China-Latin America Military Engagement: Good Will, Good Business, and Strategic Position

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SSI MONOGRAPH

CHINA-LATIN AMERICA MILITARYENGAGEMENT:

GOOD WILL, GOOD BUSINESS, ANDSTRATEGIC POSITION

R. Evan Ellis

August 2011

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FOREWORD

The reemergence of China on the global stage isarguably one of the most important phenomena ofour time. With its sustained high rates of economicgrowth, the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) has dra-matically increased trade and investment ows withthe rest of the world, including regions such as LatinAmerica, with which it historically has had very little

interaction. In many of these countries, the PRC hasgone from having an almost negligible economic pres-ence to replacing the United States as the number oneor number two trading partner. Moreover, particular-ly since the end of the global nancial crisis, Chinesecompanies, in coordination with the Chinese govern-ment and banks, have begun to make multibillion dol-

lar loans and investments in Latin America, creatinga rapidly expanding presence of Chinese companiesand workers in the region in such sectors as construc-tion, logistics, manufacturing, telecommunications,and retail. In terms of soft power, the PRC has argu-ably captured the imaginations of Latin American po-litical leaders, businessmen, and students as a powermeriting attention and, in some cases, courtship.

While a great deal of attention has been given toChinese commercial activity in Latin America, verylittle has been written in the open press regarding Chi-nese military engagement with the region. While vis-its by senior military leaders and major arms sales arereported in the Latin American press, there has been,to date, almost no detailed, comparative analysis of

the PRC-Latin America military relationship. This isparticularly striking, given the emphasis placed onmilitary relationships in determining whether Chi-


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nese engagement with the region constitutes a threatto U.S. national security interests.

Dr. Evan Ellis of the Center for Hemispheric De-fense Studies lls an important void in the burgeon-ing literature regarding Chinas activities with LatinAmerica. This monograph provides a detailed, re-gion-wide analysis of PRC military engagement withLatin America, including not only arms sales, but alsosenior-level military visits, personnel exchanges, andactivities of the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) inthe region, ranging from its 6-year participation in theUnited Nations (UN) peacekeeping forces in Haiti, toits November 2010 humanitarian exercise in Peru,An-

gel de la Paz. The work leverages the extensive Spanishand English-language primary research by Dr. Ellis inthe open source literature of the region, as well as off-the-record interviews with current and former Latin

American military ofcers who have directly partici-pated in the activities treated.

Dr. Ellis explains that Chinese military activity inLatin America is far more extensive than is commonlyrecognized. At the same time, it also goes against con-ventional wisdom by arguing that, in the short term,such activity does not seek to achieve formal alliancesor a permanent military presence in the region, butrather to advance commercial and political objectivesto include increasing Chinas understanding of, andinuence within, Latin American governments.

While the arguments of Dr. Ellis may be surprisingto some, the monograph will undoubtedly serve as animportant reference point for scholars from multipleperspectives: those following the rise of China, those

studying Latin American security issues, students ofinternational relations, and students of U.S. nationalsecurity, among others.


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In the course of these expanding interactions, thePRC has emphasized the peaceful nature of its in-

teractions, which have profound implications not onlyfor the worlds economy, but for its security environ-ment as well. The growth of China has played out dif-ferently in each region.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.DirectorStrategic Studies Institute


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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

R. EVAN ELLIS is a professor of national securitystudies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with theCenter for Hemispheric Defense Studies, with a re-search focus on Latin Americas relationships withexternal actors, including China, Russia, and Iran.His work in this area includes the 2009 book, Chinain Latin America: The Whats and Wherefores, and over

20 articles in English and Spanish published over thepast 6 years in magazines and journals ranging from

Joint Forces Quarterly toAir and Space Power Journal enEspanol to the Revista de Dinmica de Sistemas. Dr. Ellishas presented his work in a broad range of businessand government forums in Argentina, Belize, Bolivia,Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic,

Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Jamaica, Mexico, Nor-way, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the United Kingdom,the United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. He is afrequent guest lecturer at the U.S. Air Force SpecialOperations School. Dr. Ellis holds a Ph.D. in politicalscience with a specialization in comparative politics.


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SUMMARY

Over the past several years, the Peoples Repub-lic of China (PRC) has expanded its military ties withLatin America in multiple important ways. High-leveltrips by Latin American defense and security person-nel to the PRC and visits by their Chinese counter-parts have become commonplace. The volume andsophistication of Chinese arms sold to the region has

increased. Ofcer exchange programs, institutionalvisits, and other lower-level ties have also expanded.Chinese military personnel have begun participatingin operations in the region in a modest, yet symboli-cally important manner.

Military engagement among Western countriestraditionally has focused on securing greater capabil-

ity for confronting an adversary, including alliancesand base access agreements, that confer strategicgeographical position. By contrast, Chinese militaryengagement primarily supports broader objectivesof national development and regime survival. Thisincludes building good will, understanding, and po-litical leverage among important commercial partnersand technology sources, creating the tools to protect

PRC interests in countries where it does business, sell-ing Chinese products and moving up the value-addedchain in strategically important sectors, and position-ing the PRC strategically, even while avoiding alarm-ing the United States over its activities in the region.

Chinese military engagement with the region maybe understood in terms of ve interrelated types of

activities: (1) meetings between senior military of-cials, (2) lower-level military-to-military interactions,(3) military sales, (4) military-relevant commercial in-


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teractions, and (5) Chinese physical presence withinLatin America with military-strategic implications.

Based on ofcial visits documented in the press,the number of visits by senior Chinese defense of-cials to Latin America, and visits by their counterpartsto China, has increased over the past several years. Inthe second half of 2010, the number of contacts wasparticularly high, including nine visits at the Ministerof Defense or Chief of Staff level between senior Chi-nese military ofcials and their Latin American coun-terparts, in Venezuela, Ecuador, Chile, Mexico, Brazil,Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia.

The PRC has expanded the quantity and scopeof its military-to-military contacts at the institutionallevel, including its ongoing participation in the peace-keeping mission in Haiti and an increasing number ofpersonnel exchanges for training and education, joint

exercises, institutional visits, and symbolic activities.Chinese institutions host Latin American militarypersonnel from at least 18 states in Latin America ina range of Chinese Peoples Liberation Army (PLA)institutions including the PLA Defense Studies In-stitute in Changping; the Army Command Collegeand the Chinese Navy Command School, both in thevicinity of Nanjing; and a facility in Shijiazhuang. InNovember 2010, the PLA also conducted its rst bilat-eral military exercise in the region, the humanitarianassistance exerciseAngel de la Paz.

In the domain of military sales, Chinese activitiesin Latin America are also much more extensive than isgenerally recognized. Although such sales were onceimpeded by concerns over quality, maintenance, and

logistics support, Chinese arms conglomerates suchas NORINCO are moving up the value-added chain,leveraging the opening provided by Venezuelan pur-


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chases of K-8 aircraft and JYL-1 radars, selling similarequipment to Venezuelan allies Ecuador and Bolivia,

and proving their goods in the region in general.Other landmark purchases include the lease of MA-60 transport aircraft to Bolivia, with a sale of 4 of thesame aircraft under negotiation with Ecuador, as wellas the sale of WMZ-551 armored personnel carriersto Argentina, and the subsequently cancelled sale ofMBT-2000 main battle tanks to Peru. Training of mili-tary personnel, as well as command and control pack-ages such as that by Huawei for the Venezuelan orga-nization DICOFAN, have also been important, as hasthe donation of nonlethal goods. Bolivia stands out forthe quantities of trucks, busses, and other goods do-nated to the Bolivian military by the PLA since 2006,as does Jamaica, whose very small defense force re-ceived a $3.5 million donation of nonlethal goods in

the months following the exposure of serious capabil-ity gaps associated with its forced entry into the TivoliGardens neighborhood.

In addition to arms sales and contacts between thePLA and Latin American militaries, select commercialinteractions must be considered as part of its militaryengagement. In Latin America, this includes collabo-ration between the Brazilian aircraft manufacturerEmbraer and China Aviation Industrial Corporation(CAIC) II to produce ERJ-145s business jets in Harbin,China, as well as sales of Y-12 turboprop aircraft toVenezuela. In the space industry, ties include four major ongoing space-related projects in Latin America,the China-Brazil Earth Research Satellite (CBERS),Venesat-1, the Venezuela Remote Sensing Satellite,

and the Tupac Katari satellite, as well as other projectsin development and more modest collaboration initia-tives. In the telecommunications industry, Chinese


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rms such as Huawei and ZTE are major players inthe leading nations of Central and South America.

Finally, China has a low-prole but importantphysical military presence in Latin America , includ-ing military police in Haiti since September 2004, aswell as a reported presence in at least three Soviet-eramonitoring facilities: Lourdes, Bejucal,1 and Santiagode Cuba.2 In addition, the presence of Chinese logisticscompanies in major ports of the region could facilitateoperations by the PRC in the region should relationsbetween the United States and the PRC signicantlyworsen in the coming decades.

In analyzing the implications of the Chinese mili-tary presence in the region, this author recognizes thatsuch presence can contribute to legitimate regionalsecurity needs, but also foment misunderstanding. Itargues that the United States should work with China

to achieve greater transparency regarding those ac-tivities, and to engage the PRC in a positive fashionregarding their activities in the hemisphere, includingregular dialogue and the establishment of mechanismsfor resolving misunderstanding. In addition, however,it must improve its understanding of the specic dan-gers and threats that could ow out of this presence,using methodologies such as scenario-based gaming,to see how different actors in the region could seek toleverage or be inuenced in their actions by the pres-ence of China, including indirect pressures, and howthe commercial and other interests in Latin America ofactors such as Russia, Iran, and India might play intothe unfolding dynamic.


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ENDNOTES - SUMMARY

1. Manuel Cereijo, Inside Bejucal Base in Cuba: A RealThreat, The Americano, August 27, 2010, available from theam-ericano.com/2010/08/27/bejucal-base-cuba-real-threat/. Cereijos al-legations concerning Bejucal, however, have been questionedby Cuba scholar William Ratliff, among others, noting that theradar domes in the photo accompanying Cereijos article are notlocated at Bejucal, as represented, but rather at the U.S.-operatedMenwith Hill facility in the United Kingdom. See Cereijo, Beju-cal, China and Cubas adversary foreign intelligence (Bill Ratliff,U.S.), Stanford, CA: World Association of International Studies,April 3, 2006, available from waisworld.org/go.jsp?id=02a0&objectType=post&objectTypeId=3776&topicId=10.

2. Chinese Signals Intelligence and Cyberwarfare in Cuba,AFIO Weekly Intelligence Notes, No. 23-06, June 12, 2006, availablefrom www.ao.com/sections/wins/2006/2006-23.html#ChinaInCuba .


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CHINALATIN AMERICA MILITARYENGAGEMENT:

GOOD WILL, GOOD BUSINESS, ANDSTRATEGIC POSITION

INTRODUCTION

One of the most common statements made in dis-cussions of Chinese engagement with Latin Americais that such ties are primarily commercial in nature.While true, the focus on the commercial dimension ofthe relationship conceals the fact that, over the pastseveral years, the Peoples Republic of China (PRC)has also expanded its military ties with Latin Americain multiple important ways, consistent with its ownpublic declarations of intention. In November 2008,for example, the PRC issued its rst ofcial policy

paper on Latin America in which it announced thatit sought to enhance mutual visits by defense andmilitary ofcials of the two sides as well as personnelexchanges, and to deepen professional exchanges inmilitary training, personnel training and peacekeep-ing.1

Chinas military engagement with Latin Americain recent years has both expanded and deepenedin a quite public manner. High-level trips by LatinAmerican defense and security personnel to the PRCand visits by their Chinese counterparts have becomecommonplace. The volume and sophistication of Chi-nese arms sold to the region have increased. Ofcerexchange programs, institutional visits, and otherlower-level ties have also expanded. Chinese mili-

tary personnel have begun participating in operationsin the region in modest, yet symbolically importantways.


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Since the granting of port concessions in Panamato the Hong-Kong-based rm Hutchison Whampoa

in 1999, Chinese military engagement with LatinAmerica has been one of the most broadly discussed,but misunderstood, dimensions of PRC activities inthe region.2 The PRCs military initiatives in LatinAmerica are arguably not the largest or most strategi-cally signicant part of its rapidly expanding interac-tions with the region. Nor do they visibly threaten theUnited States or undermine pro-Western regimes inthe same fashion as Soviet military engagement withLatin America during the Cold War. The initiatives,however, are signicant and growing, and continueto be a key to the evaluation by U.S. decisionmakersas to whether the Chinese presence in Latin Americaconstitutes a strategic threat to U.S. interests.

The purpose of this monograph is to analyze PRC

defense and security ties in Latin America. While italso touches upon commercial and scientic activitiesthat may have military relevance, its focus is on activi-ties in the military and police sphere, which have not,to date, been analyzed in detail in a single document.The monograph is divided into three sections:

1. Objectives of PRC defense and security engage-ment with Latin America,

2. Manifestations of that engagement, and3. Conclusions.

OBJECTIVES OF PRC DEFENSE AND SECURITYENGAGEMENT WITH LATIN AMERICA

Given the predominantly commercial nature of

Chinese interactions with Latin America, it is impor-tant to begin the analysis of PRC military activities inthe region with a discussion of Chinese motivations


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for engagement with Latin America in general, andhow military ties and transactions simultaneously

support and put at risk those goals.While the PRC has publicly professed its interest

in expanding military linkages with Latin America, ithas given very little explanation of its reasons for do-ing so, or how its military activities t into its broaderengagement with the region. This does not implythat such motivations are inherently nefariousonlythat they must be examined, based on the availableevidence as well as current and historical patterns ofChinese decisionmaking.

In the spirit of Chinese thinkers such as Sun Zi,PRC military initiatives in Latin America should beunderstood as subordinate to, and in support of, long-term PRC national objectives in the region. In gen-eral, these objectives involve promoting and protect-

ing Chinas reemergence as a major global actor. Theimperatives and risks involved are a product of theexport-led growth strategy that the PRC has pursuedand rened since 1978. Specically, it has leveragedthe opportunities presented by global informationand trade ows, and its initial comparative advantagein abundant inexpensive labor to serve as a globalmanufacturing hub, attracting and using foreign in-vestment in a deliberate fashion to build its physicaland technological infrastructure and diversify its eco-nomic base, and thus moving progressively into everhigher value-added economic activities.3

Chinas pursuit of this strategy, and the nationsplace in the global economy, has created a number ofimperatives:

1. securing access to reliable sources of primaryproducts in support of manufacturing activities andcapital formation,


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2. assuring the ability to feed the Chinese popula-tion as it both urbanizes and consumes more protein,

3. establishing and protecting markets for Chinesegoods as its producers continue to expand productionand move up the value-added chain,

4. securing access to technology and global infor-mation ows,

5. maintaining a presence in institutions key toChinas global economic transactions, and

6. avoiding the consolidation of an internationalcoalition opposing the rise of the PRC.

Chinese military engagement with Latin Americasupports each of these imperatives, albeit often in in-direct ways. Chinese President Hu Jintao addressedthe role of the Chinese military in support of nationaldevelopment objectives in his call for the Chinese

Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) to carry out its newmission in the new century.4 Similarly, Chinas 2006National Defense White Paper refers to the role of thePLA in fostering a security environment conduciveto Chinas peaceful development.5 Similar languageis contained in the November 2007 constitution of theChinese Communist Party, and the 2008 National De-

fense White Paper.6 Chinese authors have written aboutthe new interest frontier of the PRC, suggesting thatthe PLA has an obligation to defend not only Chineseinterests within the physical territory of the PRC, butto protect those interests which are found outside it aswell.7

Because U.S. political leaders generally view mili-tary activities in a manner very distinct from trade

and investment, Chinese leaders have incentives to bequite cautious in their military engagement to avoidundermining important national strategic goals inLatin America. As a result, the imperatives for the


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PRC of military engagement in Latin America contrastsharply with conventional wisdom regarding the use

of the military instrument. These imperatives may beinferred as follows:

1. Building good will, understanding, and politicalleverage,

2. Creating the tools to protect PRC interests in-country,

3. Selling Chinese products and moving up thevalue-added chain,

4. Positioning the PRC strategically in the region,and

5. Reassuring the United States.

Building Good Will, Understanding, and PoliticalLeverage.

For the PRC, military engagement is one toolamong many for building political good will and le-verage in a country to make more likely that it will notoppose the entry of Chinese products or act againstits investments. Military activities are useful in thiscontext because the armed forces remain an importantpolitical actor in most Latin American countries, al-though thinking of the military as a political instru-ment is also consistent with both Chinese communistand pre-communist philosophy.

Knowing and being on good terms with the mili-tary leadership of a Latin American country help theChinese to understand the overall political dynamicof that country, anticipate actions that could be takenagainst PRC commercial interests, inuence the po-

litical leadership through military friends where nec-essary, and anticipate or avoid actions that could betaken by the armed forces in the political arena thatcould impact Chinese interests.


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Within the larger framework of military engage-ment, people-oriented activities such as leadership

visits, training, and exchange programs are particu-larly useful because they allow the PRC to confer per-sonal benets and establish relationships with currentand future defense leaders, while avoiding the typeof symbolism that military bases or military end-itemsales generate for Western analysts.

Creating the Tools to Protect Chinese InterestsIn-Country.

As Chinese companies and businessmen expandtheir physical presence in Latin America, they will ex-perience a corresponding increase in the security chal-lenges to people and operations that have confrontedthe companies of other countries operating in the re-

gion, including kidnapping, extortion, and violenceassociated with strikes, political protest, and terror-ism. Chinese petroleum and mining rms operatingin remote areas are particularly vulnerable, as seenby violence against Andes Petroleum and Petrori-ental north of Ecuador in 20068 and 2007.9 Problemsmay also be expected with the transportation of goodson newly opened highways and rail routes over theAndes and through the Amazon jungle, such as thenorthern and southern bioceanic corridors crossingPeru, the interoceanic corridor from the north ofChile through Bolivia and Brazil, and the future Man-ta-Manaus corridor.10 Cultural differences betweenthe Chinese and local populations are also likely tocontribute to tensions and increase the possibilities for

violence, as seen in the 2007 truckers strike againstChinese shopkeepers in Buenos Aires, Argentina,11 orthe November 2004 violence against Chinese commu-nities in Maracay and Valencia, Venezuela.12


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In the near term, PRC companies will have to relyupon Latin American police and armed forces, as well

as private security and the payment of protectionmoney, in order to avoid harm to Chinese personneland operations. As the value of Chinese investmentsin the region and the resources owing from it grow,the PRC will have an increasing incentive to improvethe functionality of these security forces, and to en-sure that the protection of Chinese personnel and op-erations receives priority. Similarly, it will have incen-tives to become involved in issues of port and airportsecurity in the region, as well as high-value geogra-phy which impacts the movement of goods, such asthe Panama Canal, as well as highway, rail, and alter-native canal routes crossing the continent.13

Indeed, the PRC has already demonstrated a will-ingness to use its military to protect its commercial

interests in Africa, citing threats to these interests asjustication for deploying naval forces to conduct an-ti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden in December2008.14 Also, there is already an ongoing debate withinthe PRC regarding the best ways to protect Chinesecommercial operations, including discussions by re-tiring PLA military ofcers to form private securitycompanies to support commercial ventures abroad.15

Selling Chinese Products and Moving Up theValue-Added Chain.

Although Chinese military exports are relativelysmall by comparison to other goods, they contributeto PRC national development in multiple ways. As

with other commercial products, military productsgenerate export revenues for Chinese companies suchas the defense conglomerate NORINCO, and sustain


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employment. Sales of nonlethal military goods suchas clothing and personal equipment in Latin America

by Chinese companies, for example, are often over-looked, but are a nontrivial business. Such sales alsosustain the health of the PRC defense industrial base,and help it to advance its technical capabilities in sup-port of national defense goals. This is particularly thecase with respect to high-end goods such as radars,aircraft, armored vehicles, and other sophisticatedmilitary end items or dual-use commercial goods,where sales in Latin America help China to test, prove,and rene its capabilities under eld conditions instrategically important sectors.

Positioning China Strategically in the Region.

Chinese military thinkers, as others around the

world, recognize the implications of the emergence ofthe PRC as a principal global actor, including the needto prepare for large-scale hostilities to protect theseglobal interests. Although the PLA is very careful tocast its military preparations as defensive in na-ture, debates within the PLA over the need to developa deterrent force, and references to an active de-fense16 implicitly acknowledge that Chinese thinkershave contemplated the necessity of carrying a futureconict to the adversary. Moreover, although the PRCcurrently lacks the capability to project signicant mil-itary capability beyond Asia, the pursuit of defensein depth by the PLA Navy foresees conducting thebattle as far away from its shores as capabilities willallow, while references in the 2008 Defense White Paper

to close coordination between military struggle andpolitical, economic, and diplomatic endeavors17 sug-gest a global approach to thinking about warfare.


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Nothing in the public discourse of the Chineseleadership, policy papers, or debates suggests that

Latin America is considered in the short term as abase for military operations. Nonetheless, in the longterm, when the PRC is both economically and militar-ily more powerful than it is today, the ability to deter astrategic adversary such as the United States throughholding it at risk in its own theater, and to disrupt itsability to project power at home before those forcescan reach the PRC, is consistent with the aforemen-tioned concepts, including a holistic, asymmetric ap-proach towards warfare.18

Within this broad approach, Chinas military tiesin Latin America afford geographically-specic ben-ets, such as collecting intelligence on the operation ofU.S. forces, creating diversionary crises, closing downstrategic chokepoints such as the Panama Canal, or

conducting disruption operations in close proximityto the United States.

Reassuring the United States.

As noted previously, the PRCs pursuit of militaryobjectives in the region is subordinate to its broadernational objectives. Where the two conict, the ex-act balance will reect the perceptions and self-con-dence of the Chinese leadership and its propensityfor risk-taking, factors which continue to evolve witheach successive generation of Chinese leadership.Direct forms of security assistance, for example, maysupport the objective of protecting Chinese com-panies and resource ows, yet undermine the more

important strategic objective of preserving access bythe PRC to Western technology and markets. At thevery least, China has strong incentives to portray all


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military interactions with Latin American states ina way that avoids an appearance of threatening the

United States, so as to minimize the risk of damageto its broader objectives. In many cases, this goal notonly will impact how China represents its activities,but how it structures them. Gifts of military medicalcapabilities or logistics gear, for example, may be pref-erable to selling or donating more lethal end items be-cause the former generates similar institutional goodwill and contacts, while appearing less threatening.

In general, as this section has suggested, the coursetaken by Chinese military engagement with LatinAmerica in the medium or long term is likely to dif-fer signicantly from that witnessed with respect toSoviet military activities in the region during the ColdWar. In general, the PRC is more likely to refrain fromovertly provocative activities, such as the establish-

ment of bases with a signicant Chinese presence,overt military assistance to groups trying to overthrowa regime, unilateral military intervention in the regionin a contested leadership situation, or participation inanti-US military alliances.

MANIFESTATIONS OF CHINESE MILITARYENGAGEMENT WITH LATIN AMERICA

Chinese military engagement with the region maybe understood in terms of ve interrelated types ofactivities: (1) meetings between senior military of-cials, (2) lower-level military-to-military interactions,(3) military sales, (4) military-relevant commercial in-teractions, and (5) Chinese physical presence within

Latin America with military-strategic implications.


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Meetings Between Senior Military Ofcials.

Based on ofcial visits documented in the press,the number of visits by senior Chinese defense of-cials to Latin America, and visits by their counterpartsto China, has increased over the past several years.The press accounts of the agendas of these visits sug-gest that the purpose is often to establish or strengthenrelationships, including not only exchanging views onsecurity matters, but also to discussing or nalizingagreements for arms purchases, military exchanges,or other contacts and transactions.

In the second half of 2010, the number of high-levelmilitary-to-military contacts was particularly high, in-cluding eight clusters of visits at the Minister of De-fense or Chief of Staff level between senior Chinesemilitary ofcials and their Latin American counter-

parts, including Venezuela, Ecuador, Chile, Mexico,Brazil, Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia.

1. In August 2010, Bolivian minister of DefenseRuben Saavedra traveled to the PRC to meet with hiscounterpart, then Chinese Minister of Defense CaoGangchuan.19

2. In September, Cuban General Leopoldo CintraFrias traveled to Beijing to meet with Minister Caoand other senior PRC defense leaders.20

3. Later the same month, Chief of the PLA GeneralStaff Chen Bingde traveled to Lima, Peru, for a visitthat included a joint military-humanitarian exercisebetween Chinese and Peruvian armed forces and thedonation of a $1.3 million mobile eld hospital to thePeruvian Army.21

4. Also in September, the new Chinese Minister ofDefense, Liang Guanglie, traveled to Bogota, Colom-bia, on the rst of a three-nation visit to Latin America,


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meeting with Colombian Defense Minister RodrigoRivera and other senior Colombian ofcials, and sign-

ing a defense cooperation agreement.22

5. Following his visit to Colombia, Minister Liangtraveled to Brasilia, where he met with Brazilian De-fense Minister Nelson Jobim,23 reciprocating a visitpaid by Jobim to China at the beginning of the samemonth.24

6. The third leg of the September 2010 trip by Min-ister Liang took him to Mexico, where he met with thesenior leadership of both of the institutions of the Mex-ican armed forces: The Ministry of National Defense(SEDENA) and the Ministry of the Navy (SEMAR).25

7. In November 2010, Chief of Staff Chen traveledto Quito, Ecuador, on the rst stop of a two-nationvisit, meeting with the Ecuadoran Minister of Defense Javier Ponce, as well as the head of Ecuadors Joint

Chief of Staff, Luis Ernesto Gonzalez.26

8. In the second stop of his trip, General Chentraveled to Caracas, Venezuela, where he met withhis counterpart, Defense Minister Carlos Figueroa, toprepare the military portion of the agenda for the 9thannual ministerial-level meeting of the China-Vene-zuela High-Level Mixed Commission, held in Beijingduring the subsequent month.27

Although little of the substance of the discussionsduring these visits makes it into the open press, theirrole in advancing military relationships between Chi-na and the Latin American counterpart nation has ar-guably been greater than is generally recognized: suchvisits allow the leaders involved to build familiarity

and condence by speaking face-to-face, and to ex-plore possibilities for future projects, from arms salesto expanded military exchanges. Such visits also gen-


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erally include tours of host nation facilities and op-portunities for informal discussion, raising possibili-

ties for collaboration on issues which have capturedthe attention of the leaders involved, within the limitsof their national policies. In some cases, initiativesprepared prior to the trip by staff ofcers or other of-cials are ratied during the high-level visit, whileideas generated during discussions become initiativesto be subsequently explored, administratively drivenby the declared interest of the senior leadership.

Lower-Level Military-to-Military Interactions.

In the past several years, the PRC has expanded thequantity and scope of its military-to-military contactsat the institutional level, including its ongoing partici-pation in the peacekeeping mission in Haiti and an in-

creasing number of personnel exchanges for trainingand education, joint exercises, institutional visits, andsymbolic activities. In each of these, the primary valuefor the PRC is arguably building relationships at theinstitutional level, as well as at the personal level withfuture key gures in Latin American militaries. In theprocess, it has also been able to increase its under-standing of Latin American militaries and the securityenvironment of the region.

In Haiti, military police from the PLA continue toserve as part of the United Nations peacekeeping force(MINUSTAH) present in the country. Chinese peace-keepers have had a continual presence in Haiti sincethe rst contingent was deployed in September 2004.Haiti also has the dubious distinction of having been

the site of the rst ofcially-recognized Chinese mili-tary casualties on Latin American soil. Eight membersof the PLA were among the personnel killed in Haiti


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in January 2010, in conjunction with the earthquakethat devastated the country.28 Four of the Chinese

killed were members of the MINUSTAH police force,while the other four were part of a six-person workinggroup from the Ministry of Public Security which wasvisiting the United Nations (UN) headquarters facilitywhen its roof collapsed due to the earthquake.29 Thebodies of the victims were subsequently returned tothe PRC, where they posthumously received varioushonors.30

The participation of the Chinese military in MI-NUSTAH for more than 6 years has arguably yieldedgreat benets for the PRC. It has given the PLA andhundreds of its soldiers rst-hand experience in op-erating in the Latin American environment in a policeand security rolesomething which will be of par-ticular value in the future if China begins to provide

security assistance to allies in the region in support ofthe protection of its nationals and ongoing operations.In addition, its presence in MINUSTAH has allowedthe PLA to better understand and build relationshipswith the militaries of Brazil and other nations work-ing alongside it in the operation, even while foster-ing good will in the region toward the PRC as a con-tributor to the international order. Finally, the Chinesepresence in Haiti has also arguably advanced its cam-paign to isolate Taiwan internationally, since it putspressure on the government of Haiti, which currentlyaffords diplomatic recognition to Taiwan, rather thanthe PRC.31

In the realm of training and military education,Chinese institutions host Latin American military per-

sonnel from at least 18 states in Latin Americavirtu-ally every country in the region with which the PRChas diplomatic relations. The examples listed in thefollowing paragraphs are merely illustrative:


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The National Defense University of the PLA hasmultiple institutions offering courses in both English

and Spanish to Latin American ofcers. These include:1. The Defense Studies Institute in Changping

(near Beijing), a school especially for foreigners withinthe broader university, offering courses in both Span-ish and English, including the following:

A 5-month senior staff course, taught primar-ily in Spanish. The course is presented by acombination of Chinese instructors and Com-munist-party vetted translators. Latin Ameri-can nations sending ofcers have includedMexico, Peru, Chile, Colombia, and Uruguay.The Chilean army has been sending ofcersto the course since 1999, while the Uruguay-ans have been sending students since at leastMarch 2009.

A 3-month course on strategy, campaignplanning, and military thinking, attended byofcers of the Chilean Navy, among others,since 1997.

A 10-month course on national defense andcommand, taught in English and attendedby ofcers from the Peruvian Army, the Chil-ean Navy and Air Force, and the UruguayanNavy and Air Force, among others.32

A 5-month course on Military Strategy,taught in Spanish, and attended by PeruvianArmy ofcers and Chilean Air Force person-nel, among others.

2. The Army Command College, located in Nan-

jing, offers a 4-month course in English and French,which has been attended by military ofcers fromLatin American countries including Colombia, Peru,


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Barbados, and Jamaica, as well as Africa and other re-gions.

3. The Chinese Navy Command School, outsideof Nanjing, offers a 1-year senior command course inEnglish. The course has been attended by Latin Amer-ican military ofcers, among others, including ofcersfrom Uruguay33 and Brazil.34

4. In a facility near Shijiazhuang: A 5-month course on special forces opera-

tions at the tactical-operational level. It hasbeen attended by ofcers from Uruguayfor at least the past 2 years, and perhaps bymembers from other armed forces.

A 5-month infantry company course, attend-ed by an ofcer from Uruguay in 2010, andperhaps others.

5. The Center of Military Instruction of the PLAoffers a course on martial arts which has been attend-ed by Chilean Marines, among others.

Other Chinese military institutes which have host-ed students from Latin American countries includethe following:

1. The Naval Research Institute, near Beijing,which hosted a low-ranking ofcer from the Uruguay-an Navy and perhaps others for a masters coursein naval radar and sonar, during an 11-month stay inBeijing from 2008-09.

2. An institute in Beijing hosted two low-rankingofcers from the Uruguayan Air Force and perhapsothers during an 11-month stay in the city from 2008

to 2009: One for a masters course on aerial commu-

nication. One for a course on artillery repair.


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In parallel with these programs, Latin Americanmilitaries also hosted Chinese ofcers. Examples in-

clude the following:1. For several years, beginning in 2005, the Chil-

ean Army language school hosted two Chinese pro-fessors for the Mandarin Chinese language,35 althoughas of January 2011, these instructors were no longerpresent.

2. In 2006, during a visit by a delegation from theChinese National Defense University, the Chilean warcollege ANEPE signed an agreement regarding ofcerexchanges and collaborative activities, although it hasnot yet been ratied.

Chinese collaboration with Latin American mili-taries on education and training is increasingly ex-tending to tactical-level programs as well. During the

November 2010 meeting between Chinese DefenseMinister Liang Guanglie and Colombian Defense Min-ister Rodrigo Rivera, an expansion of Sino-Colombianmilitary exchanges was agreed to, including the estab-lishment of 10 places for Colombian generals and col-onels in Chinese military academies, and the sendingof Colombian trainers to China for courses in sharp-shooting, combat under-water diving, survival, andriverine combat.36 Similarly, during General LiangsSeptember meeting with Brazilian Defense MinisterNelson Jobim, expanded cooperation between the twocountries in the area of basic training was discussed.37

In addition to opportunities for building personalrelationships and gathering intelligence, such tactical-level courses also help the PRC to develop military

capabilities in areas which may be useful in workingmore directly in the regions unique operating envi-ronments.


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An additional element of Chinas forming of mili-tary relationships with Latin America is institutional

visits. Such visits typically involve more people, butare much shorter in duration than training exchanges.Although the opportunities to develop personal tiesare by necessity more supercial, such institutionalvisits allow the PRC to reach larger groups of person-nel whose work touches many others, such as militaryprofessors and mid-grade ofcers, while also buildingor strengthening institution-to-institution linkages.Examples include the following:

Visits between Chinese and Chilean naval of-cers have occurred on an occasional basis sinceJuly 1996, but increased to one or two per yearstarting in 2005.

In Argentina, there has been a similar increasein recent years, including visits by Chinese of-

cials to the Argentine National Defense Uni-versity and the senior war colleges.

In Colombia, delegations from Chinas Nation-al Defense University visit the nations war col-lege on an annual basis.

Beyond institutional visits, other ongoing contactsbetween Chinese and Latin American militaries in-clude port visits by military training ships and war-ships by each side. The rst such visit was made bythe Chilean Navy training ship Esmeralda to the portof Shanghai in 1972. By 2009, the Esmeralda had made10 trips to Chinese ports. Reciprocally, in April 1997,the rst Chinese naval otilla visited Latin America.It included the missile destroyers Harbin and Zhuhai

and the logistics ship Nancang, which made port callsin Mexico, Peru, and Chile, as well as the U.S. baseat Pearl Harbor.38 The most recent such visit, at the


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time of this writing, came in 2009 from a Chinese na-val otilla which included the destroyer Shijiazhuang

and the supply ship Hongzehu, making port calls inValparaiso, Chile; Callao, Peru; and Guayaquil, Ecua-dor.39 Benign in character, such visits benet the PLANavy, helping it to identify requirements for the useof Latin American ports by its ships in the future formaintenance, resupply, or other purposes.40

In addition to bilateral contacts, such as thosementioned above, Chinese and Latin American mili-taries have occasional contact through conferencesand other forums. The Chilean and Chinese navies,for example, have regular contact through the West-ern Pacic Naval Symposium, with the PRC havingsupported Chiles admission to the organization.41 TheChinese, for their part, host various forums to whichLatin American ofcers are invited, including an an-

nual symposium for upper level ofcers in Beijing,which has been held at least ve times. In addition,from November to December 2007 in the city of Qing-dao, the headquarters of the PLA North Sea eet, theChinese held a seminar on the management of searchand rescue operations in which a Uruguayan navallieutenant and perhaps other Latin American militaryofcers were present.

It is also important to mention Chinese military ac-tions in Latin America which are important primarilyat the symbolic level. These include one on September16, 2010, when an honor guard of 34 persons from thePLA participated, alongside representatives from 15other countries, in a parade in Mexico City in com-memoration of the 200th Anniversary of Mexicos in-

dependence from Spain.42Finally, military-to-military contacts also have

come to include joint exercises. In November 2010,39


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Chinese military personnel participated with 50 Pe-ruvians in the humanitarian exercise Angel de la Paz,

including deployment to the village of Villa Mariadel Trunfo to perform medical services for the localpopulation.43 The joint exercise simulated a responseby the two armed forces to an earthquake, with an as-sociated chemical re,44 and was tied to the donationby the PLA to the Peruvian military of a mobile eldhospital and training of the recipients on its use in thefacilities of the 1st Special Forces Brigade in Chorril-los, near Lima.45

While not threatening in and of itself, Chinese par-ticipation in a humanitarian exercise in Latin Americamay be understood as a logical step toward its par-ticipation in the response to an actual disaster, out-side the framework of a multilateral force such as theUN. Such an offer of direct military involvement in

a Latin American country would put U.S. policymak-ers in an awkward position, since publicly blockinghumanitarian assistance from the PRC could be con-strued as increasing the number of Latin Americandeaths from the disaster in order to keep the Chinesemilitary out of the U.S. backyard. The U.S. responseto future PRC offers of direct military humanitarianassistance should thus be considered carefully by U.S.policymakers before they occur.

Military Sales to Latin America.

As with military sales by other countries, Chi-nese military sales to Latin America help the PRC tostrengthen its ties with the purchasers by meeting their

specic needs, and by tying those nations logisticallyto Chinese maintenance and training infrastructures.Such transactions also help the PRC to develop and


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sustain its own national defense industry, and earnexport sales revenues.

Innocent or not, Chinese arms sales to Latin Amer-ica are arguably one of the most closely watched facetsof Chinas engagement with Latin America. AlthoughU.S. leaders such as Assistant Secretary of DefenseFrank Mora have observed that Chinese arms salescan contribute to security in the hemisphere,46 manypoliticians and other policymakers look at such salesas indications that Chinese activities in the region con-stitute a threat to U.S. national security.

In general, PRC military sales to Latin Americahave followed the pattern of its commercial sales. Therst Chinese defense goods sold in the region wererelatively inexpensive, unsophisticated items such asmilitary clothing and personal equipment. In somecases, such goods entered Latin American militaries

as donations, such as the annual $1 million dollarsworth of hats, gloves, and other nonlethal equipmentdonated by the PLA to Colombia. Frequently, Chinesegoods have been offered by third party importers,representing companies such as the China North In-dustries Corporation (NORINCO) in the PRC, but li-censed to do business with Latin American militaries.

As with commercial goods, Chinas ability to sellsophisticated military hardware to Latin Americahas been impeded by concerns over quality, as wellas the difculty of maintaining and supporting theequipment. Such concerns have been particularlyacute with respect to materiel such as ships, aircraft,armored vehicles, weapons, and communication sys-tems, regarding which lives on the battleeld could

depend on the proper functioning of the equipment.The lack of a Chinese military presence in the regionhas compounded such concern; the absence of sales


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of Chinese gear in Latin America meant that Chinesemilitary goods were unproven in the region, and

thus more difcult to sell. Moreover, without a Chi-nese military presence in the region, maintenance andobtaining spare parts for Chinese goods were, in theminds of many leaders, a great risk.47

Despite such obstacles, as in the commercial realm,with time, the PRC and its defense companies have be-gun to move up the value-added chain to sell increas-ingly sophisticated military goods in Latin America.In doing so, it has exploited opportunities providedby regimes hostile to the United States, such as Ven-ezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia, whose political orienta-tion and inability to acquire Western military technol-ogy have led them to look to Chinese equipment.

The rst major breakthrough for the PRC in makingmilitary sales to Latin America was arguably Venezu-

elas 2008 announcement that it would purchase K-8(Karakorum) aircraft, co-developed with Pakistan.48Venezuelas decision to purchase the aircraft wasdriven in part by its inability to purchase U.S. ghters,or spare parts for its existing eet of U.S. aircraft, aswell as successful U.S. efforts to block other Westerncountries from selling to Venezuela similar aircraftthat incorporated U.S. technology.49 The agreementto ultimately purchase a total of 18 K-8 aircraft fromChina National Aero-Technology Import and ExportCorporation (CATIC), along with armaments and asupporting logistics package, was made in August2008. In the second half of 2009, 11 Venezuelan pilotsand 56 technicians were sent to China for training onthe aircraft as pilots and maintenance and logistics

support staff.50The rst 6 K-8s were ofcially received in March

2010,51 with the other 12 arriving in August. They


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were assigned to the 12th Fighter Air Group, basedat the air base Rafael Urdaneta de Maracaibo, and to the

15th Special Operations group, at the air base VicenteLandaeta Gil de Barquisimeto.52 As a result of Venezu-elan satisfaction with the transaction, the number ofK-8s desired was expanded to 40. In addition, theVenezuelan military leadership has been evaluatingthe more capable Chinese L-15 Air King, with a pro-posal by Hongdu Aviation Industry Corporation tosell the Venezuelans 24 of the aircraft.53

Despite highly positive statements by the Venezu-elan leadership regarding the K-8s, and the increaseof the purchase to 40 aircraft, the acquisition has hadits problems. In January 2010, one of the K-8s pilotedby a newly trained Venezuelan crashed on takeoff atthe military airport in Barquismetro, near Caracas.54While the Chinese blamed improper maintenance by

the recently trained Venezuelans, the Venezuelanspointed the nger at the Chinese for poor translationsof the aircraft technical manuals into Spanish. Beyondghters, the government has also declared that it willpurchase 10-12 Y-8 Chinese medium military trans-port aircraft, each capable of carrying up to 88 personsor 20 tons of cargo.55

With the support of President Hugo Chavez,purchases of Chinese equipment by the Venezuelanarmed forces also expanded into other areas. In 2005the Venezuelan air force acquired JYL-1 radars, usablefor air defense, from the rm China National Elec-tronics Import and Export Corporation (CEIEC), at acost of $150 million.56 The radars were acquired by theVenezuelan organization Compaa Annima Vene-

zolana de Industrias Militares (CAVIM), with the rstdelivered in January 2008 and subsequently put underthe command of the Venezuelan Air Force. They were


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used publicly for the rst time in 2008 in an exercisewith Brazil.57

The Chinese also installed a command and controlcenter for the Venezuelan radars at a military base nearCaracas at the end of 2008. Between April and August2008, Venezuela sent a total of 70 ofcers to the PRCfor training on the operation and maintenance of thesystem.58 By mid-2009, the Venezuelan military lead-ership was referring to a total of 10 Chinese radars asbeing operational.59 Moreover, as of June 2009, Ven-ezuela was evaluating the purchase of other Chineseradars to complement the capabilities of the JYL-1s.60

In addition to the radars and aircraft, the Ven-ezuelans have also spearheaded the introduction ofChinese command and control equipment into LatinAmerica, with the Venezuelan defense organizationDICOFAN working with the Chinese civilian telecom-

munications rm Huawei to implement the system.61

In support of the system, China has funded a trainingprogram executed by Huawei for students of the Ven-ezuelan military institute Universidad Nacional Experi-mental Politcnica de las Fuerzas Armadas (UNEFA),62 aswell as construction of a $54 million laboratory in theVenezuelan Armed forces technical university Institu-to Universitario Militar de Comunicaciones y Electrnicasde las Fuerzas Armadas (IUMCOELFA).

Despite press accounts which suggest that Chinesemilitary sales in Latin America have been relativelylimited, by the end of 2010, the Venezuelan militaryleadership was evaluating purchase of a broad rangeof Chinese systems, including such command andcontrol systems as high frequency (HF), ultra high

frequency (UHF), and very high frequency (VHF)communications systems; IGLA missile systems; anti-aircraft guns; biodegradable mines; water purication


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equipment; bridging equipment; utility aircraft; anti-submarine aircraft; ground-attack aircraft; long-range

sea surveillance aircraft; costal patrol aircraft; frigates;submarines; and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) heli-copters.

Beyond purchases of PRC military hardware,Venezuelan ofcials have also reportedly facilitatedindirect purchases of military goods by criminal andinsurgent groups such as the Fuerzas Armadas Revo-lucionarias de Colombia (FARC). An investigation bythe Colombian prosecutors ofce, for example, im-plicated the Venezuelan government ofcial AmlcarFigueroa, who presented a shopping list of weaponsfor the FARC during his visit to the weapons manu-facturer NORINCO in the PRC.63

In addition to direct purchases of military goodsand systems from the PRC, Venezuela has greatly fa-

cilitated the ability by the PRC to sell its military enditems to other, like-minded governments in the region,including both Ecuador and Bolivia. Following the leadof Venezuela, in September 2009 Ecuador negotiateda deal with the PRC for two radars, manufactured byChina Electronics Technology Corporation (CETC), tobe deployed to its northern frontier with Colombia forevaluation, with the option to purchase an additionalfour units.64 Although there were problems with thesuitability of the rst radars for the operating condi-tions they encountered, in August 2010 the Ecuadorangovernment announced that it was going ahead withthe purchase of the four additional radars, at a cost of$80 million, and would begin taking delivery on themby the end of the year.65

In addition to the radars, Ecuador has acquiredMA-60 medium transport aircraft from the PRC. Therst two aircraft acquisitions were in 2006.66 Ecuador


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continues to irt with the purchase of more Chinesemid-sized transport aircraft. In July 2009, Ecuadoran

Defense Minister Javier Ponce noted Ecuadoran inter-est in purchasing four military aircraft from the PRCfor $60 million to replace its aging eet of Brazilian

Avro military transport aircraft.67 Although no pur-chases immediately followed the declarations, duringthe February 2010 visit to China by Chairman of theEcuadoran Joint Chiefs of Staff General Fabian Varela,the PRC mentioned that it was investigating the pos-sibility of providing Ecuador with four MA-60s68 at aprice of $80 million.69 Subsequently, in August 2010,Ponce announced that he was sending a delegation tothe PRC to negotiate the purchase of two of the MA-60s for $38 million, to be delivered by the end of theyear,70 although there have been no further reports inthe press on the status of the transaction.

In addition to these transactions, the PRC has do-nated military trucks and ambulances and other non-lethal goods to Ecuador. Indeed, during the February2010 visit by General Varela to the PRC, China an-nounced that it planned to double such donations.71

Like Ecuador, Bolivia has followed the lead of Ven-ezuela in acquiring military equipment from the PRC.Prompted in part by the personal recommendation ofVenezuelan President Hugo Chavez to his colleagueEvo Morales in October 2009, Bolivian Defense Min-ister Walker San Miguel announced the planned pur-chase of a squadron (6) of Chinese K-8 aircraft for $58million.72 The aircraft are to be deployed in the vicin-ity of Cochabamba for counterdrug interception mis-sions, and represent the rst combat aircraft acquired

by the Bolivian military.73 The deal was nanced witha 25-year concessional credit, with the aircraft to bedelivered over the course of 18 months beginning inApril 2010.74


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Although the K-8s are Bolivias rst ghters, theyare Bolivias second transaction with the PRC involv-

ing aircraft for its military. In March 2007, Bolivia an-nounced the leasing of two MA-60 military cargo andpassenger aircraft from the PRC, as part of a largerdeal that included the acquisition of military transportaircraft from Venezuela.75 The Chinese MA-60 aircraftwere paid for by a $38.3 million loan from the PRC76and delivered in February 2008.

In addition to its purchase of end-items, Boliviahas also received a series of donations of other mili-tary goods from the PRC. These donations have comein four major installments: In December 2006, thePRC announced the donation to Bolivia of 25-per-son assault craft, infantry and artillery munitions,night-vision goggles, and kevlar helmets.77 In 2007,the Bolivian armed forces received 34 trucks from the

manufacturer First Auto Works (FAW), ve busses,three Toyota Land Cruiser SUVs, and a tow truck.78 InFebruary 2009, it received 2 gunboats from the PRC.79In March 2010, it received 27 busses for military trans-port, manufactured by the Chinese company Hinger,21 Nissan light trucks, and 40 Yamaha outboard mo-tors.80 Beyond these items, over the period 1987-96, thePRC also reportedly provided 10,000 AK-47 assaultries,81 in addition to having donated motorcycles, bi-cycles, and other gear to the Bolivian police.

Although the most signicant arms transactionsbetween the PRC and Latin America have come inthe socialist countries of the Bolivarian Alliance forthe Americas (ALBA) blocVenezuela, Cuba, Nica-ragua, Bolivia, Honduras, Dominica, Ecuador, plus a

few small island nationssignicant advances andnear-advances have occurred in other countries aswell. In 2009, Peru almost became the rst nation in


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Latin America to make a major purchase of armoredvehicles from the PRC. A series of ve Chinese MBT-

2000 tanks were accepted from the PRC for evaluationby the Peruvian army, and were featured prominentlyin a military parade in December 2009.82 The purchasecame under signicant criticism within Peru, and waseventually canceled by the Minister of Defense in theinterest of dedicating more resources to ghting nar-cotrafckers and recouping the state presence in theApurimac and Ene valley region (VRAE) in the inte-rior of the country.83

As noted previously, in 2010 Peru was also the re-cipient of the rst major donation of military humani-tarian equipment from the PLA, with the delivery ofa mobile eld hospital and other equipment duringthe second half of 2010, having a total value of $300million, including training of Peruvian personnel on

the equipment, and culminating in a joint Chinese-Peruvian humanitarian exercise in November of thatyear. At a lower level, Peru has also purchased Chi-nese nonlethal equipment, and in 2007 signed defenseaccords with the Chinese to allow them to participatemore directly in the Peruvian military acquisition sys-tem.84

However, Peru has not been the only U.S. ally inthe region to consider major purchases of Chinesemilitary equipment. Since as early as 2006, Chinesemilitary ofcials have discussed the possibility ofselling armored vehicles and other equipment to theColombian military.85 To date, Colombia has not pur-sued such transactions, in part due to concern overcomplications in the maintenance and support of such

equipment, and also because of the close Colombia-U.S. defense and security relationship.


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Beyond explicit military sales, the Uruguayan po-lice, the Peruvian National Police (PNP), and perhaps

other police forces in the region have explored pur-chases of Chinese equipment. The police force in Mon-tevideo, for example, has purchased police cruisers ofthe Chinese brand, Geeley.86 Similarly, in August 2007the PNP contracted with a South Korean intermedi-ary for the purchase of 700 Geeley police cars.87 Aswith the military sales, however, the transaction cameunder signicant public scrutiny and was eventuallycanceled.

At a lower level, the Colombian military has alsobeen the recipient of approximately $1 million per yearof nonlethal equipment, including gloves and winterhats to equip Colombian high-mountain battalions. Itafrmed and deepened that relationship in Novem-ber 2010 with the signing of a defense cooperation

accord.88

Costa Rica is also a strong candidate for the receiptof Chinese equipment and other assistance for its se-curity forces. In November 2010, during a visit to Bei-jing, Costa Rican Prime Minister Rene Castro made aformal request to China for assistance in training andequipping its national police for operations againstnarcotrafcking.89

Other countries in the region have also irted withthe possibility of acquiring signicant military mate-rial from the Chinese. These include Argentina, whichin 2007 was reportedly considering purchase of theChinese X-11 helicopter90 as well as military trucksand radars to provide coverage for the Northern fron-tier.91 It ultimately decided not to purchase any of

these from the PRC.The Argentine military did, however, agree to pur-

chase WMZ-551 wheeled armored vehicles from the


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Chinese manufacturer NORINCO as part of its con-tribution of a mechanized battalion to the joint Argen-

tine-Chilean peacekeeping force Cruz del Sur. In2008, the Argentine Joint Staff purchased four of thearmored vehicles for evaluation at a price of $2.6 mil-lion, including a training and spare parts package.92

The vehicles initially saw service with the Argentinemechanized battalion in Gonaives, Haiti, where theArgentine combined mechanized battalion was de-ployed as part of MINUSTAH.93 In the end, however,numerous problems with these vehicles led Argentinato suspend their procurement.94

In the case of Brazil, which has its own well-devel-oped defense industry, there have been no signicantpurchases of Chinese military hardware. Nonetheless,the possibility of China-Brazil co-production of suchitems was discussed during the September 2010 meet-

ing between Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guan-glie and his Brazilian counterpart, Nelson Jobim, inBrasilia.95

Although Chile has made signicant military pur-chases in general, it has not, to date, made signicantpurchases of Chinese military goods. As with Co-lombia, this resistance reects Chiles close militaryinstitutional ties with the United States, including anexisting military infrastructure built around U.S. andEuropean equipment, as well as a relative emphasis onquality, over pricea luxury permitted in part thanksto its large military acquisition budget, which receives10 percent of export revenues from the state miningrm Corporacin Nacional del Cobre de Chile (COLDEL-CO), per the 1976 Copper Reserves Law.96

Finally, PRC donations of military equipment toJamaica in January 2011 deserve mention. The deliv-ery of $3.5 million in nonlethal goods, principally uni-


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forms and tents, but also including helmets, binocu-lars, backpacks, and bulletproof vests to the Jamaica

Defense Force (JDF) was based on a 2008 defense co-operation agreement between the two countries.97 Al-though the donation was small in absolute terms, anddid not involve weapon platforms or sophisticatedmunitions, it is signicant because of the small sizeof the JDF, and because it came at a time in which theovertaxed Jamaican security forces were evaluatingnew ways of dealing with narco-violence such as thatwhich killed 73 persons during the forced entry intoTivoli Gardens to capture Dudus Coke in May 2010.Such gifts, in combination with Chinese experience inneighboring Haiti, potentially position the PRC to ex-pand its role in police-related activities among thosenations that recognize the PRC in the Caribbean.

There have also been some suggestions that Chi-

nese small arms have made their way into the arsenalsof Latin American countries. For example, a version ofthe Colt M-4 rie, manufactured by the Chinese armsconglomerate NORINCO as the CQ-M4, was report-edly spotted in 2008 photos of activities by the Para-guayan armed forces.98

Chinese military sales to non-state actors in theregion also deserve mention. In addition to the pre-viously discussed sale of Chinese arms to the FARCand other anti-governmental groups, a signicantportion of the military-caliber weapons purchased bynarcotrafcking organizations in Mexico are Chinesein origin, albeit purchased through third-party armsdealers.99


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In the case of Venezuela, in April 2010, the twogovernments signed an agreement for the establish-

ment of a new mid-sized airline to serve rural Ven-ezuela.101 China Development Bank agreed to lend theVenezuelan government $300 million to establish a re-gional airline. In return, the Venezuelan governmentwould purchase the 33 aircraft for the airline, Y-12s,from AVIC.102

Satellites and space technology are other areaswhose technology has both signicant commercial andmilitary applications for the PRC. Today, concurrentwith the economic and technological developmentof the PRC, the Chinese space program is pursuinga diverse array of objectives, ranging from commer-cial satellite launches, to manned space ight (Project921),103 to missions to the moon,104 Mars, and beyond.

Within this broader context, the PRC is attempting

to secure a presence in the commercial satellite mar-ket. Under the supervision of China National SpaceAgency (CNSA), space launches and related activi-ties are executed by the state-owned enterprise ChinaAerospace and Technology Corporation, with a seriesof companies falling within this framework. Theseinclude Great Wall Industry Corporation (GWIC),the sole organization authorized by the Chinese Gov-ernment to provide satellite in-orbit delivery (IOD)services, commercial launch services, and aerospacetechnology applications.105

The PRC currently has four major ongoing space-related projects in Latin America: the China-BrazilEarth Research Satellite (CBERS); Venesat-1; the Ven-ezuelan Remote Sensing Satellite (VRSS); and the Tu-

pac Katari satellite, as well as other projects in devel-opment and more modest collaborative initiatives.

The primary venue for China-Brazil space cooper-ation is the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite pro-


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gram, established in 1998. To date, a total of three sat-ellites have been launched through the program from

the Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center in Shanxi, China,in 1999, 2003, and 2007.106 A fourth launch is sched-uled in mid-2011.107 Brazil assumed approximately 30percent of the project cost, while China assumed theremaining 70 percent, including ground stations.108The importance of the project in the broader Brazil-China relationship is evidenced by the fact that a keystop during President Hus visit to Brazil in Novem-ber 2004 was to a CBERS project site at the NationalInstitute for Space Research (INPE) in the state of SaoPaulo.109

The China-Brazil space collaboration via the CBERSprogram has not been without problems. The launchof the rst joint satellite, originally scheduled for 1992,was delayed until 1998.110 Moreover, in August 2003,

the rst CBERS satellite experienced a malfunctionthat put an end to all of its data transmissions, and inApril 2005 one of two PRC-supplied imaging deviceson the second CBERS satellite stopped working due toa power supply failure.111

Such difculties have not, however, signicantlyimpeded China-Brazil space cooperation.112 Upon as-suming his post in March 2008, the new head of theBrazilian Space Agency stated that Brazil cherished itsties with the PRC and would deepen its cooperationwith China in the eld of space technology.113 In thecases of Venezuela and Bolivia, the PRC has contract-ed to develop and launch satellites, to build associatedground control stations, and to train personnel in theiruse.

Venezuela was the rst country in Latin America topay a Chinese company, GWIC, to develop and launcha satellite.114 Venezuela paid the PRC $406 million forthe project, including $241 million to develop and put


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it into space.115 As part of the project, the Chinese alsobuilt a series of ground control stations, including fa-

cilities at Camatagua and El Sombrero (the ManuelRios military base). In addition, 90 Venezuelans weresent to the PRC for education and training associatedwith the project, including 15 technicians sent for a12-month doctoral-level program, and an additional15 sent for a shorter program to obtain their mastersdegrees.

The satellite was launched from the PRC in Oc-tober 2008 and put into a 78-degree geosynchronousorbit, becoming operational in January 2009.116 It ini-tially had problems due to an irregular orbit, requir-ing adjustments from booster rockets that ultimatelyconsumed a signicant percentage of its operationallife. Venezuela has discussed plans to launch a secondsatellite in 2013, the VRSS, which would conduct re-

connaissance.117

In the case of Bolivia, on April 2, 2010, the gov-ernment of Evo Morales contracted with the ChineseAerospace Science and Technology Corporation(CASC) for the development and launch of the TupacKatari satellite.118 As in the Venezuelan case, the Boliv-ian project also included the construction of groundcontrol stations: one in Pampahasi and one in LaGuardia in the department of Santa Cruz.119 Of the to-tal $295 million cost of the program, all but $44 millionwas nanced by credit from the China DevelopmentBank.120

In addition to their contributions to the enhance-ment of the PRC space capability, Chinas construc-tion of ground control stations and tying them into

national telecommunication networks gives it unprec-edented opportunities to understand the communi-cation and space-technical architectures of each host


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country, and to tap into them in the future, if neces-sary, to collect information or disrupt them. In the case

of Venezuela, it is relevant that the Chinese telecom-munication company Huawei plays an intimate rolenot only in the construction of the satellite commandand control facility, but also in the construction of theVenezuelan ber optic network.121

From a military perspective, the utility of projectssuch as those with Brazil, Venezuela, and Bolivia, isthat they help major Chinese companies in their bidto become a commercially viable space launch andtechnology provider, in competition with establishedproviders such as Ariane and Thales. Moreover, as-sociated training of Latin American personnel in thePRC arguably provides China the opportunity tobuild relationships with, collect information from,and in some degree indoctrinate virtually the entire

cadre of the recipient countrys military and civilianspace-technical personnel.

As part of the development of its space sector, thePRC has also been pursuing initiatives in Argentina,Chile, and Peru, albeit with mixed success. With re-spect to Argentina, in May 2005 the Chinese govern-ment signed an agreement to provide technical supportand equipment to the national satellite manufacturerInvestigaciones Aplicadas (INVAP) in support of thedevelopment of a satellite by the Argentine nationalcompany Empresa Argentina de Soluciones Satelitales(ARSAT).122 In the end, however, Astrium and ThalesAlenia Space, rather than the PRC, were selected asthe major equipment suppliers to INVAP. Moreover,although the PRC was interested in providing Argen-

tina with launch services, ARSAT contracted with theFrench rm Arianespace to launch the satellite in mid-2012 from the equatorial launch site in New Guinea.123


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In the case of Chile, China expressed an interest in par-ticipating in the development and launch of Chiles

rst satellite, the Sistema Satelital de Observacin de laTierra (SSOT).124 But when the nal decision was made,the development work was awarded to the Europeanrm EADS Astrium,125 and the launch contract won byArianespace.

In the case of Peru, the nation is currently the onlyLatin American member of the Asia-Pacic SpaceCooperation Organization (APSCO), a Beijing-basedentity which began functioning in 2008, focusing onspace science and technology, training, and coopera-tive research.126

In Mexico, the April 2010 legislation establishing aMexican Space Agency127 opened a window for China-Mexico space cooperation, with a delegation from theChina National Space Agency participating in the new

organizations kickoff event, the Space Conference ofthe Americas, held in November 2010 in the Mexicanstate of Hidalgo.128

With respect to telecommunications, another sec-tor with strategic value in the information operationsand defense technology realm, Chinese rms are major players in virtually every major nation in Centraland South America. The principal companies involvedare Huawei, ZTE Corporation, and to a lesser extentShanghai Alcatel Bell. Both Huawei and ZTE haveestablished regional hubs for operations and trainingin Brazil. Both have participated in various projectsin the modernization and expansion of major SouthAmerican telecommunications architectures, includ-ing those of Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Venezuela.129

In the cases of both Huawei and ZTE, Venezuelapresented the companies, and the PRC, with a majorcommercial opportunity, with each establishing a cell


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phone manufacturing facility in the country, withplans to export production from the factories into

other parts of the region.130

In addition, Huawei hasplayed a major role in building Venezuelas ber opticnetwork, and has been involved in a series of militaryprojects as noted earlier, such as the establishment ofa command and control facility, and the training ofVenezuelan military personnel.

In the case of Shanghai Alcatel Bell, the company isthe principal contractor laying a new ber optic cabletying Cuba and Jamaica into the China-built Venezue-la telecommunications infrastructure.131 In Honduras,although the nation does not diplomatically recognizethe PRC, a Chinese consortium was reportedly inter-ested in purchasing the state telecommunications rmEmpresa Hondurea de Telecomunicaciones (Hondutel),pursuant to plans to privatize it.132

As in aviation and space, Chinese activities in tele-communications have strategic military implicationsin two areas. First, they support Chinese efforts to ac-quire and improve technical capabilities in this strate-gically important sector. Second, as a complement tospace cooperation, when Chinese companies sell hard-ware and build the telecommunications infrastructurein a region, the PRC is afforded opportunities to exploitthese networks for future information collection anddisruption activities in the unlikely but possible eventof a future conict with the United States. Moreover,such a presence makes possible the use of commercialtelecommunication ofces and activities as cover forthe potential introduction of personnel into the regionand performance of information operations.


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Chinese Physical Presence within Latin Americawith Military-Strategic Implications.

To date, the PRC has been extremely cautious toavoid establishing an overt military presence in LatinAmerica that could facilitate the emergence of a con-sensus within the United States and its allies to op-pose PRC engagement with the region. Where it hasdone so, it has maintained a very low prole, or em-phasized the scientic or nonmilitary character of thatpresence.

As noted previously, the PRC has had military po-lice in Haiti as part of the MINUSTAH peacekeepingforce since September 2004.133 Such participation hasarguably provided a valuable learning experience andengagement opportunity for them. While far morebenign than other forms of presence, such as military

bases, its activities in Haiti allows the PRC to gainexperience and develop contacts in the region, whilefostering good will among Latin American militariesthat could facilitate its military access to the region inthe future.

In Cuba, the PRC reportedly has a physical pres-ence at three or more Soviet-era monitoring facilities:Lourdes, Bejucal,134 and Santiago de Cuba.135 With theirproximity to the United States, the bases are report-edly used by the Chinese for the collection of signalsintelligence, such as intercepting radio and cellphonetransmissions, and also for the operation of a cyberespionage and training facility in the country.

In addition to their explicitly military presence inHaiti and Cuba, the PRC also has a series of govern-

ment-operated scientic bases in Antarctica, since es-tablishing its rst base there, Great Wall, in 1985.136

Although the sites are not of a military character, theyare supported by the PLA Navy, with the 1st Task


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Group established in 2004 for the specic purpose ofsupporting the base and conducting operations in the

southern ocean.137

Although the frigid temperaturesand remoteness of its Antarctic facilities from the ma-jority of Latin American states limit their military util-ity, as with Haiti they have provided opportunitiesto interact with the Argentine and Chilean militaries.The Chilean base in Antarctica, for example, is locat-ed in close physical proximity to that of the Chinese,providing opportunities for communication and col-laboration. In addition, some have speculated that thePRC presence in Antarctica may strengthen its claimto exploit mineral deposits there,138 particularly whenthe current international treaty banning mining inAntarctica expires in 2048.139

Beyond Haiti, Cuba, and Antarctica, the presenceof Chinese logistics companies in major ports of the

region arguably has some strategic military value, pre-senting a platform from which the PRC could smug-gle people or material into the region under the coverof commercial operations, in the event that relationsbetween the United States and t

China-Latin America Military Engagement: Good Will, Good Business, and Strategic Position

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Transcript of China-Latin America Military Engagement: Good Will, Good Business, and Strategic Position