research on Chinese engagement with internet governance, highlighting two notable deficiencies in the literature that justifies the dissertation's own research focus. In asserting these two gaps in the literature, the dissertation is limiting its claims to research that has focused on China's involvement in the global governance of the technical internet – as defined by the dissertation in chapter 4. While beyond the scope of the dissertation, a casual search quickly reveals that there is a large body of literature that touches upon China's engagement with other, non-technical, aspects of global internet governance and domestic Chinese internet governance. The first deficiency the literature review notes are empirical gaps in research on this issue. In particular, the review illustrates that China's engagement with internet governance has generally received intermittent and fragmented attention. There are a few studies which engage in relatively detailed examination of some aspects of Chinese involvement in internet governance, but many studies have either had a narrow focus, have not provided a detailed empirical account of Chinese involvement, or have now become somewhat dated. In part, this relative paucity of attention given to Chinese engagement with the global governance of the technical internet justifies the dissertation's focus. However, it is the second deficiency in the literature that provides the stronger justification for the dissertation's focus. That is, the review argues that there are no existing studies on China's engagement with internet governance that have engaged in an in-depth analysis of China's interaction with the core global governance norms that regulate the technical internet. As the below review demonstrates, while this issue is frequently touched upon implicitly in the existing literature, and there are a number of studies which directly consider it, no existing studies approach the issue with a view to providing a systematic and in-depth analysis of China's relationship with core internet governance norms. This is a significant gap in the literature because, as noted in the introduction, the technical internet's core global governance norms are novel and controversial elements of contemporary global governance. China's engagement with these norms is particularly interesting given these norms privilege the US and liberal values, contrasted with the Chinese state's rising global power and illiberal domestic political structure. This chapter's review of the extant literature on this subject is divided in two sections. The first considers the English language literature in substantial detail, while the second provides a somewhat briefer examination of the Chinese language literature.

a. English Literature The earliest studies of China's engagement with internet governance are largely focused on technical details related to Chinese interconnection with foreign computer networks and the emerging internet protocol system (IPS), or Chinese participation in the emerging domain name system (DNS) (see, for example: Cullen & Choy 1999; Harwit & Clark 2001; Mueller & Tan 1997, ch. 5; Tan 1999; Zheng 1994). These studies briefly consider Chinese interaction with the then emerging US authority and privatized governance norms, but internet

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governance norms are not the focus of these studies; in part, this is because such norms were at an early emergent stage of their lifecycle at this time. Hughes and Ermert's (2003, ch. 6) examination of China's early engagement with internet governance organizations is perhaps the first scholarly analysis focused specifically on the politics surrounding China's engagement with internet governance organizations. Hughes and Ermert do implicitly consider China's engagement with US government authority and non-state actor authority, but this analysis is limited in detail, and in the relatively fast-moving world of internet governance is now somewhat dated. Xue's (2004b) study of Chinese language domain names includes a brief analysis of Chinese participation in internet standards and domain name governance organizations, and thus indirectly touches upon internet governance norms, but it is limited both in the detail provided regarding China's participation in these organizations, and by the relative age of the publication. Conversely, Hu's (2005) contribution to an edited book on internet governance provides a detailed outline of the Chinese government's position regarding the US authority and privatized governance norms and the merits of an alternative equal state authority norm, but is both now relatively dated and provides little empirical detail on the history of China's engagement with these norms. More recent studies of China's involvement with internet governance organizations have a stronger focus on analysis of China's engagement with core internet governance norms, perhaps because such norms are better established by the mid-2000s. Nevertheless, they do not engage in detailed empirical analysis. Tso's (2008) study of Chinese computer scientists’ participation in domestic and global internet governance engages in a relatively detailed analysis of China's participation in internet governance organizations, and includes implicit assessment of China's position towards non-state actor authority and multi-stakeholder governance, but it has a relatively narrow focus upon a few specific organizations and upon Chinese computer scientists. Herold (2011) considers Chinese engagement with US government authority through China's interaction with ICANN, concluding that the Chinese government is opposed to this norm, but not investigating the matter in great detail. Liu (2012) examines the extent to which China has been able to influence the structure of the internet governance regime. As part of this examination, Chinese involvement with ICANN is briefly considered. Liu highlights Chinese opposition to the US authority and privatized governance norms, as well as China's advocacy for an equal state authority norm. While Liu does focus specifically on China, empirically this review of Chinese involvement is brief. Similarly, Mueller (2011) explores Chinese engagement with ICANN and other internet governance organizations as part of a broader discussion of Chinese engagement with internet governance. Like Liu, Mueller notes China's efforts to advance state primacy and equality within these organizations, but such examination is still relatively brief. Part of the reason for both Liu and Mueller's limited empirical depth is that these studies have a broader focus than just technical internet governance – as defined by the dissertation. Arsenne (2012) conducts a similar examination of Chinese engagement with internet governance organizations, considering Chinese involvement with ICANN and Chinese policies towards the multi-stakeholder governance norm. She concludes that the

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Chinese government opposes this norm, but does not provide a detailed empirical examination of Chinese engagement. Similarly, Negro (2014) examines the geopolitical context of China's engagement with DNS governance, noting in particular Chinese opposition to US government authority; however, as with other studies, this book chapter is limited in the depth of its empirical analysis. Conversely, the Asia Internet History Project, which provides a broad-ranging examination of East Asia's engagement with the internet, touches upon China's participation in the internet's development and governance but does so without considering the global governance norms that underpin it (InternetHistory.asia 2014). Another study by He and the dissertation's author, Galloway, considers Chinese engagement with the multi-stakeholder governance through examining Chinese involvement in a few core internet governance organizations (Galloway & He 2014). This study is based in part of research conducted for this dissertation, and thus reflects the author's aim to provide a more empirically detailed exploration of Chinese engagement with core internet governance norms. However, like other studies, its journal article format renders it narrowly focused on the multi-stakeholder governance norm and a few core organizations. Beyond these studies with an implicit or explicit focus on China's engagement internet governance organizations and norms, a larger and more generalized body of research exists which has touched upon China’s engagement with internet governance organizations and the core internet governance norms guiding them, but simply asserts Chinese opposition to existing norms without examining these claims in detail (see, for example: DeNardis & Raymond 2013; Larsen 2003; Malcolm 2008, ch. 5-6; Mueller 2010, ch. 6; Rogers 2006, pp. 30-2; Shtern 2009, p. 74, 114, 130; Winfield & Mendoza 2008, p. 86). In addition, while these existing studies identify China's policy positions towards core internet governance norms, they do not explicitly focus on the extent to which China has accepted the regime's core governance norms or provide detailed empirical analysis of Chinese behavior at the global and domestic levels to illustrate their arguments. With respect to the literature on China's engagement with specific governance issues of internet governance, a similar pattern of limited empirical detail exists. A number of scholars have examined China's engagement with internet standards governance. This research has predominantly focused on Chinese involvement with a specific technical standard, the internet protocol (IP) version six (IPv6). Yoshimatsu (2007) considers Sino-Japanese cooperation in IPv6 deployment, as well as in two global standards-setting organizations. DeNardis (2006; 2009b), in two detailed studies of global IPv6 development and deployment efforts, touches upon China’s IPv6 development strategies. A few other authors also briefly consider this issue (Li et al. 2003; Werbach 2008; Zhao 2010). China's activity in the development of this new technical standard has been addressed in relative detail by a number of scholars, but these scholars have not extended their analysis to the political ramifications of this activity, save in the case of DeNardis (2009b, pp. 205-6) who only briefly considers China in a broader argument about state preferences towards transnational standards-setting practices. The previously mentioned studies by Tso (2008) and Xue (2004b) have considered Chinese involvement with other internet standards related to multilingualization of domain names. However, in general there has only been a limited degree of empirical

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analysis of Chinese engagement with the IETF – the body that governs internet standards – and no substantial consideration of Chinese engagement with the privatized governance norm's operation in this area (IETF 2012). Of all areas of internet governance this dissertation addresses, Chinese involvement in the administration of the internet protocol system has received probably the least amount of empirical consideration; no studies explicitly focus on this issue, although early technically-oriented studies do examine the earlier years of China's involvement in this issue, and later textbooks on Chinese internet law briefly consider the interplay between the IPS and China's domestic internet (Shao 2012, p. 30; Xue 2010, p. 26). In regards to China’s involvement in DNS governance, a few studies stand out for the attention given to China and the level of detail that they provide. Tso (2008) offers a reasonably detailed examination of China’s position on the sub-issue of domain name multilingualization. Similarly, Xue (2004b) considers in some depth the Chinese position on multilingualization and the history of the development of Chinese domain names. Park (2008), in her PhD dissertation, considers the political economy of country-code top-level domains (ccTLDs). This exploration includes a detailed look at China’s ccTLD and the political concerns that China has regarding ICANN’s role in the governance of them. Similarly, Negro (2014) engages in a brief but broad consideration of China's interaction with DNS governance in his book chapter. These works provide the highest level of empirical detail regarding China’s view of, and engagement with, DNS governance – but they do not provide an in-depth, overall analysis of China's participation in DNS governance. Aside from this, there are a number of studies that examine China's interaction with the dispute resolution system for domain names (Chik 2008; He & Song 2010; Soo 2004; Xue 2004a, 2004b; Zhao 2009). Of these, Chik, He and Song, and Zhao all consider the degree to which Chinese practice corresponds with that at the global level. Thus, there is a relatively large number of existing works related to this specific issue of DNS governance. Overall, however, the existing literature on China's engagement with internet governance constitutes a patchwork of studies that together provide a relatively high level of empirical detail regarding China's engagement in internet governance, but many of these individual studies either have a very narrow focus, suffer from a lack of analytical depth, or have now become somewhat outdated. More importantly, there are no detailed and systematic studies of the role that China has adopted towards the core governance norms regulating the technical internet, and those studies which do consider this issue directly frequently do not justify their conclusions with a sufficient degree of empirical evidence. Thus, the dissertation argues that further research is needed to improve our understanding of this issue.

b. Chinese Literature Prior to discussing the Chinese language literature on Chinese engagement with technical internet governance, two preliminary points should be noted. Firstly, the depth of this literature review is limited by difficulty in obtaining access to the full range of Chinese language academic literature; thus, the dissertation does not claim that this literature review is exhaustive despite review of a large number of Chinese language scholarly works. In this respect, to locate sources relevant to

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the literature the dissertation has drawn on the China National Knowledge Infrastructure database to identify relevant journal articles. Secondly, the dissertation's author does not claim native speaker fluency in Mandarin Chinese and – while confident that this literature review accurately reflects the content of the works reviewed – this operates as a second barrier in asserting a comprehensive review of the relevant Chinese language literature. These limiting factors aside, this review of Chinese literature argues that the Chinese language literature on China's engagement with core internet governance norms displays the same relative paucity of empirical depth as that of the English language literature. Empirically, only a few Chinese scholars examine China's engagement with core internet governance organizations, and most do so very briefly. Run and Han (2005) briefly note the involvement of a Chinese computer scientist, Hu Qiheng, in the WSIS' Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG) as part of a broader discussion of the regime itself. Liu (2012) briefly mentions the Chinese government's advocacy for equal state authority and United Nations (UN) prominence in internet governance in an article discussing the regime's core structure, norms and actors. Yang and He (2011) touch upon China's involvement in one internet governance organization, the Internet Governance Forum. No academic articles appear to discuss Chinese involvement in technical standards development within the IETF. However, unlike the English language literature, two Chinese scholars consider China's engagement with the IPS. Hu (2009), explicitly addresses China's incorporation into the global IPS in an article that focuses on Chinese law related to IPS and DNS operation within China. Xie (2005) quickly summarizes the operation of China's domestic IPS and its relation to the global distribution of IP addresses and autonomous system numbers. Wang (2010) notes Chinese involvement in the development of internationalized domain names (IDN) within ICANN. Similarly, Liu and Zhang (2009) touch upon China's involvement in ICANN's IDN development process. Huang (2007) notes the linkages between ICANN's and China's domain name dispute resolution processes, as do both Liu (2008) and Tang (2010). On the issue of China's engagement with the core internet governance norms, the Chinese language literature is generally silent, with a few brief mentions in the articles listed above of the Chinese government's stated opposition to the US authority and privatized governance norms. Thus, Chinese scholars have engaged with this issue to some degree, but these studies are focused on justifying Chinese preferences rather than examining the pattern of Chinese behavior towards existing norms. Much like the English language literature, there is a lack of empirical depth in the Chinese language literature's analysis of Chinese engagement with core internet governance norms. This is somewhat surprising, given the reasonably large body of Chinese language academic literature related to internet governance more generally. It may be that dominance of the English language in internet governance activities, or political issues surrounding the internet in China, create barriers to this type of research by Chinese scholars. Regardless, there is a gap within both the English and Chinese language literature

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on Chinese engagement with internet governance and with its core governance norms that the dissertation aims to fill.

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3. Methodology & Methods

With the previous chapter identifying a gap in the literature on Chinese engagement with internet governance, the dissertation now presents its methodology and methods – the tools with which it analyses China’s engagement with core internet governance norms. This methodology is composed of three elements. The first provides a framework for understanding state and other actors’ behavior in global politics, as well as the structural factors that affect this behaviour. This theoretical perspective is rationalist and multi-causal, and based on liberal international relations theory, but complemented by insights from realist and constructivist schools. The second element is a framework for understanding normative change in global governance. It is based primarily on Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) norm lifecycle model, supplemented by Acharya’s (2004) conception of norm localization. The dissertation’s third methodological element is a suite of four potential state political roles towards global governance norms: norm-entrepreneur, norm-supporter, norm-maker and norm-taker. It is synthesized from existing approaches in the norm-maker/norm-taker literature and structured around the norm lifecycle model. The dissertation argues that it is a modest improvement on the dyadic norm-maker/norm-taker framework, as it more accurately describes state relationships with global governance norms as they evolve. This chapter also outlines the dissertation’s methods, by which it identifies relevant data sources and the means by which they are analysed. These are, respectively a structured identification of data sources guided by frameworks from the compliance literature in international law, and qualitative documentary analysis supported by some basic quantitative analysis.

a. A Multi-Causal Theoretical Perspective The first element of the dissertation’s methodology is its multi-causal theoretical perspective, which is developed from general international relations theory. This is used to identify the motivations for state and non-state actors’ behaviour, as well as the structural factors that affect the general operation of the international system and international society. It adopts the basic assumptions of liberal international relations theory, complemented by insights from realist and constructivist approaches to understanding world politics; an inclusive approach to analysis – if not theory-building – acknowledged as appropriate by international relations scholars across the spectrum of theoretical paradigms (Fearon 1998, pp. 295-7; Hudson 2007, p. 6; Slaughter 1994, p. 731; Waltz 1996, p. 54; Wendt 1992, p. 396). As stated by prominent realist theoretician Waltz (1996, p. 56): “Much is included in an analysis; little in a theory. Theories are sparse in formulation and beautifully simple. Reality is complex and often ugly”. Reflecting this, the dissertation argues that the assumptions of each of the three most prominent international relations paradigms have relevance in explaining the dynamics of global politics. Such a multi-causal perspective is particularly appropriate in the context of internet governance – an area of global governance involving a large variety of state and non-state actors operating across global, regional and domestic levels of political organization.

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The foundation of the dissertation's multi-causal theoretical perspective is Moravcsik's (1997, pp. 516-21) restatement of liberal international relations theory, which reduces liberal theory to three core assumptions. Firstly, that the primary actors in politics – both domestic and global – are predominantly rational individuals, or collective groups of individuals, seeking to advance or protect their interests. Secondly, that states and other organizations represent a subset of their domestic or internal societies, and they act in pursuit of the interests of changing coalitions of these actors. Thirdly, that state behavior is explicable as attempts by the state to achieve or protect their interests and constrained, if at all, by the countervailing interest-driven behavior of other states or transnational actors. While liberalism is often criticized for its perceived idealism, Moravcsik's conception is an explanatory theory rather than a normative one in that it theorizes “how states do behave rather than how they should behave” (Slaughter 1994, p. 728). As an explanatory theory, its acknowledgement of the relevance of non-state actors to domestic and global politics renders it appropriate to the dissertation's analysis. As demonstrated in the next chapter, internet governance involves – and has been designed to explicitly accommodate – non-state actor participation. In addition, the dissertation's study of core internet governance norms involves explanations of how such norms evolve from, and subsequently influence, domestic society. Liberalism's capacity to incorporate multiple actors and levels into analysis renders it the most appropriate foundation for the dissertation's theoretical perspective. Likewise, liberalism's conception of politics as interest-driven competition and compromise enables it to provide convincing explanations for a broad range of political behavior – from how domestic US politics influenced the development of core internet governance norms, to why China was initially willing to accept the US authority norm. However, while liberal assumptions ground the dissertation's theoretical perspective, it also draws on insights from realist and constructivist paradigms of international relations. In relation to realist theory, two core assumptions guide this paradigm, both of which ultimately privilege power as the primary causal factor in global politics. One is that human nature drives actors to privilege survival and power maximization, and thus power concerns motivate actor behavior (Morgenthau 1950, pp. 4-15; Rose 1998, p. 146). The other is that the world is anarchic – without a dominant central authority – and thus states, the actors with the most power, are the most significant actors in world politics. Because of this anarchy, and because human nature includes both a survival instinct and the potential to act in a predatory manner, all states must act to maximize their power or face elimination from the system. For these reasons, the desire for power and the maintenance of that power are the primary factors driving state behavior (Mearsheimer 2003; Waltz 1979; 1990, pp. 30-3). The realist perspective is too narrow, however, to be the foundation of the dissertation's theoretical perspective. Its primary focus on states limits its usefulness in the context of internet governance. Similarly, its emphasis on human instincts and anarchy as the primary causal factors in state behavior is inadequate for explaining the complexities of state behavior towards core internet governance norms, particularly as internet governance is not an explicitly

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security-related issue area. However, the dissertation does accept the realist assumption that survival and power maximisation instincts can drive interest formation, but it does not accept that these are always dominant in motivating behaviour. For example, power as a motivation satisfactorily explains why the US government asserted ultimate authority over internet governance, but less satisfactorily explains why it then invested non-state and/or non-US actors with authority. The dissertation also accepts the assumption that anarchy and material power distribution motivates state behaviour, and facilitates or constrains state strategies in the advancement or protection of their interests. The dissertation also incorporates some of the insights of constructivist international relations theory. Constructivism emphasizes the political importance of ideas, identities, perceptions of reality and the process of social interaction itself (Guzzini 2000, pp. 159-60; Hopf 1998, p. 176). Constructivism assumes that the subjective ideas and past experiences underpinning an actor's identity shapes their perception of reality, and their own determination of their interests, by providing the social meaning necessary for these interests to be implied (Hopf 1998, p. 175; Wendt 1992, pp. 396-8). For example, cyber-libertarian ideas and a history of democracy within the US shaped US beliefs about the proper structure of internet governance, leading to both the privatized governance and multi-stakeholder governance norms. Constructivism also posits that ideas and their global distribution structure global politics just as material power distribution does – motivating, facilitating or constraining behaviour. For example, Wendt highlights how US military power is threatening to Cuba and not Canada – despite their relatively similar material structural positions – because of political and cultural differences that shape these states' perceptions of political reality (LeoGrande 1998, p. 68; Wendt 1992, p. 397). Similarly, China is restrained in its advocacy of exclusive state authority over internet governance, in part, by its perception of the international community's support for democratic ideals. These broad assumptions of constructivism are incorporated into the dissertation's perspective. Indeed, Moravcsik's own restatement of liberal theory echoes constructivist assumptions, when he states that state and other organizational interests are, in part, constituted by the identities and values of individuals and sub-groups within them (Moravcsik 1997, pp. 517-18, 540-41). While Moravcsik also criticizes constructivism, this is limited to constructivist frameworks that accept structural limitations on political analysis; that is, where the inner workings of states are ignored. He notes with approval constructivist approaches that adopt liberalism’s ‘bottom-up’ orientation (Moravcsik 1997, pp. 539-41). Thus constructivism, when not predicated solely on structural reasons for the development of state identities and interests, is very similar to and broadly compatible with liberalism's foundational tenets. As with material structure, the ideational structure of world politics is also used by the dissertation as another factor influencing actors' identification of, and strategy in the pursuit of, their interests. In summary, the dissertation's multi-causal perspective adopts at its core liberal assumptions which frame global politics as a bottom-up, interest-driven process conducted by a variety of primarily rational political actors – including states acting on behalf of a sub-set of domestic society and a range of domestically or

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transnationally active non-state actors. It also incorporates the behavioural realist insight that concerns for power maximisation and survival can drive interest formation, but argues that such factors are not always dominant and, in conformity with constructivist perspectives, accepts that interest formation and pursuit is also driven by ideas, values and perceptions of reality. The dissertation's perspective acknowledges the structural realist insight that interests are pursued by actors with widely varying relative material or hard power capabilities, and their capacity to advance their interests is affected by the broader material power configuration – or material structure – of the international system. Similarly, it acknowledges the structural constructivist insight that the global distribution of ideas – or ideational structure of the world – also facilitates or constrains efforts to advance interests. The significance of any one factor is argued by the dissertation to be ultimately contingent on the specific factual circumstances or context in which political activity is occurring.

b. The Dynamics of Global Governance Norms The second element of the dissertation's methodology is its conception of how global governance norms arise and develop. This conception is informed by the dissertation’s multi-causal theoretical perspective, but relies primarily upon Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) norm lifecycle model (the norm lifecycle model), which is argued to be the most useful framework for understanding the dynamics of norm diffusion in global governance. To justify the dissertation’s approach, the concept of a ‘norm’ is reviewed along with various theoretical approaches to norm dynamics and the literature on regime theory. While regime theory appears a natural choice for the dissertation considering its topic, in practice the theory’s usefulness is limited due to its theoretical similarity to general international relations theory, and its broader focus on regime components beyond norms themselves. Instead, the dissertation argues that the norm lifecycle model provides a more parsimonious, yet still acceptably holistic, framework for understanding norm dynamics, which is flexible enough to accommodate a multi-causal theoretical perspective and accurate in explaining how and why global governance norms diffuse across international and domestic governance structures – especially when supplemented by Acharya's (2004) insights into norm localization.

i. Norms, Norm Dynamics & Regime Theory Prior to discussing approaches to norm dynamics, it is important to clarify what the dissertation means by 'norm'. There are multiple different definitions of 'norm' within the literature. One popular definition within constructivist studies is that a norm is a “standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity” (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998, p. 891). Within the regime theory literature, the accepted definition is a “standard of behaviour in terms of rights and obligations” (Krasner 1982, p. 186). A large number of other definitions exist (see: Björkdahl 2002, pp. 13-5). While some are highly specific, such as Raymond's (1997a, p. 128) definition of international norms as “generalized standards of conduct that delineate the scope of a state's entitlements, the extent of its obligations, and the range of its jurisdiction”, for the dissertation’s purposes the common

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constructivist definition – a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity – is sufficient. A more fundamental issue in the definition of norms is the issue of whether they must have a certain normative character, or ‘oughtness’, to qualify as norms? Some scholars argue that standards of behavior must be genuinely agreed upon by a majority of actors – must contain a degree of ethical 'oughtness' – to be regarded as legitimate or as norms rather than other kinds of rules (Björkdahl 2002, p. 14; Finnemore & Sikkink 1998, p. 891, 892; Florini 1996, p. 364). Conversely, others regard norms simply as repeated behavioral patterns which do not necessarily require ethical justification (Björkdahl 2002, p. 13, 14; Raymond 1997b, pp. 216, 7); as Klotz (1999, p. 14) states: “Standards [of behavior] can have functional and non-ethical origins and purposes.” This issue is critically important to the dissertation because one norm it examines (the US authority norm) is highly contested and lacks a clear normative justification. Because of this, the dissertation takes the view that norms include simple functional patterns of behavior which are complied with in specific social settings. Such norms do not necessarily rest on genuinely agreed-upon ideas about appropriate behavior and thus may not be legitimate, but they are norms nonetheless (Payne 2001, p. 41). Adopting this less exclusive definition enables each norm assessed by the dissertation to be analysed using the same methodological framework, allowing more functional or non-ethical norms to be examined alongside norms with a greater degree of genuine ethical support. Beyond definitional concerns, there are multiple perspectives on how norms arise or evolve within international society. Each of the three core paradigms in international relations provide an implicit or explicit suggestion as to how the process of norm dynamics operate, as the literature directly addressing this issue illustrates. Liberal perspectives claim that norms are proposed or accepted by states when they are in their interest, and norms spread when they are in the mutual interest of a number of states (Jervis 1999, pp. 45-6; Keohane 1984, p. 14, 87, pp. 99-100). Pressure from domestic and transnational interest groups can change state attitudes towards global governance norms and explain their evolution and diffusion (Cortell & Davis Jr 1996, p. 452; Moravcsik 2000, p. 226). Realist perspectives sustain arguments that norms are proposed or endorsed by powerful states which exert material influence via incentives or coercion to induce widespread acceptance or compliance (Andresen & Agrawala 2002, p. 42; Mearsheimer 1994, pp. 12-5). Changes in relative power explain changes in state attitudes towards global governance norms (Argomaniz 2009, p. 122; Payne 2001, p. 41). Constructivists argue that states propose or support norms that conform to their beliefs, while resisting or replacing norms that do not (Acharya 2004, p. 240; Finnemore & Sikkink 1998, p. 899). Changes in state responses to global governance norms are explained by learning processes and socialization – as ideas and beliefs evolve, or due to social interaction and peer pressure, state attitudes towards norms are revised (Checkel 1997, p. 477; Foot & Walter 2013, p. 335). Similarly, regime theory also includes within its ambit explanations for how global governance norms arise. This is because international regimes, in their classical definition, are conceived of as: “sets of implicit or explicit principles,

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norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations (Krasner 1982, p. 186).” The establishment of global governance norms, as one constituent element of an international regime, are thus addressed by regime theory. In general, however, regime theory's approach to norm dynamics parallels the three broad paradigms of the international relations field (Adler & Haas 1992; Hasenclever, Mayer & Rittberger 1996; Hopf 1998, pp. 188-91; Keohane 1984; Krasner 1982; Moravcsik 2000, pp. 225-9; Simmons & Martin 2002; Wendt 1992). Partly because of this, the dissertation relies on its multi-causal theoretical perspective instead of regime theory. The primary reason for excluding regime theory, however, is because it has a broader focus than just global governance norms, and incorporates principles, rules, and decision-making procedures into analysis. This broader focus is not incompatible with the dissertation's subject matter, but its inclusion adds an unnecessary layer of complexity to the dissertation's methodology. Instead, the dissertation adopts the norm lifecycle model, which deals directly and exclusively with theory related to norm dynamics. The reason for employing a model of norm dynamics at all is because the dissertation's theoretical perspective – while effective in explaining state or other actor behavior and factors influencing it – lacks a clear framework for conceiving of the overall process of normative change in global governance. Understanding this process has been a particular focus of the constructivist school of international relations, which has generated a few different models to explain it, including the evolutionary model of Florini (1996), and the spiral model of Risse-Kappen and Sikkink (1999). However, the dissertation adopts Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) norm lifecycle model because its conception of a structured, three-stage process of norm dynamics is simple, logical and relatively comprehensive. These characteristics have contributed to its popular acceptance amongst scholars studying global governance norms (see, for example: Acharya 2004; Cronin 2005; Fukuda-Parr & Hulme 2011; Harrison 2004; Hoffmann 2003; Ingebritsen 2002; Prantl & Nakano 2011).

ii. Finnemore & Sikkink's Norm Lifecycle Model Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998, pp. 894-905) norm lifecycle model conceives of norms as arising in a three-stage process of norm emergence, norm cascade and norm internalization. In the first stage, new ideas lead ‘norm entrepreneurs’ – individuals or sub-national groups – to redefine their interests and begin advocating for the recognition of a new norm, typically within domestic society. Eventually, these norm entrepreneurs develop or acquire an organizational platform which can directly influence state governments, populations in other states and various other transnational actors. Such platforms may be new or existing non-government organizations (NGOs), the norm entrepreneurs' own state government, or sympathetic international organizations. From these platforms, the new norm is promoted at the global level and ideally states and other actors are persuaded of the norm’s legitimacy. Norm advocacy, at both domestic and supranational levels, often occurs in an environment where pre-existing norms already operate. Thus the process is often contested. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p. 899) use the example of women's suffrage to illustrate this;

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a new idea of female equality led to advocacy for women’s right to vote, a new norm that emerged in an environment where such a right was contested. Eventually, norm entrepreneurs convince enough other actors to accept the new norm and the second stage of ‘norm cascade’ occurs, representing the new norm’s accelerating level of acceptance. Once a critical mass of states accept the norm – its ‘tipping point’ – a cascade of other states and actors begin to accept or conform to it, and it becomes an established norm. A critical mass of states can be achieved in two different, complementary ways – either enough states, or enough ‘critical states’, accept the norm. Finnemore and Sikkink tentatively suggest one-third of all states as a critical mass, while what constitutes a critical state is context-specific. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p. 901) use landmine prohibition as an example of this. Both Britain and France were critical states for a norm against landmine use due to their status as military great powers using landmines; when they accepted the norm, it facilitated the norm’s cascade through the international community. Prior to a norm cascade, states typically reject a new norm absent domestic political pressure. Post-tipping point, states begin to accept norms due to socialization pressures and identity concerns – they wish to be seen as legitimate members of the global community. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p. 902) do briefly acknowledge that material persuasion or coercion can be a factor in compliance, but primarily place causality for conformity on ideational factors. The third and final stage of the norm lifecycle is 'norm internalization'. After the norm cascade phase, states will gradually internalize the norm to the point that it achieves a taken-for-granted quality. That is, even if acceptance of the norm is due to ideational or material pressures, eventually the ideas underpinning the norm’s legitimacy become accepted, and conformity to it becomes automatic. This final stage represents the point at which a norm becomes entrenched in international society, where it permeates both the domestic societies and formal government structures of states, and of international organizations. Norms related to slavery, such as the prohibition on the right to own humans, are an example of largely internalized norms which are entrenched in international organizations, state structures and within the vast majority of domestic societies (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998, p. 891, 916). Reaching this stage, or even the norm cascade stage of the norm lifecycle, is not an inevitability, and many new norms of global governance either fail to cascade at all or, if they do, remain only partially internalized by the broader body of states within the international system. A graphical representation of the norm lifecycle model is provided below in Figure 1.

Figure 1: The Norm Lifecycle Model

Source: Finnermore and Sikkink (1998, p. 896)

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iii. Norm Localization

The norm lifecycle model is relatively comprehensive, but it is limited in its ability to explain norm internalization in specific organizations or in the domestic sphere. This issue is addressed by Acharya (2004, pp. 250-4), who argues that global norms permeate lower levels of political organization through a norm localization process. A global norm’s legitimacy may not be recognized by local or domestic society at all, and thus no internalization will occur. Alternatively, a global norm may be supported sufficiently that it localizes, with a partial internalization where the global norm is adapted, to better fit within the pre-existing framework of local norms. At the extreme end of localization, sufficient local acceptance of a global norm may ultimately result in full internalization, with the global norm displacing pre-existing local norms either entirely or in relative importance. Acharya (2004, pp. 256-60) illustrates this localization process with the global norm of collective security in the Southeast Asian region. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations partially adopted this norm, but modified it into a norm of cooperative security that ensured it did not conflict with the more locally-accepted norm of non-interference in internal affairs. The dissertation employs the more specialized model of norm localization to enhance its explanation of internet governance norm dynamics and China's engagement with them. In particular, norm localization is used to describe how China has responded to the US authority and privatized governance norms at the domestic level. Norm localization is also used to explain why the privatized governance and multi-stakeholder governance norms, respectively, refer to different degrees of non-state actor authority and different classes of stakeholders in different internet governance organizations.

iv. The Dissertation's Theoretical Perspective and the Norm Lifecycle Model

Finnemore and Sikkink's model of norm dynamics is highly persuasive due to its effectiveness in describing normative diffusion across the globe. However, this norm lifecycle model is explicitly predicated on constructivist grounds, and the dissertation makes a few minor changes to the model that are in keeping with its multi-causal theoretical perspective. Firstly, it should be noted that norm lifecycle’s agent-driven, bottom-up description of norm dynamics is as much compatible with liberal perspectives as it is with constructivist views. Thus, there is no requirement to modify this aspect of the model to fit with the multi-causal theoretical perspective. However, while Finnemore and Sikkink do not explicitly exclude material factors from the second 'norm cascade' stage, the dissertation argues that these factors should be more fully acknowledged. In particular, the dissertation would emphasize the more realist view that norm cascade occurs not only when ideational persuasion and pressure lead states into accepting norms, but also when particularly powerful states are able to use material incentives – either in the form of bribes or threats – to coerce states into conformity. Figure 2 below illustrates this perspective on the norm lifecycle.

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Figure 2: The Norm Lifecycle Model & Theoretical Drivers of Change

c. State Roles Towards Global Governance Norms

The third component of the dissertation's methodology is its framework for assessing the roles states adopt towards global governance norms, which is subsequently used to assess the roles China has adopted towards core internet governance norms. Unlike the previous two elements of the dissertation’s methodology, the dissertation aims to improve upon existing theory on state roles, and thereby make a modest contribution to existing knowledge. Specifically, it aims to improve upon the standard norm-maker/norm-taker approach to this issue. Thus, this section of the chapter begins with a review of studies employing the norm-maker/taker framework and existing attempts within the literature to improve upon the framework. Using this existing literature and the norm lifecycle model as a guide, a new framework is developed that consists of four potential state roles towards global governance norms: norm-entrepreneur, norm-maker, norm-supporter, and norm-taker. This framework is argued to be an improvement upon the existing norm-maker/taker framework because it more accurately covers the range of relationships states can have with global governance norms over their lifecycle. The inclusion of more dynamic, process-oriented norm-entrepreneur and norm-supporter roles complement the more established, static and outcome-

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4 5

6

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1. New ideas/material circumstances may lead non-state actors to reassess their interest in a pre-existing norm.

2. Those that determine their interests are best served by a new norm commence norm entrepreneurship.

3. Political pressure from domestic/ transnational norm-entrepreneurs cause some states to reassess their interest in the pre-existing norm.

- or – Changing global distributions of state interests, ideas or material power cause some states to reassess their interest in the pre-existing norm.

4. States that determine their interests are best served by the new norm commence norm entrepreneurship themselves.

5. Other states are ideationally persuaded or materially coerced into compliance with the new norm, privileging it above the pre-existing norm.

6. When a critical mass of states, or sufficient critical states, support the new norm, it reaches its tipping point and cascades through international society; displacing the pre-existing norm.

7. The new norm gradually internalizes within and across states via localization processes, and may achieve a taken-for-granted quality.

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oriented roles of norm-maker and norm-taker. This new framework aims to strike a reasonable balance between the need for accuracy in describing state roles – which is lacking in the standard norm-maker/taker framework – and the benefits of conceptual clarity inherent in the parsimonious norm-maker/taker dyad.

i. The Norm-Maker/Norm-Taker Dyad The dominant framework for describing the relationship states have with developing norms is a dyadic conception of states as either norm-makers or norm-takers. Generally, scholars have categorized states as being either a norm-maker by virtue of imposing norms that regulate a global governance issue area or playing a pivotal role in others' adoption those norms, or a norm-taker by virtue of accepting existing norms regulating an issue area or by accepting norms proposed by others. For instance, Lee, Chan and Chan (2012) – adopting a slightly different nomenclature – consider whether China can be considered a rule-maker in relation to the principles regulating humanitarian intervention in the Darfur region of the Sudan. The authors do not distinguish definitions of China's status beyond either rule-taker or rule-maker. Many other studies examining the roles played by states or other political actors adhere to this simple division of norm-maker and norm-taker roles (Dubash 2011; Foot & Walter 2013; Hirono & Lanteigne 2011; Ikenberry 1996; Posner 2009; Reilly 2011; Schirm 2012; Wang & Rosenau 2009, pp. 27-9). The division of states into norm-makers or norm-takers is often explicit, but some authors implicitly define norm-maker status as a state having a substantial influence on the adoption of specific governance structures, with the converse assumption being that a lack of such influence results in the state being a norm-taker (Lake 1993; Medeiros 2009; Oberthür & Kelly 2008). The dyadic norm-maker/taker framework predominantly grounds its assessment of state roles towards global governance norms on structurally-determined outcomes, with interests forming a secondary basis for some determinations of norm-taker status. Using this approach, states that have been capable of securing their preferences in the establishment of global governance norms are classified as norm-makers. Conversely, norm-takers are those states which are incapable of ensuring that global governance norms reflect their preferences, and must accept the preferences or others, or are states indifferent to the norms governing a specific issue area. The norm-maker/taker framework and its theoretical underpinnings do have merit. Firstly, it is parsimonious and this enables a clear assessment of whether states are norm-makers or norm-takers with respect to global governance norms. Secondly, it correctly identifies that successful state norm-making must be supported by the requisite material or ideational power to impose, or persuade others to accept, specific global governance norms – and that a lack of such power may result in states being forced to adopt a norm-taker role. However, by focusing primarily on the influence of structural factors and thus on outcomes, this dominant approach overlooks the significance of state behavior during the process of normative change in global governance. States currently attempting to replace or change existing norms will be classified as norm-takers because they have not yet successfully ensured that their preferences are implemented. Conversely, states actively resisting the norm-making of other

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states will be classified as norm-makers if their resistance is successful, and norm-takers if it is not. In these examples, the norm-maker and norm-taker labels obscure our understanding of state behavior, as they do not accurately describe the relationship a state has towards a given norm. A few scholars have noted this inadequacy of the basic norm-maker/taker framework in describing state roles towards global governance norms. Yet despite recognizing flaws in this dyadic framework, scholarly attempts at developing an improved conceptual framework has been largely piecemeal in fashion. Gao (2011a), in a study of China's role in global trade governance, posits a third role of rule-shaker to complement those of rule-maker and rule-taker. Gao (2011a, pp. 167-70) uses this role to describe China's limited contestation of global trade rules on procedural or substantive grounds. Similarly, Hufbauer (1995), in a brief article addressing China's potential role in regional economic integration, notes that it may adopt a role of rule-breaker by ignoring existing rules or opposing their adoption. Li's (2011, pp. 315-9) examination of China's engagement with international peacekeeping norms diverges from the norm-maker/taker approach, noting that states can be norm-setters or norm-contesters. Li defines norm-setting to include both norm-making and norm-taking (with norm-taking in this context understood as contributing to a norm's worldwide cascade, and thus helping to 'set' or establish it); while norm-contesting is behavior directed at defending existing norms from replacement attempts, or aimed at challenging the appropriateness of new replacement norms. Li's conception of norm-setting illustrates the close connection that the norm-maker/taker literature has with studies of norm dynamics – even making explicit reference to Finnemore and Sikkink's conception of a norm entrepreneur. Nevertheless, these studies have not attempted to redefine a coherent set of state roles to redress the limitations in the norm-maker/taker framework.

ii. Beyond The Norm-Maker/Norm-Taker Dyad The above review of the norm-maker/taker literature argues that its existing formulation suffers from an overly outcome-oriented focus that limits its accuracy, particularly when describing state roles towards global governance norms during the process of their development. Likewise, it illustrates that there have been no holistic efforts to redress this limitation through the development of an improved framework. For these reasons, the dissertation develops its own formulation of a broader and more process-oriented approach to describing potential state roles. It argues that an acceptably accurate yet still relatively parsimonious framework can be derived from linking the norm-maker/taker framework with Finnemore and Sikkink's norm lifecycle model and, in the process, adding two additional roles of norm-entrepreneur and norm-supporter to the existing framework. This broader framework allows state behavior towards global governance norms to be more accurately described throughout these norms' lifecycles, improving the analyst's capacity to assess state engagement with global governance norms, and facilitating more robust predictions of how states may behave in the future. Finnemore and Sikkink's model of norm dynamics, as noted, consists of three separate stages in a norm's lifecycle, being norm emergence, norm cascade and

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norm internalization. In the norm lifecycle model a norm begins its life as an idea that is promoted by an agent, described as a norm entrepreneur. In the context of the norm-maker/taker framework, a norm entrepreneur is uneasily described as a norm-maker prior to the successful triggering of a norm cascade. This is because the norm they are advancing does not become established until it reaches its tipping point, and commences its cascade through international society. As an additional role within the norm-maker/taker framework, however, 'norm-entrepreneur' is well suited to describing a state that is attempting to become a norm-maker; in effect, norm entrepreneurship describes norm-making in progress. Adding norm-entrepreneur to the existing dyadic framework introduces one new process-oriented state role that ameliorates the outcome-oriented weakness of the norm-maker role. It allows more accurate description of states who under the original norm-maker/taker dyad would simply be norm-takers for structural reasons but who are, when their actual behavior is taken into account, better understood as adopting a more active role. A related limitation within the norm-maker/taker framework is its capacity to describe the behavior of states that oppose the norm-entrepreneurship or norm-making of others. States who respond to this activity with some form of resistance are uneasily described as norm-takers, because they are unwilling to accept the emerging norms advocated for by norm-entrepreneurs, and they are not passively indifferent to them either. Instead, they are active opponents of new global governance norms, regardless of whether structural factors ultimately frustrate their efforts to prevent norm-entrepreneurs from succeeding and becoming norm-makers. Therefore, the dissertation argues that an additional role of norm-supporter is necessary to describe behavior that is the opposite of norm-entrepreneurship. This role of norm-supporter acknowledges the response that states can adopt towards new norms prior to them reaching the tipping point that triggers a norm cascade. It enables the difference in roles between actors with differing interests to be taken into account. Those actors who are indifferent to a newly emerging norm are better described as norm-takers, while those whose interest in the old norm is intense enough to trigger relatively active opposition are better described as norm-supporters.

iii. A Process & Outcome Oriented Framework Together, the four separate potential state roles outlined above are argued by the dissertation to constitute an adequately accurate, yet still reasonably parsimonious, framework for describing state engagement with global governance norms. It redresses the limitations that arise from the outcome-oriented norm-maker/taker framework through its inclusion of two additional process-oriented roles, and links all four roles to Finnemore and Sikkink's norm lifecycle model. By linking potential state roles to this model, the dissertation's framework ensures that it covers the broad range of possible roles states can adopt towards global governance norms across each norm’s lifecycle. A graphical representation of the link between the dissertation's process and outcome-oriented framework is provided below in Figure 3, and this final element of the chapter concludes with an overall restatement of the dissertation's framework, and its links to both the norm lifecycle model and the dissertation's multi-causal theoretical perspective.

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Figure 3: The Norm Lifecycle Model & State Roles Towards Norms

For theoretical purposes, the dissertation's framework assumes that all states, or other actors, are initially norm-takers with respect to whichever norms are currently entrenched in the global governance issue area under examination. As new ideas arise in states' domestic populations or amongst state representatives, new state preferences may develop that lead a state to promote new norms in a global governance issue area that better reflect their interests. Alternatively, as the material or ideational structure of global politics changes, states may determine that they now have the requisite power to challenge existing global governance norms which are contrary to their interests. When this occurs, states retain their

Theoretically, all states in compliance with pre-existing norm.

Theoretically, all states in compliance with new norm.

Norm-entrepreneurs arise (by non-compliance with a pre-existing norm and/or by actively advocating for a new norm). Norm-supporters may arise (by actively resisting norm-entrepreneurs). States that are passive (in relation to either the pre-existing or new norm) are norm-takers.

Norm-entrepreneurs that successfully bring the new norm to its tipping point become norm-makers. Norm-supporters that comply with the new norm post-tipping point become norm-takers. -conversely- States that refuse to comply with, or advocate for an alternative to, the new norm become norm-entrepreneurs in relation to their preferred alternative norm (a return to Stage 1 for this alternative norm). Norm-takers that comply with the new norm post-tipping point remain norm-takers, despite a change in behaviour.

States that refuse to comply with, or advocate for an alternative to, the new norm become norm-entrepreneurs in relation to their preferred alternative norm (a return to Stage 1 for this alternative norm).

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previous norm-taker role (if they continue to comply with the pre-existing norm) but also become norm-entrepreneurs that advocate for their preferred norm as a replacement for a pre-existing norm. If they succeed in advancing their preferred norm to its tipping point, a norm cascade occurs and the new norm becomes entrenched within the global community. At this time, norm-entrepreneurs become norm-makers – a change in description that reflects their success in overcoming any material or ideational structural barriers to the new norm's adoption. Any states that actively join with norm-entrepreneurs prior to the new norm reaching its tipping point can also be described as norm-entrepreneurs and, when the new norm’s tipping point is reached, can then be described as norm-makers. Conversely, states that actively oppose the norm-entrepreneurship of others in defense of existing, entrenched norms can be described as norm-supporters of the existing norm. If such states fail to prevent a new norm from reaching its tipping point, they become norm-takers in relation to the new norm. If norm-supporting states refuse to conform to a newly-established norm, then they themselves become norm-entrepreneurs, advocating for a return to the previously dominant norm or another alternative. States that were passive norm-takers of the previously dominant norm, and which form part of the post-tipping point norm cascade by conforming to the new norm, remain norm-takers. However, if these norm-taking states refuse to accept the newly established norm, they, like recalcitrant norm-supporters, are similarly transformed into norm-entrepreneurs advocating for a return to the previously dominant norm or another alternative. Likewise, if post-norm cascade the newly minted norm-makers find themselves defending the new norm against states challenging it, then they can also be described as norm-supporters in relation to the norm they established as the process of normative change continues. In theory, if a new norm cascades, and all state actors accept or conform to it, it will internalize to the extent that it is taken for granted by all. If that were to occur, then eventually all states would gradually revert to the same practical stance towards that norm and could be described as either norm-makers who played a pre-tipping point role in advocating for the norm, or norm-takers who accepted the norm post-tipping point. In practice, of course, it is unlikely that any new norm will reach such universal acceptance, and thus after a new norm's tipping point and in the norm cascade and internalization stages it is likely there will be a mix of states that can be described as norm-makers and norm-takers in relation to the newly entrenched norm, and as norm-entrepreneurs and norm-supporters in relation to efforts to replace the newly-established norm. In the event that an issue area of global governance arises that is substantively new, with no pre-existing norms to regulate it – such as occurs when new technology gives rise to new governance issues such as international flight, the regulation of outer space, or the control of nuclear weapons – the overall process is slightly modified. No states can be norm-supporters because there are no pre-existing norms that regulate the new issue area. However, any state that actively engages in the development of norms to regulate the new global governance issue area can be described as a norm-entrepreneur and, once a given norm cascades, the standard set of state roles become applicable to the issue area.

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d. Methods This final chapter section deals with the dissertation's methods, rather than its theoretical frameworks. In particular, it outlines how the dissertation identifies its sources of evidence, and the specific methods by which evidence is analysed. The first issue of identifying sources of evidence is addressed by reviewing the approaches taken in the norm-maker/taker literature and in related literatures on state compliance with international law. On the basis of this, a range of specific criteria by which China's engagement with core internet governance norms are identified at both the domestic and supra-national levels. Drawing on compliance literature as a further guide, a range of specific factors by which China's engagement with core internet governance norms can be identified are developed. The chapter then concludes with a brief outline of, and justification for, the methods by which evidence is analysed. The dissertation predominantly relies upon the qualitative documentary analysis method, although basic quantitative analysis of some sources is also conducted.

i. Source Identification Within the norm-maker/taker literature, there are two broad approaches taken to acquiring evidence of state engagement with global governance norms. Some authors focus solely on state behavior at the global level (Andresen & Agrawala 2002; DeLisle 2000; Gao 2011b; Hirono & Lanteigne 2011; Ikenberry 1996; Lake 1993; Lee, Chan & Chan 2012; Medeiros 2009; Reilly 2011; Vogler & Stephan 2007; Wang & Rosenau 2009). Indeed, Vierra (2007) explicitly notes this tendency to emphasize internationally-expressed behavior in his review of the literature relating to normative change in international society. Other authors, however, more explicitly recognize the significance of the domestic level as a source of evidence for state engagement with global governance norms. For example, Dubash (2011), in a study of India's capacity to be a global energy governance leader, emphasizes the relevance of international and domestic behavior in assessing India's status as a norm-maker or taker. A number of other empirically oriented studies do likewise (Argomaniz 2009; Foot & Walter 2013; Li 2011; Oberthür & Kelly 2008; Posner 2009; Schroeder 2008). Studies that exclusively examine state behavior at the global level are appropriate in some circumstances, such as when global governance norms are primarily designed to regulate international state behaviour. However, this approach is not suitable to assessment of state roles towards norms influencing both international and domestic behaviour. In addition, because these approaches focus solely on the international level, they are not equipped to examine state relationships towards norms across their lifecycle, as such norms may arise in the norm emergence stage from ideas within domestic society. Considering the domestic sphere is thus necessary for some global governance norms, and also when analysis focuses on state involvement in the development and evolution of these norms. This is the case with internet governance because the internet operates and is governed at both the international or transnational level, and at the domestic level. Aside from this, the dissertation seeks to determine the roles China has played in the evolution of core internet governance norms over their lifetimes.

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For these reasons, it examines evidence of China's engagement with these norms at both the domestic and global levels. The above discussion implies that the norm-taker/maker literature simply analyses state behavior without further specifying the factors relevant to analysis; implicitly, this is not the case in almost all studies and it is explicitly not the case in some. However, the most rigorous approach to identify relevant factors exists in the related literature on compliance within the international law and regime literature (Chayes & Chayes 1993; Kent 2009; Mushkat 2011). State compliance with international law is also an area of inquiry that examines domestic aspects of state behavior in conjunction with international or transnational activity (Chayes & Chayes 1993; Clarke 2003; Feinerman 1995; Guzman 2002; Kent 2002; Kreps & Arend 2006; Nadelmann 1990; Raustiala & Slaughter 2002). It can therefore be a valuable guide to identifying relevant evidence sources for the dissertation's own analysis. That said, much of the compliance literature deals with theoretical question of explaining state compliance with international law or regimes (Chayes & Chayes 1993; Clarke 2003; Feinerman 1995; Guzman 2002; Kent 2002, 2009; Koh 1997; Kreps & Arend 2006; Mushkat 2011; Raustiala & Slaughter 2002; Slaughter & Ratner 1999). This is not examined here, as it covers the same ground as that of the dissertation's multi-causal theoretical perspective. Of the compliance studies which explicitly outline factors relevant to analysis of state behaviour, Kent's (2009, p. 26, 27) is the most useful. She summarizes existing approaches into four broad factors. These are the level of formal compliance with the law or regime, the ‘depth’ of its compliance internationally, the ‘depth’ of its compliance domestically, and the degree of cooperation the state has with the spirit of the law or regime. Of these, it is the first category of formal compliance which identifies which factors are relevant to assessment of state behaviour. The other factors draw upon those in this first category to assess state satisfaction with laws or regimes and are not examined here because other elements of the dissertation's methodology address similar issues. With respect to formal compliance, the five factors Kent (2009, p. 26, 27) outlines as relevant to analysis are:

“(1) accession to a treaty or agreement; (2) procedural compliance with reporting and other requirements; (3) substantive compliance with the rules and principles promulgated by the multilateral body, exhibited in international or domestic behaviour; (4) de jure formal legal compliance, or the implementation of international norms in domestic legislative provisions, in judicial incorporation, or in institutional development; and (5) practical compliance, or compliance at the level of domestic implementation and enforcement.”

Drawing upon Koh's work, Kent further distinguishes the fifth category into political implementation, being government policy conforming to international norms, and social implementation, being widespread civil obedience to norms. The level of specificity with which compliance studies identify relevant factors to assessing state engagement with international law or regimes is highly beneficial in structuring analysis. There are, however, two aspects of compliance criteria

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that complicate its usage for this dissertation. Firstly, it is designed to examine formal international treaty law, and regimes founded on hard international law. Internet governance is neither founded upon formal international law nor is the regime a formal intergovernmental regime. Secondly, compliance criteria are explicitly focused on analyzing state acceptance of rules and norms, rather than state involvement in their development and establishment. This emphasis has been noted by Paltiel (2007, p. 201, 202) in a criticism of compliance studies' inherent orientation towards assessing non-Western states compliance with laws and regimes largely derived from Western states' preferences. Nevertheless, compliance criteria are still a useful guide, and can be modified to suit the less formal structure of internet governance, and to be more appropriate to the overall process of normative change in global governance. In particular, these criteria need to be reformulated to acknowledge the role played by non-state actors in internet governance, and also need to be stretched to include involvement in the development of internet governance norms. With those requirements in mind, the dissertation identifies the factors relevant to its analysis of Chinese roles towards internet governance norms as:

Domestic government activity, including – o Development of internet governance organizations and laws. o Participation in internet governance and judicial interpretation of

laws. o Development of internet governance policy.

Domestic non-government actors' activity, including – o Participation in designing internet governance organizations. o Participation in internet governance. o Statements on internet governance issues.

International government activity, including – o Participation in the design of internet governance organizations. o Participation in internet governance. o Participation in the formation of relevant agreements. o Statements in global fora.

Transnational non-government actors' activity, including all of the same factors as those related to international government activity.

ii. Data Acquisition

The final issue dealt with in the dissertation's methodology is its method of acquiring data. In short, the dissertation primarily relies on qualitative documentary analysis with a limited amount of basic quantitative analysis where possible. Qualitative documentary analysis is employed to create a narrative account of internet governance's history and organization. This account is itself used to define the four core internet governance norms with which the dissertation examines China's engagement, and is also used to analyse the overall lifecycles of each norm. A narrative account of the history of Chinese government and non-government interaction with these four internet governance norms is then developed, and this account is used to determine the political roles China has adopted to these core norms, as well as the alternative norms China has proposed to replace them. This account is supported, where appropriate and

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possible, by basic quantitative analysis through the generation of numerical data related to China's involvement in internet governance. The documents drawn upon derive from various sources guided by the factors identified above. More generally, the dissertation sources evidence from Chinese and non-Chinese government records and statements, the records and websites of relevant governance organizations, as well as academic journal articles and scholarly books. Evidence is also occasionally drawn from pertinent newspaper articles, non-official websites and relevant blogs. These sources allow the generation of a detailed, factual account of China's behavior towards core internet governance norms. The first category of governmental, institutional and scholarly sources are accorded greater evidentiary weight due to their official status or peer-reviewed and conventional academic nature, granting them relatively higher prima facie credibility (Burnham 2004, p. 186, 188). The remaining category, while of lesser credibility due to their informal and unofficial status, are employed to buttress more credible evidence acquired and increase the depth of factual data. Despite the potential inaccuracy in facts reported in this second evidence source, the dissertation argues their use is appropriate provided that the limits of their reliability and evidentiary weight are properly acknowledged (Bowen 2009, p. 33; Burnham 2004, p. 170, 171). The qualitative documentary analysis method is the primary method used by the dissertation because it is the most appropriate method of analyzing Chinese involvement in internet governance. Quantitative methods are inappropriate because, in general, numerical methods of generating evidence are not suitable for providing coherent accounts of behavior in multiple related, but significantly different, contexts (King, Keohane & Verba 1994, p. 5, 6; Strauss 1987, p. 2). That said, quantitative analysis can be employed in some circumstances, including generation of basic numerical data related to, for example, Chinese attendance over time at internet governance meetings. In general, however, quantitative methods cannot be used to provide a contextual account of China's behavior generally, or be consistently applied across all aspects of Chinese engagement with internet governance or across all sources (Patton 1999, p. 1193, 1195; Weber 1990, p. 9, 13). In addition to this, other qualitative methods of acquiring evidence are impractical. This is because of the subject matter of the dissertation and because of linguistic barriers. Given the general political sensitivity of the Chinese government towards internet-related issues, observation and interview techniques are impractical and complicated by linguistic barriers. In contrast to these methods, however, qualitative documentary analysis can be employed to generate a factual account of China’s activity and attitudes across all areas of enquiry and across all categories of sources, granting consistency to the analysis generally and, therefore, improving the internal logic of the research project as a whole. It also makes the task of any subsequent verification of the validity analysis easier by rendering evidence used in the dissertation more readily accessible (King, Keohane & Verba 1994, p. 8). Nevertheless, there are some limitations to the primary use of qualitative documentary analysis that need to be addressed. Firstly, as mentioned, the reliability or credibility of documents, particularly informal or unofficial documents, may be variable (Bowen 2009, p. 33; Patton

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1999, p. 1190). This uncertainty can be reduced by ensuring that the source of documents – when used as secondary sources where bias could color their presentation fact – are squarely acknowledged, and caution taken in accepting their validity (King, Keohane & Verba 1994, p. 9). Secondly, the use of a single method for acquiring factual evidence can potentially distort understanding, as different methods of acquiring data describe different aspects of empirical reality. This flaw, or limitation, in the use of a single method is typically counteracted through ‘triangulation’, being the use of multiple methods, sources, analysts, or theories to corroborate the validity of factual or theoretical claims (Patton 1999, p. 1192, 1193). The use of multiple methods, as discussed, is largely impractical and inappropriate; nevertheless, the dissertation's usage of qualitative documentary analysis is buttressed at times by basic quantitative methods. The use of multiple analysts is similarly inappropriate, due to this being a dissertation required to be conducted individually. As noted the dissertation does draw upon a range of sources, which limits the extent of any overall uncertainty about credibility of evidence. Finally, theoretical triangulation relates to the theoretical significance, rather than the factual validity, of claims. While the dissertation does provide a theoretical explanation for its findings, it is beyond its scope to consider multiple perspectives – such a task is more appropriate to any follow up study.

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4. The Technical Internet, Its History & Governance

The last chapter outlined the dissertation’s methodology and methods, which are employed in its analysis of core internet governance norms and Chinese engagement with them. Before engaging in this substantive analysis, however, it is necessary to delineate the scope of the dissertation’s analysis, and introduce the historical and organizational context in which internet governance occurs. This chapter provides this background information. It first defines internet governance, narrowing the concept to technical internet governance before further delineating the dissertation’s focus to three specific elements of this governance, namely: internet-specific technical standards (internet standards), the internet protocol system, and the domain name system. Following this, a brief description is given of the technical internet’s technological characteristics, which illustrates how internet standards, the IPS, and the DNS operate. A broad overview of the technical internet’s historical development and governance is then provided. This history describes the internet’s US origins and the influence of this on its technological design and governance, as well as the internet’s evolution into a global communications system, and the related political evolution of its global governance. The chapter concludes with an overview of the contemporary technical internet governance regime. It outlines the organizations that administer the technical internet and decide upon internet governance policy, as well as the organizations which contribute to this policy development and shape the internet governance regime’s future evolution. The linkages between the global, regional and domestic levels of internet governance are also illustrated, along with a description of the various actors involved in the governance process.

a. Internet Governance Internet governance is a broad concept and it can be defined in a range of different ways, depending on the theoretical perspective and empirical focus of inquiry. It can, for instance, be framed by domestic legal theory, by regime theory, or by reference to substantive governance issues or levels of governance (compare, for example: Kurbalija 2010; Lessig 1999; Mayer-Schonberger 2002; Mueller, Mathiason & Klein 2007). However, consistent with its focus on the international and transnational politics of internet governance, the dissertation adopts the definition of internet governance provided by a UN taskforce, the Working Group on Internet Governance. This definition (the WGIG definition) conceives of internet governance broadly as: “the development and application by Governments, the private sector and civil society, in their respective roles, of shared principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and programmes that shape the evolution and use of the Internet (WGIG 2005f, p. 4).” Aside from its overall definition, the WGIG definition also defines the substantive scope of internet governance issues across the four categories of technical issues, internet-specific issues, issues relevant to both the internet and other phenomenon, and internet-related development issues (WGIG 2005f, p. 5). As these categories imply, internet governance has a very wide scope. Due to this, the dissertation limits its consideration to the technical issues category. Apart from considerations of time and space, this deliberate limitation is because

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technical issues are foundational to the internet’s existence, and thus an important issue area, as existing studies have not considered China’s engagement with these issues in substantial detail, or with a specific focus on the norms regulating technical internet governance. Further, the most controversial governance organizations and norms within internet governance are largely concerned with technical issues (Collins 2007, p. 23; Komaitis 2008, p. 58). Thus, this area provides the most significant context for examining China's engagement with internet governance. The WGIG definition states that technical issues involve (WGIG 2005f, p. 5):

“Issues relating to infrastructure and the management of critical Internet resources, including administration of the domain name system and Internet protocol addresses (IP addresses), administration of the root server system, technical standards, peering and interconnection, telecommunications infrastructure, including innovative and convergent technologies, as well as multilingualisation.”

This definition captures the critical role that the internet's core technical architecture has in both constituting and regulating the global internet. However, it goes further by linking purely internet-specific issues with internet-related technical telecommunications governance issues. For the dissertation’s purposes, this is too broad for precise analysis of Chinese engagement with internet governance – it includes substantive issues that are not specific to the technical internet, and not regulated by core internet governance norms. Accordingly, the dissertation limits its scope to internet-specific technical issues within the WGIG definition, namely the management of critical internet resources – including IPS and DNS administration – root server system administration, internet standards, and multilingualization. Of these, root server system administration and multilingualization are essentially sub-issues within the governance issues of internet standards, the IPS, and the DNS. Root servers are the authoritative routing servers containing information about domain names and IP addresses, and can be subsumed within analysis of their governance (Mueller 2004 ch. 3). Likewise, multilingualization refers to multi-lingual domain names and can be subsumed within analysis of internet standards and the DNS (Kurbalija 2010, pp. 46-7). Therefore, the dissertation limits its focus to three categories of technical internet governance issues: internet standards, IPS administration and policy, and DNS administration and policy.

b. The Technical Internet The heart of the technical internet is the transmission control protocol/internet protocol (TCP/IP) suite of computer internetworking standards, which enable the internet’s existence and regulate its operation (Mueller, Mathiason & Klein 2007, p. 244). While they rely on computers and telecommunications networks to function, it is this TCP/IP protocol suite that interlinks discrete computers and networks with each other, transforming them into the internet. TCP/IP’s operation is commonly described by postal analogy (e.g. Drezner 2004, p. 491). IP acts as a digital envelope showing the receiver's and sender's addresses, while TCP acts as

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a digital letter filled with information – together they form a ‘packet’. Using TCP/IP, the digital equivalent of a book can be mailed through the digital equivalent of an unreliable postal service with weight restrictions and careless employees. TCP splits the novel into numerous parts with reassembly instructions, while IP provides addressing information. The entire novel can then be reliably transmitted even if each packet travels a different path, arrives in the wrong order, or is lost in transit – if a packet doesn't arrive, the receiver can inform the sender and it can be resent (Challinor 2000). TCP/IP forms part of a broader group of internet-specific technical standards that operate “above the wire and below the application” (DeNardis 2009b, p. 170; IETF 2000a, 2012). Together, this system of internet standards enables the internet’s existence. To work effectively, internet standards rely upon the internet protocol system and the autonomous system, which allocates each computer and computer network its own unique digital address (e.g. 192.0.34.123) (Gao 2001). IP addresses are generally used by individual computers, while autonomous system (AS) numbers are typically used by larger networks to facilitate more efficient communication between them. Each such signifier on the internet must be unique, however, for the system to work properly (Mueller 2004, pp. 33-4). For this reason, these unique addresses are allocated hierarchically from the global level to the regional or national level, then down further to smaller network operators and eventually, in the case of IP addresses, to specific computers. IP addresses and AS numbers are allocated by the same internet governance organizations. Thus, for the dissertation’s purposes, references to the IPS include references to the AS unless the context indicates otherwise. While internet standards and the IPS allow the internet itself to function, a further domain name system exists to facilitate easier human navigation of it. The DNS is a global system of unique linguistic addresses (Mueller 2004, ch. 3). It offsets the inherent difficulties involved in internet navigation via IP addresses (e.g. 192.0.34.163) with a system of linguistic identifiers (e.g. www.icann.org). Much like the IPS, each domain name must be unique to work properly, and thus the DNS is organized hierarchically. This hierarchy is based on distinct namespaces, such as .com or .au. Rights to specific namespaces are granted contractually by a global authority to a namespace operator (registry), which then contractually authorizes lower level operators (registrars) to sell specific names (e.g. icann.org) (Kurbalija 2010, p. 43, 44). The registrars keep lists of all domain names in use and provide these to the registry which, in turn, provides these lists to the global authority. The IPS and DNS enable machines and humans to navigate the internet, respectively, but it is the root server system which binds the two together into a coherent whole. Root servers contain information about the association of IP addresses with domain names. They enable computers to find the network location (IP address) of websites when a user searches for it with a domain name (Karrenberg 2004). Root servers allow IP address associations with domain names to be traced up from individual computers to the global authority and back down again. In practice, however, this is rarely necessary as this information is distributed to lower-level servers to limit bandwidth usage and increase the internet’s efficiency (Karrenberg 2008; Mueller 2004, pp. 47-50). Root servers

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are the bridge that connects the IPS and DNS, rendering the internet truly global for everyone (DeNardis 2009a, p. 176; IETF 2011a). Figure 4 below provides a basic graphical illustration of the role root servers, and other technical internet architecture, play in the operation of the internet.

c. A Brief History of the Technical Internet & Its Governance

i. The Early Internet The internet grew out of computer internetworking research in the Cold War era, conducted by predominantly Western governments, private sector corporations, civil society academics and computer science enthusiasts (Franda 2001, pp. 22-5). The distinctive, global information and communication technology now described as the internet was the most successful variant of this research. It arose within the US and reflects a series of concerns that motivated the research of Western governments and the epistemic community of computer scientists (Cerf 2012; Werbach 2008, p. 350). The technology itself, and its governance, has been heavily influenced by the historical interplay between the interests of this diverse group of actors and their capacity to use power to advance those interests. The internet and its governance structure has been particularly shaped by the US government, which used its greater relative material power to implement its preferences while moderating its decisions to appeal to the values and interests of various domestic and foreign non-state or state actors. The early computer internetworking research that ultimately led to the internet’s development was motivated by concerns amongst state governments and the technical community over existing network technologies which, in the Seventies, were beginning to be marketed by private sector computing giants such as IBM.

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These technologies were proprietary, a feature which violated the open access values of the epistemic community of computer specialists, and jeopardized the interests of many Western governments and private sector actors (Eriksson & Giacomello 2006, pp. 224-5; Malcolm 2008, pp. 3-5). This concern is well illustrated by IBM’s 1975 refusal of a Canadian government request to develop a method of interconnection between IBM’s proprietary internetworking standards and other such standards. Such behavior led the French government to advise European counterparts in 1978 that, “If IBM became master of the network market, it would have a share – willingly or unwillingly – of the world power structure”. (Drezner 2004, p. 491). Thus, consistent with the values of many computer scientists and the interests of state governments, much internetworking research from this period aimed at the development of open access standards. In addition, Western governments – particularly the US government – wanted to develop computer networking technologies that would enable telecommunications to operate in the event of Cold War hostilities (Cullen & Choy 1999, pp. 99-100; Franda 2001, p. 23). This led to US government-funded research of internetworking standards which optimized open access, interoperability, and reliability in an effort to maximize the survivability of computer networks (Cerf 2012). The end result of this was the development of TCP/IP by a US experimental research unit called ARPA (and now called DARPA), under the auspices of the Department of Defense (Sonbuchner 2008, p. 188). TCP/IP's design criteria were also complementary with the interests of other Western governments and non-state actors that desired open, efficient and reliable internetworking standards. This was important to the US government due to its interest in undermining the state-centric International Telecommunications Union’s (ITU) control over global telecommunications, which had a preference for protectionist policies (Drake & Wilson 2005, ch. 1; Mueller, Mathiason & Klein 2007, p. 239). At this time the ITU was attempting to establish a set of universal technical standards for computer internetworking. Thus, ensuring TCP/IP was attractive to others served US government interests in undermining ITU authority. While the story is more detailed, the end of these 'protocol wars' was that TCP/IP became internationally recognized as an open access internetworking standard alongside other standards. By the early Nineties, computer usage and internetworking began to accelerate dramatically as personal computer ownership spread (Selin 1996, p. 368). Combined with the invention of the http protocol and the development of the World Wide Web, this led to further acceleration of the nascent internet’s growth (Mueller 2004, pp. 100-10). Due to the size and wealth of the US market at this time, the vast majority of networked computers were physically located in the US and used the TCP/IP protocol suite (Komaitis 2009, p. 137). This made the TCP/IP network attractive to non-US users, and the globe slowly transitioned to TCP/IP use. Ultimately, the majority of Earth’s computers began using TCP/IP and the US-based network emerged as the internet. As noted, TCP/IP requires a centralized IPS and is supported by the DNS. Because of TCP/IP’s US-centric history, these governance systems were located in US territory and operated by both US academics and the US government – with responsibility transitioning over time from the Department of Defense to the Department of Commerce and

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its agency, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) (NTIA 1998b; Sonbuchner 2008, pp. 187-9).

ii. The ICANN Era This early internet governance regime operated without major controversy until the beginning of the Nineties when, due to the internet’s rapid growth in the early Nineties, a larger-scale method of managing the IPS and DNS became both necessary and potentially lucrative. Consistent with domestic US norms, the US government granted private companies a share in the management of the DNS alongside US academics (Eriksson & Giacomello 2009, p. 212; Mueller, Mathiason & Klein 2007, p. 238). Despite private sector involvement in DNS management being consistent with US domestic beliefs in general, it was not so with respect to the civil society members of the US, and increasingly the transnational, technical internet community (Drezner 2004, p. 494). Nor was it in the interests of the ITU and many state governments for the US to enjoy operational control and territorial jurisdiction over the internet's core architecture (Whitmore, Choi & Arzrumtsyan 2009, p. 5). As private sector actors involved in DNS governance began to charge fees for domain name registration, those opposed to privatization of the internet’s architecture were galvanized into action. A collection of US and non-US technical internet community members, along with internet-related international organizations, formed a coalition called the International Ad-Hoc Committee (IAHC) (Mathiason 2008, p. 53, 54) The IAHC formulated a plan to transfer the IPS and DNS away from exclusive US control (Franda 2001, p. 45; Mueller, Mathiason & Klein 2007, pp. 238-240). A new hub was to be established in Switzerland to prevent privatization of the internet's architecture and consolidation of US power over the internet. In fact, the internet’s global root was briefly transferred away from the US government-designated private sector operator – Network Solutions (now VeriSign) – by Jon Postel, a ‘father of the internet’ involved in DNS governance (Werbach 2008, p. 357). On January 28, 1998, Postel engineered a switch of the global root from Network Solutions’ server to his own at the University of Southern California (Goldsmith & Wu 2006, pp. 42-6) The IAHC transfer plan was already known to the US government when Jon Postel switched the internet’s core root server. His actions immediately came to their attention and the government successfully demanded that Postel restore the server to Network Solutions’ control – publicly asserting its authority over the internet's root in the process, on the basis of having funded TCP/IP research (Sonbuchner 2008, p. 190). This position had been developed in response to the threat of the IAHC proposal, and growing resentment over both US internet control and internet commercialization. The Clinton administration's top internet expert, Ira Magaziner, summarized the government’s position in an interview at the time, stating that: “The United States paid for the Internet, the Net was created under its auspices, and most importantly everything Jon [Postel] and Network Solutions did were pursuant to government contracts.” (Goldsmith & Wu 2006, p. 41).

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Having decisively asserted its authority, the US government moved to establish a global regime for technical internet governance that would entrench its control, reflect its own values and interests, and allay the concerns of the international and technical internet community (Drezner 2004, pp. 495-7; Mueller 2004, ch. 6 & 7). The Clinton administration demanded that all interested parties collectively negotiate the formation of this regime. Ultimately, following a first abortive attempt at negotiations, the administration provided its own set of guidelines on how this system should be constituted (NTIA 1998a). The US government required penultimate authority for internet governance to be granted to a non-profit corporation, incorporated under US law and located within US territory, that was to be internationally representative and inclusive of state, private sector, civil society and individual actors. This resulted in the creation of ICANN, which oversees the global operation of, and policy development for, the IPS and DNS. When ICANN was created, the US government initially planned to divest itself of authority over the technical internet by gradually transferring it to the technical internet community, a plan halted by the Bush administration but restarted by the Obama administration, which has stated it will relinquish the US government’s authority in 2015 (Cukier 2005, p. 8; NTIA 2014b). ICANN’s structure and the regime it largely oversees will be outlined in detail below, but it is important to note that its design reflects a few core values and interests of the parties involved in, and influencing, its establishment. First and foremost, it reflects US governmental concern to maintain unilateral, ultimate authority over the technical internet (DelBianco & Cox 2008). While this authority has waned, and by design will eventually disappear, it remains formally in place (NTIA 2012a; ICANN 2009r; Mueller & Kuerbis 2014, p. 3, 4; US Supreme Court 1945). Secondly, ICANN reflects a belief that non-state actors, and the private sector in particular, are best positioned to ensure that the internet both operates effectively and in a manner beneficial to commercial and non-commercial internet users (Ayres 2008; ICANN 2012at). Thirdly, ICANN reflects a belief that civil society involvement in internet governance prevents state or private sector attempts to restrict open internet access or freedom of speech generally (IETF 2011b; MacKinnon 2009b). The existence of US hegemony over the internet, and the core values and interests that ICANN reflects, decisively shapes the global politics of internet governance.

iii. Post-ICANN Regime Reform Efforts In the years leading up to ICANN's establishment, developed world governments and the ITU began to realize the magnitude of the internet's significance. Despite last-ditch efforts by the IAHC to circumvent US government control, it was able to entrench its technical internet authority through the establishment of ICANN. Nevertheless, from within the ITU, aggrieved state actors resolved to reform internet governance by removing unilateral US control and replacing non-state actor authority with the norm of state primacy in global telecommunications governance (ITU 1998b). To this end, and others, the 1998 Plenipotentiary Meeting of the ITU called for the establishment of a world summit on the nascent 'Information Society'. This call was approved by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in 2002, which formally established the World Summit on the Information Society (UNGA 2002).

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The WSIS took place over two Summits in 2003 and 2005, with a range of other meetings supporting it. It continues to exist today, although in a largely vestigial capacity with respect to issues of internet governance (ITU 2006). The topic of internet governance emerged as a major, and perhaps the major, controversy of the WSIS process, and spawned the creation of a specialized body between the two main Summits (Kummer 2007; Rogers 2007). This body, the WGIG, developed the global consensus definition of internet governance (WGIG 2005f). Nevertheless, the WSIS failed to resolve disputes surrounding internet governance. In its final Summit, it recommended that a body, the Internet Governance Forum, be established to continue debate on internet governance policy and reform (IGF 2012a; Malcolm 2008; WSIS 2005b). The IGF has operated since 2006, serving as an organizational platform where disparate state and non-state actors meet annually to discuss internet governance and the future of its global governance. The ITU and the various governments dissatisfied with the US government-imposed, ICANN-led regime quickly realized the IGF was not likely to instigate a major change in internet governance. They initiated a range of measures aimed at triggering a wholesale restructure of the internet governance regime, with a view to replacing core internet governance norms with ones more suited to their state-centric preferences. These include attempts at restructuring internet governance, including resolutions at the UN proposing international treaties that would affect this issue (UNGA 2011b), through efforts at reform through the 2013 renegotiation of the ITU's primary International Telecommunications Regulations (ITR) treaty (Fidler 2013), and, following a wave of anti-US sentiment after revelations of global surveillance by the US National Security Agency, at NETMundial – an international meeting hosted by Brazil aimed at developing collective will to reorganize internet governance (Mueller & Kuerbis 2014). These and various other ad-hoc activities, along with regularized activities in organizations such as ICANN and the IGF, continue to drive the evolution and global politics of internet governance and the core norms regulating it.

d. The Technical Internet Governance Regime As the above history of the internet suggests, the contemporary technical internet governance regime is centered on ICANN. The regime, however, is much broader than just this one organization. While ICANN, its subsidiary bodies and a range of affiliated organizations administer and develop policy for the internet protocol and domain name allocation systems, internet standards governance is largely outside of its jurisdiction – although administration of the IPS and DNS is, of itself, a form of administering internet standards usage. The regime also extends beyond administrative and policy-setting activities, covering broader policy debate on internet governance issues and discussion on the future of the internet governance regime itself. The regime is multi-faceted and complex, incorporating a broad array of international intergovernmental organizations, transnational organizations, regional state and non-state organizations, state governments, and domestic non-state organizations. To make sense of this intricacy, discussion of the regime is separated into two sections addressing firstly administrative organizations, being those which administer the technical internet and/or have

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authority to set policy related to it, and secondly policy organizations, being those which contribute to policy debate and discussion of the regime’s future. Similarly, the range of different actors participating in internet governance is very diverse. Internet governance organizations allow involvement in their activities by state actors and non-state actors, or by a combination of various stakeholder groups that typically include some or all of the following: governments, intergovernmental organizations, private sector actors, civil society actors, the technical community, academia, and individuals (Ayres 2008; IGF 2012i; WSIS 2007). However, while the below discussion uses loose terminology, subsequent chapters in the dissertation categorize actors more strictly as either state or non-state actors, or as members of three broad stakeholder groups – government, the private sector, and civil society. State actors include governments, intergovernmental organizations and their respective agencies or representatives. Non-state actors include all other actors. The government stakeholder group refers to all of the state actors defined above. The private sector stakeholder group includes all organizations or individuals that are not explicitly state actors and which operate explicitly on a profit-making basis (Börzel & Risse 2005, pp. 3-5). Similarly, the civil society stakeholder group are all organizations that are not explicitly state actors, but which are not explicitly oriented towards profit-making (Arts 2003, p. 5).

i. Administrative Organizations Administration and policy setting for the technical internet occurs within a variety of different organizations and is conducted by a range of actors. There are, however, two basic divisions. Some organizations and actors are primarily involved in internet standards administration and policy-setting, while others are primarily involved in these activities in relation to the internet protocol and domain name systems. Internet standards are largely governed outside the hierarchical framework of organizations that govern the IPS and DNS. In addition to this, internet standards are primarily governed at the global level. While these standards are administered by actors at multiple different levels of political organization, policy is set for them solely at the global level. By contrast, the IPS and DNS are governed across global, regional and domestic levels, although policy setting is concentrated in global level organizations.

1. Internet Standards Generally speaking, internet standards do not require complex administration to function, they just need to be configured properly to enable internet connectivity (IETF 1996b, s. 1.1, 3.3). Their open access design also means anyone can use them without securing express permission (IETF 2008). Thus, daily administration of internet standards is typically handled by IT departments and specialists that supervise or repair computers and computer networks.1 The development of internet standards themselves, however, is subject to a complex 1 While the general usage of internet standards only requires proper configuration and is open to all, actual internet access requires a unique IP address (IETF 2011a). This specific, authoritative instance of internet standard protocol parameter allocation is IPS governance, and DNS governance is another form of it.

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governance system. The chief organizations involved in the internet standards development process are the Internet Society (ISOC), the Internet Architecture Board (IAB), the IETF and its Steering Group (IESG), and the Internet Research Taskforce (IRTF) and its Steering Group (IETF 2011b). Of these various bodies, it is the IETF which actually conducts internet standards development. ISOC serves as a legally incorporated institutional home for – and financial supporter of – the other bodies (Cerf 1995; Cerf, Kahn & Chapin 1992; IETF 1996b; ISOC 2014a). It has a minor procedural role in internet standards development and in the IETF’s and IAB’s internal governance processes (IETF 1996b, s. 6.5.3; 2004b, ss. 3.7, 4.5, 6). The IAB has overseen TCP/IP development since its earliest days (IETF 1990). Nowadays, it is the supervisor of – and external liaison for – the IETF and IRTF, and serves a range of other administrative and advisory roles (IAB 2014; IETF 2000b). Like ISOC, the IAB only has a minor procedural role in internet standards development and in the IETF and IRTF’s internal governance – although it does set overall priorities for these bodies (IETF 1996b; 2000b, s. 2.1; 2004b, s. 3.7.3; 2011b). The IRTF and IRSG focus on long-term research and are not directly involved in standards development (IETF 1996a, 2011b). The IETF forms the heart of the internet standards governance system. Within it, computer scientists and IT specialists from around the world pool their technical knowledge to develop internet standards (IETF 2011b, s. 3.12). The IESG, as the IETF’s steering group, coordinates the IETF's activities and makes final substantive decisions on internet standards (IETF 1996b, s. 6). Its membership is drawn from the IETF and serves for two years in the IESG, while also acting as Area Directors within the IETF (IETF 2011b). Area Directors are responsible for coordinating standards development for specific technical issue areas, with a number of Working Groups within each area. These Working Groups develop standards through online mailing lists and in face-to-face meetings at regular IETF meetings (IETF 1998, s. 3). Participation is open to anyone, both in the online mailing lists and in face-to-face meetings. Decisions on standards are based on 'rough consensus', as determined by the Working Group Chair(s). Once rough consensus is reached, the Chair asks the Area Director to recommend it to the IESG for approval as an internet standard (IETF 1998, s. 7.4). Most standards development work is done by Working Groups, but it is also possible for individuals to directly propose internet standards (IETF 1996b, s. 2.2). The IETF operates according to a libertarian philosophy, exemplified by a famous quote from IETF member David Clark who stated that: “We reject kings, presidents and voting. We believe in rough consensus and running code.” (IETF 2011b). Reflecting this, IETF membership is open to any individual in their personal capacity, and only in this capacity. Its leadership is largely voluntary and drawn from active IETF members, who are selected by a partially randomized Nominating Committee after consultation with the IETF community (IETF 2004b). The IETF holds exclusive authority over the setting of internet standards, although a number of other entities contribute to their development, including taskforces set up by global or regional multilateral intergovernmental organizations, government agencies, transnational organizations, universities and

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research institutes, and individual computer scientists or IT specialists (APEC 2012; DeNardis & Raymond 2013, p. 10; The IPv6 Forum 2012; ISO 2012; Tso 2008, p. 126; Zhao 2004, pp. 5-6). However, such activity must filter through the IETF to result in a formal internet standard.

2. The IPS & DNS ICANN directly oversees the internet protocol, domain name and root server systems, coordinating their technical administration and setting policy for them. ICANN is a formally independent, not-for-profit public benefit corporation incorporated under Californian law (ICANN 2012au). It has authority over domain name usage and – in conjunction with the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) and VeriSign – authority over the IPS, AS and root server system (IANA 2012; ICANN 2012at; NTIA 2012b). The right to use globally unique IP addresses, AS numbers and domain names is given subject to contractual agreement with ICANN’s policies (DelBianco & Cox 2008, pp. 28-30). Actors below ICANN, often private businesses, then sell or distribute these resources to smaller entities until unique IP addresses are assigned to individual computers and unique domain names assigned to individual persons. Historically, ICANN’s authority derived from a contract with the US government and it remains partially supervised by it. This contract was replaced in 2009 by an ‘Affirmation of Commitments’, which transitioned the US government’s exclusive power of policy review to the wider ICANN community (ICANN 2009a). Nevertheless, the Affirmation of Commitments requires ICANN to remain headquartered – and legally incorporated – within the US, rendering it ultimately subject to US legal jurisdiction (ICANN 2009r; US Supreme Court 1945). In addition, the IPS and root server system is directly managed by the IANA and Verisign, both deriving their authority from US government contracts requiring them to operate according to ICANN policy (NTIA 2012a, 2015). US government involvement in IPS and DNS governance is indirect and does not typically affect its daily operation, but the US government retains the final right to approve changes to the internet’s global root (Mueller & Kuerbis 2014, p. 3, 4; NTIA 2014b). This ensures ultimate US government control of internet governance and galvanizes states and other actors to push for reform of the current regime (WGIG 2005f, p. 5; DelBianco & Cox 2008, p. 41; Drezner 2004, p. 497). Administration of the IPS is supervised by ICANN but daily administrative activity is conducted by the IANA, which authorizes and maintains records of IP address and AS number allocations to the regional level (IANA 2012). Regional internet registries (RIR) then divide the globe up geographically for IP address and AS number allocation (Mueller 2004, pp. 39-48). For example, the Asia-Pacific Network Information Centre authorizes and administers IP address and AS number allocations to users in the Asia-Pacific (APNIC 2012a). Below RIRs are two types of lower level authorities, each contractually authorized by their respective RIRs (IANA 2014). National internet registries (NIR), like the China National Network Information Centre (CNNIC), have allocation monopolies within the territory of some states (CNNIC 2003b). In others states, private sector internet service providers (ISP) receive IP addresses and AS numbers directly

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from their RIR and in this capacity are known as 'local internet registries (LIR) (IANA 2014). NIRs and LIRs then allocate these resources downwards to smaller ISPs and businesses, which in turn manage the allocation to individual computers. ICANN exerts more direct administrative control over the DNS, yet the IANA along with VeriSign still undertake much of its daily administration (IANA 2012; ICANN 2001i, 2009a, 2011g; NTIA 2014b). ICANN negotiates contracts with DNS registries or registrars which authorize them to operate and compels compliance with ICANN’s policies (ICANN 2014d). These contracts also direct registries to provide domain name allocation information to the IANA ( ICANN 2012q). As part of this process, the IANA and VeriSign maintain the root servers that link the IPS and DNS together (NTIA 2012a). Two types of domain names exist: country-code top-level domains like .au for Australia, and generic top-level domains (gTLD) such as .com. In theory, ccTLD operators are authorized by ICANN, but in practice many are selected by state governments who regard their ccTLD as sovereign property (IANA 2007; Park 2009). Nevertheless, ccTLDs and the IANA cooperate to ensure these domains are accessible by all. In regard to gTLDs, ICANN grants contractual authority to manage and distribute these domains to predominantly private sector registries (ICANN 2012an). Both ccTLD and gTLD registries subsequently authorize registrars, such as the well-known US company 'GoDaddy', which in turn sell domains to businesses or individual consumers (ICANN 201aj). Policy-setting for the IPS and DNS is largely conducted by ICANN and its subsidiary bodies or affiliated organizations. However, this policy also intersects with domestic law once these systems reach the national level. There is wide variation in policy approaches across domestic internet governance regimes, where some states establish formal government oversight of the IPS and DNS, while others only intervene for specific purposes. China, for example, asserts state authority over the IPS and DNS within its territory – authorizing allocation authorities and actively supervising them (Ministry of Information Industry 2004, 2005a, 2005b). By contrast, more liberal states such as Australia generally only intervene for narrower law enforcement purposes, such as with laws relating to search warrants (Australian Government 1995, Pt. 10.6, 10.7). Particularly with respect to the DNS, state law overlaps with ICANN policy on issues such as intellectual property, privacy and defamation protection, registration of public service or anti-social domains, and domain name dispute resolution procedures (Chik 2008; Deibert 2010, p. 285, 286; ICANN 2012aq 2014a; Ministry of Information Industry 2004; Mueller & Chango 2008; Willoughby 2009). Nevertheless, despite these national idiosyncrasies, ICANN sets global policy and contractually requires IPS and DNS operators to comply with its policy. ICANN policy-making processes involve the input of 'Advisory Committees' and 'Supporting Organizations' constituted by different stakeholder groups – self-described by ICANN as a ‘bottom up, consensus-driven, multi-stakeholder model’ of governance (ICANN 2009a, art. 8(c); 2012at). It reflects the compromise negotiated by the US government during ICANN’s creation and privileges non-state actors, particularly the private sector (Ayres 2008, p. 2; Kesan & Gallo 2008, p. 362). Ultimate decision-making authority is vested in ICANN's Board of Directors, which consists of 16 voting members and five non-

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voting liaisons (ICANN 2011g, art. VI). Eight voting members are chosen by ICANN's Nominating Committee and seven by ICANN's Supporting Organizations – the remaining voting member is the ICANN President. The five non-voting liaisons are appointed by ICANN's Advisory Committees, the Technical Liaison Group (TLG), and the IETF. Figure 5 illustrates the Board's place in ICANN and ICANN's overall structure.

Figure 5: ICANN’s Organizational Structure

Source: ICANN (2014ce). ICANN's Board reflects its overall organizational structure. Supporting Organizations represent stakeholders concerned with specific policy areas (ICANN 2011g). The Address Supporting Organization (ASO) represents IP address and AS number allocation stakeholders. The Country-Code Name Supporting Organization (ccNSO) represents ccTLD operators. The Generic Name Supporting Organization (GNSO) represents gTLD operators along with commercial and non-commercial gTLD users. Individual internet users are represented through the At-Large Advisory Committee (ALAC). Governments are represented through the Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC). Root server administrators are represented through the Root Server System Advisory Committee (RSSAC), and internet security experts through the Security and Stability Advisory Committee (SSAC). The TLG represents various internet-related technical standards organizations, while the IETF represents itself. ICANN’s Nominating Committee is composed of a broad cross-section of delegates from these subsidiary bodies (ICANN 2011g, art. VII). The ICANN Board’s structure grants a wide range of stakeholders input into policy setting, but it is clear that non-state actors have greater decision-making authority than state actors, which are relegated to largely advisory roles. This is the most notably controversial aspect of ICANN’s governance model (Kesan & Gallo 2008, p. 390, 391). ICANN’s broader policy development processes also reflect its governance model and philosophy, however. The Board generally makes policy based on reports or submissions from Supporting Organizations, Advisory Committees and other subsidiary bodies (ICANN 2012at). These bodies

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develop policy related to their area of focus and put them to the Board for approval, while also advising the Board on how other policies may affect their stakeholders. A range of further measures ensure transparency and accountability in Board decisions, including public agenda announcements, public solicitation of comments, public Board records, and a variety of policy appeal procedures (see, for example: ICANN 2011g, arts. III, IV, V, XII; ICANN 2014ch). Each of ICANN’s subsidiary bodies has its own organizational structure and policy development processes, as do a range of affiliated organizations that liaise with ICANN. Many of ICANN's subsidiary bodies only operate at the global level, without geographical sub-division, due to the nature of their policy focus. For example, as gTLDs such as .com and .org are not geographically organized, the GNSO only operates at the global level and is organized via stakeholder class rather than geographical origin of stakeholders. For similar reasons, the GNSO, GAC, RSSAC, SSAC, TLG and the IETF all operate solely at the global level. By contrast, the ccNSO, ASO and ALAC also have subsidiary bodies or affiliated organizations that are regionally organized. The ASO is responsible for developing policy related to the IPS and is comprised of five stakeholder groups – the five regional RIRs. The ASO's Executive Council consists of 15 members elected by each RIR's membership or Executive Council. ASO policies are developed within and amongst RIRs, voted upon by each RIR in accordance with its own policy development process, and then reviewed by the ASO Executive Council before it is put to the ICANN Board (ASO 2014b). The ASO acts as the representative of the various RIRs within ICANN. There is also a twin organization, the Numbers Resource Organization (NRO), constituted by the same members as the ASO, which acts as the coordinator for the RIRs activities and as their representative to governments and other bodies (ASO 2014a). As the ASO’s structure suggests, the Asia-Pacific region’s RIR contributes to ICANN’s policy development. However, APNIC also directly develops IPS policy for the Asia-Pacific region (APNIC 2012a). Membership within APNIC is open to all organizations and individuals, but voting rights and voting weight within it is based on the number of IP address allocations a member is responsible for (APNIC 2014m, 2014o). APNIC appoints an Executive Council from amongst its membership, but each Councilor must act in their personal capacity. Decisions of the Executive Council require a simple majority vote (APNIC 1998, Pt. V). Policy is developed within APNIC through similar processes to within the IETF, via working groups, public mailing lists and consensus decisions at open meetings, followed by Executive Council endorsement (APNIC 2014w). The Executive Council may also refer any policy to a formal vote by APNIC's membership, and the general membership may pass policies or overturn Executive Council decisions through votes at APNIC meetings (APNIC 1998, Pt. VII; 2004e). Policy for the DNS is developed within both the ccNSO and the GNSO. The ccNSO is constituted by ccTLD operators, such as .au or .cn. It is headed by a Council made up of three representatives appointed by ICANN's Nominating Committee and three ccTLD operator representatives from each of ICANN's regional areas – North America, South America, Europe, Asia-Pacific, and Africa

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(ICANN 2011g, art. IX). The ccNSO Council manages the ccNSO's activities and establishes working groups on policy issues. Policy decisions are made by Council consensus or supermajority vote, then submitted to a vote of general ccNSO members before being put to the ICANN Board (ICANN 2011g Annex B). Aside from its global level organization, the ccNSO also affiliates with Regional Organizations of ccTLD operators. For the Asia-Pacific, this is the Asia-Pacific Top-Level Domain Association (APTLD) (APTLD 2012). It is constituted by voting ccTLD operator members and non-voting members from the DNS community. APTLD policy decisions are determined by vote at annual meeting. It largely acts as a forum for communication amongst Asia-Pacific ccTLD operators, but it and other Regional Organizations can submit policy proposals to the ccNSO Council (ICANN 2011g, art IX, s. 3(2)). The GNSO is responsible for developing gTLD policy, and is comprised of four stakeholder groups reflecting a gTLD constituency: registries, registrars, commercial users, and non-commercial users. These stakeholder groups and ICANN's Nominating Committee appoint members to the GNSO Council which makes final decisions on policies developed by the GNSO. Once the Council accepts a policy, it is then passed to the ICANN Board. GNSO policies are developed via Working Groups chartered by the GNSO Council, in a similar fashion to how policy development is organized in the IETF (GNSO 2014a, 2014b; ICANN 2011g, art. X). The above organizations partially specialize in either IPS or DNS policy, but the GAC and the ALAC have a broader focus. The GAC is expressly constituted as an advisory body and has two stakeholder groups, national governments and intergovernmental organizations, but only governments have voting privileges. Nevertheless, GAC’s policy recommendations are customarily determined through consensus in typically closed-door meetings (GAC 2011). Both the GAC’s and ICANN’s bylaws require the ICANN Board to consider GAC advice and, in the case of public policy-related issues, to provide reasons if GAC advice was not followed (ICANN 2011g, art. XI, ss. 2 (1) (j), (k)). The ALAC is responsible for representing individual internet users within ICANN, and is comprised of regional and local organizations designed to represent individual internet users (ICANN 2011g, art. XI, s. (2) (4)). The Advisory Committee itself is composed of two representatives from each of the ALAC's Regional At-Large Organizations (RALO) and one representative from each of ICANN's five geographical areas chosen by ICANN's Nominating Committee. The ALAC makes general policy decisions based on consensus or, in the event an ALAC member requests a vote, by simply majority (ALAC 2013 art. 12). The ALAC develops policy through chartered work teams, which may or may not be open to the public, as well as via generally public mailing lists and meetings (ALAC 2013 ss. B, C). The ALAC’s Asia-Pacific RALO is the Asian, Australasian and Pacific Islands RALO (APRALO). The APRALO is responsible for representing individual internet users from the Asia-Pacific region and is comprised of local At-Large Structures (ALS) (APRALO 2009). Each ALS has one vote within APRALO, although decisions are made by consensus where possible, or majority vote where

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not. APRALO meetings are only open to its members, but its website is publicly accessible and provides a space for contribution to APRALO's policy development (APRALO 2014). The ALSs themselves have a broad variety of organizational structures, reflecting the substantial diversity amongst different states, cultures and interest groups within states and the relatively non-specific criteria for their certification by ICANN (ALAC 2014). The remaining subsidiary bodies or ICANN-affiliated organizations have very specific foci. The RSSAC, SSAC and TLG focus specifically on root server, security or other technical issues, respectively, and are all relatively small advisory bodies to the ICANN Board. RSSAC and SSAC members are appointed directly by the board (ICANN 2011g, art. XI, s. 2). The TLG includes representatives from the IAB, the ITU, the World Wide Web Consortium (which develops http and html standards), and the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ICANN 2011g, art. XI-A, s. 2). The IETF similarly provides assistance in technical matters to the ICANN Board (ICANN 2011g, art. VI, s. 9 (d)).

ii. Policy Organizations Beyond administrative organizations, a range of policy organizations form part of the internet governance regime. They do not administer the technical internet or have authority to set policy, but they still influence internet governance. Some affect the evolution of the internet governance regime, some feed policy inputs into the IETF or ICANN, and some are forums where the technical internet community network amongst themselves. A few policy organizations – particularly those primarily focused on internet governance – have internal structures that reflect core internet governance norms. This makes them particularly relevant to the dissertation’s analysis. For reasons of space and due to difficulties in public access to documents, however, only the most relevant and accessible of these are considered. Nevertheless, a broad, if brief, overview of policy organizations is provided here to provide context.

1. Global Level Organizations The UN is the highest level policy organization that influences the internet governance regime’s evolution. Its General Assembly occasionally votes on internet governance-related treaties or resolutions. For example, the UNGA approved the ITU's proposal for the WSIS and, post-WSIS, has charged the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) with managing post-WSIS outcomes (UNGA 2002; UNGA 2006). ECOSOC itself has designated the UN Commission on Science and Technology for Development (UNCSTD) as the coordinator of the WSIS review process (ECOSOC 2006). Of all UN agencies, however, the ITU has played the most prominent role in internet governance. It proposed the WSIS and supervised its initial operation (ITU 1998b, 2006). In addition, as the chief forum for global telecommunications governance, the ITU also intermittently addresses internet governance (Zhao 2004). For example, negotiations related to updating the ITU’s International Telecommunications Regulations (ITR) have been used by some states to push internet governance reform (ITU 2012b; WCITleaks.org 2012a).

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The WSIS itself is particularly relevant to the global politics of internet governance. As noted, it was the first international attempt at reforming internet governance. Debate on this issue occurred at the two main WSIS Summits and in their related preparatory and regional conferences, including within the WGIG – which exclusively addressed internet governance (ITU 2006). The WSIS was an explicitly multi-stakeholder process (UNGA 2002). However, despite a variety of non-state actors being entitled to participate in the WSIS, only state governments were entitled to vote on WSIS outcomes (Raboy 2004, pp. 228-31; WSIS 2007). Following the two main WSIS Summits, high level discussion of internet governance largely moved to the IGF – an organization proposed by the WSIS itself – although an annual review of progress towards WSIS outcomes is headed by the UNCSTD (WSIS 2005b). The IGF was the WSIS’ successor for high-level internet governance debate and is now the most prominent policy organization (Malcolm 2008, p. 339, 353). It is a prominent annual forum in which the international and transnational community jointly debate internet governance (IGF 2012b). The IGF began in 2006 and its initial five-year mandate extended for another five years in 2011 (UNGA 2011a, para. 17). Similarly to the WSIS, the IGF’s meetings are preceded by a series of preparatory meetings and supplemented by regional – and some national – internet governance forums (IGF 2012i; Malcolm 2008, pp. 364-78). The IGF is a multi-stakeholder body and grants authority to non-state actors (IGF 2012b). While not empowered to make any decisions or recommendations, the IGF’s primary organ – the Multi-Stakeholder Advisory Group (MAG) – is constituted by a panel of government, private sector and civil society actors with equal authority over its agenda. Participation in the IGF is also multi-stakeholder, open to the three stakeholder groups of governments, the private sector and civil society. A final group of global-level policy organizations are those created by the transnational technical internet community. Chief amongst these is the ISOC, the institutional and financial home for the IETF (Cerf 1995). The ISOC also serves as a home for the broader internet community, including both individual and organizational members (ISOC 2014d). It provides a networking and policy deliberation forum, and a platform for policy advocacy by the technical internet community. It is a multi-stakeholder organization committed to open, bottom-up governance, and determines its policies by majority vote in generally public annual meetings (ISOC 2013, art. II; 2014c). In addition to the ISOC, a range of further transnational organizations exist at the global level, such as the International Association of Top-Level Domains (IATLD) – a group which lobbies ICANN on policy – and the Multilingual Internet Names Consortium (MINC), which is dedicated to promoting multi-lingualization of domain names (IATLD 2014; MINC 2014).

2. Regional & Domestic Level Organizations Below the global level are a number of regional and domestic-level policy organizations. As noted above, some regional and domestic bodies are affiliated with the IETF’s internet standards development processes or incorporated within

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ICANN’s IPS and DNS policy development processes. Beyond these, a range of regionally-focused intergovernmental organizations touch upon internet governance activities. For the Asia-Pacific region, these include the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and the Asia-Pacific Telecommunity (APT) (APEC 2014; APT 2014). Both are primarily state-based organizations and consider internet governance policy matters as part of their broader telecommunications policy activities. They are not explicitly multi-stakeholder bodies, but they do allow involvement in policy discussion by non-state members. As noted, the IGF also incorporates a series of subsidiary or affiliated regional and national level forums. For the Asia-Pacific region this forum is the Asia-Pacific Regional Internet Governance Forum (APrIGF) (APrIGF 2012a). Like the IGF itself, the APrIGF is explicitly a multi-stakeholder body and grants non-state actors authority over its operation (APrIGF 2013e). In addition to regional IGFs, the technical internet community in some states have organized national level IGFs to feed into either their associated regional IGFs or directly to the global IGF (auIGF 2014; MYIGF 2014). Similarly, the ISOC establishes subsidiary regional Bureaus, including an Asia-Pacific Bureau, which seek to coordinate regional ISOC activity (ISOC 2014b). Below ISOC’s regional Bureaus are national or sub-national chapters, which have a variety of forms and play a role in ISOC’s internal governance processes and other activities (ISOC 2013art. IV). ISOC chapters also typically contribute to internet policy development in their national or sub-national areas, and provide a platform for the technical internet community's self-organization. A range of specialized regional internet governance bodies also exist, providing platforms in which the technical internet community can network and share expertise. In the Asia-Pacific, examples include the Asia-Pacific Internet Association (APIA) – which hosts an annual meeting for private sector actors engaged in internet-related business in the region – and 'AP*' or 'APstar', a loose coalition of Asia-Pacific internet organizations that facilitates policy development and coordination amongst the Asia-Pacific technical internet community (APIA 2014; APStar 2014). Finally, at the domestic level a further group of actors contribute to policy development for the technical internet and foster technical internet community networking. These include government agencies, universities and research institutes, national or sub-national industry bodies, civil society interest groups, and interested individuals.

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5. Core Technical Internet Governance Norms The previous chapter discussed the technical internet’s history and the structure of the contemporary internet governance regime, and in the process alluded to some of the normative beliefs and practices that shape internet governance. This chapter, in contrast, explicitly focuses upon these beliefs and practices; in particular, those that are the most significant in shaping which actors have decision-making authority for internet governance, and which actors have the right to participate in governance. It draws upon the previous chapter’s analysis and the insights of internet governance scholars to identify and describe four core internet governance norms, with which the dissertation subsequently analyses Chinese engagement to determine if China has been or can be a norm-maker in internet governance. These four norms are:

The US authority norm, which rationalizes the US government’s authority over the technical internet.

The privatized governance norm, which justifies non-state actors' authority over internet governance.

The multi-stakeholder governance norm, which legitimizes the right of various stakeholder groups to participate in internet governance.

The state authority norm, an emerging alternative to both US government authority and privatized governance that seeks to justify the rights of state actors to equal or greater authority over internet governance than non-state actors.

a. The US Authority Norm

The US government authority norm is a standard of behavior specifying that the US government alone has ultimate authority over the IPS and DNS, and may determine who governs it and how they do so. ICANN’s initial creation, its contractual authorization as the IPS and DNS administrator, supervisor and chief policy-setting body, and its early supervision by the US government were all expressions of this norm, representing the US government asserting its authority. However, as part of the gradual transition of ultimate authority to the technical internet community, the US government’s authorization and supervision of ICANN lapsed in 2009, when the initial contract between the US government and ICANN was replaced with the Affirmation of Commitments. Nevertheless, this development still requires ICANN to remain incorporated and headquartered in the US, rendering it subject to US legal authority. In addition, the US government retains express authority over the IPS through its contractual authorization of the IANA as its administrator, over the DNS and root server system through its contractual authorization of the IANA and VeriSign as their administrators, and through its role as the final authorizer of changes to the root zone file. Therefore, internet use implicitly signifies acquiescence to US government authority, as all authoritative internet resources originate from US government-authorized agents. Similarly, at least until 2009, acceptance of ICANN policy and participation in its development involved implicit compliance with US government authority. The dissertation has predominantly identified the existence of the US authority norm from its own analysis of the technical internet’s US-centric history, and from the role the US government has in its governance; this establishes US

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authority as a fact. The normative character of this authority, however, is generally not noted in the literature on internet governance, although it is still recognized by some, even if largely in a negative sense. For example, a study focusing specifically on principles and norms for the internet governance regime notes that “the unilateral control of the DNS root currently held by the US government is undesirable (Mueller, Mathiason & Klein 2007, p. 250).” Likewise, the WGIG report (WGIG 2005f, p. 12) itself explicitly notes the normative element of US authority, arguing that “No single Government should have a pre-eminent role in relation to international Internet governance”. It could be argued that the US authority norm’s arguable lack of legitimacy or ethical ‘oughtness’ renders it more of a rule than a norm, with power underwriting its existence rather than genuinely shared expectations or beliefs about its appropriateness. While there is an arguable lack of ethical ‘oughtness’ to US government authority, there are still ethical justifications for its existence. From the US government's perspective, its role as the inventor of TCP/IP renders its assumption of ultimate authority appropriate (Goldsmith & Wu 2006, p. 41; Sonbuchner 2008, p. 190). This appropriateness is further justified, from the US government's perspective, by the belief that its status as a democracy and great power qualify and entitle it to assume benign authority over internet governance, where it can further advance its preferences for privatized governance and freedom of expression (DelBianco & Cox 2008, p. 39, 40; NTIA 1998a). Regardless of the ethical basis of the US authority norm, the dissertation argues that it can still be identified as a norm, as it does in fact regulate which actor has ultimate authority over the internet. This is acknowledged, albeit grudgingly, by those who use the internet and engage with internet governance. Norms, as noted in the methodology chapter, “can have functional and non-ethical origins and purposes”. (Klotz 1999, p. 14). Beyond the US authority norm’s identification as a norm itself, its identification as one of the most significant internet governance norms is due to the fact that it regulates the exercise of authority over the technical internet at the highest level. Indeed, because it defines who has ultimate authority over the IPS and DNS, it is arguably the most significant internet governance norm.

i. The Lifecycle & Theoretical Drivers of the US Authority Norm

US government authority has arguably structured internet governance since the internet’s earliest days, but its significance only gradually emerged as the technology grew in importance both within the US and globally. As noted, TCP/IP research was funded by the US government, and responsibility for early IPS and DNS governance was assigned by the US government to both its own computer scientists and those from academia. Through these actions, US government representatives acted as norm entrepreneurs, establishing a behavioural standard of US government authority over the technical internet. At that early stage, this assertion of authority was relatively uncontroversial because it advanced US academics interest in participating in internet standards development and internet governance, and because the TCP/IP network was mostly a research tool used primarily by US actors. The issue of US government

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authority only became a major controversy when internet use expanded, spreading globally and beyond the research community. These developments led the US government to assign some DNS governance responsibility to the private sector, which contravened the interests of the technical internet community, and raised awareness of US government authority over the technical internet amongst the international community. Ultimately, it triggered the IAHC attempt to relocate the internet’s global root, a challenge to the emerging US authority norm that led the US government to overtly assert its authority over the IPS and DNS and oversee the creation of ICANN. The US government had clear material interests motivating this assertion of its authority – the desire to safeguard or enhance US power, and to undermine ITU authority over global telecommunications. Similarly, ideational interests drove the US to protect its authority in the belief this would help advance freedom of expression online, and advance the legitimation of privatized global governance processes (Rogers 2007, p. 6; Weinberg 2011, p. 198). It can reasonably be argued that the US authority norm reached its global tipping point – the moment in transition from its emergence stage to its cascade stage – when the US government used its material power to enforce its authority. It coerced the return of the global root from Jon Postel’s servers to Network Solutions’ while pressuring the technical internet community and the international community into acceptance of ICANN as the penultimate authority over the IPS and DNS. In theoretical terms, the US acted as a critical state that triggered a coercive norm cascade. It had the material power necessary to do so, due to its physical control over the internet’s architecture, and due to the importance of the US network to other states. Conversely, others had a material interest in acquiescing to US government authority – it allowed them access to the internet and the various benefits it brings. They also lacked the material power to establish a competing network, as the value of the internet at that time was centered heavily on access to US-based services and information. In addition, the US government’s strategy in establishing ICANN – limiting its own use of authority, and empowering non-state actors – mitigated the challenge US government authority represented to others’ interests ( see for example: ITU 2005a, p. 3; Von Arx & Hagen 2002, p. 14, 15). Based on this argument of the US as a critical state, the dissertation asserts that 1998 constitutes the tipping point for the US authority norm, as the forced return of the root and ICANN's establishment occurred in this year. It could be also argued, however, that the tipping point of the US authority norm was not reached until 2002. From 1999 to 2002, ICANN’s GAC membership doubled, with membership increasing from roughly 30 to 60. Thus in 2002 the GAC achieved a state government membership level of approximately 60 – roughly one-third of all states in existence (WSIS 2005a, pp. 2-6). Nevertheless, the dissertation argues that 1998 reflects the more appropriate marker than 2002, because this marks the time US government authority was first challenged and overtly asserted, meaning states were forced to acknowledge its existence at this time. The rough doubling of GAC membership between the years 1999-2002, and 2002-2004, constitutes the actual norm cascade phase for the US government authority norm (WSIS 2005a, p. 5).

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On this logic, the US authority norm entered its internalization phase in 2004 when more than half of all states at least nominally accepted US government authority. However, given its controversial nature and subsequent efforts to replace it, it seems highly unlikely it will ever truly engender internalization – material incentives justify acceptance of this norm rather than genuine belief in the appropriateness of US government authority. While US material power over the internet has declined over time, unilateral disconnection from the US-controlled global root is highly unlikely; it would be a serious economic risk and could create a perception of isolationism. Widespread defection from US government authority through the coordinated creation of an alternate IPS and DNS is more likely, but also improbable. The limitations the US government has placed on itself, combined with the democratic nature of ICANN’s privatized governance model, means that the norm is primarily opposed for ideational reasons – due to its inherent inequality. For US allies and more liberal states, their interest in a more equitable replacement is balanced by interests in either protecting US power or advancing democratic models of global governance. For non-US allies and more illiberal states, such competing interests do not exist, but the political history of internet governance has illustrated that reaching global agreement on replacement of the US authority norm has been difficult. Nevertheless, while there are reasons for the US authority norm’s continued existence, it is undoubtedly the most controversial and contested core internet governance norm. Resistance to it drives the behavior of many state actors – both governments and intergovernmental organizations – which seek to replace this norm with the alternative state authority norm that has traditionally justified who has ultimate authority in global governance, and in the broader issue area of global telecommunications governance overseen by the ITU (MacLean 2008). Resistance to the US authority’s norm also drives the behavior of some state actors and many non-state actors who seek to replace it with a new norm that grants either a multi-stakeholder coalition of state and non-state actors ultimate authority over the technical internet, or grants a multi-stakeholder coalition of purely non-state actors such authority (Mueller 2010, p. 246; Mueller & Kuerbis 2014). Indeed, the US government itself states that its ultimate goal is to replace its authority with the privatized governance norm, which will justify non-state actors not only having administrative and policy development authority over internet governance, but also ultimate authority over the internet's global root (NTIA 2014b). The US plans to divest itself of its residual authority in 2015, and thus it is likely that the US authority norm will very soon come to the end of its lifecycle through its replacement with non-state actor authority.

b. The Privatized Governance Norm The privatized governance norm is a standard of behavior stipulating that non-state actors have the right to exercise authority over the technical internet's administration and policy development. This norm is particularly well entrenched in internet standards governance, where only natural persons may participate in the IETF’s processes. Unlike IPS and DNS governance, non-state actors wield ultimate authority over internet standards. As noted, state actors and non-state organizations can contribute to the development of TCP/IP protocols, but such

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activity must feed into the IETF for further development. Non-state actor authority is more limited in its application to IPS and DNS governance, as ultimate authority remains vested in the US government. Nevertheless, both private sector and civil society actors have the right to exercise authority over IPS and DNS administration and policy. ICANN most prominently reflects the privatized governance norm, as non-state actors alone enjoy voting rights on the Board, and policy development is largely conducted by its subsidiary bodies, which are predominantly populated by non-state actors. State actors are only permitted an advisory role in ICANN through the GAC and its appointment of a non-voting Board member. The privatized governance norm also influences other regime organizations. The RIRs, for example, allow both state and non-state actors to participate in policy development and decision-making. Similarly, in the IGF, authority over the Forum's agenda is shared amongst state and non-state actors. The privatized governance norm has been identified by the dissertation both through its own analysis of internet governance’s history and characteristics, which identify its existence as a fact. However, the dissertation is supported in its identification of the privatized governance norm by both regime organizations themselves and by internet governance scholars. The NTIA’s initial proposal for ICANN stated that private-sector action is “preferable to government control” (NTIA 1998a). ICANN, as noted, explicitly refers to itself as having a multi-stakeholder governance model, while also stating that a core value is “remaining rooted in the private sector” (ICANN 2011g, art. I, s. 2 (11)). Similarly, APNIC’s governing membership is “open to any person, unincorporated association, firm, corporation, governmental organization, or non-governmental organization” (APNIC 1998, ss. 3(a), 4). Beyond this, the privatized governance that characterizes internet governance has been a particular focus for scholars. While frequently characterized as multi-stakeholder governance, the fact of privatized governance is noted by many scholars, as is normative argument in its favor (Kesan & Gallo 2008, p. 403, 404; Kleinwachter 2004, p. 239, 249; Malcolm 2008, p. 39, 40, 320; Mueller, Mathiason & Klein 2007, p. 239, 250). Unlike US government authority, non-state actor authority has a reasonably high level of legitimacy, with genuine acceptance amongst many internet governance participants. The appropriateness of the privatized governance norm stems from liberal beliefs in democracy and limited government, and it enjoys a broad level of support amongst liberal state governments – particularly those with a solidarist view of sovereignty – because it empowers individuals and various societal groups to participate in governance (ITU 2005a; Kleinwachter 2004, p. 237, 241, 248; NTIA 2014b; Weinberg 2011, p. 198). For similar reasons, it enjoys support from non-state actors themselves; these actors, however, also have more material reasons for accepting this norm as it justifies their own increased power (Mueller 2010, p. 217, 220). Non-state actor authority is significant because, like the US authority norm, it regulates the exercise of authority at the highest level in internet standards governance. Similarly it regulates authority at the penultimate level in IPS and DNS governance. The privatized governance norm is also significant because it represents a direct challenge to the traditional authority of states in global governance, asserting that non-state actors have the right to equal, or greater, authority over internet governance than state actors. In most issue

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areas and through most of modern history, the reverse has been true (MacLean 2008; Rosenau 1995, pp. 18-20; Weiss 2000, p. 809, 810).

i. The Lifecycle & Theoretical Drivers of the Privatized Governance Norm

Similarly to US government authority, the privatized governance norm emerged from the internet’s US-centric history, arguably structuring internet governance from its inception and growing in significance alongside the internet itself. The US government never asserted proprietary rights over TCP/IP standards, as this would fatally undermine its interests in creating open standards and undermining ITU authority. Because of this, US non-state computer scientists have always been active in internet standards governance and acted as norm entrepreneurs – gradually distancing themselves from US government funding and entrenching their own authority. Remaining US government links to internet standards governance were severed in the early Nineties, when the IAB transitioned its institutional home from DARPA to the ISOC. At the same time, in 1992, the IETF formalized the exclusive rights of natural persons to authority over internet standards development (IETF 1992). Conversely, non-state actor authority over IPS and DNS governance was initially granted by the US government to US academics, with it eventually incorporating private sector actors into DNS governance – forcing US academics to share authority with Network Solutions. At around this time, similar commercialization of the internet was occurring in other states as ISPs began to be more involved in IPS administration and as the DNS grew in importance (Paré 2003, p. 75). Thus, a combination of US government representatives and transnational non-state computer scientists acted as norm entrepreneurs that gradually established non-state actor authority within IPS and DNS governance. The privatized governance norm emerged because it was in the material interests of the US government, as noted, to empower US non-state actors to establish an open, attractive, internetworking system that helped undermine ITU authority. Similarly, for such non-state actors it enhanced their own power. The main reasons for the norm’s emergence, however, are ideational. As noted above, the US has interests in advancing liberal ideals, including the ideal of privatized governance. Likewise, these ideals were shared by the liberal, developed states that were the early adherents to the US TCP/IP network and by non-state actors in these states. As with the US authority norm, however, it was the US government’s grant of authority to the private sector and the resultant triggering of the IAHC efforts, which led to US material power being exerted to create ICANN and entrench the privatized governance norm in IPS and DNS governance. Identifying the privatized governance norm’s tipping point is complicated by its earlier, uncontested emergence in internet standards governance. 1992 is arguably the tipping point for the norm within internet standards governance as the IETF formalized its processes that year. Non-state actor authority in internet standards governance then quietly cascaded across transnational and international society without any substantial opposition – even the ITU took nearly a decade to begin half-hearted attempts at asserting state authority over this governance (Zhao

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2004). However, despite this earlier tipping point, it is more reasonable to regard the privatized governance norm’s general tipping point as occurring in 1998 – with the US serving as a critical state by using its material power to coercively bring about the norm’s tipping point in IPS and DNS governance through ICANN’s establishment. This use of material power forced both civil society and private sector actors to accept each other’s authority over this governance, and forced state actors to acknowledge the authority of non-state actors. Thus, despite the privatized governance norm’s earlier emergence in internet standards governance, the dissertation argues that the norm reached its overall global tipping point in 1998. As with US government authority, the same theoretical factors precluded other states from opposing this action, although the material interests of non-state actors and shared ideational interests in privatized governance amongst liberal state and non-state actors meant opposition was less intense (Mueller 2004, p. 174). The dissertation therefore argues that the privatized governance norm’s cascade stage commenced in 1998 and concluded around 2004, when more than half of the states in the world had joined the GAC and publicly acknowledged that state actors do not enjoy decision-making authority over internet governance – as stated in Principle 2 of the GAC's Operating Principles (GAC 2011). Based on this analysis, non-state actor authority is currently in the norm internalization stage of its lifecycle. However unlike the US authority norm, there is a reasonable chance that it may internalize across the global community to the extent that it achieves a 'taken for granted' quality. This is arguably already the case with the norm’s application to internet standards governance, where there is little to no challenge to the IETF’s authority beyond occasional claims by governments or the ITU that the ITU itself would be a more appropriate authority due to its more representative character (Kleinwachter 2004). It also appears relatively uncontroversial at the regional level, within RIRs’ governance of the IPS and regional, DNS governance-oriented administrative organizations. Non-state actor authority in many policy organizations also illustrates, perhaps, a growing acceptance of the privatized governance norm. For example, while the WSIS denied authority to non-state actors, the IGF has granted formally equal authority to both state and non-state actors, as did NETMundial. Non-state actor authority may also potentially evolve into a more significant core internet governance norm, as it is a competitor to the US authority norm as the normative regulator of who has ultimate authority over the technical internet. Attempts to entrench ultimate non-state actor authority over IPS and DNS governance began with the IAHC proposal. However, despite the US government’s decisive victory over these early efforts to dislodge its ultimate authority, the US government itself – reflecting US domestic beliefs and strategic efforts to incorporate various stakeholders into ICANN – stated that it aimed to eventually transfer this authority to the transnational technical internet community, a plan that was reaffirmed in 2014 by the Obama administration, with the goal to transfer ultimate IPS and DNS authority to ICANN in 2015 (NTIA 2005, 2014b). While beyond the scope of the dissertation to examine in detail, support for the privatized governance norm's replacement of US government authority appears strong amongst most non-state actors, and amongst liberal state governments with a more solidarist perspective on sovereignty.

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Nevertheless, non-state actor authority remains highly controversial in global level IPS and DNS governance due to its challenge of traditional state authority. The privatized governance norm remains controversial amongst state governments with a pluralist conception of sovereignty including, but not limited to, most illiberal states (Mueller 2010, p. 258). These state governments, and other non-state actors who disagree with the libertarian beliefs underpinning the privatized governance norm, advocate for the state authority norm to replace the norm of non-state actor authority as the regulator of authority within ICANN (Kesan & Gallo 2008, p. 399). The likelihood of such efforts being successful is, however, even lower than efforts for the state authority norm to replace the US authority norm. As noted, there is a much broader level of genuine ideational support for the privatized governance norm amongst liberal state governments, and it is arguably in both the material and ideational interests of non-state actors. Thus, there is less opposition to the norm in general. Unilateral disconnection from the predominantly privately governed IPS and DNS would incur severe economic and prestige consequences for states opposed to this norm. Likewise, widespread defection from the norm through the creation of an alternate, predominantly state actor-governed IPS and DNS faces greater collective action challenges than in response to state rejection of US government authority, as material interests in – and ideational support for – the privatized governance norm is higher amongst liberal states and non-state actors.

c. The Multi-Stakeholder Governance Norm The third core internet governance norm the dissertation identifies is the multi-stakeholder governance norm. This norm, like the concept of multi-stakeholder governance itself, relates to the right of different stakeholder classes interested in, or affected by, internet governance to participate in that governance (Vallejo & Hauselmann 2004, p. 3). The identification of relevant stakeholder classes, and the distribution of authority amongst these stakeholders, varies across different governance issue areas and organizations (DeNardis & Raymond 2013; Vallejo & Hauselmann 2004, p. 6). Of itself, multi-stakeholder governance does not stipulate which actors have authority, but it does stipulate that all relevant stakeholders should have some participatory rights. Outside of internet standards governance, which does not recognize any stakeholder class beyond the natural individual, the multi-stakeholder governance norm is particularly well entrenched in the internet governance regime. It justifies the grant of voting and non-voting Board seats to various stakeholder classes on the ICANN Board, and justifies the existence and organization of ICANN’s subsidiary bodies. Within some of these subsidiary bodies, such as the GNSO, the norm also justifies participation by further, more finely grained, stakeholder classes. In policy organizations, multi-stakeholder governance justified the right of non-state actors to participate in the WSIS and NETMundial, and it continues to justify the rights of state and non-state actors to participate in the IGF’s processes. Like the privatized governance norm, the multi-stakeholder governance norm has been identified by the dissertation through analysis of internet governance’s history and structure, which identify its factual existence. In addition, the norm is explicitly recognized by both regime organizations and by internet governance

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scholars. At first, the NTIA and ICANN did not overtly identify multi-stakeholder governance as a guiding norm for internet governance, but the NTIA’s proposal for ICANN’s establishment included the statement that: “Technical management of the Internet should reflect the diversity of its users …[and] ensure international input in decision making.” (NTIA 1998a). ICANN did not refer to itself as a multi-stakeholder organization until 2002 but, as noted above, it now refers to its own governance model as multi-stakeholder (ICANN 2002a; Weinberg 2011, p. 199, 201). Some administrative organizations are not multi-stakeholder, such as the ccNSO or APTLD, which only recognize a single stakeholder class. Others, such as APNIC, do recognise multiple stakeholders without explicitly noting their multi-stakeholder character. In contrast, policy organizations closely related to internet governance, such as the WSIS, IGF and NETMundial, have always explicitly noted their multi-stakeholder character. Internet scholars also consistently recognize the existence of multi-stakeholder governance within the internet governance regime (DeNardis & Raymond 2013; Kleinwachter 2004; Malcolm 2008; Raboy, Landry & Shtern 2010). The multi-stakeholder governance norm has perhaps the strongest degree of genuine acceptance amongst internet governance participants, in part because its legitimacy is more broadly recognized – multi-stakeholder governance gradually infiltrated UN processes in the Nineties, particularly in relation to global environmental governance (Codding Jr & Gallegos 1991; Hemmati, Dodds & Enayati 2002, ch.1). Multi-stakeholder governance is considered appropriate because it is believed to render policy development more sensitive to stakeholders’ interests, thus improving policy legitimacy and effectiveness (Hemmati, Dodds & Enayati 2002, pp. 20-5). In internet governance, because the multi-stakeholder governance norm is silent on which actors should wield authority, it is relatively uncontroversial and not generally challenged – even by illiberal states. The norm is highly significant within internet governance because it legitimizes the rights of various actors to participate in governance, including the rights of both state actors within ICANN and non-state actors of varying stakeholder class across a range of organizations. The privatized governance norm may justify non-state actor authority over the technical internet, but multi-stakeholder governance justifies the rights of both private sector and civil society actors to wield this authority. The multi-stakeholder governance norm is also significant because it affects the structure of ICANN's subsidiary and affiliated organizations, many policy organizations and domestic internet governance regimes.

i. The Lifecycle & Theoretical Drivers of the Multi-Stakeholder Governance Norm

Prior to ICANN’s establishment, IPS and DNS governance was not a consciously multi-stakeholder process, despite being conducted by US government agencies alongside US civil society actors, with gradual inclusion of US and non-US civil society and private sector actors. For example, RIRs such as APNIC have always subconsciously facilitated involvement by multiple stakeholder classes (APNIC 2012b). It wasn’t until the ITU-organized WSIS posed a challenge to ICANN’s authority that IPS and DNS governance began to be consciously identified as a multi-stakeholder process (Weinberg 2011, p. 199, 201). Nevertheless, internet

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governance has been multi-stakeholder in character from its earliest days. The early players in internet governance – the US government, US academics, and later Network Solutions – can arguably be considered norm entrepreneurs implicitly establishing the multi-stakeholder governance norm. This is particularly so with the US government, which was responsible for granting a role in DNS governance to the private sector in the mid-Nineties. Materially, multi-stakeholder governance was and is clearly in the interests of non-state actors, as it justifies their place at the governance table regardless of whether they get to wield authority. While undefined at the time, the multi-stakeholder governance norm was also clearly in the material interest of the US government when it established ICANN; the inclusion of multiple stakeholders was a way to include governments in internet governance without ceding authority to them, and a means of resolving the simmering tension between civil society and private sector actors which was partially responsible for the IAHC affair. The emergence of multi-stakeholder governance was also clearly due to domestic US libertarian and democratic beliefs, which drove the US government to allow civil society participation in IPS and DNS governance, and later to incorporate the private sector into DNS governance. Because multi-stakeholder governance was implicitly part of internet governance prior to its explicit articulation as a norm, it seems reasonable to conclude that the multi-stakeholder governance norm reached its tipping point when the US government exerted its material power to structure internet governance via the ICANN model. By doing so, the US acted as a critical state that coerced state and non-state actors into accepting the rights of various stakeholders to participate in internet governance. Alternatively, multi-stakeholder governance could be said to have reached its tipping point later in either 2002, when ICANN incorporated the term multi-stakeholder into its bylaws, or in 2003, when the first WSIS Summit concluded with unanimous agreement amongst state actors that internet governance should be multi-stakeholder in character. It is more logical, however, to accept the 1998 date, as the multi-stakeholder governance norm was clearly emerging prior to ICANN’s establishment, and the US government’s actions decisively entrenched the rights of various stakeholder classes to participation in IPS and DNS governance. On this view, the norm cascade period commenced in 1998 and the actions of state actors in 2001 and 2003 constituted elements of that phase in the multi-stakeholder governance norm's lifecycle. Given the WSIS dealt with matters beyond internet governance itself, 2003 is argued to be the most appropriate date for the conclusion of the norm cascade period, because the WSIS agreement reached in this first Summit was the first time at which a majority of state governments explicitly acknowledged multi-stakeholder governance in the context of internet governance. The rapid acceptance of the multi-stakeholder governance norm by internet governance participants is due to it serving the material interests of state actors, as it justified their right to have some participatory rights within ICANN, and thus some influence over IPS and DNS policy. Similarly, it granted non-state actors the right to participation in internet governance activity. Acceptance is also due to the broad ideational support that multi-stakeholder governance generally has in the international community, as

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discussed above. Multi-stakeholder governance has thus been in its internalization phase since 2003, and is likely to develop a genuine ‘taken-for-granted’ character, if it hasn’t already, due to the broad ideational support it receives (WGIG 2005f, art. IV, s. 29).

d. The State Authority Norm The state authority norm is an emerging norm, rather than an established one; it relates to the right of state actors to enjoy equal authority over internet governance, either exclusively amongst themselves or in terms of states wielding equal or greater rights relative to non-state actors. Exclusive state authority is most frequently proposed as a replacement for the US authority norm, granting states collectively equal rights to ultimate authority over the internet’s global root. It is also advocated as an alternative to the privatized governance norm in IPS and DNS governance, replacing non-state actor authority with exclusive state authority. Some advocates of the state authority norm propose only that it weaken non-state actor authority, rather than replace it entirely, arguing that state actors should have equal or greater rights than non-state actors in IPS and DNS governance. As an emerging norm, the state authority norm does not currently operate in any of the internet governance regime’s administrative organizations – save at the national level. Some policy organizations, however, are regulated by this norm. Clearly the UN and ITU, as intergovernmental organizations, privilege state actors. Those more closely related to internet governance may be less discriminatory, however. The WSIS, for example, only allowed state actors to determine WSIS outcomes, but the IGF grants agenda-setting authority to both state and non-state actors. The state authority norm has been identified in part from analysis of internet governance’s history and structure; the post-ICANN era particularly indicates sustained efforts at advocacy of this norm. Advocacy for state authority is also well documented in policy organizations and in scholarly analysis of internet governance. The WSIS outcomes included statements that: “Policy authority for Internet-related public policy issues is the sovereign right of States (WSIS 2005b s. 35 (a)).” Similarly, the WGIG proposed a range of alternative structures for the internet governance regime which granted greater state authority, and argued that: “No single Government should have a pre-eminent role in relation to international Internet governance (WGIG 2005f, art. V, s (2), pp. 13-15).” Subsequent advocacy for greater state authority has occurred within the UN, the IGF and other fora. State authority norm advocacy by some governments has also been noted by many scholars analyzing internet governance politics (Kesan & Gallo 2008, p. 399; Mueller 2010, p. 258; Rogers 2007, p. 9; Weinberg 2011, p. 200; Werbach 2008, p. 365). The norm is similarly identified from the dissertation’s analysis of China; as subsequent chapters illustrate, the Chinese government is a strong advocate for greater state authority. The state authority norm's appropriateness stems from traditional beliefs about state sovereignty and the rights of states in global governance. In their strongest conception, these beliefs justify the political view that only state governments, and their duly authorized agents, have the right to participate in global governance, while in weaker conceptions they justify views that states should

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have greater or at least equal authority over global governance relative to non-state actors (WGIG 2005f, pp. 13-6). There appears to be a reasonably high degree of support amongst state actors for greater state authority over internet governance, both amongst illiberal governments and amongst more liberal states with a more pluralist view of sovereignty (Kummer 2007, pp. 6, 10; Mueller 2010, p. 258). The norm is significant because advocacy for it drives much of the politics relating to the internet governance regime’s evolution – including the behavior of the Chinese government. This makes it particularly important to the dissertation’s subject matter.

i. The Lifecycle & Theoretical Drivers of The State Authority Norm

The state authority norm is currently in its norm emergence phase, and does not yet have any substantive effect on internet governance – as defined by this dissertation – above the national level. Its emergence is due primarily to the material interests of states and intergovernmental organizations; the norm justifies the rights of state actors to greater authority over internet governance. The norm is also arguably in the material interests of some non-state actors from developing countries, given that currently the internet governance regime grants greater influence to the US government and Western, predominantly US-based, non-state actors who participate in higher numbers than their developing world counterparts (Collins 2007, p. 16; Tripathi, Singh & Dube 2009, p. 381). The norm's emergence is also driven by traditional beliefs about the role of the state as the sole legitimate representative of its population’s collective will, and by beliefs that only state governments or their agents have a legitimate right to participate in politics above the national level (Hu 2005, p. 189; Kummer 2007, p. 10, 11). As an alternative to the US authority norm, and given the various factors highlighted above that lead states to acquiesce to US government authority, it seems unlikely that the state authority norm will reach its tipping point. For similar reasons, it is unlikely that this norm will reach its tipping point as a replacement for the privatized governance norm.

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6. Domestic Chinese Internet Governance

This chapter is the first of three which present the dissertation’s research into Chinese engagement with internet governance and its core norms. Each of these empirically-oriented chapters analyse different aspects of Chinese participation in internet governance with a focus on how this reflects on Chinese engagement with core internet governance norms. This chapter examines China’s domestic internet governance regime and policy, the next chapter examines Chinese engagement with administrative organizations, and the third empirically-oriented chapter examines Chinese engagement with policy organizations. Each of these three chapters briefly illustrates the significance of its analysis to China’s relationship with core internet governance norms, but direct analysis of China’s overall roles towards each of these norms, and the theoretical factors that shape these roles, is presented in the subsequent four chapters. This chapter considers the history and structure of China's domestic technical internet governance regime. It first examines the history of China’s early engagement with the technical internet, followed by analysis of the role of China’s government in its domestic regime, and concluding with analysis of the structure of the administrative and policy organizations within China’s domestic regime.

a. China's Early Engagement with the technical Internet China’s first engagement with the internet began in the late Eighties, and this gradually deepened as the internet grew past its research-oriented youth. China's relationship with the internet dates specifically to 1987, when China's first computer network was established (Cullen & Choy 1999, p. 103; Mueller & Tan 1997, p. 82). This network allowed the first transnational email to be sent from China to Germany, but the network was not based on TCP/IP protocols and could only interconnect with US networks through European gateways (Tso 2008, p. 118; Zheng 1994, p. 236). Early Chinese networks used a range of different technical standards, with the earliest TCP/IP-based network established in 1992, at Tsinghua University (CNNIC 2004 at 13). Direct, and permanent, interconnection between Chinese networks and the internet – the US TCP/IP-based network – did not occur until April 20, 1994 (State Council 2010, Pt. I). This direct internet link arose from discussions between Chinese and Western computer scientists, followed by negotiations between Chinese and US government officials that culminated in a formal intergovernmental agreement at the 1994 Sino-US Joint Commission on Scientific and Technological Cooperation (Harwit & Clark 2001, p. 382; Tso 2008, p. 119, 120). Thus, by necessity, the Chinese government and Chinese civil society computer scientists were required to acknowledge US government authority over the technical internet. Following this Sino-US agreement, China began receiving IP address allocations from APNIC (CNNIC 2004 at 23). The Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), which played a key role in facilitating China’s internet access and was the administrator of Beijing city's largest research network, undertook IP address allocation in China through its subsidiary network information center (Tso 2008, p. 120; Zheng 1994, p. 239). The CAS' role in IP address allocation was subsequently formalized by the Chinese government in 1997 when it authorized

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the CAS to establish the China Internet Network Information Centre (CNNIC 2003c, at 61, 63). China’s early IPS governance thus followed the basic structure of the US system; while government was involved to some extent, particularly with respect to funding and the designation of authority, non-state actors from civil society universities and research institutes took a leading role in the administration. Although China formally interconnected with the TCP/IP-based internet in 1994, China's ccTLD – the .cn domain – was established and incorporated into the internet's global root much earlier, in 1990 (CNNIC 2004, at 10; Mueller & Tan 1997, p. 83). Establishment of this domain was facilitated by collaboration between Chinese, German and US computer scientists who secured temporary permission from US authorities to create China's experimental TCP/IP-based e-mail services (Tso 2008, p. 118). Much like the later interconnection between China and the US-based IPS, establishing the .cn domain initially occurred with recognition of US authority over it. The computer server storing the .cn domain's registry information was located in Germany from 1990 until formal Chinese interconnection with the internet in 1994, at which time it was transferred to servers physically located in China (Tso 2008, p. 118; Xue 2004b, p. 561). The .cn domain was jointly administered by computer scientists in both Germany and China until 1994, at which time the CAS became its sole operators (CNNIC 2004 at 10; Xue 2004b, p. 561). When the Chinese government later formalized the CAS' role in IP address allocation in 1997, it also formally authorized the CNNIC to manage the .cn domain (CNNIC 2003c, at 61, 63). Thus, similarly with the IPS in China, the early operation of China's DNS has been characterised by civil society actors assuming the lion's share of governance responsibility.

b. The Chinese Government's Role in Domestic Governance As discussed below, and reflecting the global regime’s structure, daily administration of – and policy development for – China's technical internet is primarily conducted by a nominally non-state actor-led, multi-stakeholder governance regime. However, the Chinese government is, and always has been, a supervisor of this activity – the bureaucracy has formal oversight of the domestic regime, and Chinese law shapes some elements of internet governance policy. Beijing contributed funding to the early development of Chinese computer networks and, as noted, it was necessary for the Chinese and US governments to formally agree on Chinese interconnection with the internet (Tso 2008, pp. 116-21; Zheng 1994, pp. 236-9). After this, the Chinese government continued to fund the development of China’s internet-related telecommunications infrastructure and encouraged the private sector to take commercial advantage of the internet through initiatives such as the ‘three Golden’ projects (Hughes & Wacker 2003, pp. 13-5; Tso 2008, p. 120, 121). In 1996, the Chinese government began to formally regulate internet governance. The State Council, the PRC’s peak government body (as opposed to the CCP’s) began a re-organization of Chinese technical internet-related policy development (Saich 2004, p. 115, 153; Tan 1999, pp. 266-8). It established the Leading Group on Informatization to coordinate the various ministries, departments and state-owned enterprises that were currently involved in this area (Tso 2008, p. 123;

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Xue 2004b, p. 561). The Leading Group developed a centralized, coherent regulatory environment for China’s internet, headed by a new super-ministry – now the Ministry for Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) – created in 1998 (Fu & Mou 2010, p. 650, 656; Harwit & Clark 2001, p. 387). As part of this process, the Leading Group formally authorized the CNNIC’s role in domestic IPS and DNS governance. However, while the CNNIC was able to develop its own policy on the IPS and China’s .cn domain, the Leading Group also established a series of interim regulations providing guidelines for this policy (Shao 2012 ch. 2; Xue 2004b, p. 561, 562). Authority over these interim regulations later passed to the (now) MIIT and they were revised into permanent legislation. The formal authorization of the CNNIC was the first act to unequivocally assert the Chinese government’s authority over the technical internet in China, which eventually extended to requiring records of IP address allocation and domain name registrations to be provided to Beijing (Xue 2004b, p. 561, 562). Such laws specifically note APNIC's role in IP address allocation and indirectly note ICANN/IANA's role, with each containing a provision stating that the law applies to “organizations that obtain the IP addresses directly from the Asia Pacific Network Information Center and other international institutions with the administrative right of IP addresses” (Ministry of Information Industry 2005a art. 2; 2005b, art. 4). Reflecting this, the CNNIC’s own IP address allocation policy notes that its activities are conducted in conformity with APNIC’s policies (CNNIC 2003a). The combination of initial direct acknowledgement of the US government’s authority over the IPS, along with subsequent regulation of the domestic Chinese IPS, indicates the limit Beijing places on recognizing US authority. Similarly, the explicit legal recognition of APNIC and ICANN’s authority combined with regulation of the CNNIC represents both a demarcation of the extent to which Beijing accepts non-state actors exercising authority over internet governance, and a substantial degree of acceptance or conformity with the privatized governance norm. Like the IPS, domain names in China have been formally regulated since promulgation of the Leading Group's interim regulations, and Chinese language domain names (Chinese IDNs) – such as . (.zhongguo [.China]) – have been regulated since at least 2000 (CNNIC 2004). Regulations specify that DNS registries and registrars, including those engaged in gTLD business, must be approved by the Chinese government, yet also note that they must comply with policy in the “international Internet domain name system” (CNNIC 2012c arts 3, 4, 7, 9; Ministry of Information Industry 2004, arts. 4, 12). Beijing’s authority over DNS governance is also evident in government directives, such as one issued in 2006 requiring the CNNIC to conduct a six-month review of domain registrations to remove any that could damage China’s global image (Ministry of Information Industry 2006). However, Chinese law also provides the CNNIC authority to administer and developing DNS policy and oversee domain name dispute resolution (Ministry of Information Industry 2004, art. 36-39). Nevertheless, the law renders such dispute resolution subordinate to either decisions of a people's court or of an arbitration institution (Ministry of Information Industry 2004, art. 38). Thus, like the IPS in China, there seems to be a tension between Beijing’s assertion of ultimate authority over China’s DNS,

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along with overlapping conformity with the privatized governance norm through empowerment of the CNNIC and recognition of ICANN’s authority. The Chinese government's 1997 assertion of authority over China's internet included authority over the .cn domain and it has repeated this claim multiple times (State Council 2010, Pt. VI; IGF 2006a; Park 2009; Yu 2003, p. 6). This challenges the US government’s and non-state actors’ authority, as the US government and ICANN claim authority over both ccTLD and gTLD allocation (IANA 2007; Sonbuchner 2008). The fact that the .cn domain, and other ccTLDs, remain within the US-controlled, ICANN-operated global root indicates ICANN’s and the US government’s unwillingness to aggressively assert their authority, as this could force a determined challenge to it (DelBianco & Cox 2008, p. 41; Park 2009, p. 193). Conversely, the failure of ccTLD operators to decisively sever the link between their nameservers and ICANN's global root servers likely results from both technical difficulties in doing so and the political damage that this could cause (Von Arx & Hagen 2002, pp. 10-2, 35-8; Yu 2003, p. 7). It would be technically difficult to stop the IANA from directing domain name resolution to Chinese .cn domain nameservers, and doing so would sever the .cn domain from the internet – which would be politically isolating and could be economically damaging. As a result, China’s claims of sovereign ccTLD authority represent a primarily symbolic action, both rejecting US government and non-state authority while accepting their role in global administration of ccTLDs. Chinese government preferences towards internet governance are also reflected in general government policy statements on the internet, in particular in the White Paper on the Internet that Beijing released in 2010, which provides an overview of the Chinese government's view of various aspects of the internet's general importance and the means by which it should be governed (State Council 2010). Most of the policy statements relevant to core internet governance norms are contained within 'Chapter IV: Basic Principles and Practices of Internet Administration' and 'Chapter VI: Active International Exchanges and Cooperation' – although brief comments on the internet standards governance are made in 'Chapter I: Endeavors to Spur the Development and Application of the Internet'. Chapter VI provides an indication of Chinese resistance to the US authority norm, clearly outlining the Chinese government's view of the division of authority, noting that: “Though connected, the Internet of various countries belongs to different sovereignties” (State Council 2010 ch. VI). Chapter VI also clearly outlines the Chinese government's view on how the internet governance regime should be structured, namely that:

“China holds that the role of the UN should be given full scope in international Internet administration. China supports the establishment of an authoritative and just international Internet administration organization under the UN system through democratic procedures on a worldwide scale … China maintains that all countries have equal rights in participating in the administration of the fundamental international resources of the Internet, and a multilateral and transparent allocation system should be

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established on the basis of the current management mode (State Council 2010 ch. VI).”

The first sentence of Chapter VI, stating that the internets of various countries are their respective property, is a clear rejection of US government authority – particularly given the surrounding context. The more detailed statement on reform of the current regime, arguing it should be inter-governmentally conducted on the basis of equal state sovereign rights, makes this very clear. This detailed statement also clearly indicates that China's preferred alternative to the US authority norm is the state authority norm. Chapter VI is also a clear rejection of the privatized governance norm in favor of the state authority norm, and terms such as 'democratic procedures on a worldwide scale' and 'multilateral' are intended to convey that internet governance should be conducted predominantly by governments – a subtle use of language, the meaning of which is made clearer when compared with similar Chinese government statements in global level policy organizations (in chapter 8). The white paper also provides insight into Beijing’s view of non-state actor authority in Chapter IV, which asserts that: “The Chinese government plays the leading role in Internet administration ... The state telecommunications administration department is responsible for the administration of the Internet industry, including the administration of basic resources of the Internet such as domain names, IP addresses within China” (State Council 2010, ch. IV). Interestingly, no specific mention is made of the CNNIC, despite its authorization from the MIIT to manage the Chinese IPS and elements of the DNS. Chapter IV does note, however, that China “actively explores channels and methods of scientific and effective Internet administration by law, and has formed a preliminary Internet administration model that is suitable for China's conditions and consistent with international practices” (State Council 2010, ch. IV). Thus, while the government clearly asserts its ultimate authority, it also appears keen to conform to the international practice of giving direct administrative and policy authority to non-state actors. Nevertheless, Chapter IV does not directly acknowledge the privatized governance norm, although it does state that: “The state proactively promotes industry self-regulation and public supervision. The Internet Society of China (ISC) ... is a national organization of the Internet industry with a remit for serving the development of that industry, netizens and the decisions of the government” (State Council 2010, ch. IV). The final element of the white paper relevant to the privatized governance norm is Chapter I, which indirectly acknowledges non-state actor authority by making brief mention of the IETF's role in internet governance in discussion of Chinese contributions to internet standards development (State Council 2010, ch. I). No part of the White Paper on the Internet directly uses the term 'multi-stakeholder', giving an indication that the multi-stakeholder governance norm is relatively uncontroversial for the Chinese government. In this respect, Chapter VI notes that a reformed internet governance regime should be based on the 'current management system' and states that:

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“The governments of all countries should support the Internet industry in holding international exchange activities, encourage its efforts to expand consensus through exchanges, and resolve problems facing the Internet industry with joint efforts. The development of the Internet industry brings with it a series of new scientific and moral problems. Experts and scholars of various countries should be encouraged to conduct academic exchanges and share their research findings (State Council 2010, ch. VI).”

Thus, there is perhaps some level of acceptance of multi-stakeholder governance within Chapter VI, if only with respect to non-state actors having a role in enhancing consensus between countries on internet governance issues, and in providing information to state actors. Chapter IV's statement that China's domestic regime is 'consistent with international practices' and its recognition of the ISC also indicates some level of acceptance of the multi-stakeholder governance norm.

c. Chinese Administrative Organizations

i. Internet Standards As discussed, internet standards governance doesn’t require coordinated daily administration (beyond allocation of IP addresses and similar resources), and internet standards development is solely conducted at the global level by the IETF. That said, the CNNIC has somewhat sidestepped the IETF via its role in the coordination of internet standards development elated to Chinese IDNS such as . (.zhongguo [China]). In fact, as discussed in more detail below, standards related to these Chinese IDNS were implemented in China's internet unilaterally – that is, without waiting for either IETF approval of the standards, or for ICANN's development of a regulatory environment for incorporating IDNs into the global root (Xue 2004b, p. 563). In a sense, therefore, the CNNIC has acted in a governance capacity for internet standards, but this has only occurred in relation to development of standards for Chinese IDNs and the CNNIC has been quick to apply to the IETF to have such standards recognized officially (Tso 2008, pp. 125-8). The CNNIC's activities in developing Chinese IDN-related standards is better seen as simply a part of the preliminary process of internet standards development that occurs prior to formal submission of such standards to the IETF. While its actions in relation to Chinese IDN standards development somewhat contravene the authority of the IETF, it doesn't contravene the operation of the privatized governance norm in internet standards governance, given that the CNNIC itself is nominally a civil society actor itself. Aside from the CNNIC, there are a range of domestic Chinese organizations engaged in internet standards development, and which feed their activity into the IETF. Chinese private sector actors, such as corporations involved in telecommunications or technical internet-related business, and Chinese civil society actors, such as technical internet governance organizations and universities, research institutes or think tanks, do participate in the development of internet standards (Arkko 2013; Tso 2008, p. 126). Nevertheless, because of the strictly global-level organizational structure of internet standards development, and the resulting transnational relationships that such activity

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entails, the dissertation discusses Chinese involvement in this activity in more detail in the subsequent chapter. In one sense, however, the fact that the Chinese government does not intervene in or formally regulate the internet standards development process within China does suggest a degree of conformity or even acceptance of the privatized governance norm – at least in the relatively apolitical context of its application to internet standards.

ii. The IPS and DNS As foreshadowed, and with the exception of the Chinese government's supervisory role, the CNNIC is the highest IPS authority within China. Below this, the private sector also clearly has a substantial role in operating the lower levels of China's IPS and DNS, as it is the business of ISPs to provide internet access to customers by supplying IP addresses to them, and the business of registries and registrars to provide domain name registration for internet users (CNNIC 2012a, 2012e; Ministry of Commerce 2007). The CNNIC does not have a set of publicly available bylaws that governs its operation. Nevertheless, some information about its internal workings is available. The CNNIC Steering Committee is the highest authority within the organization and is supported by an Expert Committee, both of which are constituted by a range of civil society, government and private sector actors (CNNIC 2013a; Xue 2004b, p. 562). It is debateable how independent the CNNIC is from the Chinese government, particularly given the fact that the CNNIC includes a CCP Party cell that actively recruits members from within the CNNIC and contributes to the organization's work (CNNIC 2012b, p. 41). Nevertheless, even if it is concluded that the CNNIC is not very independent from the Chinese government, it remains the case that the organization operates according to a multi-stakeholder governance model and generally empowers non-state actors to wield substantial authority over China's domestic internet. The CNNIC is responsible for administering IP address and AS number allocation within China, and for setting policy related to this activity (CNNIC 2012e). Ultimately, the CNNIC's authority over the IPS in China is derived from both the Chinese government and from APNIC. The Chinese government authorizes the CNNIC to govern China’s IPS, but the CNNIC sources the necessary resources from APNIC, and thus ultimately from the IANA (CNNIC 2012e). Thus, despite the Chinese government intervening at the national level, there is no competing, uniquely Chinese IPS – if there were, China would be severed from the internet. Given that the IANA's own authority ultimately derives from the US government, China’s acceptance of the IANA’s authority carries with it a tacit conformity to the privatized governance norm, as well as to the US authority norm. The CNNIC is also the highest authority for elements of DNS governance in China, including for the .cn domain and for Chinese IDNs, with authority derived from the Chinese government and ICANN. The CNNIC largely operates the Chinese DNS within the global root and in accordance with ICANN policy, but as noted it also recognizes Beijing’s authority over the .cn domain. The CNNIC has operated its own domestic domains outside of the global root. Chinese IDNs – such as . (.zhongguo [China]), . (.wangluo [network]) and .

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(.gongsi [company]) – have existed since the end of the Nineties (Xue 2004b, pp. 563-6). The . domain was only incorporated into the ICANN-operated global internet root in 2010, while other Chinese IDNs remain outside of the global root pending a long and ongoing technical and policy development process (CNNIC 2012d; ICANN 2014cf). That the CNNIC has been willing to develop and deploy its own Chinese IDNs absent ICANN's approval does indicate a degree of rejection of ICANN's, and ultimately, the US government's authority over the DNS, as they did not wait for ICANN’s approval. CNNIC officials have, however, claimed that Chinese IDNs do not represent a challenge to the globally-centralized DNS, and were designed to be compatible with ICANN’s eventual multi-lingualization policy (MacKinnon 2006; Tso 2008, pp. 126-8; Xue 2004b). This has since turned out to be the case (Dam 2010; CircleID 2012). Moreover, as discussed in the next chapter, China has been an active participant in the development of internet standards and general policy related to ICANN's eventual incorporation of IDNs into the global root. Thus, while the CNNIC's establishment of Chinese IDNs does demonstrate a degree of independent initiative to develop new domains, it also illustrates a clear baseline level of conformity to ICANN's, and the US government's, claims to be the ultimate authorities over the DNS. In 2008, China established two further Chinese IDNs, the . (.zhengfu [government]) and . (.gongyi [public interest]) domains. Unlike other Chinese IDNs, these are not operated by the CNNIC, but by a non-profit organization called the China Organizational Name Administration Center (CONAC) (CONAC 2014a, 2014b). Like the CNNIC, CONAC has no publicly available bylaws, but it also doesn’t provide much information about its internal workings. The two domains operated by CONAC are scheduled to be incorporated into the internet's global root once ICANN's IDN TLD technical and policy development processes are finalized, following the signing of a registry contract with ICANN at the end of 2013 (CONAC 2013). That these new domains are operated by a civil society organization provides further evidence of China’s conformity to the privatized governance norm, as does CONAC’s willingness to recognize ICANN’s global authority. The extent to which CONAC reflects Chinese acceptance of non-state actor authority should not be overstated, however, the organization is closely affiliated with the Chinese government – being authorized by the MIIT. Also, while there is no direct evidence of a CCP cell within CONAC, it is highly likely one exists as it is the CCP’s policy to establish a party cell in any Chinese organization with more than three members (Saich 2000, p. 133). The CCP may not be as vigilant in implementing this policy as in past years, but given the close association CONAC has with the Chinese government, it is reasonable to assume it has significant influence over the organization.

d. Chinese Policy Organizations The most important policy organization in China’s domestic regime is the Internet Society of China (ISC), which is distinct from the ISOC and is not a national ISOC chapter; in fact, there are no China-based chapters of the ISOC. The ISC likely represents an attempt by the Chinese government to keep the

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Chinese technical internet community somewhat separate from the broader transnational community. It is formally a non-profit, non-government organization designed to operate, similarly to the ISOC, as a forum for interaction amongst the Chinese technical internet community, but is also clearly associated with the Chinese government – serving as a vehicle for the popularization of government policy and subject to supervision by the Chinese government (ISC 2011a, 2011b). Rebecca MacKinnon, a well-known Chinese internet expert, has stated that the ISC is effectively a “quasi-governmental” organization (MacKinnon 2012, p. 35) Unlike the CNNIC, the ISC's structure is formally designated. The ISC's by-laws clearly note that members of civil society and the private sector, along with individual technical internet experts, may become members of the ISC (ISC 2011b, art. III). These members are entitled to vote for representatives in the ISC Congress, which then itself elects a Board and Standing Committee for the organization (ISC 2013). There is no direct evidence of a CCP cell within the ISC, but it is likely that one exists similarly to that within the CNNIC, given CCP policy and the ISC’s relationship with the Chinese government (Saich 2000, p. 133). The ISC’s multi-stakeholder structure does indicate some Chinese acceptance of multi-stakeholder governance. Aside from the national level ISC, lower-level provincial and municipal Internet Societies also exist within China that are, again, not affiliated with the ISOC and which operate on a similar basis to the ISC (see, for example: Shanghai Internet Society 2009; Guangdong Internet Society 2014). These provincial and municipal level Internet Societies do not appear to be formally associated with the national ISC – at least in terms of any hierarchical organization – but are also multi-stakeholder in their membership. Finally, as with other states, there are a range of other organizations such as private sector telecommunications or internet companies, and civil society universities, research institutes and individual computer scientists, that contribute to domestic Chinese internet governance through membership in the CNNIC, the ISC and lower-level Internet Societies, or through participation in standards development activities or various technical internet-related administrative or policy development fora (CDNC 2004b; CERNET 2006; CNNIC 2013a; ISC 2013).

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7. Chinese Engagement with Administrative Organizations

The previous chapter focused upon the domestic aspects of China's engagement with internet governance and core internet governance norms. In contrast, this chapter, and the subsequent chapter on policy organizations, explores Chinese involvement in global and regional level internet governance. This chapter presents an empirical analysis of Chinese participation within administrative organizations, examining the engagement of the Chinese government, private sector and civil society, and briefly highlighting how their participation in administrative organizations sheds light on China’s relationship with core internet governance norms. The chapter’s analysis first considers Chinese involvement in internet standards development and related activity that feeds into the IETF's processes, followed by examination of Chinese participation within organizations directly involved in IPS and DNS administration and policy setting. It attempts to provide a loosely chronological account of Chinese engagement but, due to the fragmented nature of the internet governance regime, chronological continuity is not maintained across analysis of different internet governance issues or across Chinese involvement in different administrative organizations.

a. The IETF & Internet Standards

i. The IETF Chinese participation in the IETF has gradually increased since the early Nineties, but analyzing the extent of government, private sector and civil society involvement is complicated by the IETF’s limiting of formal participation to natural persons in their individual capacity. Nevertheless, IETF records provide an indication of overall Chinese involvement and some indication of participants’ stakeholder affiliation. Generally speaking, Chinese engagement with the IETF was minimal until 2005, but since then Chinese nationals have attended IETF meetings in increasing numbers, and have become increasingly significant contributors to the IETF's standards development (Appendix 1 and Appendix 2). The rise of Chinese participation in IETF meetings is illustrated in Figures 6 and 7, below. Similarly, the growth in significance of China to the IETF’s overall output is illustrated in Figures 8, 9 and 10 below. With respect to that significance, the Chair of the IETF noted in 2013 that China would shortly become the second biggest contributor to the IETF after the United States (Arkko 2013). Approximately 408 Chinese authors have contributed to IETF documents, including Requests For Comments (RFC) – the IETF's documents of record – with at least 154 Chinese-authored RFCs (Appendix 2). The exact number of Chinese authors cannot be precisely determined, because IETF statistics are computer-generated and provide some erroneous information (Appendix 2).

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Source: Author’s Own Research (Appendix 1)

Figure 7: Chinese Attendance at IETF Meetings by Stakeholder Group 1994 - 2014

Source: Author’s Own Research (Appendix 1)

Figure 6: Total Chinese Attendance at IETF Meetings 1986 - 2014

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Figure 8: Comparison of Country Contributions to RFC Authorship

Source: IETF (2014e)

Figure 9: Author Numbers by Country for IETF Documents (RFCs & Other Working Documents)

Source: IETF Tools (2015b)

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Figure 10: Chinese RFC Authorship By Year

Source: Author’s Own Research (Appendix 2) Although Chinese participation in IETF meetings and contributions to IETF document production has increased significantly, appointment of Chinese individuals to administrative positions in the IETF has been lesser but has also gradually increased. One Chinese civil society-affiliated participant, Li Xing, was appointed to the IAB in 2013, but no Chinese citizen has been appointed an IETF Area Director or, therefore, been an IESG member (IAB 2014; IETF 2014g). Eight Chinese nationals have been appointed as Working Group Chairs however, with the first such appointment in 2005. All Chinese Working Groups chairs, with the exception of one civil society-affiliated representative and one of unknown affiliation, have been private sector-affiliated (Table 1).

Table 1 - Chinese IETF Working Group Chairs Active Working Groups

Concluded Working Groups

Dates Active Chinese Chair(s)

Dmm 2007 - Present

Dapeng Liu (Private Sector)

Lwig 2011 - Present

Zhen Cao (Private Sector)

Mif 2009 - Present

Hui Deng (Private Sector)

softwire 2005 - Present

Yong Cui (Civil Society)

ppsp 2010 - Present

Ning Zong (Private Sector) & Yunfei Zhang (Unknown)

decade 2010 -2012 Haibin Song (Private Sector) hokey 2006 - 2012 Tina Tsou (Private Sector)

Source: IETF (2014a, 2014c, 2014f)

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While unable to directly engage with the IETF, the Chinese government has tacitly accepted the organization’s role in internet standards governance by allowing Chinese citizens to participate in the IETF. This is also evident in the Chinese government’s willingness to allow the IETF’s 79th meeting to occur in Beijing in 2010 (IETF 2010b). Chinese government-affiliated IETF participants, mostly MIIT employees, attended this meeting and have attended a number of others (IETF 2010a). The first recorded IETF meeting attendance by Chinese government-affiliated individuals was at IETF 31 in December 1994, where nine Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications employees attended (Appendix 1). In fact, these were the first recorded Chinese participants in IETF meetings. Chinese government employees have also attended the 39th, 45th, 51st, 63rd, 68th and 72nd IETF meetings; beginning with IETF 74 in 2009, Chinese government employees have attended every subsequent meeting. Chinese government employees have also made a minor contribution to authoring IETF documents; at least eight have authored or co-authored RFCs (Appendix 2). As Table 2, below, indicates, however, individuals affiliated with the Chinese government have been minimal contributors relative to other Chinese stakeholder groups. None have been appointed to administrative positions within the IETF, however. This involvement of Chinese government-affiliated individuals in IETF meetings and document authoring – along with Beijing’s willingness to allow an IETF meeting to occur in China and for Chinese individuals to engage with the IETF – indicates that the Chinese government is not as strongly opposed to the privatized governance norm operation in internet standards as it is towards this norm in IPS and DNS governance. Indeed, the lack of Chinese government opposition to, and tacit acceptance of, non-state actor authority in internet standards governance suggests that the Chinese government may have internalized this norm in this governance area to some degree.

Table 2: Summary of Chinese RFC Contributors by Stakeholder Group Government Private Sector Civil Society Unknown Total

8 276 116 8 408 Source: Author’s Own Research (Appendix 2) Save as hosts or sponsors of IETF meetings, Chinese private sector organizations are unable to directly participate in the IETF. Chinese corporations have hosted and sponsored these meetings, beginning with IETF 70 in 2007, which was sponsored by Huawei, a Chinese telecommunications company (IETF 2014d). Subsequently, the IETF 79 meeting held in Beijing was sponsored by Huawei, ZTE, China Telecom, China Mobile, H3C and Rujie Networks (IETF 2010b). Huawei has sponsored six further IETF meetings, from meeting 83 through to meeting 88, and was a host of IETF 88. The only further Chinese private sector sponsorship was with China Telecom’s support of IETF 85 (Appendix 1). Chinese private sector-affiliated individuals have engaged extensively with the IETF since IETF 63 in 2005, but prior to this there is only evidence of such participation at IETF 34 in 1995. Since IETF 63, however, the Chinese private sector has been the most active Chinese stakeholder group within the IETF in both meeting attendance and IETF document authorship, as Figure 7 and Table 2, above, indicate (see also Appendix 1 and Appendix 2). At least 276 private sector-affiliated Chinese IETF participants have authored RFCs and the very first

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Chinese authored RFC, published in 1995, was co-authored by a private sector-affiliated individual (IETF 1995; Appendix 2). Five Chinese private sector-affiliated IETF participants have been appointed as Working Group Chairs (Table 1). Chinese civil society organizations are also unable to directly engage with the IETF save as meeting sponsors or hosts. Tsinghua University, the CNNIC and the ISC all co-hosted the IETF 79 in Beijing, and Tsinghua University also sponsored IETF 85 (IETF 2010b) (Appendix 1). Chinese civil society-affiliated participants have not engaged with the IETF in equivalent numbers to private sector-affiliated individuals, but their engagement has still been substantial, and meeting attendance has gradually increased since 2005 (Appendix 1). Chinese civil society-affiliated IETF participants have also contributed to a number of RFCs, with at least 116 such authors (Appendix 2). Li Xing, from Tsinghua University, has been appointed to the IAB, while at least one civil society-affiliated Chinese IETF participant has been appointed a Working Group Chair (IAB 2014; IETF 2014b). The participation of Chinese private sector and civil society-affiliated individuals within the IETF's meetings and in the development of Internet standards indicates a degree of acceptance of, and conformity to, the privatized governance norm amongst these stakeholder groups – suggesting a substantial internalization of this norm within Chinese society.

ii. Peripheral Standards Development Chinese actors have also engaged in internet standards development that has ultimately fed into the IETF. Domestic Chinese universities, private sector corporations and government organs have been engaged in the development of internet standards which have then been fed into the IETF as standards proposals; RFC 5814, for example, involves Chinese contributions from all three categories of stakeholders and is based in part off development conducted in China (IETF 2010c). Aside from this, Chinese computer scientists have been involved in regional development of internet standards. Of particular note is the Joint Engineering Taskforce established as a joint venture in 2000 by network information centers (NIC) across the East Asian region (Tso 2008, pp. 126-8). This body included the CNNIC and its Japanese, Taiwanese and Singaporean counterparts. The Joint Engineering Taskforce was established by the Chinese Domain Name Consortium (CDNC), a body dedicated to developing, and regulating, Chinese IDNs. The CDNC was established in 2000, slightly before the Joint Engineering Taskforce was formed, and its initial membership included the CNNIC and counterparts from Macao, Hong Kong and Taiwan (CDNC 2004a; Tso 2008, p. 126). Since then, it has expanded to include Joint Engineering Taskforce members, the MIIT's China Academy of Telecommunications Research (CATR), and a range of other Chinese and non-Chinese private sector and civil society actors (CDNC 2004b). It continues to develop internet standards, with the most recent being RFC 6858, which is related to IDN email, and was submitted to the IETF's standards track and approved by the IESG in 2013 (CDNC 2014; IETF 2013). As with Chinese non-state actor participation in the IETF itself, this regionally-focused internet standards development activity suggests significant

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acceptance and internalization of the privatized governance norm’s appropriateness in this area.

b. ICANN & IPS/DNS Governance

i. A Brief Overview of Chinese Participation in ICANN China has engaged with ICANN since its establishment, across all three stakeholder groups. This is evident from historical records of ICANN meetings that provide a snapshot of Chinese engagement with the organization (see Appendix 3). In addition, the ICANN’s various subsidiary bodies and affiliated organizations provide their own records that illustrate sustained Chinese private sector and civil society participation in ICANN. These historical records are somewhat unreliable, because they are often incomplete or in some cases no longer accessible. The reason for this is that they have been created in part to fulfill ICANN's commitment to transparent governance, but also in part simply as a means of record-taking for internal use by participants in ICANN’s governance processes. Thus, they cannot be used to provide a definitive account of China's, or any other states', engagement with ICANN and related bodies. Nevertheless, they can still be used to confirm some level of Chinese engagement with the organization, and in their entirety provide a reasonably accurate and comprehensive snapshot of that engagement. In terms of general Chinese engagement with ICANN, China has hosted ICANN meetings twice: at ICANN 14 in Shanghai in 2002, and again at ICANN 46 in Beijing in 2013 (ICANN 2012ae). Chinese participation has been recorded at ICANN meetings since ICANN's fourth meeting in Los Angeles in 1999 (ICANN 1999c). Beginning with ICANN 4, information about meeting attendees began to be recorded – although inconsistently – and these records suggests that Chinese attendance and participation in ICANN meetings was consistent but small in number until 2009, after which time attendance and active participation began to substantially increase; this is illustrated in Figures 11, 12 and 13 below (see also Appendix 3).2 At earlier ICANN meetings, it appears that language barriers were a deterrent to Chinese attendance. The lack of Chinese participation and its potential link to language barriers was noted by attendees at the first ICANN meeting held in China in Shanghai, 2002 (ICANN 2002d). Chinese attendance at ICANN meetings also appears to be heavily influenced by the geographic setting in which the meetings occur, at least as indicated by attendance at ICANN 46 in Beijing – which had almost 10 times the level of Chinese attendance than the next most attended ICANN meeting.

2 The much larger relative number of Chinese attendees at ICANN 46 skews meaningful graphical representation of Chinese attendance at ICANN meetings. ICANN 46 is therefore excluded from Figures 11 and 12. Note that the gaps in attendance from roughly 2002 to 2008 reflect errors in ICANN record keeping, rather than a lack of Chinese attendance itself.

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Figure 11: Total Chinese Attendance at ICANN Meetings 1999 – 2014

(exc. ICANN 46)

Source: Author’s Own Research (Appendix 3)

Figure 12: Chinese Attendance at ICANN Meetings by Stakeholder Group 1999 – 2014 (exc. ICANN 46)

Source: Author’s Own Research (Appendix 3)

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Figure 13: Active Chinese Participation at ICANN Meetings by Stakeholder

Group 1999 - 2014

Source: Author’s Own Research (Appendix 3)3 Further information from ICANN's subsidiary bodies or affiliated organizations illustrates that China has engaged with ICANN from before its first official meeting. For example, the Chinese government attended the GAC's first meeting in March, 1999 – a few weeks prior to the first general ICANN meeting (GAC 1999a). However, while the Chinese government was an early participant in ICANN, it left the GAC in 2001 and has not generally been an active participant (MacKinnon 2009a; Mathiason 2008, p. 89). The Chinese government returned to the GAC in 2009, however, and since then its engagement with ICANN at both meetings and more generally has increased slightly. Private sector involvement in ICANN’s subsidiary bodies and affiliated organizations has been quite limited, and Chinese civil society is clearly the most active stakeholder group in ICANN's general meetings and in its subsidiary bodies and affiliated organizations.

ii. ICANN & The Chinese Government The Chinese government’s first recorded attendance at ICANN’s general meetings was in 1999; although, as noted above and discussed further below, Beijing had earlier engagement with ICANN in the GAC. Chinese government participation at ICANN 3 can be inferred through informal chat records of an ICANN Board/GAC meeting (ICANN 1999b). At ICANN 4, comments indicate China's GAC representative was present at a GAC meeting (ICANN 1999a). Records also illustrate Chinese government attendance at ICANN 6, 7 and 8. A long gap in Chinese government participation is then indicated from 2001 until ICANN 35 in 2009 – save for a statement at ICANN 20 made by a Chinese diplomat, Zhao Houlin, in his then capacity as an ITU official. This large gap is

3 Note that ‘active participation’, for the purpose of Figure 13, refers to: recorded attendance at – or the chairing of - specific sessions at ICANN meetings, presentations given by Chinese actors, and comments made at specific sessions by Chinese actors.

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due to Beijing’s withdrawal from the GAC in 2001, coinciding with the commencement of WSIS, and illustrates an effort to delegitimize ICANN as a strategy to weaken the US government’s and non-state actors’ authority over internet governance (Tso 2008, p. 132). China's return to the GAC at ICANN 35 was welcomed by the ICANN Board and was followed by government representatives attending each subsequent ICANN meeting – with the exception of ICANN 41 and 42 – from ICANN 38 in 2010 to the last 2014 meeting, ICANN 51 (Appendix 3). However, all recorded statements by Chinese officials from ICANN 35 to 45 related primarily to technical issues or advancing China's interests in Chinese language IDNs. China's GAC representative’s comments at ICANN 45 are the first recorded Chinese government statements at ICANN meetings that are relevant to core internet governance norms. Here, in a GAC high-level meeting, China’s representative stated that governments should play a greater role in ICANN and the IANA should be more accountable (ICANN 2012u). The next three ICANN meetings did not result in any further statements relevant to core internet governance norms, although the Chinese government was active in these meetings. However, at ICANN 49 in 2014, the Chinese government stepped up its advocacy of the state authority norm, with almost all of its GAC representatives’ comments pushing for stronger government authority within ICANN. Of those that weren’t, one argued in favor of stronger geographical diversity in ICANN to strengthen multi-stakeholder governance, with the representative noting that North America accounted for 75% of participation in ICANN, and Europe provided a further 15% (ICANN 2014z). Beijing’s focus on the state authority norm was likely because it sensed an opportunity to advance it, given the US government’s recent announcement that it would transition its internet governance authority to ICANN in 2015 – itself made in the context of the upcoming NETMundial meeting and growing international resentment over US spying programs (Almeida 2014, p. 65, 66);Lemos 2014, p. 6). Beijing was therefore very active at ICANN 49. Interestingly, its advocacy for greater government authority in ICANN was frequently framed in terms of advancing the multi-stakeholder governance norm by strengthening equality amongst stakeholder groups. This use of multi-stakeholder governance to justify government equality in ICANN, while perhaps mostly an expedient strategy, does suggest some internalization of the multi-stakeholder governance norm. The Chinese government’s comments at ICANN 49 included a statement in a joint GAC/Board meeting that the upcoming IANA transition should result in governments acquiring a decision-making role in ICANN, and that ICANN was illegitimate without this (ICANN 2014ah). In a preparatory meeting for the ICANN CEO's briefing of the GAC, China's representative again called for greater government authority in ICANN, justifying this on the need for genuinely multi-stakeholder governance (ICANN 2014ag). In a series of GAC Plenary meetings, China's GAC representative further pushed for stronger state roles in ICANN, first calling for NETMundial to consider the issue and arguing that multi-stakeholder governance should mean equality for state actors in ICANN (ICANN 2014ad), then welcoming the US government’s announcement on the IANA transition (ICANN 2014ac), and finally reiterating its call for greater state

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authority in ICANN as a means of improving ICANN’s multi-stakeholder character (ICANN 2014ae). China’s GAC representative also enquired in a GAC/RSSAC session whether the GAC could be more active in the RSSAC, and whether root servers could be more equitably distributed around the globe (ICANN 2014ai). This intensified advocacy for greater state authority continued in ICANN 50, where the majority of the Chinese GAC representatives’ comments were again related to it, welcoming the upcoming IANA transition and stating support for a stronger government role in ICANN (ICANN 2014bc), also arguing that the IANA transition should strengthen the role of the GAC within ICANN (ICANN 2014be), and further, welcoming GAC moves to strengthen its position in ICANN (ICANN 2014bg). These comments also clearly indicate continued resistance to the US authority norm, and in one GAC meeting China’s representative voiced concern over whether ICANN, following the IANA transition, remain incorporated under Californian law (ICANN 2014bd). Similarly, it showcases continued resistance to ICANN’s privatized governance model. ICANN 50 also saw the first comments from a non-GAC representative that touched upon core internet governance norms. A Chinese Minister of Cyberspace Administration commented, in a high-level government meeting, that governments should play a leading role in internet governance, but also that the private sector, civil society and other stakeholders had legitimate roles to play (ICANN 2014bi). The same Minister gave a speech at the welcome ceremony, at one point lauding the US government's decision to transition its internet governance authority to ICANN (ICANN 2014bp). At ICANN 51, China's advocacy for the state authority norm slowed down, although China's GAC representative still advocated for an active GAC role in the IANA transition, and queried whether the US government's contractual relationship with VeriSign – the authoritative root zone file operator – would also be transferred to ICANN (ICANN 2014bs). Perhaps indicating Chinese favorability to the impending IANA transition, a CATR employee stated in one meeting that he welcomed the participation of all stakeholders in ICANN and NETMundial, and further noted that China was likely to increase its participation in internet governance in an ICANN Public Forum (ICANN 2014bv). The Chinese government's intermittent participation in ICANN meetings sheds some light on China's stance towards core internet governance norms. The absence of Chinese government involvement in ICANN meetings until China's GAC return in 2009 shows Beijing’s resentment at both US government authority and non-state actor authority. At the same time, however, the Chinese government’s return to the GAC has seen an increase, if only small, in Beijing’s participation in ICANN meetings, which suggests ongoing acquiescence to both of these norms. Nevertheless, as Chinese government participation from ICANN 49 onwards indicates, it has enthusiastically welcomed the announcement that the US is abandoning its authority, and pushed for the rights of governments in ICANN in response. This illustrates its continuing preference for greater state authority over internet governance, even if it has moderated its position by only arguing for equality between state and non-state actors in ICANN. The Chinese government's involvement in ICANN meetings, and particularly the framing of its

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arguments about government's role in ICANN post-ICANN 49, also suggests a relatively high degree of acceptance of multi-stakeholder governance. Aside from annual ICANN meetings, Chinese government representatives are generally only able to participate in ICANN through the GAC, although one Chinese government representative, Zhao Houlin, then an ITU official, was a member of ICANN's Independent Review Panel Nominating Committee from 2000 to 2002 (ICANN 2015al). Unfortunately, GAC meetings and records are generally closed to the public. Some Chinese GAC involvement can be observed in GAC outreach meetings at general ICANN meetings however, and the GAC does provide some limited information about its activities. Chinese government representatives are recorded as having attended the first ever GAC meeting, out of only 25 states attending. At this meeting they agreed to the first ever GAC statement, which noted: “The National Governments endorse the principles behind the creation of ICANN.” (GAC 1999a). Ironically, the third such principle is 'Private, Bottom-Up Coordination' and includes the phrase “responsible, private-sector action is preferable to government control” (NTIA 1998a). It is likely the Chinese government did not entirely comprehend the significance of these principles, or at least felt pressured to endorse them. Its early GAC involvement clearly indicates, however, the Chinese government’s acquiescence to the US authority and privatized governance norms. The first GAC meeting recorded participants and meeting minutes, but subsequent meetings have not consistently done so (GAC 2012). Nevertheless, given China’s GAC withdrawal was in 2001, it is probable Beijing attended the second GAC meeting in 1999 (Thorne 2010; Tso 2008, p. 132). This meeting promulgated the GAC’s 'Operating Principles', which include a general acknowledgment of ICANN's wide-ranging authority over internet governance, a commitment to ICANN’s “private bottom-up coordination”, and an acknowledgment that the “GAC is not a decision-making body” (GAC 1999b, 1999c). These clauses within the GAC's Operating Principles have not been changed, thus despite the Chinese government's disapproval, it acquiesced to them again upon its 2009 GAC return (GAC 2011). Similarly, Beijing’s allowance of the 2001 ICANN meeting in China is particularly significant because it occurred the year after China's government withdrew from the GAC – illustrating a willingness to acknowledge ICANN’s importance and allow Chinese non-state actor participation in the organization (ICANN 2002c). China's 2001 withdrawal from the GAC can be viewed as motivated by a range of factors, as noted by MacKinnon (2009a) on her blog. In part it was a protest against government subordination in ICANN, in part a protest against US government authority, and in part a protest over Taiwan’s inclusion in the GAC. When the Chinese government left ICANN, it engaged in a sustained campaign in the WSIS, and later the IGF, to replace the US authority and privatized governance norms with the state authority norm, as discussed in detail next chapter. Beijing’s decision to re-join the GAC is due in part to Sino-Taiwanese rapprochement, which resulted in Taiwan accepting a designation as ‘Chinese Taipei’ in the GAC (MacKinnon 2009a). In addition, the Chinese government appears to have decided it needed GAC representation to advance its interests in IDN policy, which ICANN was beginning to formally develop at this time.

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China’s GAC representative’s comments at the second GAC meeting since China’s return support this analysis, as the representative informed the GAC then that China would apply in the first round for a fast-tracked IDN ccTLD (ICANN 2009k, 2009l). When China returned to the GAC, the Chinese government commenced more direct engagement with ICANN and its policy development processes (ICANN 2012r). ICANN’s CEO met both the Director General of the CNNIC and representatives from the MIIT in a visit to Beijing in March 2010, which was followed by a further visit to China in December 2011 (ICANN 2010x, p. 2; 2011t). China’s GAC return also resulted in China’s public sector reform commission acquiring contractual accreditation from ICANN for its gTLD registrar activities and membership in the Registrar Stakeholder Group within the GNSO (ICANN Registrar Stakeholder Group 2015; InterNIC 2015). Another ICANN meeting was held in China after its GAC return, and this meeting coincided with ICANN establishing its first 'global engagement center' in Beijing in collaboration with the CNNIC (CNNIC 2013b). In addition to the factors identified above, China’s GAC return and subsequent high-level engagement with ICANN, and China’s GAC return, are likely due to the failure of WSIS and the IGF to fundamentally shift the power over internet governance to a more traditional intergovernmental entity such as the ITU. It represented a lessening, if only temporary, of the Chinese government’s intensity in its efforts to promote the state authority norm (MacKinnon 2009b). It is also worth noting that, despite its clear opposition to US government and non-state actor authority in internet governance, Beijing never blocked Chinese non-state actors from participating in ICANN during its self-imposed isolation (Thorne 2010). This, the extent of Beijing’s post-2009 contact with ICANN officials, and the 2014 calls for equal rather than greater state authority in ICANN, perhaps suggests growing acceptance of the privatized governance norm by the Chinese government.

iii. ICANN & The Chinese Private Sector Chinese private sector actors, much like the Chinese government, have had a fairly limited level of engagement with ICANN. The CNNIC's position in China’s domestic regime, where it manages all IPS-related allocations within China and is the .cn domain registry, limits the degree of direct engagement by Chinese businesses with ICANN. However, unlike Chinese .cn domain registrars, Chinese gTLD registries and registrars must receive direct or indirect contractual authorization from ICANN, and thus must acknowledge ICANN’s authority (ICANN 2012aj). This indicates clear acceptance of non-state actor authority and indirectly indicates acquiescence to US government authority. Evidence of Chinese private sector acceptance of ICANN's authority is also illustrated by the roughly 70 – as of 2014 – ICANN-accredited domain name registrars operating within China and providing gTLD registration services (ICANN 2014n; InterNIC 2015). Further evidence of Chinese private sector acceptance of, and engagement with, the privatized governance norm and multi-stakeholder governance norms can be illustrated through these actors' participation within ICANN meetings and with ICANN's subsidiary or affiliated organizations.

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Sponsorship records for ICANN meetings are generally unreliable until ICANN 28, and there are no clear indications of Chinese private sector sponsorship prior to ICANN 33 (Appendix 3). Chinese corporations, including the Zodiac Group (ICANN 35, 36, 46), HiChina (ICANN 45, 46) and Knet (ICANN 43, 46) have all sponsored ICANN meetings, with particularly heavy concentration of Chinese corporate sponsors at ICANN 46 in Beijing. Unfortunately, no sponsorship records exist for ICANN 14, held in Shanghai. At ICANN's general meetings, private sector actors have participated in policy discussion and in workshops, but generally in small numbers, as indicated in Figure 13 (see also Appendix 3). The first record of Chinese private sector involvement, beyond simple attendee registration, was at ICANN 6, when an Eastern Communications company representative remotely participated in domain name policy meeting. Beyond this, active participation in technical discussions at ICANN meetings is not recorded again until ICANN 36 and 43. At ICANN 46 in Beijing, the Chinese private sector were much more active, likely due to the meeting’s location. A range of different Chinese corporate representatives gave presentations on their businesses or discussed ICANN policy issues. No Chinese private sector actors are then recorded as participating in policy discussion at ICANN 47 and 48, but a small number of such actors have participated in ICANN 59, 50 and 51. Much like the record of the Chinese government in ICANN meetings, Chinese private sector involvement illustrates that most participation is apolitical, with a business or technical focus. No Chinese private sector actors have commented directly on any core internet governance norms. Nevertheless, the simple fact of their attendance – and engagement in the policy discussions – at ICANN meetings indicates a degree of conformity to the privatized governance norm and acceptance of multi-stakeholder governance. Like involvement in ICANN meetings, the Chinese private sector has had limited participation in ICANN’s subsidiary bodies and affiliated organizations. There is some evidence of Chinese private sector engagement with ICANN's Board and administrative staff, in particular through the 70 or so Chinese gTLD registrars accredited by ICANN (ICANN 2014n; InterNIC 2015). There are about 12 – as of 2014 – Chinese-operated new gTLD registries accredited by ICANN (ICANN 2015ao) Engagement with the ICANN Board is also demonstrated in some limited correspondence, where a few large Chinese companies have acknowledged ICANN’s authority over gTLDs (ICANN 2000g, 2000h, 2012r). Only one private sector representative has been part of ICANN’s executive taskforces – the ICANN Membership Implementation Task Force which operated around 2002 (ICANN 2015ai, 2015an). The GNSO is the location of the Chinese private sector’s most active participation in ICANN. The precursor to the current GNSO, the Domain Name Supporting Organization, had two recorded Chinese members, both of which were gTLD registrars (ICANN 2002b). The current peak body of the GNSO, the GNSO Council, has no Chinese membership, and there have been no past Chinese members of the Council (ICANN 2013v, 2013w, 2013x, 2013y, 2013z, 2015ab). There are also no current Chinese staff within the GNSO (ICANN

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2014h). However, two private sector-affiliated individuals have registered as candidates for GNSO administrative positions, or as working group members (ICANN 2015t, 2015u). One of these individuals is a member of a GNSO working group on privacy issues (ICANN 2014i). As noted briefly in chapter 4, the GNSO is itself supported by a range of subsidiary bodies representing various gTLD stakeholders, however, there are no reliable public records of sub-GNSO Council leadership groups prior to 2012 (ICANN 2014m). That said, available records indicate that there have been no Chinese members of the Commercial Stakeholder Group Council (ICANN 2013o, 2015o, 2015p); or within sub-groups of this Group (Intellectual Property Constituency 2015; ICANN 2011j, 2012w, 2014f, 2015q, 2015af). Similarly, in the Registries Stakeholder Group, there have been no Chinese members of its leading Council (ICANN 2013s, 2013t, 2014k). There are also no Chinese members of this Group, although two Chinese companies (Alibaba and Sina) are observer members, and a KNet representative has been active in two different working groups within this Group (gTLD Registries Stakeholder Group 2015a, 2015b, 2015c, 2015d). In the Registrars Stakeholder Group, there have likewise been no Chinese members of its leading Council (ICANN 2013q, 2013r, 2014j). There are six recorded Chinese private sector members of this Group, however (ICANN Registrar Stakeholder Group 2015). The final sub-group of the GNSO, the Non-Commercial Stakeholder Group has also had no Chinese members in its leading Council (ICANN 2012x, 2013p, 2014g). There are no public records of membership in the NCSG (ICANN 2015r).

iv. ICANN & Chinese Civil Society Relative to the Chinese government and private sector, Chinese civil society actors have been much more active in general ICANN meetings and within ICANN's subsidiary bodies and affiliated organizations. The high level of Chinese civil society involvement in ICANN suggests a significant degree of acceptance and conformity to both the privatized governance and multi-stakeholder governance norms, and indirectly indicates acquiescence to the US authority norm. While the total numbers of Chinese civil society participants at ICANN meetings is roughly similar to the Chinese private sector, Chinese civil society representatives have been much more active participants, as indicated by Figures 12 and 13 above (see also Appendix 3). Similarly, more sustained sponsorship of ICANN meetings has been provided by Chinese civil society organizations. In particular, the CNNIC has been very active with consistent sponsorship from ICANN 32 in 2008 through to ICANN 45 in 2012. While not sponsoring ICANN 46 in Beijing, the CNNIC was a co-host of the meeting itself. The CNNIC did not sponsor the next two ICANN meetings, but resumed its sponsorship for ICANN 49, 50 and 51. CONAC has also been a prominent sponsor of ICANN meetings, sponsoring ICANN 37, 38, 43, 44, 45 and acting as a co-host for ICANN 46. The CNNIC and the ISC jointly hosted ICANN 14 in Shanghai, and the ISC was also a co-host of ICANN 46. Chinese civil society actors became active participants in ICANN meetings at approximately ICANN 20 in 2004. However, due to inconsistencies in ICANN's records, incomplete records prior to ICANN 20 and missing records for ICANN

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30 and 31 disrupt analysis of this pattern (Appendix 3). Prior to ICANN 20, the CNNIC is recorded as a signatory in a Communique signed just prior to ICANN 4, in which ccTLD operators state they will withdraw from the Domain Name Supporting Organization – a precursor subsidiary body that later split into the GNSO and ccNSO (ICANN 1999d). In fact, perhaps due to the China’s 2001 GAC withdrawal, the CNNIC did not formally join the ccNSO until 2008 (ICANN 2008e). Until ICANN 18, civil society participation is only recorded at ICANN 6, 10 and 11 in general session attendance records. The first active civil society participation was at ICANN 10, where a CNNIC representative was recorded engaging in policy discussion at an ICANN Public Forum (ICANN 2001h). Increased civil society participation from ICANN 18 onwards is due in part to the election of Qian Hualin, a CNNIC-affiliated computer scientist, to the ICANN Board earlier in 2003 (ICANN 2014c). From this meeting until ICANN 27, when he left the Board, Qian participated in a many sessions at ICANN meetings, most were Board meetings and all dealt with internal ICANN governance or technical issues. Aside from Qian's participation, a small number of CNNIC and Chinese ALS representatives engaged in consistent participation in sessions at ICANN meetings until roughly ICANN 35. Some of the Chinese civil society actors that began to consistently participate in ICANN meeting sessions around 2003 are quite prominent (see Appendix 3). The academic Xue Hong, for example, a prominent participant in the ALAC and across ICANN's subsidiary bodies in general, has a sustained level of participation at ICANN meetings. Zhang Jian, initially a CNNIC employee who has had a number of roles at ICANN and in the APTLD, is another. Likewise, Li Xiaodong, a CEO of the CNNIC, has a sustained level of involvement in ICANN meetings as have a few other prominent CNNIC representatives. ICANN 35 in 2009 saw another slight increase in the depth of Chinese civil society participation in ICANN meetings, and following ICANN 45 in 2012 a larger and sustained increase in this depth occurred. The vast majority of Chinese civil society participation in ICANN meetings is oriented towards discussion of technical policy issues, however. In a few instances, Chinese civil society actors have commented on internal governance within ICANN. For example, Xue Hong has commented on ALAC governance processes or APRALO election procedures at ICANN 37 and 38 respectively, and Zhang Jian has discussed the relationship between the ccNSO and the GAC at ICANN 41. This direct engagement with ICANN's internal governance structure indicates a substantial degree of acceptance by Chinese civil society of the privatized governance and multi-stakeholder governance norms. Similarly, in other instances Chinese civil society actors have discussed domestic Chinese internet governance or compared it to global practices. For example, at ICANN 43 Xiadong Lee discussed China's real name .cn registration system, and Xue Hong discussed the Chinese government's role in .cn domain governance. Such statements are generally designed to inform the transnational community about China's practices, and rarely critique them beyond noting differences in government’s role in domestic internet governance, such as between the US and China.

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While implicit Chinese civil society attitudes towards privatized governance and multi-stakeholder governance can be observed through their general participation in ICANN meetings, a few comments by Chinese civil society representatives do directly related to these norms. Generally, these comments are directed at multi-stakeholder governance and expanding stakeholder participation from the developing world. There are no statements by Chinese civil society actors at ICANN meetings that indicate opposition to multi-stakeholder governance, and only a few directly supporting it. At ICANN 44, Xue Hong commented on the limits of multi-stakeholder governance approaches – although other statements by her at ICANN 49 and 50 indicate a high level of support for the multi-stakeholder governance norm. Similarly, at ICANN 45 a CONAC representative stated that advancing multi-stakeholder governance in China was their responsibility. At a meeting on the IANA transition during ICANN 49, the CNNIC CEO, Li Xiaodong, commented in support of multi-stakeholder governance and greater developing world participation in ICANN. Only a few comments by Chinese civil society actors directly touch upon the US authority or privatized governance norms. Zhang Jian at ICANN 41 stated that the GAC had no authority over the ccNSO, clearly acknowledging the authority of non-state actors. However no comments have clearly expressed any preferences on these norms. For example, at ICANN 49 Xue Hong commented on the need for ICANN to expand its multi-stakeholder character by engaging governments and the developing world more, while at ICANN 50 she discussed accountability for ICANN and stressed that she and the other panelists in the session were not pushing for an 'ITU-like' body. Chinese civil society actors are also clearly aware of the US government's relationship with ICANN, but have not directly expressed any preferences towards that relationship at ICANN meetings. This was indicated by a comment at ICANN 51 by a Chinese member of ICANN's coordination group for the IANA transition, which stressed the need for ICANN to adopt a multi-stakeholder process, and querying what would happen if the US government refused ICANN's proposal. Beyond ICANN meetings and related activity, there has been a substantial level of Chinese civil society engagement with the ICANN Board, bureaucracy and subsidiary organizations. Both the CNNIC and CONAC are ICANN-accredited IDN registries (ICANN 2015ao). The CNNIC has also been delegated China's IDN ccTLD by ICANN (ICANN 2015ak). Qian Hualin from the CNNIC, has been the only Chinese ICANN Board member, serving from June 2003 until December 2006 (ICANN 2014c). Li Xiaodong, also from the CNNIC, served briefly as ICANN’s Vice President for the Asian region (ICANN 2011t). Chinese civil society representatives have also been members of ICANN's executive task forces: Qian Hualin from the CNNIC was the chair of the President's Advisory Committee on IDNs, and academic Xue Hong was a member of the committee from 2005 to 2010 (ICANN 2010s). Hu Qiheng from the CNNIC was a member of an IDN Committee which operated in 2002 (ICANN 2015am). Two Chinese civil society representatives – Xue Hong and Zhang Jian – have been ICANN Nominating Committee members in 2009 and 2010, and in 2012 and 2013, respectively (ICANN 2008a, 2010a, 2012a, 2013a).

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There aren't direct records of past ASO membership, but available information indicates that Wu Jianping from Tsinghua University was a member of the ASO Advisory Committee from 1999 to 2001 (CNNIC 2003c; Tsinghua University 2006); minutes from ASO meetings also confirm this (ICANN 2000a, 2000b, 2000c, 2000d, 2001a, 2001b, 2001c, 2001d, 2001e). Mao Wei, a Chinese academic, also appears to have been a member of the ASO Advisory Committee in 2006, as ASO meeting minutes confirm (ICANN 2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2006d, 2006e, 2006f, 2006g, 2006h, 2006i, 2006j, 2006k, 2006l). Given the NRO has the same membership as the ASO, both of these actors have thus been members of the NRO (NRO 2015). The ccNSO was formed in 2004 but, as noted, the CNNIC did not join it until 2008 – shortly before the Chinese government returned to the GAC (ICANN 2008e). That said, China has been quite active in the ccNSO since it joined. One ccNSO Council meeting was held in Beijing in 2013 (ICANN 2015f). Chinese civil society representatives have been ccNSO members from 2008 onward; Zhang Jian and Xue Hong were ccNSO members from 2008 through to 2010, and 2011 to 2014, respectively (ICANN 2015l). One CNNIC representative is part of a current ccNSO working group on the IANA transition (ICANN 2015ac), while a range of Chinese civil society actors have been part of past ccNSO working groups, predominantly from the CNNIC but also Chinese employees of ICANN itself or of the APTLD (ICANN 2015c, 2015d, 2015e, 2015g, 2015h, 2015i, 2015j, 2015k). China has been an active member in the APTLD. The CNNIC is a member, but it is unclear when it joined (APTLD 2015d). One CNNIC representative is a Vice-Chair of the APTLD (APTLD 2015b). Another CNNIC representative, Zhang Jian, served as APTLD General Manager from May 2010 to the end of 2013 and yet another, Qian Hualin, was APTLD Board Chair from July 2000 to mid-2001 (see Appendix 4; InternetNZ 2010). Chinese civil society representatives have also been active in APTLD working groups (APTLD 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2013d). APTLD meetings have been held in China on three occasions: Shanghai in 2002, Beijing in 2009, and Xian in 2013 (APTLD 2015c). APTLD meeting records indicate that Chinese civil society has participated since close to APTLD’s establishment, but have become much more active since the end of 2007 (Appendix 4). With the exception of the attendance of one government representative and two private sector representatives at separate APTLD meetings, all participation in APTLD has been from Chinese civil society. This is illustrated in Figure 14, below. Similarly, sponsorship and hosting of APTLD meetings appears to have been only been provided by the CNNIC (Appendix 4).

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Figure 14: Chinese Attendance at APTLD Meetings by Stakeholder Group

1998 - 2014

Source: Author’s Own Research (Appendix 4) Six Chinese civil society-affiliated individuals have registered for GNSO administrative positions or working group membership – four from CONAC, one from the CNNIC, and one from Beijing Normal University (ICANN 2015v, 2015w, 2015x, 2015y, 2015z, 2015aa). A CONAC representative is a member of a GNSO working group on policy-making metrics (ICANN 2014e). Another CONAC representative is a member of a working group on translation issues (ICANN 2014l). A CNNIC member was a member of a past working group on intellectual property issues (ICANN 2013u). An ICANN-employed Chinese individual was also a member of a registration abuse policy working group (ICANN 2015s). Within the GNSO's sub-groups, CONAC is an observer member of the Registries Stakeholder Group (gTLD Registries Stakeholder Group 2015b). Two CONAC representatives are members of this Group's accountability working group (gTLD Registries Stakeholder Group 2015a). Chinese civil society has been active within the ALAC, although there have been no Chinese chairs of the ALAC (ICANN 2015m). There are two Chinese ALSes, the Chinese Domain Name Users Alliance (CDNUA) and At-Large@China (ICANN 2010c). At-Large@China was a founding member of APRALO, the ALAC's Asia-Pacific branch (ICANN 2015b). APRALO has held at least one meeting in China, during ICANN 46 (ICANN 2013e). Overall, Chinese activity within the ALAC appears to be dominated by one prominent individual, Xue Hong. She was a founding member of the ALAC and has since held a range of positions within it, including as a member of the ALAC itself, as the ALAC's IDN liaison, and as a member of the ALAC Board’s selection committee (ICANN 2011k, 2015n). Xue Hong has also been an interim chair of APRALO in 2010, and then a full Chair of that body in 2011 and 2012 (ICANN 2011a, 2014cg). She has also been active in a range of ALAC working groups (ICANN 2011b, 2011e, 2013c, 2014b, 2015a).

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There are no Chinese members of the RSSAC, but both a CONAC and CNNIC representative each joined the RSSAC Caucus – a body working on root server policy – when it was formed in 2014 (ICANN 2015ap). There is one Chinese member of the SSAC, Li Xiaodong, but no indication of how long he has been a member (ICANN 2015aq). Existing records only cover recent years, but it appears there have been no Chinese TLG members (ICANN 2015aj). The extensive participation of Chinese civil society actors within ICANN's bureaucracy and policy development activities illustrates a high level of acceptance amongst Chinese civil society of non-state actor authority and multi-stakeholder governance. These actors have assumed active roles in ICANN's bureaucracy, from the Board level down to policy development roles in sub-groups within subsidiary organizations such as the GNSO, which suggests a genuine willingness amongst Chinese civil society actors to assume authority over internet governance, and active conformity to the privatized governance norm. Similarly, the sustained involvement of Chinese civil society actors in ICANN and across various different bodies within it, as well as the support stated for multi-stakeholder governance at ICANN meetings, suggests genuine agreement with the multi-stakeholder governance norm, and substantial internalization of the norm. Chinese civil society statements and behavior within ICANN do not touch directly upon the US authority norm, however. Indirectly, the willingness of these actors to engage in ICANN despite its subordination to the US government implies a certain degree of conformity to the US authority norm, but gives no indication of whether Chinese civil society genuinely accepts it or opposes it. Likewise, Chinese civil society activity within ICANN does not provide any indication of how the state authority norm is viewed.

v. APNIC Chinese engagement with APNIC deserves special mention because this organization is a central element of the IPS in China’s region, and China has an extensive history of engagement with it – including prior to its formal incorporation in 1995. The Chinese State Information Center, five private sector actors, and two civil society organizations were founding members of APNIC (APNIC 2012b). Li Xing, from the China Education and Research Network (CERNET), attended the first ever APNIC conference and is noted as having “made significant contributions to APNIC's formation and establishment” (InternetHistory.asia 2014). As an RIR, APNIC existed prior to ICANN’s establishment, and like the IETF has subsequently been incorporated into its governance structure. That Chinese actors, across all stakeholder groups, were founding members of the organization illustrates the length of Chinese engagement with privatized and multi-stakeholder governance within internet governance. Chinese engagement with APNIC has remained significant throughout its history, and this long-standing and increasing participation in APNIC’s activities suggests a high level of acceptance of – and conformity to – the privatized governance and multi-stakeholder governance norms, including, arguably, substantial internalization of their appropriateness. There are approximately 70 Chinese members of APNIC (APNIC 2014s). Of these, only one is a state actor (the State Information Center), while there are four

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civil society members – the CNNIC, CONAC, CERNET and the CERNET Center – and 65 private sector actors. However, while private sector actors dominate China’s share of APNIC membership, civil society representatives are far more active within APNIC. Civil society representatives have been active members of APNIC’s Executive Council for each year of its existence – save for the first year, 1996. Li Xing from CERNET served from 1997 to 2002, Qian Hualin from the CNNIC from 2001 to 2006, Mao Wei from the CNNIC from 2007 to 2008, and Zhang Jian from the CNNIC from 2009 to 2010 (APNIC 2014q). Currently, Ma Yan from the Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, and Zhao Wei from the CNNIC serve on the Executive Council. Ma Yan was elected in 2003, and his current term expires in 2016. Zhao Wei was elected in 2011 and her term ends in 2015 (APNIC 2014p). Similarly, all Chinese contributors to APNIC policy proposals are associated with civil society, save for three individuals of unknown stakeholder affiliation. Nine policy proposals in total have been put forth by Chinese authors: four have been successfully adopted (APNIC 2010j, 2010m, 2011n, 2011o); and five have been rejected (APNIC 2010k, 2010l, 2010n, 2011m, 2012s). Two Chinese citizens are employed by APNIC directly, but APNIC provides no historical staff records (APNIC 2014a). One staff member, Pan Guangliang, has been particularly active in APNIC's technical education and outreach program. He has given presentations on APNIC's behalf on multiple occasions (APNIC 2004g, 2006j, 2006k, 2007k, 2007m, 2007n, 2008f, 2010i, 2013t). APNIC also hosts or attends technical Internet-related meetings as a form of outreach and education. APNIC's Global IPv6 Summits, held from 2000 until 2011, occurred in China each year from 2002 through to 2009 (APNIC 2014r). APNIC has also given presentations in internet governance-related meetings in Beijing 2002 and 2006, in Shanghai in 2004, Xinxiang in 2010, Xian in 2013 and Yangzhou in 2014 (APNIC 2014t, 2014u, 2014v). Evidence of Chinese engagement with APNIC is also available from APNIC’s membership surveys, which are conducted roughly every second year. No details of Chinese engagement were provided in the inaugural member survey in 1999, but the second survey noted that Chinese APNIC members were highly positive of government involvement in internet development (APNIC 2001c, p. 19). Most information in the surveys relates to technical matters, and does not touch upon core internet governance norms, however. The percentage of Chinese respondents in APNIC surveys has gradually risen from an outlier 23.1% in 2001, with a gradual increase from 1.2% in 2004, to 2.2% in 2007, 3.3% in 2009, 6.5% in 2011 to constituting the largest respondent group with 30.8% in 2012 (APNIC 2001c, p. 7; 2004f, p. 4; 2007l, p. 12; 2009m, p. 19; 2011l, p. 25; 2012r, p. 7). The 2014 survey report did not provide these statistics, but noted that responses from Chinese individuals had declined substantially, with 250 fewer responses (APNIC 2014n). The most detail about Chinese engagement with APNIC is available from APNIC’s general conferences. However, like ICANN, APNIC's archive is incomplete. It begins with APNIC 8, held in 1999, but the recording of attendance at APNIC conferences is intermittent (Appendix 5). That said, Chinese attendance at APNIC conferences has gradually increased and, like ICANN meetings, has

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spiked when APNIC conferences have been held in China itself (Appendix 5). This is graphically illustrated in Figures 15 and 16, below. Transcript recordings of APNIC conferences did not commence until APNIC 16, although some inconsistent records are provided from APNIC 9 until 16. APNIC conferences have been held in China twice, with APNIC 28 held in Beijing in 2009 and APNIC 36 held in Xian in 2013 (APNIC 2014l).

Figure 15: Total Chinese Attendance at APNIC Conferences 1999 - 2014

Source: Author’s Own Research (Appendix 5)

Figure 16: Chinese Attendance at APNIC Conferences by Stakeholder Group 1999 - 2014

Source: Author’s Own Research (Appendix 5)

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While the Chinese government was a founding member of APNIC, it has not been an active participant in APNIC conferences, with Beijing’s representatives only clearly recorded as attending three (Appendix 5). Similarly, only three statements by Chinese government representatives are recorded in APNIC conferences, and two of these are from a Chinese ITU official, rather than a direct government employee; as illustrated in Figure 17 below (see also Appendix 5). The first recorded attendance was at APNIC 28 in 2010, as was the first recorded comment by a Chinese government representative. At this conference an MIIT representative stated at a plenary meeting on the Internet in China that he welcomed all stakeholder involvement in internet governance (APNIC 2009j). At APNIC 29 a Chinese ITU official commented on an ITU proposal for IP addresses to be allocated on country basis rather than through the usual process (APNIC 2010b). The same ITU official discussed the ITU’s relationship with APNIC and other internet governance organizations at APNIC 38, where he noted that the ITU was not trying to take over the internet and noted the value of multi-stakeholder governance (APNIC 2014g, 2014i). Although minimally engaged, the willingness of Beijing to accept non-state actor authority in APNIC suggests is it more concerned with this norm at higher levels of authority than at the regional level, and the Chinese government participation in APNIC conferences also indicates acceptance of multi-stakeholder governance. Figure 17: Active Chinese Participation at APNIC Conferences by Stakeholder

Group 1999 - 2014

Source: Author’s Own Research (Appendix 5)4 Despite vastly outnumbering other stakeholder groups in total membership, the Chinese private sector has not been particularly active at APNIC conferences, as Figure 17 above demonstrates. Available records do suggest, however, that private sector representatives have consistently attended APNIC meetings in relatively small numbers (Appendix 5). Chinese corporations have also sponsored

4 Note that ‘active participation’, for the purpose of Figure 17, refers to: recorded attendance at – or the chairing of - specific sessions at APNIC conferences, presentations given by Chinese actors, and comments made at specific sessions by Chinese actors.

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a few APNIC meetings (Appendix 5). China Mobile sponsored APNIC 10, China Telecom sponsored APNIC 11 and 14, while China Netcom sponsored APNIC 18. APNIC 28, held in Beijing, was sponsored by China Mobile, China Telecom, China Unicom, ChinaMotion Telecom, Shocom, the Great Wall Broadband Network and BJEnet. No further private sector sponsorship then occurs until the next APNIC conference held in China, APNIC 36 in Xi’an, where the Beijing Internet Institute was a co-host, while China Mobile, China Unicom and China Telecom were sponsors. Two Chinese companies, the China ISP Union and 21Vianet, sponsored APNIC 38. Chinese private sector representatives have not made any comments at APNIC conferences that relate to core internet governance norms (see Appendix 5). Relative to other stakeholders, Chinese civil society has been very active in APNIC meetings, with available records indicating consistent attendance in small numbers but relative active participation in conference sessions (Appendix 5). The CNNIC has been an active sponsor and host of APNIC conferences (Appendix 5), sponsoring APNIC 10, 12, 15 and, from APNIC 18 onwards, consistently sponsoring every APNIC conference save for APNIC 22, 25 and 28. While not sponsoring APNIC 28, the CNNIC was its host and was also co-host of APNIC 36. At APNIC conferences, a few specific civil society-affiliated individuals have been particularly active. Li Xing from CERNET was very active in APNIC’s earlier days, Pan Guangliang from APNIC has also been very active since 2004. Beyond these two, both Li Xiaodong and Zhao Wei from the CNNIC have been active in recent meetings. The first recorded Chinese civil society participation in APNIC conferences was at APNIC 9 in 2000, where Li Xing gave a presentation on the IPS in China (APNIC 2000b). APNIC conferences then record consistent but low levels participation on technical discussions by Li Xing and intermittent participation by other Chinese civil society actors until APNIC 16 in 2003 – when transcripts begin to be provided in APNIC's archives. After APNIC 16 the depth of Chinese civil society participation in APNIC conference activity gradually increases, with the CNNIC in particular becoming progressively more active. The vast majority of Chinese civil society participation does not directly touch upon core internet governance norms, instead focused on technical issues. Only two comments directly touch upon these norms. At APNIC 21, Qian Hualin commented on Chinese IDNs being outside the global root, stressing that this was not an attempt to create an alternative root but simply to provide IDN service to China. By stating this, Qian acknowledges China’s ongoing conformity to the US authority norm and the privatized governance norm. At APNIC 28, Li Xiaodong gave a presentation on the benefits of multi-stakeholder governance in the IGF, illustrating support for this governance. Overall, the sustained participation of Chinese civil society actors in APNIC conference activity, and the leadership positions taken by some, suggest a high level of acceptance and support for both non-state actor authority and multi-stakeholder governance within APNIC.

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8. Chinese Engagement with Policy Organizations

China’s engagement with administrative organizations provides considerable insight into China’s relationship with core internet governance norms, but it occurs directly in the course of the internet’s administration and addresses specific policies. As a result, Chinese actors’ statements aren’t always self-consciously related to the appropriateness of internet governance norms or focused on consideration of how the regime, overall, should evolve. Discussion within policy organizations, however, is more focused on these issues, and thus this chapter analyses Chinese government, private sector and civil society engagement with those that are the most significant for internet governance. It first considers China’s involvement in the WSIS, followed by Chinese participation in the IGF, and finally concludes with analysis of Chinese engagement with internet-governance related activity in the UN, ITU and in the NETMundial meeting. As with the previous chapter, it aims to provide a loosely chronological account but, due to the regime’s fragmented nature, continuity is not maintained across analysis of different organizations.

a. The WSIS The WSIS, as noted in chapter 4, was a global, UN-sponsored process of two formal Summits considering the implications of the emerging information society. It was proposed by the ITU shortly after ICANN’s formation, but wasn’t exclusively focused on internet governance (ITU 1998b). However, the WSIS’ agenda clearly indicated that internet governance was a key factor contributing to its occurrence (ITU 1998a; WSIS 2005b). The WSIS is widely viewed as the first international attempt to reform the internet governance regime, following the failure of the IAHC to prevent the US government’s consolidation of power over the internet (Collins 2007; Mueller 2004, ch. 7; Rogers 2007). The Chinese government's support for the establishment of WSIS at the ITU and in the UNGA constitute its earliest moves to reform the internet governance regime (UNGA 2001, 2002). The language of the ITU’s WSIS proposal does not specifically call for it to be a multi-stakeholder process, but it does call for the inclusion of all partners and consideration of appropriate roles for various partners (ITU 1998a, 1998b). Given the ITU has always involved non-state actors in an advisory capacity, Beijing’s support for the WSIS proposal indicates at least some tacit support for multi-stakeholder governance. A stronger indication of Chinese support for multi-stakeholder governance comes from the UNGA resolution endorsing the creation of the WSIS, which explicitly stated that the UN “encourages other intergovernmental organizations, including international and regional institutions, non-governmental organizations, civil society and the private sector to contribute to, and actively participate in, the intergovernmental preparatory process of the Summit and the Summit itself.” (UNGA 2002, cl. 5). Such a statement clearly reflects a diplomatic balancing act, but it does support the appropriateness of multi-stakeholder governance and indicates acceptance of this norm by those that acquiesced to its passage, including China. However, the WSIS’ form of multi-stakeholder governance more closely resembled traditional state-centric approaches that relegated non-

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state actors to peripheral roles (Hintz 2007, p. 251; Kummer 2007, p. 6). Indicative of the Chinese government’s qualified acceptance of this form of multi-stakeholder governance, it requested during both WSIS Summits that non-state actors be excluded from working groups considering policy (Collins 2007, p. 23, 24). In the first phase of the WSIS, the Chinese government attended all Preparatory Committees, the Asia-Pacific regional preparatory conference, and the actual Summit itself – sending 17 delegates (ITU 2004). Beijing was not yet focused on internet governance in this first phase, however. The Chinese government had two contributions to the first preparatory committee, in the form of two letters – one sent by Brunei on behalf of the ‘Group of 77 and China’, the other sent by the Chinese delegation’s head (ITU 2002a, 2002b). Both focused on developing state needs in the information society, but China’s own letter did comment on the WSIS’ multi-stakeholder character, also indicating its resistance to non-state actor authority. It stated that: “the private sector and the civil society do make a difference in the development of the information society. Their participation and inputs are important for both the preparatory work and the Summit itself. However, it should be also noted that since policy directions and goals for global information society development will be defined during the Summit, governments obviously should play the leading role in the preparatory process” (ITU 2002a, p. 4). Aside from these letters, the Chinese government’s remaining contributions to this preparatory process was a statement on the need for public-private partnerships in infrastructure development, and two amendments to human rights-related proposals (ITU 2003b, 2003c, 2003d). At the Asia-Pacific regional preparatory conference, the media reported that the Chinese government demanded the expulsion of Taiwanese non-state actors, but this was likely due to Beijing’s desire to avoid international legal personality accruing to Taiwan, rather than opposition to non-state actor involvement in the WSIS itself (ICANN 2008d; ITWorld.com 2003). At the actual Summit, the Chinese government only made a statement in the first plenary session, where a Minister of the (now) MIIT stated the private sector and civil society should strengthen cooperation in the development of the information society, but specifically noted that inter-governmental organizations should be more involved in internet governance (ITU 2003a). The first WSIS Summit resulted in a ‘Declaration of Principles’, an international agreement on the basic principles guiding development of the information society, which devoted three specific clauses to internet governance. These clauses reflect diplomatic compromise on beliefs about internet governance and thus are vague, aspirational and partially contradictory. This is most evident in parts relevant to both the privatized governance and state authority norms, where the text can be read as providing support for both norms, to some extent – depending on what the terms ‘internet-related’, ‘public policy’ and ‘technical issues’ mean. They state that (WSIS 2003, cl. 48, 49): “The international management of the Internet should be multilateral, transparent and democratic, with the full involvement of governments, the private sector, civil society and international organizations”. They then state that internet governance

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“encompasses both technical and public policy issues and should involve all stakeholders”, and that “Policy authority for Internet-related public policy issues is the sovereign right of States”, but the “private sector has had and should continue to have an important role in the development of the Internet, both in the technical and economic fields”, and that “International organizations … should continue to have an important role in the development of Internet-related technical standards.” These clauses are much clearer on the US authority and multi-stakeholder governance norms. While US government authority isn’t directly mentioned, the text does clearly support equal state authority over internet governance when it notes that governance should be multilateral, and include full involvement of governments. They are also clearly supportive of multi-stakeholder governance, with the roles of five stakeholders explicitly recognized, including those of states, the private sector and international organizations noted above, but also recognizing that (WSIS 2003, cl. 49): “Civil society has also played an important role on Internet matters, especially at community level, and should continue to play such a role”, and “Intergovernmental organizations have had and should continue to have a facilitating role in the coordination of Internet-related public policy issues”. Overall, because it reflects diplomatic compromise, Beijing’s status as a signatory to the Declaration of Principles only clearly indicates that it is supportive of multi-stakeholder governance itself and for the state authority norm to replace US government authority. Following this first WSIS Summit, characterized by Beijing's relatively cautious criticism of internet governance, the Chinese government became much more vocal in voicing opposition to both the US authority and privatized governance norms, and in stating its support for the state authority norm. In the WGIG, which occurred between the first and second WSIS Summits, the Chinese governmental delegation clearly asserted its preferences, arguing that the US government should not have unilateral authority over the technical internet, and that ICANN should not have penultimate authority over the IPS and DNS but rather be subordinate to intergovernmental authority. Initially, Chinese government statements at the WGIG simply referred to the need for greater intergovernmental authority in this area and the lack of any existing legitimate governance entity. However, eventually the Chinese government delegation flatly asserted the injustice of one country having authority over internet governance, but did not mention the US by name, even though it eventually named ICANN as a target of its criticism. The first statement of the Chinese delegation to the WGIG was provided in a preliminary consultation on the WGIG’s establishment. It noted several times that states should hold the leadership position within internet governance, and tacitly disputed the US government’s and ICANN's authority, commenting that “the current biggest problem facing Internet is the absence of legitimate entity of the international Internet governance” (WGIG 2004b). Subsequently, in comments on draft working papers for the WGIG, the Chinese delegation reiterated its desire for the WGIG to focus on internet governance reform by empowering governments and intergovernmental organizations, noting that “WGIG’s mission is to promote the equal participation rights of all the sovereign governments in the

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decision-making process regarding the Internet public policies” (WGIG 2005a). As this illustrates, Chinese government statements were initially oblique in their criticism of US government and non-state actor authority, if not in the advocacy for the state authority norm. This remained the case for the second meeting of the WGIG. In this meeting, the Chinese government’s WSIS delegation head, Ambassador Sha Zukang, reiterated China’s desire for governments to lead in internet governance policy-setting, but also noted that the private sector and civil society had “positive roles to play in the development of the Internet” (WGIG 2005d). Comments by the Chinese government delegate at WGIG's third meeting, however, were much more forceful with respect to the US authority and privatized governance norms, arguing that “the position and role of governments have been ignored even in the danger of being marginalized, rather than being strengthened ... China believes the current Internet governance situation is dominated by the private sector and a single country. This is unjust and harmful to the long-term development of Internet … China opposes the view that a single-party stakeholder dominates internet governance while excluding others … China also opposes the viewpoint that the roles of different stakeholders should not be differentiated, but mixed together” (WGIG 2005c). This delegate’s contribution went on to propose an intergovernmental organization under the UN to replace existing arrangements, strongly criticized privatized governance in the internet governance regime, and rejected the concept of ‘trilateralism’ – being the equal sharing of power between governments, the private sector and civil society (Collins 2007). The Chinese government’s statement at the third WGIG meeting clearly indicates opposition to both US government authority – the ‘single country’ – and to privatized governance, while also advocating for the state authority norm to replace these norms. It also touched upon multi-stakeholder governance, however, expressing support for it: “We believe that it [internet governance] should be multi – should have multiple participation. It should – the governments of sovereign states representing common interests of stakeholders, including private sector, civil society and mass Internet users should play a leader role in global Internet-policy making, while private sector, civil society and other stakeholders will continue to play an active and promoting role in this process” (WGIG 2005c). The statement went on to argue that existing private sector and civil society actors involved in internet governance are drawn heavily from developed states, and thus developing states are at a disadvantage. In the WGIG's fourth substantive meeting, the Chinese delegation again criticized the US government's and ICANN's role in internet governance, mentioning ICANN this time by name, and providing a more detailed explanation of its internet governance reform proposal that would see ICANN's authority transferred to an UN-supervised intergovernmental organization. The statement indicated support for multi-stakeholder governance. The statement also included a proposal that the (then) proposed IGF be supplemented with a separate intergovernmental body authoritatively addressing internet governance reform (WGIG 2005b). The element of the Chinese delegation's statement relevant to the regime's core norms is:

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“to the situation where Internet resources now is managed by one government, in future it should be jointly managed by all governments in terms of its public policy. We suggest that the Working Group consider the establishment under the U.N framework, new specialized intergovernmental lightweight Internet resources policy management agency as highest level of decision-making body of Internet resources. It should have three functions: policy management, supervision and authorization, and international coordination. On the composition of such an agency, each state should, based on its own condition, designate a stakeholder as its representative; however, in decision-making, each state should have one vote. Private sector and the civil society and other stakeholders could widely participate in the discussion and express their advisory role. However, based on the above-mentioned principle of division of labor by different stakeholders, they should have no decision-making power and right to vote on public policy issues. Secondly, the supervision and authorization by ICANN should be transferred to this agency. The specific operation of Internet resources, in principle, could be mandated to ICANN; however, ICANN should be supervised and managed by the agency under the United Nations, the relevant public policy issues should be approved by this agency” (WGIG 2005b).

A final WGIG meeting occurred in which its formal report was presented to the WSIS, but it included no further Chinese government statements. When WGIG completed its deliberations it produced a report with four separate recommendations for reforming the internet governance regime (WGIG 2005f, pp. 13-6). In addition, a separate book was produced from submissions by WGIG members, and the Chinese delegation head, Hu Qiheng, wrote an essay outlining her position that, of the four reform options, Model One headed by a ‘Global Internet council’ was the most appropriate (Hu 2005, pp. 200-1). It is reproduced below in Figure 18. This option most closely resembled the Chinese proposal during the WGIG, and it is provided below. Hu argued that this model – situating an inter-governmental body above ICANN – was necessary and just, allowing extensive participation by non-state actors in internet governance, and being unlikely to damage the existing benefits of ICANN’s multi-stakeholder governance model (Hu 2005, pp. 187-92).

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Figure 18: Model One Of the WGIG’s Four Proposed Reforms

Source: WGIG (2005f, p. 13) Hu's essay also makes a series of further comments with respect to multi-stakeholder governance and non-state actor authority. Firstly, she notes that the original and current multi-stakeholder character of the regime “is the most valuable ‘Internet Culture’ that provides an encouraging and stimulating environment for the fostering of innovation in technology and business and further serves as the essential source of the dramatic development of the worldwide Internet” (Hu 2005, p. 186). Hu went on to state, however, that the regime’s current privatized governance model disadvantages developing states and governments generally, while also causing suspicion that policies are made primarily to benefit the private sector. Hu argued in favor of multi-stakeholder governance, but argued that governments are the most legitimate authorities for internet governance. Her essay represented her beliefs regarding internet governance reform, but given her position as head of the Chinese government’s WGIG delegation, it seems reasonable to conclude that Beijing’s policy is similar to that of Hu’s own personal views – particularly given Chinese government statements in the WSIS and WGIG largely conform to her viewpoint.

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In the second WSIS Summit, the Chinese governmental delegation was much less active, although the delegation itself was much larger at 59 delegates in total (ITU 2005b). The Chinese government refrained from repeating its more forceful WGIG position, with only a single statement provided at the second preparatory committee, advocating intergovernmental authority over the technical internet and pointing out the injustice of internet governance being “monopolized by one state” (WGIG 2005d). A Chinese official also made a wide-ranging but uncontroversial statement at the actual Summit touching upon the digital divide, international cooperation, respect for different cultures and strengthening internet security (ITU 2005c). The second WSIS Summit concluded with agreement on the ‘Tunis Agenda on the Information Society’, which devoted almost a third of its contents to internet governance, technical and non-technical (WSIS 2005b, pp. 6-12). The internet governance section summarized existing information from the Declaration of Principles and the WGIG report, but it also included further substantive statements related to core internet governance norms, which:

State that internet governance should be multi-stakeholder at all levels where possible.

Call for all stakeholders to have the opportunity to participate in policy decision-making related to internet governance.

Acknowledge that the internet has thus far been successfully run by a private sector-led governance system.

State that no country should be involved in decisions about another country’s ccTLD. Call for all governments to have an equal role and responsibility for internet governance.

State that governments do not need to be involved in technical matters that do not impact upon international public policy issues (WSIS 2005b, cl. 37, 52, 55, 63, 68, 69).

As a signatory to this international agreement, China can be taken to have agreed to the Tunis Agenda’s provisions. This indicates Chinese acceptance of multi-stakeholder governance, as this is not a controversy in the Tunis Agenda, and Chinese opposition to US government authority, as neither is this controversial. However, the Tunis Agenda is vague in its significance for the privatized governance and state authority norms, with its meaning dependent on how ‘technical matters’, ‘equal role and responsibility’, and ‘international public policy issues’ are defined, which means it is not particularly useful in identifying Chinese government policy towards these norms. The Chinese private sector and civil society were also involved in the WSIS process, although not nearly as prominently as the government. Only one Chinese corporation, Huawei, attended the first Summit, but four attended the second and two – Huawei and ZTE – attended in large numbers (ITU 2004, 2005b). These two Chinese companies were major sponsors for the second Summit, and the ZTE President, at least, was engaged in discussion of the digital divide at the Summit (Huawei 2005; ITU 2005d; MacKinnon 2005; ZTE 2006). Chinese civil society organizations were also present at both Summits, with at least four attending in Geneva, and at least five attending in Tunis (ITU 2004, 2005b). Of these, the ISC was the most high profile, with a representative contributing to policy debate at the first WGIG meeting, arguing in favor of greater government authority over

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IPS and DNS governance and, interestingly, over internet standards as well (WGIG 2004a, 2005e). In the third WGIG meeting, an ISC representative also supported stronger governance authority in internet governance (WGIG 2005c). These are notable as the first recorded comment by a Chinese non-state actor in support of the state authority norm in any of the regime’s administrative or policy organizations. Chinese non-state actors’ general involvement in the WSIS is also significant because it indicates the support of these actors for multi-stakeholder governance. After the initial WSIS Summits concluded, an annual WSIS Forum was established to follow up on the WSIS’ work. Their records are somewhat opaque, particularly for the years 2006 to 2008, when no outcome document was produced and no other documents provided sufficient detail for substantive analysis. However, participation records are partially available for the 2006 Forum and indicate no Chinese involvement, but no such records exist for the next two years (WSIS 2013a, 2013c). The 2009 records are more detailed, but they similarly do not indicate Chinese engagement or lack thereof (WSIS 2009). The 2010, 2011 and 2012 records all indicate that the MIIT and China's permanent UN mission participated in these Forums (WSIS 2010; 2011, p. iv; 2012, pp. x, xvi). They also indicate that Chinese non-state actors were not involved in 2010 and 2011, but that the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) attended the 2012 Forum (WSIS 2012, p. xxxii). Two government representatives, one from the MIIT and one Chinese UN official, attended the 2013 WSIS Forum. Two civil society representatives also attended, one from the CNNIC and another from the Guangdong Academy of Social Sciences (WSIS 2013b, pp. xv, xxxii). None of the records for these WSIS Forums indicate what, if any, substantive comments the Chinese participants made. The 2014 WSIS Forum was attended by Chinese government representatives from the MIIT, in UN and World Economic Forum capacities, and from the Chinese Bureau of Statistics (WSIS 2014a; 2014c, p. 5) (WSIS 2014c, p. 180). An MIIT Vice-President is recorded as giving a speech, but it did not relate to internet governance (WSIS 2014a). One Chinese private sector actor participated in this forum but didn’t comment on internet governance (WSIS 2014b). Chinese civil society was represented at the 2014 Forum by the CNNIC, which organized a workshop on ICT capacity building (WSIS 2014c, p. 130, 133). The WSIS Forums are not strictly related to internet governance, although they do consider the issue in small part. Chinese participation in the WSIS Forums does indicate Chinese acceptance of multi-stakeholder governance, but otherwise doesn’t reflect on other core internet governance norms.

b. The IGF At the end of the WSIS, participants (including China) agreed to continue internet governance discussion within a newly created Internet Governance Forum (IGF 2012b). This has been held annually since 2006 (UNGA 2011a, para. 17). Like WSIS, the IGF is explicitly a multi-stakeholder forum (see generally: IGF 2012d; IGF 2012l; Malcolm 2008, ch. 5). A Secretariat administers the Forum and initially decided upon its internal structure. Generally, however, the IGF’s substantive agenda is decided upon by the MAG – comprised of 40 to 60

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representatives, with half from government, and a quarter each from the private sector and civil society. The MAG, and Secretariat, manage the IGF’s preparatory process and organizes the annual IGF itself. The preparatory process is structured around a period of open consultations, followed by MAG meetings, along with regional IGF meetings and further preparatory meetings. During the preparatory process, the IGF’s annual agenda is determined. The annual Forum itself is open to all stakeholders, and includes main sessions organized around annual primary themes, along with a range of workshops, ‘Dynamic Coalitions’ and other events. China has been actively engaged in the IGF, both in terms of attendance at the annual Forum and in terms of participation in various IGF processes. Figures 19, 20 and 21 provide a graphical illustration of this below.

Figure 19: Total Chinese Attendance at the IGF 2006 - 2014

Source: Author’s Own Research (Appendix 6)

Figure 20: Chinese Attendance at the IGF by Stakeholder Group 2006 - 2014

Source: Author’s Own Research (Appendix 6)

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Figure 21: Active Chinese Participation at the IGF by Stakeholder Group

2006 - 2014

Source: Author’s Own Research (Appendix 6)5 A Chinese government delegate from the (now) MIIT was appointed to the initial MAG, and an MIIT representative has been included within the MAG in all years up to 2012, save for 2010 (Appendix 6). In 2013, China’s UN representative became a MAG member, displacing the MIIT for the first time. The Chinese government has contributed broadly to discussion of the various issues arising in the context of internet governance, and has participated in a range of workshops and other events at the IGF across its lifetime (Appendix 6). However, the clear focus has been on advancing the role of governments in internet governance. Beijing’s first contribution to the IGF is indicative of this. During the inaugural 2006 IGF’s preparatory process, the Group of 77 and China sent a letter requesting the IGF address ‘equitable and stable resource management’ – a reference to IPS and DNS governance (IGF 2006/2007). It was supportive of multi-stakeholder governance, but recommended that the MAG have 20 government members, and 10 each from the private sector and civil society. The bloc was successful in establishing this MAG structure. A further letter from this bloc qualified their support for multi-stakeholder governance and non-state actor authority in the MAG, insisting that governments, the private sector and civil society all meet separately during the preparatory process – a proposal not adopted by the IGF (IGF 2006/2007). After the 2006 IGF’s preparatory process and during the actual 2006 forum, the Chinese government’s contribution was limited to technical issues and discussion

5 Note that ‘active participation’, for the purpose of Figure 21, refers to: recorded attendance at – or the chairing of - specific sessions, workshops or dynamic coalitions at the annual IGF and at preparatory sessions, presentations given by Chinese actors, and comments made at specific sessions by Chinese actors. The IGF 2009 records a large increase in ‘Unknown’ activity because dead links prevent an accurate determination of non-state actor involvement in workshops. Figure 21 does not include active participation in the IGF 2015’s preparatory process.

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of censorship (Appendix 6). Overall, the inaugural IGF failed to discuss the role of ICANN and the nature of core internet governance norms. Thus, during the 2007 preparatory phase, China – along with others – successfully pushed for this to be remedied. During the preparatory process for the 2007 IGF, the Chinese government delegate also commented that they were supportive of multi-stakeholder participation in the Forum, particularly within Dynamic Coalitions. At the end of this preparatory process, China expressed dissatisfaction that the IGF was not ‘results-oriented’, and indicated its preference for the IGF to produce recommendations on internet governance reform. At the actual forum, the Chinese government representative commented on the need for internet governance reform in favor of governments, and obliquely referred to US dominance over the present system. The Chinese government also participated in a variety of workshops on various internet governance issues (Appendix 6). The Chinese government was less active in the 2008 preparatory process, but it did state that governments should lead ICANN, then obliquely criticize the US authority norm, and praise the IGF’s efforts to enhance discussion amongst all stakeholders (Appendix 6). At the actual forum, the Chinese government discussed a range of technical issues and attended a variety of workshops, but it also commented in support of the Brazilian government’s call for greater government involvement in internet governance, and made a direct request that the IGF focus on the role of governments in internet governance – suggesting the need for an intergovernmental supervisory entity while also praising the multi-stakeholder character of the IGF itself. At this IGF Beijing indicated that the IGF’s lack of progress was frustrating China, and tentatively recommended that the IGF, if it failed to suggest concrete reforms, be abandoned. Subsequently, in the 2009 preparatory process, the Chinese delegation stated its belief that the IGF had failed, suggesting its remit be passed to an intergovernmental organization under the UN which could address US government authority. At the actual Forum, the Chinese delegation acknowledged the IGF’s multi-stakeholder character in mildly positive terms, but asserted it had failed to reform internet governance, and should not have its mandate renewed – reiterating China’s support for an intergovernmental process to supplant the IGF (Appendix 6). Following the 2009 IGF, the process of reviewing the IGF’s mandate began within the UN. A Chinese diplomat, Sha Zukang, who represented Beijing during the WSIS and was subsequently promoted to Undersecretary of the UN’s Economic and Social Council, attempted to convert a renewed IGF into a more intergovernmental and outcome-oriented body (Mueller 2011, p. 185). Ultimately, this effort failed and the IGF continued as before (UNCTAD 2015). During the 2010 IGF preparatory process, the Chinese government’s involvement was muted, with a single cautious statement that the IGF’s activities should continue in ‘relevant UN meetings’ and a ‘relevant decision’ should be made on the IGF’s renewal (Appendix 6). Given majority support for renewal, Beijing’s lack of assertiveness is likely due simply to avoiding unnecessary conflict (ECOSOC 2010). At the actual IGF, the Chinese government made a single statement that internet governance was very important, and that China was fully cooperative with the world in its governance. However, perhaps as a sign of Beijing’s dissatisfaction, no MIIT representative was on the 2010 MAG, and no

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Chinese government representatives participated in workshops or other events – something noted by other IGF participants (IGF 2010b, 2010e). Nevertheless, in 2011 the Chinese government resumed its active participation in the IGF (Appendix 6). An MIIT representative returned to the MAG, while Chinese government delegates participated in the preparatory process, a number of main sessions, and workshops. Discussion in the 2011 IGF included comments on an intergovernmental cybersecurity treaty China and others had proposed at the UN, which included providing committing signatories to developing intergovernmental internet governance (UNGA 2011b; IGF 2011i, 2011l). A Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs representative acknowledged this proposed treaty, but his statement was largely limited to noting the agreement was non-binding. The Chinese government remained on the MAG for 2012 and was active in both the 2012 preparatory process and Forum, commenting that developing states remained underrepresented in the IGF, and calling for more involvement from all stakeholders from such states (Appendix 6). In 2013, China’s permanent UN representative took over the MIIT’s position on the MAG, although an MIIT representative still attended preparatory meetings (Appendix 6). However, only the formal MAG member, Chen Hongbing, made substantive comments in the 2013 preparatory process. During the May meetings, he approved of the 2013 focus on enhancing multi-stakeholder governance, noting that such discussion should remain aware of WSIS’ outcomes and promote multi-stakeholder governance “which is multinational, democratic, and transparent” (IGF 2013e). Chen also commented that stakeholder roles in internet governance needed to be examined further, called for sovereignty to be a theme of the 2013 IGF, advocated for greater IGF participation from developing states, noted that multi-stakeholder governance shouldn’t be a theme more important than others, and argued that discussions should address the need “to change the current unreasonable situation of the governance of critical Internet resources” (IGF 2013h; Appendix 6). These comments reflect Beijing’s ongoing advocacy for the state authority norm, with a view to it abolishing the US authority norm and at least superseding the privatized governance norm. The comments also, however, indicate general support for multi-stakeholder governance. At the actual 2013 IGF, China was very active in main sessions, workshops and other events (Appendix 6). That year’s Forum was dominated by fallout from Edward Snowden’s revelations of US spying activity – resulting in mutual recriminations between Chinese and US officials over use of the technical internet for espionage and censorship, respectively. At the end of the 2013 IGF, the IGF provided a press release stating that the 2013 IGF had been overshadowed by surveillance concerns, quoting a Chinese Foreign Ministry representative stating that “some individual countries are carrying out large scale surveillance” (IGF 2013l). Chinese government representatives also commented on core internet governance norms at the Forum, stating that multi-stakeholder governance was a good thing but that excluding any stakeholder group was ill-advised, and that internet governance should be multilateral, transparent, and needed to conform to WSIS Principles, and also that ICANN’s multi-stakeholder model was flawed for not incorporating the views of ordinary internet users and governments.

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Beyond the Chinese government, the Chinese private sector and civil society have also been heavily involved in the IGF. The Chinese private sector has only had a limited degree of participation within the IGF, however (see Appendix 6). The first recorded involvement of Chinese private sector actors in the IGF is in a workshop in 2009, but this is followed by involvement by generally one or two corporate representatives in each subsequent IGF. All private sector involvement has been on technical issues that do not touch directly upon core internet governance norms. In contrast, Chinese civil society has been much more active in the IGF across its lifetime; indeed, one civil society organization, the Chinese Association of Science and Technology (CAST) has been involved in workshops in every IGF (see Appendix 6; IGF 2010j). A representative of the CASS was appointed to the MAG in 2012 and served through to 2014. In 2015 his position was replaced by Li Xiaodong from the CNNIC. The CNNIC itself has sponsored IGF 2013 and 2014 – the only two years for which sponsorship information is available, and possibly the only two years in which the IGF has been sponsored by organizations outside the host country and the UN. Most Chinese civil society involvement in the IGF has been related to technical issues, but some has been relevant to core internet governance norms (Appendix 6). An ISC representative hosted a workshop at the 2006 IGF which proposed the ‘World Internet Norm’, advocating in part for a greater government role in internet governance. In 2007, a representative from the ‘China Internet Emergency Response Group’ – a likely reference to quasi-governmental CNCERT/CC which addresses security issues related to the IPS and DNS – supported the Chinese government’s contention that ‘one state’ controlling internet governance was unjust. This is the most outspoken statement on the US authority norm by a Chinese non-state actor in any administrative or policy organization. In this same year the ISC’s Secretary-General stated in a security main session that government should be more involved in internet governance. Beyond this, a number of Chinese civil society actors have discussed the value of multi-stakeholder governance in the IGF (Appendix 6). In the 2012 preparatory process, the CASS MAG member called for greater developing state involvement in the IGF. At the Forum, Xue Hong, in her academic capacity, discussed the value and uniqueness of the multi-stakeholder governance norm in internet governance, and a Chinese attendee of unknown stakeholder affiliation queried how to improve developing state participation in internet governance. Beyond this, a number of Chinese civil society actors have discussed the value of multi-stakeholder governance and the need for greater involvement of developing states in the IGF. In the preparatory process for the 2012 IGF, Guo Liang supported calls for greater developing state involvement in the IGF. In her academic capacity, Xue Hong discussed in clearly positive terms the uniqueness of multi-stakeholder governance in internet governance in a workshop on politics and the internet. At the 2012 IGF the sole comment on core internet governance norms by an unknown Chinese attendee also occurred, with an attendee querying how the IGF could enhance developing state participation in internet governance in an open forum main session.

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In 2013 Xue Hong discussed China’s domestic internet governance, explicitly noting the multi-stakeholder character of the CDNC. A CNNIC representative also noted this organization’s multi-stakeholder character. Likewise, another CNNIC representative noted that multi-stakeholder governance in China’s domestic governance could be improved, and that the concept itself was ambiguous. Li Xiaodong, also representing the CNNIC, commented in detail on the multi-stakeholder characteristics of the CNNIC. Each of these statements generally assumed that multi-stakeholder governance was a positive thing, although most simply discussed multi-stakeholder governance in purely functional terms (Appendix 6). Similarly, in 2014, comments related to the norm generally implied a high degree of acceptance and internalization of multi-stakeholder governance by Chinese civil society actors. At this Forum, a CNNIC representative discussed the CNNIC's multi-stakeholder character. A CASS representative also commented on how non-English speakers and developing states could participate more in internet governance.

i. The Asia-Pacific Regional IGF While the global IGF has operated since 2006, the Asia-Pacific region did not establish a regionally-focused IGF until 2010. China has engaged with this body – the Asia-Pacific Regional IGF – since its establishment. In fact, Zhang Jian, representing the APTLD, gave welcoming remarks at the inaugural meeting that welcomed the formation of a multi-stakeholder regional Forum (APrIGF 2010a, 2010b). However, aside from one attendee of unknown stakeholder affiliation, all Chinese participation in the APrIGF has come from civil society actors, and there have been no recorded Chinese sponsors. The APrIGF’s peak body, the Multi-stakeholder Steering Group, only provides records for 2013 and 2014, which indicate that both Zhang Jian and Xue Hong have been members for these years (APrIGF 2013d, 2015). Most of the Chinese participation in this regional Forum has been focused on technical issues, although consistent attendance by Chinese civil society actors – and a few comments from some of them – suggest support for multi-stakeholder governance. Two comments at the 2010 APrIGF also indicated qualified support for the privatized governance norm. At this inaugural Forum, aside from Zhang Jian’s welcoming remarks, Xue Hong gave a presentation for the CDNC, Zhang Jian presented on behalf of the APTLD, and an unknown attendee also gave a presentation on China’s IDN ccTLD (APrIGF 2010a, 2010f). Xue Hong discussed the value of multi-stakeholder governance while giving her presentation, stating that for internet governance there was “no other way for global policy making” and that all stakeholders should be included (APrIGF 2010c). In one session, Xue Hong and another civil society actor, Isaac Mao, discussed the value of multi-stakeholder governance, with both noting that privatized governance was important but that including governments was as well (APrIGF 2010d). Isaac Mao also stated that domestic Chinese internet governance should include involvement by the government, private sector and civil society (APrIGF 2010e). At the 2011 APrIGF, three Chinese civil society actors – from the CNNIC, APTLD and academia – gave presentations on technical issues, and Xue Hong

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chaired one main session (APrIGF 2011a, 2011b, 2011c). Xue Hong was particularly active in workshops at this regional Forum, and in one briefly noted the need for ICANN to internationalize further (APrIGF 2011d, 2011e, 2011f). Chinese participation in the 2012 APrIGF was decreased relative to the two earlier forums, with only Xue Hong speaking at the event. In addition to discussing technical issues, Xue Hong noted legal issues surrounding ICANN’s multi-stakeholder governance model (APrIGF 2012b, 2012c, 2012d). The 2013 regional Forum did not provide any transcripts, so the details of Chinese involvement are not available. However, two Chinese academics, a CERNET representative, and a number of CNNIC representatives were active in the Forum’s sessions and workshops (APrIGF 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2013f, 2013g). Similarly, transcripts for many of the 2014 sessions and workshops are not available, but existing records indicate participation by Xue Hong in her CDNC capacity, and by two CNNIC representatives (APrIGF 2014a, 2014b, 2014c, 2014d, 2014e).

c. The UN, the ITU & NETMundial The Chinese government’s activities in the ITU and the UN in the lead-up to the WSIS, at the WSIS itself, and in the IGF post-WSIS, indicates a sustained effort to achieve international agreement on a norm of equal state authority over internet governance being recognized as dominant – with the effect of abolishing US government authority, and reducing or abolishing non-state actor authority. Beijing has clearly preferred for this to occur via the creation of an intergovernmental organization that either replaces ICANN outright, or replaces the US government’s current supervisory role over the internet’s global root. Equally clear, however, is the fact that China failed in this task in the WSIS and IGF. It has nevertheless continued these efforts in the UN and other policy organizations. As noted in discussion of the IGF, in 2011 China, Russia, Tajikstan and Uzbekistan called for an international code of conduct for cybersecurity that included a clause calling for the establishment of a multilateral technical internet management system (UNGA 2011b, p. 4). This clause is clearly directed at weakening US government authority and privatized governance, although it makes no mention of multi-stakeholder governance. Further Chinese government efforts at reform of internet governance regime has occurred at the 2012 World Conference on International Telecommunications (WCIT), held by the ITU in December 2012 (ITU 2012a). The WCIT aimed to revise the International Telecommunications Regulations, the ITU’s primary global telecommunications treaty which had not been revised since 1988. Thus, the WCIT was the first opportunity for the ITU to incorporate internet governance into the ITRs. This led to speculation that the ITU, through the actions of its member states, would make a power grab for technical GIG authority (Kinderis 2012), a power grab that did, in fact, eventuate at the WCIT. Much of the ITR negotiations at the WCIT were behind closed doors, but public pressure for the ITU to provide transparency, and the creation of a ‘WCITleaks’ website, led to certain information being made public (Dourado 2012). Ultimately, the WCIT resulted in a new version of the ITRs, but they were largely silent on internet governance, with a sole supporting resolution attached to them reiterating the WSIS Tunis Agenda’s statements (ITU 2012a; ITR, art. 10 (61); Resolution/Plen

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3 (Dubai 2012)). Despite this, the US government and 54 other state governments refused to sign the new ITRs, for reasons including concern over their effect on state control of the internet (Dourado 2012; ITU 2012b). China's involvement in the WCIT appears to have followed the same path as its previous efforts in the UN, the ITU, the WSIS and the IGF, to have internet governance shifted towards a traditional multi-lateral, state-led governance model. Publicly available documents on Chinese contributions to WCIT include a request for new articles on cybercrime and cyber-security to be added to the ITRs, and two proposals submitted by China in conjunction with Russia and a range of African and Middle Eastern states which aimed to expand and entrench state governments' authority over internet governance, and provide an international legal basis for the divestment of the US government's and ICANN's existing authority (WCITleaks.org 2012a, 2012b, 2012c). When the first of these proposals was submitted, public outcry led to its withdrawal and, despite a second attempt at its inclusion by China and others, the language was not included in the final draft of the ITRs (Dourado 2012; ITU 2012a). As with Chinese and other states’ efforts in the WSIS, IGF and elsewhere, it appears that China failed in efforts to advance the state authority norm, abolish the US authority norm, and abolish or replace the privatized governance norm within the WCIT. Following the failure of the Chinese government and other governments to reform internet governance through the WCIT, the next development in this effort occurred in 2014, at a meeting on internet governance called NETMundial. NETMundial was organized and hosted by Brazil in response to global outrage over US government spying – including on Brazil's President (Lemos 2014, p. 6). Overall, Chinese attendance at the meeting was limited to two government officials and five civil society representatives (NETMundial 2014d). NETMundial’s peak body also included a Chinese UN official in its membership (NETMundial 2014b). Two submissions to NETMundial were made by Chinese government representatives: A Chinese UN official submitted a proposal for multi-stakeholder governance to be defined inclusively, with broad reference to multiple stakeholder classes (NETMundial 2014h), and the Chinese Foreign Affairs Ministry also submitted the ‘International Code of conduct for Information Security’ – the same document it submitted to the UN in 2011 and containing the same terms stipulating internet governance should be multilateral (NETMundial 2014c). One Chinese civil society actor submitted a suggestion on basic internet governance principles, which called for all actors to have the same rights in that governance (NETMundial 2014a). At the actual NETMundial meeting, two Chinese government representatives commented in sessions along with two civil society representatives. A Chinese UN official gave a welcoming statement at opening ceremony (NETMundial 2014e). A Foreign Affairs Ministry official stated in one session that order was as important as human rights in internet governance, that internet governance should respect sovereignty, and that the world should ‘go with the UN resolution’ – a likely reference to the document submitted to NETMundial (NETMundial 2014f). A CNNIC representative commented at a session on internet governance principles that internet governance should respect the rights of states (NETMundial 2014g), while another CNNIC representative stated that internet

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governance should be open to all stakeholders, but that different stakeholders should have different responsibilities (NETMundial 2014g). Thus, overall, Chinese participation in NETMundial illustrated continued advocacy for the state authority norm by the Chinese government and, interestingly, by CNNIC representatives. It also indicates continued acceptance of multi-stakeholder governance.

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9. China & The US Authority Norm

Building upon the last three chapters’ empirically-oriented analysis of Chinese engagement with administrative and policy organizations, the next four chapters engage in more theoretically-oriented analysis of this engagement. Specifically, each of these chapters assesses the overall roles that China has adopted towards each of the four core internet governance norms examined by the dissertation, and in doing so draws upon the norm lifecycle model and the dissertation’s suite of four potential political roles. These chapters also provide a theoretically-informed explanation for why China has adopted its various norm-maker, norm-taker and norm-entrepreneur roles towards these norms over their lifecycles, relying upon the dissertation’s multi-causal theoretical perspective to guide this explanation. This chapter examines the US authority norm, the next considers Chinese roles towards the privatized governance norm, followed by a chapter analyzing China and the multi-stakeholder governance norm and, finally, a chapter considering Chinese roles towards the state authority norm. With respect to US authority norm, this chapter argues that China has been a norm-taker towards US authority across its lifecycle, but has clearly become a dissatisfied norm-taker and has not internalized the norm within domestic Chinese internet governance. China’s norm-taker role is largely due to its initially passive acceptance of US government authority, and because Chinese actors were not actively involved in advancing the US authority norm to its global tipping point. China’s early acceptance of US government authority was motivated primarily by an interest in acquiring internet access, which also helped advance broader interests in technological progress, economic growth, and the promotion of the PRC’s and CCP’s internationalist image. Achieving internet connection explains China’s early norm-taker role, and partially explains why China continues to comply with US government authority despite Beijing’s eventual opposition to it. China remains a norm-taker, however, mainly because it doesn’t have sufficient material power – relative to the US – to abolish US government authority, or the ability to secure sufficient ideational support for an alternative to that authority. For Chinese non-state actors, in addition to these factors, they are constrained from efforts to oppose the US authority norm by interests in maintaining good relationships with non-Chinese counterparts. Despite complying with US government authority, China has not internalized this norm to any significant extent, instead rejecting its validity below the national level. This is because the norm threatens Chinese material interests and beliefs – it grants the US greater institutional power, and implies China is subordinate to the US.

a. China’s Role During the Norm Emergence Phase China’s role during the US authority norm’s emergence cannot reasonably be described as that of a norm-entrepreneur, as no Chinese actors actively contributed to the norm’s emergence. China’s engagement with US government authority in this phase was mostly reactive and passive. No Chinese actors were part of the IAHC efforts to challenge the US government, and instead passively accepted the right of the US government to control the IPS and DNS. As argued in chapter 5, it was US government officials who acted as norm-entrepreneurs by

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assuming authority over the nascent IPS and DNS and, in 1998, employing US material power to coercively trigger the norm’s global tipping point. Ironically, the unquestioning early acceptance by Chinese computer scientists and government officials of US government authority means that China could be regarded as playing a role in cementing the US authority norm’s position – given that China acknowledged this authority prior to the norm reaching its tipping point. However, this argument would ignore the passive role China played. As China did not actively contribute to the US authority norm reaching its tipping point, it cannot be described as a norm-entrepreneur. In addition, US government authority is generally only applicable at the global level – regulating final authority over the global internet root. Thus, it cannot be argued that China was a norm-entrepreneur at the regional or domestic levels. Instead, China is best described as having been a norm-taker, due to its largely passive acceptance of US government authority. Following early efforts by Chinese computer scientists to link China to the internet, Beijing and Washington negotiated a formal accord allowing Chinese interconnection with the IPS; the Chinese government directly acknowledged US authority in 1994. In addition, the .cn domain’s establishment in 1990 required a set of informal permissions from US government officials. Combined with Chinese non-state actor involvement in integrating China into the IPS, this illustrates early passive acceptance of US government authority amongst the Chinese technical internet community. In 1997 the Leading Group on Informatization indicated China’s perception of the US authority norm’s limits, rejecting its applicability below the national level by asserting sovereign control of China’s IPS and DNS. Nevertheless, it was unable to prevent the norm from reaching its global tipping point and, because of this, and its early passivity towards US government authority, it is best seen as a norm-taker. Initially, China’s passive norm-taker role arose because acceptance of US government authority was in the material interests of both the Chinese government and Chinese civil society computer scientists. This is because the US government was, and formally still is, the gatekeeper for internet access, as it has ultimate control over the global internet root (NTIA 2012a, 2015). Securing internet access was in Beijing’s material interests for a range of reasons. China clearly benefited materially from Chinese internet interconnection, as this advanced China’s general scientific and technological development. As former leader Jiang Zemin noted in the late Nineties: “Each of the four modernizations (of agriculture, industry, education and the military) has to depend on informatization” (Qiu 2004, p. 101). Strategically, internet access thus had great potential to enhance China’s longer-term relative power. In addition, internet access had potential to fuel economic growth, and thereby reduce the chance that China would continue to lag behind US and Western development levels (Zhao 2010, p. 269). In 1994, when China gained internet access, the internet’s economic potential was gradually becoming apparent (Gordon 2002, p. 4). It was reasonable to conclude it would enhance Chinese economic growth, which it eventually did (Jiang 2010, p. 77, 78; Qiang 2007, p. 16). For Chinese computer scientists, internet interconnection allowed access to the world’s largest network and easy communication with foreign counterparts, helping advance China’s research (Komaitis 2009, p. 137). Chinese private sector actors were not active in

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early Chinese efforts to secure internet access, but their early involvement in APNIC suggests they shared similar material interests as the rest of Chinese society. For less material reasons, Chinese interconnection with the internet helped to bolster China’s international image as a modern state that had abandoned earlier iconoclastic policies and hostility towards the Western world order (Kalathil & Boas 2010, p. 24; Medeiros & Fravel 2003, p. 24). Fostering a more internationalist image had strategic and diplomatic benefits for Beijing, increasing the willingness of liberal states to engage with China and accept China’s rise (Wang & Rosenau 2009, p. 23, 30). Domestically, this image also helped shore up the CCP’s domestic legitimacy, which is predicated in part on its ability to return China to a position of greatness, and in part on providing prosperity for the Chinese people. (Hachigian 2001, pp. 120-2; Wang 2005). Collectively, the pursuit of these interests outweighed any material or ideational concerns the Chinese government had over US internet hegemony. It was also necessary for Beijing to ignore these concerns, as Washington was unsure of granting China internet access due to the potential gains China could make from access to US networks (Hughes & Ermert 2003, p. 132; Tai 2013, pp. 244, 245). It also seems likely that Chinese computer scientists at least shared the ideal of open access to information with Western computer scientists – a goal best served by access to the TCP/IP network (Hu 2005, p. 186). China’s relative structural position also contributed to its initially passive norm-taker role. In the early Nineties, US material power placed it in a commanding position in the international system generally and, in the context of the internet, rendered the US network the largest and most sophisticated in terms of both size of the user base and quality of emerging online services (Mowery & Simcoe 2002; Saich 2004, p. 311). The legacy of centuries of Western economic and technological strength also meant that the underlying telecommunications network on which the internet relies was also dominated by the US and Europe – and, despite declining Western hegemony, is still predominantly controlled by Western states or US allies (Harvey 2013, p. 148; Malecki & Wei 2009). In addition, by 1994 most of the developed world had begun incorporating itself into the US TCP/IP network (Mowery & Simcoe 2002). Thus, any Chinese attempt to develop a competing global computer network would have been practically difficult given US material advantages and China’s relative lack of capabilities in global telecommunications. This material power disparity mean that Beijing, and Chinese non-state actors, had little choice but to passively accept US government authority. Ideationally, the international community's perception of China also acted as a barrier to any Chinese visions of an internet outside of US control. In the early Nineties, shortly after the fall of the Soviet Union and the occurrence of the Tiananmen Square incident, China's government was in an isolated political position – subject to sanctions from Western states as a result of the Tiananmen Square incident and reeling from the global retreat of communism, which jeopardized the CCP's domestic position in China (Larson & Shevchenko 2010, p. 77; Saich 2004, p. 75). In this environment, beyond any material structural barriers, it would have been difficult for China to persuade other states to join an

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international computer inter-network with a more equitable authority structure, and virtually impossible to convince liberal states. Such action would also likely have damaged Chinese efforts to advance its global reputation as an accepted member of international society – an important element of the Chinese government's general economic and political strategy (Ross & Zhu 2008, ch. 2).

b. China’s Roles During the Norm Cascade Phase By 1998 the norm had reached its tipping point and, as argued, China had no active role in its emergence. China’s role, therefore, remained that of a norm-taker in the US authority norm’s norm cascade phase. However, the Chinese government clearly transitioned during this phase from an apparently satisfied norm-taker into a much more vocally dissatisfied one. Despite limited rejection of the norm’s reach into the domestic sphere in 1997, Beijing did not begin actively contesting US government authority over the global internet root until 2001 – halfway through the norm’s cascade phase. In that year, China left ICANN’s GAC and gradually began advocating for the state authority norm as a replacement for the US authority norm. Nevertheless, it remained a norm-taker because it was unable to replace US government authority, and has continued to comply with that authority. Conversely, Chinese non-state actors have remained apparently satisfied norm-takers. Beijing continued to operate China’s domestic IPS and DNS in conformity with the global system during this cascade phase, with domestic law directing the CNNIC and other actors to conform to the US-government supervised global regime – directions which the CNNIC largely complied with. While independently created and operated Chinese IDNs emerged in this phase, the CNNIC actively reassured ICANN that it was not seeking to operate outside of the global internet root. Compliance with the US-controlled system is also evident in Chinese private sector acceptance of ICANN’s authority, along with substantial and growing Chinese non-state actor engagement with ICANN, APNIC and various other administrative organizations during this time. China’s continued acquiescence to US government authority is largely due to the ongoing interest China has in remaining part of the US-controlled internet, which is stronger than its interest in protesting US authority. China also did not have the requisite material power or ideational support to coerce the US government into abandoning its authority, or to persuade others to circumvent it. That Beijing’s behavior changed in 2001 is largely due to changing calculations over advancing Chinese interests, given changing circumstances and greater Chinese knowledge of other states’ preferences. Likewise, changes in the material and ideational structure of global politics, and the Chinese government’s perception of this, had occurred by 2001. All of these factors contributed to China’s shift to overt dissatisfaction with the US authority norm and active resistance to it during its norm cascade phase. The interests China advanced by initially recognizing US government authority had largely been achieved by 2001, although some – such as broad interests in technological progression, economic development and maintaining an international image – could have been damaged by disconnection from the US-controlled root. Nevertheless, because China’s more immediate interests had been achieved, Beijing had more freedom to oppose US government authority.

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Because the Chinese state has a clear material interest in divesting the US government of its authority, as this would strengthen China’s relative power, it commenced advocating for the replacement of the US authority norm with the state authority norm. Similarly, the Chinese government’s assessment of its more ideational interests had changed by 2001. The domestic benefits accruing to the CCP by facilitating Chinese internet access had largely been achieved, as had the promise of economic growth from the internet (Qiang 2007, p. 16). Thus, Beijing considerations surrounding the merits of passive acquiescence to US government authority had arguably changed. Beijing now stood, and stands, to gain more domestically by opposing this authority as it helps paint the CCP as an advocate for a more equal world order that enhances the Chinese state’s global position (Gries et al. 2011; Yan 2001, p. 16, 17). The changing material and ideational structure of world politics also altered the Chinese government’s perception of its interests and its freedom to pursue them. Materially, China from 2001 onwards has become progressively stronger in relative material power. Its share of global GDP, and economic interdependence between other states and China, has grown dramatically since 1994 (Lin 2011, pp. 1-3). By contrast, the US and wider Western world's material structural dominance has shrunk (Cox 2012). This has granted China greater freedom to be more forceful in its pursuit of its interests, as other states now have a stronger interest in avoiding tension with the PRC in order to protect their strategic position and economic relationships (Ross & Zhu 2008, p. 242). Nevertheless, relative to the West, it remains the case that China remains at a disadvantage in terms of general material power and control of global telecommunications infrastructure (Acharya 2014, p. 167; National Science Foundation 2014, pp. 4-13). Thus, the Chinese government has more space to push for equal state authority to replace US government authority, but it is not in a dominant enough position to unilaterally impose its preferences in the manner in which the US government was able to do in the mid-Nineties. Ideationally, China’s position has also changed since 1994. China’s growing material power has enabled it to dampen or marginalize any ideational pressure the Wwest can exert on China (Ross & Zhu 2008, pp. 242, 243). China’s vulnerability, from the Tiananmen Square incident and communism’s global retreat, has also seemingly ended, and left the CCP largely unscathed (Sutter 2012, p. 18, 139, 284; Zhu 2011, p. 124). These trends have further enhanced China’s freedom to pursue interests incompatible with those of the US, including advocacy for the US authority norm’s replacement. Beijing’s awareness of global beliefs on the appropriateness of US government authority has also grown. The ITU’s WSIS proposal provided a platform for states to coordinate a response to US government authority, and by 2001 the Chinese government arguably had a clearer indication of how widespread opposition to it was. Nevertheless, during the norm’s cascade phase, this resulted only in China's withdrawal from ICANN's GAC and muted criticism of the US authority norm in the first phase of the WSIS in 2003. While it seems reasonable to assume that Chinese non-state actors would also prefer some alternative to the US authority norm, they did not express opposition to it during its norm cascade phase – instead remaining passive norm-takers. This

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is likely due to these actors having stronger interests in maintaining good relations with non-Chinese internet governance participants, in maintaining good relations with the Chinese government, and due to a lack of material power. Both Chinese civil society and private sector actors arguably prioritize maintaining good relations with internet governance organizations, businesses and other actors over abolishing US government authority, because Chinese participation in internet governance and technical internet-related business will be facilitated through such relationships. Given the justifications for the US authority norm – safeguarding free expression and a privatized governance model – and the illiberal reputation of China, public support for the norm’s replacement could damage Chinese non-state actors’ relationships (Mueller 2010, p. 217). Similarly, Beijing’s own clear preference for the state authority norm to replace the US authority norm explains why Chinese non-state actors do not actively support a different alternative, such as the privatized governance norm; doing so would likely anger the Chinese government and jeopardize Chinese non-state actors relationship with their own government. In addition, Chinese non-state actors simply do not have the material power necessary to effect any realistic change in global acceptance of US government authority, rendering active opposition to it futile. Conceivably, Beijing could encourage this opposition, but doing so would impose costs on these actors without any clear advantage accruing to the Chinese government. Thus, while it is likely that Chinese non-state actors are dissatisfied with US government authority, their interests and lack of power resulted in their ongoing passivity during the US authority norm’s cascade phase.

c. China’s Roles During the Norm Internalization Phase China’s norm-taker role towards the US authority norm has continued since 2004 as it has been unable to engineer the norm’s replacement. During this phase of the norm’s lifecycle, the Chinese government has both reaffirmed its substantive compliance with US government authority and much more actively advocated for its replacement, both in policy organizations and within ICANN itself. Nevertheless, Beijing’s GAC return in 2009 indicates its continuing compliance with US government authority, given continuing US authority over the global root. Similarly, China’s domestic law still directs the CNNIC and other domestic internet governance actors to operate within the global internet root. Unlike the Chinese government, Chinese non-state actors have generally maintained their passive norm-taker role, although some limited resistance to US government authority is evident in civil society actors’ statements in policy organizations. These actors continue to comply with US government authority by operating China’s internet within the global root. Overall, China has not internalized the US authority norm to any significant extent. Beijing’s statements and behavior indicate clear rejection of the norm’s appropriateness and, to a lesser extent, so does that of Chinese non-state actors. The Chinese government’s continuing norm-taker role during the internalization phase is due to the same constellation of material and ideational interests – and similar material and ideation structural constraints – as those that shaped China’s role in the US authority norm’s cascade phase. Material constraints on Beijing

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have gradually lessened since 2004 as Chinese material power has grown, particularly since the Global Financial Crisis in 2009 (Ikenberry 2011; Xinbo 2010, p. 159). In addition, the Chinese government’s perception of other states’ preferences has arguably enhanced its perceived freedom to oppose US government authority. In addition, the US invasion of Iraq also weakened the international reputation of the US (Brzezinski 2013, p. 70). Thus, based on these ideational shifts in world politics and Beijing’s perception of them, the Chinese government subsequently engaged in much more forceful opposition to the US authority norm in the WGIG. Post-WSIS, Beijing has continued its opposition to the US authority norm in the IGF, UN and ITU. The revelations Edward Snowden provided of widespread US foreign espionage also significantly damaged the US government’s reputation in internet governance and, as noted, led to increased Chinese hostility at the 2013 IGF and directly to Brazil’s hosting of the NETMundial meeting in 2014 (Almeida 2014, p. 65, 66). These spying revelations may even have triggered the US government’s policy shift from the Bush administration’s indefinite retention of US government authority over the internet’s global root to the 2014 announcement that the US would transfer its authority to the 'global multi-stakeholder community' in 2015 – thereby replacing US government authority with the privatized governance norm (Mueller & Kuerbis 2014, p. 2; NTIA 2014b). China is thus likely to partially achieve its goal of abolishing the US authority norm, having been part of a coalition that successfully pressured the US government, although it is unlikely to see it replaced by China’s preferred alternative. Since 2004, the only direct statement by Chinese non-state actors against US government authority was by a CNCERT/CC representative in the IGF, who stated that ‘one government’ controlling internet governance was unjust. Otherwise, a few statements have been made by Chinese civil society actors in other policy organizations, in particularly the ISC in the WGIG, in favor of a stronger government role in internet governance. These could be interpreted as objections to the US authority norm rather than the privatized governance norm, but such statements have nevertheless been minimal, and Chinese non-state actors continue to passively comply with US government authority for the same reasons motivating this behavior during the norm’s cascade phase. Despite Chinese non-state actors’ passivity and the Chinese government’s failure to abolish the US authority norm, it is also apparent that China does not genuinely accept the legitimacy of US government authority. Beijing has clearly set limits on the extent of its acceptance, refusing to recognize its effect below the national level in 1997 via the Leading Group of Informatization’s asserting of sovereign Chinese authority over the Chinese IPS and DNS, and the establishment of legal supervision of Chinese technical internet operators. Chinese government policy statements also indicate a clear rejection of this norm, and Beijing’s behavior and statements in the regime’s administrative and policy organizations clearly demonstrate its ideational rejection of US government authority. While Chinese non-state actors have not asserted their rejection of the US authority norm’s appropriateness so overtly, they have also not expressed any

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support for it. It is beyond the scope of the dissertation to examine domestic Chinese society in detail, but it does appear that Chinese non-state actors reject US government authority and would prefer to see it replaced, as indicated in statements made in Chinese academic journals and newspaper articles (see, for example: Cai 2012; Guo 2012; Huang 2007; Jiang 2011; Li 2002; Wang 2011; Xie 2005; Yu 2004). Given the broad rejection of the US authority norm by Chinese actors, it is clear that there has been no internalization of this norm. No Chinese actors express genuine ideational support for it, and it has not been localized within the domestic Chinese internet governance regime. China has simple acquiesced to its operation at the global level to the minimum extent necessary.

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10. China & The Privatized Governance Norm

Relative to the US authority norm, China has had a much more complex set of roles towards the privatized governance norm, with its roles varying across different governance levels and across different internet governance issues. In internet standards governance across the global, regional and domestic levels, China was not a norm-entrepreneur, as it was not actively involved in the emergence of non-state actor authority in this area. It has thus been a norm-taker, but an apparently satisfied one, throughout the privatized governance norm’s lifecycle. This is largely due to Beijing’s lack of any strong preference over how internet standards governance is conducted, and because the privatized governance norm in this area is in the material interests of Chinese non-state actors – granting them authority over this governance issue. China appears to have internalized the norm in this context, given its operation in domestic Chinese internet standards development, the extent of Chinese conformity to it, and the lack of any clear Chinese dissatisfaction with non-state actor authority in this context. In global IPS and DNS governance, China was also not a norm-entrepreneur because it was not active in the emergence of the privatized governance model at the global level, and has thus been a norm-taker across the privatized governance norm’s lifecycle. The Chinese government, similarly to the US authority norm, has clearly become a dissatisfied norm-taker in this context since 2001. It has remained a norm-taker, however, for largely the same reasons that it has in relation to US government authority, with the major difference being the greater ideational resistance Beijing faces in its efforts to abolish or weaken non-state actor authority. Conversely, Chinese non-state actors appear to have remained relatively satisfied norm-takers. This is because the norm is in these actors’ material interests, granting them rights to exercise authority. Growing Chinese non-state actors’ involvement in global IPS and DNS governance also suggests that these actors have internalized this norm, genuinely agreeing with its appropriateness in this context, even if the Chinese government has not. At the regional level of IPS and DNS governance, China was a norm-entrepreneur in regional IPS governance because it actively contributed to the establishment of non-state actor authority in this context, and has thus become a norm-maker following the privatized governance norm reaching its global tipping point. However, China was not a norm-entrepreneur in regional DNS governance, primarily because this did not exist before the norm reached its global tipping point, and has therefore been a norm-taker across the privatized governance norm’s lifecycle in this context. The Chinese government and Chinese non-state actors appear to be satisfied with privatized governance at the regional level. This is likely because Beijing doesn’t have a strong preference towards the norm’s operation at this level, and because structural factors constrain it from challenging non-state actor authority at the regional level. For Chinese non-state actors, their satisfaction is likely due to the norm being in their material interests, and that the norm is arguably genuinely regarded as appropriate. Thus, it appears that Beijing may have internalized the norm’s appropriateness in regional IPS and DNS governance, and that Chinese non-state actors have internalized it in this context.

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In domestic Chinese IPS and DNS governance, China was a norm-entrepreneur because its non-state actor authority over the Chinese IPS and DNS was established much before the privatized governance norm reached its global tipping point, and it has therefore been a norm-maker across the rest of the norm’s lifecycle. For the Chinese government, its acceptance of the norm at the domestic level is due to the same factors that shaped its response to the norm at the global level, but also because domestic privatized governance is arguably in Beijing’s material interests, and genuinely regarded as appropriate so long as non-state actor authority remains subordinate to the Chinese government. For Chinese non-state actors, the privatized governance norm in domestic IPS and DNS governance is in their material interests and arguably genuinely agreed with by them. Thus, counter-intuitively, it appears that Beijing is relatively satisfied with non-state actor authority in domestic Chinese internet governance, and has internalized it in this context. However, it is more accurate to describe this as an instance of norm localization, as the Chinese government has ensured that the privatized governance norm in domestic IPS and DNS governance grants non-state actors authority, but not authority equal to, or greater than, that of the Chinese government.

a. China’s Roles During the Norm Emergence Phase With the privatized governance norm in internet standards governance – across the global, regional and domestic levels – China can’t be described as a norm-entrepreneur because Chinese actors were generally not engaged in this governance until after the norm reached its global tipping point, and because no Chinese actors actively contributed to the norm’s emergence. As argued in chapter 5, the privatized governance norm in internet standards governance reached its global tipping point in 1992, six years earlier than it did in global IPS and DNS governance. It was individual computer scientists from the US who acted as norm-entrepreneurs in this context, triggering a quiet cascade of the norm when they formalized the IETF’s governance processes in 1992. There is no record of Chinese actors being involved in the establishment of the IETF’s internal governance procedures. Chinese government-affiliated individuals did not attend an IETF meeting until 1994, and individuals affiliated with other stakeholder groups are not recorded attending IETF meetings until 1995. Similarly, the first Chinese authored RFC was published in 1995. Therefore, due to the earlier tipping point of the norm in internet standards governance and China’s limited involvement in the early IETF community, China is best described as a norm-taker in this context. Similarly, there was no regional internet standards development in the Asia-Pacific, at least that China was a part of, until the Joint Engineering Taskforce was established in 2000. Thus, Chinese engagement with regional internet standards governance only occurred after the privatized governance norm had reached its general global tipping point. For that reason, China cannot be regarded as a norm-entrepreneur at the regional level, and is instead better described as a norm-taker. Likewise, domestic internet standards governance in China appears to have begun with the CNNIC’s development of Chinese IDNs in 1997. Here, Chinese civil society did engage in standards development before the norm of

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non-state actor authority reached its general global tipping point. However, given the earlier establishment of the norm in this issue area, and the relatively late commencement of domestic Chinese standards development, it is arguably more accurate to describe China as having been a norm-taker rather than a norm-entrepreneur. Given the lack of any early Chinese government involvement in internet standards governance, and its lack of any attempt at regulating this issue area, it appears that Beijing’s passive norm-taker status towards the privatized governance norm in internet standards governance is due simply to it not having a strong preference for how this activity was conducted. This seems probable given that internet standards are explicitly designed to be freely available and to only address technical issues – there aren’t, therefore, any commercial or political concerns inherent within this governance issue. For Chinese non-state actors, the norm’s existence in internet standards governance is in their material interests, as it justifies their right to exercise authority within this governance area. This explains why Chinese civil society actors willingly accepted the emergence of non-state actor authority over internet standards governance. Much like with US government authority, Chinese involvement with the privatized governance norm’s emergence in global level IPS and DNS governance was mostly reactive, and China cannot be described as having been a norm-entrepreneur during the norm’s emergence. Prior to ICANN's formation, no Chinese actors were involved in the global governance of the IPS and DNS, with both of these activities conducted by the US government and predominantly US private sector and civil society actors. Instead, Chinese efforts to establish the .cn domain and interconnect with the IPS simply accepted the right of non-state actors to wield authority over the global IPS and DNS. Chinese actors were also not involved in the IAHC attempt to divest the US government of its authority over the global root, and no Chinese actors were involved in the US government's orchestration of ICANN's creation. Thus the establishment of non-state actor authority in global IPS and DNS governance occurred without any active involvement of China. For that reason, China is best described as a norm-taker during the emergence of the privatized governance norm in global IPS and DNS governance. Beijing likely adopted its initial norm-taking role towards the norm in global IPS and DNS governance for the same reasons it passively accepted the US authority norm, and the same is true for Chinese civil society actors. That is, acceptance of the privatized governance norm helped secure enhanced research opportunities for Chinese computer scientists, potentially enhanced China's strategic position by improving its technological and scientific expertise, increased prospects for economic growth and for China to catch up to Western levels of development, and granted reputation benefits to the Chinese state internationally and the CCP domestically. Similarly, the same material and ideational structural barriers prevented the Chinese government from actively contesting this norm in its early lifecycle, namely China's lack of material power over global telecommunications infrastructure, the physical location of the internet's global root in US territory, growing global interconnection with the US TCP/IP-based internet, and the Chinese government's sensitive political position following the fall of the Soviet

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Union and the occurrence of the Tiananmen Square incident. One final ideational barrier also likely further constrained Beijing's early willingness to contest the norm in this area. Unlike the US authority norm, there were and are much broader levels of genuine agreement with the appropriateness of privatized governance amongst liberal states and amongst non-state actors (Kleinwachter 2004, p. 233; Rogers 2007, p. 7, 8). With regional IPS governance, however, China can be argued to have acted as a norm-entrepreneur. All three Chinese stakeholder classes were founding members of APNIC – which was established in 1995, three years prior to the privatized governance norm's global tipping point. While the Chinese government’s early involvement with APNIC was limited mostly to its membership of the organization, it was nevertheless involved in APNIC’s founding and contributed, therefore, to the establishment of its privatized governance model. The Chinese private sector has a similar level of engagement, but five businesses were founding APNIC members. Conversely, Chinese civil society was a much more active stakeholder group in APNIC’s early years. As noted in chapter 7, Li Xing from CERNET was a significant contributor to APNIC’s establishment and was elected to APNIC’s EC in 1996. Since APNIC’s establishment, Chinese civil society actors have been active participants within the organization. They, in particular, can be argued to have acted as norm-entrepreneurs in establishing non-state actor authority in regional IPS governance, although this arguably extends to Chinese actors from all three stakeholder groups. China cannot be regarded as a norm-entrepreneur in regional DNS governance, however, because the pre-ICANN regime largely glossed over regional DNS governance. After ICANN’s establishment, the only regional level administrative organization dedicated to regional DNS governance in the Asia-Pacific is the APTLD. While Chinese civil society actors were involved in the APTLD’s establishment, the organization was only founded in 1998, and thus not until after the privatized governance norm had reached its global tipping point. Thus, there was no Chinese engagement with privatized governance in regional DNS governance during the norm’s emergence phase, because such governance did not exist at this time. Beijing’s norm-maker role with respect to regional IPS governance is arguably due to the Chinese government lacking any strong preference about how regional level internet governance is conducted. Aside from inferences about its preference towards the privatized governance norm in global level IPS governance, Beijing has given no indication of its preferences at the regional level. Arguably it has no strong preferences, because modification of regional IPS governance would not change the character of the global regime, would damage China’s reputation with no clear benefit, and would be effectively as difficult to achieve as reform of global IPS and DNS governance. In essence, the Chinese government has bigger fish to fry at the global level. Conversely, it is in the material interests of Chinese non-state actors for the norm to regulate regional IPS governance, as this justifies the right to authority over this governance issue. Chinese non-state actors’ extensive early engagement with APNIC has also arguably socialized Chinese civil society and – to a lesser extent private sector –

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actors into genuinely internalizing beliefs about the value and appropriateness of privatized governance in this context. Structural factors would also constrain any Chinese government efforts to replace the privatized governance norm in regional IPS or DNS governance. Despite growing Chinese material power, Beijing does not have the material power at the regional level to impose a state-led governance model – in part because it does not have dominant control over regional telecommunications infrastructure (Malecki & Wei 2009, pp. 372-4). Additionally, APNIC and the APTLD are legally incorporated and physically located in Australia and Malaysia, respectively (APNIC 2015; APTLD 2015a). Beijing cannot, therefore, exert legal and physical control over regional administrative organizations the way Washington could at the global level. Even if it could, regional changes would have no effect on the global regime, and could jeopardize China’s global reputation. Ideationally, Beijing is also constrained from pursuing reform at the regional level because liberal states – such as Australia or Japan – would likely oppose efforts to establish state authority over regional IPS and DNS governance. In domestic Chinese IPS and DNS governance, China can be described as a norm-entrepreneur in the privatized governance norm’s emergence phase. While it took a formal Sino-American intergovernmental agreement to incorporate China into the IPS, its domestic governance was conducted by the nominally civil society CAS from 1994 until 1997. In 1997, Beijing itself formally authorized the establishment of the CNNIC as China’s peak IPS body, which grants authority to both civil society and private sector actors. Because the development of China's domestic IPS occurred prior to the norm reaching its global tipping point, it is arguably the case that China was a norm-entrepreneur at the domestic level. Similarly, domestic DNS governance in China was initially conducted by Chinese civil society computer scientists, and upon China’s incorporation into the global root in 1994, authority over the .cn domain was vested in the CAS. It was not until 1997 that the Chinese government intervened, formalizing current arrangements by authorizing the CAS’ subsidiary body, the CNNIC, to operate the .cn domain. Thus, as with the IPS in China, the DNS in China has a long and sustained history of non-state actor authority over its daily administration and policy development prior to the privatized governance norm reaching its global tipping point. Therefore, China can be described as a norm-entrepreneur in relation to domestic DNS governance. The Chinese government seems to have initially accepted the privatized governance norm in domestic IPS and DNS governance because of the various benefits this granted the Chinese state. By allowing civil society computer scientists to take an early leading role, Beijing maximized the chances of China securing permission to interconnect with the US TCP/IP network and reap the potential rewards, namely: enhanced research opportunities, technological progress and economic growth, and the reputation benefits internet access provided the PRC internationally and the CCP domestically. Beyond these factors, Beijing had begun experimenting with privatization in the Chinese economy in the Eighties and this ramped up in the Nineties, concomitant with the internet's emergence (Harwit & Clark 2001, pp. 384-7; Saich 2004, pp. 282-5). Arguably, therefore, Beijing already had an emerging preference for privatized

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governance which rendered it more open to accepting the appropriateness of privatized governance of China’s IPS and DNS – so long as this authority is subordinate to that of the Chinese government. For Chinese civil society computer scientists, their early assumption of responsibility likely occurred because it was in their material interest to do so. It was necessary for someone to manage China’s nascent IPS and DNS, and given computer internetworking was initially a predominantly academic activity, these computer scientists were naturally placed to govern these systems. In addition, Chinese computer scientists were arguably socialized into accepting the privatized governance norm through interaction with the nascent technical internet community; most internet governance in the US was at this time conducted by civil society computer scientists, and most global collaboration occurred between academics. It is likely that this exposed Chinese computer scientists to US cyber-libertarian beliefs, and may have influenced their perception of privatized governance’s legitimacy. After the formalization of China's domestic regime in 1997, it clearly continues to be in the interests of Chinese civil society actors – and now those of the Chinese private sector – to have authority over China’s IPS and DNS, as this grants them power they otherwise would not have.

b. China’s Roles During the Norm Cascade Phase China’s role towards the privatized governance norm during the cascade phase of its lifecycle have remained largely similar to those it adopted during the norm’s emergence phase, although, once the norm reached its global tipping point, China’s status as a norm-entrepreneur in regional IPS governance and domestic IPS and DNS governance means that it can subsequently be described as a norm-maker in these contexts. In relation to internet standards governance across the global, regional and domestic levels, China has remained a norm-taker and appears to be a relatively satisfied one. As noted, Chinese engagement with the IETF was limited until 2005, but individuals affiliated with each stakeholder group did participate in IETF meetings in limited numbers between from 1992 to 2004, and two RFCs were published during this time (Appendix 2; IETF 2004a). Because of this ongoing engagement, and because there is no evidence of Chinese dissatisfaction with non-state actor authority in this context, China can be described as a satisfied norm-taker. This also appears the case in regional and domestic internet standards governance. The Joint Engineering Taskforce, establishing in 2000, facilitated Chinese non-state actor participation in internet standards development at the regional level, while the CNNIC engaged in standards development related to Chinese IDNs within China from approximately 1997 onwards, and contributed to the creation of the CDNC. There has been no indication by the Chinese government that it disapproves of these arrangements, and non-state actor involvement in regional and domestic standards development implies that the Chinese government is genuinely willing for such actors to exercise authority in this context. The reasons for China’s ongoing satisfied norm-taker role in this area are likely the same as in the norm emergence phase – Beijing has no strong preference in this issue area, and the privatized governance norm serves non-state

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actors’ material interests. It is also arguably the case that China had already come to genuinely accept the appropriateness of the norm in this context, and thus internalized it. In regards to global IPS and DNS governance, as with US government authority, the Chinese government gradually transitioned to a more dissatisfied norm-taker role during the privatized governance norm’s cascade phase. Beijing has nevertheless remained a norm-taker in this context, because it has been unable to engineer the replacement of the norm with the state authority norm. Continued Chinese government acquiescence to the privatized governance norm in global IPS and DNS governance is evident in Beijing’s early participation in ICANN’s GAC, which involved direct acknowledgement of the advisory role of governments, a role explicitly recognized by the Chinese government in its agreement with the GAC’s initial Operating Principles, which affirmed support for ICANN’s privatized governance model. This illustrates Beijing’s passive acceptance of non-state actor authority up until its withdrawal from the GAC in 2001. Following this, however, the Chinese government gradually began to advocate for the state authority norm to replace – or at least weaken – the privatized governance norm in global IPS and DNS governance. While Beijing subtly indicated this in the first phase of the WSIS, it continued to tacitly accept the participation of Chinese non-state actors in ICANN’s governance processes – including acceptance of an ICANN meeting occurring in China in 2002. The Chinese government’s transition to a dissatisfied norm-taker in this context is due to the Chinese government’s changing perception of its interests and structural position. These were discussed in detail in the previous chapter, but in summary are that the Chinese government continued to have an interest in interconnection with the internet as it advanced broader interests in technological progression, economic development, and maintaining China's internationalist image. This meant that Beijing was unwilling to cease compliance with the privatized governance norm by severing connections with the global internet root. Nevertheless, The Chinese government had greater freedom to promote its preference for stronger state authority over global IPS and DNS governance because, so long as it complied with the privatized governance norm by remaining within the global internet root, it would not jeopardize its material and ideational interests. In addition, China’s relative material power had increased since the Nineties, and the Chinese government's perception of its relative position within the material structure of the international system had changed. Likewise, its political vulnerability in global politics had decreased, and its awareness of other states’ preferences towards internet governance had increased. All of this combined to make Beijing more willing to actively contest non-state actor authority in global IPS and DNS governance. Unlike the Chinese government, Chinese non-state actors seem to have remained relatively satisfied norm-takers towards the privatized governance norm in global IPS and DNS governance during the cascade phase of its lifecycle. As chapter 7 and 8 illustrated, the Chinese private sector had limited but sustained participation in administrative organizations between 1998 and 2004, and made no clear comments indicating disagreement with the norm in any policy organizations. Similarly, Chinese civil society had limited, sustained but far more active

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involvement than the private sector in administrative organizations during this time, and likewise made no clear statements indicating disagreement with the privatized governance norm until 2004. The continued satisfaction of Chinese non-state actors with privatized governance in global IPS and DNS governance appears to be because the norm is in their material interests, granting them the right to participate in governance. For Chinese civil society, there is also arguably a substantial degree of ideational acceptance of this norm, given the high levels of sustained engagement by these actors across all internet governance organizations. With regional IPS governance, China can be described as having shifted from a norm-entrepreneur into a norm-maker, due to its active role establishing the norm in this governance. In regional DNS governance, however, China can only be described as a norm-taker, because the APTLD was only formed after the privatized governance norm reached its global tipping point. Nevertheless, in both roles China appears to be satisfied with its status across all three stakeholder groups. The Chinese government has, as noted, had limited engagement with APNIC, but it remained a member of the organization and made no statements indicating dissatisfaction with privatized governance of the regional IPS during the norm’s cascade phase. The Chinese private sector was similarly inactive in APNIC, although two companies sponsored APNIC conferences during this time. Chinese civil society actors, in contrast, were active in and sponsored APNIC conferences during this time, and held high-level positions within APNIC in the norm’s cascade phase. APNIC itself also hosted or participated in a range of events in China during this time. In regional DNS governance, Chinese acceptance of the privatized governance norm during its cascade phase is evident in the role Chinese civil society representatives played in the formation of the APTLD, in the high-level positions held by one representative within APTLD, and in the active participation within APTLD conferences by Chinese civil society representatives. As with the Chinese government, no Chinese non-state actors made any comments at policy organizations indicating disapproval of the norm in regional IPS or DNS governance. The reason for China’s continuing satisfaction with its norm-maker and norm-taker roles at the regional level is likely the same as those that explained these roles in the privatized governance norm’s emergence phase. The Chinese government lacks any strong preference towards regional IPS and DNS governance as it doesn’t change how the global regime operates, and interfering with it would damage China’s reputation, and because China lacks the material power to effect any significant change. For Chinese non-state actors, the reason for their continuing satisfaction is likely because the norm in regional IPS and DNS governance is in their material interests, granting them power over this governance. The high levels of Chinese involvement, at least in terms of Chinese civil society, within regional internet governance organizations also suggests genuine acceptance of non-state actor authority at the regional level. Similarly to regional IPS governance, China’s initial norm-entrepreneur roles in domestic IPS and DNS governance means that it can be described as a norm-maker in this context. It also appears to be a satisfied norm-maker. Since the privatized governance norm reached its global tipping point, the Chinese

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government has signaled its continuing acceptance of privatized governance in China’s domestic regime by allowing the CNNIC to remain the peak domestic body, allowing non-state actor-operated DNS dispute resolution schemes within China, and allowing gTLD registrars to wield administrative authority. In addition, it has allowed Chinese non-state actors to maintain direct relationships with APNIC, ICANN and foreign gTLD registries and registrars. The fact that non-state actors continued to wield authority over China’s IPS and DNS during the privatized governance norm’s cascade phase, even as the Chinese government was gearing up to challenge it at the global level, indicates that China is relatively satisfied with the norm at the domestic level – albeit with non-state actor authority clearly subordinate to that of the Chinese government. Beijing’s apparent satisfaction with non-state actor authority in domestic Chinese IPS and DNS governance is likely due to the same reasons it initially accepted this norm in domestic Chinese internet governance. It maximizes the benefits of Chinese internet access by facilitating Chinese non-state actor contact with the internet governance regime, and preserves some of the image benefits of Chinese conformity to the privatized governance norm. Simple path dependence – as the Leading Group on Informatization had already organized China’s domestic regime – and a Chinese governmental preference for some level of (tightly supervised) privatized governance because of its perceived efficiency, are also likely reasons (Harwit & Clark 2001, pp. 384-7; Saich 2004, pp. 282-5). The history of China's partial privatization of domestic telecommunications governance does suggest it is at least somewhat supportive of privatized governance models (Fu & Mou 2010). Given that the Chinese government can intervene in the domestic regime when necessary, has subordinated non-state actor authority to its own authority, and can infiltrate domestic organizations with CCP cells, it seems likely that Beijing genuinely believes a limited form of privatized governance is appropriate in its domestic IPS and DNS governance (Saich 2000, p. 133; Shao 2012, ch. 2). For Chinese non-state actors, their continuing satisfaction with the norm in this context is due to it being in their material interest, while it is also likely these actors genuinely believe in its legitimacy.

c. China’s Roles During the Internalization Phase Since 2004, China’s various roles towards the privatized governance norm at different levels, and across different governance issues, have remained identical to those it had during the norm’s cascade phase – China remained a norm-taker towards the norm at the global level, in internet standards governance and in regional DNS governance, while it remained a norm-maker in regard to regional IPS governance and domestic Chinese IPS and DNS governance. The reasons for these ongoing roles, and the various levels of Chinese satisfaction, are also identical to those in the norm cascade phase of the privatized governance norm’s lifecycle. The only major difference is that the intensity of Chinese government dissatisfaction with non-state actor authority in global IPS and DNS governance has waxed, waned, and waxed again during this phase of the norm’s lifecycle. Nevertheless, China has remained satisfied with the norm in all areas save in global IPS and DNS governance, and Chinese actors across all three stakeholder groups appear to have internalized the norm to a significant degree in internet

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standards governance, regional IPS and DNS governance, and in the localized form of the norm in domestic IPS and DNS governance. The Chinese government has clearly not accepted the legitimacy of privatized governance in global IPS and DNS governance – although it has moderated its efforts from seeking abolishment of non-state actor authority in ICANN to seeking it being weakened. However, Chinese non-state actors – particularly from Chinese civil society – appear to genuinely accept the legitimacy of the norm in global IPS and DNS governance. China has remained a norm-taker towards the privatized governance norm in internet standards governance, and it appears to be very satisfied with the norm in this context to the point, arguably, of having internalized it – taking it for granted in this issue area. Chinese engagement with internet standards governance has strengthened during the norm’s internalization phase. Chinese government-affiliated individuals have become consistent attendees at IETF meetings since 2009, and have gradually increased their contribution to RFC development. There is also some limited support for the IETF in the Chinese White Paper on the Internet, which describes the IETF in positive terms. Overall, the small but growing level of Chinese government-affiliated individuals’ engagement with the IETF, the lack of any criticism of it by Beijing, and Chinese government acceptance of Chinese non-state actor engagement with the IETF suggests that the Chinese government has internalized the privatized governance norm in this context, accepting its legitimacy in global level internet standards governance. This is also arguably the case with respect to regional and domestic internet standards governance, where there has been no indication of Chinese government opposition to non-state actor development of internet standards governance, and some indication of Chinese government participation in the CDNC and Joint Engineering Taskforce. Compared with the Chinese government, Chinese individuals affiliated with the private sector and civil society – and particularly those affiliated with private sector – have increased their participation with the IETF dramatically since 2004, with consistent and growing attendance at IETF meetings since 2005, growing levels of responsibility within the IETF itself, and increased contributions to RFC development. Chinese corporations, and some civil society organizations, have become regular sponsors of IETF meetings since 2007. This increasing participation in the IETF suggests a high degree of acceptance of privatized governance in internet standards governance amongst Chinese non-state actors, and a significant degree of internalization of the norm. The fact that Chinese non-state actors have largely not commented on the IETF’s governance model in administrative or policy organizations supports this analysis, the sole exception being a single comment at the WGIG in 2004 by an ISC representative, who argued in favor of a primary role for governments in this area. This comment, however, occurred prior to the significant increase in Chinese engagement with the IETF, and it is also contradicted by subsequent Chinese approaches to internet standards governance at the regional and domestic levels, where non-state actors have taken active roles in development. However, the Chinese government has clearly not internalized the privatized governance norm in relation to global IPS and DNS governance. Here, Beijing’s

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dissatisfaction with the norm has been variable, but throughout the norm’s internalization phase it has attempted to either replace this norm with the state authority norm or – later in this phase – weaken it within ICANN. Beijing’s dissatisfaction with privatized governance of the global IPS and DNS was strongest in 2004 at the WGIG, where Chinese government representatives argued forcefully for state actors to enjoy exclusive authority over the internet’s global root. These efforts continued, less forcefully, in the second phase of the WSIS and in the IGF, UN, ITU and NETMundial. Conversely, however, Beijing returned to its subordinate position in ICANN’s GAC in 2009 and increased its engagement with ICANN. China has also conformed to the privatized governance norm by remaining within the global internet root, and its opposition to privatized governance has moderated slightly, with Chinese government representatives arguing in later ICANN meetings that the IANA transition should result in governments being granted equal power relative to non-state actors within ICANN, rather than that they should have greater power. Beijing has also continued to tacitly accept the participation of Chinese non-state actors within ICANN and related bodies, and within policy organizations. It seems unlikely that the Chinese government has come to genuinely accept the legitimacy of non-state actor authority over the global IPS and DNS, however, despite its varying dissatisfaction. Rather, it is more likely that it simply does not have the material power or ideational support to engineer the norm’s replacement in this area. Chinese non-state actors have arguably deepened the degree of their acceptance of the privatized governance norm during its internalization phase, however, as growing non-state actor participation in global level regime organizations suggests. Chinese private sector actors, despite their relatively low levels of engagement with ICANN and related bodies, have nevertheless sustained their participation within these organizations, continued to operate within the global root, and have made no clear statements opposing non-state actor authority in global IPS and DNS governance in either administrative or policy organizations. Relative to the private sector, Chinese civil society involvement in administrative organizations indicates a deeper level of acceptance of the privatized governance norm, as demonstrated by more active involvement (including sponsorship and increased attendance levels) at ICANN meetings, increased participation in policy development within ICANN’s subsidiary bodies, and more significant positions being held by Chinese civil society representatives in ICANN’s internal bureaucracy. Chinese civil society organizations continue to operate China’s IPS and DNS within the global root – save for the apparently temporary external operation of Chinese IDNs. This suggests that Chinese non-state actors, particular Chinese civil society actors, have increasingly internalized the norm in global IPS and DNS governance, genuinely accepting its appropriateness in this context. Chinese non-state actor engagement with policy organizations in the privatized governance norm’s internalization phase has also been sustained, and civil society representatives have assumed positions within the IGF’s MAG. Nevertheless, comments by Chinese non-state actors in policy organizations have tended to either be ambivalent about privatized governance, or critical of it. Criticism of non-state actor authority is evident in the ISC representatives’ statements in the WGIG and the IGF, and by civil society actors at the NETMundial meeting – which in all instances called for governments to have a greater role in internet

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governance. Despite such occasional comments, however, the pattern of Chinese non-state actor engagement with global IPS and DNS governance has illustrated increased participation and generally implicit support for privatized governance. Arguably, Chinese non-state actors have come to genuinely accept the appropriateness of non-state actor authority in this context. Unlike global IPS and DNS governance, the Chinese government has not indicated any dissatisfaction towards the privatized governance norm in regional IPS and DNS governance during the norm’s internalization phase. In fact, Beijing’s engagement with APNIC has slightly increased during this time, although the low level of engagement suggests that it remains largely unconcerned with privatized governance at the regional level. This lack of concern suggests, perhaps, that Beijing has internalized the norm’s appropriateness at the regional level to some extent. However, the degree of support for this norm in regional IPS and DNS governance is stronger with Chinese non-state actors. They have remained active in regional IPS and DNS governance during the privatized governance norm’s internalization phase, particularly with respect to Chinese civil society participation within APNIC and the APTLD. Chinese civil society has also been active in the APrIGF since this organization was founded. The fact that Chinese non-state actor engagement with regional level IPS and DNS organizations, and with the APrIGF, has been increasing over time suggests a high degree of acceptance and internalization within the Chinese private sector and Chinese civil society of the norm's appropriateness in this area. Continuing Chinese acceptance of the privatized governance norm in domestic IPS and DNS governance is also evident in the norm’s internalization phase. China’s domestic regime remains centered in the CNNIC, and the Chinese government has extended non-state actor authority by authorizing CONAC to govern some of China’s IDNs. This suggests that the Chinese government continues to support privatized governance in domestic IPS and DNS governance, at least in its localized form with non-state actor authority clearly subordinate to that of the Chinese government. However, as noted above, Beijing’s support for a significant degree of non-state actor authority in its domestic regime may simply be because it can so readily influence the domestic internet governance through law, a coercive state apparatus, and CCP influence over non-state actors within domestic internet governance organizations. For Chinese non-state actors, it seems clear that they continue to genuinely accept their own rights to some authority within China’s domestic internet governance regime.

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11. China & The Multi-Stakeholder Governance Norm

China’s roles towards the multi-stakeholder governance norm have varied across governance levels and some issue areas, but solely due to when Chinese engagement commenced, and the underlying reasons for China’s roles are relatively simple. As noted in chapter 5, internet standards governance is not multi-stakeholder at the global level, therefore this chapter focuses only on IPS and DNS governance. At the global level, China was not a norm-entrepreneur because it did not actively contribute to the multi-stakeholder governance norm reaching its global tipping point. Thus, it has been a norm-taker across the multi-stakeholder governance norm’s lifecycle, but a satisfied one. In regional IPS governance, China was a norm-entrepreneur because of its founding role in APNIC, and has since been a satisfied norm-maker. It wasn’t a norm-entrepreneur in regional DNS governance, however, because this governance wasn’t clearly established prior to the multi-stakeholder governance norm’s global tipping point. China has therefore been a norm-taker in this context, but a satisfied one. Domestically, China’s early establishment of a multi-stakeholder regime has resulted in it being a norm-entrepreneur and consequently a satisfied norm-maker. The underlying factors behind China’s various roles are straightforward. For that reason, they are stated here at the beginning of the chapter because they explain Chinese behavior towards the multi-stakeholder governance norm across its lifecycle and across various different governance levels. Multi-stakeholder governance is in the material interests of the Chinese government, private sector, and civil society because it justifies their right to participate in internet governance and enhances the quality of administration and policy development. Similarly, it is in each of these stakeholder group’s ideational interest, as they all believe in the underlying justification for multi-stakeholder governance – that it improves the quality and legitimacy of governance. Because multi-stakeholder governance is in the interests of the Chinese government, material and ideational structural factors do not play a large role in the dissertation's explanation for China's roles towards the norm. It should be noted, however, that the same structural factors that apply to the privatized governance norm also relate to the multi-stakeholder governance norm. The sole exception is that global ideational structure is more in supportive of multi-stakeholder governance than it is towards non-state actor authority, as indicated by broad acceptance of the concept within the more state-centric UN and ITU and across other global governance issue areas (UNGA 2002; Hemmati, Dodds & Enayati 2002; ITU 1998b; Vallejo & Hauselmann 2004)

a. China’s Roles During the Norm Emergence Phase In global IPS and DNS governance, China cannot be regarded as a norm-entrepreneur because it was not active in the establishment of early IPS and DNS governance. As noted in the previous two chapters, no Chinese actors were involved in early global level IPS and DNS governance, or in the IAHC attempt to relocate the global root, or in the establishment of ICANN. Instead, it was primarily US stakeholders, particularly the US government, which acted as norm-

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entrepreneurs by actively developing a multi-stakeholder regime – even if it was not initially described explicitly in those terms. China is best described as a norm-taker because it wasn’t an active contributor to the emergence of multi-stakeholder governance in global IPS and DNS governance. In that respect, China had very little engagement with multi-stakeholder governance prior to the norm reaching its global tipping point in 1998. Chinese actors were not involved in global level IPS or DNS governance prior to ICANN’s establishment, beyond their interaction with the US actors that governed these systems before ICANN’s establishment. At the regional level, China can, however, be argued to be a norm-entrepreneur with regional IPS governance because of its founding role with APNIC. APNIC was founded in 1995 with its implicitly multi-stakeholder governance model and, in fact, the organization’s founding members included Chinese government, private sector and civil society actors. The involvement of Chinese actors in APNIC’s founding is the first clear indication of Chinese government, private sector or civil society support for the multi-stakeholder governance norm, as even domestic Chinese internet governance did not acquire an explicitly multi-stakeholder character until 1997. That said, beyond membership in APNIC there is limited further evidence of Chinese engagement with APNIC’s multi-stakeholder governance processes prior to the norm reaching its global tipping point. China cannot be regarded as a norm-entrepreneur in regional DNS governance, however, as the APTLD was only established in 1998 – after the multi-stakeholder governance norm’s tipping point – and in any event it is not expressly constituted as a multi-stakeholder body. With China’s domestic IPS and DNS governance regime, China can be described as having been a norm-entrepreneur because the multi-stakeholder character of the CNNIC was established just before the multi-stakeholder governance norm reached its global tipping point. Prior to the CNNIC’s formation, the IPS and DNS in China were only governed by a single stakeholder group – the nominally civil society CAS. Presumably the Chinese government was involved in this process, and possibly some private sector actors, but not in any formal or publicly-recorded manner. That said, it is almost certain that actors from these two groups were engaged in IPS and DNS administration in the sense of managing their own networks or domain name allocation businesses. In any event, it was only when the Leading Group on Informatization authorized the CAS to formally establish the CNNIC that China’s IPS and DNS governance regime acquired an overtly multi-stakeholder character – incorporating Chinese government, private sector and civil society representatives into the CNNIC's highest organs, namely its Steering Committee and Expert Committee. Because the CNNIC was formed in 1997, and the multi-stakeholder governance norm reached its global tipping point in 1998, it can be argued by the barest of margins that China was a thus a norm-entrepreneur with respect to multi-stakeholder governance at the domestic level.

b. China’s Roles During the Norm Cascade Phase Because China was not actively involved in the multi-stakeholder governance norm’s emergence in global IPS and DNS governance, it became a norm-taker

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when the norm reached its global tipping point in 1998. Throughout the norm’s cascade phase it appears to have been a relatively satisfied norm-taker. When ICANN was established in 1998, the Chinese government's participation in the GAC from then until 2001 implicitly indicated its acceptance of multi-stakeholder governance, as did Chinese government attendance at earlier ICANN meetings. Beijing’s GAC withdrawal in 2001 could be construed as occurring in protest of multi-stakeholder governance, but the reasons for China’s withdrawal are more likely due to the Chinese government’s dissatisfaction with the US authority and privatized governance norms, rather than with multi-stakeholder governance. Beijing’s willingness for an ICANN meeting to take place in China during this phase of the norm’s lifecycle, and for Chinese non-state actors to continue to engage with ICANN following China’s GAC withdrawal, also indicates tacit acceptance of ICANN’s multi-stakeholder processes. Although not exclusively focused on internet governance, the ITU’s WSIS proposal called for ‘all partners’ to be included in the eventual Summits, and the UNGA resolution on the WSIS expressly called for different stakeholder classes to participate. As China was a party to these resolutions, they can be regarded as indirect indications of Chinese government support for multi-stakeholder internet governance. That said, Chinese government representatives did request for non-state actors to be excluded from working groups at the first WSIS Summit. Yet prior to this, in the preparatory phase of the first Summit, a Chinese government delegate stated that private sector and civil society actors were important participants in the WSIS, but also argued that policy issues should be addressed by governments. Thus, China’s hostility to non-state actors in WSIS working groups is most likely a reflection of its opposition to the privatized governance norm rather than multi-stakeholder governance itself. The Chinese government was also a signatory to the WSIS Declaration of Principles, which included explicit support for multi-stakeholder internet governance. Chinese non-state actor involvement in global IPS and DNS governance during the multi-stakeholder governance norm’s cascade phase also indicates support for multi-stakeholder governance. During this time, private sector and civil society actors had limited but sustained participation in ICANN and its related bodies and, in the case of Chinese civil society, relatively active involvement in ICANN meetings and in the bureaucracy of ICANN and its subsidiary bodies. This engagement with global level administrative organizations indicates implicit acceptance of multi-stakeholder governance. Nevertheless, Chinese non-state actors did not directly comment on the norm during its cascade phase in ICANN or its related bodies. This is also true with respect to Chinese non-state actor involvement in the first phase of the WSIS. Although a few private sector and civil society representatives attended this first phase, none of them made any direct comments on multi-stakeholder governance. In regional IPS governance, because China was a norm-entrepreneur in the norm emergence phase, it can be described as subsequently becoming a norm-maker, and appears to be a relatively satisfied one. Chinese stakeholders from all three groups remained members of APNIC during this time, and both private sector and civil society representatives were active in small numbers in APNIC conferences at this time, discussing policy issues and competing for internal APNIC positions.

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In addition, both Chinese businesses and civil society organizations sponsored APNIC conferences between 1998 and 2004 – collectively providing sponsorship of almost every conference held during this period. Chinese civil society actors retained positions on APNIC’s peak body across the multi-stakeholder governance norm’s cascade phase. The involvement of Chinese non-state actors in APNIC’s activities suggests both ongoing conformity to the norm in regional IPS governance, and a substantial level of acceptance of it. This acceptance does not appear to be particularly enthusiastic in the case of the Chinese government, but nor are there any clear indications of dissatisfaction with multi-stakeholder governance in this context from it or any Chinese non-state actors. In the multi-stakeholder governance norm’s cascade phase, China cannot be regarded as either a norm-maker or a norm-taker in regional DNS governance, as the only regional level organization of which China is a part is the APTLD – which was only established in 1998 and is not expressly constituted as a multi-stakeholder body. Thus, multi-stakeholder governance largely does not apply in this context. Domestically, China’s early status as a norm-entrepreneur in Chinese IPS and DNS governance means that it can be described as a norm-maker after 1998. China appears to be satisfied with multi-stakeholder governance at the domestic level, as domestic IPS and DNS governance continues to be operated by the multi-stakeholder CNNIC, and during this phase of the norm’s lifecycle, the ISC was created as an expressly multi-stakeholder body.

c. China’s Roles During the Norm Internalization Phase Since 2004, China has retained its various norm-taker and norm-maker roles towards the multi-stakeholder governance norm, and it has remained reasonably satisfied in these roles. The extent of Chinese acceptance of multi-stakeholder governance in internet governance, and the statements made by Chinese actors in administrative and policy organizations, suggests that China genuinely accepts the legitimacy of multi-stakeholder governance, and has arguably internalized it to a substantial extent. At the global level, Beijing’s return to ICANN’s GAC and its subsequently heightened level of engagement with high-level ICANN officials suggests its ongoing acceptance of multi-stakeholder governance. In addition, Chinese government representatives’ consistent attendance at ICANN meetings further indicates Beijing’s satisfaction with the multi-stakeholder elements of ICANN’s governance model. In that respect, the statements that Chinese government representatives began to make at ICANN meetings after the US announcement of the IANA transition clearly indicate Chinese government support for multi-stakeholder governance. In these comments, as noted, Chinese government calls for stronger government roles within ICANN were justified by reference to the need to enhance the multi-stakeholder character of ICANN. This strongly suggests that Beijing has internalized the multi-stakeholder governance norm, genuinely accepting its appropriateness in global IPS and DNS governance. In policy organizations, Beijing’s acceptance of multi-stakeholder governance has similarly been illustrated. The Chinese government’s forceful advocacy of the state authority norm in the WGIG also carried with it frequent acknowledgement that non-state actors had important – if not decision-making – roles to play in internet governance. Similarly, the Tunis Agenda reached at the end of the second

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WSIS phase acknowledged the need and value of multi-stakeholder internet governance. That Chinese private sector and civil society actors also participated in both the WSIS and its follow-up process in limited numbers also indicate a degree of tacit Chinese government support for multi-stakeholder governance. As a signatory to the Tunis Agenda, Beijing also agreed on the need for further multi-stakeholder discussion of internet governance in the IGF, and it has itself participated in the IGF for almost every year or its existence. Chinese government support for multi-stakeholder governance, however, is qualified by the facts that it pushed for non-state actor roles to be minimized in the IGF’s MAG, and that it stated the IGF’s mandate should not be renewed, in favor of an intergovernmental body continuing discussions of internet governance reform. While this indicates a degree of disapproval of the multi-stakeholder governance norm, Beijing’s attitude was mostly a response to non-state actor authority. Even in its calls for the IGF to be dissolved, Chinese government representatives stated their support for multi-stakeholder governance. Similarly, in 2012, a delegate called for increased participation from all stakeholders from the developing world, and in 2013 a series of statements by Chinese government delegates indicated support for multi-stakeholder governance itself. The partial ambivalence Beijing has expressed towards multi-stakeholder governance is also evident in its calls at the UN and ITU for internet governance to become a multilateral affair, which implies that it would be restricted to state actors, while continuing to support multi-stakeholder governance at the IGF and NETMundial. Overall, however, the Chinese government has been a relatively consistent supporter of multi-stakeholder governance within administrative and policy organizations, and its statements indicating disapproval of non-state actors are largely directed at these actors having authority over internet governance, rather than having participatory rights in that governance. In addition to this, Beijing has not sought to limit the degree of involvement by Chinese non-state actors with global multi-stakeholder internet governance processes. That China so consistently conforms to multi-stakeholder governance, and that that governance is almost always singled out as a beneficial mechanism in criticisms of the privatized governance norm, suggests that the norm has been internalized to a significant extent within the Chinese state. The Chinese private sector and civil society also appear to be relatively satisfied norm-takers with respect to this norm. There has been a strong and increasing level of engagement by Chinese non-state actors in ICANN’s meetings, in terms of attendance levels, sponsorship by Chinese organizations, and the level of active participation in these meetings. Similarly, Chinese non-state actor involvement in ICANN’s bureaucracy and in subsidiary bodies suggests that the Chinese private sector and civil society are supportive of multi-stakeholder governance. Few Chinese non-state actors have commented on multi-stakeholder governance in administrative organizations, however. That said, those that have commented are generally supportive of the norm. Chinese private sector and civil society representatives were also participants in the second phase of the WSIS and to a limited extent in WSIS follow up activities. They have been very active participants within the IGF and, in the case of civil society, in the APrIGF as well, Likewise, Chinese civil society actors were participants within the

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NETMundial meetings. While most of this participation has not provided direct evidence of support for multi-stakeholder governance, a few comments by Chinese civil society actors at the IGF, APrIGF and at NETMundial indicate support for the multi-stakeholder governance norm, and the pattern of engagement indirectly indicates this. Overall, it seems highly likely that Chinese non-state actors, particularly Chinese civil society actors, genuinely agree with the legitimacy of multi-stakeholder governance, and have internalized the norm’s appropriateness at the global level. At the regional level, Chinese conformity with the multi-stakeholder governance norm in APNIC has continued, and there is no indication that China is dissatisfied with multi-stakeholder governance within this organization. The fact that Chinese actors from each stakeholder group remain members of APNIC illustrates China’s ongoing conformity to, and acceptance of, multi-stakeholder governance. This acceptance does not appear enthusiastic on the part of the Chinese government and private sector, however, given their relatively limited participation in APNIC. Conversely, Chinese civil society has had a consistently high level of participation within APNIC, being active in APNIC's Executive Committee throughout the multi-stakeholder governance norm’s internalization phase, and active participants in APNIC’s policy development processes and at APNIC conferences. Aside from this indirect evidence of continued Chinese conformity to and support for the norm in APNIC, one Chinese civil society representative has commented directly on multi-stakeholder governance in the organization. Li Xiaodong, representing the CNNIC, gave a detailed statement at APNIC 28 about the benefits of the IGF's multi-stakeholder governance model. Overall, this suggests that China has genuinely accepted the appropriateness of multi-stakeholder governance in regional IPS governance. Likewise, China appears to remain a satisfied norm-maker at the domestic level during the norm internalization phase of the multi-stakeholder governance norm. China’s domestic regime continues to be multi-stakeholder in character and, since the ISC was founded, a range of further provincial and municipal level Internet Societies have been established with governance structures that are multi-stakeholder in character. With the exception of CONAC's establishment as an exclusively civil society body, there have been no domestic actions taken by the Chinese government or other actors that have diminished the operation of multi-stakeholder governance in China's domestic regime. That said, the Chinese White Paper on the Internet fails to mention multi-stakeholder governance directly, despite stating that China's domestic regime is consistent with 'international practices', and commenting on the ISC's role in internet industry self-regulation in China. Nevertheless, it remains the case that at the domestic level China has not altered its role, and remains a norm-maker in relation to the multi-stakeholder governance norm. Arguably, the extent of multi-stakeholder internet governance activities within China, and the duration of Chinese acceptance of the norm at the domestic level, means that China genuinely accepts the appropriateness of multi-stakeholder governance and has internalized it to a significant degree within its domestic regime.

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12. China & The State Authority Norm

The final norm the dissertation analyses Chinese engagement with is the state authority norm. This chapter argues that China has been a norm-entrepreneur in relation to this norm by establishing Beijing’s ultimate authority over domestic IPS and DNS governance within China, by advocating for state authority to replace the US authority norm as the regulator of ultimate authority over the global internet root, and by advocating for state authority to either replace the privatized governance norm or at least to weaken it by granting state actors equal or greater authority in internet governance. China has not advocated for the state authority norm at the regional level. Unlike the other norms analysed by the dissertation, the state authority norm has not been established in internet governance and remains in its norm emergence phase. Thus, China has remained a norm-entrepreneur even though it has established the norm in its domestic internet governance regime. It is largely the Chinese government that has actively advocated for greater government authority – Chinese non-state actors have generally not done so, save for a few isolated comments in policy organizations. Given the nature of the state authority norm, China’s advocacy for it is intertwined with its opposition to both US government authority and non-state actor authority. For that reason, much of this chapter’s content is similar to that within chapters 9 and 10. To avoid unnecessary repetition, this chapter refers back to the more detailed analysis in these earlier chapters where possible. The Chinese government's adoption of a norm-entrepreneur role towards the state authority norm is due to its material interest in greater power over internet governance, and its ideational interest in advancing state equality and primacy in global governance. At the global level, China’s commencement of its norm-entrepreneur role towards the state authority norm in 2001 is argued to have occurred due to Beijing's changing interest assessments and changing structural circumstances, which were illustrated in detail in the previous chapter on the US authority norm. China has remained a norm-entrepreneur with the state authority norm for the same reasons it has been unable to replace US government authority or weaken the privatized governance norm, that is, due to Beijing’s lack of material power and insufficient ideational support amongst other actors in world politics. Given these circumstances, and assuming the US government does transition its authority in 2015, it will likely become more difficult for China in the future to establish greater government authority in global IPS and DNS governance. That China has not advocated for the state authority norm at the regional level is arguably due to the same reasons it is indifferent to privatized governance at that level – it has no strong preference over regional internet governance, and structural constraints render it incapable of achieving its goals at this level. China commenced its domestic norm-entrepreneur role in 1997, when the Leading Group on Informatization asserted Beijing’s ultimate authority over domestic IPS and DNS governance, and did so because the state authority norm is in the Chinese government’s material and ideational interests for the same reason it is at global level – it grants Beijing greater authority, and it arguably conforms to Chinese government’s beliefs in the appropriateness of state control of domestic

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governance. It has since retained this role as the state authority norm has not reached its global tipping point. For Chinese non-state actors, they have passively accepted strong government authority in domestic Chinese government because it is not in their material interest to oppose their government, as this could jeopardize their role in domestic internet governance, and domestic non-state actors do not have sufficient material power to resist Beijing.

a. China’s Roles During the Norm Emergence Phase Prior to 2001, the Chinese government was not an active proponent of the state authority norm at the global level. However, since then Beijing has been an active norm-entrepreneur through its advocacy for the privatized governance norm's replacement with exclusive government authority, or at the very least for non-state actor authority to be weakened by strengthening the role of governments in global IPS and DNS governance. This norm-entrepreneur role can only be ascribed to the Chinese government from 2001 onwards, because – as noted in relation to the US authority and privatized governance norms – Beijing expressed no dissatisfaction towards existing norms until that year. The withdrawal of the Chinese government from ICANN’s GAC thus indicates the commencement of China’s norm-entrepreneur role towards the state authority norm. Since the Chinese government's withdrawal from the GAC, it has sustained its advocacy for greater government authority, but has largely done so without the support of the Chinese private sector or civil society, despite a few comments by from ISC representatives at the WGIG and IGF, and a few comments by CNNIC representatives and a Chinese lawyer at NETMundial, made in support of greater government involvement in internet governance. Beijing’s commencement of advocacy for the state authority norm in 2001 likely began because stronger state authority over internet governance was in the Chinese government’s material interest, as it would grant them greater power over the technical internet. This was also likely in Beijing’s ideational interest as well, due to Chinese beliefs in the sovereignty equality of states and beliefs that governments are entitled to greater authority than non-state actors in global governance (Ginsburg 2010, p. 33, 34; Wang & Rosenau 2009, p. 13, 14). As noted in previous chapters, Beijing began to advance its preference for stronger state authority over internet governance due to its changing interest assessments towards global level IPS and DNS governance as its engagement with the technical internet deepened, as the structure of the international system and international society changed, and as the Chinese government’s awareness of both these changes and other states’ preferences towards internet governance became clearer. The various interests advanced by passive Chinese government acquiescence to the US authority and privatized governance norms had already largely been achieved by 2001, and other interests could be better served by a more actively oppositional stance towards these norms. Similarly, China’s relatively stronger material power position in the international system by 2001 facilitated its commencement of a norm-entrepreneur role towards the state authority norm, and its ideational vulnerability had lessened dramatically since the early post-Cold War years. Beijing’s awareness of the extent of other states’ resistance to US

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government authority and, to a lesser extent, the privatized governance norm, had also risen by 2001 due to Chinese involvement in ICANN and in the ITU, and the UN’s efforts to establish the WSIS. These factors combined to grant Beijing greater freedom to advance its material interest in stronger state authority over the technical internet, and ideational interest in state equality and supremacy within global politics. Chinese non-state actors have not, however, similarly contested the US authority norm in favor of equal state authority – despite a few isolated statements to the contrary. As noted previously, this is largely because privatized governance is in Chinese non-state actors' material interests, and they also appear to genuinely accept its appropriateness. Thus, the state authority norm is not in their material or ideational interests. In addition, the relative passivity of Chinese non-state actors towards both US government authority and general state authority is explicable on the grounds that competing interests in maintaining good relations with various internet governance participants results in avoidance of overt opposition to both the US authority and state authority norms being the wisest choice of action. Although Beijing indicated its dissatisfaction with US government authority and privatized governance by leaving the GAC, and similarly indicated its preference for a stronger government role in internet governance in the first WSIS phase, it wasn’t until the WGIG that the Chinese government began to fully express its opposition to the US authority and privatized governance norms, and to outline its preference for greater authority for state actors in internet governance. As the WGIG progressed, the Chinese government delegation gradually increased the intensity with which it advocated for greater government roles in internet governance. In the fourth and final substantive WGIG meeting, Beijing most directly expressed its preference, and did so in the strongest terms it had done to date. The Chinese delegation put forward its proposal for the global IPS and DNS to be governed by a UN agency and explicitly stated that: “Internet resources ... should be jointly managed by all governments ... each state should have one vote. Private sector and the civil society and other stakeholders could widely participate in the discussion and express their advisory role. However ... they should have no decision-making power and right to vote on public policy issues” (WGIG 2005b). In the WGIG, therefore, the Chinese government clearly articulated not only that the US authority norm should be abolished and replaced with equal state authority over the internet’s global root, but also that non-state actor authority should be abolished almost entirely – forcefully arguing that only governments should be allowed to engage in policy-setting for the technical internet. The forceful behavior of the Chinese government in the WGIG is likely because the first phase of the WSIS provided China with its clearest indication of broad support for the abolishment of US government authority, and relatively widespread support for the replacement or weakening of the privatized governance norm. Knowing this, Beijing thus had greater freedom to advance its preferences. In addition to this, the US government's decision to invade Iraq had recently weakened its general international reputation (Brzezinski 2013, p. 70). The WGIG was also the first international forum in which the internet governance

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regime’s future was directly addressed, so it therefore provided the Chinese government with an excellent opportunity to press for its preferences to be recognized in internet governance. Interestingly, however, the Chinese government’s advocacy for the state authority norm has gradually moderated. At first this was mostly terms of the forcefulness with which it argues in favor of an exclusive government role in policy-setting within internet governance and against unilateral government authority. Beijing never repeated its preferences in such stark and forceful terms as it did at the WGIG. This is likely because Beijing has calculated that further aggressive advocacy is unlikely to result in equal state authority displacing the US authority and privatized governance norms, given that this strategy failed at the WSIS; continued aggressiveness would also likely have been counter-productive, unnecessarily alienating states and other actors with differing preferences in a context where the Chinese government did not have the material power to coercively impose its preferences. As noted in previous chapters, while Beijing’s growing material power has grown since the early Nineties, it hasn’t grown sufficiently to enable China to forcibly restructure the internet governance regime. Similarly, the Chinese government does not have sufficient ideational support amongst other states to engineer a coordinated replacement of US government and non-state actor authority. Following the WGIG, the Chinese delegation to the second WSIS Summit provided additional, but much less forceful, statements of Chinese opposition to the US authority norm. No direct Chinese government statements related to advocacy for the state authority norm to replace the privatized governance norm were made in the second Tunis Summit. After the WSIS, the Chinese government has made clear that it is committed to contesting the validity of US government authority and advocating for its replacement with the state authority norm, while similarly contesting the validity of non-state actor authority and advocating for its replacement or weakening. Beijing has frequently stated its desire for the US authority norm to be abolished in the IGF, even suggesting that the IGF had failed because it hadn't produced recommendations for this change in internet governance once its initial five-year mandate had ended. Despite China's return to the GAC in 2009, its government has continued to advocate for greater government authority at the IGF. Similarly, the White Paper on the Internet published by the Chinese government in 2010 indicates its continuing preference for greater government authority over the technical internet. The White Paper states that the Chinese government adopts the leading role within China's domestic regime which, in a supervisory sense, it does. However, as indicated in previous chapters, the Chinese government appears to be reasonably comfortable with the idea of non-state actors wielding penultimate authority over China’s domestic IPS and DNS, as well as in regional IPS and DNS governance. With respect to the global regime, the White Paper does reiterate China's stance that the UN should assume responsibility over the technical internet through a multilateral organ, and notes that governments should resolve policy issues related to the technical internet. Beijing has also sustained its advocacy for global IPS and DNS governance to be reformed in favor of state governments within the UN, ITU and at NETMundial. The Chinese government

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jointly submitted to the UNGA – alongside Russia, Tajikistan and others – a resolution related to internet security issues which included a clause calling for multilateral internet governance mechanisms. China also resubmitted this resolution to the ITU's WCIT in 2012. In 2014 it again proposed this resolution at the NETMundial meeting in Brazil, and made further statements arguing for a stronger government role in internet governance. However, over time it has moderated its argument that non-state actors should have no decision-making power over policy for the technical internet, arguing instead that governments should have greater or equal power relative to non-state actors, rather than that governments should have exclusive power. This is most evident in Chinese government statements in ICANN meetings occurring in 2014, after the US announcement of the impending IANA transition, where the Chinese government argued instead that governments should have a greater role within ICANN, but not greater authority than non-state actors or exclusive decision-making authority within ICANN. This, and the fact that non-state actors do have some decision-making power within China's domestic regime, may suggest that China's preference to traditional, exclusively state-centric authority is at least amenable to some non-state actor authority, if not equality with state actors' authority. Nevertheless, it is most likely that at the global level, Beijing continues to prefer non-state actors being granted authority only to engage in administrative and policy input capacities. It appears unlikely that China’s advocacy for the state authority norm will result in it displacing the US authority norm, although Beijing’s efforts can arguably be regarded as having put additional pressure on the US government to relinquish its authority over the technical internet. Instead, it looks like the US government will once again be able to leverage its remaining institutional power into achieving its preference for global IPS and DNS governance to be governed by a non-state actor-led regime. That said, given the Chinese government’s sustained pattern of advocacy for the state authority norm, it also seems likely that Beijing will continue to advocate for greater government authority once US government authority has been abolished. It appears unlikely, however, that the Chinese government will be able to successfully engineer the replacement of the privatized governance norm with the state authority norm, and fairly unlikely that it will be able to weaken non-state actor authority by establishing stronger government authority over global IPS and DNS governance. There is broader support for the privatized governance norm in the international community, and this means that China faces an uphill battle in its attempts to have this norm replaced or weakened. While beyond the scope of the dissertation to analyse in detail, it appears that illiberal states, and liberal states with a pluralist conception of sovereignty, support greater state authority in internet governance, but a coalition of liberal states with solidarist conceptions of sovereignty and a large number of non-state actors support privatized governance (Collins 2007; Mueller 2010, ch. 11). In particular there is deep resistance within the US and many other Western states to the idea that state governments should govern the internet (Mueller 2010, p. 217; NTIA 2014a; Rogers 2007, p. 6). Thus, there is much less support for China’s preferences amongst other state and non-state actors and a significant amount of opposition. China’s moderation of its

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argument regarding state authority within ICANN may, perhaps, reflect Beijing’s awareness of this. In addition to this, US and Western material power, and the combined material power of states that prefer a privatized internet governance system, precludes China from imposing its preferences in global IPS and DNS governance. Similarly, broader ideational structural factors do not favor Beijing. China's illiberal domestic political structure likely damages its credibility in advocating for the replacement or weakening of the privatized governance norm – at least amongst liberal states (MacKinnon 2011, p. 32; Rogers 2007, p. 6). China's gradual implementation and sustained development of the Great Firewall has also likely further damaged its credibility amongst these states (Diamond & Plattner 2012, pp. 166-70). Claims by predominantly US actors that a 'UN takeover' of the Internet would jeopardize its free and open character are rendered more persuasive by these attributes of China, even as the US government's own credibility has been weakened over the 21st Century and following the US spying revelations (Pfanner 2012). The US government's early-mover advantage in entrenching non-state actor authority, the resultant path dependence this has granted the privatized governance norm, the broad levels of support for this norm, and the ongoing weaknesses in China's relative material power and ideational support have been sufficient to constrain China from successfully implementing its preferences for stronger state authority over internet governance. In the future, if the US government does transition its authority to the ICANN community, these factors will probably make Chinese efforts to establish greater government authority even more difficult. Beijing has not advocated for the state authority norm at the regional level, and this is arguably for the same reasons that it has not advocated against the privatized governance norm at the regional level – it does not have any strong preferences towards regional internet governance, and it is structurally constrained from achieving its goals at this level due to a lack of material power over regional internet governance organizations and telecommunications infrastructure, and due ideational opposition from more liberal states in the Asia-Pacific. Chinese non-state actors, similarly to at the global level, do not have an interest in greater government authority at the regional level. Domestically, the Chinese government became an advocate for the state authority norm in 1997, when the Leading Group on Informatization asserted Chinese government authority over domestic Chinese IPS and DNS governance. Since that time it has remained a norm-entrepreneur, maintaining Beijing’s ultimate authority over China’s domestic internet. The Chinese government has not become a norm-maker, however, because the state authority norm has not reached its global tipping point. As with its behavior at the global level, Beijing’s support for the state authority norm at the domestic level is due to it being in its material interests, and because it likely genuinely believes that governments are the most appropriate authorities in internet governance. For Chinese non-state actors, while it is not in their material interest for Beijing to wield ultimate authority over the IPS and DNS in China, neither is it in their material interest to oppose the Chinese government – Beijing could easily divest these actors of their roles in domestic Chinese internet governance.

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13. Conclusion

This dissertation has aimed to answer the questions of whether China has been a norm-taker or a norm-maker in technical internet governance, and whether it is able to change the normative structure of the internet governance regime. Specifically, it examined the roles that China has adopted towards four core internet governance norms: the norm of US government authority, the privatized governance norm, the multi-stakeholder governance norm, and the emerging norm of equal state authority. It also analysed the factors shaping China’s roles, to determine whether China wanted to, or could, change the dominant norms in internet governance. Ultimately, the dissertation argued that China had largely been a norm-taker at the global level of internet governance, but more of a norm-maker at the regional and domestic levels. It has also attempted to establish a norm of greater government authority within internet governance at the global level. The roles China has adopted suggests that it does want to change some aspects of the current internet governance regime, seeking to remove US government authority and limit non-state actor authority over the technical internet, but is otherwise satisfied with the multi-stakeholder character of internet governance and the authority of non-state actors below the global level. China is nevertheless unable to implement the changes that it wishes to make, because other states and non-state actors do not share its interests sufficiently, and because China does not have the material power or ideational appeal necessary to impose its preferences in this area. The issue of Chinese engagement with internet governance was the focus of the dissertation for a few key reasons. As one element of contemporary global governance, understanding China’s involvement in internet governance is important because it helps to build a comprehensive understanding of China’s approach to global governance and its engagement with contemporary international society. This is significant because China is a rising power, growing in relative material power within the international system and therefore more able to influence the conduct of global governance and the evolution of international relations. Understanding Chinese engagement with technical internet governance is important because the internet is a highly significant technology, which influences global politics and human interaction across virtually every issue area and at almost every level of activity. Its technical governance is therefore an important component of contemporary global governance. It is also an area where a range of unusual governance practices occur. Analyzing Chinese engagement with these practices therefore helps contribute to our understanding of Chinese preferences towards emerging forms of global governance. In addition, our understanding of China’s involvement in the global governance issue area of technical internet governance is limited, with existing literature not examining the issue in sufficient empirical detail, nor expressly considering Chinese engagement with its broader, overarching normative structure. To build an answer to the dissertation's research questions, the dissertation developed a methodology grounded in a multi-causal theoretical perspective, which guided the dissertation’s explanation of state and other actors’ behavior, in terms of both their underlying motivations and the factors that constrain or

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facilitate their actions. The dissertation then drew upon Finnemore and Sikkink's norm lifecycle model to describe how core internet governance norms have evolved, and to help guide analysis of Chinese engagement with these norms as they developed. A definitional suite of four potential state roles towards global governance norms was also synthesized from a review of existing approaches in the norm-maker/taker literature and related studies, which enabled the roles China has adopted towards core internet governance norms to be accurately described at each phase of these norms’ lifecycles. Finally, the dissertation outlined its methods, describing how it employed a structured approach to identifying which facts were relevant to answering its primary research questions that was based on methods within the norm-maker/taker and compliance literatures, as well as how it acquired these facts – by adopting the use of qualitative documentary analysis to generate data from existing documents and by employing some basic quantitative methods to collate some of the data drawn from existing documents. Following this, the dissertation provided some background information on the technical internet, its governance and its history – along with an overview of the contemporary technical internet governance regime. It defined technical internet governance as comprised of three more specific sub-issues – internet-specific technical standards, the internet protocol allocation system, and the domain name allocation system. The US-centric history of the technical internet and its early governance was outlined to illustrate how contemporary internet governance came to exist, and indicate how its core norms arose. The internet governance regime’s structure was then analysed, with the regime divided into two broad groups of administrative organizations and policy organizations, which administer and set policy for the technical internet, or contribute to policy development and debate the regime’s future, respectively. Drawing upon the preceding review of technical internet governance and existing studies of internet governance norms, the dissertation identified three core internet governance norms that regulate how authority over internet governance is allocated, and which justify which actors may participate in that governance. Similarly, background information, existing studies, and the dissertation’s own research also contributed to the identification of a fourth emerging norm that challenges existing norms, seeking to reorient how authority is allocated in internet governance. These four norms were the norm of US government authority over the technical internet, the norm of privatized internet governance, the multi-stakeholder governance norm, and the equal state authority norm – this last norm was identified as an emerging norm that some actors, including the Chinese government, have sought to have replace the US authority norm, and replace or weaken the privatized governance norm. China’s engagement with the internet governance regime was then analysed, with a focus on how this engagement shed light on Chinese relationships towards core internet governance norms. To deepen its analysis of China’s involvement with internet governance, and to ensure it highlighted Chinese relationships towards its core norms, Chinese actors were analysed as belonging to one of three broad stakeholder groups – the government, private sector and civil society. As noted in the introduction, however, the independence of Chinese non-state actors – particularly civil society actors – is uncertain given the Chinese government’s

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strict controls on domestic Chinese society. Thus, the dissertation recognizes that some Chinese non-state actor behavior may not genuinely reflect these actors’ preferences, and that there is a degree of uncertainty in its related arguments and conclusions. These qualifications aside, Chinese stakeholders’ engagement with internet governance was analysed across three broad areas, examining Chinese behavior and statements within domestic Chinese internet governance, within administrative organizations at global and regional levels, and within key policy organizations at global and regional levels. The roles Chinese actors had adopted towards core internet governance norms was then explicitly examined, along with the factors that shaped these roles. Overall, this dissertation argued that China has been more of a norm-taker in technical global internet governance than it has been a norm-maker, but it has also highlighted the complex and dynamic nature of Chinese engagement with core internet governance norms. At the global level, China played no active role in the emergence of US government authority, privatized governance or multi-stakeholder governance norms in the internet governance regime, and was therefore not a norm-entrepreneur towards them. Instead China adopted a passive, and initially a satisfied, norm-taker role towards these norms. China initially accepted the US government’s authority over the technical internet without complaint because it had a strong interest in acquiring access to the US-based internet, as this helped to advance broader material interests in technological progress and economic growth, as well as ideational interests in improving China’s internationalist image and maintaining the Chinese government’s domestic legitimacy. In addition, structural constraints, in the form of material power weaknesses relative to the US and the PRC’s ideational vulnerability in the immediate post-Cold War era, meant that China had little choice but to accept US government authority over the technical internet. The same factors shaped China’s early and passive norm-taker role towards the privatized governance norm in global IPS and DNS governance, although in the case of Chinese non-state actors this norm was also in their own material interest, granting them the right to authority over internet governance, and was arguably ideationally supported by them due to socialization pressures from engagement with the US and transnational technical internet community. Conversely, China’s early, passive norm-taker role towards non-state actor authority in internet standards governance is due to Beijing having no strong preference over how this governance activity is conducted, while Chinese non-state actors have a clear material interest in the norm in this context as it justifies their right to authority. For the multi-stakeholder governance norm, China’s early, passive norm-taker role is due simply to multi-stakeholder governance being in the material interests of Chinese actors, as it justifies their right to participate in internet governance, and it is arguably the case that Chinese actors genuinely believe in the value of multi-stakeholder governance as a quality-enhancer for administration and policy development. Since the US authority, privatized governance and multi-stakeholder governance norms reached their global tipping points in 1998, China has retained its norm-taker status towards them at the global level, and continued to conform to each of them during their norm cascade phases – from 1998 to 2004. However, the

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Chinese government gradually transformed from a passive, and apparently satisfied, norm-taker of the US authority norm and the privatized governance norm in global IPS and DNS governance into a dissatisfied norm-taker in 2001. This shift in attitude was accompanied by the Chinese government becoming a norm-entrepreneur in relation to the emerging state authority norm, seeking to have it replace US government authority and either replace or weaken privatized governance in global IPS and DNS governance. Conversely, Chinese non-state actors continued to be relatively passive norm-takers towards the US authority and privatized governance norms, and both the Chinese government and Chinese non-state actors remained passively norm-takers towards non-state actor authority in internet standards governance and multi-stakeholder governance. The reasons Beijing shifted from a satisfied to a dissatisfied norm-taker in these contexts, and became a norm-entrepreneur in favor of the emerging state authority norm, are because its initial interests in securing internet access – as well as the broader interests this served – had largely been achieved by 2001. As a result, so long as China continued to remain within the global internet root, it had greater freedom to pursue other interests. The Chinese government’s subsequent behavior and statements suggest that it has a strong material interest in securing greater power over global IPS and DNS governance, and arguably an ideational interest in preserving state equality and supremacy within global governance. These interests came to the fore in Beijing's interest assessments after 2001. In addition to this, China's growing relative material power and acceptance within the international community have strengthened its ability to pursue its preferences in global governance, while Beijing’s heightened awareness of other actors’ preferences towards internet governance encouraged it to pursue the abolishment of US government authority, and the replacement or weakening of the privatized governance norm in global IPS and DNS governance. As a result, the Chinese government gradually began to oppose these norms at the global level during the norm cascade phase of their lifecycles, and to gradually begin active support of the emerging state authority norm. Chinese non-state actors did not join the Chinese government in gradually transitioning to dissatisfied norm-takers towards the US authority norm and the privatized governance norm in global IPS and DNS governance during these norm’s cascade phase, however. In regard to US government authority, it seems likely that Chinese non-state actors would prefer an alternative to it, but they haven’t expressed any opposition due to stronger interests in maintaining good relations with US actors and internet governance organizations, with the Chinese government itself, and because of their lack of material power. With privatized governance in global IPS and DNS governance, Chinese non-state actors’ apparent satisfaction with the norm in this context is likely due to the norm being in their material interests – granting them the right to authority over this governance. Arguably, privatized governance in this context is in Chinese non-state actors’ ideational interests as well – they likely genuinely believe it is an appropriate form of structuring internet governance. The fact that Chinese non-state actors, and particularly Chinese civil society actors, have been actively engaged with internet governance organizations during the privatized governance norm’s cascade phase indicates that Chinese society is more satisfied with non-

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state actor authority than the Chinese government, at least in relation to global IPS and DNS governance. The Chinese government’s apparent satisfaction with the privatized governance norm in internet standards governance at the global level is for the same reason as its satisfaction in the norm’s emergence phase – Beijing doesn’t appear to have a strong preference over how internet standards governance is conducted. For Chinese non-state actors, the norm in this context serves their material interests. Arguably, all three Chinese stakeholder groups began to genuinely accept the appropriateness of non-state actor authority in internet standards governance during the norm’s cascade phase, if not earlier, given that there have been no clear indications of dissatisfaction, suggesting that it has acquired a ‘taken-for-granted’ quality, and has been internalized by Chinese actors. Similarly, China’s continuing satisfaction with the multi-stakeholder governance norm at the global level is due to the norm being in the material and arguably ideational interests of all three of China’s stakeholder groups, and was likely internalized by China before or at least during this phase of the norm’s lifecycle. During the norm internalization phase of the US authority, privatized governance and multi-stakeholder governance norms at the global level, which began in 2004, China has retained its various satisfied and dissatisfied norm-taker roles – although the Chinese government has moderated the degree of its dissatisfaction with non-state actor authority in global IPS and DNS governance, and has done so for the same underlying reasons as drove Chinese behavior during these norm’s cascade phases. China has also remained a norm-entrepreneur in relation to the state authority norm. The Chinese government has much more actively opposed US government authority and the privatized governance norm in global IPS and DNS governance since 2004, forcefully registering its disapproval at the WGIG, and outlining its preference for state governments to collectively replace the US government as the ultimate authority over the internet’s global root, and for governments to assume exclusive authority over policy-setting for the global IPS and DNS – displacing non-state actors’ authority. Beijing has maintained this advocacy up until the present day, although it has moderated it opposition to privatized governance, changing its argument over time from the need for exclusive state authority over global IPS and DNS policy-setting to one of greater or at least equal state authority relative to non-state actors. The Chinese government has remained a norm-taker towards the US authority norm and the privatized governance norm in global IPS and DNS governance and a norm-entrepreneur in its efforts to establish greater government authority in internet governance. Despite being motivated by the same interest considerations that drove it to oppose these norms and advocate for the state authority norm, ongoing US and Western material advantages, broad support for non-state actor authority in the global community, and reputational concerns plaguing the Chinese government have all meant that it is structurally constrained from successfully coercing or persuading international society into accepting the state authority norm. The US government has announced it will transition its authority to the global multi-stakeholder community in 2015, however, and while Chinese government advocacy for the US authority norm’s replacement is unlikely the sole cause of this, it can arguably be regarded as having contributed to the

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impending demise of US government authority. Chinese non-state actors have also maintained their passive norm-taker role towards the US authority norm during its internalization phase, for the same reasons as in the norm’s cascade phase of its lifecycle. Overall, China cannot be regarded as having internalized the US authority norm, because it is clear that neither the Chinese government nor Chinese non-state actors genuinely believe in the appropriateness of US government authority. With the privatized governance norm in global IPS and DNS governance, while Beijing has maintained its advocacy for the state authority norm to replace, or at least weaken, non-state actor authority in this context, and moderated its position towards privatized governance, it cannot be regarded as having genuinely come to accept the appropriateness of non-state actor authority in this governance. Instead, more moderate advocacy for the state authority norm to weaken this norm is likely more of a strategic move, and Beijing cannot reasonably be argued to have internalized the norm in this context. Chinese non-state actors, on the other hand, have arguably come to genuinely accept the appropriateness of privatized governance of the global IPS and DNS, given the relative lack of opposition from these actors and the sustained and increasingly levels of Chinese private sector and civil society involvement in this governance area. With the privatized governance norm in global internet standards governance, the continuing passive acceptance of the norm in this context, and the increasingly levels of Chinese participation in the IETF from individuals affiliated with all three stakeholder groups, suggests that privatized governance here has been genuinely internalized by China. Similarly, the continuing acceptance of the multi-stakeholder governance norm at the global level, increasing levels of participation by all three Chinese stakeholder groups in internet governance, and a number of statements indicating support for multi-stakeholder governance suggests it has also been internalized by China. At the regional level, China has had more of a proactive role in establishing the structure of internet governance. It has been a norm-entrepreneur and norm-maker in regard to the privatized governance norm in regional IPS governance, but has been a norm-taker in regard to the privatized governance norm in regional internet standards and DNS governance. It has similarly been a norm-entrepreneur and norm-maker with the multi-stakeholder governance norm in regional IPS governance. The multi-stakeholder governance norm does not apply to regional DNS governance, as this governance is underdeveloped at the regional level and conducted only by one stakeholder group – ccTLD operators within the APTLD; thus China has not engaged with it in this context. Likewise, multi-stakeholder governance does not apply to internet standards governance, as this is conducted at the global level only by natural persons. The US authority norm does not apply below the global level, as it regulates authority over the internet’s global root, and thus there has been no Chinese engagement with this norm at the regional level. Similarly, Beijing has not advocated for the greater government authority at the regional level. China’s norm-entrepreneur roles towards the privatized governance and multi-stakeholder governance norms in regional IPS governance is due to Chinese involvement – across all three stakeholder groups – in the founding of APNIC.

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This occurred prior to either of these norms reaching its global tipping point and thus, once this point was reached in 1998, China has become a norm-maker in this context. Beijing’s willingness to accept non-state actor authority in regional IPS governance is likely because it doesn’t have a strong preference towards how regional internet governance is conducted, as its attention is focused on changing the global structure of the internet governance regime. In addition, the same structural factors that constrain its behavior at the global level operate at the regional level as well. For Chinese non-state actors, their role in establishing the privatized governance norm in regional IPS governance is due to the norm being in their material interest, and likely due to their ideational support for the norm. For all three Chinese stakeholder groups, multi-stakeholder governance at the regional level is in their material and ideational interests, as it grants them the right to participate in governance and they arguably genuinely believe it improves the quality and legitimacy of administration and policy development. In the privatized governance and multi-stakeholder governance norm’s emergence phases, regional internet standards or DNS governance were not yet established, and thus no Chinese actors were norm-entrepreneurs in these contexts. In the norm cascade phase, Chinese actors’ roles as norm-entrepreneurs in establishing non-state actor authority and multi-stakeholder governance in regional IPS governance means that they can be described as norm-makers. China, across all three stakeholder groups, appears to be satisfied in these roles. Similarly, when regional internet standards and DNS governance were established, China became a norm-taker regarding the privatized governance norm in these contexts, and has been a satisfied norm-taker across all three stakeholder groups. As with China’s regional behavior in these norms’ emergence phases, the Chinese government appears satisfied with its roles because it doesn’t have any strong preferences towards regional internet governance, particularly given its structural constraints at this level, while the multi-stakeholder governance norm is in its material and arguably ideational interests. These factors also explain why the Chinese government has not advocated for the state authority norm at the regional level. For Chinese non-state actors, both privatized governance and multi-stakeholder governance are in their material interests and, given the sustained, high-level engagement of these actors with regional internet governance, they arguably genuinely accept the appropriateness of the privatized governance and multi-stakeholder governance norms at the regional level. Chinese roles and satisfaction have not changed after 2004, and thus in the norm internalization phase China’s regional roles have remained unchanged. The increasing levels of Chinese participation in regional internet governance, particularly from Chinese civil society, and the lack of any stated opposition to non-state actor authority and multi-stakeholder governance at this level, suggest that China has genuinely internalized these norms in this context. Domestically, China has also had a more proactive role towards core internet governance norms. China was a norm-entrepreneur with the privatized governance and multi-stakeholder governance norms in domestic Chinese IPS and DNS governance and has, since these norms reached their global tipping point, become a norm-maker. However China was a norm-taker with respect to non-state actor authority in internet standards governance, because this norm reached its global tipping point earlier in relation to this governance issue. China

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has also been a norm-entrepreneur with the state authority norm in domestic Chinese IPS and DNS governance, but as this norm remains in its emergence phase it has not become a norm-maker. The establishment of the CNNIC as a multi-stakeholder body that granted administrative and policy-setting authority for China’s IPS and DNS occurred prior to the privatized governance and multi-stakeholder governance norms reaching their global tipping point, and thus the Chinese government and civil society can be regarded as norm-entrepreneurs in this context. When these norms’ reached their global tipping point in 1998, China can therefore be described as a norm-maker. China was not a norm-entrepreneur with domestic internet standards governance, however, because despite such governance activity occurring within the CNNIC by 1997, the earlier global tipping point for the privatized governance norm in this governance issue renders China a norm-taker. Similarly, despite Beijing asserting its authority over domestic Chinese internet governance in 1997, it remains a norm-entrepreneur because this norm has not reached its global tipping point. China appears to be satisfied with the operation of the privatized governance and multi-stakeholder governance norms in its domestic internet governance regime, and has arguably localized or internalized them, respectively. Acceptance of non-state actor authority was initially in the material interests of the Chinese government to secure Chinese internet interconnection and thereby advance a range of related goals. Despite efforts at the global level to replace or weaken this norm, domestically Beijing appears to remain satisfied with the norm because it has been localized to ensure the government has ultimate, supervisory authority over Chinese internet governance – non-state actors’ authority is circumscribed by government supervision of, and roles within, the CNNIC and ISC, by Chinese legislation, and by the domestic political influence of the CCP. For Chinese non-state actors, their satisfaction with its domestic operation is explicable on the simple grounds that the norm is in their material interest, justifying their participation in domestic internet governance – though they may also genuinely believe in the democratic ideals underpinning this norm. With respect to multi-stakeholder governance, as with this norm at the global and regional levels, it is in the material and ideational interests of the Chinese government and Chinese non-state actors, because it improves, or at least is believed to improve, the quality of administration and policy development, and it also justifies the rights of non-state actors to participate in internet governance. For the state authority norm within China, Beijing’s imposition of it is due to it being in its material interests and belief that governments are the most appropriate authorities in internet governance, while Chinese non-state actors are likely unwilling to challenge Chinese government authority as it could jeopardize their role in domestic internet governance. Overall, the dissertation’s findings on Chinese roles towards core internet governance norms are significant because they contribute to a deeper understanding of Chinese engagement with internet governance, illustrating that despite the clear aim of Beijing to reform this area of global governance in favor of state rights, China overall has conformed to existing core internet governance norms and to various extents localized or internalized the privatized governance and multi-stakeholder governance norms. The dissertation also illustrates that the preference for greater state rights in internet governance appears largely limited

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to China's government, with Chinese non-state actors more enthusiastic supporters of non-state actor authority and multi-stakeholder governance. That the privatized governance norm has localized within China, and the multi-stakeholder governance norm has internalized in China, also demonstrates that China has had a dynamic relationship with the norms regulating the technical internet's governance, integrating them where appropriate and altering them where possible. Thus, the dissertation's empirical examination of China and its more theoretical analysis of Chinese engagement with core internet governance norms helps to fill an existing gap in the literature on China and the internet. This knowledge also facilitates our ability to predict how China may respond to future changes in the structure of internet governance, or what changes it may try to make itself. In particular, the upcoming IANA transition and resulting abolishment of US government authority in September, 2015 will alter the context in which Beijing's advocacy for the state authority norm occurs. From the dissertation's analysis, however, it is clear that the abolition of the US authority norm will not result in the Chinese government abandoning its norm-entrepreneurship, because China's preference is for stronger state authority in internet governance generally rather than just the removal of US government privileges. Nevertheless, China is likely to remain a norm-taker towards the privatized governance norm because it is unlikely in the near to mid-term future that Chinese material power will enable China to coerce global acceptance of this norm. Likewise, broad global support for non-state actor authority will continue to constrain China's state authority norm advocacy, and may become more constraining once US government authority is abolished. That said, the acceptance of the privatized governance and multi-stakeholder governance norms by China suggests that China will most likely seek to only weaken the privatized governance norm and will not attempt to reform multi-stakeholder governance. Beyond any structural factors constraining it from doing so, it seems unlikely that the Chinese government will try to exclude non-state actors from wielding any authority over the technical internet, but will be satisfied with states ultimately having greater authority than non-state actors – a preferred outcome that is likely to result in ongoing tension between the Chinese government and the internet governance regime. The dissertation's findings are also significant in a broader sense because they contribute to our understanding of what sort of great power China is likely to become. The findings provide evidence that Beijing will likely be rational and reasonably restrained in efforts to reform aspects of global governance it is unsatisfied with – firmly promoting its preferences, but not to the extent that it is unwilling to conform to existing norms or to compromise achievement of its goals. The dissertation also illustrates that despite its authoritarian tendencies, the Chinese government is partially open to Chinese non-state actors participating in global governance processes. Chinese non-state actors can and do participate in internet governance, and appear to have preferences towards its core norms that conflict with those of the Chinese government. That Beijing accepts this, and that Chinese non-state actors appear to genuinely believe in the appropriateness of non-state actor authority, indicates that China is willing to tolerate or adapt to the growing cosmopolitan trend in global governance (Wang & Rosenau 2009, p. 12; Weiss 2000, p. 796).

155

Ultimately, the contributions of the dissertation are that it helps fill an empirical gap in the literature on China's engagement with technical internet governance, and that it contributes to the broader literature on Chinese engagement with global governance. The dissertation also makes a modest contribution to the theoretical literature on state engagement with global governance, through its development of theoretically-informed classifications for state roles towards global governance norms. Hopefully, each of these three contributions will be of some benefit to other researchers. The dissertation has aimed to provide a reasonably comprehensive overview of China's engagement with internet governance and its core norms, but there are a number of limitations to its findings. The author’s incomplete knowledge of the Chinese language limits the dissertation’s analysis of domestic Chinese internet governance and Chinese language research, and the records of many internet governance organizations are either not publicly available or only partially reliable. These factors impact upon the depth of the dissertation’s analysis. Similarly, for reasons of space, the dissertation’s scope is narrowly focused on Chinese engagement with the most significant internet governance organizations and on four core internet governance norms it identifies, reducing the breadth of its findings. Reflecting these limitations, a range of possible avenues for further research exist which would complement the dissertation's findings. A more detailed examination of domestic Chinese perceptions of internet governance norms, for example, through analysis of Chinese language publications or interviews with Chinese participants in the internet governance regime would strengthen understanding of the differences between Chinese government and non-state actors’ preferences towards core internet governance norms. Broadening the scope of analysis to include consideration of more peripheral internet governance organizations would also advance the depth of our understanding of Chinese engagement with internet governance. Similarly, studies that explored Chinese engagement with other internet governance norms – such as those related to accountability or the end-to-end principle – or that examined China’s specific policy preferences towards technical internet governance issues, would supplement the dissertation’s findings. Expanding the scope of enquiry further to include Chinese engagement with technical global telecommunications governance or non-technical aspects of internet governance would also complement the dissertation's research, helping to build a more comprehensive view of China's engagement with the internet, global telecommunications and the governance of these systems.

156

Appendix 1: Chinese Participation in IETF Meetings

IETF Meeting

Year Chinese Sponsors/

Hosts

Total Chinese

Attendees*

Govt Private Sector

Civil Society

Unknown

1 1986 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1986 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1986 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 1986 0 0 0 0 0 0

5** 1987 NA NA NA NA NA NA 6 1987 0 0 0 0 0 0

7** 1987 0 NA NA NA NA NA 8 1987 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 1988 0 0 0 0 0 0

10 1988 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 1988 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 1989 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 1989 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 1989 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 1989 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 1990 0 0 0 0 0 0 17 1990 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 1990 0 0 0 0 0 0 19 1990 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 1991 0 0 0 0 0 0 21 1991 0 0 0 0 0 0 22 1991 0 0 0 0 0 0 23 1992 0 0 0 0 0 0 24 1992 0 0 0 0 0 0 25 1992 0 0 0 0 0 0 26 1993 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 1993 0 0 0 0 0 0 28 1993 0 0 0 0 0 0 29 1994 0 0 0 0 0 0 30 1994 0 0 0 0 0 0 31 1994 0 9 9 0 0 0 32 1995 0 0 0 0 0 0 33 1995 0 0 0 0 0 0 34 1995 0 3 0 2 1 0

35** 1996 NA NA NA NA NA NA 36 1996 0 0 0 0 0 0

37** 1996 NA NA NA NA NA NA 38 1997 0 0 0 0 0 0 39 1997 0 1 1 0 0 0 40 1997 0 0 0 0 0 0 41 1998 0 0 0 0 0 0 42 1998 0 0 0 0 0 0 43 1998 0 2 0 0 2 0

157

44 1999 0 0 0 0 0 0 45 1999 0 1 1 0 0 0 46 1999 0 0 0 0 0 0 47 2000 0 1 0 1 0 0 48 2000 0 7 0 5 1 1 49 2000 0 5 0 5 0 0 50 2001 0 3 0 1 2 0 51 2001 0 7 1 3 3 0 52 2001 0 16 0 5 10 1 53 2002 0 8 0 3 5 0 54 2002 0 14 0 5 9 0 55 2002 0 1 0 1 0 0 56 2003 0 1 0 1 0 0 57 2003 0 4 0 4 0 0 58 2003 0 1 0 0 1 0 59 2004 0 12 0 4 8 0 60 2004 0 2 0 1 1 0 61 2004 0 4 0 3 1 0 62 2005 0 6 0 3 3 0 63 2005 0 40 1 16 23 0 64 2005 0 28 0 20 8 0 65 2006 0 26 0 21 5 0 66 2006 0 45 0 31 14 0 67 2006 0 33 0 20 12 1 68 2007 0 44 5 29 10 0 69 2007 0 41 0 31 10 0 70 2007 Huawei

(Sponsor) 46 0 35 9 2

71 2008 0 22 0 17 5 0 72 2008 0 63 8 43 10 2 73 2008 0 28 0 18 2 8 74 2009 0 89 4 52 15 18 75 2009 0 133 8 69 26 30 76 2009 0 87 3 63 21 0 77 2010 0 127 5 61 24 37 78 2010 0 130 9 63 30 28

79*** 2010 Tsinghua University, CNNIC,

ISC (Hosts)

- China

Mobile, H3C, Rujie

Networks (Sponsors)

438 13 137 130 158

80 2011 0 153 15 72 18 48

158

81 2011 0 149 10 78 18 43 82 2011 0 150 7 82 21 40 83 2012 Huawei

(Sponsor) 152 6 82 22 42

84 2012 Huawei (Sponsor)

146 11 65 30 40

85 2012 Huawei, China

Telecom, Tsinghua

University (Sponsors)

137 14 69 24 30

86 2013 Huawei (Sponsor)

109 6 52 20 31

87 2013 Huawei (Sponsor)

137 12 54 36 35

88 2013 Huawei (Host)

- China

Telecom, Huawei

(Sponsors)

107 7 55 15 30

89 2014 0 103 6 57 21 19 90 2014 0 115 2 59 25 29 91 2014 0 120 2 74 26 18

Source: Author's own research into IETF Meeting Records Archive (IETF 2015). * The appendix likely understates the actual level of Chinese participation. IETF meetings do not directly record attendees’ country affiliation until IETF 73. In addition, IETF meeting records are incomplete and attendee registration is voluntary. Prior to IETF 73, Chinese attendees are identified as PRC citizens if two corroborating pieces of evidence exist (i.e. Chinese (Mandarin) name and country affiliation, .cn email address, affiliation with PRC-based organization, etc.). Post-IETF 73, country affiliation is used to identify Chinese attendees, although corroboration is used in instances where no country affiliation is given. ** No records exist for these meetings or records do not provide a corroborating piece of evidence (i.e. they only record name and no further information). *** IETF 79 is the only meeting held in China (Beijing).

159

Appendix 2: Chinese Authored RFCs & Chinese

Contributors to IETF Documents

a. Chinese Authored RFCs

1842 5836 6423 6661 6909 7109 1922 5852 6430 6696 6930 7110 3743 5866 6431 6697 6934 7121 4562 5919 6435 6705 6942 7123 4564 5930 6436 6715 6956 7130 4713 5949 6437 6723 6957 7136 4925 5993 6439 6734 6958 7138 5121 6023 6440 6737 6972 7139 5142 6036 6456 6751 6974 7140 5164 6041 6468 6769 6984 7148 5210 6043 6474 6776 6990 7150 5316 6052 6479 6777 7002 7152 5336 6053 6531 6791 7003 7156 5392 6098 6535 6792 7004 7172 5425 6141 6558 6798 7005 7178 5493 6144 6563 6828 7010 7179 5495 6145 6566 6829 7025 7180 5565 6159 6572 6843 7037 7227 5729 6205 6608 6855 7039 7244 5747 6219 6630 6856 7040 7269 5790 6232 6636 6866 7045 7333 5810 6264 6642 6867 7062 7349 5814 6273 6644 6879 7069 7388 5818 6279 6646 6883 7075 7411 5833 6378 6653 6898 7096 5834 6422 6654 6905 7098 Total: 154

Source: Author's own research derived from IETF Tools list of Chinese IETF document contributors (IETF Tools 2015a). Data is inclusive till end of 2014. Note that the IETF's statistical data generator returns some erroneous results, omitting some authors and attributing others' erroneous Chinese nationality. Each RFCs in this Appendix has been verified for authorship/co-authorship by PRC citizens.

This space is intentionally blank.

160

b. Chinese Contributors to IETF Documents

Summary by Stakeholder Group

Government Private Sector Civil Society Unknown Total 8 276 116 8 408

Chinese Contributors by Stakeholder & Name*

Government Private Sector Private Sector cont. Private Sector cont.

Baohong He Aijun Wang Liang Xia Yuanbin Yin

Fang Li Bill Huang Lianshu Zheng Yuanchen Ma Guoying Zhang Bin Gu Lianyuan Li Yuanjiao Liu

Hui Tian Bin Liu Lingli Deng Yuanlong Jiang Shihui Duan Bin Wang Lixing Wang Yue Qin

Shu Liu Bing Li Lizhong Jin Yungui Wang Yu Wang Bing Liu Lu Huang Yuqi Wang

Yunbin Xu Bo Gao Ma SuAn Yuxiang Hu Bo Wu Mach Chen Yuzhi Ma

Civil Society Brandon Li Mao Yang Zhang Fei Cathy Li Miao Lei Zhen Cao

Baoping Yan Cathy Zhou Michael Yan Zhenbin Li Baoxian Zhang Chen Li Mike Cheng Zhenqiang Li Bingkun Zhou Chengbin Shen Min Ye Zhibo Hu Binyang Liu Chongfeng Xie Mingui Zhang Zhihua Liu

Boxin Du Chu JunSheng Minpeng Qi Zhirong Zhang Ce Luo Chunju Shao Nan Wu Zhonghua Chen

Changqiao Xu Chunshan Xiong Ning Zong Zhonghui Yao Changqing An Claire Bi Oliver Huang Zhongyu Gu Chuanhuang Li Cui Wang Peng Fan Zhu Lei Chunming Wu DaCheng Zhang Peng Liang Zitao Wang

Cong Liu DaCheng Zhang Qi Chen Ziyao Cheng Congxiao Bao Dan Li Qian Wang

Depeng Jin Danhua Wang Qiandeng Liang Unknown De-Yun Gao Danping He Qiang Wu

Di Wu Dapeng Li Qiao Fu Diao Yongping Diao Yuping Dapeng Liu Qilei Wang Kui Huang Enhuan Dong Davey Song Qin Wu Liao Ming

Fei Song Dayong Guo Qiong Sun Linjian Song Gang Ren Deng Lingli Qiuchao Yi Meng Yu

Gengyu Wei Di Ma Rachel Huang Xiaohong Deng Guang Yao Dongnian Cheng Ran Chen Yi Bai

Guangwu Hu Duoliang Fan Renhai Zhang Zhiming Wang Haikuo Zhang Emily Chen Renwei Li

Hao Wang Emma Zhang Richard Li Hong Zhang Eric Wu River Huang

Hongke Zhang Fan Shi Rong Gu

161

Hong-Ke Zhang Fang Wei Rong Zhang Hongtao Li Fangwei Hu Rongbo Zhang

Hu Daoyuan Fatai Zhang Ruinan Sun Jiagui Xie Fei Zhang Ruiqian Jing

Jiahai Yang Feng Guo Ruiquan Jing Jianfeng Guan Feng Huang Ruobin Zheng

Jiang Dong Feng Zheng Sam (Zhongqi) Xia Jiankang Yao Fengyuan Zou Shanzhi Chen Jianping Wu Fortune Huang Shaowei Liu

Jie Huang Frank Feng Sheng Jiang Jie Zhang Frank Xia Shi Fan Jin Zhao Frankey Feng Shi Li

Jing Cheng Fu Qiao Shitao Li Jingguo Ge Fuyou Miao Shunwang Zhuang Juan Wei Gang Chen Sunshine Zhang

Jun Bi Gang Yan Tao Chou Kai Gao Guangming Yang Tao Han Ke Xu Guangtao Zhou Tao Lin Li Su Guangying Zheng Tao Sun

Lieguang Zeng Guoliang Han Tian Tian Ligang Dong Guozhen Cheng Tianfu Fu

Lin Guo Haibin Song Tianle Yang Linlin Zhou Haibo Wang Tianran Zhou Lishan Li Haiyan Zhang Tieying Huang

Long Zhang Han Li Tina Tsou Lu Sun Hao Chen Ting Ao

Mao Wei Hao Long Ting Liao Mi Zhang Haomian Zheng Vic Liu Ming Gao Haoxing Shen Wang Weijun

Mingchuan Zhang He Zekun Wang Zhiguan Mingwei Xu Hong Zhou Wei Cao

Nan Hua Hongjun Zhai Wei Chen Nan Wang Hongyu Li Wei Huang

Neng Geng Huang Hua Ye Wei Meng Neng Zhang Huafeng Wen Wei Song Ning Kong Huan Du Weibo Li Peng Wu Hui Deng Weiguo Hao Peng Zuo Hui Ji Weiping Xu

Prof. Jianyong Chen Hui Liu Weiqiang Cheng

Prof. Jun Zhang Hui Ni Weiwei Yang Qi Sun Hui Yang Wenhui Zhou

Qian Hualin Huiying Xu Wenjing Cao

Qin Wang Ian Foo Will (Shucheng)

Liu Qin Zhao Jacni Qin Xia Chen Sean Shen James Huang Xiafeng Ji

Shenghui Yan Jia He Xian Zhang

162

Shu Yang Jian Ding Xiangsong Cui Shuai Gao Jian Luo XianGuo Zhang

Wangyang Liu Jian Yang Xiaodong Duan Wanying Jia Jiang Sheng Xiaohu Xu Wei Gong Jiang Xingfeng Xiaojun Zhuang Wei Mao Jiangang Tong Xiaoming Chen Wei Mi JiangTao Hao Xiaoran Guan

Wei Quan Jianhua Gao Xihua Fu Wei Zhang Jianjie You Xin Li

Wei-Cheng Zhao Jianning Liu Xin Yang Weimin Lei Jianrui Han Xingfeng Jiang

Weiming Wang Jiao Kang Xingyue Zhou Weiqiang Sun Jie Dong Xinpeng Wei

Wendong Wang Jie Hu Xin-ping Wang Wenhong Wang Jiehui Hu Xinxin Zhang Wentao Shang Jin Li Xinzong Zeng

Xiali Yan Jin Peng Xiugang Wei Xiangyang Gong Jing Huang Xu Ye

Xiaodong Lee Jing Zhao Xuan He Xiaohan Liu Jinwei Xia Xudong Zhang

Xiaohong Huang Jishang Yang Xuehui Dai Xiaoping Zheng Jizhuang Zhao Xueqin Wei

Xing Li Judy Zhu Xuewei Wang Xing Zhou Julong Lan Xuhong Song Xirong Que Jun Sun Yan Ding

Yan Ma Junfang Wang Yang Bo Yan Zhang Junlin Zhang Yang Gao Yantao Sun Junru Lin Yang Shi

Ye Zhou Kai Liu Yang Wang Yi Sun Ke Li Yangbo Lin

Yichen Zhang Kepeng Li Yao Li Yong Cui Kepeng Li Yi Jiang Yong Li Kevin Yin Yi Lin

Yongli Zhao Kunkun Lou Yifan Chen You Wang Lanshan Zhang Yihong Huang

Yu Cao Le Tian Yinben Xia Yu Jiang Leaf Y. Yeh Ying Cheng Yu Zhai Lehong Niu Yisong Liu

Yuchi Chen Lei Li Yiyong Zha Yuefeng Ji Lei Miao Yizhou Li Zesong Fei Lennard Xiao Yong Luo Zhiwei Yan Li Xue Yongbing Fan Zhu Haifeng Li Zhang Yu Fu Zilong Liu Liang Fang Yu Mao

Source: Author's own research derived from IETF Tools List of Chinese IETF document contributors (IETF Tools 2015a). Data is inclusive till end of 2014. Note that the IETF's statistical data generator returns some erroneous results, including: failing to identify all Chinese contributors each time statistical data is generated,

163

duplicating others and attributing others' erroneous Chinese nationality. The Appendix has slightly more contributors than the number typically generated online, due to slightly different statistical data generated on multiple occasions. Each contributor is assumed to be a PRC citizen unless further information in their IETF profile indicates otherwise. Some duplicated authors and other erroneous results have been removed, see next section for list of removed contributors. * All names are as listed in the IETF Tools list, save that for duplicates of the same author one name has been selected over the other duplicates (which are illustrated in the section below).

This space is intentionally blank.

164

c. Contributors Removed from Appendix Section b. Name Removal Reason Name Removal Reason

Barry Leiba Not PRC Citizen NDSC Statistical

Generator Error

Bert Greevenbosch Not PRC Citizen P.R. CHINA Statistical

Generator Error

Bo Yang Duplicate of Yang

Bo Qiong Duplicate of Qiong

Sun

Contribution Statistical

Generator Error Rajiv Papneja Not PRC Citizen Dhruv Dhoddy Not PRC Citizen Robins George Not PRC Citizen

Fank Xia Duplicate of Frank

Xia Roni Even Not PRC Citizen

Frank Liang Xia Duplicate of Frank

Xia Sam Aldrin Not PRC Citizen Great Wall Asset

Management Corporation of

China Statistical

Generator Error Sam K. Aldrin Not PRC Citizen Huub van Helvoort Not PRC Citizen Senthil Kumal S Not PRC Citizen

Lee Xiaodong Duplicate of

Xiaodong Lee ShangHai Statistical

Generator Error

Lei Wang Not PRC Citizen Shenzhen Statistical

Generator Error Lei Zhu Not PRC Citizen Spencer Dawkins Not PRC Citizen

Li Lianyuan Duplicate of Lianyuan Li

State Key Laboratory of Networking

Statistical Generator Error

Li Zhenbin Duplicate of Zhenbin Li Suresh BR Not PRC Citizen

Liang Duplicate of Frank

Xia Susan Hares Not PRC Citizen

Liang Xia (Frank) Duplicate of Frank

Xia Switching

Technology Statistical

Generator Error

Linda Dunbar Not PRC Citizen Will Duplicate of Will (Shucheng) Liu

Maarten Vissers Not PRC Citizen Will Liu Duplicate of Will (Shucheng) Liu

Mach (Guoyi) Chen

Duplicate of Mach Chen Wu Chunming

Duplicate of Chunming Wu

Mach Duplicate of Mach

Chen Xiaodong Li Duplicate of Xiadong Lee

Malcolm Betts Not PRC Citizen Yong (Oliver)

Huang Duplicate of Oliver

Huang Mark I. Williams Not PRC Citizen Young Lee Not PRC Citizen

Milan Patel Not PRC Citizen Mishael Wexler Not PRC Citizen

165

Appendix 3: Chinese Involvement in ICANN Meetings

Meeting/Year

Chinese Sponsors/

Hosts*

Chinese Attendees (Total/Government/Priva

te Sector/Civil Society/ Unknown

Details of Chinese Participation**

1 (1999) ***

0 0 0 0 0 0 None

2 (1999) ***

0 0 0 0 0 0 None

3 (1999) ***

0 0 0 0 0 0 Government GAC representative attendance

at ICANN Board/GAC Meeting inferred in informal

chat recordings (ICANN 1999b).

4 (1999) 0 4 1 2 1 0 Government

Comments indicate Chinese government attendance at a

GAC meeting (ICANN 1999a).

5 (2000) 0 4 0 4 0 0 None

6 (2000) 0 16 1 8 7 0 Private Sector An Eastern Communications

Co. Ltd representative remotely participated in a meeting related to domain

name policy (ICANN 2000f).

Civil Society A representative of the CASS

remotely participated in ICANN's Public Forum

(ICANN 2000e).

7 (2000) 0 9 1 5 3 0 None

8 (2001) 0 15 1 8 6 0 None

9 (2001) 0 6 0 3 3 0 None

10 (2001)

0 1 0 0 1 0 Civil Society A CNNIC representative

remotely participated in an ICANN's Public Forum

(ICANN 2001h).

166

11 (2001)

^

0 4 0 0 2 2 Civil Society A CNNIC representative remotely participated in a meeting related to internet security (ICANN 2001f).

The same CNNIC representative remotely

participated in another meeting on internet security (ICANN

2001g).

12 (2002)

***

0 NA NA NA NA NA None

13 (2002)

***

0 NA NA NA NA NA None

14 (2002) ***, ^^

0 NA NA NA NA NA None

15 (2002)

***

0 NA NA NA NA NA None

16 (2003)

***

0 NA NA NA NA NA None

17 (2003)

***

0 NA NA NA NA NA None

18 (2003)

***

0 NA NA NA NA NA Civil Society A Chinese member of the

ICANN Board, Qian Hualin, commented in an ICANN Board meeting about joint technical standards work

between CNNIC and a range of other East Asian NICs

(ICANN 2003a). Qian Hualin further

participated in a meeting on WHOIS operations where he

commented on WHOIS in China (ICANN 2003b).

19

(2004) ***

0 NA NA NA NA NA None

20 (2004)

0 NA NA NA NA NA Government Zhao Houlin, in his ITU

167

*** capacity, commented at a joint ICANN/ITU ccTLD workshop

(ICANN 2004c).

Civil Society Qian Hualin, as an ICANN Board member, made brief

comments on administrative matters at a public Board meeting (ICANN 2004b).

Qian Hualian commented on IDN matters at a further Board

meeting (ICANN 2004d). Two civil society

representatives, one from At-Large@ China and another

from CNNIC, gave presentations on IDN customer

feedback and IDN rollout in China, respectively (ICANN

2004e).

21 (2004)

***

0 NA NA NA NA NA Civil Society Qian Hualin, as an ICANN Board member, wished a

departing ICANN employee good luck during a Board meeting (ICANN 2004a).

Two CNNIC representatives and a Chinese ALS representative gave

presentations on IDNs in China and commented on IDN issues

in a meeting on that topic (ICANN 2004f, 2004g).

22

(2005) ***

0 NA NA NA NA NA Civil Society Qian Hualin, as an ICANN

Board member, discussed IDN matters in a Board meeting

(ICANN 2005c). Qian Hualin, as an ICANN

Board member, discussed IDN matters in a public forum

(ICANN 2005e).

23 (2005)

***

0 NA NA NA NA NA Civil Society A CDNC member and Qian Hualin - as ICANN Board

168

member - both commented on IDN issues at an IDN

workshop (ICANN 2005f). At an ICANN Board meeting, Qian Hualin discussed a range of issues including the ICANN budget and multi-lingualization

of ICANN's online presence (ICANN 2005a).

At a workshop on IDNs, a representative of At-

Large@China and Qian Hualin, representing the

ICANN Board, were panellists (ICANN 2005g).

24

(2005) ***

0 NA NA NA NA NA Civil Society Qian Hualin, as an ICANN

Board member, and a CNNIC representative commented on IDNs at a workshop on that

issue (ICANN 2005d). A CDNC representative

chaired another IDN workshop (ICANN 2005h).

Qian Hualin, as an ICANN Board member, seconded a

motion on the appointment of ICANN staff at a Board

meeting (ICANN 2005b).

25 (2006)

***

0 NA NA NA NA NA Civil Society Qian Hualin, as an ICANN

Board member, commented on IDN policy and recused

himself from a vote on the .xxx domain due to a conflict of interest at a Board meeting

(ICANN 2006n). A CNNIC representative gave

a presentation on .cn to the ccNSO (ICANN 2006q).

A CNNIC representative and an At-Large@China

representative each gave presentations on IDNs in China, while Xue Hong

representing the ALAC gave a presentation on ICANN's IDN activities and moderated the

169

overall ALAC meeting where the presentations were given

(ICANN 2006m).

26 (2006)

***

0 NA NA NA NA NA Civil Society Qian Hualin, as an ICANN Board member, presented a

resolution related to administrative matters at a Board meeting (ICANN

2006n). Qian Hualin, as an ICANN Board member, attended an

IDN workshop (ICANN 2006r).

27

(2006) ***

0 NA NA NA NA NA Civil Society Qian Hualin, as an ICANN Board member, gave a final farewell at an ICANN Board

meeting and voted on resolutions related to

expanding available gTLDs (ICANN 2006o).

Xue Hong, representing the ALAC, also gave a

presentation at an IDN workshop (ICANN 2006p).

28

(2007) ***

0 NA NA NA NA NA Civil Society Xue Hong, as an ALAC

member, discussed IDN policy in a GNSO Public forum

(ICANN 2007b). Xue Hong, as an ALAC

member, discussed IDN policy again at a workshop on that

issue (ICANN 2007d).

29 (2007)

***

0 NA NA NA NA NA Civil Society Xue Hong, in her academic

capacity, commented on IDN policy at a public forum

(ICANN 2007c).

30 (2007)

0 0 0 0 0 0 Civil Society A CNNIC representative gave

a presentation on IDNs in China at a ccNSO meeting

170

(ICANN 2007a).

31 (2008)

***

0 NA NA NA NA NA None

32 (2008)

CNNIC (Sponsor)

12 0 0 12 0 Civil Society Xue Hong commented on IDN

policy at an IDN workshop (ICANN 2008f).

In a ccNSO meeting, two CNNIC representatives

commented on gTLD policy and one, Zhang Jian, gave a presentation on the CNNIC

(ICANN 2008b). A third CNNIC representative commented on IPv6 policy in a workshop related to that issue

(ICANN 2008g).

33 (2008)

***

CNNIC (Sponsor)

NA NA NA NA NA Civil Society Qian Hualin, in his personal

capacity, attended and commented on IDN issues at a

workshop (ICANN 2008h). Zhang Jian from the CNNIC gave a presentation on the

CNNIC at a ccNSO meeting (ICANN 2008c, 2008i).

34

(2009) ***

CNNIC (Sponsor)

NA NA NA NA NA Civil Society Xue Hong, in her APRALO

capacity discussed IDN policy in an At-Large meeting

(ICANN 2009f). Xue Hong participated in an

APRALO meeting in her APRALO capacity (ICANN

2009e). A CDNC representative

commented on IDN policy in a meeting on that issue (ICANN

2009c). A CNNIC representative

commented on IDN issues in a ccNSO meeting (ICANN

2009g).

Unknown

171

An unknown commented on DNSSEC issues in a meeting on that topic (ICANN 2009q).

35

(2009) CNNIC/ Zodiac Corp.

(Sponsors)

3 0 0 3 0 Government China's GAC representative

briefly commented on China's application for Chinese

language IDNs to be recognised by ICANN and incorporated into the global

root (ICANN 2009j). China's GAC representative

attended an ICANN Board/GAC meeting and

China's return was welcomed by the ICANN Board (ICANN

2009l).

Civil Society A CNNIC representative

commented on IDN policy at an IDN ccTLD workshop

(ICANN 2009t). A CONAC representative attended a GNSO meeting

(ICANN 2009n). The same CONAC

representative attended a DNSO working group meeting

(ICANN 2009o). Another CONAC

representative commented on intellectual property rights at a new gTLD meeting (ICANN

2009u). Four further CONAC

representatives at the ICANN Public Forum commented on IDN issues along with a few

other technical issues (ICANN 2009s).

Unknown

An unknown commented on IDN policy in a ccNSO

meeting (ICANN 2009p). An unknown commented on IDN issues in a public forum

172

(ICANN 2009s).

36 (2009)

CNNIC/ Zodiac Corp.

(Sponsors)

14 0 1 12 1 Government China's GAC representative

commented in support of China's IDN ccTLD

application in a GAC meeting (ICANN 2009k).

Private Sector

A representative of HiChina Ltd commented on IDN policy

at an ICANN Public Forum (ICANN 2009v).

Civil Society

A CNNIC representative gave an update on CNNIC (ICANN

2009h, 2009x). The same CNNIC

representative commented on IDN policy in an IDN ccTLD workshop (ICANN 2009w). A CONAC representative

commented on IDN policy in a 'Get to know ICANN' meeting

(ICANN 2009m). Xue Hong commented on

trademarks issues at an APRALO meeting (ICANN

2009d). Xue Hong commented on IDN policy at an ALAC Secretariat

meeting (ICANN 2009b). Xue Hong commented on DNS abuse at a workshop (ICANN

2009i). Three CONAC members commented on a range of technical issues including IDNs and trademarks at an

ICANN Public forum (ICANN 2009v).

Unknown

Two unknowns commented on a range of technical issues at a public forum (ICANN 2009v).

173

37 (2010)

CNNIC/ Zodiac Corp.

(Sponsors)

15 1 1 13 0 Government China's GAC representative

briefly introduced himself at a joint ICANN Board/GAC working group meeting

(ICANN 2010r).

Civil Society Xue Hong commented on the ALAC's governance processes

at an ALAC regional leadership meeting (ICANN

2010g). Xue Hong remotely

participated in an ALAC policy issue discussion and

commented on WHOIS policy (ICANN 2010f, 2010o).

Xue Hong commented on gender equality at ICANN at a

Nominating Committee workshop (ICANN 2010w).

A CNNIC representative commented on China's real

name registration system for domain names (ICANN

2010n).

Unknown An unknown briefly

commented on a chatroom related to a ccNSO Tech Day

meeting (ICANN 2010q).

38 (2010)

CNNIC/ CONAC

(Sponsors)

8 0 2 5 1 Government An MIIT representative

discussed visa issues related to the potential holding of an ICANN meeting in China - subsequently occurring in

Beijing at ICANN 46 - at an accountability and

transparency meeting (ICANN 2010b).

Civil Society

A CNNIC representative gave a presentation on Chinese

IDNs (ICANN 2010y).

174

Xue Hong commented on general policy matters at an

ALAC meeting (ICANN 2010i).

Xue Hong commented on the consensus appointment of an APRALO official, rather than

resorting to a re-election (ICANN 2010p).

Xue Hong briefly commented on remote chatservers at, and chaired, an At-Large Regional Secretariats Meeting (ICANN

2010l, 2010m). Xue Hong also commented on

gTLD policy at an ALAC Policy Discussion meeting

(ICANN 2010e). Xue Hong commented in

remote chat at an ALAC and Regional Leaders meeting

(ICANN 2010d). Two CONAC members

commented on gTLD policy at an ICANN public forum

(ICANN 2010t).

39 (2010)

CNNIC (Sponsor)

16 3 0 13 0 Civil Society Zhang Jian representing

ICANN gave a presentation on IDNs at a joint ccNSO-GNSO

meeting (ICANN 2010v). Zhang Jian representing

APTLD gave an update on APTLD (ICANN 2010k). Two CONAC members

commented on IDN issues at an ICANN Public Forum

(ICANN 2010t). Li Xiaodong commented on IDN issues at an IDN ccTLD workshop (ICANN 2010u).

Xue Hong chaired an APRALO meeting (ICANN

2010j). Xue Hong commented

numerous times on ALAC issues at an ALAC and

Regional leadership working session (ICANN 2010h).

175

40

(2011) CNNIC

(Sponsor) 19 2 4 13 0 Civil Society

Li Xiaodong representing CNNIC gave a presentation on Chinese IDNs (ICANN 2011i,

2011q). Zhang Jian representing

APTLD gave an update on APTLD (ICANN 2011d). Li Xiaodong representing

CDNC gave a presentation on Chinese IDNs (ICANN

2011u). A CONAC member

commented on IDN issues at an ICANN Public Forum

(ICANN 2011n). Xue Hong commented on a

range of issues at an At-Large Regional Leadership meeting

(ICANN 2011f).

Unknown An unknown introduced

herself in a joint ccNSO/GNSO IDN working group (ICANN

2011l)

41 (2011)

CNNIC (Sponsor)

22 0 6 13 2 Civil Society Zhang Jian representing

APTLD gave a presentation on IDNs at a ccNSO Council meeting (ICANN 2011r). Li Xiaodong representing

CDNC commented on IDN policy at a workshop (ICANN

2011p). Xue Hong commented on IDN

issues at an ALAC Policy Discussion forum (ICANN

2011c). A CONAC member

commented on IDN policy at an ICANN public forum

(ICANN 2011n). Li Xiaodong engaged in policy

discussion related to root server policy (ICANN 2011v).

Zhang Jian commented in a

176

workshop about the ccNSO not needing to follow GAC advice

and advocating for a one member, one vote system for the ccNSO (ICANN 2011o).

42

(2011) CNNIC

(Sponsor) 4 0 0 4 0 Civil Society

Zhang Jian representing APTLD gave a presentation on

regional TLD joint projects (ICANN 2011s).

Xue Hong commented on IDN policy at a ccNSO members meeting (ICANN 2011h). Li Xiaodong, representing CNNIC, attended at a root server and security meeting

(ICANN 2011x). Li Xiaodong, representing

CNNIC, was heavily engaged in policy discussion at another

root server and security meeting (ICANN 2011w).

Unknown

An unknown commented briefly in an ICANN Summit

on Developing Countries (ICANN 2011m).

43

(2012) CNNIC/ CONAC/

KNet Corp.

(Sponsors)

25 3 5 16 1 Government China's GAC representative briefly commented on the

operation of the .cn domain (ICANN 2012v).

Private Sector

A Chinese private sector actor from an unknown company interested in registering new gTLDs commented on policy matters related to this issue at an At-Large meeting (ICANN

2012j). A representative of the firm

KNet commented in an ICANN Public Forum on IDN

policy (ICANN 2012af).

177

Civil Society Zhang Jian representing

APTLD gave a presentation on APTLD (ICANN 2012am).

Xue Hong attended a ccNSO meeting in her capacity as ccNSO member (ICANN

2012z). Xue Hong, in her ccNSO capacity, attended another ccNSO meeting (ICANN

2012aa). Xue Hong discussed IDN

policy at an At-Large meeting (ICANN 2012y).

Li Xiaodong commented on .cn real name registration

policy at a WHOIS workshop (ICANN 2012al).

Xue Hong commented in detail on the Chinese government's

role in relation to the .cn domain at a ccNSO meeting

(ICANN 2012o). A CONAC member and a

CDNC representative commented on IDN policy at an IDN workshop (ICANN

2012ah). Xue Hong attended a meeting on intellectual property rights

(ICANN 2012ao). A CNNIC representative

commented on IDN policy at a TLD meeting (ICANN

2012ap). A CNNIC representative attended an IDN policy

development meeting (ICANN 2012ag).

Xue Hong attended an APRALO meeting (ICANN

2012d).

44 (2012)

CNNIC/ CONAC

(Sponsors)

21 2 6 12 1 Government Brief technical policy remarks

were made by a Chinese government representative at a GNSO non-commercial users

178

constituency meeting (ICANN 2012ak).

Civil Society

Zhang Jian gave an update on APTLD's joint activities with the GNSO (ICANN 2012e). Zhang Jian gave a general

update on APTLD (ICANN 2012f).

Xue Hong representing APRALO and Li Xiaodong

representing ICANN commented on IDN policy in an ALAC meeting (ICANN

2012c). Xue Hong commented on IDN policy at an APRALO Monthly

meeting (ICANN 2012d). Xue Hong commented at an At-Large meeting on IDN issues but also noted that

multi-stakeholder governance approaches have their limit

(ICANN 2012g). Li Xiaodong representing ICANN commented on his experience working with ICANN at a Fellowship

meeting (ICANN 2012t). Xue Hong represented the

ccNSO at an ICANN Academy meeting (ICANN 2012ad). A CNNIC representative

commented on IDN policy at an IDN meeting (ICANN

2012ah).

45 (2012)

CNNIC/ CONAC/ HiChina

Corp (Sponsors)

19 1 5 12 1 Government At a GAC high level meeting, China's GAC representative stated, during discussion of general policy issues, that governments should play a

greater role in ICANN and that the IANA should be more

accountable (ICANN 2012u). The Vice Minister of China's

public sector reform

179

commission provided a pre-recorded video to attendees at ICANN 45, which welcomed

ICANN and its members to the forthcoming ICANN 46 in Beijing (ICANN 2012af).

Civil Society

A CNNIC representative gave a presentation on the .cn

domain (ICANN 2012as). Zhang Jian gave an update on

APTLD (ICANN 2012ab). A CNNIC representative gave

a presentation on IDNs in China (ICANN 2012s).

Xue Hong represented the ccNSO in a workshop that

discussed policy related to the ccNSO (ICANN 2012b). Xue Hong commented on

ALAC policy at an At-Large meeting (ICANN 2012h).

Xue Hong commented on IDN policy at an At-Large

workshop (ICANN 2012i). Xue Hong commented on

trademark issues at an ALAC meeting (ICANN 2012k).

Li Xiaodong commented on censorship in China in the context of the upcoming

Beijing ICANN meeting at an At-Large meeting (ICANN

2012l). Xue Hong commented on China's upcoming ICANN

meeting at a ccNSO Council meeting (ICANN 2012m).

Two CNNIC members commented on the upcoming China ICANN meeting at a ccNSO members meeting

(ICANN 2012n). Xue Hong commented on ccTLD policy issues at a ccNSO members meeting

(ICANN 2012p). A CNNIC member discussed

180

the upcoming China ICANN meeting and presented a video

which included an address from CAS and ISC officials,

while a CONAC member also stated that advancing multi-stakeholder governance in

China was their responsibility (ICANN 2012af).

A CNNIC attendee commented on IDN policy at a workshop

(ICANN 2012ar).

Unknown An unknown commented on multi-stakeholder policy at a meeting of the GNSO's non-

commercial users’ constituency, but the transcript

didn't accurately record the statement (ICANN 2012ac).

46

(2013) ^^

Wanwang Corp/ Zodiac Corp/ KNet Corp

(Sponsors) –

CNNIC/ CONAC/

ISC (Hosts)

591

47 135

204

205

Government An MIIT Vice Minister

provided welcoming remarks at a welcome ceremony for this

meeting (ICANN 2013bp). An MIIT representative

discussed general policy issues at a high level meeting on internet architecture and

ICANN's Asia-Pacific strategy (ICANN 2013ab ).

A Chinese government representative briefly

introduced themself at an accountability and

transparency meeting (ICANN 2013b).

A CATR employee commented on technical

matters at a DNS risk management meeting (ICANN

2013m).

Private Sector A representative from

CoreEmail gave a presentation about their IDN-enhanced email business (ICANN

181

2013bc). A China Mobile representative

gave a presentation on Ipv6 deployment at China Mobile and commented on Ipv6 in China at an IPv6 workshop (ICANN 2013bf, 2013bh).

A KNet representative commented in a workshop

related to Internet development in developing countries

(ICANN 2013k). A representative from Zodiac

Group commented on contractual compliance issues with ICANN (ICANN 2013l).

A China Unicom representative commented

briefly on trademark issues at an ICANN Public Forum

(ICANN 2013bb). A KNet representative briefly

commented at an ALAC-hosted meeting (ICANN

2013bk). A BIA representative

commented on IPv6 issues (ICANN 2013bm).

In a High Level Meeting, representative from China

Unicom commented on gTLD policy, a representative from Sina.com gave a presentation

on Weibo (China's Twitter-like software), and a representative from Qihu 360 introduced their

business activities (ICANN 2013ab).

Civil Society

A CNNIC representative gave a presentation introducing CNNIC (ICANN 2013j).

A CNNIC representative gave a presentation on DNSSEC

(ICANN 2013n). Zhang Jian gave an APTLD

update (ICANN 2013g). A CNNIC official gave a

presentation on IDN in China

182

(ICANN 2013bj). A CNNIC official gave a

presentation on IPv6 in China (ICANN 2013be).

Xue Hong and another representative from At-

Large@China attended an APRALO meeting (ICANN

2013d). Xue Hong and another representative from At-

Large@China commented on general issues at another

APRALO meeting (ICANN 2013f).

A CDNC representative commented on Chinese IDNs at another APRALO meeting

(ICANN 2013h). Xue Hong commented on

trademark and IDN issues at an At-Large meeting (ICANN

2013i). Four CNNIC representatives and one university professor

commented on policy at a meeting on regional

cooperation (ICANN 2013k). Five civil society attendees

commented on general policy at a High Level meeting

(ICANN 2013aa). Xue Hong commented briefly

in an Academy workshop (ICANN 2013az).

An individual Chinese Internet user commented on DNS

policy at the ICANN Public Forum (ICANN 2013ba).

An ISC representative discussed the value of the IGF

in positive terms (ICANN 2013bd).

Two civil society attendees commented at an IPv6

workshop (ICANN 2013bg). Xue Hong chaired a meeting on Chinese ALSes and local

outreach in which many unidentified Chinese

183

participants spoke (ICANN 2013bk).

A civil society attendee briefly commented at a Tech Day

workshop (ICANN 2013bn). Xue Hong attended a

trademark workshop (ICANN 2013bo).

Zhang Jian representing APTLD commented at an IDN

working group (ICANN 2013bi).

Hu Qiheng, a prominent Chinese computer scientist

who helped established China's initial TCP/IP-based

connection with the US, spoke at the welcome ceremony

(ICANN 2013bp). A CONAC representative, at a

meeting on NGOs and new gTLDs, commented on NGO status in China in the context of internet governance, noting that a range of Chinese NGOs

have varying relationships with the Chinese government, all

have some connection by means of NGO registration

requirements, and that not all are funded by the government. The representative also noted the public administrative role

some internet governance NGOs in China have and the need for greater transnational

collaboration by Chinese internet governance

organizations (ICANN 2013ad).

Unknown

An unknown commented on DNSSEC issues at a meeting

on that topic (ICANN 2013ac).

47 (2013)

0 34 6 9 18 1 Government An MIIT representative

introduced themselves during a GAC meeting (ICANN

184

2013ak). A GAC representative briefly

commented on gTLD policy in the GAC Open Plenary

(ICANN 2013al). A GAC representative briefly commented on general issues

at another GAC meeting (ICANN 2013am).

Civil Society

A Chinese ccNSO representative introduced

themselves at an Academy working group session

(ICANN 2013ae). Xue Hong commented on IDN variant and trademark issues in an APRALO monthly meeting

(ICANN 2013af). Xue Hong commented on

trademark and UDRP issues at an At-Large meeting (ICANN

2013ag). Xue Hong, in her ccNSO Council member capacity, attended a ccNSO Council meeting (ICANN 2013ah). Zhang Jian had a few brief comments read out on her

behalf at a ccNSO meeting, thanking the ccNSO as she left her position within it (ICANN

2013ai). Xue Hong attended a ccNSO

SOP meeting (ICANN 2013aj).

48 (2013)

0 39 7 10 19 3 Government A GAC representative

commented on new gTLD policy in a joint ICANN

Board/GAC meeting (ICANN 2013av).

A GAC Representative introduced himself in one GAC

plenary session (ICANN 2013at).

A GAC representative commented on gTLD policy in

185

another GAC plenary session (ICANN 2013au).

Civil Society

Xue Hong commented on general policy issues at an Academy working group session (ICANN 2013an). Xue Hong, in her ccNSO

capacity, introduced herself in a joint ALAC/ccNSO meeting

(ICANN 2013aw). Xue Hong introduced herself

as a representative of the CDNUA in an APRALO

monthly meeting (ICANN 2013ao).

Xue Hong commented on ccNSO administrative issues in

her ccNSO capacity at a ccNSO Council meeting

(ICANN 2013ap). Xue Hong, in her ccNSO capacity, commented on

various policy recommendations in a ccNSO

members meeting (ICANN 2013aq).

A CONAC representative commented on DNSSEC issues

in a DNSSEC workshop (ICANN 2013as).

A CNNIC representative commented on new gTLD

security issues in a meeting on that topic (ICANN 2013ar).

Xue Hong, in her ccNSO capacity, commented on

internal ccNSO administrative issues in a meeting on internal

ccNSO issues (ICANN 2013ax).

Xue Hong attended a ccNSO SOP meeting (ICANN

2013ay).

49 (2014)

CNNIC (Sponsors)

60 3 26 20 11 Government A GAC representative made general comments on gTLD

186

policy in a GAC Communique Overview meeting (ICANN

2014aa). A GAC representative made general comments on gTLD

policy in a GAC Plenary meeting (ICANN 2014af).

Two Chinese GAC representatives introduced

themselves in the GAC Opening Plenary (ICANN

2014ab). A GAC representative, in a GAC briefing by ICANN's

CEO, commented that geographical diversity in

ICANN should be improved to strengthen multi-stakeholder

governance - noting that North America alone constitutes 75% of all participation in ICANN and Europe alone constitutes a further 15% (ICANN 2014z).

At an ICANN Board/GAC meeting, a GAC representative stated that the upcoming IANA

transition should result in governments having a

decision-making, rather than just advisory, role in ICANN

and that the lack of such a role renders ICANN illegitimate

(ICANN 2014ah). In a preparatory meeting for

the ICANN CEO's briefing of the GAC, China's

representative called for greater government authority in

ICANN, justifying this on the need for genuinely multi-stakeholder governance

(ICANN 2014ag). At a GAC plenary meeting, a GAC representative called for greater government power in internet governance, noting

that the then upcoming NETMundial meeting should consider the issue and arguing

that multi-stakeholder

187

governance should mean granting an equal voice for states in ICANN (ICANN

2014ad). In another GAC plenary meeting China's GAC

representative welcomed the announcement of the US government that it was

planning to transfer ultimate authority for internet

governance to ICANN (ICANN 2014ac).

In another GAC plenary meeting a GAC representative

reiterated China's call for greater government roles in ICANN, again referencing

multi-stakeholder governance to justify equality amongst

stakeholder groups in ICANN (ICANN 2014ae).

A GAC representative also enquired in a joint

GAC/RSSAC session whether the GAC could play a more active role in the RSSAC's activities and whether root

servers could be more equitably distributed around the globe (ICANN 2014ai).

Private Sector

A Chinese lawyer commented briefly on participation in ICANN's legal work in a

Fellowship meeting (ICANN 2014y).

A KNet employee also commented on a range of gTLD policy issues in a

meeting on TLD registries (ICANN 2014ar).

Civil Society

A CNNIC representative gave a presentation on the .cn

domain at a ccNSO meeting (ICANN 2014q, 2014u).

Another CNNIC representative

188

gave a presentation on DNSSEC deployment in the

.cn domain at a DNSSEC workshop (ICANN 2014v,

2014w). Xue Hong, in her ccNSO

capacity, gave a presentation on DNS trademark issues in a

ccNSO meeting (ICANN 2014r).

Xue Hong commented on ICANN's online learning

resources development in an Academy Working Session

(ICANN 2014ak). Xue Hong, in both her ALAC

and ccNSO capacities, attended a joint ALAC/ccNSO meeting

(ICANN 2014am). Xue Hong attended an

APRALO monthly meeting in her CDNUA capacity (ICANN

2014p). Xue Hong, representing

Beijing Normal University, and a representative from ICANN's

Beijing Engagement centre attended an APrIGF meeting and Xue Hong suggested the APrIGF discuss the IANA transition (ICANN 2014o).

Xue Hong attended a ccNSO Council Meeting in her ccNSO

capacity and briefly commented on ICANN

Academy operations (ICANN 2014s).

Xue Hong attended a ccNSO members meeting and

commented on the need for ICANN to expand its multi-

stakeholder character by engaging governments and the

developing world more (ICANN 2014t).

A CONAC representative introduced herself at an

ICANN Fellowship meeting (ICANN 2014x).

189

The CNNIC CEO, Li Xiaodong, commented in

support of multi-stakeholder governance and greater

developing world participation in ICANN at a meeting on the

IANA transition (ICANN 2014aj)

A CONAC representative discussed CONAC's activities

in a new gTLD meeting (ICANN 2014aq).

A CONAC representative remotely participated in a meeting on domain name

collision (ICANN 2014an). A CONAC representative

commented on their activities in China in a Public Forum meeting (ICANN 2014ao). Xue Hong in her ccNSO

capacity attended a ccNSO SOP meeting (ICANN

2014ap).

Unknown An unknown commented on

IDN work and Chinese language issues at an IDN

workshop (ICANN 2014al).

50 (2014)

CNNIC (Sponsors)

54 3 25 22 4 Government In a GAC meeting on human

rights law and ICANN, a GAC representative voiced concern over how such law would be

reflected in ICANN policy and also stated China’s support for ICANN reconstituting itself as

an entity not incorporated under Californian law (ICANN

2014bd). Two GAC representatives

introduced themselves in the GAC Opening Plenary

(ICANN 2014bf). In a GAC meeting, a Chinese representative welcomed the

upcoming IANA transition and inferred support for a stronger

190

government role within ICANN (ICANN 2014bc). In another GAC meeting a

representative opined that the IANA transition should strengthen the role of

government in ICANN while also commenting on a range of

internal GAC policy issues (ICANN 2014be).

In another GAC meeting China's representative

welcomed moves to strengthen the GAC's position within ICANN (ICANN 2014bg).

A Chinese Minister of Cyberspace Administration

addressed a high level government meeting,

commenting on a range of matters but noting both that governments should play a

leading role in internet governance and that the private sector, civil society and other

stakeholders all have legitimate roles to play in internet

governance (ICANN 2014bi). A Chinese Minister of

Cyberspace Administration gave a speech at the welcome

ceremony for ICANN 50, making a series of general

comments and also lauding the US government's decision to transition authority over the

internet's global root to ICANN (ICANN 2014bp).

Private Sector

A KNet employee discussed KNet's new gTLD

development and services in a gTLD meeting (ICANN

2014bm).

A Chinese domain registrar briefly participated in a

NomCom meeting (ICANN 2014as).

191

A representative from a Chinese new gTLD registry, ZDNS, commented on IDN issues in the ICANN Public

Forum (ICANN 2014bj). Two new gTLD registrars commented on new gTLD

policy in a Registrars Stakeholder Group meeting,

with one of the registrars directly noting the differences

in US and Chinese government approaches to regulating DNS governance (ICANN 2014bo).

Civil Society

A CNNIC representative gave a presentation on CNNIC at a

ccNSO members meeting, where he explicitly outlined a Chinese conception of internet

governance that was clearly multi-stakeholder (ICANN

2014bl). Xue Hong engaged in detailed

discussion of accountability within ICANN in a meeting on that issue (ICANN 2014aw). Xue Hong engaged in further

detailed discussion of accountability at ICANN in

another session of an accountability meeting

(ICANN 2014ax). Xue Hong again engaged in further detailed discussion of accountability at ICANN in

another session of an accountability meeting

(ICANN 2014av). Xue Hong, in a fourth session of an accountability meeting, engaged in further detailed discussion of accountability

within ICANN (ICANN 2014ay).

Xue Hong introduced herself at an At-Large meeting,

representing APRALO (ICANN 2014az).

192

A Chinese employee of At-Large introduced herself at an

At-Large meeting (ICANN 2014at).

Xue Hong discussed accountability in an ATLAS II Plenary, stressing that she and

other panelists were not pushing for an 'ITU-like' body

(ICANN 2014au). A CNNIC representative

commented on the CNNIC's role in China in a ccNSO

members meeting (ICANN 2014ba).

Xue Hong, in her ccNSO capacity, commented at an

Academy session on the value of leadership training and noted the importance of

experience in multi-stakeholder communication (ICANN

2014bb). Xue Hong gave a welcome

speech to ICANN newcomers in this meeting for such

newcomers (ICANN 2014bn). A CONAC representative commented on IDN policy issues in a Public Forum

meeting (ICANN 2014bj). A Chinese employee of

ICANN commented on a range of DNS policy issues in a

Registrars Stakeholder Group meeting (ICANN 2014bo). A CONAC representative commented on translation issues in ICANN's policy development process in a

meeting on that topic (ICANN 2014bh).

Unknown

An unknown asked a question about the relationship between

the GAC and the rest of the ICANN organization in a

Fellowship meeting (ICANN 2015ad).

193

An unknown commented on the IANA transition in a

meeting on that topic, calling for historically

underrepresented groups to be better represented in the

transition process (ICANN 2015ae).

An unknown commented on IDN issues in China at a

meeting on IDN root zone issues (ICANN 2014bk).

51

(2014) CNNIC

(Sponsors) 33 5 19 9 0 Government

At a GAC meeting the Chinese representative welcomed the

GAC's active role in the IANA transition process, and queried whether the US government's contractual relationship with VeriSign - the .com registry

and authoritative root zone file operator - would also be

transferred to ICANN (ICANN 2014bs).

A GAC representative queried, in a preparatory meeting

related to an ICANN Board/GAC meeting, where

internet governance was headed following the

conclusion of NETMundial (ICANN 2014by).

A GAC representative also queried in a joint ICANN

Board/GAC meeting where internet governance was heading following the

conclusion of NETMundial (ICANN 2014by). A CATR employee

commented on policy related to translation of ICANN websites

into other languages in a meeting on that topic (ICANN

2014ca). Another CATR employee

made general comments on internet governance,

welcoming the participation of

194

all stakeholders in ICANN and NETMundial, and noting that

China was likely to increase its participation in internet

governance in an ICANN Public Forum (ICANN

2014bv).

Private Sector Two Chinese new gTLD

registry employees commented on general policy related to

new gTLD policy in a gTLD Registries meeting (ICANN

2014bt).

Civil Society Xue Hong in her CDNUA

capacity commented on UDRP issues in an At-Large meeting

(ICANN 2014bq). A Chinese member of

ICANN's coordination group on the IANA transition

commented in a meeting on that topic, stressing the need for ICANN to adopt a multi-

stakeholder process and querying what would happen if

the US government refused ICANN's proposal (ICANN

2014bu). A Chinese Internet Association member introduced themselves

in an intellectual property constituency meeting (ICANN

2014bx). A CONAC representative

commented on IDNs in China at a registry and registrar

meeting (ICANN 2014bz). A Chinese ICANN employee commented on registrar issues in a registrar meeting (ICANN

2014cb). Xue Hong, in her ccNSO

capacity, attended a ccNSO SOP meeting (ICANN

2014cc). A CNNIC representative

195

commented on IDN email issues at a meeting related to IDN issues (ICANN 2014cd).

Unknown

An unknown briefly introduced themselves in a working group

on internet governance (ICANN 2014br).

An unknown discussed general IDN policy in detail in an IDN

root zone issue meeting (ICANN 2014bw).

Source: Author's own research into ICANN Meetings archives (ICANN 2015ah). * Records of ICANN sponsors are unreliable until ICANN 29. Thus this list of Chinese sponsors/hosts may understate earlier Chinese sponsorship/hosting of ICANN meetings, particularly with respect to ICANN 14, which was held in China. ** Details listed in this section are drawn from recorded details of each meeting. These details are generally from session/sub-meeting transcripts but, especially in the earlier ICANN meetings, are also drawn from recorded information about formal submissions to ICANN or recorded information about presentations given at ICANN meeting sessions/sub-meetings. Earlier ICANN meetings do not reliably provide transcripts for each session/sub-meeting in the general meeting; in some instances transcripts appear to be available but all links to them are now dead. It is not until ICANN 32 that session/meeting transcripts become consistently available. The unreliability of some ICANN records, particularly those from earlier ICANN meetings but also generally due to transcription errors, means that this Appendix likely understates the extent of Chinese involvement in ICANN meetings. *** ICANN meetings 1, 2 and 3 did not record attendance. Meeting 12 through to meeting 29 similarly did not record attendance. Meetings 31, 33, 34 do not provide publicly accessible attendance records. ^ Meeting 11 was the first meeting to record the country affiliation of attendees. For the meetings prior to this, the status of apparently Chinese attendees as PRC nationals was determined by whether they had a Chinese name along with another piece of corroborating evidence (i.e. a .cn email address, affiliation with a PRC-based organization, etc.). Stakeholder affiliation was determined by the PRC-based organization with which attendees were associated. If no association was given, the attendee is listed as part of the unknown stakeholder group. ^^ ICANN meetings 14 and 46 were held in the PRC, in Shanghai and Beijing respectively.

196

Appendix 4: Chinese Participation in APTLD Meetings

Year Month Attendees* Sponsors/Hosts**

Details of Participation***

1998 February NA NA NA

1998 July 1 Civil Society NA

Qian Hualin noted as part of the taskforce that created the APTLD.

1998 August 0 NA None

1999 February 1 Civil Society NA

Qian Hualin recorded as APTLD's GAC liaison.

1999 May 0 NA None

1999 June NA NA None

1999 November 0 NA None

2000 February 1 Civil Society NA

Qian Hualin was made a Committee Chair.

2000 July 1 Civil Society NA

Qian Hualin was elected Chairman of APTLD.

2000 October 1 Civil Society NA

Qian Hualin recorded as Chair of Board meeting.

2000 October NA NA NA

2000 November NA NA None

2001 February NA NA NA

2001 February 3 Civil Society NA None

2001 March NA NA None

2001 May 6 Civil Society NA

Qian Hualin recorded as Chair of Board meeting.

2001 August 1 Civil Society NA

Qian Hualin in his APTLD capacity gave an update on APTLD.

2001 September 1 Civil Society NA

A CNNIC representative gave a report on DNS dispute resolution

issues.

197

2001 November 1 Civil Society NA

A CNNIC representative gave a report on APTLD policy issues.

2002 March NA NA None

2002 June NA NA None

2002 September NA NA None

2002 September 1 Civil Society NA None

2002^ October NA NA None

2002 November NA NA None

2003 January 2 Civil Society NA None

2003 February NA NA None

2003 May NA NA None

2003 May NA NA None

2003 August NA NA None

2003 October 1 Civil Society NA None

2003 November NA NA None

2004 February NA NA None

2004 February Some Civil Society* NA None

2004 April NA NA None

2004 July NA NA None

2004 November NA NA None

2005 February NA NA None

2005 July NA NA None

2005 October NA NA None

2006 March 1 Civil Society NA Qian Hualin representing CNNIC

gave an update on the .cn domain.

198

2006 June NA NA None

2006 November NA NA None

2007 February NA NA None

2007 June 0 0 None

2007 August NA NA NA

2007 October NA 0

A CNNIC representative gave a presentation on IDN policy issues. The same CNNIC representative

gave a presentation on the .cn domain.

2008 February 2 Civil Society 0

A CDNC representative gave a presentation on IDN issues.

2008 May 2 Civil Society 0 None

2008 December 1 Civil Society CNNIC

A CNNIC representative gave a presentation on anti-phishing strategies in the .cn domain.

2009 February 2 Civil Society CNNIC

A CNNIC representative gave a presentation on anti-phishing strategies in the .cn domain.

2009^ August

1 Government

8 Civil Society

CNNIC (Host)

Qian Hualin representing CNNIC gave a welcome speech as host.

Zhang Jian, representing CNNIC, gave an update on CNNIC.

An MIIT representative, Cui Shuitian, discussed internet development in China.***

A CDNC representative discussed IDN policy issues.

A CNNIC representative discussed IDN policy issues.

2010 March 2 Civil Society 0

Zhang Jian representing the ccNSO gave a presentation on IDN policy

issues.

2010 June 3 Civil Society CNNIC

Zhang Jian representing APTLD gave a welcome presentation.

Xue Hong representing APRALO

199

gave a presentation on APRALO activities.

A CNNIC representative discussed IDN policy issues.

2010 October 2 Civil Society 0

Zhang Jian representing APTLD gave a welcome presentation.

Zhang Jian representing APTLD gave a presentation on APTLD's

activities. A CNNIC representative discussed

DNS abuse issues.

2011 February 3 Civil Society 0

Zhang Jian representing APTLD gave a welcome presentation.

Zhang Jian representing APTLD gave multiple presentations on

APTLD's activities. A CNNIC representative discussed

IDN policy.

2011 April 3 Civil Society NA

Zhang Jian in her APTLD capacity introduced TLD organizations active in internet governance.

2011 August 2 Civil Society 0

Zhang Jian representing APTLD gave a welcome presentation.

Zhang Jian representing APTLD gave a presentation on APTLD's

activities. A CNNIC representative discussed

IDN issues.

2011 December 2 Civil Society 0

Zhang Jian representing APTLD gave a welcome presentation.

Zhang Jian representing APTLD gave a presentation on APTLD's

activities. A CNNIC representative gave an

update on .cn events. The same CNNIC representative discussed ccTLD policy issues.

2012 February 3 Civil Society 0

Zhang Jian representing APTLD gave a welcome presentation.

Zhang Jian representing APTLD gave a presentation on APTLD's

activities.

200

2012 June 3 Civil Society 0

Zhang Jian representing APTLD gave a welcome presentation.

Zhang Jian representing APTLD gave a presentation on APTLD's

activities. A CNNIC representative gave a

presentation on IPv6 issues. The same CNNIC representative

gave a presentation on IDN issues.

2012 November 3 Civil Society NA

Zhang Jian representing APTLD gave a welcome presentation.

Zhang Jian representing APTLD gave a presentation on APTLD's

activities. A CNNIC representative gave a presentation on the .cn domain.

Another CNNIC representative gave an anti-phishing presentation.

2013 February 6 Civil Society 0

Zhang Jian representing APTLD gave a welcome presentation.

Zhang Jian representing APTLD gave a presentation on APTLD's

activities. A CNNIC representative discussed

ccTLD policy. Another CNNIC representative

discussed gTLD policy.

2013^ August

3 Civil Society

2 Private Sector

CNNIC (Host)

A CNNIC representative gave a welcome speech as host.

A CNNIC representative gave a presentation on the .cn domain.

Another CNNIC representative gave another presentation on the .cn

domain. A Zodiac Corp. representative gave a presentation on gTLD issues.*** A China Telecom representative gave a presentation on anti-DNS

hijacking.***

2014 February 0 NA NA

2014 May 1 Civil Society 0

A CNNIC representative spoke on IDN issues.

2014 September 2 Civil 0 Zhang Jian representing the Macau

201

Society ccTLD gave a presentation on this domain.

Source: Author's own research in APTLD Meeting archives (APTLD 2015c). * Attendance by Chinese citizens determined by records kept in APTLD Meeting Program/Agenda records, which intermittently record attendee affiliation. Where attendance is not recorded, the number of Chinese attendees is inferred from the number of distinct individuals active in a given APTLD meeting. Registration for attendance at APTLD meetings is not mandatory, thus the Appendix likely slightly understates the extent of Chinese participation. Note that for the February, 2004 meeting no specific number was given for attendees from the CNNIC. ** NA in the Sponsors/Hosts column refers to instances where the APTLD has not recorded sponsors/hosts. *** All participants are associated with civil society organizations unless specifically indicated by *** after the details of participant actions. There are only three instances of stakeholders outside of civil society participating in APTLD meetings: two private sector participants in the August, 2013 meeting; and, one government participant in the August, 2009 meeting. ^ Three APTLD meetings have been held in China: the August, 2013 meeting in Xian; the August, 2009 meeting in Beijing; and, the October, 2002 meeting in Shanghai.

202

Appendix 5 - Chinese Involvement in APNIC Meetings

Meeting/Year*

Chinese Sponsors

/Hosts

Chinese Attendees** (Total/Government/ Private Sector/Civil Society/ Unknown)

Details of Chinese Participation***

8 (1999) 0 3 0 3 0 0 None

9 (2000) 0 10 0 5 5 0 Civil Society Li Xing from CERNET gave

a presentation on Ipv6 in China at an IPv6 meeting

(APNIC 2000b).

10 (2000)

^

China Mobile/ CNNIC

(Sponsors)

13 NA NA NA NA Private Sector A China Mobile

representative gave a presentation on the company

at an address SIG meeting (APNIC 2000a). A China Telecom

representative ran in an EC election, but was not elected

(APNIC 2000c).

11 (2001)

^^

CERNET/China

Telecom (Sponsors)

NA NA NA NA NA Civil Society Li Xing from CERNET

chaired a meeting on database issues (APNIC 2001b).

12

(2001) ^^

CNNIC (Sponsor)

NA NA NA NA NA Civil Society Li Xing from CERNET gave

a presentation on database issues in a meeting on that

topic (APNIC 2001a). Wu Jianping, from Tsinghua University, ran for a position in APNIC's EC in an election

but was not successful (APNIC 2001d).

13

(2002) ^^

0 NA NA NA NA NA Civil Society Pan Guangliang representing APNIC gave a presentation on IPv6 in an IPv6 meeting

(APNIC 2002b) Li Xing chaired a database

policy meeting and presented on the topic with another

203

CERNET representative (APNIC 2002a).

14

(2002) ^^

China Telecom (Sponsor)

NA NA NA NA NA Civil Society Li Xing from CERNET

chaired a database meeting (APNIC 2002c).

15

(2003) ^^

CNNIC (Sponsor)

NA NA NA NA NA Civil Society Li Xing from CERNET

chaired a database meeting and reported on it at the general APNIC member meeting (APNIC 2003a,

2003b).

16 (2003)

^^

0 NA NA NA NA NA Civil Society Li Xing from CERNET

chaired a database meeting and gave a report on the

meeting at an APNIC general member meeting (APNIC

2003d, 2003e, 2003g, 2003i). Pan Guangliang from APNIC gave a presentation on IPv6 at

a meeting on that topic (APNIC 2003h, 2003j). A CNNIC representative

running for the EC introduced himself in an APNIC general

member meeting but subsequently lost an EC

election run-off determined by a coin flip (APNIC 2003c,

2003f).

17 (2004)

^^

0 NA NA NA NA NA Civil Society Li Xing from CERNET

chaired a database SIG and reported on it at the general member meeting (APNIC

2004a, 2004b).

18 (2004)

China Netcom/ CNNIC

(Sponsors)

11 0 3 8 0 Civil Society Li Xing from CERNET

chaired and commented in the database SIG and reported on

it to the general member meeting (APNIC 2004c,

204

2004d).

19 (2005)

^^

CNNIC (Sponsor)

NA NA NA NA NA Civil Society Li Xing from CERNET

chaired and commented in the database SIG and reported it

to the general member meeting (APNIC 2005a,

2005b). A CNNIC representative

chaired an IPv6 SIG (APNIC 2005c).

20

(2005) CNNIC

(Sponsor) 16 0 7 9 0 Civil Society

Qian Hualin briefly commented on intellectual

property issues in the Opening Plenary (APNIC

2005g). Li Xing from CERNET

chaired a database meeting, commented on database

issues and reported on his database meeting the general

meeting (APNIC 2005d, 2005f).

A CNNIC representative attended the Policy SIG

meeting (APNIC 2005h). A CNNIC representative co-

chaired an IPv6 SIG but wasn't present as he was

attending a presentation in another session (APNIC

2005e).

21 (2006)

CNNIC (Sponsor)

22 0 10 10 2 Civil Society Li Xing from CERNET

chaired and commented in and then presented on his database meeting at the

general members meeting (APNIC 2006a, 2006b).

Qian Hualin commented at a general member meeting on

China's IDN being outside the global root, noting that this

was not in an attempt to create an alternative root but

205

simply to provide IDN service to the Chinese people

(APNIC 2006c). Ma Yan, an academic in

Beijing, commented briefly at a general member meeting

(APNIC 2006d). A CNNIC representative gave

an update on CNNIC in the NIR SIG (APNIC 2006e).

22

(2006) ^^

0 NA NA NA NA NA Private Sector A China Telecom

representative participated in an APOPS meeting (APNIC

2006f).

Civil Society A CNNIC representative gave

an update on CNNIC in the NIR SIG (APNIC 2006i).

The same CNNIC representative chaired an

IPv6 meeting (APNIC 2006h).

Li Xing from CERNET gave a presentation on IPv6 at a

lightning talk session (APNIC 2006g).

23

(2007) ^^

CNNIC (Sponsor)

NA NA NA NA NA Civil Society A CNNIC representative

chaired an IPv6 meeting and gave a presentation with

another CNNIC representative (APNIC

2007b). A CNNIC representative gave

a CNNIC update at an NIR SIG (APNIC 2007c).

Two CNNIC representatives gave a presentation on

CNNIC at a general policy meeting (APNIC 2007d).

Two CNNIC representatives and Pan Guangliang from

APNIC commented on various issues at the general member meeting (APNIC

206

2007a).

24 (2007)

^^

CNNIC (Sponsor)

NA NA NA NA NA Private Sector A China Telecom

representative commented on profitability of broadband in an APOPS meeting (APNIC

2007f). The same China Telecom

representative commented on APNIC fees at an annual

members meeting (APNIC 2007e).

Civil Society

Pan Guangliang from APNIC commented briefly on general matters at an annual members

meeting (APNIC 2007e). Two civil society actors, Pan Guangliang from APNIC and

a CNNIC representative, commented on NIR issues

(APNIC 2007g). Zhang Jian representing the CNNIC introduced herself at

a policy meeting (APNIC 2007h).

25

(2008) ^^

0 NA NA NA NA NA Civil Society Pan Guangliang from APNIC gave an update on APNIC's

activities in the AMM (APNIC 2007i).

A CNNIC representative commented on .cn issues in a

DNS meeting (APNIC 2007j).

26

(2008) CNNIC

(Sponsor) 22 0 5 13 4 Civil Society

Li Xing from CERNET commented on IPv6 and v4 issues in two IPv6 meetings

(APNIC 2008b, 2008c). A CNNIC representative gave

an update on CNNIC in an NIR meeting (APNIC

2008d). Zhang Jian and Pan

207

Guangliang, in their APNIC capacities, commented on IPv4/v6 issues in a policy

SIG (APNIC 2008e). Pan Guangliang from APNIC

discussed internal APNIC matters in the AMM (APNIC

2008a).

27 (2009)

CNNIC (Sponsor)

16 0 1 15 0 Civil Society Pan Guangliang from APNIC

briefly commented in the policy SIG (APNIC 2009c). Two CNNIC representatives

commented on general matters in the AMM (APNIC

2009a). Two CNNIC representatives

commented on IP address issues at the NIR SIG

(APNIC 2009b). Zhang Jian, as a CNNIC

representative, commented on general policy issues at a policy meeting (APNIC

2009c).

28 (2009) ^^,^^^

CNNIC (Host)

- China

Mobile/ China

Telecom/China

Unicom/ China

Motion Telecom/ Shocom/

Great Wall

Broadband Network/BJENet/ CERNET (Sponsors)

NA NA NA NA NA Government In a plenary meeting on the Internet in China, an MIIT

representative stated that he welcomed involvement by all

stakeholders in Internet governance (APNIC 2009j).

Private Sector

A China Mobile representative commented in

a plenary meeting on the Internet in China on general

issues (APNIC 2009j). Four private sector actors from China Telecom and

China Mobile discussed IPv6 issues at the APOPS meeting

(APNIC 2009e).

Civil Society Two civil society

208

representatives, both from the CNNIC, were elected to chair the Policy SIG and the NIR

SIG (APNIC 2009g). The CNNIC signed an MOU on Internet development and

cooperation with APNIC (APNIC 2009g).

At a plenary meeting on the Internet in China, Hu Qiheng

representing the ISC discussed her role in establishing China's

connection to the TCP/IP Internet, and five CNNIC

representatives also introduced facts about China's

domestic internet development (APNIC 2009j). Li Xing from CERNET gave

a presentation on IPv6 in China (APNIC 2009i).

Pan Guangliang discussed IPv6 at APNIC in the AMM

(APNIC 2009d). A CNNIC representative

discussed IPv6 issues at the NIR SIG (APNIC 2009h).

Three civil society representatives, two from

CNNIC and Pan Guangliang from APNIC, commented on general issues at a Policy SIG

meeting (APNIC 2009k). Five civil society actors -

including: Xue Hong in her academic capacity, two CNNIC representatives,

Zhang Jian in her ICANN capacity, and a CDNC

representative - commented on Internet governance matters at an Internet governance meeting;

including comments from Li Xiaodong from the CNNIC

that gave a detailed statement about the benefits of the IGF's multi-stakeholder governance

model (APNIC 2009f).

209

Zhang Jian gave a detailed account of APNIC's policy

processes, acting as the Policy SIG meeting chair

(APNIC 2009l).

29 (2010)

^^

CNNIC (Sponsor)

NA NA NA NA NA Government A Chinese ITU official commented on an ITU proposal for IPv6 to be

allocated on a country basis instead of through the usual

process (APNIC 2010b).

Civil Society Pan Guangliang gave a

presentation representing APNIC at the AMM (APNIC

2010a). Two CNNIC representatives commented on general policy

issues at the Policy SIG (APNIC 2010c).

Two civil society actors commented on general policy issues, including Ma Yan in his academic capacity who

commented on general matters and Zhao Wei from the CNNIC, who discussed the CNNIC's use of mailing

lists for internal discussion of APNIC policy issues (APNIC

2010a).

30 (2010)

CNNIC (Sponsor)

18 0 5 12 1 Civil Society Pan Guangliang discussed IPv4 allocation as APNIC's

representative (APNIC 2010d).

Ma Yan in his academic capacity and Zhang Jian in

her APTLD capacity commented briefly on general issues at the AMM (APNIC

2010f). Two CNNIC representatives

commented on IPv6 and gTLD issues at the Policy

SIG, one of whom chaired the

210

meeting (APNIC 2010h). Zhao Wei, CNNIC, co-

chaired and commented in the NIR SIG (APNIC 2010g).

Li Xing from CERNET gave a lightning talk on IPv6

(APNIC 2010e).

31 (2011)

CNNIC (Sponsor)

62 2 14 46 0 Private Sector A Chinese Microsoft

representative commented on general issues in China's internet business at the

opening ceremony (APNIC 2011f).

Civil Society

Zhao Wei from the CNNIC commented on her role as a chair of the NIR SIG at the

AMM (APNIC 2011a). Two civil society actors, Li

Xing from CERNET and Ma Yan in his academic capacity,

commented on IPv6 and network development in

China in an IPv6 transition meeting (APNIC 2011d).

Li Xiaodong from the CNNIC commented on

various issues in the DNSSEC Executive Summit

(APNIC 2011c). A CNNIC representative commented on various matters at the closing

ceremony (APNIC 2011b). A CERNET representative

commented on IPv6 issues at an IPv6 workshop (APNIC

2011e). Wu Jianping in his capacity

as a representative of an Asia-Pacific networking group

commented on general issues at the opening ceremony

(APNIC 2011f).

32 CNNIC NA NA NA NA NA Civil Society

211

(2011) ^^

(Sponsor) A CERNET representative commented briefly in a

general Panel discussion (APNIC 2011k).

A CNNIC and a CERNET representative commented on general issues at a policy SIG

(APNIC 2011h). Ma Yan commented on

various policy issues at an IPv6 transition meeting

(APNIC 2011g). A CNNIC representative

commented briefly on issues at the NIR meeting (APNIC

2011j). Ma Yan in his APNIC

capacity commented on general internet issues in China (APNIC 2011i).

33

(2012) ^^

CNNIC (Sponsor)

NA NA NA NA NA Civil Society A CNNIC representative and

a CERNET representative gave two separate

presentations each (APNIC 2012e).

A CNNIC representative gave an IPv6 presentation at the NIR SIG (APNIC 2012g).

A CNNIC representative gave an IPv6 presentation at an

IPv6 meeting (APNIC 2012d).

A CERNET representative gave a presentation at an

IPv6-related meeting (APNIC 2012c).

A CNNIC representative and a CERNET representative

commented on general policy in a policy SIG (APNIC

2012h). Ma Yan in his academic

capacity commented in the AMM on general matters

(APNIC 2012f).

34 CNNIC 23 0 10 9 4 Private Sector

212

(2012) (Sponsor) A China Mobile representative gave a

presentation on mobile internet in China (APNIC

2012l, 2012o).

Civil Society Two CNNIC representatives,

a CERNET representative and a Chinese APNIC

employee gave presentations on technical issues (APNIC

2012l). A CNNIC representative co-chaired an NIR SIG (APNIC

2012k) Pan Guangliang in his

APNIC capacity commented on general issues at a policy meeting, at a global reports

meeting, and gave a presentation on APNIC services (APNIC 2012i,

2012j, 2012q). A CNNIC representative gave a presentation on PKI issues

at a PKI meeting (APNIC 2012m).

Li Xing gave a presentation on IPv6 issues at a lightning

talk (APNIC 2012p). Two civil society

representatives, a CNNIC and APNIC representative

respectively, introduced themselves at the general annual meeting (APNIC

2012n).

35 (2013)

CNNIC (Sponsor)

33 5 8 13 7 Civil Society A CNNIC representative

chaired and commented in the NIR SIG (APNIC 2013c).

Another CNNIC representative gave a

presentation at the WEIRDS BoF (APNIC 2013e).

A CNNIC commented briefly on being part of APNIC in the AMM (APNIC 2013a).

213

Ma Yan and Zhao Wei commented on their roles in the APNIC EC at the AMM

(APNIC 2013b). Zhao Wei introduced Xian,

the next APNIC meeting location, at the AMM

(APNIC 2013d).

36 (2013)

^^^

CNNIC/ BII

(Hosts) - CNNIC/ BII/China Mobile/ China

Unicom/ China

Telecom (Sponsors)

112 1 60 46 5 Private Sector A BII representative

commented briefly in the APOPS Plenary 1 (APNIC

2013j). Two China Telecom

representatives commented on IPv6 issues in a meeting

on that topic (APNIC 2013n). A BII representative

commented on IPv6 issues at the Opening Ceremony

(APNIC 2013q). A Chinese IDN registrar

representative presented on IPv6 issues at an IPv6

meeting (APNIC 2013h).

Civil Society Li Xing chaired and

commented in a Policy SIG (APNIC 2013r).

Two Chinese APNIC representatives commented in

the Policy SIG 2 (APNIC 2013s).

Two civil society representatives commented in

the Opening Ceremony, including a CAS

representative and Zhao Wei from the CNNIC who chaired the meeting (APNIC 2013q).

A CNNIC representative commented on IPv6 in China

in the NIR SIG (APNIC 2013p).

Pan Guangliang from APNIC commented on APNIC's general activities at the

214

APNIC Services meeting (APNIC 2013i).

A CNNIC representative gave a presentation at a PKI

workshop (APNIC 2013o). A Beijing academic spoke at

a women leaders’ session (APNIC 2013l).

Two CNNIC representatives commented on IPv6 issues

(APNIC 2013n). A CONAC presented on DNS issues in an APOPS session

(APNIC 2013k). Two Chinese APNIC

representatives commented on election processes for the Policy SIG, one who helped facilitate the election process

(APNIC 2013r, 2013s). A CERNET representative

and a Beijing academic commented on general issues

in an anniversary meeting (APNIC 2013f).

Ma Yan in his academic capacity commented on

general issues in the AMM (APNIC 2013g).

Unknown

An unknown attendee commented in an IPv6

meeting on general issues (APNIC 2013m).

An unknown attendee commented in an IPv6 meeting on IPv6 issues

(APNIC 2013n).

37 (2014)

CNNIC (Sponsor)

20 0 9 9 2 Civil Society Ma Yan in his academic

capacity gave a presentation on IPv6 at an IPv6 BoF

(APNIC 2014c). Two Chinese APNIC representatives briefly

commented in the AMM (APNIC 2014b).

215

38

(2014) CNNIC/

China ISP Union/

21Vianet (Sponsors)

15 1 6 8 0 Government Zhao Houlin, in his ITU capacity, was a keynote

speaker at this conference. In his speech he noted the close

collaboration between the ITU, APNIC and other

internet governance organizations. He also noted that the ITU is not trying to

take over internet governance and noted the value of multi-

stakeholder governance (APNIC 2014g, 2014i).

Civil Society

Ma Yan and Zhao Wei in their APNIC capacities

commented briefly in the AMM (APNIC 2014d).

A Chinese APNIC representative and a CNNIC

representative briefly commented in another session of the AMM (APNIC 2014e).

Pan Guangliang in his APNIC capacity gave a presentation on APNIC

services (APNIC 2014f). Ma Yan in his APNIC capacity discussed EC

elections in a policy meeting (APNIC 2014j)

Two Chinese APNIC representatives discussed general policy issues at

another session of a policy meeting (APNIC 2014k)

A CNNIC representative gave a presentation on IPv6 in

China and Another CNNIC representative commented in

a NIR meeting (APNIC 2014h).

Source: Author's own research into APNIC conference archives (APNIC 2014l). * APNIC only commenced recording/archiving its general conferences at APNIC 8. ** APNIC did not record country affiliation until APNIC 18, although APNIC 10 did

216

record country affiliation in graph form. For meetings 8 and 9, the status of apparently Chinese attendees as PRC nationals was determined by whether they had a Chinese name along with another piece of corroborating evidence (i.e. a .cn email address, affiliation with a PRC-based organization, etc.). Stakeholder affiliation for all meetings was determined by the PRC-based organization with which attendees were associated. If no association was given, the attendee is listed as part of the unknown stakeholder group. *** Details listed in this section are drawn from recorded details of each meeting. These details are generally from session/sub-meeting transcripts but, especially in the earlier APNIC conferences, are also drawn from recorded information about events or presentations given at APNIC conference sessions/sub-meetings. Transcripts did not begin to be provided for APNIC conferences until APNIC 16. The unreliability of some APNIC records, particularly those from earlier meetings but also generally due to transcription errors, means that this Appendix likely understates the extent of Chinese involvement in ANPIC conferences. ^ APNIC 10 only indicated attendance by country via a graph, rendering this figure approximate. ^^ APNIC's attendance records are incomplete or not publicly available. Meetings 11 to 17 have no attendance records, while meetings 19, 22 to 25, 28, 29, 32 and 33 also do not have attendance records. ^^^ APNIC 26 and 36 have been held in mainland China, in Beijing and Xian respectively.

217

Appendix 6 - Chinese Involvement in the IGF

Year Chinese Sponsors

*

Chinese Attendees** (Total/Government/ Private Sector/Civil Society/ Unknown)

Details of Chinese Participation***

2006 NA 0 **

0 **

0 0 **

0 Government An MIIT representative was on

the inaugural IGF Advisory Group (which later became the

MAG) (IGF 2007a). The 'Group of 77 & China' sent a

letter to the UN Secretary-General in relation to the IGF, which was supportive of multi-

stakeholder governance but advocated for governments to outnumber other stakeholder

groups generally and equal them in the Advisory Group -

suggesting 20 government, 10 private sector and 10 civil

society representatives for this body (IGF 2006/2007).

A further letter sent by the Group of 77 & China insisted that governments, the private

sector and civil society all meet separately during the IGF's

preparatory phase (IGF 2006/2007).

An MIIT representative commented in the Setting the

Scene main session, stating that it was important to safeguard

state security online (IGF 2006c).

A government representative commented in an Openness main

session, stating that there were no content restrictions on

China's internet (IGF 2006e).

Civil Society Hu Qiheng, a CNNIC and ISC representative, commented on IDN issues in a diversity main

session (IGF 2006a). A CNCERT/CC representative

218

commented in a security panel on spam issues (IGF 2006b).

ISC and CAST representatives organized a workshop on

internet security (IGF 2006d). The ISC organized a workshop

in which a 'World Internet Norm' was proposed, which advocated for a secure and 'trusty' internet and for government authority

over internet governance (Winfield & Mendoza 2008, p.

2, 10).

2007 NA 35 19 0 16 0 Government An MIIT representative was a member of the renewed IGF Advisory Group (which later

became the MAG) (IGF 2007a). A Chinese government

representative commented on a range of matters in a preparatory

meeting, stating that governments should have a

greater role in internet governance, that critical internet resources should be a priority for

discussion, that developing states should be better

represented and noting support for multi-stakeholder

governance (IGF 2007h). The Chinese government

submitted a letter to the IGF stating that critical internet

resources, development issues and the role of government

should be a priority for discussion (IGF 2007b). A Chinese government

representative commented in a preparatory meeting that critical internet resources should be part

of the IGF's agenda (IGF 2007g).

A Chinese government representative in a critical

internet resources main session commented on the need for

internet governance reform in

219

favour of governments and obliquely referred to US

dominance over the present system (IGF 2007f).

A Ministry of Education representative commented in a

workshop on internet governance principles support of

a 'World Internet Norm' proposed by Chinese civil

society representatives in IGF 2006, which placed an emphasis on a secure and 'trusty' internet

(IGF 2007c).^

Civil Society In a critical internet resources main session, a delegate from

the ‘China Internet Emergency Response Group’, a likely reference to CNCERT/CC, supported the government’s contention that ‘one state’

controlling internet governance was unjust (IGF 2007f). A CNNIC representative reported in the opening ceremony on China’s

development of its own domestic DNS that the

representative claimed does not rely on IP addresses (IGF

2007d). The Secretary-General of the ISC commented in a security

main session on spam and on the need for government

involvement in internet governance (IGF 2007e).

The ISC and CAST organized a workshop on development issues

and the internet (IGF 2007i).

2008 NA 14 6 0 8 0 Government An MIIT representative was a

member of the MAG (IGF 2008g)

In a preparatory meeting, a Chinese government

representative stated that

220

managing internet resources should be done in a multilateral

and democratic way (IGF 2008a).

In a preparatory meeting the Chinese government stated that it supported the current agenda, which included critical internet

resources (IGF 2008f). At an emerging issues main session, it was noted that the

Chinese government representative had supported

Brazil's call for greater government involvement in

ICANN (IGF 2008c). At an open dialogue main

session, a Chinese embassy representative stated that

governments should have a greater role in internet

governance while also briefly commenting on multi-

lingualization issues (IGF 2008d).

At a critical internet resources meeting, an MIIT representative

made a direct request that the IGF focus on the need for discussion of the role of governments in internet

governance, noted that 'one government' controls internet

governance, suggested the need for an intergovernmental

supervisory entity and praised the multi-stakeholder character of the IGF itself (IGF 2008b). The Chinese government was

involved in workshops discussing development,

cybersecurity and online dispute resolution within domain name

administration (IGF 2008i, 2008j, 2008k).^

Civil Society

An ISC representative in an open dialogue main session

discussed spam issues and child

221

pornography regulation (IGF 2008e).

The ISC organized a workshop on the internet and people with

disabilities (IGF 2008f) Xue Hong in her academic capacity was a panellist in a

workshop on digital education issues (IGF 2008h).

The ISC and CAST organized a workshop on cybersecurity,

while a Beijing academic and CAS members were also

panellists in this workshop. A third version of the 'World

Internet Norm' was proposed in this workshop but is no longer

accessible (IGF 2008i). The ISC and CAST organized a workshop on development issues

in internet governance (IGF 2008j).

A Beijing academic organized and was a panellist in a

workshop on online dispute resolution (IGF 2008k).

2009 NA 42 18 0 24 0 Government

An MIIT representative was a member of the MAG (IGF

2009b). In a preparatory meeting, the

Chinese government representative called for critical internet resources to be a focus

of the IGF (IGF 2009c). In another preparatory meeting,

the Chinese government representative stated that despite

four years of the IGF, critical internet resources were still

unilaterally controlled by one government, and stated that this issue should now be moved to an intergovernmental forum

instead of the IGF (IGF 2009d). In a further preparatory meeting,

the Chinese government delegate stated the IGF had failed to address the issue of

222

unilateral control of the internet, that an intergovernmental body should take over this task, and that the IGF's mandate should not be reviewed (IGF 2009g).

A non-Chinese participant commented in a security and openness main session that a

previous session had been disrupted the day before when

the Chinese government delegation walked out after

being criticised over the Great Firewall (IGF 2009e).

At a critical internet resources main session, a Chinese

government representative commented briefly on the

importance of developing IPv6 (IGF 2009a).

At a taking stock and looking forward main session, a Chinese government representative again noted the IGF's failure to address unilateral control of the internet

and outlined its proposal for transferring IGF activities to an intergovernmental body within

the UN framework (IGF 2009h). An MIIT representative attended

a workshop on IPv6 (IGF 2009m).

Private Sector/Civil Society

A number of Chinese non-state actors were involved in

workshops related to freedom of information, cloud computing, development, the digital divide and education, and people with disabilities on the Internet (IGF

2009i, 2009j, 2009k, 2009l, 2009n, 2009o).^

Civil Society

The ISC contributed in a taking stock main session where its Vice President stated the IGF should focus on transnational

issues and respect national and

223

cultural differences (IGF 2009f).

2010 NA 31 9 1 20 1 **

Government In a preparatory meeting, a

Chinese government representative stated that the

IGF’s activities should continue in ‘relevant UN meetings’ and a

‘relevant decision’ should be made on renewing the IGF’s

mandate (IGF 2010f). The Chinese government made a

statement in a critical internet resources main session that

internet governance was very important and that China was

fully cooperative with the world in its governance (IGF 2010g).

Private Sector

A Qihoo 360 representative participated in a workshop on cloud computing (IGF 2010d).

Civil Society

The ISC and CAST both organized workshops at this IGF

(IGF 2010a). A Chinese academic was a part

of a dynamic coalition on internet rights and principles

(IGF 2010c). An ISC member was part of a workshop on cloud computing

(IGF 2010d) A representative of both the ISC

and CAST organized and chaired a workshop on internet

governance principles (IGF 2010h).

A Chinese academic was part of a workshop on international law and internet governance issues

(IGF 2010i).

Unknown An unknown participated in a

workshop on development issues and internet governance (IGF

224

2010k).

2011 NA 22 8 1 7 6 **

Government An MIIT representative was a

member of the MAG (IGF 2011j).

In a preparatory meeting a Chinese government

representative commented on various issues related to the IGF's agenda, and also noted that critical internet resources were the most important issue

(IGF 2011e). An MIIT representative attended

a preparatory MAG meeting (IGF 2011j).

A Chinese government representative commented on general IGF agenda issues in another preparatory meeting

(IGF 2011g). In a security and openness main session, a Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs representative stated that China, Russia and other states had put forward a

proposal on internet security to the UN and encouraged other states to approve it. He noted

that it was a non-binding treaty (IGF 2011f).

A Ministry of Foreign Affairs representative commented in a dynamic coalition meeting on freedom of expression, noting

that protection of this right varied amongst issues and

societies (IGF 2011b). A Chinese government

representative participated in a workshop on copyright issues in

schools and the internet (IGF 2011c).^

Private Sector

Two private sector actors participated in a good practice forum on e-commerce issues

(IGF 2011d)

225

Civil Society

An ISC representative chaired a good practice forum on e-

commerce issues (IGF 2011d). A CNNIC representative

participated in an IDN workshop (IGF 2011h).

An ISC member chaired a workshop on open knowledge environments in developing

countries, and a CAST representative and a Chinese

academic contributed to discussions as well (IGF 2011k).

Unknown

An unknown participated in a workshop on strengthening ccTLDs in East Africa (IGF

2011a).

2012 NA 41 9 12 20 0 Government An MIIT representative was a

member of the MAG (IGF 2012i).

An MIIT representative commented in a preparatory MAG meeting on the IGF's

agenda, stressing the need to advance developing state

participation (IGF 2012h). A Chinese government

representative commented in a preparatory meeting on the IGF's

agenda (IGF 2012j). A Chinese government

representative commented in another preparatory meeting on the IGF's agenda (IGF 2012k). A Ministry of Foreign Affairs

representative stated in an internet governance for

development main session that he had attended a few

workshops on this issue at this IGF and that there was much we could do to improve developing state access to the internet (IGF

226

2012f).

Private Sector

A China Telecom representative and a Baidu representative

discussed mobile internet issues in a workshop on that topic (IGF

2012r).

Civil Society The first Chinese non-state actor, Guo Liang from the

CASS, was appointed to the MAG in 2012 (IGF 2012i).

Guo Liang, a MAG member, commented briefly on the IGF's agenda in a preparatory meeting

(IGF 2012e). In a preparatory meeting Guo

Liang supported calls for greater developing state involvement in

the IGF (IGF 2012e). Xue Hong in her academic capacity commented on law

enforcement use of IP addresses and domain names in a security

main session (IGF 2012m). Xue Hong in her academic

capacity commented on online dispute resolution issues in a workshop on that topic (IGF

2012n). Xue Hong discussed IDN issues in a new gTLD workshop (IGF

2012p). Xue Hong in her academic

capacity discussed the uniqueness of multi-stakeholder

governance in internet governance in a workshop on politics and the internet (IGF

2012q). Xue Hong was the moderator in a workshop on law enforcement

using domain names (IGF 2012u).

Xue Hong in her academic capacity discussed trademark

issues in new gTLD's in a

227

meeting on gTLD issues (IGF 2012v).

A CNNIC representative discussed DNS blocking and

censorship in China in a forum on internet filtering (IGF

2012w). CERNET co-organized a

meeting on internet communications in disaster

situations (IGF 2012o). An ISC representative chaired a

workshop on mobile internet (IGF 2012r).

An ISC chaired a workshop organized by CAST on open knowledge environments in developing countries (IGF

2012s). A CNNIC representative

discussed new gTLD issues in a ccTLD workshop (IGF 2012t).

Unknown

An unknown Chinese attendee asked a question about

enhancing developing state participation in internet

governance in an open forum main session (IGF 2012c).

2013 CNNIC 32 9 3 20 0 Government

China's Permanent UN representative, Chen Hongbing,

was a MAG member (IGF 2013g).

A Chinese UNDESA official, Wu Hongbo, selected Markus Kummer to act as the IGF's

Interim Chair for the 2013 IGF (IGF 2013f).

An MIIT representative was an observer at preparatory MAG

meetings (IGF 2013d). China's government MAG

member commented in a MAG meeting on the IGF's agenda

(IGF 2013i). An MIIT representative in a

228

preparatory meeting commented on the IGF's agenda (IGF

2013b). In a preparatory meeting, China's government MAG

member approved of this year's focus on enhancing multi-

stakeholder governance, but also noted that such discussion should take note of WSIS'

outcomes and consider promoting multi-stakeholder

governance “which is multinational, democratic, and transparent” He also stated that

stakeholder roles in internet governance was a divisive issue

that needed to be examined further (IGF 2013e).

China's government MAG member in a preparatory MAG meeting supported a call for the inclusion of sovereignty as an

issue or theme for the 2013 IGF, noted that multi-stakeholder

governance itself shouldn't be considered a theme more important than others, and argued that critical Internet

resources needed to be discussed “to change the current

unreasonable situation of the governance of critical Internet

resources” (IGF 2013h). In a focus session on internet

governance principles, a Chinese government delegate commented on the need for human rights to

be recognized in Internet governance (IGF 0213).

In a taking stock, emerging issues - internet surveillance meeting, a Chinese Foreign Ministry delegate stated that mass surveillance of foreign

citizens was unacceptable, in a clear reference to the US spying

program. The delegate also stated that human rights were

important but needed to be

229

balanced against each other. The issue of surveillance led to

mutual recrimination between this Chinese delegate and a US

official The delegate also explicitly stated that multi-

stakeholder Internet governance was a good thing and that

excluding any stakeholder group was ill-advised (IGF 2013m).

In a high level leaders meeting, an MIIT representative

discussed China's internet development and noted that technical GIG needed to be

multilateral and conform to the WSIS Principles (IGF 2013c).

A Chinese government delegate in an online oppression

workshop stated the US had double standards in criticising

other states' online human rights in light of US spying (IGF

2013q). A Chinese UN representative

commented briefly on women's issues in a workshop on

protecting rights online (IGF 2013s).

A Chinese GAC representative attended a workshop on

Enhanced Cooperation hosted by the CNNIC, and criticised the

ICANN multi-stakeholder model as not incorporating the views of

ordinary internet users and governments (IGF 2013w).

At the end of the 2013 IGF, the IGF provided a press release

stating that the end of the 2013 IGF had been overshadowed by

surveillance concerns which mentioned that a Chinese

Foreign Ministry representative noted that "some individual

countries are carrying out large scale surveillance" (IGF 2013l).

Private Sector

A Tencent representative

230

commented on mobile internet issues in a workshop on real-time communication services

(IGF 2013t).

Civil Society Guo Liang, from CASS retained his position on the IGF's MAG

(IGF 2013g). Guo Liang commented in a preparatory meeting on the

difficulty of staging IGF workshops using Chinese

language (IGF 2013k). Guo Liang attended the May

preparatory process meetings but made no recorded comment

(IGF 2013j). Xue Hong commented on

privacy policy in China in a privacy workshop (IGF 2013n).

Xue Hong commented on China's real name domain

registration system in a workshop on online identity

security (IGF 2013o). Xue Hong commented on

China's Internet governance regime in an IDN workshop, noting in particular the multi-stakeholder character of the

CDNC (IGF 2013p). A CNNIC representative

discussed China's IDN research, and noted the multi-stakeholder

character of the CDNC (IGF 2013v).

A CNNIC representative discussed ccTLDs and IDNs in a

workshop on ccTLDs (IGF 2013r).

An ISC representative chaired a workshop on real-time

communications that was organized by the ISC and CAST,

and a Beijing academic was a panellist in this workshop (IGF

2013t). A CNNIC representative

commented on China's internet

231

governance regime and the global one in a workshop on

internet governance, noting that multi-stakeholder governance

could be improved upon and that the term has many different

meanings (IGF 2013u). Two CNNIC representatives

moderated a workshop on Enhanced Cooperation, which

was hosted by the CNNIC. One representative, Li Xiaodong,

commented in detail on China's internet governance regime and

the multi-stakeholder governance model of the CNNIC

(IGF 2013w). In a dynamic coalition meeting on internet values Xue Hong commented on digital rights

management issues (IGF 2013a).

2014 CNNIC 37 11 7 19 0 Government China's Permanent UN

representative was a member of the MAG (IGF 2014f, 2014y). A Chinese UNDESA official

wrote a formal invitation to the IGF for various stakeholders

(IGF 2014d). Zhao Houlin, representing the

ITU, gave a speech at the welcoming ceremony, where he praised the cooperation between the ITU and internet governance

organizations (IGF 2014c, 2014g).

Qian Bo, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs representative, in a main session on the evolution of the internet governance ecosystem

and future of the IGF, stated that the IGF is too much of a

talkshop and its proposals should be implemented, noted

that multi-stakeholder governance was a good thing and supported by the Chinese government, and stated that governments should play a

232

dominant role in internet governance (IGF 2014e).

A Chinese Foreign Ministry official, Qian Bo, gave a speech

at the IGF’s 2014 closing ceremony and touched briefly on

the digital divide (IGF 2014a, 2014b).

Zhao Houlin, representing the ITU, was a panellist in a side meeting on WSIS+10 (IGF

2014i). An MIIT representative

commented in an accountability workshop on the IANA transition, stressing that

governments should be more involved in the process (IGF

2014l). A CATR representative

participated in a workshop on broadband access in developing

countries (IGF 2014n). An MIIT representative

commented on China-Africa cooperation in internet

development in a workshop on the internet as an engine for

growth and development (IGF 2014u).

Private Sector

A Chinese private sector representative participated in a workshop on cloud computing

and mobile internet (IGF 2014k).

A China Telecom representative participated in a workshop on

broadband access in developing countries (IGF 2014m). A Huawei representative

participated in a workshop on open data issues (IGF 2014r).

Civil Society

Guo Liang retained his position on the 2014 MAG (IGF 2014y). Guo Liang was a panellist in a

233

main session on internet access, growth and development

policies. He commented on the digital divide in China and

Chinese internet development policies (IGF 2014h).

A CAST representative was a remote moderator in a workshop on mobile cloud computing (IGF

2014j). A CAST representative, an ISC

representative, a Beijing academic, and a 'Chinese Institute of Electronics'

representative participated in a workshop on cloud computing

and mobile internet (IGF 2014k).

Two ISC representatives and a CAST representative

participated in a workshop on broadband access in developing

countries (IGF 2014m). Two CNNIC representatives participated in a workshop on

future internet architecture (IGF 2014o).

A CAS representative participated in a workshop on small island developing states and the information society,

discussing the role of the CAS in assisting these islands (IGF

2014q). A CASS representative

participated in a workshop on children's rights in the digital

age (IGF 2014p). Two CAST representatives, two

CAS representatives, an ISC representative and a Chinese

academic participated in a workshop on open data issues

(IGF 2014r). A CNNIC representative

participated in a workshop on ccTLDs and internet governance literacy, commenting on the new cyberspace ministry in China, its relationship to the CNNIC and

234

the CNNIC's own multi-stakeholder character (IGF

2014s). A CASS representative

commented on the need to expand past just English

language usage at internet governance events and

organizations in a workshop on developing country participation

in internet governance (IGF 2014t).

Unknown

An unknown attendee participated in a workshop on

future internet architecture (IGF 2014o).

2015

^^ NA NA NA NA NA NA Government

China's Permanent UN representative was a member of

the MAG (IGF 2015). China's government MAG

member introduced himself in a preparatory meeting (IGF

2014w).

Civil Society Li Xiaodong from the CNNIC

was a member of the 2015 MAG (IGF 2015).

Guo Liang, representing the CAS, participated in the

December 2014 MAG open consultations, part of the

preparatory process for IGF 2015 (IGF 2014x).

Guo Liang commented in a preparatory meeting that no

Chinese government representative had given a

formal speech at the IGF (IGF 2014v).

Guo Liang introduced himself in another preparatory meeting

(IGF 2014w).

Source: Author's own research into IGF meeting archives (IGF 2012g).

235

* Sponsor information is indicated in the IGF's annual financial statements, which are only available for IGF 2013 and 2014 (IGF 2012g). ** IGF attendance lists are voluntary, thus the number of recorded attendees may understate how many Chinese participants there were in the IGF. This is particularly evident in IGF 2006, which as the details column indicates did involve Chinese government and civil society participation. Chinese participants are identified by their Chinese language names and another piece of corroborating evidence (i.e. Chinese government body, Chinese corporation or Chinese civil society organization/university, etc.) IGF 2010 and IGF 2011 had apparently Chinese attendees with affiliations listed only as 'Others/Personal Capacity'. These attendees do not have further corroborating evidence beyond a Chinese language name - thus the attendance of unknown stakeholders may be overstated. *** Details listed in this section are drawn from recorded details of each IGF meeting. These details include session, workshop, dynamic coalition and other transcripts, as well as documents outlining core information about chairs and panellists in these various IGF events. Some details also include formal submissions made to the IGF. This is particularly the case with the first IGF in 2006 which included a number of letters sent to the UN Secretary-General prior to the IGF's establishment, which relate to its intended structure and organization. Transcripts for IGF events contain some transcription errors, meaning that this Appendix likely understates the extent of Chinese involvement in ICANN meetings. ^ The links to some IGF records are now dead, thus claims made by the Appendix indicated with the ^ symbol can no longer be confirmed. Rather than leave the data out entirely, the Appendix retains it to provide the reader with the most information possible but indicates that the reliability of these claims is limited. ^^ The IGF 2015's preparatory process commenced in December of 2014, thus these elements of the IGF 2015 are included in the Appendix.

236

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