A China-U.S. Space Arms Race?

Stephen Uhalley, Jr.

The 50th Anniversary of the Space Age

Three days ago, October 4, marked the 50th anniversary of the successful orbiting of Sputnik I and the beginning of the space age. Sputnik was a wake-up call for the United States.1 In the Cold War race for space that was now out of the starting gate the Russians made a remarkably good showing, but the United States won the race decisively and today dominates space.

So, 2007 is a special year in the history of the space age. The occasion has been commemorated in many aerospace conferences, pronouncements, publications, and special space launchings. We have been afforded ample opportunity to reflect on what has been a fascinating half century of space exploration, of amazing discovery, and of finding imaginative ways to make productive use of space. Indeed, all those satellites orbiting overhead have tremendously transformed our lives and our remarkably evolving understanding of the earth and of the overall cosmos. We realize, too, that we have all become critically dependent upon those objects we place in space.

In recognition of this exciting yet sobering new reality, aerospace enthusiasts and others have seen this moment in time as propitious not only to reminisce but to thoughtfully plan ahead as well. After all, with the passing of the Cold War we are already well into what is regarded as the Second Space Age, characterized as it is by many nations becoming active in space, not just two superpowers, or perhaps, for a time, a single such power. Indeed, we can already imagine a coming global political environment that will have its corresponding Third Space Age. In any case, all can see that there is need for planning ahead accordingly, in order to assure that activity in space is conducted rationally and equitably. We all have much at stake.

The Chinese Space Program

China, too, has enthusiastically taken part in the excitement of space exploration and utilization in recent years and just last year celebrated its own 50th anniversary in this field.2 It has registered stellar, if prudently measured, achievements in recent years and has passed two especially notable milestones: the first in 1999 with the launching of an orbiting spacecraft; the second, the successful manned missions of 2003 (one astronaut or

1 . Although just a footnote here, but germane to the interests of our Association, it will be remembered that it was Sputnik that prompted passage of the National Defense Education Act, which established area and language study centers at a number of universities. This included funds for the newly established Center for Chinese Studies at the University of California at Berkeley, of which I was a charter fellow! For years afterward, Chinese studies in the United States benefited immensely.2 The best book on this program so far is Brian Harvey, China’s Space Program: From Conception to Manned Spaceflight, New York: Praxis Publishing, 2003. A much more concise account is Marcia S. Smith, “China’s Space Program: An Overview,” Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, October 21, 2003. Both sources need updating.

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taikonaut, for 21 hours in space) and 2005 (two taikonauts, for five days). Appropriately enough, the third milestone was slated for this year, on this special fiftieth anniversary of the space age. This will be with the launching of China’s first unmanned lunar orbiting mission, the Chang’e. Actually, this was to have taken place earlier this year, although, without explanation, it has been rescheduled for this fall instead.

These are all important achievements and they dramatically call attention to China’s significant role in space. It further underscores the seriousness of China’s future plans, which include China’s first space walk next year, in 2008, aboard Shenzhou VII, which is scheduled to launch with three taikonauts aboard. A space laboratory is projected by 2015, along with lunar landings, a lunar base, and a mission to Mars. These ambitious plans were unveiled at the 22nd National Space Symposium in Colorado Springs in April 2006,3 and outlined more fully in China’s white paper on space activities released in October 2006.4 Further insights into these plans have been revealed subsequently.5

It is worth noting that China’s space activity is not limited to such high profile, headline making events. The scope of its space program is both deep and broad. China already has its own constellations of satellites, more than forty at present and steadily increasing in number (about ten each year) and sophistication. This assemblage includes the beginnings of the Beidou (or Compass) navigational system that alone will eventually consist of around thirty satellites.6 Beidou will compete with the American Global Positioning System (GPS), as well as with the Russian GLONASS and the European Galileo systems. The Chinese navigation system poses a commercial threat to the latter, which is struggling just to come into being. The American GPS, meanwhile, has been available to all, free of cost, and is being upgraded, still free to all.

China is getting more and more into the business of making and launching satellites for other countries and actually has expectations of dominating this market eventually. The Russians who currently handle forty percent of the lucrative international commercial launch market and who hope to increase this percentage cannot be too happy at this prospect. In fact, the Russian space program is lagging at present, although we can expect a burst of renewal here as well as hard cash and patriotic sentiment levels continue to rise in a renewed autocratic Russia.

Why?

One can ask why it is that China has gone into space in such a big way. After all, much of what is now being accomplished was done decades earlier by two other countries taking

3 By Luo Ge, vice administrator of the China National Space Administration. See Leonard David, “China Unveils Ambitious Space Plans at National Space Symposium,” April 5, 2006, in www.space.com/news.4 See People’s Daily Online, October 12, 2006.5 In May 2007, China’s State Council approved the 11th five-year plan on space development. Vice Premier Zeng Peiyan stressed that this five-year period (2006-2010) is key to China’s space development, with priority given to manned space flight, lunar exploration, a new launch vehicle, and high-resolution earth observation. Xinhua, Beijing, May 14, 2007. In www.spacedaily.com,, May 14, 2007.6 See Kevin Pollpeter, “To be more precise: the Beidou Satellite Navigation and Positioning System, China Brief, Vol. 7, Issue 10 (May 16, 2007): 1-5.

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great risks into the unknown with primitive equipment. Furthermore, one may wonder why more of China’s treasure trove of foreign exchange reserves might not be better invested in dealing with truly urgent environment pollution concerns that so much threaten to eventually undermine the country’s developmental progress.

There are three main reasons for the space program. One is that prowess in space is today’s most evident indicator of great power status; hence to play a major role in this field is an important matter of national pride, and pride for Chinese everywhere. Stroking this pride is especially important for the political leadership, as achievements here help offset grave concerns about systemic inequities, corruption, pollution, and stalled serious political reform. This is not a motivation to be underestimated.

Secondly, China’s leaders, comprised of so many with engineering training, know that a serious space program pays off handsomely. It stimulates technological and scientific advances and spin offs, and raises standards of precision throughout industry and society. This eventuates in the enhanced value and marketability of manufactures. Thus space investment is legitimately and explicitly considered the key technology in China’s drive for comprehensive national strength. Such profound commitment, furthermore, presages well for China’s ambition to finally get into the difficult competition of building and selling large commercial aircraft.

Thirdly, there is the national security or military consideration. This is so important that it is the military that runs China’s space program. A readily mobilized media provides superlative publicity for successes, while shortcomings can be concealed. For example, we learned only two months ago of the deadly threat to China’s first manned mission in 2003. Military control accounts for the program’s opaqueness. This also accounts for the diminutive cooperation with others in space, despite the rhetoric. There is some cooperation, particularly with Russia, but with understandable reservations on both sides. In any case, the military’s prominent role precludes more serious international cooperation.

Unfortunately, despite the genuine worthiness of the first two reasons, i.e., national pride and technological advantage, which provide so much good reason for celebration, it was the third factor, the military, that was in the forefront as the 50th year of the space age dawned. Thus it was that Beijing came to herald this special global anniversary year in yet another, distinctively memorable way. And in doing so, cast a pall over an otherwise exclusively celebratory year.

ASAT Test Shock

On January 11 this year China launched a Long March missile aimed at one of its aged weather satellites, named Fengyun 1C, some five hundred miles above the earth, scoring a direct head-on bulls eye kinetic hit. No new technology was involved, but it was no mean feat either, although the targeted satellite had been maneuvered to facilitate the encounter. China became only the third nation to conduct such an anti-satellite (ASAT) test successfully, and the first one to do so from ground level. The former Soviet Union

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and the United States had conducted similar tests decades earlier with weapons already aloft.

Curiously, it took almost two weeks for the Chinese government to finally acknowledge the test. Then, it provided belated assurances that the event was not a threat to any nation and immediately reiterated its appeal for an anti-weapons space treaty. Separately, China’s defense minister, visiting in Japan, claimed that it was a “scientific” event but that there would be no repetition of the test. It was apparent that there was a division within the Chinese leadership on this important issue and the Foreign Ministry, for one, apparently was not informed ahead of time. This lack of high level governmental coordination and the unilateral behavior of the military can justly be regarded as potentially alarming.7 Perhaps Hu Jintao, a civilian engineer, had little choice but to accede to military pressure in this year that also sees the convening of the party congress, which is to approve his continued leadership for another five years.

Of course, the test was not a surprise to Washington, which had been aware of previous failed ASAT tests, just as it knew of earlier laser beam attempts to “paint” an American satellite.8 Able observers have warned for years of China’s space weapon interests and possibilities.9 What is surprising is that the Chinese would want to conduct such a test in the first place, as well as the clumsily provocative way in which they went about it, despite predictable costly consequences.

Rationale

Chinese motives, although not officially announced, were made clear enough even before the ASAT test by individual Chinese speaking unofficially. For example, in 2005, Hui Zhang, a Chinese space weapons expert at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, said that Chinese strategists believed that American missile-defense plans pose a great threat to China’s national security in that they could be used to neutralize China’s nuclear deterrent and give the United States more freedom to encroach on China’s sovereignty, including on Taiwan-related issues.10

As is well known, the Chinese have been building their military capability for years. They are deeply concerned about American military superiority, something that for all the cash and determination China is unlikely to match head to head for decades. Thus Beijing focuses on an asymmetrical response, going for the dominant power’s Achilles’

7 See Bates Gill and Martin Kleiber, “China’s Space Odyssey: What the Antisatellite Test Reveals About Decision-Making in Beijing,” Foreign Affairs (May/June 2007): 2-6.8 News of the ASAT test was first reported by Aviation Week & Space Technology (AW&ST) on aviationweek.com on January 17, 2007, with a follow-up print article by Craig Covault in AW&ST, January 22, 2007: 24-25.9 See, e.g., Larry M. Wortzel, “China and the Battlefield in Space,” The Heritage Foundation Web Memo No. 346, October 15, 2003, James A. Lewis, “China as a Military Space Competitor,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 2004, and Michael P. Pillsbury, “An Assessment of China’s Anti-Satellite and Space Warfare Programs, Policies and Doctrines,” prepared for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, January 19, 2007.10 See Martin Sieff, “China ready to counter U.S. space plans,” Insight on the News-World, May 23, 2005 (www.insightmag.com, May 24, 2005).

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heel, even as it concurrently expands its naval (particularly submarine) and aerospace capabilities. Knowing that American military effectiveness depends on certain space assets, they seek to neutralize these. In the event of a military conflict with the United States, possibly over Taiwan, Beijing thus might consider putting out of commission key American satellites, or at least suggest a credible threat that they might do so. Obviously, this possibility does now complicate the Taiwan Strait equation, affecting the calculus that determines what Washington is to do if Taiwan is attacked.

China’s overall idea, it would appear, is to have a two-pronged approach in dealing with American dominance in space. One approach is to develop space weaponry of its own that can be used against American satellites. At the same time, it seeks diplomatically to maneuver the United States into a legal framework that would prevent Americans from developing the space assets or weapons necessary for adequate defense. At least, this latter prong is rhetorically present, and pushed, even if the Chinese themselves might actually have reservations about having restraints placed on what they might do in space. In this regard, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Senior Associate Ashley Tellis argues: “The importance of space denial for China’s operational success implies that its counterspace investments, far from being bargaining chips aimed at creating a peaceful space regime, in fact represent its best hope for prevailing against superior American military power.” Hence, he believes, “Beijing will not entertain any arms-control regime that requires it to trade away its space-denial capabilities.”11

In the event, finding itself in a very awkward situation, the Chinese government has decided not to provide any explanation of the ASAT test, probably because to do so would lead to further uncomfortable questions. It also recognizes that silence has its own eloquence. It has, after all, made an unmistakable statement regarding its capability to shoot down a satellite, and with greater precision than simply detonating a nuclear device in space. It can be seen, at base, a challenge to American dominance in space, in keeping with a tradition of possessing at least a modest deterrence capability. As Eric Hagt has plausibly pointed out, “It was a deliberate and strategic, but also defensive, act.”12

Thus, the making of this bold statement by action was deemed more important than eventually having to deal with the untoward consequences, if these were ever seriously considered to begin with.

These consequences include the damage done physically in space, the adverse implications for the peaceful rise to power line and to China’s credibility generally, and the further complicating of the already complicated U.S.-China relationship. Furthermore, it is likely to provoke a surely unwanted or undesirable reaction that could lead to further American efforts to protect their space assets and determine ways to neutralize the Chinese military in this regard. Finally, it will preclude the possibility of taking full advantage of opportunities for American cooperation in space, which might

11 Ashley J. Tellis, “China’s Space Weapons,” The Wall Street Journal, July 23, 2007, p. A15; This view is elaborated upon in his article “China’s Military Space Strategy,” Survival, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Autumn 2007):41-72..12 “China’s ASAT Test: Strategic Response,” China Security (Winter 2007): 38.

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otherwise greatly facilitate the success of the Chinese program and expedite useful collaborative scientific research.

Compounding the Space Debris Problem

The first and foremost cost of the Chinese ASAT test was its immediate compounding of the problem of accumulating debris in space, a cost not only to the Chinese themselves, but to all who use space. This is a little understood but big problem of which the Chinese themselves have been very much aware. In recent years China has played a growing international role in dealing with the proliferation of space debris. In 2002, for example, it joined with other concerned nations to suggest voluntary guidelines for debris control. This April, Beijing was to have hosted the annual meeting of the advocacy group, known as the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee. Obviously to avoid embarrassment, this meeting was postponed.

It is worth knowing that for decades already, space experts have feared that eventually a speeding bit of orbital debris (traveling as it does about 17,400 mph, or ten times faster than a bullet fired from a high-powered rifle) will smash a large spacecraft into hundreds of pieces, commencing a chain reaction, i.e., a slow cascade of collisions that will expand relentlessly, eventually creating genuine chaos aloft. There is general agreement in the scientific community that the number of objects in orbit has already surpassed a critical mass, i.e., a point at which a chain reaction becomes inevitable. Thus, anxiety regarding this subject had already been mounting.

Early this year, the federal list of detectable objects in orbital space (four inches or larger) had reached ten thousand. Reportedly, the Air Force Space Command was actively monitoring 14,000 or so objects before the Chinese ASAT test.13 To this worrisome, ever growing number, on January 11, the Chinese added as much as another fifteen percent of space junk in the four inches or larger size range, making this the worst such single episode in space history. But the number of yet smaller flying objects and particles from the test may reach as many as two million!14 Much of this debris will remain in space for many decades.

“Today, next year or next decade, some piece of whirling debris will start the cascade, experts say….It’s inevitable,” claims Nicholas Johnson, chief scientist for orbital debris at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).15 It is surmised that the chain reaction is destined to begin at some point anyway, but, for sure, China’s newly created fragmentation cloud will hasten its onset.

Contradicting the Peaceful Rising (or “Peaceful Developing’”) Line

13 According to Brig. Gen. C. Donald Alston, the Command’s director of space operations. In Bill Gertz, “Beijing space test scattered debris,” The Washington Times, April 10, 2007.14 According to NASA estimates. Tim Johnson, “China missile test littered space with loads of debris,” The Seattle Times, March 30, 2007.15 William J. Broad, “Space junk may spell doom for pricey satellites,” The New York Times reprinted in the Marin Independent Journal, February 6, 2007, p. A4.

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Accordingly, it is likely that this dangerous military test has had some negative effect on China’s peacefully rising line, which itself has come to be called the peacefully developing line, reflecting a desire to shy away from anything that can be construed as provocative internationally. And the test is a less than endearing gesture in the midst of what is seen as a “charm offensive” in the world. The heedless endangerment of what is regarded as mankind’s commons in space contrasts jarringly with China’s gestures of genuinely peaceful engagement with the world community. It raises questions about China’s status as a positive stakeholder.

As Joan Johnson-Freese, a not unsympathetic specialist on China’s space program, put it, the Chinese “should realize that the primary impact of their ASAT test is to have shot themselves in the foot diplomatically.”16Michael Krepon, co-founder of the Henry L. Stimson Center, and critic of the Administration’s space policy, conceded that the Chinese test was unsubtle, and very un-Chinese.17And Kevin Pollpeter, who just one day before the test had owned how “China’s space diplomacy thus facilitates its rise as a military power, while enhancing its reputation abroad,”18 now conceded that “China’s test could also undermine its campaign to assuage concerns about its potential rise.”19

There is here a simple matter of trust. No one is likely to really approve of how this matter was conducted and is yet being handled by the Chinese government. Consequently, it will be harder for Beijing to sell the usual rhetoric. Remember that only three months prior to the ASAT test China had issued its white paper on space activities, in which it undertook to “protect the space environment, and develop and utilize space resources in a rational manner.”20 And how credible is the repeated assurance from Beijing that it opposes the introduction of weapons into space? Major General James Armor, director of the National Security Space Office of the Department of Defense, is on record with his view: “The contradictions between China’s statements and its actions raise legitimate questions about the credibility of their declaratory policies, statements, and security commitments.”21

16 Professor Johnson-Freeze is chair of the U.S. Naval War College’s National Security Decision Making Department. See her “America’s China Worries – Part I,” Yale Global, February 6, 2007, in http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/article.print?id=8714. She is author of a new study, Space as a Strategic Asset, New York: Columbia University Press, 2007.

17 See William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, “Flexing Muscle, China Destroys Satellite in Test,” The New York Times, January 19, 2007.18 “Competing Perceptions of the U.S. and Chinese Space Programs,” China Brief, Volume 7, Issue 1 (January 10, 2007): 1-4.

19 “Motives and Implications Behind China’s ASAT Test,” China Brief, Vol. 7, Issue 2 (January 24, 2007): 3.20 People’s Daily Online, October 12, 2006 (http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200610/12/print20061012_311151.html)21 In testimony at the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform’s Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs’ “Weaponizing Space: is current U.S. policy protecting our national security?” hearing on May 23, 2007. . See: http://nationalssecurity.oversight.house.gov/story.asp?ID=1334.

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Nor is the reputation of China’s soft diplomacy helped much by Chinese misrepresentations of American space policy. The United States did announce a new National Space Policy last October, the first such update in ten years. This updating of the policy, actually not much changed from previous versions that date back to the Eisenhower Administration, was issued partly in response to China’s recent successes in space, particularly its manned space program. But critics have claimed that the new policy is an effort to weaponize space, or is hostile posturing or another example of unilateralism, accusations that play well in the current atmosphere of elevated anti-American sentiment around the world.

Of course, it may not be particularly helpful that domestic critics play on this interpretation as well. In May 2007, for example, Rep. John Tierney, chairman of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform’s Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, spoke of the “aggressive and unilateral” tone of the national space policy.22 Theresa Hitchens, director of the Center for Defense Information, similarly comes down hard on the national space policy.23

But such negative readings of the national space policy had already been taken to task by leading space specialist and writer James Oberg, for example, who had earlier criticized the use of misleading material by The Washington Post. The newspaper, however, did not publish his letter to its editor, but it is available online, and reads in part. “The genuine and lamentable threat of igniting a ‘space weapons race’ from this and dozens of similar examples, is not from an explicit policy of firmness and deterrence (as exemplified by the new policy) but from careless misinformation and deliberate disinformation…and from careless reporting by news media figures whose professional standards need reviving.”24

Kevin Pollpeter, referred to earlier, had made an enlightening comparison of the most recent American and Chinese space policy documents (which coincidentally had been issued only a week apart in October 2006). He shows how the American text “detrimentally” increased the visibility of U.S. national security concerns, while the Chinese managed to divert attention away from the military uses of its space program.25 Remember, however, that this astute comparison was published just one day before China’s ASAT test!

Ironically, it was on the very day that American Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, Robert G. Joseph was explaining the new space policy that China conducted its ASAT test.26 Put simply, Joseph was reiterating the point that American space policy seeks primarily “to ensure that we maintain and enable free access to and use of space for peaceful purposes for the United States and all nations of the world – and

22 In his opening statement to the “Weaponizing Space…” hearing, May 23, 2007. Ibid.23 In her testimony to the “Weaponiizing Space…” hearing, May 23, 2007, Ibid.24 “Unpublished Letter to the Editor, WP,” December 17, 2006. In http://jamesoberg.com/12172006postrebuttal-mil.html.25 “Competing Perceptions of the U.S. and Chinese Space Programs,” China Brief, Volume 7, Issue 1 (January 10, 2007): 1-4.26 Speaking at a Center for Space and Defense Forum in Colorado Springs. See http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/78679/htm.

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for the benefit of mankind.” It also “mandates the pursuit of programs and capabilities to ensure that our space assets are protected.” This point, itself subject to misinterpretation, is reassuringly clarified: “by maintaining the right of self-defense, the United States is not out to claim space for its own. Our policy is not about establishing a U.S. monopoly of space, as some have asserted.”27

Complicating further the complex US-China relationship.

As we all know, China and the United States have a very broad and complex relationship with notable ups and downs. Each side derives unmistakable benefit from the relationship. But there are a number of issues that irritate both parties. At bottom, there is a mutual distrust that deters realization of the real friendship that should obtain between our two countries and peoples. For its part, the United States has good reason to remain skeptical about a Chinese autocracy that fears serious political reform, that disallows an independent media, and that generally orchestrates a nationalistic climate among its populace that can easily inflame a manipulable anti-American sentiment, even as Beijing greatly increases its military capabilities. This is all aggravated by Beijing having cultivated such patriotic fervor over Taiwan that it becomes politically difficult for China’s leaders to appear soft on the issue. On February 15, 2007, the National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies convened a roundtable comprised of China and space specialists to discuss the implications of the Chinese ASAT test. Among the key points to come out of the discussion was the observation that “The extension of U.S.-China competition into the space domain will complicate efforts to build a stable and constructive bilateral relationship.”28 Yet it is the United States, primarily, that must deal with China’s space warning and growing capability.

It is important not to overreact, as Joan Johnson-Freeze quickly cautioned,29 although it is equally important not to escape into denial. In any case, even in the United States the reaction has been somewhat muted. There has been surprisingly little comment from the Bush Administration directly, undoubtedly because it is so distracted by the war on Islamist extremists and other concerns in or arising from the Middle East, and by its view of the pivotal importance of Chinese cooperation in resolving the North Korean nuclear weapon issue.

Reviving American Concern for Space Security

Even so, there are many who are concerned. The net result will be that at the very least the warning has been noted, and American vigilance heightened. Accordingly, the Chinese ASAT test has been called “a gift” in terms of serving as a wake up call, another consequence the Chinese could not have desired. Senator Jon Kyl (R-Arizona), already 27 Ibid.28 See Phillip C. Saunders and Charles D. Lutes, “China’s ASAT Test: Motivations and Implications,” INSS Special Report, June 2007: 1-6. 29 “America’s China Worries – Part I,” Yale Global, February 6, 2007.

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an advocate for a strong space defense, was quick to stress the need for an appropriate response by the Bush Administration to “the nature and urgency of this threat,” a response that he had not yet seen. One prominent observer (not identified here) exclaimed that China’s test was “a big favor…it activates our attention and capabilities.” There would be many similar responses, as there would be meetings and publications devoted to space matters that would dwell on this untoward development in the following weeks and months.

And if there is little apparent overall general public reaction to China’s ASAT test, this is not the situation in the space community where the concern is more evident. Lt. General Michael A. Hamel, commander of the Air Force’s Space and Missile Systems Center, makes no bones about it: “If adversaries are using space in ways that would threaten American or our forces on the battlefield, we have to be able to disrupt or deny their use of those capabilities.”30 The latest issue of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics’ Aerospace America features an article suggesting that near space, “our strategic space shore,” presents a unique and advantageous venue for combating growing threats.31

Jeopardized Space Cooperation

Under the circumstances, opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation in space have been jeopardized, and this is a particularly unfortunate consequence of China’s ASAT test. Remember that there had been initiated a notable effort only last year to promote active space cooperation between the two countries. This was undertaken despite serious reservations. James Oberg, for one, wondered what, in effect, the Chinese would bring to the table and cautioned that “the rationale and tactics for such efforts must be based on reality, on cold-blooded assessments and on hard bargaining.”32 But the prospects for cooperation nonetheless received a boost during Chinese President Hu Jintao’s April 2006 visit to Washington. Thus in September 2006, American astronaut Leroy Chiao, who was the first person of Chinese descent to walk in space and to command a space mission, visited China.33 And that same month, NASA Administrator Michael Griffin made NASA’s first official visit to China. Among others, he was accompanied by veteran female astronaut Shannon Lucid, who was born in China.34

Outer space is a lonely place. For those brave enough to endure the demands of space flight it will always be encouraging to have others similarly positively engaged, sharing the adventure and the excitement of exploration, cooperating in the discovery of new scientific knowledge, and hopefully representing optional or redundancy possibilities that 30 Speaking to the American Forces Press Service’s meeting in April 2007. See Steven Donald Smith, Long Beach, CA, April 23, 2007, in http://www.spacewar.com/reports, April 23, 2007.31 Edward H. Allen, “Our strategic space shore: Opportunities in near space,” Aerospace America (September 2007): 26-31.32 “The U.S. and China: What ‘Common Ground’ in Outer Space?” Marshall Institute Policy Outlook (August 2006): 1-9. Oberg is very knowledgeable about the Soviet/Russian space programs and knows well the limitations of cooperation with them.33 See Leroy Chiao, “Inside Shenzhou Central,” Air & Space (February/March 2007): 28-29.34 “NASA Administrator Departs China After ‘Rewarding’ First Visit,” NASA News, September 28, 2006 (www.nasa.gov/about/highlights/griffin-china-prt.htm).

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might be life-saving. And, undoubtedly, there are many fine Chinese aerospace scientists and engineers and others who are serious about getting the most constructive benefit possible from space exploration and utilization and who are not just aiming for military or political advantage. It would be mutually beneficial to work with such people.

Fortunately, the door does remain open. The United States has, in fact, been quite open in its approach to space, as can be seen in any fair reading of its national space policy, noted above. Moreover, two years earlier, in 2004, President George W. Bush had announced a Vision for Space Exploration that redefined NASA’s goals in a big way, including as it did plans for manned lunar and Mars missions.35 The president also made it clear in this important announcement that other nations were invited to participate in what he explicitly said would be “a journey, not a race.”

And just last year (2006), in order to implement this vision, NASA conducted a thoroughgoing international dialogue that lasted from April through December to determine an appropriate global exploration strategy. This dialogue solicited input from more than a thousand individuals and 14 of the world’s space agencies, including China’s. As a result, the dialogue managed to generate agreement on six strategic themes for lunar exploration, 180 possible objectives among those themes, and a draft framework document. This global exploration strategy is considered a work in progress and is expected to inform future discussions among NASA and its partners regarding collaboration and cooperation in the exploration of the moon, Mars, and beyond.36

A Space Arms Race?

Both Beijing and Washington publicly deny that there is such a race. In Washington, both the Defense Department and State Department concur, at least publicly.

It is relevant here that the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute in its July 2007 listing of key strategic issues puts the strategic implications of China’s growing space capabilities in last place among twenty-two such key issues in the Asia-Pacific region.37

This mirrors reality. The disparity between Chinese and American space programs is so great that there really should be no talk of a race between the United States and China in space, either overall, or in the military dimension of space.

The investment of the U.S. in space is huge. American presence and leadership in space is an overwhelmingly commanding one, albeit this will change with time. American experience in cooperating with other nations in space is rich and generous. Americans understand that space is important for everyone. But it has to be understood that space is

35 See: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040114-3.html.36 See NASA-Global Exploration Strategy FAQ, at http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/exploration/news/GES-FAQ37 The listing does, however, put the balancing of U.S. security interests in China and Taiwan in first place and the implications of China’s growing economic and military power in the region in third place. U.S. Army War College Key Strategic Issues List, Strategic Studies Institute, July 2007: 17-18.

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exceedingly important for the currently very actively engaged American military. Space utilization is necessary in order to conduct operations effectively in many diverse geographical locations, which the United States in the undesired default role of world policeman often finds itself embroiled. The very lives of American servicemen and servicewomen depend upon space assets and this on a continuing, daily basis.

By contrast, China’s serious space program is relatively new, has relatively few assets in place, and relies heavily on technology from outside China. The country’s growing military prowess is not immediately threatened. Some degree of minimal deterrence capability appears to be a comprehensible and respectable objective for China. But China’s military opaqueness, rapid military modernization and growth, and demonstrated but unexplained capability to destroy satellites have to be kept in mind.

Thus, at the very least, Washington is constrained to plan effective ways to make satellites more secure, including greatly improving space situational awareness, providing redundancy for emergency situations, using smaller, so-called operationally responsive satellites, and to seek other means of accomplishing this objective. This makes continued progress in space more expensive. But thanks to China’s warning, the additional costs are more likely to be accommodated.

As for the claims that the U.S. has a determined program to weaponize space, frankly these are to be taken with a grain of salt. There have been cogent arguments made for sometime to avoid undertaking such weaponization. Michael O’Hanlon, for example, has so argued.38 But now, that argument has been somewhat compromised.

Even so, there is little to get worked about thus far. For example, in discussing the military budget on June 25, 2007, knowledgeable insider Lt. Col. Peter Hays candidly remarked: “You don’t see a big line for space weapons in here. That’s ‘cause there ain’t any. Okay? There aren’t any secret programs to put up space weapons; there are no major experiments even looking at this. We don’t have that budget. So a lot of what you hear or read about is kind of speculation that’s groundless…I am telling you that authoritatively…So get over it.” 39

New Space Treaty?

Meanwhile, the Chinese ASAT test also inadvertently undermines at least in part its argument, along with the Russians, for a new space treaty. The American position is that the existing space legal regime based upon the 1967 Outer Space Treaty is adequate. There are voices, of course, in support of dialogue to explore the possibilities of a new

38 In his Neither Star Wars Nor Sanctuary: Constraining the Military Uses of Space, Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2004. 39 Comments made on June 25, at a Carnegie Endowment for International Peace nonproliferation conference in Washington, D.C. Transcript by Federal News Service, Washington, D.C., June 25, 2007. Dr. Hays is currently with Science Applications International and has worked at the National Security Space Office. He is a co-editor of Spacepower for a New Millennium: Space and U.S. National Security, McGraw-Hill, 2000.

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treaty. Rep. Edward Markey (D-Mass.), for example, was quick to urge that President Bush guarantee the protection of vulnerable American satellites “by initiating an international agreement to ban the development, testing, and deployment of space weapons and anti-satellite systems.”40

One day, in fact, it might be desirable to have a new comprehensive space treaty. But for now the argument against a legally binding new space treaty is compelling and revolves around the considerable difficulty in defining just what constitutes a space weapon and the unlikelihood of gaining agreement on a verification regime. To begin with, Jeff Kueter, president of the George C. Marshall Institute, has, among others, pointed out that, for a fact, space has for sometime already been militarized and weaponized.41 Interestingly, Chinese speaking unofficially have admitted to as much, or see it coming. In January at a meeting in Davos, Switzerland, Yao Yunzhu, a PLA senior colonel, who directs the Asia-Pacific Office of the Academy of Military Science in Beijing, brought up the subject of her country’s ASAT test that had taken place just days earlier and said: “My prediction: Outer space is going to be weaponized in our lifetime.”42

Perhaps more reasonable in the meantime are calls for working out acceptable rules of the road in space, something that is less than legally binding, but clear enough for all to comprehend. There is probably room here for productive dialogue between both domestic critics and defenders of the American space policy. Nor is there any reason not to talk to the Chinese, to make clear our concerns. There certainly are Chinese who listen, who are willing to listen, and to learn. By the same token, it should be recognized that Americans, too, can and do listen, and learn. Talk is fine. But, again, vigilance is necessary. There is that nagging fundamental difference in our systems, ours distinguished by so much transparency and theirs by so little.

Meanwhile, even though there may not yet be a real space arms race, there is a tension, and a quickened sense of competition. It is not just in space, nor just beneath the ocean’s surface or elsewhere. Cyberspace assaults on the Pentagon indicate that the concern is broader, ranging as it does throughout the electromagnetic spectrum. In his contribution to a recent publication on the Chinese military, Larry Wortzel may have it about right, particularly as China itself, the more it too becomes dependent on space assets, similarly becomes more vulnerable: “Strong competition in both space control and information warfare will characterize the future military development of China and the United States for some time to come.”43 Unfortunately, I don’t see how this can be gainsaid at the moment.

40 Michael Bruno, “Aerospace Daily & Defense Report,” Aviation Week, January 26, 2007. See: http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=space&id=news/ASATO1237.xml41 In testimony at the “Weaponizing Space…” hearing, May 23, 2007.42 Edith M. Lederer, AP, ”Chinese officer predicts space weapons,” January 26, 2007, in www.washingtontimes.com. 43 “China: Warfare in the Information Age,” in Andrew Scobell and Roy Kamphausen, eds., “Roundtable: Sizing the Chinese Military,” Asia Policy, No. 4 (July 2007): 105. http://asiapolicy.nbr.org . Dr. Wortzel is a retired Army colonel, formerly with the Heritage Foundation, and chairman of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission.

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Unfortunately, too, in a year that provides such an opportunity to celebrate the tremendous achievements of the past fifty years in space and that provides a propitious occasion to plan rationally and cooperatively and with optimism for the years ahead, we have been saddled also with new apprehensions.

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