Charting Transformation through Security: Contemporary EU-Africa Relations

New Security Challenges Series

General Editor: Stuart Croft, Pro-Vice-Chancellor for Research (Arts and Social Sciences)at the University of Warwick, UK, and Director of the ESRC’s New Security ChallengesProgramme.

The last decade demonstrated that threats to security vary greatly in their causes and man-ifestations, and that they invite interest and demand responses from the social sciences,civil society and a very broad policy community. In the past, the avoidance of war was theprimary objective, but with the end of the Cold War the retention of military defence asthe centrepiece of international security agenda became untenable. There has been, there-fore, a significant shift in emphasis away from traditional approaches to security to a newagenda that talks of the softer side of security, in terms of human security, economic securityand environmental security. The topical New Security Challenges Series reflects this pressingpolitical and research agenda.

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Abdul Haqq BakerEXTREMISTS IN OUR MIDSTConfronting Terror

Robin CameronSUBJECTS OF SECURITYDomestic Effects of Foreign Policy in the War on Terror

Jon Coaffee, David Murakami Wood and Peter RogersTHE EVERYDAY RESILIENCE OF THE CITYHow Cities Respond to Terrorism and Disaster

Sharyl Cross, Savo Kentera, R. Craig Nation and Radovan Vukadinovic (editors)SHAPING SOUTH EAST EUROPE’S SECURITY COMMUNITY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRSTCENTURYTrust, Partnership, Integration

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Håkan Edström, Janne Haaland Matlary and Magnus Petersson (editors)NATO: THE POWER OF PARTNERSHIPS

Håkan Edström and Dennis GyllensporrePOLITICAL ASPIRATIONS AND PERILS OF SECURITYUnpacking the Military Strategy of the United Nations

Hakan Edström and Dennis Gyllensporre (editors)PURSUING STRATEGYNATO Operations from the Gulf War to Gaddafi

Christopher Farrington (editor)GLOBAL CHANGE, CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESSImplementing the Political Settlement

Adrian GallagherGENOCIDE AND ITS THREAT TO CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL ORDER

Kevin Gillan, Jenny Pickerill and Frank WebsterANTI-WAR ACTIVISMNew Media and Protest in the Information Age

Toni HaastrupCHARTING TRANSFORMATION THROUGH SECURITYContemporary EU–Africa Relations

Andrew HillRE-IMAGINING THE WAR ON TERRORSeeing, Waiting, Travelling

Andrew Hoskins and Ben O’LoughlinTELEVISION AND TERRORConflicting Times and the Crisis of News Discourse

Paul Jackson and Peter AlbrechtRECONSTRUCTION SECURITY AFTER CONFLICTSecurity Sector Reform in Sierra Leone

Bryan MabeeTHE GLOBALIZATION OF SECURITYState Power, Security Provision and Legitimacy

Janne Haaland MatlaryEUROPEAN UNION SECURITY DYNAMICSIn the New National Interest

Michael Pugh, Neil Cooper and Mandy Turner (editors)WHOSE PEACE? CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OFPEACEBUILDING

Brian Rappert and Chandré Gould (editors)BIOSECURITYOrigins, Transformations and Practices

Brian RappertBIOTECHNOLOGY, SECURITY AND THE SEARCH FOR LIMITSAn Inquiry into Research and Methods

Brian Rappert (editor)TECHNOLOGY AND SECURITYGoverning Threats in the New Millennium

Nathan RogerIMAGE WARFARE IN THE WAR ON TERROR

Ali Tekin and Paul Andrew WilliamsGEO-POLITICS OF THE EURO-ASIA ENERGY NEXUSThe European Union, Russia and Turkey

Lisa WatanabeSECURING EUROPE

Mark Webber, James Sperling and Martin A. SmithNATO’s POST-COLD WAR TRAJECTORYDecline or Regeneration

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Charting Transformationthrough SecurityContemporary EU–Africa Relations

Toni HaastrupFellow, University of Warwick, UK

© Toni Haastrup 2013

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Contents

List of Illustrations vi

Acknowledgements vii

List of Abbreviations ix

1 Introduction: Continuity and Change in EU–AfricaRelations 1

2 Evaluating a Contemporary Institution: EU–Africa Relations 31

3 Regionalising Security: The APSA and External Partners 61

4 EU Support for the ASF: AMANI AFRICA Cycles 84

5 Scapegoats and Heroes: Establishing a Small Arms Regime? 112

6 Change in Motion: Evolution between Layering andConversion 141

Conclusion: Transformation Deferred? 165

Notes 175

Bibliography 181

Index 226

v

Illustrations

Figures

1.1 Pathways of change through cooperation 233.1 Components of the African peace and security

architecture 696.1 Division of labour: component parts creating the whole 1516.2 Illustrating security as change in EU–Africa relations 163

Tables

1.1 Key differences between ‘traditional’ and ‘new’ models ofsecurity engagement 8

2.1 Regional organisations in Africa 472.2 The other institutionalisms 543.1 Peace and security department and PSC secretariat

responsibilities 733.2 European Union missions and operations in Africa 755.1 African sub-regional frameworks to halt small arms

proliferation 1165.2 EU micro-disarmament policy instruments 1236.1 Characteristics of the AMANI AFRICA cycle and SALW

support 1446.2 Declarations of division of labour in EU policy

frameworks 1506.3 Observing change in EU–Africa relations through security

cooperation 159

Boxes

1.1 Components of the Joint Africa EU–Strategy, adoptedDecember 2007, Lisbon, Portugal 20

5.1 PCASED support for ECOWAS moratorium 1315.2 Pan-African initiative: Fight against Illicit Accumulation

and Trafficking of Firearms in Africa 133

vi

Acknowledgements

This book was started in the Department of Politics and InternationalRelations at the University of Edinburgh; yet the development of thiswork has been within the ‘cosy’ confines of Politics and InternationalStudies (PAIS) at the University of Warwick. My thanks therefore spanseveral institutions and countries.

I am incredibly grateful for the encouragement of my advisers JohnPeterson and Rachel Hayman for their consistent enthusiasm and sup-port. And yet my intellectual development would have been impossi-ble without the support of colleagues (and friends) Nur AbdelkhaliqZamora, Ramneek Grewal, Anna-Lena Hogenauer, Amy Niang andLorenzo Ranalli, whose constant support always provided the light atthe end of the tunnel. My gratitude also goes to my former officemates Jaako Kuosmanen, Hilary Cornish, Catherine Rose Stocks-Rankin,Ewen McIntosh, Kostas Kostagiannis and Chris Ogden for providing anamiable environment to work in, and the necessary diversions whenneeded. I would also like to thank Meryl Kenny, Hope Murray andAmanda Wittman: three wonderful role models. I am also grateful forthe support of Fiona Mackay, who has been a wonderful friend andmentor.

A very special thank you goes to Ellen Stewart and Bahar Baser forbeing exceptional friends and a wonderful inspiration.

The completion of this book has been encouraged by Shaun Breslin,Nicola Pratt and Nick Vaughan-Williams, who were always ready to lis-ten to my frustrations, and especially Richard Whitman, whose wisdomand constant and quiet encouragement are much appreciated. Specialthanks to two office mates from different seasons – Oz Hassan andCatherine Jones – and to friends and colleagues Linda Åhall, ChrisClarke, Laura Downey, Denise Hewlett, Franklyn Lisk, Joao Nunes, JillPavey, Sharifah Sekalala and Alex Sutton: thank you all for making theworking week (and sometimes weekend) bearable.

This book could not have been completed without the cooperationof many officials and scholars who facilitated my field research, all myinterviewees in Addis Ababa, Brussels and Paris. Because anonymity isthe name of the game, I can say no more, but THANK YOU! I amespecially grateful to the many officials and scholars who shared their

vii

viii Acknowledgements

thoughts and experiences. I am also indebted to the University Associa-tion of Contemporary European Studies and the European Commission,and the University of Edinburgh for providing the funding for my fieldresearch.

I am eternally grateful to the Dipeolu family for hosting me on myfirst visit to Addis Ababa.

At Palgrave Macmillan, Christina Brian for thinking this was an ideaworth pursuing, and Harriet Barker for having faith that this book couldbe finished, thank you. I am also grateful to the anonymous reviewersfor their insightful comments. Finally, I would like to thank my fam-ily – my siblings, Tejumade and Olumide, my cousin and aunt, Ayoand Yemii, my grandmother, Elfrida, and especially my parents, Dejiand Esther Haastrup, for their unwavering support and encouragement.Their generosity, love and patience keep me going and I dedicate thisto them.

Abbreviations

AASM Associated African States and MadagascarACDS African Chief of Defence StaffACOTA African Contingency Operations Training and

Assistance ProgrammeACP African Caribbean and Pacific Group of CountriesACRI African Crisis Response InitiativeAEC African Economic CommunityAFRICOM US Command AfricaAGOA African Growth Opportunity ActAMIS African Union Mission in SudanAPF African Peace FacilityAPSA African Peace and Security ArchitectureASA Africa–South America SummitASEAN Association of Southeast Asian NationsASEM Asia–Europe MeetingASF African Standby ForceATCs African Training CentresAU African UnionCADSP Common African Defence and Security PolicyCAR Central African RepublicCEWS Continental Early Warning SystemCFSP Common Foreign and Security PolicyCJTF United States Combined Joint Task ForceCMD Conflict Management DepartmentCPA Africa–EU Cairo Plan of ActionCPD Conflict Prevention and Early Warning DivisionCSDP Common Security and Defence PolicyCSOs Civil Society OrganisationsCSSDC Conference on Security, Stability, Development and

Cooperation in the Continent (Africa)DAC Development Assistance Committee (OECD)DDR Disarmament, Demobilisation and ReintegrationDEVCO Development and Cooperation – EuropeAidDFID Department for International Development (UK)

ix

x List of Abbreviations

DG Directorate-General (European Commission,Council and Parliament)

DPKO United Nations Department of PeacekeepingOperations

DRC Democratic Republic of the CongoDSD Defence and Security DepartmentECD European Consensus on DevelopmentECDPM European Centre for Development Policy

ManagementECJ European Court of JusticeECOSOCC Economic, Social and Cultural Council of the

African UnionECOWAS Economic Community of West African StatesEDF European Development FundEEAS European External Action ServiceEMIFCA EU–MERCOSUR Interregional Framework for

Cooperation AgreementEPA Economic Partnership AgreementESDP European Security and Defence PolicyESS European Security StrategyEU European UnionEUAVSEC European Union Aviation Security MissionEUCAP NESTOR EU Mission on Regional Maritime

Capacity-Building in the Horn of AfricaEUCAP SAHEL EU CSDP Mission in NigerEUFOR European Union ForceEUNAVAFOR European Naval Force Somalia – Operation

ATALANTAEUPOL European Union Police OperationEURATOM European Atomic CommunityEU SEC EU Advisory and Assistance Mission for Security

ReformEU SSR European Union Security Sector ReformEUTM European Union Training MissionFCO Foreign and Commonwealth OfficeFOCAC China-Africa Cooperation ForumG8 Group of 8GPOI Global Peace Operations InitiativeGSC General Secretariat of the CouncilGTZ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische

Zusammenarbeit (German Society for TechnicalCooperation)

List of Abbreviations xi

IANSA International Action Network on Small ArmsIfS Instrument for Stability (EU)IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on DevelopmentIPA International Peace AcademyJAES Joint Africa–EU StrategyLAS League of Arab StatesMERCOSUR Mercado Común del Sur (Southern Common Market)MOD Ministry of DefenceNATO North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationNEPAD New Partnership for Africa’s DevelopmentNGO Non-Governmental OrganisationNMOG Neutral Military Observer GroupNPE Normative Power EuropeOAS Organization of American StatesOAU Organisation for African UnityOCTs Overseas Countries and TerritoriesOECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and

DevelopmentOIC Organisation of Islamic ConferenceOSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in EuropePCASED Plan of Action for the Implementation of the

Programme for Coordination and Assistance forSecurity and Development

PoA Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat, andEradicate the Illicit Trade of Small Arms and LightWeapons in All Its Aspects

PCRD Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development PolicyPRC People’s Republic of ChinaPSC AU Political and Security CouncilPSOD Peace Support Operations DivisionR2P Responsibility to ProtectRECAMP Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de

la PaixRECs Regional Economic CommunitiesRECSA Regional Centre on Small ArmsRELEX DG External RelationsRIPs Regional Initiative ProgrammesRPF Rwandan Patriotic FrontSACU Southern African Customs UnionSADC Southern African Development CommunitySALW Small Arms and Light Weapons

xii List of Abbreviations

SSA Sub-Saharan AfricaSSR Security Sector ReformTCI UK Transfer Control InitiativeTICAD Tokyo International Conference on African

DevelopmentUN United NationsUNDP United Nations Development ProgrammeUNECA Economic Commission for AfricaUNIOGBIS United Nations Integrated Peace-Building Office in

Guinea-BissauUNOAU United Nations Office to the African UnionUNSC United Nations Security Council

1Introduction: Continuity andChange in EU–Africa Relations

The past two decades have witnessed the re-emergence of internationalmultilateral and regional organisations as key actors on the interna-tional political scene. One of the most prominent of these institutionsis the European Union (EU). One defining feature of the EU’s inter-national outlook has been its relationship with developing countries,particularly those in Africa. Between 1957 and 1989, the bulk of theEU’s development assistance and trade favoured the African-dominatedAfrican, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of countries. In addition, EUmember states such as France, the United Kingdom and Germany main-tained bilateral relations with their former colonies. Africa has thereforeprovided the context for many of the EU’s external relations in thepast 50 years. This period maintained and entrenched the unequal rela-tionship between European countries and the former colonies througheconomic aid engagement, cultivating a donor–recipient dynamic. Thisparadigm ensured power asymmetries that favoured European andNorth American countries that represented the global North, at theexpense of African countries of the South.

Recent events in the global political arena, however, have rein-forced the need to re-examine EU–Africa relations beyond the donor–recipient paradigm and in the context of international security relations.As French troops continue to battle against extremists in Mali, withBritish support, the question of Europe’s relationship with its formercolonies has again come to the fore in international security dis-course. Furthermore, the political upheaval that has led to the so-calledArab Spring has had an effect on peace and security in North Africa.Lives were lost as intransigent state apparatuses repressed their citi-zens. In Libya, the response was the ousting of Col. Muammar Ghadafithrough direct support for anti-government ‘rebels’, including weapons

1

2 Charting Transformation through Security

distribution by France, and an eventual military intervention under-taken by the United States, France and the United Kingdom under theauspices of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). These activ-ities were undertaken ostensibly for humanitarian reasons, to protectcivilian lives.

However, these good intentions have repercussions for the organi-sation of security cooperation among global actors, and North–Southrelations in particular. These repercussions, I would argue, also apply toEU–Africa relations. It is clear that framing interaction between Northand South predominantly within a development paradigm does notadequately capture the complexity of the relationship. Additionally,continental Africa’s political concerns are invariably linked to interna-tional security and thus deserve thorough evaluation. Furthermore, aswe see in the role of the African Union (AU) as a mediator betweenLibya’s Ghadafi and anti-government ‘rebels’, regional institutions areincreasingly playing a prominent, if not always an effective, role ininternational security. This is also evident in the EU’s embargo onLibya on behalf of its member states, while the EU and the AU met inAddis Ababa with representatives from the Arab League and the UnitedNations (UN).

Throughout the intervention in Libya, and indeed all the North-ern engagements undertaken during the so-called Arab Spring, the AUconsistently complained about being sidelined, despite previous com-mitments by external partners to seek local solutions to insecurity in theregion. This situation, the AU believes, effectively undermines efforts tocreate lasting peace, while entrenching the status quo in North–Southrelations. This example illustrates one of the pervading tensions of 21st-century North–South relations, which, while considering security as animportant element in that relationship, reinforces the asymmetries wefind in development interactions.

At the minimum, then, outside engagement in Africa tells us thatthe context for evolving EU–Africa relations ought to lie at the inter-section of development (which defines the old relationship) and newsecurity concerns as mutual frames of understanding. Additionally, therelationship is complex and highlights a tension between the desiresto discard the donor–recipient paradigm in favour of a more egalitar-ian one. Finally, this transformation from the existing status quo to anew relationship ought to consider how new local actors such as theAU can respond to the challenges. Given the global repercussions oflocalised political challenges, cooperation, especially region-to-regioncooperation, must be pursued as the recipe for lasting peace.

Introduction: Continuity and Change 3

These developments in the international system provide an overarch-ing backdrop to understanding EU–Africa security cooperation, whichis the focus of this book. A nuanced investigation of recent EU–Africarelations therefore suggests that we cannot adequately understand thehistorical, present and future relationship between Europe and Africaas a simple one of donor and recipient. The relationships that haveevolved are complex, complicated by dynamics in the internationalsystem, but especially by dynamics within Europe and Africa respec-tively, and consequently between Europe and Africa. Within the policyarena, the evolution of EU–Africa relations has taken place within thediscourses of reform through change.

Since the end of the Cold War, Europeans and Africans have bothvoiced their desire to address the inequality that characterises themajority of EU–Africa relations. This impetus for change was driven,in part, by the international community’s efforts to further enmeshAfrica in the global economic and political system, which espoused fur-ther cooperation and interdependence through multilateralism. Giventhat the unequal relations were exacerbated by the separation of eco-nomic cooperation and political cooperation, one of the intendedoutcomes of reform was the integration of the political and theeconomic.

The separation of economic and political external relations had beenborn out of the reticence of EU member states to integrate politically.This, however, led to an unrealistic division between the actions of theEuropean Community (including EU–ACP relations) and the bilateralactions of the EU’s individual member states in African countries. How-ever, further political integration within the EU and the new quest fora more coherent and cohesive regional integration contributed to theefforts at reform.

Beginning in the mid-1990s and escalating since 2000, both the EUand its African states and regional organisations commenced the processof integrating political and economic concerns. The impetus to mergethese concerns is born out of mutual EU and African interests. In addi-tion, the European and African countries and organisations aimedto shift from the donor–recipient paradigm to one that emphasisedequality, ownership and partnership.

The Cairo Declaration and Action Plan of 2000 provided the firstclear platform for a new, explicit political dialogue between Europe andAfrica, based on a framework of inter-regionalism. The premise of inter-regionalism in this context is a relationship based on region-to-regioninteraction rather than a mismatch of bilateral relations. A relationship


based on inter-regionalism assumes that each region strives to pro-mote its own interests, thereby pursuing regional actorness. The CairoDeclaration highlighted security as a prerequisite for socio-economicdevelopment. In this way, the declaration directly links areas that werepreviously divergent in EU–Africa relations. By explicitly addressing thepolitical concerns linked to endemic economic concerns, such as thelinks between poverty, weak state institutions and protracted conflicts(insecurity) in places such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Maliand Somalia, to name a few, all the agreements pertaining to EU exter-nal relations with Africa issued between 2000 and 2007 introducedsomething new, a change, into EU–Africa relations: the inclusion andinter-regionalisation of security. In 2007, security became a definitivearea of cooperation between the EU and Africa in the peace and securitynexus of the Joint Africa–EU Strategy (JAES).

Although the volume of literature on EU–Africa relations has mush-roomed to address the empirical evidence of the EU’s security engage-ment in Africa over the past five years, this literature does not often dealwith the implications of this new dimension for existing cooperation.Rather, the focus tends to be on the shortcomings of current cooper-ation. This recent literature often ignores the increased engagement ofAfrican actors in determining the type and processes of EU external rela-tions in Africa. Yet, as European and African actors begin to considerthe 3rd Action Plan under the JAES, understanding the dimensions ofhow the EU–Africa relationship is constituted is imperative for furtherimprovements towards transformation.

This book, then, explores the impact of new security considerationson the nature of EU–Africa relations. It argues that the organisationof security cooperation through region-to-region (inter-regional) coop-eration provides the opportunity to transform EU–Africa relations byconsidering the history of their evolution. However, although EU–Africarelations have evolved, and continue to do so, the state of play is thatthe relationship has not been transformed . . . yet. The goal of the book isto show why change has happened in the five years since the JAES andto explore the conditions under which transformation can be enabledand inhibited. To do this, we must understand the broader context ofEU–Africa relations. The book will also be seeking to answer questionssuch as ‘What conditions make security cooperation a reliable avenueto explore this transformation?’ This introductory chapter will explorewhat security means in the 21st century while navigating the spacewhich EU–Africa security cooperation occupies and how it influencestransformation in existing relationships.


1.1 EU–Africa relations: The security dimension

One of the aims of this book is to highlight what security means in thecontext of EU–Africa relations. In order to situate this new dimensionof EU–Africa relations within the broader context of international secu-rity, it is just as important to understand what security means in thisrelationship.

Security cooperation in EU–Africa relations is linked to prior EUdevelopment commitments. New security cooperation is an expressionof the linkage between security and development, or the security–development nexus. The security–development nexus is a succinct termfor the links made in foreign policy practice that is holistic and seeks toaddress the interconnectedness of conflict management, security sectorreforms, disarmament and rebuilding societal infrastructure in post-conflict settings (OECD, 2001; Hurwitz and Peake, 2004). It is a uniqueway of viewing security, although it necessarily involves traditionalsecurity dimensions such as militarised intervention or civilian policeaction. According to Kerr (2007), ‘empirical observations and severaldata-collections studies reveal the significance of that nexus’ (p. 92).

The security–development nexus is consistent with the EU’s con-tinued engagement in international peace and security. This is evi-dent from the views expressed in the 2008 Council’s Report on theImplementation of the European Security Strategy (ESS), which statesthat

As the ESS and the 2005 Consensus on Development have acknowl-edged, there cannot be sustainable development without peace andsecurity and without development and poverty eradication there willbe no sustainable peace.

(2008b, p.12)

The security–development nexus is useful for analysing the complexitiesof intra-state conflicts and other antecedent insecurities. Accordingly,the increased engagement of the international community in Africanaffairs through direct support for peace support operations, disarma-ment and security sector reform and the strengthening of Africancapabilities are seen as part of this nexus between security and devel-opment (see Mark Malloch Brown address, 2003; Raymond Johansenspeech, 2007).

Some commentators dispute the link between security and develop-ment in policy practice, especially in the context of the War on Terror


(Bretherton and Vogler, 2006, p. 133). The argument is that interna-tional partners such as the EU are securitising development issues basedon the perception that Africa is a source of the risks and threats asso-ciated with terrorism (Bachmann and Hönke, 2008, p. 6; Sörensen andSöderbaum, 2012). The perception is that security resources for devel-opment assistance are being diverted for use in ‘security’ initiatives,or that traditional development issues are being linked to hard secu-rity concerns (see Duffield, 2005; Bachmann and Hönke, 2008; Brown,2008; Bagayoko and Gibert, 2009). This securitisation1 of developmentinterprets the linkage of security and development as having a negativeeffect on donor–recipient relationships, including on civil society (seeIPA, 2006; Howell and Lind, 2009). Specifically, policy links betweendevelopment and security are often framed through the lenses of post-colonial discourses; consequently, increased external intervention inAfrica is identified as an example of the disadvantages of linking securityand development.

Despite these concerns about the securitisation of development,policy practitioners in both Europe and Africa believe that there isan overlap between development and security, and that this overlapshould be harnessed to ensure peace and security for Africa’s citi-zens. While the marginalisation of civil society actors within Africansecurity institutions remains a substantive shortcoming, there is littleevidence that security concerns have overridden tangible developmentneeds. Moreover, the emphasis placed by institutional actors in Africaon ‘the natural link’ between security and development has servedto underline the priority of development concerns to internationaldonors. While challenges of policy implementation exist in mergingthese seemingly divergent fields, for the necessary changes to have anyimpact on security and development in Africa this merger may proveuseful.

The security–development nexus is a further result of a norma-tive approach to security known as human security. At least threeother approaches in the discipline of International Relations (IR) –particularly International Security (IS), including liberalist traditions,critical security studies approaches and constructivism – have influ-enced the development of human security as an approach withinsecurity studies. Indeed scholars such as Dannreuther (2007) placethe human security approach within a liberal/‘conventional’ construc-tivism/historical sociology continuum, which indicates its robust lin-eage. This approach was first defined in the 1994 United NationsDevelopment Programme (UNDP) report. This approach pursues a


people-centric notion of security. Importantly, it appeals to both EU andAU policy-makers.

Regional declaratory statements by both the EU and the AU, such asthose of the ESS, the Conference on Security, Stability, Developmentand Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA) and the Protocol Establishing thePeace and Security Council (of the AU), have all expressed the newconcept of human security. African institutions and governments pur-port to embrace the concept of human security. In Africa, where themajority of threats to security come from within a country’s own bor-ders, human security helps to analyse the normative dimensions ofsecurity by raising ethical issues (Kerr, 2007, p. 93). Human securitystretches the concept of security from the horizontal, beyond militaryobjectives alone, to the vertical, to incorporate the participation of indi-vidual, local, regional and international structures and actors (Hutchful,2008). Situating the new EU–Africa relations within a human securityparadigm is important: it illustrates the potential for change by high-lighting the paradigm shift from traditional approaches to security,which also effectively separates politics from economics and securityfrom development.

Nevertheless, while Africans and Europeans espouse human securityin its broadest sense, the bulk of African security challenges are linkedto active, dormant and potentially violent conflict situations, whichsometimes require traditional security responses. These insecurities aredeeply rooted in the social, political and economic situation on the con-tinent. Thus human security practice in Africa means that the military(with the holistic cooperation of civilian and police actors) remains akey element in the peace and security of communities and institutions.According to the Ghanaian scholar Eboe Hutchful, the human securityconcept divested of a military aspect is one that is pushed by interna-tional organisations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), whomiss the point about the continued usefulness of some aspects of ‘hardsecurity’ (Hutchful, 2008, p. 79), which could potentially hinder Africa’squest for peace. Here, then, security relies on Hutchful’s functionalapproach.

The evolving approaches to security have resulted in differentapproaches to the issue over the past two decades. Table 1.1 below out-lines the differences between the traditional models of implementingsecurity and the ‘new’, or non-traditional, model.

From the foregoing, the evolution of security and its new inclusionin EU–Africa relations suggest that security potentially contributes tochanges in the overall EU–Africa relationship.


Table 1.1 Key differences between ‘traditional’ and ‘new’ models of securityengagement

‘Traditional’ model ofsecurity engagements

‘New’ model of securityengagements

Responses to threats Military Military and non-military.

Source of threats External External (border disputes)and internal.

Actors (belligerents andnon-belligerents)

States States and non-states(sub-nationalist groups,civil societyorganisations,internationalorganisations andregional organisations).

Duration of engagement Short-term (cessationof violence)

Medium- to long-termthrough post-conflictreconstruction.

Source: Adapted from Haastrup (2013b, p. 52).

1.2 The evolution of EU–Africa relations

Change in the governance of EU–Africa relations is only important, orat least relevant, if we have a good grasp of the historical context ofEU–Africa relations. The genesis of EU–Africa relations is also tied tothe creation of what is now the most integrated regional institutionin the world: the EU. In the aftermath of World War II, France, WestGermany, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Italy agreed tothe creation of the European Economic Community (EEC). These coun-tries had colonial ties to Africa. Coincidentally, 1957 also marked thefirst decolonisation in Africa, with Ghana gaining its independence fromBritain, and other African countries followed throughout the 1960s.In the Treaty of Rome, which established the EEC, France had requestedthat its colonies and territories have special consideration, leading to theConvention of the Association of Overseas Territories (OCTs). The inclu-sion of the former European colonies allowed the continued associationof France and Belgium with their former colonies.

The EEC member states, in addition to their commitments to integra-tion, agreed to assist the OCTs and decolonising nations, with technicaland financial support from the European Development Fund (EDF). Thissupport had two aims. On the one hand, it was to help the formercolonies develop their social, political and economic infrastructure.


On the other, it gave European countries continued, and consistent,access to their former colonies. This consideration of the OCTs in theTreaty of Rome was based on an agreement not between the EEC andthe OCTs but rather among the European signatories. Thus, Europeanstates had not consulted the newly independent states of Africa, makingthe terms of association strictly European.

The initial member states of the EEC focused on assistance to fran-cophone countries, specifically former French and Belgian colonies.In 1956 the French government argued that it was essential that itretained its links with its former colonies within the framework of theEEC. However, the outcome of this was a framework in which a donor–recipient paradigm based on colonialism continued to function in apost-colonial environment. It is clear, then, that from the very begin-ning EU–Africa relations were bound to be, at the very least, morallyproblematic, plagued with accusations of neo-colonialism – a label thatstill resonates today even in the context of EU security engagement inAfrica.

By including association with African countries in the Treaty of Rome,all the member states of the EEC had equal economic (and arguablyexploitation) access to the African francophone countries. Whateverthe context, the inclusion of relations with the OCTs in the found-ing document of the EU is important to understanding how the firststeps towards the institutionalisation of cooperation commenced. Fur-ther, highlighting the genesis of these relations underlines its colonialimpetus.

Following the wave of independence in the OCTs, the EEC re-examined the commitments to Africa in its Treaty of Rome. This ledto an updated arrangement. In 1963 the EEC and 18 countries, whichformed the Associated African States and Madagascar (AASM), signedthe first in a series of agreements. This agreement was different fromthe previous one because it was between the European countries andthe African ones. Although a small change on paper, it was highlysignificant, as it meant that in theory the colonial state no longermade the decisions for the client territory. In practice, however, it ledto no significant change. The first agreement or convention, YaoundéI, was signed in Cameroon. This agreement still focused on formerfrancophone colonies. Yaoundé I preserved preferential trade relationsbetween Western European countries and their former colonies, andit was especially favourable to France. It guaranteed France access toraw materials from Africa, which made up the bulk of the newlyindependent states’ revenues.


Since neither Britain nor Portugal was an initial member of the EEC,there was no advocate for the inclusion of the anglophone or luso-phone African countries. Additionally, due to Britain’s absence fromthe EEC, this association of African and European states contributedto the artificial but persistent colonial division of sub-Saharan Africa,with the AASM on the one hand and the African Commonwealth states(former British colonies) on the other. These former British coloniespromptly complained that Yaoundé I was biased towards the formerFrench colonies, giving them premium access to European markets.Thus Yaoundé I appeared to preserve the French colonial system inAfrica.

Germany and the Netherlands supported the view that YaoundéI reinforced colonialism, sharing similar concerns about the undueinfluence of France in Africa’s post-colonial relations (Goutier, 2008).These criticisms resulted in several bilateral agreements between the EECand individual Commonwealth countries, including Nigeria, in 1969(although this was not ratified, due to the Nigerian Civil War) and theArusha agreement with three East African countries – Kenya, Ugandaand Tanzania – which was implemented in 1971. Under the new agree-ments, the second EDF provided financial assistance to the African statesas support to build up infrastructure. The fact that France retained a his-toric neo-colonial agenda in Africa remained a concern for Germany andother EU member states.

The terms of Yaoundé I left no doubt about the colonial nature ofEU–Africa relations at this early stage. Forwood notes that this agree-ment and subsequent ones were structured around the aspirations ofand factors within the European institution itself, rather than through aconsultative process between Europe and Africa (Least Developed Coun-tries) (Forwood, 2001, p. 424). Nevertheless, Yaoundé I provided whatis often referred to in new institutionalism as the institutional inno-vation of the current inter-regional institution in EU–Africa relations.The agreement laid the groundwork on which other agreements werebased and which was adapted to foster EU–Africa relations throughoutthe 20th century.

The successor of Yaoundé I, Yaoundé II, came into force in 1971. Notsignificantly different from its predecessor, Yaoundé II incorporated theArusha agreements, thereby including some former British colonies. Theincorporation of some former British colonies was intended to addressearlier criticisms that relations between Europe and Africa were a reflec-tion of French-driven neo-colonialism. In 1972 Mauritius was acceptedinto the Yaoundé II convention.


Brown (2000) argues that the acceptance of Yaoundé II by Africancountries reflected the continued influence of French external rela-tions on former colonies within a regional European context. AlthoughYaoundé I ought to have provided African countries with a greater mar-ket share and consequently more wealth in the international economy,this was not what happened. The arrangement mostly benefited Europe,and soon other European countries were clamouring to be included inYaoundé II. France had successfully given the impression that it wouldalways take care of its former colonies. Britain, unlike France, absenteditself from the continent soon after decolonisation.

In addition to concerns or perceptions about France’s Svengali-likeengagement in Africa, European countries were worried about thespread of communism. These European countries saw it as their dutyto keep communism at bay in Africa, thus interfering with the choiceof political system for African states. The argument here, then, is thatgovernance structures in Africa were still being determined by imperiallinkages. In practice, colonial relations had not been completely over-come, and the 1960s were not the dawn of a new age for Africa. Thus,despite the additional inclusion of newly independent African states inthe convention, relations between Europe and Africa remained largelythe same.

With the accession of the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmarkto the EEC in 1973, conditions seemed right for the re-evaluation ofthe collective association of the European Community (having evolvedfrom the EEC) towards Africa. Unlike the other European countries, theUnited Kingdom had former colonies outside Africa, in the Pacific andCaribbean regions. In theory, this meant that the European Community(EC) could no longer be seen to be guilty of favouritism towards Africancountries. By August 1973, the EC had invited 21 Commonwealth coun-tries and Ethiopia, Sudan, Liberia, Equatorial Guinea and Guinea-Bissauto negotiate association agreements intended as a possible successor toYaoundé. With the exception of South Africa, every independent sub-Saharan African state had been invited (Goutier, 2008). Led by Nigeria,the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries suggested a single agree-ment, believing they were bound together by their colonial experiencesand economic development status in the international system. The sug-gestion of a single agreement also provided the opportunity for formercolonies to assert their interests to the EU, with the eventual aim ofaddressing some of the asymmetry in North–South relations.

The single agreement had some initial benefits. A single agreementwith the former colonies made it easier for the EC to consolidate its


external economic cooperation. The consolidation of countries fromthree regions paved the way for the formal grouping of countries fromAfrica, the Caribbean and the Pacific, later known as the ACP group(Babarinde and Faber, 2005, p. 3). Engaging with the former colonies inthis manner was therefore bureaucratically expedient. Indeed, the cre-ation of the ACP group included formalised rules and norms and thestandard operating procedures encoded in the Georgetown Agreement(amended in 2003).

Despite the formalisation of the ACP group, there was no shift inthe dynamics of North–South relations in the context of Europe andthe rest of the world. Rather, it reinforced the pattern of engagementthat had always existed. Arguably, it worsened EU–Africa relations inthat it institutionalised the prevailing colonial paradigm. Nevertheless,it also created the platform from which current relations are evolving.As we will see in Chapter 2 when examining the usefulness of the newinstitutionalist paradigm for understanding the change in EU–Africarelations, the creation of institutions for the purpose of cooperationembedded the established pattern of cooperation, from whence furtherinteraction followed. Essentially, while institutions have a way of mak-ing processes stable, it is also through them that we can begin to changethe position of the actors involved.

Lomé I was the first agreement established under the aegis of theEC–ACP cooperation. Signed in 1975, and in force from 1976, it contin-ued the system of preferential trade between the EU and ACP countriesand extended previous conventions (Goutier, 2008, p. 8). It guaranteednon-reciprocal trade concessions to ACP countries, thereby allowing90% of ACP exports into the EU duty-free. According to The Courier,it retained the contractual nature of aid, among other things, althoughit was more detailed and precise, focusing also on the growth of agri-cultural infrastructure. After five years, the agreement was renewed asLomé II. In Lomé II, cooperation between the ACP and EC remained thesame, with two exceptions. First was the further expansion of ACP mem-bership. Second, the System of Stabilization of Export Earnings fromMining Products (or SYSMIN) was added under this convention. Thiswas a mechanism designed to assist the ACP countries in upgradingtheir own mineral production capabilities (Babarinde and Faber, 2005,p. 4; Goutier, 2008).

Lomé III came into force in 1985. This agreement reflected, to anextent, the evolution of the relationship between the EC and the ACPgroup of countries, as well as a maturity in the agreements’ priorities.Lomé III retained all the trappings of the previous agreements. TheEC maintained its privileged position with the ACP countries, most of


which were dependent on this external aid. However, the situation wasalso exacerbated by the weak governance systems in post-colonial Africa(Englebert, 2000; William, 2007; Braithwaite, 2010).

Lomé III reflected a weariness that comes with seemingly inescapable,static relationships. Goutier (2008) notes that the period of negotiationsthat led to Lomé III reflected ‘aid fatigue’ on the part of the donornations. European countries felt they were not getting the positivereturns expected from the agreements with the ACP: i.e., social, eco-nomic and political development in Africa and the Caribbean. Rather,poverty was at its highest rates since independence, and many countrieswere governed by military or other sorts of dictatorships. Particularly,in Africa, the lack of positive results from economic cooperation andaid was blamed on the frequent and often volatile political crises withinmany African states.

By the time Lomé III came about, the developmental progress ofAfrican states seemed to have reached a plateau, which the construc-tion of existing agreements had not helped. This stalemate was thereforea key motivator when the European Commission began to renegoti-ate Lomé III on behalf of the member states. In the negotiation ofLomé III, we begin to see attempts to re-order EU–Africa relations.Prior to Lomé III, the EC maintained political neutrality (Frisch, 1997).The maintenance of political neutrality on the part of the EuropeanCommission did not preclude the interference of EC member statesin the political affairs of other individual African states, but all poli-cies mediated by the EC were supposedly politically neutral. Indeed,the claim to political neutrality was used to political advantage bythe EC, ensuring (superfluous) influence on matters that are now seenas human insecurity concerns.2 It should be noted, however, that thedifferent approach of the Commission and the member states also con-tributed inconsistencies that made the ACP less cohesive in definingtheir interests.

What set Lomé III apart from previous conventions was the introduc-tion of ‘policy dialogues’. The static nature of relations between Europeand the ACP states in 1985 suggested that it was no longer tenable for‘high’ politics to be seen as running parallel to social and economicdevelopment. The reconciliation of this, however, would require inter-nal consistencies within the EC between European Commission actionsand member-state actions. Furthermore, if change was to occur, it wouldrequire the engagement of African states, especially as they dominatedthe ACP group.

Yet this would be difficult. Although the untenable separation of pol-itics from social and economic development would become apparent in


the years to come, African states viewed the acknowledgment of politicalissues in their dealings with Europe as an imposition of conditions foraid. For example, during negotiations, the ACP countries took issue withthe phrase in the Lomé III agreement which introduced a commitmenton their part to the preservation of ‘human dignity’. This reference tohuman dignity was to emphasise the importance of observing humanrights in the function of trade, aid and development, which clearly veersin the direction of a political concern rather than economic coopera-tion. Nevertheless, the ACP countries accepted the changes in writing.Moreover, although the new consideration for human rights was com-mendable, the process through which it came about further showed thepersistence of the existing pattern of EU–Africa relationship rather thanchange.

In 1990 the ACP and the EC agreed to Lomé IV. In this agreement,the EU stipulated stricter controls on the use of funds. Additionally, theEuropean Commission increased the period of validity for each agree-ment from the usual five years to ten years. The idea was to provide‘better continuity of development programmes’ (Goutier, 2008, p. 9),although the new ten-year period was subject to a mid-term review in1994–1995. The agreement emphasised issues considered more politicalin nature than those in previous agreements:

the promotion of human rights, democracy and good gover-nance; strengthening of the position of women; the protection ofthe environment; decentralized cooperation; diversification of ACPeconomies; the promotion of the private sector; and increasingregional cooperation.

(European Commission, 1990)

Like the inclusion of ‘human dignity’, these new strictures were not wel-comed by the ACP group of states. The ACP group, and particularly theAfrican countries, argued that the European Commission was deviatingfrom the purpose of the institution, which was trade and aid for socialdevelopment, and instead imposing a normative agenda. However, thenew changes reflected the broader shifts in international developmentcooperation in the 1990s, as acknowledged in the European Commis-sion’s Green Paper on relations between the EU and ACP countries. Oneof the themes highlighted in the Green Paper was the implications of thecollapse of the Soviet Union. Importantly, it highlighted the inclusionof the newly democratising nations of Central and Eastern Europe in


the consideration of EC external policy and relations. If the EC was pur-suing democracy as an external policy objective in the region, it madesense that the Commission would also pursue it elsewhere, including inAfrica.

Evidently, the end of the Cold War created new opportunities andchallenges for international donors, and this period had an impact onthe trajectory of development assistance and external relations morebroadly. Following the mid-term review of Lomé IV, the EU soughtto re-evaluate its relationship with the ACP group, dominated by sub-Saharan African countries. Attempts at this re-evaluation are seen inthe first Cotonou Agreement of 2000, which was both a continuationof and a movement away from the previous agreements. Although theEDF funded the Cotonou Agreement, like the others, the new terms ofEU–ACP relations were very explicit about the political nature of devel-opment assistance in the 21st century. The negotiation of the CotonouAgreement was contingent on the changes occurring in the interna-tional system and internally among the actors involved. These includedactors such as the EU and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), inits last days.

The increased visibility of the EU in the global arena meant that,at the very least, it had to consider what others saw as the preferen-tial role given to the ACP countries, possibly at the expense of otherexternal cooperation agreements (Babarinde, 2005, p.18). This increasedvisibility was coupled with the development of its security capabilities,particularly the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Estab-lished by the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, the CFSP provided a frameworkfor further cooperation and coordination among member states in areasof foreign policy. Furthermore, from the EU’s perspective, enlargementand the prospect of further enlargement meant that the utility ofresources committed externally had to be maximised. Because the EU’sexternal relations commitment had increased beyond Africa to areas ofarguably greater geo-strategic importance, it became necessary to see atangible return on its investment.

Above and beyond this, a change in EU–Africa relations was soughtbecause Africa remained poor, despite decades of preferential treat-ment. This suggested that the existing formula was not working. Furtherincreases in violent conflicts and state fragility meant that the prospectsfor socio-economic development were at an all-time low. The worstexamples of these developments were the Rwandan genocide and theprotracted conflict in Somalia. By the mid-1990s, politics, security andeconomic development were on an irreversible collision course. It was


untenable to keep these spheres separate. It is within these contexts andprocesses that the EU and African countries committed themselves tothe inclusion of security in existing cooperation frameworks, startingwith the EU–ACP Cotonou Agreement of 2000.

1.3 Security as opportunity

One of the core arguments of this book is that the integration of securityinto the business of EU–Africa relations presented an opportunity forthe transformation of existing relations. The different actors involvedin this transformation, however, were all motivated by different factors.In the EU, as the integration project has evolved and its competencieshave expanded, the predominantly inter-governmental area of securityis gradually becoming institutionalised, in some cases as a part of thedevelopment policies and in others as part of CFSP, now the CommonSecurity and Defence Policy (CSDP). This is evident in the EU’s exter-nal relations discourse through statements issued under the CFSP, theEuropean Security and Defence Policy (EDSP) and the European Con-sensus on Development (ECD). More recently, these commitments havebeen articulated in the EU Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa(2011) and the EU Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel(2011).

As already noted, while the first explicit inclusion of new security con-siderations in EU–Africa relations is the Cairo Declaration, its roots weretraceable to the former economic and development policy agreementsin that these provided the justification for dialogue. By the time LoméIV, the agreement between the EU and ACP countries, was in place,the EU had begun a dialogue with the OAU, although it relied heav-ily on the separate apparatuses provided by the grouping of African,Caribbean and Pacific countries, on the one hand, and by the EU, onthe other. For example, in 1993, the then EU Commissioner for Devel-opment Aid, João de Deus Pinheiro, first addressed the need, officially,to consider peace-building and security in Africa as part of Directorate-General Development’s work. At this point in EU–Africa relations, therewere no formal links between the EU and OAU beyond the EU–ACPrelationship. The existing trade/aid relations in the Lomé IV contexttherefore provided a springboard for focused inter-regional political dia-logue. By bringing (peace and) security into the domain of the EU’s workin Africa, the EU was breaking new ground. Prior to this, security wasconsidered strictly the domain of certain EU member states, despite theexistence of the 2nd Pillar CFSP/CSDP, which proposed a foreign policy


for the EU (Haastrup, 2013b). To include security as part of developmentwas a departure for the EU itself as much as for EU–Africa relations, sinceEU member states cleared favoured sovereignty over security issues andbilateral commitments regarding security engagement in Africa.

In 1995, at the European Council meeting in Madrid, European lead-ers and experts highlighted the challenges of conflict in Africa, bringingit to the forefront of the EU’s global political concerns. Highlightingthese challenges at that time and in that forum was especially sig-nificant, given the inadequate response or performance and even theperceived complicity of EU member states such as France during theRwandan genocide (Dallaire, 2003; Jaboeuf, 2008). The EU agreed at thismeeting that it had a responsibility to help mitigate armed conflict inAfrica (EU Presidency, 1995).

As part of the re-evaluation of its relationship with Africa, the EU alsocreated an initiative – the Euro Mediterranean Partnership (or BarcelonaProcess) – with five North African countries: Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia,Morocco and Libya. Whereas prior to 1995 the focus of EU–Africa rela-tions had been on relations with sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) through theACP framework, the inclusion of the North African countries as part ofthe EU’s broader Africa strategy also signalled a change in EU–Africa rela-tions. It also opened the debate about how best the EU should respondto the various challenges of insecurity in Africa, and the effects of thatinsecurity on Europe. The debate was outlined in the Commission’sGreen Paper on future EU–ACP relations. This plan sets out the chal-lenges and opportunities for a new partnership (European Commission,1996). The Green Paper identified four potential options for transform-ing EU–Africa relations. One of the options was to break the existingACP conventions in favour of tailored regional agreements: i.e., separateAfrican, Caribbean and Pacific agreements.

By 1997 the European Commission issued a communication high-lighting the nexus or link between security and development especiallyin its external relations. Further, EU member states had reached a com-mon position that designated security as a necessary area of cooperationbetween themselves (Olsen, 2001). This nexus has been recently rein-forced in the 2011 Sahel strategy. As Youngs (2008) notes, however, thislinkage is hardly remarkable and is indeed obvious (p. 1). Moreover, thesubstantive effects of this linkage have been difficult to ascertain in EUforeign policy practice (see also Bello, 2012). Nevertheless, the linkingof security to development has implications for the internal dynamicsof EU institutions. While the link is increasingly accepted, within theEU the implementation of this nexus has the potential to create rivalries


among the key actors: the European Commission, which is charged withdevelopment policies, and the European Council, representing memberstates charged with external security engagement. Suffice to say, the EU’srelationship with Africa also has implications for the EU internally.

Lomé IV’s successor, the Cotonou Agreement, created a new avenuefor dialogue on political issues, including security within the existingtrade–aid relationship. This agreement reflected the slow but steady ero-sion of the old arrangements. Unlike the previous agreements, wherethe inclusion of political elements constituted a broadening of normsand principles in the already established relationship, the CotonouAgreement created a new norm, including security. For example, itincluded the EU’s commitment to support regional initiatives on (peaceand) security in Africa. The inclusion of the commitment to supportregional security reflected the internal EU commitment to cooperatewith ACP countries involved in armed conflict. Further, the com-mitment in the Cotonou Agreement supported the ongoing parallelprocess of security cooperation between the EU and Africa through theOAU. Internal changes within the EU’s development policy outlooktowards the end of the 20th century, which included the promotionof democracy, further created the space to include more in the CotonouAgreement.

Changes in EU–Africa relations are supported by changes in Africa’slandscape. Despite the challenges and opportunities for Africa withinthe Millennium Development Goals (MDGs),3 the fragility of thecontinent’s political landscape became apparent in the period fol-lowing the immediate aftermath of the Cold War. The internationalcommunity, including African leaders, civil society and the donors,acknowledged that insecurity through violent conflicts had exacer-bated poverty and caused development to stagnate. This stagnationundermines the systems of governance and exacerbates insecurity inAfrica.

Observers saw the situation in Africa as an opportunity for ‘a globalaffirmation of the European Security and Defence identity’ (Lenzi, 1995,pp. 63–64; cited in Olsen, 2001). Essentially, cooperation with Africa onsecurity was envisioned as a prototype for the EU to test its own abil-ities as a security actor or develop its ‘strategic culture’4 (Cornish andEdwards, 2001; Martinsen, 2003; Whitman and Haastrup, 2013). It wasalso an opportunity to develop a new kind of relationship with Africancountries. This idea was especially pushed by the United Kingdomand France, two former colonial powers whose foreign policy futurecontinues to be intertwined with their past in Africa (Olsen, 2001).


The Cairo Declaration and the EU–Africa Cairo Plan of Action (CPA)of 2000 laid out the extent of the proposed cooperation between theEU and OAU member states. The adoption occurred at the first everEU–Africa summit under the aegis of the OAU and EU. AlthoughOlsen (2006) argues that the Cairo Summit was largely symbolic andlacked substance, it was nevertheless a significant moment in EU–Africarelations. It signalled the move from the convenient EU–ACP cooper-ation to a new kind of inter-regional cooperation, founded on equalregional importance being given to both Europe and Africa, at least intheory.

In 2005, five years after the initial EU–Africa Summit, the EU unveiledits own strategy for Africa adopted by the Commission and memberstates, titled The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership. In thisdocument, the EU committed itself to ‘address Africa as one entity’[COM (2005) 489 final]. Further, it reinforced the desire for a relation-ship based on equality, partnership and ownership and clearly identifiedpeace and security as an emerging area of cooperation. The 2005 strat-egy is important because it acknowledged the fundamental challenges ofEU–Africa relations under the ACP framework and clarified the changesexpected under new EU–Africa relations. In identifying the need forequality, partnership and ownership, the EU was introducing new normswith the deliberate intention of transforming the existing status of EU–Africa relations. While this document was unilateral on the part of theEU, the three principles identified as prerequisites for change were con-sistent with aims subsequently articulated at EU–Africa troikas. Thesethree principles challenge the very basis of EU–Africa relations as estab-lished in the Treaty of Rome and subsequently within the EU–ACPframework.

Between 2006 and 2007, the EU engaged in extensive negotiationswith African countries on creating a new cooperation context andformal agreement, which went beyond the boundaries of the ACPagreements. Following these negotiations, which also included exten-sive consultation with members of civil society organisations, a newagreement was developed. In December 2007 at the Lisbon EU–Africasummit, EU member states, the European Commission, member statesand 53 African countries signed the JAES. It was the first agreement thatenjoyed a ‘contribution of equals’ based on the active participation ofthe African side in the drafting process. Its principal aim was to addressthe concerns of the African continent vis-à-vis its relationship with theEU from a holistic viewpoint, so it is committed to combating the per-sistent insecurities and underdevelopment in Africa within the external


Box 1.1 Components of the Joint Africa EU–Strategy,adopted December 2007, Lisbon, Portugal.

Main Partners: EU, AU (including African Regional EconomicCommunities) and the UN (in the case of Peace and Security).

Funding: EU member states, European Commission (EuropeanDevelopment Fund); AU membership dues.

8 Areas of Cooperation:

1. Peace and Security2. Governance and Human Rights3. Trade and Integration4. Partnership on Millennium Development Goals (poverty

reduction)5. Energy6. Climate Change7. Migration, Mobility and Employment8. Science, Information Society and Space

relations framework of the EU. In this agreement, the signatory partiesdelineate eight specific areas of cooperation as being equally important(see Box 1.1).

The eight areas of cooperation of the JAES are supported by the EDF,the EU’s main aid instrument to Africa. Concerning the development ofthe peace and security cluster, both the EU and the AU have committedto seeking additional funds for the African Peace Facility (APF) with theaim of making the AU’s African Peace Fund self-sustaining.

The JAES aimed to usher in a new era of social, economic and politi-cal cooperation between Europe and Africa. It signalled a potential shiftin EU–Africa relations, which was in part necessitated by security chal-lenges in Africa, and thus included new dimensions of cooperation onpeace and security. Importantly, it signalled a shift from the usual bilat-eral domains dominated by member states to recalibrating security as aregional concern for the EU and AU. The main purpose of the JAES is tosupport African initiatives and institutions, and to build up the capabil-ities of African actors, as articulated in the First Action Plan. On securityin particular, the First Action Plan committed the EU to cooperationwith the AU on:


• Enhanced dialogue on challenges to peace and security;• Full implementation of the African Peace and Security Architecture

(APSA); and• Predictable funding for African-led peace support operations (JAES

First Action Plan, 2007).

The Second Action Plan reiterated these three areas of cooperation butexpanded the parameters under consideration. On dialogue, the EU andAU committed to promoting thematic issues such as terrorism and thelink between gender and international security. Regarding the imple-mentation of the APSA, the Second Action Plan committed to a betterintegration of the components of the APSA, while acknowledging sig-nificant progress, especially in the formulation of the African StandbyForce (ASF). Finally, while the goal of more predictable funding wasnot achieved under the First Action Plan, plans to reinstitute a 3rdAfrican Peace Facility were outlined for implementation during the Sec-ond Action Plan. The overall achievement of the Second Action Planis beyond the scope of this book; nevertheless, it highlights the con-tinuity of JAES priorities and underscores the importance of securitycooperation between the EU and the AU.

Security cooperation as outlined under the JAES is important whenexamining the change in EU–Africa relations, since concerns aboutachieving security in Africa have been a central motivator for change inthe EU’s approach to Africa. Further, the inter-regionalisation processesthat are being pushed through the security process create the spaceswithin which the enduring paradigm of North–South relations – thatis, the donor–recipient paradigm – can shift so that Africa is not at adisadvantage. This is important in reviewing the progress of the JAES.

The formation of the AU and new structures also contributed to theinter-regionalisation of security cooperation. The AU’s predecessor, theOAU, was incapable of providing the partnership needed on the Africanside. Indeed the OAU Charter highlighted a resistance to engagementwith Europeans in the realm of security, which was perceived as inter-ference, a potential breach of state sovereignty (OAU Charter, 1963).The Charter emphasised the protection of territorial integrity, directedagainst the possibility of intervention from former colonial powers.In addition, there was explicit resistance to external entities ‘interferingin the internal affairs of States’ within the African region (OAU Charter,1963).

The evolution of the OAU to the AU, wherein there is recognitionof independent security capabilities with a role for external actors, has


thus encouraged security cooperation. As the continental institution,the European countries increasingly perceive the AU as a natural partnerfor the EU’s new roles in Africa. The EU–AU relationship was brought onby the mutual interest in tackling Africa’s insecurities, and the opportu-nity for the EU to share its own best practices in regionalism (Haastrup,2013a).

Previously, the inter-regionalisation of security had been prevented byinternal dynamics within the EU and the limited capacities of Africa’sregional institutions, particularly the OAU. Chapter 2 of this bookexamines the development of security in the EU’s integration process.In addition to the lack of enthusiasm for security cooperation in Africa,as seen in Chapter 3, security was also not an area in which the EU wasin a position to lend its support. For Western European countries afterWorldWar II, with the emergence of the ColdWar, the Soviet Union andcommunism became the main threats to security, not African countries.The ‘security’ engagement in Africa by foreign countries was limited tothe United States’ and the Soviet Union’s support for proxy regimes.Otherwise, Europeans (with the exception of France) were absent fromAfrica’s security landscape.

This book contributes a new dimension to the existing literatureon and knowledge of EU–Africa relations. Until recently the literaturehas been reluctant to give Africa a single regional agency despite theexistence of the AU, and in the context of inter-regional engagementwith the EU external relations. Most of the literature often addressedAfrica in the context of EU–ACP relations, neglecting the myriad ofEuropean–African relations, including bilateral relationships. This bookprovides a holistic and focused assessment of EU–Africa relations. Thisis important because different relations serve as the subtexts to newand future and adjacent relations: e.g., France’s political engagementin Africa influences its position when negotiating with other EU mem-ber states about continued support for Africa. By considering onlythe EU–ACP, which is primarily (although not solely) a conduit fortrade- and aid-centred socio-economic development, the literature hasthus far limited our knowledge of the EU and Africa’s new politicalinstitutions.

Yet despite the scholarly attention to development assistance and eco-nomic cooperation, other areas of EU–Africa relations are experiencingchange (see Sicurelli, 2010). These changes have been encouraged byshifts in the international system as well as in Europe and Africa. Giventhe increased engagement of the EU in Africa’s security affairs, as evi-denced by training missions in Somalia and recently in Mali, it would be


remiss not to consider what security means, as this has become essentialto understanding contemporary EU–Africa relations.

The implementation of the various agreements and the processesof consultation and negotiation have institutionalised the relationshipbetween the EU and Africa for over 50 years. By ‘institutionalisation’, wemean a process whereby cooperation between the EU and Africa contin-ually incorporates norms or shared standards of behaviour, starting firstwith the processes of EU–ACP relations (Smith, 2004a, b).

Shifts in EU–Africa relations are intended to result in a dynamicpolitical outcome due to the changes in the characteristics of the polit-ical context, the institution itself and the role of the dominant agent(Mahoney and Thelen, 2010, p. 15). Essentially, the inter-regionalisationof different policy areas, as well as the new roles of the AU as regionalactor and new EU capabilities as exhibited through security coopera-tion, ought to contribute to changes in EU–Africa relations. Figure 1.1(see also Haastrup, 2013b) seeks to capture the trajectory of the shifts inEU–Africa (security) cooperation in the post-Cold War era.

The figure below illustrates the argument that the inter-regionalisationof security has been the impetus for some of the changes in theEU–Africa institution. However, what sort of changes does the new

Change in EU−Africa relations

Respect forAfrican institutionsand consistentcontinental approach tosecurity in Africa

Increased coordination and harmonisationwithin the EU tosupport Africaninitiativeseffectively

African rights of initiative and implementation,including the emergenceof the AU as aregional actor

Inter-regionalisation

of security/security

cooperation

ExistingEU−Africarelations

Figure 1.1 Pathways of change through cooperation


EU–Africa relationship aspire to? A study of policy documents, theacademic literature and extensive field research on EU–Africa relationsidentifies three desirable principles that are deemed to underpin the newinter-regional relations (see EU Strategy for Africa, 2005).

These principles are equality, partnership and ownership. If we trans-late these concepts into practice, then we can consider an evolution orchange to have occurred in the EU–Africa institution. There is consid-erable literature on these concepts in relation to broader internationaldevelopment, and they need to be approached as discursive aspirations.The centrality of these concepts of equality, partnership and ownershipwithin the Joint Strategy makes them useful principles to assess changesin EU–Africa relations in relation to security cooperation.

The new EU–Africa relations are founded on the principle of equality,defined in the EU Strategy for Africa as ‘mutual recognition and respectfor institutions and the definition of mutual collective interests’ (EUStrategy for Africa, 2005). In translating equality to actionable objec-tives, EU–Africa relations would weigh African interests in the sameway as European interests. The outcomes of European policies sincedecolonisation, such as continued poverty and stagnant social devel-opment, suggest that, while Europe may have benefited from EU–Africarelations, Africa has not done so. A scenario where security cooperationcreates a forum for the equal participation of the EU and the AU, leadingto a real potential for equal benefits, would signal a change in EU–Africarelations.

Partnership is a relatively new indicator of change in the context ofNorth–South relations. Over the past two decades, development studiesliterature has defined partnership in two ways: dependent partnershipand active partnership (Lewis, 1998). Dependent partnerships ‘are oftenlinked to the availability of funding’, wherein the recipients of supportaccede to the demands of the donor partners and have no independence(Lewis, 1998, p. 504). This makes participation in the decision-makingprocess difficult for the country or institution receiving assistance frompartners in the global North.

Active partnerships are difficult to achieve in the context of North–South relations. They are

built through ongoing processes of negotiation, debate, occasionalconflict, and learning through trial and error. Risks are taken, andalthough roles and purposes are clear they may change according toneed and circumstance.

(Lewis, 1998, p. 504)


Active partnership is what the EU strives for when working with Africaninstitutions, especially the AU Commission, the Peace and SecurityCouncil and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs). However, theability to achieve this in security cooperation is often threatened sincethe AU is less developed than the EU as a regional actor. Hence, in thisbook, I make the distinction between the two types of partnership.

Ownership is perhaps the murkiest of practices to define. It can havemultiple meanings, and it is extremely difficult to assess (Whitfieldand Fraser, 2009a). Nevertheless, given that it is an expressed outcomeof changes within EU–Africa relations, it deserves acknowledgement.In this context, ownership expresses the degree of control the AU canexercise over the initiation, the design and the implementation ofsecurity cooperation (adapted from De Renzio et al., 2008, p. 2).

Ownership is the ‘acceptance of, commitment to and responsibilityfor the implementation of [. . .] home grown solutions’ (Girvan, 2007,p. 3; emphasis added). Home-grown solutions rely on the local knowl-edge of the policy environment. According to the United Nations’International Peace Academy, ownership should further the six dimen-sions: ‘responsiveness, consultation, participation, accountability, con-trol and sovereignty’ (IPA, 2006, p. 7). Ownership as an aspirationof North–South relations has emerged because of the imbalances ofpower between supposed partners in the international system. Wherelocal knowledge is lacking, the resulting policies may be short-livedin their usefulness or efficiency. Although the discourse around own-ership has existed for well over a decade, it has only emerged as anexpressly defined aim of EU–Africa relations in the past five years.Hence ownership in this regard has become a new principle of EU–Africa relations. Achieving change in the context of EU–Africa relationswould ensure that ownership, in Girvan’s (2007) definition, is thebenchmark for new relations. The translation of these three princi-ples into practice would indicate a transformation in existing EU–Africarelations.

In evaluating change as a whole within EU–Africa relations, thisbook relies on expressions found in recent scholarship on histori-cal institutionalism, the context of which will be discussed in moredetail in Chapter 2. Traditionally, one of the benefits of historicalinstitutionalism had been its ability to highlight the power of path-dependency within an institutional framework (Pierson, 2005). How-ever, the reality of institutional evolution has re-directed recent studiesin this field to theorise about change (Thelen, 2004; Hacker, 2004;Streeck and Thelen, 2005; Mahoney and Thelen, 2010).


In the books How Institutions Evolve and Explaining Institutional Change,Thelen (2004 and 2010 (with Mahoney)) suggests that endogenousfactors have a greater effect on institutional change than exogenousones. In examining the case of security cooperation within EU–Africarelations, changes occurring within the international system after theCold War had a big impact on the re-examination of insecurity inAfrica as well as redefining security to include new concepts of thesecurity–development nexus and human security. The prevailing histor-ical institutionalist literature would argue that the end of the Cold Warconstituted a critical juncture for EU–Africa relations without which thechanges observed could not have occurred.

Thelen’s argument concerning institutional evolution does not dis-count the impact of a critical juncture such as the end of the Cold War;however, she contends that substantive changes happen beyond thosecritical junctures which are enabled by internal changes within the insti-tution itself. The evidence from the case studies in Chapters 4 and 5strongly supports Thelen’s argument. While the international environ-ment may have been conducive to security cooperation in EU–Africarelations, it has been the strength of EU security capabilities and the re-organisation of regionalism in Africa that has most affected the abilityto achieve equality, partnership and ownership.

1.4 Research design and structure

This book examines two cases of EU support for building capabilitywithin the APSA as undertaken during the First and Second ActionPlans. These cases are illustrative examples of security cooperation.The analysis provided in this book relies on a qualitative case-studyresearch design, which informs the approach to data collection andanalysis methods. Consequently, the research relies on semi-structuredinterviews, document analysis, narrative analysis and process tracing.

By undertaking an assessment of recent EU–Africa relations in thismanner, this book ‘investigates a contemporary phenomenon withinits real-life context, especially when the boundaries between the phe-nomenon and context are not clearly evident’ (Yin, 2003, p. 13).It allows for the examination of different facets of EU–Africa coopera-tion on security. Further, these case studies highlight the gaps in theinterregional institution which continue to impede or strengthen therelations, while drawing out lessons for future Action Plans.

This research design is particularly relevant, as it allows for descrip-tive complexity and the necessary personal observation necessitated by


the interactions of the EU and the AU (Stake, 1978, p. 7). In this book,especially, the research design serves the larger purpose of providing thecontext and background to EU–Africa cooperation. It tells the ‘story’ ofthe actors, stakeholders and processes involved in the cooperation.

The examples evaluated in this book were selected from activi-ties jointly undertaken by the EU and the AU. These examples are:(1) EU support to build the ASF, of five combat-ready multidimensionalbrigades; and (2) EU support to strengthen the institutions and pro-grammes fighting the illicit accumulation and trafficking of small armsand light weapons. Each case is assessed in full in Chapters 4 and 5,respectively. These two examples were implemented between 2007 and2012. Further, both cases are examples of security cooperation, whichare based on shared meanings of security in the AU and the EU; essen-tially both cases were co-owned by the EU and AU. Additionally, bothcases were undertaken under the mandate of the JAES. Hence, thesecases met three criteria:5

1. Actions defined within the framework of the Africa–EU partnershipand dialogue.

2. Actions oriented towards a specific security goal within the criteria ofthe security strategy.

3. Actions ‘made operational with physical activity [including] financ-ing and diplomacy’.

This book covers the process of change in EU–Africa relations, focusingon how the EU works with the AU in the cooperation area of security.It argues that a combination of institutional dynamics within the EUand the AU which reconstitute themselves in EU–Africa relations con-tributes to changes in EU–Africa relations. However, while those changesare happening, a complete transformation has yet to occur, and conse-quently change in EU–Africa relations, it is argued, is a work in progress.The process through which change can occur requires the internal divi-sion of labour on security matters among EU actors. This division oflabour allows EU decisions to engage more in international securitybecause it does not demand the member states to act beyond their abili-ties or conscience. Further, it allows for equal participation by EU actors,thereby challenging the hierarchy.

Moreover, the development of the institutional capabilities of the AUis essential. If the AU is unable to build the structures that will defendits interests within EU–Africa relations, it loses its ability to participatein the fulfilment of the three principles of change.


Chapter 2 sets out the analytical framework for the rest of the book.Specifically, the book adopts a historical institutionalist perspective onthe development of EU–Africa relations. This chapter examines theevolution of the EU, drawing on regional integration debates and theliterature on the ‘EU as a Global Actor’, thereby locating the role ofthe EU in international affairs. It then highlights the emergence ofthe AU as a regional actor. While the literature on EU–Africa rela-tions often commences from the perspective of the EU’s internationalrelations, this book situates EU–Africa relations within a specific andunique framework of institutionalised inter-regionalism. The chapterenhances the core argument of the book by presenting the basis throughwhich security cooperation constitutes change to EU–Africa relations.The idea of institutionalised inter-regionalism is based on a frameworkthat weaves historical institutionalism and the empirical concept ofinter-regionalism as necessary dimensions of EU–Africa relations and anintegral basis for continuing EU and AU external relations.

Chapter 3 explores the APSA. This is a recent formation within the AU,and consequently this chapter in part examines the development of thisnew regional organisation. It describes the development of a regionalsecurity mechanism in Africa and then outlines the intended functionof the five main components of the APSA, the main organisationalactors and the extent to which they fulfil their roles. The chapter furtheranalyses the impetus for external engagement in this regional securitymechanism. It does this by first examining the regional and multi-lateral legal provisions that allow the engagement of external actorsin the development of Africa’s security mechanisms. It also highlightsthe practical needs of the APSA, such as lack of funding and organ-isational capabilities, which demand the inclusion of other actors inAfrica’s regional processes. The chapter concludes by highlighting whyand how the creation of the APSA potentially transforms the processesof EU–Africa relations, and EU external (security) relations broadly. Thischapter also leads into the next two, which focus on case studies of howEU–Africa security cooperation has aspired to change existing EU–Africarelations.

Chapter 4 examines the first of the case studies implemented as aresult of new EU–Africa relations. This case study explores the EU’s sup-port for one component of the APSA, the ASF. It specifically addressesthe AMANI AFRICA Cycle I and II, the programme through whichthe EU helps the AU develop its operational capabilities for regionalpeace operations. The chapter focuses on the transformation of an orig-inal French programme, RECAMP, to a multilateral, multidimensional


capability-building EURORECAMP programme. The transformation ofthis programme from a national European one to a joint initiative ofEuropean states within the broader context of a joint training initiativewith African regional institutions exemplifies a substantive departurefrom the usual practice of EU–Africa relations. In this chapter, the argu-ment is that the process through which this particular programmewas developed to incorporate existing European national programmeswithin a design constituted in part by African personnel is indica-tive of the types of changes aspired to in EU–Africa relations. Withthe AU playing a significant role in the design and construction ofthe programme, the process of EU–Africa security cooperation shiftsfrom the pre-existing donor–recipient paradigm. The chapter concludesby assessing the extent to which the dynamics of implementing theAMANI AFRICA Cycles have impacted the transformation of EU–Africarelations.

In Chapter 5, the focus is on another example of new security coop-eration between the EU and the AU. This case addresses the attempt toestablish a small arms regime for Africa aimed at stopping the prolifer-ation of guns. While tackling this issue is not new in EU engagementin Africa, the approach under the JAES is different. Unlike previous EUengagement in the area of small arms proliferation, the new approachspecifically examines efforts to create a continental approach. Theattempt at a continental approach constitutes one dimension of trans-formation in EU–Africa relations. Additionally, this approach shifts theresponsibility for addressing small arms from European Commission-implemented programmes to the whole of EU support for an African-conceived initiative. The chapter addresses the AU’s vision of combat-ing small arms proliferation, particularly the attempt to mainstreamsmall arms interventions into components of the APSA. The chapterexplores the context of EU small arms interventions in Africa lookingat prior bilateral programmes. While the progress towards a continen-tal approach has been hindered by institutional constraints within theEU and AU, respectively, this chapter questions whether the initial out-come of a continental strategy supported by the EU in Africa reflects thetype of change aspired to. This chapter further highlights the impact ofthe EU and AU approaches to small arms proliferation on the trans-formation of EU–Africa relations. Chapter 6 explores the patterns ofchange and continuities. This chapter assesses the extent to which thenew area of security cooperation has led to transformation in EU–Africarelations, on the one hand, and potentially better external relations forthe EU, on the other. The chapter further examines the factors which


explain why change has occurred the way it has and what this sort ofchange means for EU–Africa relations. Specifically, this chapter identi-fies how the internal dynamics of the EU, especially relations betweenmember states and Brussels institutions, affect change. It also highlightshow the nascent institutional framework within which the AU proposesthe African position hampers the implementation of change or transfor-mation. This concluding chapter evaluates the broader implications ofEU–Africa transformation for new patterns of international cooperation,the EU’s engagement in international security and the increasing role ofthe AU in international affairs.

The short conclusion to this monograph explores further avenues forresearch in context of EU–Africa security cooperation. It underscores theimportant elements and key arguments of the book, suggesting otherimportant dynamics for further exploration in determining the progresstowards transformation in EU–Africa relations, security in Africa and EUsecurity policies.

2Evaluating a ContemporaryInstitution: EU–Africa Relations

Introduction

The contemporary understanding of EU–Africa relations relies on themerging of new conceptual paradigms, including regionalism and NewInstitutionalism. This is particularly true of new security cooperation.From the regionalist perspective, the view is that ‘the regional levelstands more clearly on its own as the locus of conflict and co-operationof states and at the level of analysis for scholars seeking to explorecontemporary security affairs’ (Lake and Morgan, 1997, pp. 6–7). Thevalue of New Institutionalist approaches in EU–Africa relations, partic-ularly historical institutionalism, stems from the context within whichcontemporary EU–Africa relations have evolved. The historically nar-row development, it is argued, has been instrumental in the methodthrough which security cooperation has developed in EU–Africa rela-tions. Consequently, this chapter is developed using these mutuallyreinforcing perspectives of EU–Africa relations. In essence, it suggestsan institutionalist frame through which to understand contemporaryEU–Africa relations.

Independently, many of the existing theories and concepts developedby EU experts have proved inadequate. These inadequacies exist despitethe fact that theoretical work on EU external relations is abundant. Thisliterature on EU external relations has not attempted to understand orexplain the evolution of external relations in the context of the histor-ical uniqueness of EU–Africa relations. Much of this literature focuseson EU motivations to engage in external relations or EU decision-makingprocesses and, recently, on outcomes of EU foreign policy actions. Oftenthese analyses exclude the reality or the process of EU engagement ininternational (security) relations, which also considers the contributionsof the external partner.

31


In developing a framework that probes the reality of EU–Africarelations, this chapter argues that an institutionalist view of inter-regionalism provides the best tool to define and understand the scopeof current EU external relations vis-à-vis Africa. This merger of inter-regionalism and institutionalism considers the whole of EU–Africa rela-tions in its historical context and within the field of international rela-tions. This chapter therefore develops institutionalised inter-regionalismas an analytical framework. It develops this framework by ‘marrying’historical institutionalism to the empirical concept of inter-regionalism.Often the theories and concepts applied to EU external relations focuson integration debates. While these debates are important for under-standing the EU’s capabilities and limitations, they do not alwayscontribute to a better understanding of the EU’s external (security)relations within a specific context: in this case, Africa.

This chapter proceeds as follows. It begins by briefly exploring theconcepts and theories that are central to explaining the internal inte-gration processes that have contributed to studies on EU externalrelations, as these have often been the focus of the literature. Thechapter especially explores the concepts used to delineate the ‘actorness’of the EU externally: i.e., how the EU is driven and able to act withpurpose when engaging in foreign affairs. Second, it engages withthe concept of regionalism, highlighting the emergence of the AU asAfrica’s interlocutor. Third, the chapter introduces the empirical con-cepts of regionalism and inter-regionalism as methods of internationalcooperation, acknowledging the increasing relevance of regions in theglobal political system. Fourth, it brings together the literature oninter-regionalism and historical institutionalism in the context of newEU–Africa security cooperation as a framing device or prism throughwhich to view EU–Africa relations. It does this by creating an appropri-ate analytical framework, institutionalised inter-regionalism, for the studyof EU–Africa relations. The chapter then concludes that, by consideringEU–Africa inter-regionalism as an institution, historical institutionalismoffers tools through which change can be analysed.

2.1 (Re-)Theorising EU external relations . . . as if othersmattered

Understanding the external relations of the EU is a merger of the con-ceptual and the empirical. Often, assessments of EU external relationsbegin with integration theories or assumptions related to the inter-nal constitution of the EU. These integration theories explain how the

Evaluating a Contemporary Institution 33

internal procedures of the EU determine its different policies, includ-ing foreign or external relations policies. Two EU integration theoriesoften proffered within the context of the EU’s international relationsare neo-functionalism and liberal inter-governmentalism.

Ernst Haas most notably advanced the theory of neo-functionalismin the late 1950s and the 1960s. He used this theory to explain thedevelopment of EU policy integration (Haas, 1958). This theory fallswithin the liberalist school of thought in that it sees the value of coop-eration among nation-states. The theory, however, emphasises the roleof non-state actors in driving the integration project forward (Schmitter,2005). Although neo-functionalists do not discount the role of mem-ber states as actors in the integration process, it posits however, that,‘They do not exclusively determine the direction and extent of sub-sequent change’ (Schmitter, 2005, p. 257). Rather, neo-functionalistsargue that the initial process of economic integration within the EU willproduce positive spillover into other policy areas, such as political cooper-ation. Positive spillover will occur when the member state governmentsgive over power and responsibility to the supranational institution.Over time, they argue, economic integration will yield to social inte-gration, which will in turn yield to areas of political cooperation (Haas,1958; Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970). Initially, the neo-functionalistlogic was obvious during the earlier stages of EU integration. However,the perceived stagnation of European political integration discreditedthis theory, especially in the area of foreign policy and security coop-eration. Further, neo-functionalism as an integration theory has beenunable to account for the EU’s role as an international actor. Liberal inter-governmentalism then arose as an alternative theory to, and critique of,neo-functionalism during the period of stagnation in European politicalintegration.

Liberal inter-governmentalism is one of the most influential EU inte-gration theories. It posits that states will cooperate only when theyhave similar interests that states, not institutions, determine the courseof EU integration. Its most famous proponent is Andrew Moravcsik,who outlines the logic of why and how EU member states cooperatein his book Choice for Europe (1998). Moravcsik argues that economicinterests primarily drive policy integration among European memberstates. As these interests converge, the integration project is morelikely to advance (Moravcsik, 1998, pp. 3, 60–66). These economicpreferences are derived from domestic debates within governmentsand other social groups within each state and subsequently throughinter-state bargaining, from whence polices emerge. In short, liberal


inter-governmentalism contends that the process of integration con-tinues if it strengthens national governments’ powers domestically.Liberal inter-governmentalism further downplays the role of institutionsin shaping the behaviour of EU actors, especially the member states(Moravcsik, 1998, 2009).

The inability of the EU to achieve a truly ‘common’ foreign policydespite the existence of the CSDP is concrete evidence of the liberalinter-governmentalist thesis. The continued reluctance of EU memberstates to cede power to the supranational level is further evidence thatthey drive integration. Although there are a few areas where the memberstates often act cooperatively, these are limited by the fact that ced-ing the powers to create unified foreign and security polices for all EUmember states has often been seen as potentially weakening nationalgovernment powers (Smith, 2003, p. 3). Liberal inter-governmentalismwould therefore be applicable to the internal mechanisms currently inplace to create foreign policy, especially security policy.

While liberal inter-governmentalism makes a very convincing case, itdoes not acknowledge the impact of prior relations with external part-ners on the trajectory of further policy integration. For instance, therelationship between the EU and the ACP countries neither strength-ened nor weakened EU member states domestically. However, pastcolonial ties drove the EU member states’ decision to cooperate with thecountries in the ACP. This motivation does not imply that the memberstates did not benefit from their relationship with the ACP; however,this was not often the priority. Further, liberal inter-governmentalismignores the impact that EU partners (and other external forces in theglobal political environment) have on EU policies. For instance, it isnow apparent that the formation of New Institutions such as the AU andthe increasing geo-strategic importance of Africa have affected EU-widepolicies in Africa. And although the newer Central and Eastern Europeanmembers of the EU do not have immediate interests in Africa, the EU hasconsistently sought more cooperation rather than less with African insti-tutions. Essentially, EU member states’ decisions are not only a result ofnational interests. External pressures on individual member states candrive integration at the EU level. Additionally, while the EU memberstates aim to promote a unified EU in certain policy areas, their ability todo so depends on the perceptions of partner institutions such as the AU(Gomez, 2003, pp. 4, 10). Finally, liberal inter-governmentalism cannotexplain why the unified development and economic cooperation policytowards Africa prevailed or why it has expanded to a security dimen-sion: i.e., it cannot explain endurance or change outside of perceived


EU interests. Ricardo Gomez (2006) therefore rightly notes that liberalinter-governmentalism debates do not contribute much to the role ofthe EU as a security actor in the international system (pp. 9–10).

Where integration theories have not succeeded, EU scholars haveformulated new concepts for the particular purpose of explaining theEU’s role as an international actor. Christopher Hill’s concept of thecapabilities–expectations gap (1993) is one such concept, and it movesbeyond the integration debates of foreign policy formation. Hill seeksto understand the challenges the EU faces in trying to achieve a coher-ent foreign policy and to act upon those foreign policy objectives. Heargues that the EU is unable to fulfil the expectations other politicalactors have of it because it has limited security capabilities to act coher-ently (Hill, 1993). Essentially, having created the CFSP in 1992, the EUraised the expectations of its own institutions and member states, andespecially other members of the international community. The explicitcommitment to security policies is therefore seen as a promise of EUcapabilities intended to contribute to international peace and security,a promise which, according to Hill’s thesis, the EU cannot fulfil.

Hill defines capabilities as ‘the use and threat of force, diplomacy, eco-nomic carrots and sticks, cultural influence’, among others (Hill, 1998,p. 23) – in effect, the capabilities one might expect from nation-statesparticipating in the international political system. Expectations refer tothe ‘ambitions or demands of the EU’s international behaviour whichderive from both inside and outside the Union’ (Hill, 1998, p. 23).Expectations are therefore the pressures that the EU faces internallyfrom among the member states and externally from candidate countriesand other third countries (or institutions) to act in a certain way. Thefundamental assumption of Hill’s thesis is that expectations of the EUexceed its current abilities, and they are the same for both nation-statesand the regional institutions. Hill posits that the EU is unable to fulfilthese expectations based on its ‘[in]ability to agree, its resources and theinstruments at its disposal’ (Hill, 1993, p. 11).

Over all, the capabilities–expectations gap is a useful concept forunderstanding the EU’s internal limitations in dealing with its exter-nal partners. Despite the increase in capabilities, internal inadequacieswithin the EU’s external relations architecture affect the ability ofthe EU to fulfil its foreign policy commitments. In relation to Africa,specifically, Hill argues that the ACP countries had high expectationsof the EU during the creation of the CFSP because they feared theEU might ‘lose interest in development policy’ (Hill, 1998, p. 31).The implication is that, without careful consideration and planning,


increasing competencies in other areas of foreign policy, especiallyinternational security, would jeopardise the strength of the EU’s eco-nomic/development policies towards Africa. Yet Hill’s analysis does notprovide any evidence that the EU was not able to meet its expecta-tions. Certainly, there have been recent concerns among ACP coun-tries about the fairness of the proposed EU Economic PartnershipAgreements (EPAs). However, this dispute does not signify a loss ofinterest in development policies. Indeed, the contrary has occurred,with deeper cooperation with the African members of ACP, includinginfrastructure development and cooperation in areas of science andtechnology.

Further, the existence of a capabilities–expectations gap has not pre-vented the EU from being an international actor, and on this issue Hill’sanalysis falls short. The EU’s capabilities as a security actor can and doexist beyond traditional state capabilities such as autonomous militarycapabilities (even if this is desirable). As Söderbaum and Stålgren (2010)recently noted, notwithstanding the complexity of the EU’s reticenceto move towards a single common foreign policy, the EU’s role as anactor is often framed ‘within rather conventional state-centric notionsabout world politics’ (p. 2). Framing the EU’s role as an internationalactor through state-centric lenses renders such analysis problematic forthe assessment of EU–Africa relations. A truly original analysis of EUexternal actions transcends the characterisations that depend solely onthe states as the central unit of analysis, since other factors beyondthe member states influence the function of the EU. The point is this:while the capabilities–expectations gap exists, capabilities in EU termsdiffer from state capabilities. In examining the EU’s complex and ongo-ing relationship with Africa, the capabilities–expectations gap does notelucidate the increase in common positions among members of theEU towards Africa, and increasing cooperation between European andAfrican institutions.

Ian Manners (2002) further contributes to the debate on the role ofthe EU as an international actor by categorising the EU’s contribution tointernational relations. He argues that, despite what may be consideredlimited capabilities, the EU is able to and does perform in the context ofa specific international role. This international role of the EU is describedas normative. In describing it thus, Manners means that:

the EU as a normative power has an ontological quality to it – that theEU can be conceptualized as a changer of norms in the internationalsystem; a positivist quantity to it – that the EU acts to change norms


in the international system; and a normative quality to it – that theEU should act to extend its norms into the international system.

(Manners, 2002, p. 252)

The EU’s function as a normative power is different from its role inthe scenario presented by Hill. It is meeker, seemingly more altruisticand relies more on carrots than on sticks. Manners argues that scholar-ship on the external roles of the EU ought to move beyond traditionalconceptions of how an international actor, primarily a state, mightact. Essentially, basing judgement of the EU’s abilities on the inter-governmental nature of its security resources through dependence onmember states for its military capabilities is not useful for understandingthe actual external actions of the EU (Smith, 2004b; Manners, 2006a).To wholly contend that the potential of the EU as an international (secu-rity) actor is weak or ineffectual would be a simplistic and problematicassessment.

For Manners, the EU’s role in international affairs stems from the‘normative elements of its international identity’ (2006a, p. 69). Heidentifies nine norms which the EU possesses. One of these is peace.Arguably, any means to promulgate the peace norm is acceptable anddoes not only involve military capabilities or force, as suggested by Hill.Indeed, evidence from EU actions suggests that the EU has been espe-cially welcomed in areas where its primary mission is civilian ratherthan military (see also Sicurelli, 2010). In fact, the EU shows its strengthin civilian crises management and articulates its position as a civiliancrises actor in the security strategy. The idea of normative power inrelation to Europe potentially gives a holistic view of EU internationalactorness in many areas, including sustainable peace (and security)beyond militarised interventions. Further, the tendency to focus onissues of insecurity taking a regional approach, it has been argued, isevidence of the EU’s norm promulgation of this approach to engag-ing with external actors (see Manners, 2002; Meunier and Nicolaidis,2006; Sicurelli, 2010). Moreover, the benefit of the Normative PowerEurope (NPE) claims is that, unlike neo-functionalism, liberal inter-governmentalism and the capabilities–expectations gap, it looks beyondthe decision-making processes of the EU.

Despite its broader outlook on EU roles in international relations, NPEdoes not adequately account for those areas where the EU does engagebeyond civilian missions in the area of so-called ‘hard’ security. It can-not adequately explain the use of the EU’s admittedly limited militarycapabilities (for example, providing logistical support to the AU mission


in Somalia (AMIS), police action in the Democratic Republic of Congoand current military training of African troops all over the continent).Further, the argument proffered by NPE portrays the EU as an altruisticdo-gooder and discounts the well-choreographed creation of EU foreignpolicy capabilities and pursuance of interests, which do not always alignwith those of the EU’s international partners (Hyde-Price, 2006). Thiscertainly is not the case when one looks at the whole of EU–Africa rela-tions; it would be misleading to assume that the EU is not self-interested(see Merlingen, 2007). Indeed, the shortcomings of the EU as an inter-national power have precipitated the new developments in EU–Africarelations.

Additionally, NPE, like the capabilities–expectations gap, whichspecifically addresses the EU’s external relations, leaves out the impact ofthe EU’s external partners on its actions. Even if the EU were to be a forcefor good by exporting the peace norm to Africa, undoubtedly it wouldhave to do export the norms with partners on various levels. These part-ners matter when determining the extent to which the translated normsremain EU interventions. For example, if the norm is internalised bythe recipient partner and practised as within those particular contexts,the norm potentially ceases to be an ‘EU’ norm. Therefore, while NPEaddresses some of the motivations of EU action by establishing the pres-ence of the EU in the international arena, it leaves out the processes andthe role of external partners in the formation and implementation offoreign policy.

A substantial amount of EU external relations is preoccupied with theEU’s international identity, its values and principles, its internationalactorness and presence. The internal perceptions of the EU rather thanits performances are often at the heart of these analyses. Consequently,the literature on the EU as an international actor often fails to con-sider the cooperation dimension outside of EU member states. Yet theliterature is useful to understanding the evolution of the study of EUexternal relations. So does the IR discipline provide us with an answerto assessing the EU in international affairs?

The realist approach to international relations, for instance, viewsthe state as the central unit of analysis. Further, the state is a unitary,self-interested actor which acts apart from the rest of society (Morgan,2007, p. 17). Neo-realists view cooperation among states in the inter-national system as a temporary condition (Waltz, 1979; Mearsheimer,2001). This view of cooperation explains why the EU has found it dif-ficult to achieve a common foreign policy among its members. Yet therealist approach cannot account for developments among EU member


states to make their foreign policies more coherent. Further, it cannotaccount for why the EU has explicitly included peace and security asan area of cooperation with African states and institutions after manyyears of development and economic cooperation. In addition, the realistapproach is not sufficiently equipped to assess the upsurge of region-to-region cooperation beyond the remit of the traditional state. As itcannot adequately account for the new EU–Africa security cooperation,it is not an appropriate approach to use when framing current EU–Africarelations.

Liberal approaches to security have more to say about cooperation.For proponents of the liberalist approach, the state is an actor in inter-national relations; however, institutions are also important. It sees thestate as a representation of the elite’s preferences in a domestic setting:i.e., on a national level. The liberalist perspective does not discountthe states’ interests but sees government policies as being dependenton those in charge of the government at a particular time. The liber-alist traditions therefore view cooperation between states favourably.Unlike the realist traditions, liberalists contend that states get tired ofthe competitive nature of the anarchic system (Morgan, 2007, p. 26).They therefore see the value of cooperating on issues of mutual securitysuch as nuclear proliferation, international arms control and terrorism.This cooperation takes place within institutions. This liberal traditionhas often promoted the creation of multilateral institutions and regimes.Liberalists, therefore, perceive the EU as one of the relevant institutions.

Despite its contributions to the study of international cooperation,the liberalist approach falls short of explaining non-state securityactions and inter-regional cooperation. Like the realist approach, it putsgovernments or states at the centre of international affairs, therebybypassing the recent upsurge in regionalism in international coopera-tion and, by extension, inter-regionalism too. The liberalist approachtherefore does not consider the EU or the AU as actors in their own right.The lack of empirically detailed research means that theorising based onthe actual analysis of the EU’s performance, as an international actor,is still a work in progress (for exceptions see Holland, 1995; Ginsberg,2001; Bretherton and Vogler, 2006). This body of existing empiricalwork has yielded better interpretations of the EU’s performance as aninternational political actor. We find that mainstream IR theories, whichexamine international cooperation more broadly, also fail to capture thedynamics of recent EU–Africa relations adequately.

Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler’s book The European Union as aGlobal Actor relies on a constructivist interpretation of the EU’s external


relations. Bretherton and Vogler present some of the most convincingempirical evidence and interpretations of EU external relations. Theirwork depicts the EU as a hybrid institution – neither state nor intergov-ernmental institution (even in its foreign policy), unique and evolving.Further, they conceptualise the external ‘actorness’ of the EU by apply-ing three criteria: opportunity, presence and capability. These three criteriaestablish the extent of the EU’s involvement in policy areas outside itsown borders (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006, p. 24).

Bretherton and Vogler further argue that actorness is a construct basedon the perception of actors within the EU and third countries. Whereasprevious EU external relations studies often focus on the shortcomingsof the EU, they neglect the perception of the action recipients: that is,the third countries and other international organisations. The opportu-nity criterion is therefore the structural context within which an actiontakes place. The external environment enables or constrains the abil-ity of an actor to act in a certain way. The existence of the EU and itsinfluence beyond Europe denotes its ‘presence’ in the international sys-tem. Presence along with actorness had been a measure of EU visibilityoutside its borders. Capability remains as defined by Hill, the ‘internalcontext of EU action’, although Bretherton and Vogler do not insiston the EU’s state-like military credentials (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006,p. 24). The important contribution of Bretherton and Vogler’s analysis isthe idea of opportunity. This criterion emphasises that one cannot judgethe actorness of the EU without consideration of the sorts of constraintsthat it may face externally.

However, the notion of opportunity does not go far enough in itsoverall assessment of EU external relations, commitments and actions.Although opportunity considers events and ideas as conditions that influ-ence the EU’s participation in the global political system, it does notconsider the historical context of these events and ideas. Essentially, itdoes not answer the question of why those particular events and ideas,at that particular time. The influence of these ideas on EU relations withexternal partners is important because they are often specific and play arole in determining the trajectory of future relations. Thus, while oppor-tunity acknowledges the roles of individual actors and groups of actors,the analysis also fails to communicate how history plays a role in thedevelopment of the EU relations with its external partners.

Another example of empirical evidence of the EU’s internationalaction is found in Roy Ginsberg’s Baptism by Fire. Ginsberg exam-ines the EU’s foreign policy. He argues that, unlike the generalassumption of theories such as liberal inter-governmentalism and the


capabilities–expectations gap, the EU does make a significant contri-bution to non-economic areas of external relations, including security.Ginsberg (2001) suggests that studies on EU external relations oughtto consider the ‘real-time’ participation of the EU in what constitutes‘security’. Rather than engaging solely with the normative debates ortheoretical assertions about what the EU ought to be doing, or what it isincapable of doing, a better gauge of EU roles in international securityis the analysis of what it is actually doing. Further, the success or failureof these roles also depends on the perception of the action recipient.Hence, theorising about the EU’s participation in international securitymust initially consider the impact of EU action on its intended target.The idea that the empirical nature of the EU’s engagement in interna-tional relations ought to inform rigorous analysis of new and futurepolicies and engagement guides this analysis of contemporary EU–Africarelations.

In considering the EU’s role in external relations, its primary iden-tity as a regional entity and what that position means inform all otherdimensions of its external relations. Being the most developed regionalentity, it is not surprising that there are some asymmetries in the rela-tions of the EU with other similar entities. The level of organisationand internal coherence (compared to that of other regions) in the EU isthe basis for this assessment. The high level of regional development inEurope tends to exacerbate the imbalance of ‘power’ relations vis-à-vis aregion such as Africa.

Traditionally, the study of international relations defines power asthe ability to make others do something they would not otherwisedo – i.e., coercion (Morgenthau, 1948; Strange, 1989, p. 165). How-ever, this conception of power can hardly be applicable to the EU, sinceintrinsically its appeal is its cooperative rather than confrontationalpreferences, as evidenced by its own development as a region. For all thetalk about asymmetrical power, there is no clear indication of what sortof power the EU possesses aside fromManners’s consideration of norma-tive/civilian power, which does not elucidate the sorts of power utilisedin actual interactions. In essence, normative power is possessed prior tointeraction and remains a constant. There does not seem to be an indi-cation that normative power influences proceedings, since regions andthird countries too want to promote their own interests and perspectivesduring negotiations.

It is therefore necessary to conceive of a region’s power in anothermanner that reflects the constant bargaining that goes on within theinter-regional establishment. In the past, it has not typically been


useful to conceive of regional power in the same way as state power.Indeed, conceiving of regional power in the same way as state power asalluded to earlier is actually a shortcoming of the study of EU’s externalrelations.

Lavenex and Kunz (2008) and Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (2008)have argued that the predominant conception of power in internationalrelations (relational power) fundamentally excludes the ‘structural’ ele-ment of EU agency in its external relations. Their argument is that thesheer position of the EU as a formalised polity representative of over500 million people influences the political process and institutions ofinteraction without coercion (Strange, 1994, p. 310). Bossuyt (2008) fur-ther argues that the ability of the EU to exert influence and its powerought to be differentiated from the classical form of relational power tothe structural form.

Structural power denotes the ability of an actor to determine the con-ditions under which relations take place. The idea of structural poweris not new. Susan Strange, one of the early proponents of this type ofpower, argued that structural power conferred ‘the power to decide howthings shall be done, [and] the power to shape frameworks’ (Strange,1988, p. 25). An actor possessing structural power has the capacity todetermine the best arrangement through which it can maximise itsinternational security interests. One example of EU structural powerhas been its ability to engage in relations through frameworks of dia-logue, strategic partnerships and agreements.1 Undoubtedly, the outflowsof these arrangements are relative to its success; however, the ability todefine relations within these frameworks is a reflection of marshallingstructural power as understood here. Hay (2002) further reinforces thisperception of the EU by defining structural power as the ‘ability ofactors to “have an effect” upon the context, which defines the range ofpossibilities for others’ (p. 185). In understanding these sorts of less tan-gible, non-coercive power, Lukes (2005) argues that this sort of poweris exerted at the level of agenda-setting on issues and potential issuesand can be covert and subjective, which captures the idea of regionalactorship (Lukes, 2005, p. 29).

While it does not negate the quest for relational power, and indeedleaves room for the exercise of such power by a political actor, struc-tural power can give an insight into how the EU as a regional entityactually functions, based on its present capabilities and actions ratherthan how it may want to function. Traditional conceptions of power donot capture the influence of the EU on its external partners. By accu-rately understanding the type of power possessed by the EU, we can


assess how asymmetries that have inevitably favoured the EU withinthe inter-regional institution occur.

The extent of its structural power makes the EU the dominant partnerwithin EU–Africa relations. Its role as a dominant partner is importantbecause it influences the structuring of security cooperation and, byextension, the changes that result from this organisation. The extentof its resources, the length of its integration experience and position inprior European–African relations measure the EU’s role as a dominantpartner. The role of the EU as a dominant power, however, does not pre-clude some African advantage in EU–Africa relations. In addressing theEU’s engagement with Africa on migration, Van Creikinge (2008) arguesthat African countries exploit EU capability deficiencies to further theirown agendas.

The existing power asymmetry between the EU and Africa thereforedoes not automatically rule out the ability of the EU–Africa institutionto achieve the aims of new EU–Africa relations. In any case, the regionalpower of the EU (its structural power) very much determines how theEU relates to other actors, including other regional representatives suchas the AU. In considering the potential of regional power, then, the anal-yses is able to move from a predominant focus on EU actions to equalconsideration of the African position. In the next section, let us turn ourattention to the emergence of the AU as Africa’s representative.

2.2 Developing Africa’s regional capabilities

In order to understand how the AU has emerged as Africa’s core regionalinterlocutor, and indeed the counterpoint to the EU in Africa, let usfirst examine the concepts related to the role of regions and their par-ticipation in the international system. Regionalism, which is often usedinterchangeably with regional cooperation, can be defined broadly as‘a policy whereby states and non-state actors cooperate and coordinatestrategy within a given region’ (Fawcett, 2004, p. 433). Regionalismdenotes a certain policy drive happening within a given region. Thereare, however, at least two understandings of what constitutes a region.A region is either defined by the geographical proximity of the members,as with the EU, or by zones that share identical patterns of behaviourbased on similar histories, as with the Commonwealth states or theACP states (Fawcett, 2004, p. 432).2 The central aim of regionalismis the pursuance of common interests on specific issues, which couldhappen by promoting a sense of community among members (softregionalism) or through the formalisation of regional networks into


organisational structures (hard regionalism). Importantly, regionalisminvolves the efforts of state representations as well as non-state actorssuch as civil society organisations (Fawcett, 2004).

The related concept, regionalisation, which is often confused withregionalism, involves not only motivation for regionalism but also theprocess through which regionalism occurs. Simply, regionalisation maybe described as the process through which regionalism is integrated.It can be spontaneously prompted or can develop over time. It involvesthe consolidation of cooperation in from one policy area or sector tothe rest of the region. Events in the international system have promptedthe development of these concepts. Evidently, the EU itself is a productof regionalisation, and it continues to promote regional integration inother regions (See Cameron, 2010; Farrell, 2010; Haastrup, 2013a).

Finally, there is the concept of region-ness. Region-ness is about thelevel or extent of cohesiveness which a particular region has achievedthrough its ideological project of region-building (regionalism), andthrough the spontaneous processes of region formation (Hettne et al.,2008, p. 15; Hettne, 2008, p. 3). Five variables or measurements of cohe-sion determine the level of region-ness within a certain space (Hettne,2008, p. 6). These variables include regional social space, regionalsocial system, international society, community and institutionalisedpolity.

Regional social space is a geographical area, bounded in a specific terri-tory by mostly non-related local groups of people. It is this understand-ing of a regional social space that renders Fawcett’s second definitionof regions – ‘zones that share identical patterns of behaviour based onsimilar histories’ – wholly inadequate without the benefit of proxim-ity. Through various process of interaction within the regional socialspace, a regional social system is founded with the view to regionaliseor deepen integration. Historically, a regional social system has oftendeveloped through coercion, as in empire growth through colonisation.Viewing the region in terms of international society implies that thesets of rules that make interactions between the states that constitutethe region orderly are ‘enduring and predictable’ (Hettne, 2008, p. 4).

In seeing itself as a member of international society, a region mayseek to formalise its integration thus far, thereby constituting a de jureregional institution, as with the EU and the AU, or it may choose notto, relying on spontaneous acts of integration (de facto). At the fourthlevel, the region becomes a community through enduring organisa-tional frameworks which facilitate even deeper cooperation throughmore fluid communication networks, the ‘convergence of values, norms


and behaviour throughout the region’ leading to identity formationon a regional level (Hettne and Söderbaum, 2000, p. 466). In terms ofsecurity, at the regional level, the test for the region is whether it hasconsidered what its role could be in bringing about a peaceful orderand if necessary using force to stave off conflict. In this way, the regionbecomes a security community (Deutsch et al., 1957). ‘Security commu-nity’ refers to a pluralistic community, in the cases of both the EU andAU, where members of the communities are integrated to the extent thatthey have decided not to fight each other and will find other means toresolve disputes if any still occur (Deutsch et al., 1957).

Within the most advanced and final level of region-ness, the com-munity becomes an institutionalised polity with permanent structuresfor decision-making and a level of integration that allows for col-lective action and actorness. According to Hettne, this polity doesnot have to confirm to the configurations of any existing entity andis therefore sui generis. To date, only the EU has achieved this fifthlevel of region-ness; however, it remains an aspiration of states inthe African and Latin American regions3 and is therefore useful toanalyse regions. The regional actorship approach to region formationdemonstrates the evolutionary process of integration, although this pro-cess does not occur so neatly. Moreover, although no other regionalgrouping is on the fifth level, the impact that region-ness has onhow a region acts in its external relations is of great interest. Thisidea of region-ness, when taken together with the previously discussedconcepts of presence and actorness, produces the notion of regionalactorship.

Regional actorship is important to understand the regional positionsand external relations preferences of each regional actor. It is ‘the rela-tive cohesion of the regional actor [which] shapes external action [ . . .It] in turn impacts on regional identity and consciousness throughthe expectations and reactions of external actors’ vis-à-vis the region’(Hettne, 2008). Through regional actorship, each interacting regionstrives to exert its influence on the political process of cooperation andwithin the defined institution of operation.

The different stages of regional actorship have been present in thedevelopment of the EU as a political entity, and indeed the multitudeof literature on EU integration expresses the different facets of the EU’sregionalisation process. As a newer organisation, the development of theAU’s regional actorship has had less consideration. Yet it is important tounderstand that process in the context of new EU–Africa relations andto give voice to the African dimension of this alliance.


Africa has a less established region-ness, despite its long history ofregional integration. Indeed, the first empirical example of a regionalorganisation in Africa is the Southern African Customs Union (SACU),which was established in 1910. In any case, Africa has been associatedwith different types of regional integration, manifested in the form ofsub-regional organisations. Table 2.1 illustrates the current regional andsub-regional organisations in the African continent.

The AU is the most recent realisation of regional continental integra-tion in Africa based on original ideas of pan-Africanism. Pan-Africanismis a broad movement to unite all the peoples of Africa and Africandescent into one global community. Pan-Africanism emphasises coop-eration to resist imperialism. It potentially delivers the reasoning or atleast motivation for the emergence of the AU as an actor – more than IRtheories can deliver.

The origins of the AU, of course, go back to the formation of theOAU and its inability effectively to provide security for the citizensof its member states. Following a series of overhauls within the OAUand negotiations among African states, the decision to create the AUwas finalised in Sirte, Libya, in 1999. Egypt, Libya, Nigeria and SouthAfrica, in particular, pushed for the reforms within the OAU and thecreation of the new AU. After a process of patient negotiations, con-ciliation and reconciliation (Tieku, 2004), the Constitutive Act of theAU was established on 11 July 2000. In addition to accelerating inte-gration, one of the primary aims of the New Institution was to addressthe experiences of the continent since independence, such as combatingpoverty and HIV/AIDS, attaining universal education and tackling statefragility and insecurity. So right from its inception the role of the AUincluded maintaining stability, peace and security (see Muritihi, 2005;Akokpari et al., 2007; Engel and Gomes Porto, 2010) on the African con-tinent. As a result, however, the remit of the AU goes beyond addressingthe traditional military defence of a specific territory against externalthreats. Inter alia, it includes addressing the challenges of intra-state con-flict, weak governance structures and civil protection from autocraticgovernance (Muritihi, 2005; William, 2007).

As a result, the Constitutive Act sought to create

an operational structure for the effective implementation of the deci-sions taken in the area of conflict prevention, peace-making, peacesupport operations and intervention, as well as peace-building andpost-conflict reconstruction.

(African Union, 2000)

47

Table 2.1 Regional organisations in Africa

Regional organisation Membership Type of organisation

African Union (AU) All African States minusMorocco

Pan-African,continental

Arab Mahgreb Union(AMU)

Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia,Libya, Mauritania

Free trade area

Common Market forEastern and SouthernAfrica (COMESA)

Burundi, Comoros,Democratic Republic ofCongo, Djibouti, Egypt,Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya,Libya, Madagascar,Malawi Mauritius,Rwanda, Seychelles,South Sudan, Sudan,Swaziland, Uganda,Zambia, Zimbabwe

Free trade area

East African Community(EAC)

Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda,Tanzania, Uganda

Trading bloc

Economic Community ofCentral African States(ECCAS)

Cameroon, CentralAfrican Republic, Chad,Equatorial Guinea,Republic of the Congo,Gabon

Economic community

Economic Community ofWest African States(ECOWAS)

Benin, Burkina Faso, CapeVerde, Côte d’Ivoire,Gambia, Ghana, Guinea,Guinea-Bissau, Liberia,Mali, Niger, Nigeria,Senegal, Sierra Leone,Togo

Economic & politicalcommunity; free tradearea and collectivesecurity grouping

Inter-governmentalAuthority onDevelopment (IGAD)

Djibouti, Eritrea,Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia,South Sudan, Sudan,Uganda

Regional developmentorganisation

Southern AfricanDevelopmentCommunity

Angola, Botswana,Democratic Republic ofCongo, Lesotho,Madagascar, Malawi,Mauritius, Mozambique,Namibia, Seychelles,South Africa, Swaziland,Tanzania, Zambia,Zimbabwe

Economic & politicalcommunity; free tradearea and collectivesecurity grouping


Although the regional organisation the OAU was functional from 1963to 2000, the organisation did not foster interdependence among itsmembers. It simply provided a forum for discussion and lacked any sub-stantive influence within Africa, and even less outside. Presently, Africarelies on the financial and expert support of the EU to build its capa-bilities. In this way, the process of continental regional integration inAfrica is dependent on the EU. Although the EU lacks autonomous mil-itary capabilities to tackle traditional security concerns, it is at a furtherstage of regional integration than any other region in the world. This,in addition to capabilities in tackling non-traditional security threats,further enhances the EU’s advantage in its inter-regional relations.

The EU’s commitment to promoting regional integration fostersregion-to region cooperation as part of its external relations remit. Theprioritisation of inter-regionalism in the practice of EU external rela-tions has also gained prominence in scholarly circles especially amongthose who subscribe to New Regionalism. Comparative adherents ofNew Regionalism, which denotes the third wave of regionalisation,which is inclusive of economic as well as political and social pro-cesses, are increasingly interested in the implications of interactionbetween two self-defined regions and their institutions. Although stillin its infancy, as a concept, inter-regionalism describes the processes ofregional actorship when two regions interact.

By seeking to understand how two regions that have both embracedregionalism and regionalisation cooperate in international politics,one can hope to contribute to the burgeoning literature on inter-regionalism, on the one hand, and, on the other, to analyse in-depththe true nature of EU relations with Africa, vis-à-vis the concept ofinter-regionalism.

2.3 Extending inter-regionalism to international security

Building on Ginsberg’s observations, this book works on an additionalpremise: that history, in reference to the existing relationship betweenthe EU and its counterpart the AU, plays an important role for presentand future relations. While prior conceptions of the EU’s abilities or rolesas an international actor rely on a view of international relations that isunchanging, they are also too preoccupied with the internal EU dimen-sions of security. They fail to examine constraints and opportunitiesprovided by the international environment, especially the EU’s partners,including third countries and regional and International Institutions.Additionally, they fail to consider the type of relationship itself and


the impact that relationship has on EU performance. In this context,this chapter seeks to understand EU–Africa relations based on region-to-region cooperation. Increasingly, international cooperation is beingdetermined by nation-states joining regional groupings. Further, nation-states are increasingly calling on these groupings to act on their behalfwith other regional groupings. To understand the propensity of the EUto externalise regionalism and use it in its external relations framework,it is important to define the concepts accurately.

Inter-regionalism relies on often, but not necessarily, formal arrange-ments that embody the regional actorship of the regions involved incooperation. Cooperation has often been on socio-economic matters,but increasingly this has included political concerns as well. Under-standing interregional arrangements from an empirical standpoint isuseful to tease out the motivations for each arrangement in specific pol-icy areas, and to understand prior arrangements and current complex-ities. Hänggi (2000) identifies three different types of inter-regionalismin which the EU engages including:

(a) Relations between regional groupings(b) Bi-regional and trans-regional arrangements(c) Hybrids such as relations between (ad-hoc) regional groupings and

single powers (Hänggi, 2000)

This book, however, considers a specific definition of inter-regionalism,meaning the relationship between two regional groupings wherein bothexhibit regional actorship. While some eminent scholars have writ-ten about EU inter-regionalism, these have usually been in respectto Asia, and in the area of economics and development cooperation(Edwards and Regelsberger, 1990; Hänggi, 2000; Gilson, 2002; Hettne,2004; Aggarwal, and Forgarty, 2004; Söderbaum et al., 2005, p. 366;Camroux, 2006). Through its dialogue process with the Association ofSoutheast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the EU has established what someconsidered the group-to-group inter-regionalism with Asia. With thedevelopment of frequent dialogue with Asia, the EU actively used itsdominant position as the most advanced regional organisation to pro-mote region-ness in other regions. The EU convenes its dialogue withAsian countries through the Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM),4 which ini-tially met in 1996. Meetings between the two regions under the auspicesof the forum are now a regular occurrence, and the grouping is set toadmit more members, including India, in the near future. In promoting


region-ness, the EU also promotes its own external relations throughinter-regionalism.

The EU’s emphasis on inter-regionalism has yielded cooperation withCentral Asia and Latin America, in addition to its engagement in Africa.In Central Asia, EU inter-regionalism is relatively new and therefore lessintegrated. However, the European Council recently adopted the ‘EUand Central Asia: Strategy for a New Partnership’ under the Partnershipand Cooperation Agreements and Interim Agreements, the EC RegionalAssistance Strategy Paper 2007–2013 programmes of the EU. The coun-tries recognised under this inter-regional arrangement are: Kazakhstan,the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (Councilof European Union, 2007b).

Additionally, the inter-regionalism literature has also reflected onthe experiences of the EU with Latin America through its dealingswith MERCOSUR (Mercado Común del Sur/Southern Common Mar-ket) and the Rio Group. With some exceptions, prior to the 1990s, theEU was not typically involved in Latin America (Smith, 2003, p. 78).Smith has ascribed the lack of EU involvement in Latin America to thegreater presence of the United States in this region, and the absenceof an intense regionalisation drive. Two of the leading experts oninter-regionalism previously described the EU–MERCOSUR relationshipas ‘the closest approximation of “pure inter-regionalism”’ because itreflects an instance of ‘two relatively coherent, self-defined and highly-institutionalized regional blocs that have been negotiating a commercialagreement on a one-to-one basis’ (Aggarwal and Fogarty, 2003, p. 346).Through the institution of the EU–MERCOSUR Interregional Frameworkfor Cooperation Agreement (EMIFCA), the EU continues to negotiate ontrade with MERCOSUR and consistently declines to deal with individualmembers by insisting on interaction at a regional level (Aggarwal andFogarty, 2003, pp. 347–348; Aggarwal and Fogarty, 2004, pp. 4–5). Basedon the foregoing, the EU indicates a preference for inter-regionalism oneconomic issues.

Hybrid inter-regionalism is epitomised in the EU–ACP relationship(Aggrawal and Fogarty, 2003). Although Hettne (2004) and Fawcett(2004) characterise the ACP as a region in this regard, the ACP had noneof the elements of regionalisation or region-ness. The ACP was createdto engage with the EU and indeed is constitutive of at least three dis-tinct regions, which have undergone processes of regionalisation uniqueto them. While the creation of a secretariat contributed to greater effi-ciency in dealing with the ACP group of countries, and undoubtedly


contributes to the institutionalisation of EU–Africa relations, it did notsignificantly increase the regional actorship of Africa in the period whenthis was the dominant manner of cooperation. I would therefore con-tend that the ACP did not meet the criteria of a region, although it didcreate an avenue for dialogue among participants.

While the literature depicting inter-regionalism in the EU’s exter-nal relations is steadily growing, the literature on inter-regionalismin security relations is still limited. A summary of EU external rela-tions activities shows the Union’s proclivity to establish region-to-region interactions as a means of establishing its external presence andactorness in various regions. However, there is no indication of whatthe desire to establish region-to-region interactions might mean forinternational security relations cooperation in general. The majority ofthe inter-regional pairings assessed in the regionalism literature oftencommence with the intention of economic alliances, which includetrade agreements and aid packages in some cases. Although the litera-ture on peacekeeping operations chronicles the UN support for regionalinitiatives as mandated in Chapter VIII, Articles 52 and 53, of theUN Charter, there is scant evidence to suggest the pursuance of inter-regionalism that is aimed at promoting peace and security within aspecific space and in the international system. Given the increasedregionalisation of international cooperation and the lack of adequateacademic resources on assessing security through inter-regionalism, inthis book I address the conceptual and empirical knowledge gaps onsecurity within interregional arrangements.

The new security arrangement between the Europe and Africa isdependent on history and the representative regional institutions.Together, these form the basis of a single EU–Africa institution. It istherefore appropriate to employ tools that help to understand the func-tion of this institution as well as the formal organisations within whichcooperation takes place between the two regions. A thorough analysismust also consider the development of the EU and the AU, and developan understanding of how both contribute to the way in which we under-stand inter-regionalism. Such an analysis will also consider the natureof the EU’s external engagements. New Institutionalism is an analyti-cal tool, deployed to understand cooperation between the EU and AUas well as the motivations, constraints and outcomes of that relation-ship. This approach considers the establishment of inter-regionalismbetween the EU and Africa as an institution in itself, and the rolesthat the formal structures play in the exercise of inter-regionalism. The


next section lays out the tenets of New Institutionalism. It includes thevarious forms of this institutionalism and its relation to the previouslydiscussed EU–Africa inter-regional arrangement.

2.4 When theory met concept: A New Institutionalistapproach to inter-regionalism

From the New Institutionalist perspective, institutions are important inthe structuring of political relations (March and Olsen, 1984). Beyondthis, institutions also affect political outcomes. In essence, institutionaltypes are critical to understanding what types of policy result withina particular institution, including decisions about whether to coop-erate and the type of cooperation to participate in (Aspinwall andSchneider, 2000; Steinmo, 2001). New Institutionalism allows socialresearch to move beyond the roles that individual actors play withinan organisation to shape it. It allows us to consider the effects institu-tions have on individual actors, groups of actors and other institutions;for instance, how does engaging in the inter-regional process shapeEU–Africa actions? In order to understand the processes of EU–Africainter-regionalism, New Institutionalism will allow us to observe, under-stand and analyse the consequences of persistent EU–Africa relations forall the actors involved, including African and European states, as wellas their representative regional institutions. It also allows for a broaderunderstanding of new AU structures as well as of the impact of neweractors in Africa such as China and, to a great extent, the United States.Using New Institutionalism as a tool of assessment is especially relevantto the subject of this book, where the central aim is to understand thefunction of inter-regionalism in a specific policy area and the outcomesthis collaboration generates.

In their seminal article, March and Olsen (1984) argue that thesocial sciences were increasingly being organised around institutionsand therefore proposed New Institutionalism as a way to understand therole of institutions in political processes. To understand this analyticalapproach fully, it is important to know what an institution is. As will beshown subsequently, there are different types of New Institutionalisms,which specify their own definition of the institution; however, amongthe different approaches, there is a consensus that these are ‘new’ways of looking at ‘institutions’. According to Steinmo, within the NewInstitutionalism approach, institutions structure the process of politicalinteraction in three ways: (1) they define the actors who can participatewithin a specific context; (2) they influence the political strategies of


the various actors; and (3) they shape actor preferences (Steinmo, 2001,p. 462). New Institutionalists move away from the ‘old’ conceptionof institutions, which were materialist, often considering only formalstructures, to consider the rules and routines of organisations, includingthe informal and formal practices – their Standard Operating Procedures(SOPs). In the context of the New Institutionalist approach, the formalstructures of the AU and the EU structures in Brussels represent organ-isations of political processes; the sum of actions that take place in thecontext of these organisations make up the institution.

In ‘Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms’, Hall andTaylor (1996) distinguish between three analytical approaches that restwithin what is called New Institutionalism: namely, rational choice,sociological and historical. Peters (1999), however, notes seven othertypes of New Institutionalism. In addition to the three cited by Hall andTaylor, he adds Normative Institutionalism, Empirical Institutionalism,Interest Representation and International Institutionalism (Peters,1999). Recently, other accounts of institutionalism, including con-structivist (Hay, 2007a,b) and discursive institutionalisms (see Schmidt,2008), offer accounts of how ideas and discourse influence institutions.These new perspectives have contributed to the recent debates about therelevance of institutions and how to understand change within them.Arguably, then, the sheer number of approaches to institutions is indica-tive of their importance to the political environment (see Table 2.2). Forpragmatic reasons of utility, we will use the typology established by Halland Taylor.

Hall and Taylor centre their analysis of the three institutionalisms onthe ideas of ‘calculus’ and ‘culture’, which have different roles withinthe three approaches. The calculus approach contends that institutionspersist because of the individuals in it. These individuals are suppos-edly unwilling to deviate from the standard rules and norms becausethey are worried that it might be to their own personal disadvantage.Essentially, within this framework the individual is the principal sub-ject within the institution and maximises utility. The calculus approachmaintains that institutions serve as the contexts within which the indi-vidual can maximise their preferences. Conversely, the culture approachemphasises the normative role of the institutional actor. Those that holda preference for the cultural approach argue that the configuration ofinstitutions is not attributable to individual choices. Instead, the insti-tutional structure determines individual behaviour. Consequently, thestructure of the institutions is restrictive on the individual, and institu-tional change is stagnated because its influence limits individual choice.


Table 2.2 The other institutionalisms

Institutionalism type Characteristics

Empirical Institutionalism This terminology is interchangeable with‘rational-choice institutionalism’

International Institutionalism Concerned with the structural constraints ofstates by formal and informal realities ofinternational politics

Network Institutionalism Shows how informal interactions betweenagents (individuals and groups) shapepolitical behaviour

Discursive Institutionalism Emphasises the role of ideas and discoursesin understanding dynamics of institutionalchange

Constructivist Institutionalism Emphasises the role of ideas and narrativeswithin institutions to shape behaviour andinfluence political action through specificframes of meaning

Feminist Institutionalism Concerned with how gender norms operateand how gendered dynamics are constructedand replicated within institutions

Source: Adapted from Lowndes (2010, p. 65).

These two approaches inform the three New Institutionalist schools ofthought, and are drawn into the structure–agency debate, where in thecalculus approach the agency is prioritised and in the cultural approachstructure is more important.

Rational-choice institutionalism holds that actors within an institu-tion cooperate to solve collective action problems (Hall and Taylor,1996). It sees institutions as formal sets of rules within which rationalactors define the boundaries of action. The institution in the rational-choice frame does not influence actors’ preferences; instead, it simplyprovides the context within which the actors’ aims are to maximiseinterests. Rational-choice institutionalism assumes that the institutionalcontexts give the social actor information about the implications oftheir actions. Based on this approach to institutions, the structure of theinstitution is dependent on the actors in it (Lowndes, 2002, pp. 95–96).

Sociological or Normative Institutionalism defines institutionsbroadly as including, in addition to formal rules and procedures, cul-tural practices that are socially constructed. Whereas rational-choiceinstitutionalism sees institutions as the parameters needed to maximise


benefits without shaping actor preferences, sociological institutionalismis the opposite and therefore fits in with the cultural approach. This typeof institutionalism moves beyond the rigidity of material structures andargues that the embedded practices of the institution as derived fromformal and informal rules affect actor preferences and determine insti-tutional identities. Sociological institutionalism emphasises the socialand political constructs of institutions.

In addition to the EU–Africa relationship, the EU security architectureis also institutionalised.5 Although acutely aware that negotiations onEU security actions remain primarily inter-governmental, the securityarchitecture still has a structured function. Thus, the EU’s security archi-tecture defies the rationalist explanation that states are the sole determi-nants of security within the EU. According to Smith (2004), rationalistapproaches (realism and liberal inter-governmentalism) towards theinstitutionalisation of security within the EU are inadequate becausethey place too much emphasis on rigid actor preferences and out-comes, without explaining the processes or giving an account of theinstitutional constraints of the EU itself. Smith further argues that con-centrating on specific events that bring about further cooperation isinadequate, since much goes on between inter-governmental negotia-tions to affect the subsequent events (Smith, 2004, p. 26). These applyalso to EU cooperation with external partners. By applying an analyticalframework of New Institutionalism, because it considers both strate-gic and normative considerations of security integration, to investigatehow the EU’s internal coordination and assess security cooperation withexternal partners.

The contention of this book is that the formal and informal institu-tional rules, norms and processes that rely on and are motivated by thehistories, ideas and strategic interests of the two regions determine theEU’s collaboration with Africa through the AU on matters of security.To this extent, cooperation in the form of inter-regionalism is itself aninstitution. In this context, therefore, it is most appropriate to utilisethe historical institutionalism approach to analyse inter-regional coop-eration. Historical institutionalism considers the importance of bothcalculus and cultural approaches in the institution of cooperation.

In using New Institutionalism as an analytical tool, the book navigatesthe collaboration of the European and African states within the con-text of their formal structures in Brussels and Addis Ababa, respectively.It uses the historical institutionalism approach because the approachassumes some level of self-interest on the part of the relevant actors. Yet,the historical institutionalist approach also depends on their material


histories and the way these histories motivate, constrain and shape ideasabout the nature of cooperation.

Historical institutionalism is one of the most utilised approaches ofNew Institutionalism, given its eclectic approach to institutions and,importantly, institutional change. It is not without reason that his-torical institutionalism has been the choice for many social scientists,however. Historical institutionalism aims to understand how politicaloutcome is determined ‘by the institutional setting in which [they] takeplace’ (Ikenberry, 1988, pp. 222–223) by considering the evolution ofthe institution. Historical Institutionalism brings together the seem-ingly divergent approaches of calculus and culture as contributing tothe relationship between structure and agency and suggests a symbiosisbetween actor preferences and its exogenous impact on the institu-tion and the institutional context and its endogenous impact on theactor (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992; Hay and Wincott, 1998). In acknowl-edging this relationship between the calculus and culture, institutionalchange from a historical institutionalism perspective occurs within thecontext of an interactive relationship between the institutions and theindividuals, whereby they influence each other. In this book, histori-cal institutionalism is used as an essential analytical tool without whichwe cannot understand the development of security cooperation in EU–Africa relations. Historical institutionalism allows for a clear picture tounderstand the opportunities and constraints of this inter-regionalismand the political outcomes that result from it. Inter-regionalism inthe historical institutionalism analysis is considered a structuring vari-able ‘through which battles over interests, ideas and power are fought’(Steinmo, 2001).

Moreover, this book also takes a particular view about the nature ofinstitutions and the process that creates the institutions. While institu-tions are the ‘rules of the game’ (North, 1990, p. 3), institutionalisationdescribes the active process of cooperation occurring between the EUand the AU on specific decisions. These decisions continually incorpo-rate existing ‘norms, or shared standards of behaviour’ based on historyand ideals to create new outcomes (Smith, 2004, p. 26). Additionally,Hall and Taylor emphasise four core features of institutions from thehistorical institutionalism perspective.

The first one is the relations of individuals (or actors) to the institu-tion. The second feature of historical institutionalism and its practition-ers emphasises the ‘asymmetries of power associated with the operationand development of institutions’ (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p. 938). Thelogic behind this feature is that institutions affect the distribution ofpower among social groups, privileging certain groups over others.


Related to this, the third feature of historical institutionalism high-lights institutional development over initial formation. The institutionis developed and persists over time because of path-dependency, the ideathat patterns of initial institutional choices will ‘persist, unless thereis some force sufficient to overcome the inertia’ (Peters, 1999, p. 64).As institutions go about their regular routines, the result of these activi-ties increases the attractiveness of the course chosen. The attractivenessof the chosen course in turn reinforces the routine (Pierson, 2004,p. 18). This loop is known as positive feedback, which Arthur (1994c.f. Pierson, 2004 p.18) argues has four main characteristics. The firstis unpredictability. Unpredictability means that, although the positiveaspects of a chosen course are reinforced, we cannot know what aspectsof these are positive a priori. Second, positive feedbacks are supposedlyinflexible, making it difficult to change the direction from a certaincourse, possibly succumbing to the ‘lock-in’ effect. The lock-in effectexplains the monotony of EU–ACP agreements until Lomé III. Third,positive feedback processes further give allowance for small events atthe beginning of institutional formation to have effects that contributeto the path of the institution. Known as nonergodicity, these events areimportant to the overall analyses of institutional process.

Finally, considering everything that may have resulted from takinga particular path, which has resulted in positive feedback, one mustleave room for the possibility that, although a particular set of pro-cesses may be preferred or locked in, these may not be the mostefficient set of processes to pursue to achieve the aims of the institu-tion. For instance, despite acknowledging the effects of politics on amostly economic relationship, nothing in previous EU–Africa relationspromoted equality and partnership between EU and African partners.Further the ownership of the decision-making processes and implemen-tation of initiatives by African actors was not part of previous relations,although these have been recognised by the EU as goods in themselves.Rather, all agreements within the EU–ACP framework still emphasisedthe same ‘unequal exchanges’ (Onwuka, 1989, p. 65). On the face ofit, the trajectory of the EU–Africa relations suggests path-dependency,as found in a historical institutionalism analysis. A historical processthat is path-dependent remains so because of the self-reinforcement ofpositive feedback (Arthur, 1994; David, 2000). Over all, the processesare difficult to reverse once a particular trajectory is taken (Hacker,2002, p. 54).

Similarly, scholars of historical institutionalism have borrowed thenotion of increasing returns from the fields of economics and technol-ogy. This is the idea that each ‘increment added to a particular line of


activity yields larger rather than smaller benefits’ (Pierson, 2005, p. 22).It has been used to examine economic processes as well as advances intechnology. Increasing returns have triggered positive feedback effectsin the field of technology, causing lock-in patterns even when there arealternatives that are more efficient. According to Pierson, in the study ofpolitics four features occur where self-reinforcing processes are at work(Pierson, 2005, p. 44). The features include multiple equilibria, where ini-tial conditions conducive to positive feedback and a range of outcomesare generally possible. In addition, there is contingency, where relativelysmall events occurring at the right moment have a lasting as well as theimportant role of timing and sequencing in that the right things needto occur at the right moments in order to have positive effects. Finally,yet importantly, there is the stage where a single equilibrium is reachedand the institution is stable, in inertia. Essentially, an institution fromthe historical institutionalism perspective is prone to continuity ratherthan change.

However, recent contributions to the historical institutionalist per-spective suggest that, despite the propensity for continuities in insti-tutions where history plays a very prominent role, incremental changeis possible and could be significant enough to transform the institu-tion. In this situation, where a transformation in EU–Africa relationsbased on equality, ownership and partnership is being sought, historicalinstitutionalism again offers the best analytical tools for understandingthe implications of security cooperation. Change in EU–Africa rela-tions has been gradual. In Explaining Institutional Change, Mahoney andThelen (2010) consolidate recent work on change within the historicalinstitutionalist perspective (Schickler, 2001; Thelen, 2002; Streeck andThelen, 2005). In this work they identify four ways in which institu-tions can change: displacement, layering, drift and conversion (Streeckand Thelen, 2005; Mahoney and Thelen, 2010, pp. 15–16).

Displacement refers to the replacement of old rules with new ones.Layering refers to the introduction of new contexts within existing insti-tutions alongside old ones. There is no consideration from breakingaway from the old institution. Indeed we already saw this type of changewith improvements in Lomé IV, the Cotonou Agreement and indeed thecontinuation of development cooperation in the context of the JAES.By enacting change through new amendments, institutional actors areconstrained since their aim is not to undermine existing institutions orantagonise those who would rather maintain the status quo (Streeck andThelen, 2005, p. 23). For this reason, changes dominated by the contextof EU–ACP relations are only incremental. Drift refers to the changes


that occur when rules remain the same but their impact is different as aresult of changes in the external environment (Hacker, 2005; Mahoneyand Thelen, 2010, p. 17). Conversion refers to the active exploitation ofexisting rules for redeployment to new uses (Thelen, 2003). The extentto which security cooperation is indicative of any of these changes isexplored fully in the subsequent chapters.

Finally, for historical institutionalists, ideas play a key role in deter-mining political outcomes (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p. 942; Campbell,2002; Steinmo, 2008). Historical institutionalists contend that, whileinstitutions are very important to the organisation of political rela-tions, ideas play a key role in influencing political actors. HistoricalInstitutionalism thereby leaves room for the other influences that couldaccount for the broader EU–Africa relationship.

In the absence of an appropriate IR or EU theory that adequatelyconsiders both partners to illuminate recent EU–Africa relations, insti-tutionalised inter-regionalism serves as a useful analytical framework forseveral reasons. First, it provides an appropriate and precise context forcontemporary EU–Africa relations. While other studies accept EU–Africarelations as an example of inter-regionalism, they do not account forwhy relations have developed as they have and why and how changeis occurring (exception is Olsen, 2006, pp. 199–214). Second, institu-tionalised inter-regionalism moves beyond the descriptive nature of theempirical concept of inter-regionalism. It contextualises the EU–Africarelations by illuminating the processes of cooperation within formaland informal structures. Further, it considers the historical dimension inEU–Africa relations. Third, historical institutionalism applied to inter-regionalism provides the tools to examine and chart the types andextent of changes, as well as continuity in EU–Africa relations. It fur-ther assesses the whole of EU relations as a global actor rather than theinternal challenges of the EU alone.

Using historical institutionalism as a the frame for understanding newEU–AU capabilities links the institution, its interactions and intentionson a practitioner level to the formal structures that outwardly repre-sent the two sides of the inter-regional pair. Further, it emphasises thetemporal dimension of processes – in this case, the importance of timeand specific events in the evolution of inter-regionalism. These take intoaccount the combined effects of the structures and processes of interac-tion. As an analytical tool, the application of historical institutionalismto inter-regionalism allows us to trace the historical processes that sup-port or challenge the institutionalisation of inter-regionalism betweenthe EU and Africa.


Applied to inter-regionalism, then, historical institutionalism squarelyconfronts the association of the EU in reality and moves away from thecontinued debates on the EU’s integration, addressing the role of theother regional actor, the AU. Additionally, the application of historicalinstitutionalism to inter-regionalism emphasises ‘endogenous historicalprocess’ of regionalisation and consequently inter-regionalism (Hettne,2004).

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter has highlighted the structure and benefits of a new analyt-ical framework for EU–Africa relations: institutionalised inter-regionalism.By highlighting the main concepts and theories often used for under-standing the structure and motivation of EU external relations, thischapter exposes their limitations. Given the gaps in some of the con-cepts currently being utilised to explain the EU’s role in internationalaffairs, the chapter has used the empirical concept of inter-regionalismto create a new framework that considers the EU’s partners. These con-cepts also provide a means by which to evaluate this relationship byproposing that the nature of the relationship, often defined only asa process, is itself an institution (constituent of formal and informalprocesses). In this chapter, we attempt to grapple with the constant pre-occupation of IR studies: the concept of power and the form it takesgiven the parameters of this specific relationship. Having defined EU–Africa inter-regionalism as an institution, the chapter speaks to theattributes of institutions. It further considers how these relate to whatwe are observing in EU–Africa affairs, concluding that the tools pro-vided by historical institutionalism help to provide the suitable framefor understanding inter-regional EU–Africa relations.

3Regionalising Security: TheAPSA and External Partners

Introduction

In assessing change through a New Institutionalist lens, changes withinan institution often require the inclusion of new structures. Certainly,in assessing security as a potential change, the inclusion of new struc-tures, which are able to support new capabilities and processes, is worthexamination. The most important of these new structures for EU–AU security cooperation is, of course, the African Peace and SecurityArchitecture (APSA). This chapter provides an overview of develop-ment of regional capabilities for governing security leading to thecreation of the APSA. Unlike other assessments of the APSA, however,this chapter also seeks to highlight the role of key external actors:the United States, China and the EU. Moreover, it evaluates the con-solidation of regional capabilities, including the global and regionallegal instruments that account for the development of regional securityinstitutions.

This chapter proceeds as follows: first, it examines the rise of regionalsecurity mechanisms in the context of UN provisions and the aca-demic debates and discourses on regional security institutions. It thenevaluates the evolution of African regional capabilities as essential tointer-regional cooperation on security. Third, it examines the role thatfour important external partners – the United States, China, the UN andthe EU – have played in governing security in Africa and supporting thedevelopment of continental capabilities. Finally, the chapter concludesby highlighting the implications of the different approaches taken byeach partner, with the aim of showing why the EU remains the keyregional partner to the AU in security.

61


3.1 The international security politics of regional security:Governing insecurity

In the past two decades the idea that regional actors, mainly institu-tions, have a role in the governance of international security has becomeaccepted in the practice of international relations. In particular, theseregional actors constitute part of what Mark Duffield (2005) has referredto as the ‘liberal peace complex’. Africa, which has been the locus forvarious international security challenges in this time, thus provides alens through which to evaluate the efficacy of regional actors in thegovernance of international security.

The intellectual project that has considered regions as actors in inter-national security has a rather robust lineage. In the IR sub-field ofSecurity Studies, attempts to integrate the role of regional actors in thediscipline is most notable in the work of Barry Buzan and Ole Waever(2003), who established regional security complex theory (see Regionsand Security), arguing that regions and regional institution have becomemore prominent within the international security landscape (p. 4). Sim-ilarly, Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett in Security Communities(1998) invoked Karl Deutsch’s idea of security communities adaptinga constructivist framework so that those communities are constituent ofareas where there are shared meanings, identities and values and requir-ing a level of institutional integration (see also Adler and Greve, 2009).These approaches squarely confront the phenomenon of regional actorsgoverning dimensions of global security, an increasing occurrence sincethe end of the Cold War.

To be sure, the role of regional actors in the governance of security isnot a new idea. Indeed, the regionalisation of security has its origins inChapter VIII of the UN Charter. This section of the Charter allows forthe role of regional entities in the governance of international securitywithin their spheres of influence.

Recourse to Charter provisions has been partly as a result of a crisis inUN capabilities, measured by the perceived failures in Somalia, Rwandaand Srebrenica. The UN’s shortcomings are captured in the well-knownBrahimi Report. The Brahimi Report (2000) assessed the shortcomingsof the UN’s peacekeeping capabilities and stated that ‘there are manytasks which the United Nations peacekeeping forces should not be askedto undertake and many places they should not go’ (Brahimi Report,2000). It highlighted the fact that regional organisations could poten-tially play the role of agents of international peace and security withintheir spheres of influence. These roles, the Report argued, would make

Regionalising Security: APSA and External Partners 63

up for the deficiencies in the UN’s peacekeeping system. The limita-tions of the UN, in addition to its own insecurities, thus had a directimpact on the construction of the continental security mechanisms.So although the AU was in the process of formation at the time theBrahimi Report was published, its publication allowed for internationalsupport to build regional capabilities for security. In the institutionaldevelopment of this new regional security mechanism especially, we seehow the AU has ‘borrowed’ institutions from partners such as the UNand the EU to create the APSA.

To understand fully the development of the APSA, however, it isimperative to understand the dynamics of regionalism on the conti-nent and thus locate security within this narrative. Starting with theOAU, which was founded in May 1963, the regionalisation of secu-rity and what constitutes insecurity was only considered in reactionto the broader experiences of colonialism on the continent. Specif-ically, African leaders sought to ensure that former colonial powersdid not encroach on new freedoms and the process of decolonisa-tion. Consequently, the founding Charter of the OAU prohibits exter-nal entities from ‘interfering in the internal affairs of States’ (OAUCharter, 1963). The OAU was the tangible result of pan-Africanism,a movement and philosophy that promoted the idea that liberationfrom colonial tyranny was dependent on the unity of Africans inAfrica and in the Diaspora. Although the movement was born out-side Africa, it was championed by Black American intellectuals in theDiaspora, including Ghana’s first post-independence president, KwameNkrumah. Nkrumah was one of the most recognisable proponents ofpan-Africanism. On the eve of decolonisation, then, he envisioned aliberated and emancipated ‘United States of Africa’ (Nrumah, 1970).The reluctance of many newly independent African states to give upsovereignty to a supranational entity ultimately affected the extent ofthe OAU’s capabilities.

The OAU viewed the continent’s security issues within a specific con-text, which viewed the protection of territorial integrity as the centralsecurity concern for the pan-African institution. Wheeler (2000) goesfar as to suggest that, by having total opposition to intervention on thebasis of territorial integrity, African countries denied the legitimacy ofmilitary intervention even when they were necessary to save lives.

In the effort to dissuade interference from former colonial pow-ers, however, the Charter also provided some Africa leaders withimpunity. Using the Charter provisions internally as well as UN normson non-intervention (see Article 2.4 of the UN Charter), the lack


of accountability among African leaders ensured Africa’s systematicdecline, characterised by authoritarian governments and corruption atthe expense of African citizens. The cardinal rule of non-interferencewas almost literally killing Africa. This approach became known as apolicy of ‘indifference’, especially to the dynamics of many internalconflicts in Africa and the lives lost in those conflicts.

By the end of the Cold War and in the decade following the collapseof the Soviet regime, the discourse on sovereignty in the internationalsystem was changing, and African actors were part of the conversation.In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, it became apparent thatthe international relations paradigm that encouraged non-interventionwas not working for the OAU. Seen as a club of dictators, the OAUespecially had lost its credibility as being representative of ordinaryAfricans within and outside the continent. This period saw the riseof new understandings of what sovereignty meant, and an emphasison democracy and human rights, as well as the development of theconcept of human security. In this context, the strict adherence to non-intervention was questioned. Ravaged by internal security issues suchas internally displaced people, cross-border refugees, gross violationsof human rights within states and some of the most violent conflictsof the 20th century in places such as the Congo, Chad, Somalia andRwanda, to name a few, Africa was not in great shape. Further, bythe end of the Cold War, African states remained among the poorestin the world, development seemed stagnant and poverty levels wereon the increase. By the middle of 1990s, then, it was clear that thenon-interference approach economically, socially and indeed politicallywas acutely flawed. Moreover, the OAU lacked the appropriate mech-anisms and the institutional capabilities to fill the vacuum left by thelimitations of the UN and were not equipped to deal with the contem-porary security challenges of Africa. In this way, we see how the creationof a regional security governance structure relied on multiple regionaland international factors as the Cold War ended and the new centurybegan.

In 1993 African leaders adopted the OAU Mechanism (later Centre)for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in explicitacknowledgement of changes in the international security landscape.The aim of theMechanismwas to put every aspect of the conflict cycle atthe heart of the OAU. Its creation thus constituted a significant changein the ethos of the OAU since new OAU capabilities necessarily clashedwith the idea of non-interference. The intention of the Mechanism wasto manage African experiences, especially cross-border issues, such as


refugees and arms proliferation, and internal state issues, such as theobservation of elections.

It should be noted that one event, the Rwandan genocide, signifi-cantly altered African perspectives on non-intervention. At the initialstages of the conflict, African leaders seemed to accept the inaction ofthe UN Security Council (UNSC) especially (and the West in general) asaccepted wisdom on non-intervention. But as the massacre progressedand it became apparent that beyond the inaction, it was not beingacknowledged, African leaders realised their powerlessness within theglobal governance architecture.

At the time when the genocide in Rwanda ended, the OAU led theefforts towards mediation, which led to the eventual signing of theArusha Agreement. Indeed, the OAU was able to deploy a Neutral Mil-itary Observer Group (NMOG) to maintain a stable Demilitarised Zonebetween the two warring factions, the Rwandan government and theRwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), until it handed over the mission tothe UN.

Yet, although what is remembered the most about Rwanda todaywas the inability of the UNSC to prevent the death of approximately800,000 people, the genocide was also a self-indictment of Africa’s lackof resources, and capabilities (Masire et al., 2000). In the OAU investiga-tion into the genocide, the international panel of eminent personalitiesnoted that, like the UN, the OAU denied the fact that the genocide inRwanda was taking place. The panel found that this constituted ‘a moralfailure’ of the OAU (Masire et al., 2000), although it also hinted thatAfrican condemnation would not have mattered within a multilateralsetting. The feeling of helplessness crystallised by the events around theRwandan genocide was compounded by the fact that Western powerswho had the means to intervene invoked the same non-interventionnorms as the OAU. The irony of this has contributed to recent actionto repeal strict non-intervention in international affairs. Indeed, theprinciple of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which has been adopted bythe UN General Assembly, was pioneered by the African diplomat andnoted academic Francis Deng (ICISS, 2001). The main impetus for R2P isto engender responsibility within the international community to pre-vent atrocities such as the Rwandan genocide. Essentially, Africa’s ownindependent capabilities are critical to solving the issue of Africa’s ownsecurity challenges. The need to take more responsibility has influenceda new security formula in Africa (Ruiz-Gimenez, 2011), one linked toownership – African solutions to African problems and the creation of anew regional mechanism to tackle security challenges.


3.2 The African peace and security architecture: Structuresand administration1

In the post-Cold War period, as internal conflicts in Africa seemed tomultiply, the UN’s involvement on the continent continued to wane.The situation in Africa was characterised by many intra-state conflicts,which took on regional and inevitably international dimensions. Thisperiod thus saw a rise in the participation of sub-regional organisationsin Africa’s peace and security landscape. In consideration of the hostilesecurity environment in Africa and the evolution of ideas on sovereigntyand intervention, African actors expanded their participation in peacesupport missions. Since the 1990s, the sub-regional organisation Eco-nomic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has developedsome of its capabilities, enabling it to intervene in various internalconflicts such as Sierra Leone (1991, 1998), Guinea-Bissau (1999) andrecently in Côte d’Ivoire (2003). In South Africa, forces of the SouthernAfrican Development Community (SADC) intervened during the coupd’état in Lesotho (1997). Similarly, African troops contributed to mis-sions in Somalia (1994–1995), Comoros (1997–1999), the DemocraticRepublic of the Congo (DRC) (1999) and Ethiopia–Eritrea (2000) andfollowing the Rwandan genocide.

The desire to consolidate the autonomy of African actors to act inaddressing the insecurity in Africa led to the eventual dismantling ofthe OAU and the reconstitution of a new continental organisation. Thistransformation was characterised by a move from the concept of non-intervention to non-indifference (Mwanasali, 2008), which prioritisedideas of good governance, democracy and human rights under the broadrubric of human security. These ideas are codified in the Declarationon the Framework for an OAU response to Unconstitutional Changesof Government (Lomé Declaration) in 2000 (OAU, 2000a). This newapproach effectively replaced the strict anti-colonial and anti-apartheidstance as the central motivation for regional integration, and regionalsecurity.

While donor countries from the political West often insisted ondemocratisation and human rights practices as conditions of aid, itwould be incorrect to attribute the new regional priorities as exter-nally motivated. In the first decade after the Cold War, a wave ofdemocratisation swept through Africa, thrusting ideas of good gov-ernance, democracy and human rights back into the lexicon of thepolitical elite. Furthermore, the end of apartheid in South Africa,Namibian independence and the end of conflict in Mozambique and in


Ethiopia further signalled the irrelevance of some of the main motiva-tions for the OAU, while providing hope for a better Africa, or a secondrenaissance (see Ruiz-Gimez, 2011). Further, Africans were looking atlessons learned at the international level in a period that also sig-nalled increased regionalisation or the rise of New Regionalism. Despitethe international dimensions of this evolution, there was also a clearAfrican identity within the revamped regionalism, which invariablyled to a renewed pan-African discourse for continental integration asthe answer to tackling African challenges (see Mandaza et al., 2002;Lansdaberg, 2004; Hettne and Soderbaum, 2010). Finally, the increas-ing sense that the lack of support from the West during Rwanda andthe waning of external interventions suggested that the internationalcommunity did not care for Africans. Consequently, many felt that itwas left to Africans to fend for themselves by coming together in a moretangible way.

The process of establishing the OAU’s successor, the AU, in Sirte,started in 1999 on the recommendation of the late Libyan leader,Muammar Gaddafi. Initially convened to strengthen OAU capabilities,the leaders instead decided to create a new institution. Although stillbased on the underlying philosophy of pan-Africanism, the aspira-tions of this new institution and its resulting security mechanism weresituated within a broader global narrative on governing security.

Led by regional ‘hegemons’ Egypt, Ethiopia, Libya, Nigeria and SouthAfrica, the creation of the AU also laid out the conditions for creating theAPSA by identifying security challenges on the continent. In 2000 theConstitutive Act of the AU formally established the organisation. Whileaccelerating integration was a key priority for the AU, another of theprimary aims was to address new modes of insecurity on the continentsince independence, such as combating poverty, HIV/AIDS, attaininguniversal education and tackling state fragility. The AU now had the taskof maintaining stability, peace and security (see Murithi, 2005; Akokpariet al., 2007; Engel and Gomes Porto, 2010). It is clear that the remit ofthe AU goes beyond addressing traditional security concerns such as themilitary defence of a specific territory against external threat or just thechallenges of intra-state violence (Muritihi, 2005; Williams, 2007). Thisbroad focus on what constitutes security underscores the claim that theAU like the EU views human security as the appropriate frame throughwhich security ought to be understood.

The creation of the AU, and its security mandate, was especiallysupported by changes in the international environment. Despite thereticence of Western countries to intervene in Africa in the 1990s, the


United Kingdom intervened in Sierra Leone in 2000 and France in Côted’Ivoire in 2002, and the EU with its limited capabilities intervenedin the DRC in 2003.2 Similarly, following an extended period of non-engagement, increased insecurity on the continent also meant a returnof the UN to Africa. However, African countries such as Nigeria, Kenyaand Ghana were some of the main contributors to these UN missions.The change in the international context from the immediate post-ColdWar period of the 1990s to that of 2000 underscored the need for aconsistent and sustainable security mechanism that can help Africancountries achieve socio-economic development and sustainable peace.

At present, the AU represents all African states in all countries on thecontinent, including North Africa with the exception of Morocco.3 TheAU consists of both political and administrative bodies. Its core decision-making organ is the Assembly of the AU, which is made up of all theheads of government of member states. Additionally, there is a linkedpan-African parliament and an Executive Council (foreign ministers ofmember states), which prepare the decisions of the Assembly. Further,the Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC), comprising memberstates’ ambassadors, exists in an advisory capacity to the ExecutiveCouncil, while the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC),a consultative body, exists as an interface between the AU and civilsociety. And although the success of ECOSOCC, for example, is ques-tionable, its existence is symbolic of new AU aspirations in peace andsecurity and beyond.

Specific to the issue of security, the Constitutive Act is clear aboutthe AU’s objective. ‘to promote peace, security and stability on thecontinent’. Further, the Constitutive Act committed to creating an oper-ational structure for the effective implementation of the decisions takenin the area of conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace support oper-ations and intervention, as well as peace-building and post-conflictreconstruction (OAU, 2000c).

The implementation of the Constitutive Act’s peace and securityaspirations is outlined in the 2002 Protocol Relating to the Establish-ment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC Protocol). Adopted in2003 at an AU meeting in Maputo, its eventual format incorporatedinsights from former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo deliveredin response to the Conference on Security, Stability, Development andCo-operation in Africa (CSSDCA). In addition to the PSC Protocol, theSolemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Pol-icy (CADSP) of 2004, the AU Non-Aggression Common Defence Pact(AU-NACDP) and AU Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development


(PCRD) constitute the key legal instruments and policy frameworksunderpinning the APSA.

The PSC Protocol details the various components of the APSA. Theseinclude: the establishment of the PSC; the Panel of the Wise; theContinental Early Warning System (CEWS); the ASF; and the PeaceFund. Figure 3.1 below illustrates the APSA’s various components. TheAPSA is perhaps the most innovative creation within Africa and perhapsother regional governance structures. Unlike the EU, whose securityarchitecture evolved slowly, the APSA has hit the ground running.

African leaders approved the members of the Panel of the Wise inJanuary 2007, but officially launched this component of the APSA inDecember 2007, when the Modalities for the Functioning of the Panel ofthe Wise was agreed. The Panel of the Wise is integral to the AU’s ability

African StandbyForce (ASF)

Continental EarlyWarning System

(CEWS)

African Peaceand SecurityArchitecture

(APSA)

Peace fund

Panel of the Wise(PoW)

Figure 3.1 Components of the African peace and security architecture(Source: Haastrup, 2010, 2012, 2013b).


to engage in preventative diplomacy as part of its peacemaking capa-bilities (Murithi and Mwaura, 2010). Article 11 of the Constitutive Actprovides the legal basis for the Panel, while the Modalities establish theprocess for its implementation. The Panel of theWise is designed to con-sist of five eminent Africans, serving renewable three-year terms, withno political affiliations at the time of their appointment. In the attemptto reform security governance so that it addresses gender imbalances,the Panel currently consists of two women. While the Panel supportsthe work of the PSC, it has the mandate to intervene in any situation inpursuance of peace and security on the continent (African Union, 2007).To that end, the Panel has been active in the Central African Republic,Somalia and the Sudan. This power frees the Panel from the ‘politicalcorrectness’ that sometimes encumbers PSC action. Murithi andMwaura(2010) argue that this innovation is derived from a specific African tra-dition that values the wisdom and abilities of the elder. This reinforcesthe notion that the APSA has been designed as an example of ‘Africansolutions to African problems’ (Jegede, 2009). The Panel of the Wiseis an innovative component of the APSA, especially when comparedto other regional security institutions. Like many of the APSA compo-nents, however, it is under-funded and its findings are dependent onwhether the PSC and Assembly of Heads of States agree to act. Addition-ally, the small number of members and the ‘fixed’ nature of membershiphave been criticised as being hindrances to effective action. Murithi andMwaura (2010), for example, advocate a pool of experts rather than analmost permanent five, so that relevant expertise can be deployed asneeded. Additionally, they note that, given that domestic insecuritiesare often unacknowledged until conflict in unpreventable, the Panel’swork is challenging as a conflict prevention entity. Finally, its benefit interms of conflict prevention is still unclear given the overlap of its workwith other AU components and indeed the UN.

Another component of the APSA, the CEWS is central to the AU’sconflict prevention capabilities, and critical to conflict management andconflict resolution. The often reactive responses undertaken in the con-flict management and resolution stages of the conflict cycle are costlyin terms of human lives and financially. Tiruneh (2010, p. 10) notes,for example, that the activities often undertaken in post-conflict recon-struction, such as disarmament, demobilisation and the reintegration offormer combatants, are far less costly if prevented (see Chapter 5). There-fore, conflict prevention and its tools become essential to security on thecontinent. A fully-fledged CEWS should be able to ‘monitor, analyze anddevelop tailored and timely response and policy options to threats to


peace and security on the Continent’ (Wane et al., 2010). Also mandatedby the Constitutive Act and the PSC Protocol, the CEWS’s nerve centreis the Situation Room, which is under the aegis of the Conflict Manage-ment Division. The implementation strategy for the CEWS is found inthe draft Roadmap for the Operationalisation of the CEWS (2005) andFramework for the Operationalisation of the Continental Early WarningSystem (2006). However, the CEWS remains under-developed. In thefirst place, it is under-staffed. Further, intelligence-gathering for earlywarning is dependent on information-sharing relationships, especiallywith the RECs. However, there are no permanent mechanisms for thissort of information-sharing (see Tiruneh, 2010).

The ASF is a continental arrangement drawn from the five sub-regional groupings of RECs in the form of five brigades, and a sixth basedin Addis Ababa, the development of which I discuss in the next chapter.It is designed as a rapid reaction force to undertake a range of peacesupport operations, including ‘preventive deployment, rapid interven-tion, peacekeeping and peace-making’ (Ruiz-Gimenez, 2011). Accordingto Article 13 of the Protocol establishing the PSC, the ASF will consistof ‘multidisciplinary contingents with civilian and military components’(emphasis added). The multidimensionality of the arrangement stemsfrom the reality that ‘conflict does not happen in a vacuum’4 andconsequently non-military solutions are also needed to ensure lastingpeace. Thus, the ASF constitutes the implementable aspect of the APSA.The ASF is empowered to intervene in African border wars and intra-state conflicts, including civil unrest caused by unlawful changes ingovernment.

The Peace Fund is intended to provide the necessary financialresources for the administration of peace and security in Africa. Theintention of the APSA’s designers was that the Peace Fund would bederived from the AU’s general budget, voluntary state contributions andphilanthropic donations from within and outside Africa. The work ofthese components can only be carried out on the instruction of the PSC.The PSC is the central governing entity for the APSA. As the decision-making organ of the APSA, the PSC has the responsibility to prevent,manage and resolve conflicts on the continent.

Importantly, the PSC advises the Assembly of Heads of States toauthorise military intervention in accordance with Article 4 of the Con-stitutive Act. The PSC has been functional since March 2004 and ismodelled on the UNSC, with some notable differences (see Haastrup,2013a). Unlike the UNSC, the PSC comprises representatives of 15 mem-ber states. Of those, five member states representing the sub-regions


have membership in the Council for three years each, while the otherten are represented for two years each. Yet, the almost permanent pres-ence of widely accepted regional hegemons such as South Africa, Nigeriaand Algeria creates a de facto system that suggests a hierarchical sys-tem that makes the PSC similar in practice to the UNSC (Sturmanand Hayatou, 2010). Further, election to the PSC is based on the cri-teria established in Art. 5g, which necessitates ‘respect for constitutionalgovernment, rule of law and human rights’ (AU, 2002). Despite these cri-teria, however, Williams (2010) has noted that the membership of Libya(under Ghadaffi) and Sudan (under Bashir) undermines the Protocol.

However, while it is charged with these new responsibilities, a two-thirds majority of the Assembly of Head of States must approve anyrecommendation for action in order for an AU intervention to occur.It should be noted, though, that the PSC can recommend interventionwith or without the consent of the member state embroiled in con-flict. Furthermore, the PSC has the authority to levy sanctions againstunlawful changes in government (AU, 2002).

The powers given to the PSC constitute a marked shift of organisa-tional powers within the AU compared to the OAU. One of the motivesfor the new role of the AU is that ‘a collective security and early warningarrangement [ought to] facilitate timely and effective responses to con-flict and crises situations in Africa’ (Dersso, 2009). The PSC has thus beenan important element in the institutionalisation of the AU’s new peaceand security outlook. The PSC is an important component of APSA.It further constitutes a success for those who have long campaigned fora regional organisation with more teeth. The PSC is in permanent ses-sion, which enables Permanent Representatives in Addis Ababa to meetas often as necessary (Sturman and Hayatou, 2010). The PSC Secretariat,with other components of the AU Commission, including the Chairper-son’s office, helps to draft PSC recommendations as well as proposals forimplementing the PSC’s responsibilities towards the APSA.

The administrative hub of the AU and the APSA is the AU Com-mission. A Chairperson, supported by the Deputy Chairperson andeight Commissioners, who represent different portfolios, manages theCommission. In this chapter, we will focus on the peace and securityportfolio, which is also managed in the Peace and Security Department.The Peace and Security Commissioner and Director of Peace and Secu-rity provide the management of the Peace and Security Department.Together with their staff, they constitute the largest and most amplyfunded department within the AU. It is modelled on the UNDepartmentof Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), although with significantly less


resources. The Peace and Security Department provides overall supportto the Commission, the PSC and the Assembly of head of states and gov-ernments. Formally, the Peace and Security Department consists of fourdivisions through which the PSC’s decisions are implemented: ConflictPrevention and Early Warning Division (CPD); Conflict Managementand Post-Conflict Reconstruction Division (CMD), Peace Support Oper-ations Division (PSOD), the Peace and Security Secretariat and theDefence and Security Division (DSD). These four divisions, in additionto the PSC Secretariat, implement the APSA. Table 3.1 illustrates eachdivision and the PSC secretariat’s responsibilities.

In addition to these administrative arrangements at the continen-tal level, the existence of a continental architecture is dependent onthe integration of existing peace and security mechanisms at the sub-regional level, which the Commission is also responsible for coordinat-ing. These sub-regional organisations are known as Regional EconomicCommunities (RECs). While some see the RECs as being a separatecomponent of the APSA, it is worth noting that they are integral toevery other component as an overarching element of the APSA. RECswere initially encouraged by the United Nations Economic Commis-sion for Africa (UNECA). African leaders created these economic unions

Table 3.1 Peace and security department and PSC secretariat responsibilities

CPD CMD PSOD DSD PSCsecretariat

Managesthe CEWSand conflictpreventioninstruments andpractices

Conflictresolution andmanagement

Preparing policyfor PSC

In charge ofthe AU’scounter-terrorismstrategy

Liaisonbetween PSCand Peaceand SecurityDepartment

Managesmediationprogrammesincluding Panelof the Wise

Peace-buildingandpost-conflictreconstruction

Supportmanagement andimplementationof peace supportoperations

Managesdisarmamentand non-proliferation

Operationaland adminis-trativesupport toPSC

Manages theAU BorderProgramme

Managing AULiaison Officeto RECs andmember states

The ASF Securitysector reform


as a precursor to continental economic integration as outlined in theAbuja Treaty of 1991, which established the African Economic Com-munity (AEC). In Article 88 of the Abuja Treaty as well as Article 3 ofthe Constitutive Act of the AU, RECs are designated as building blocksfor continental integration. Beyond their initial purpose, many of theRECs have developed capabilities beyond economic integration. Con-sequently, they too have security mechanisms. In the effort to integratethe existing work of the sub-regional organisations to the new continen-tal architecture, the RECs have negotiated a series of Memorandums ofUnderstandings (MoUs) with the AU. The MoUs outline the relationshipbetween the AU and the RECs. Their purpose is to increase communi-cation between the RECs and the AU, and to strengthen and deepenrelations between the sub-regional and continental levels of administra-tion. The AU liaison officers to the RECs and the REC liaison officersin Addis Ababa support the AU implement the day-to-day function ofthese MoUs.

While the AU recognises several sub-regional groupings on the conti-nent, for peace and security specifically, five RECs are relevant as theyrepresent the source of the regional brigades being constituted (seeTable 3.2). The new security architecture further embeds the role of RECsat the continental level. This is especially evident in the framework ofthe ASF and the CEWS, which depend on the integration of the existingsub-regional mechanisms. However, the integration of the RECs into theAU has been especially challenging, due mainly to two interlinked lim-itations: underdeveloped institutional capabilities and lack of resources(see Franke, 2006).

Despite provisions made through the establishment of the PeaceFund, the AU member states have not always been able to fulfil theirobligations. So, although there is commitment to the APSA, this hasnot been enough to mitigate many of the challenges. Consequently,external partners are fundamental to the integration of Africa’s securitymechanisms and the ability of these mechanisms to perform. Indeed,the AU provided for this eventuality in its PSC Protocol, Article 17titled Relationship with the United Nations and Other International Organi-zations, which states that ‘the Peace and Security Council shall cooperateand work closely with the United Nations Security Council, which hasthe primary responsibility for maintenance of international peace andsecurity’ (PSC Protocol, Article 17, section 1, p. 25). Clearly, the AUitself acknowledges the continued role of the UN, and especially thelink between regional and international security. Importantly, however,


Table 3.2 European Union missions and operations in Africa

Mission/operationtype

Name Country/region Duration

Military Operation ARTEMIS DRC/Central Africa 2003

Civilian Mission EU SEC DRCongo

DRC/Central Africa 2005

Civilian – MilitaryOperation

Support toAMIS II

Sudan/Horn ofAfrica

2005–2006

Civilian Mission EUPOL KinshasaRD Congo

DRC/Central Africa 2005–2007

Military Operation EUFOR RD Congo DRC/Central Africa 2006

Civilian Mission EUPOL RD Congo DRC/Central Africa 2007 (ongoing)

Military Operation EUFORChad/CAR

Chad & CentralAfricanRepublic/CentralAfrica

2008–2009

Civilian Mission EU SSRGuinea-Bissau

Guinea-Bissau/WestAfrica

2008–2010

Military Operation EUNAVAFOR –Atlanta

Somalia/Gulf ofAden /Horn ofAfrica

2008 (ongoing)

Military Operation EUTM Somalia Horn of Africa 2010 (ongoing)

Civilian Mission EUAVSEC SouthSudan

South Sudan/Hornof Africa

2012 (ongoing)

Civilian Mission EUCAP NESTOR Horn of Africa 2012 (ongoing)

Civilian Mission EUCAP SAHELNiger

Niger/West Africa 2012 (ongoing)

Military Operation EUTM Mali Mali/West Africa 2013 (ongoing)

Source: European External Action Service, March 2013.

Article 17 goes on to identify the financial obligations the UN mayhave towards engaging the AU in tackling security challenges in Africa,drawing on the basis of Chapter VIII.

Section 4 of Article 17 goes on to state:

The Peace and Security Council shall also cooperate and work closelywith other relevant international organizations on issues of peace,security and stability in Africa. Such organizations may be invited toaddress the Peace and Security Council on issues of common interest,


if the latter considers that the efficient discharge of its responsibilities doesso require.

(emphasis added)

This provides the framework for the AU’s engagement with externalpartners. Although the Protocol specifies organisations, it is in the spiritof this instrument that the AU enters partnerships with individual statesin addition to partnerships with multilateral and other regional organi-sations. Presently, the AU has ‘strategic’ partnerships with the EU (JAES),South America (ASA), China (FOCAC), Japan (TICAD), the United States(AGOA), the Arab world, India, Turkey, (South) Korea and several otherinstitutional relationships throughout the world. We can see, then, thatthere is a role for external partners embedded into the development ofthe APSA.

3.3 External partnerships and development of the APSA

To mitigate the challenges of Africa’s security landscape, the AUhas been particularly open to collaboration with external partners.Klingebiel (2005a) has argued that the changes to Africa’s security land-scape brought on by the peace and security architecture have alsocreated newmotivations for the engagement of external actors in Africa.He gives three ‘push factors’ for the new engagement: the increasedimportance of Africa in the international security arena; the reluctanceof non-African, particularly Western, countries to participate in peacemissions in Africa; and the commitment to support the development ofthe APSA as an innovative entity that acknowledges the nexus betweensecurity and development (see Chapter 2). To understand how externalpartners go about their new engagement with Africa, and the AU in par-ticular, let us now consider the activities of the UN, the United States,China and, of course, the EU. These four actors represent the bulk ofexternal partner contributions to the APSA.

The United States

During the Cold War and in the immediate post-Cold War period, Africawas not an area of strategic interest for the United States, despite itslimited engagement in Somalia in the early 1990s. However, followingthe events that have so captured America’s public imagination throughits documentation in the movie Black Hawk Down, the United Stateswithdrew from the continent, seemingly leaving Africans to their own(non-existent) devices.


In 1997, however, the United States created the African CrisisResponse Initiative (ACRI) while Bill Clinton still had the presidency.ACRI’s beneficiaries included specific American allies in Africa. Further,it encouraged bilateral relations between the United States and recipientAfrican countries, including national military training and support forAfrican contributions to UN peace support operations.

However, the post-9/11 world has reconfigured the United States’relationship with African countries, especially at a continental level.As a region, Africa has increased as an area of strategic importance inUnited States foreign policy, especially in the so-called War on Terror.Whereas North Africa, due to its proximity to the Middle East, hasoften been highly prioritised, United States activities have increasedin the Horn of Africa and in the Sahel, calling for a whole-of-Africaapproach. The United States’ anti-terrorism priorities are determiningthe shape of this new relationship with Africa (see also Haastrup, 2012).Indeed, in a report authored by its Africa Policy Advisory Panel, theUnited States admitted that Africa had assumed a new strategic posi-tion in United States foreign policy, especially in the construction of theUnited States national interests (US State Department, 2002; US AfricanPolicy Advisory Panel, 2004). Africa has therefore become an area of‘mounting uncontrolled spaces’ (Ploch, 2010). In addition to the impe-tus provided by the so-called War on Terror, the increasing UnitedStates’ dependence on African oil and the increasing Chinese presencein Africa’s political and economic landscape drive the United States’engagement.

The administration of President George W. Bush transformedACRI into the African Contingency Operations and Training Assis-tance (ACOTA). An important component of ACOTA is the GlobalPeace Operation Initiative (GPOI), which provides logistical support forpeacekeeping in Africa (Haastrup, 2012). In 2004 the United States estab-lished the Combined Joined Task Force (CJTF), which supported theanti-terror activities in the Horn of Africa. The base of operations for theCJTF is the American military base in Djibouti, while its area of opera-tional concern also includes Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Somalia. Morerecently, and to deal with the Africa’s ever-growing relevance as a region,in 2007 the United States established the Africa Command (AFRICOM),one of nine Unified Combatant Commands of the United States ArmedForces. AFRICOM covers all United States military operations in Africa,with the exception of Egypt. This command unit signals a regional turnin the United States’ approach to Africa, suggesting a response to Africa’sown integration efforts.


Yet many are opposed to the existence of AFRICOM, claiming itspurposes is ‘increased resource exploitation’ (Campbell, 2012) and theinstigation of violence, and especially, that it undermines the author-ity of the AU (Campbell, 2012). Recent expansions of the United Statessecret drone programme in impoverished African states further fomentthe claim that the United States is only interested in its own immedi-ate interest, at the expense of sustainable peace and security in Africa.Consequently, the United States remains suspect as a peace and securitypartner for the AU. Indeed, the disagreement between the AU and theinternational community on the intervention in Libya by NATO, spear-head by the United States, has further impaired a meaningful workingrelationship between the AU and AFRICOM. While, rhetorically, sucha partnership exists, the United States would have more success in itsdealings with the AU within a multilateral or trilateral forum. However,insofar as the United States intends to keep AFRICOM and everythingthat comes with it on a bilateral basis with individual African mem-ber states, it will undermine security integration on the continent andchallenge local ownership of Africa’s security processes.

China

An increasingly recognisable presence in Africa, China has a relationshipwith African states that is dominated by country-to-country engage-ment but which has increased and deepened in recent years. China’srole on the continent is, however, not new. As far back as the 1960s,China sought to balance out the political influence of the West in Africa.The rapid development of this relationship, however, has lent itself tocontinent-wide partnership, as evidenced by FOCAC, founded in 2000.In 2006, China’s Africa policy was presented as indicative of its visionof the world and, in particular, the framework of its relationship withAfrican partners. Often this relationship is presented as economic innature and dominated by China’s quest for energy resources (see alsoNgwawi, 2006); however, it goes beyond this and has political implica-tions (see Wenping, 2007). China’s African policy and instruments suchas FOCAC suggest an increased Chinese understanding of the Africanpeace and security landscape wherein local ownership is prioritised. It issaid that African peace security perspectives converge in the Chineseapproaches to non-traditional security threats.

In any case, China acknowledges the importance and role of regionalactors in tackling global security challenges (Congressional ResearchService, 2008) as a way of preventing external intervention in inter-nal affairs. In the UNSC, especially, China tends to demonstrate often


implicit support (through abstention) for measures recommended bythe AU. Most recently, in Libya, although weary of NATO intervention,China conceded that the wishes of ‘the Arab League, the AU and Africancountries’ prompted an abstention rather than a negative vote (VanHoeymissen, 2011, p. 96). Chinese engagement with regional organi-sations in Africa has also included the appointment of representativesto some RECs and to the AU and an ongoing political dialogue, whichcommenced in 2008.

Although dominated by economic exchange, China’s relations withAfrica have deepened in the political and security spheres. Further,working on the logic that Africa’s insecurities could challenge Chineseenergy security, China has also contributed financially to the peace sup-port missions undertaken by the AU and UN in Sudan and Somalia(see Wheeler, 2000, p. 186; Lynch, 2006; He, 2007, pp. 29–30; AfricaFiles 2008; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC). Beyond this, wesee little direct engagement with the APSA, although there is a strongrhetoric, which is found in the African policy of building up the capac-ity of regional organisations, especially the AU. Recently, the Chinesegovernment contributed all the funds required to build a new AUheadquarters, which was completed in 2012 as an act of Chinesefriendship with Africans. There is perhaps no more powerful symbolof Chinese commitment to engagement with the AU, whatever themotivation.

The UN

For reasons already stated, the UN is very much an important partner ofthe APSA, or, at least, so it seems to both the UN itself and to its Africanpartner. In supporting African attempts to develop its security capabili-ties and also the goal of local ownership, UN administrative presence forthe continental organisation has developed rapidly. Through UNECA,in the old days of the OAU, the UN always maintained a close rela-tionship. Yet the commitment to increasing the AU’s capabilities hasalso meant a restructuring of UN’s relations with the OAU’s successor,especially as regards security.

Shortly after the creation of the AU, in 2006, the UN establishedthe Ten-Year Capacity-Building Programme for the AU. This was organ-ised around thematic clusters including the development of peace andsecurity capabilities (UN [A/61/630], 2006). This commitment, however,operated various institutional structures, including the AU PeacekeepingSupport Team under the aegis of the DPKO.


In July 2010, the UN’s general assembly voted to consolidate UN rela-tions with the AU through the creation of the UN Office to the AU(UNOAU). This new office integrated:

the various peace and security presences in Addis Ababa: the UN Liai-son Office, the AU Peacekeeping support Team, UN Planning Teamfor the AUMission in Somalia and the administrative functions of theJoint Support and Coordination Mechanism of the AU–UN Hybridoperation in Darfur.

(Security Council Report, 2011)

This new office, headed by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General, ostensibly enhances AU–UN cooperation.We already see this inpractice through the hybrid mission and close coordination on Somalia.Like other actors, the UN, including the Security Council, is awarethat local ownership must be a key element in responding to Africaninsecurities. In response to the first report of the Special Representa-tive presented to the Security Council, permanent and non-permanentmembers of the Security Council emphasised the importance of train-ing and the need to build capacity, because the AU is knowledgeableabout the continent’s security needs and because it can support the UN’sresponsibilities for international peace and security.

Perhaps the most important element of the UN’s contribution tothe development of the APSA is training and capacity-building. In theten-year plan established in 2006, the UN is specifically tasked withsupporting the AU’s capacities to undertake successful peace supportoperations under a UN mandate that accords flexible financing to theAU (and other regional organisations) (UNSCR [1809], 2008; A/63/666–S/2008/813). Recent reviews, however, suggest that cooperation forcapability is tense, due to disagreements on how to deal with ongoingsecurity challenges in Africa. If we take African ownership, equality andpartnership as fundamental goals of African security capacity-building,events such as the NATO intervention in Libya, authorised by the UN,undermine the prospect of these principles being achieved. Africanleaders have consistently noted that they are marginalised nowheremore obviously than within the UNSC, despite increased rhetoricalcommitment to empowering regional institutions (Williams, 2012). Fur-thermore, there are fundamental structural differences between the AU’sapproach to peace support and the UN’s. Whereas the UN still oper-ates on the basis that humanitarian interventions will be engaged onlywhere there is peace to keep, the AU is committed to stemming violence,


creating peace in essence and rebuilding it if necessary. These struc-tural differences therefore seem insurmountable at first glance. Yet, asPaul Williams notes, the best option for further UN–AU integrationis to move beyond cooperation on peacekeeping and for the UN toembrace the holistic approach required to mitigate Africa’s security chal-lenges. These challenges must be surmounted so that the AU is acceptedas a legitimate interlocutor for Africa because at present there is noalternative – in Africa today, without the regional institutions securitychallenges cannot be mitigated.

The EU

Since an explicit security partnership with African countries was estab-lished in 2007 in the JAES, the EU’s security engagement in Africa hasincreased significantly, and indeed Africa constitutes the majority of itsnon-European security commitments. Often, EU engagement in Africais as part of a tripartite alliance that includes the UN and the AU.Often, however, the EU is also able to persuade other actors such asthe United States, China and to a certain extent NATO, as we see in theAMANI AFRICA case, another training programme (see Chapter 4).

Prior to 2007, the EU often tried to engage regional entities such asthe AU as in the logistical support given to the AU mission in the Sudan(AMIS II) from 2005 to 2006. However, for the most part, it was contentwith the agreement of the relevant African state. Importantly, how-ever, the EU’s commitment to ‘effective multilateralism’ meant it alwayssought the approval of the UNSC before any support or intervention.

An obvious explanation of new security engagement in Africa is toview it, on the one hand, as a natural extension of previous relationshipbut also, on the other, as an opportunity to reinvent the relationship sothat it adequately reflects the reality of Africa and adequately respondsto its political, social and economic challenges. Since the end of 2007,the EU’s engagement in Africa’s security landscape has increased inresponse to developments in North Africa, the Horn of Africa and theSahel.

These new strategies constructed within the broader framework ofJAES have created new opportunities for EU–AU cooperation with theoverarching aim of bringing peace to the African continent. Yet, as arecent edited collection, notes broadly on security cooperation, thesenew developments have only raised doubts about efforts to cooperate onpeace and security, especially with regard to the integration of the RECsand the inclusion of civil society groups from all over the continent(Pirrozi, 2012).


In any case, the EU, six years on, remains the largest contributorto the development of African capabilities and is thus essential tounderstanding the development of this new structure.

3.4 Conclusion

With the shift from the OAU to the AU, there is an increased level ofregional and multilateral partnerships to tackle insecurities in Africawhere there are occurrences of violent conflicts linked to humanitariancrises, the proliferation of weapons and inevitably high levels of povertyand weak institutions. The AU accepts these insecurities as challenges tothe territorial integrity of African states and, importantly, the security ofthe people who live within Africa’s boundaries. African leaders, throughthe AU, are especially committed to mitigating atrocities such as theRwandan genocide, by being self-sufficient so as not to depend solelyon the political will of Northern countries even within the frameworkof the UN.

Additionally, the UN, having acknowledged its limitations, based onits failure to defend international security in Rwanda, began a cam-paign to activate Chapter VIII of the UN Charter fully. Chapter VIII hasallowed and encouraged the development of regional organisations’ability to respond to persistent and new security challenges. Neverthe-less, the AU’s lack of experiences and resources to develop the institu-tional capabilities and instruments to tackle Africa’s security challengeshas meant a dependence on external partners.

The role of external actors in the development of African capabilitieshas been important in conceptual as well as practical terms. By support-ing African-led initiatives and coordinating with the AU and regionalmechanisms on African challenges that impact international security,the potential for a new paradigm of international peace support is beingdeveloped.

Moreover, these external actors have different approaches andmotiva-tions for their engagement with the AU, which then have implicationsfor the further integration of African security, the AU’s ability to be aneffective regional interlocutor and the resultant APSA.

Whereas the United States’ and China’s new partnerships with the AUseem incidental to their own immediate preferences, with the UN andthe EU there is the sense that the regionalisation of security in Africais part of a sincere desire for autonomous capabilities and for the AU tofind a new role in the international arena. China’s partnership, however,has not attracted the same sorts of criticism as that of the United States


because it does not focus on amilitarisation of Africa. Indeed, the UnitedStates’ engagement calls into question whether it is a useful partner toaddress the holistic dimensions of security, especially within a humansecurity paradigm.

Despite the challenges of engaging with external partners, however,it is still important to note that the emergence of the AU as a regionalsecurity actor has contributed a significant critical moment in the over-all relationship between Africa and Europe. This incarnation of Africanregionalisation and regional security actorness has created new institu-tions committed to peace and security cooperation, something unlikelyto have happened within the prior EU–ACP framework.

As the core interlocutor for Africa, the AU is the key player in try-ing to achieve regional actorship, by promoting African interests andimplementing peace and security initiatives on behalf of its memberstates. Despite its commitments to regional integration and the creationof important institutional structures, the AU itself is less developed as aninstitution of external relations. Rather, the AU is an organisation thatmust rely on a network of other internal actors, including the RECs,and external partners to push forward the agenda on peace and security.Yet as recent work has shown on the dimension of EU–AU peace andsecurity relationship, the lack of consistent inclusion of RECs (Schaefer,2012) serves to undermine the relationship. Nevertheless, the prevail-ing wisdom is that key states such as Ethiopia, Nigeria and South Africa,which have long promoted integration within their own sub-regions,still show a commitment to integrated peace and security at the conti-nental level as the way to respond effectively to security challenges onthe continent.

With this in mind, the subsequent chapters will take us back to theearly days of the JAES, using two examples to tease out the opportunitiesand constraints for coherence and consistency in the efforts to increasethe capabilities of Africa’s security mechanisms. Importantly, this assess-ment will elucidate the changes brought by new security cooperation.Furthermore, it will underscore how institutionalised EU–Africa prac-tices can constrain change and consequently affect new EU–AU securitycooperation.

4EU Support for the ASF:AMANI AFRICA Cycles

Introduction

In this chapter I explore one dimension of security cooperation in EU–Africa relations. This is one example of how the EU and AU worktogether to build the necessary capabilities needed to tackle securitychallenges in Africa. Collaboration on these challenges is, of course,implemented as part of the broader EU engagement in internationalaffairs and the AU’s increasing responsibility for international security asit pertains to Africa. The creation of the EURORECAMP and implemen-tation of the AMANI AFRICA training Cycles, especially Cycle I,1 is aninformative process and a good illustrative example of how the securitycooperation between the EU and the AU contributes to the evolutionof EU–Africa relations. EURORECAMP is ‘a [European] tool to help theAfrican Union (AU) to validate the African Standby Force (ASF)’ throughvarious cycles (European External Action Service (EEAS) website, 2013).

Cooperation in the past was among the donors rather thanbetween the donors and the recipients. This chapter argues that thischange reflects a marked shift in the conceptualisation of peace sup-port capacity-building programmes in EU–Africa relations. The exis-tence of EURORECAMP and the ongoing implementation throughAMANI AFRICA reflects the importance of Africa’s security – its securitythreats and its institutions to the EU. Additionally, AMANI AFRICA illus-trates the consequences of African states’ departure from the con-cept of non-interference in security from external powers. In Europe,EURORECAMP is a concrete illustration of the ability of EU memberstates to merge their interests and to collaborate on matters of inter-national security. In addition, the examination of the EURORECAMPframework and the AMANI AFRICA Cycles reveals new opportunities

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EU Support for the ASF: AMANI AFRICA Cycles 85

for multilateral action, which occur in the context of evolved inter-regional cooperation. An added insight derived from examining thiscase is that it offers a view of the impact of EU–Africa security coop-eration on internal EU integration (and contestations) in the area ofsecurity.

This chapter proceeds as follows. First, it defines and describes theEURORECAMP framework in the particular context of AMANI AFRICA,as a tool designed deliberately to build the capabilities of the AU’s ASF.Second, it discusses the context within which the AU is building upthe ASF. It places the AU’s initiative firmly within an international con-text, which must rely on external partnerships with international actorssuch as the EU, the UN and NATO. It further explores the origins ofthe cooperation, which led to the EURORECAMP and AMANI AFRICA.It does this by focusing on the national, regional and internationalimpetus resulting in the Europeanisation of the EU member states’national programmes. Third, the chapter addresses the challenges tothe EURORECAMP and the AMANI AFRICA Cycles, as gleaned from anassessment of Cycle I from three perspectives: European, African andinternational. In the fourth and final part, the conclusion draws on theanalytical tools established earlier in the book to understand change.The chapter concludes that the implementation of AMANI AFRICA isan example of how security cooperation between the EU and Africaengenders shifts from prior relations.

4.1 Transformation of RECAMP to EURORECAMP

EURORECAMP is a multidimensional framework, which in the firstinstance transforms the French Renforcement des Capacités Africainesde Maintien de la Paix (RECAMP)2 programme into an inter-regional/multilateral process. Its core stakeholders are the AU and theEU (including the European Commission, the General Secretariat ofthe Council and the member states). In addition, the United States,Japan, NATO and the UN are the external partners who form theconsortium to develop African capabilities. EURORECAMP is also con-sistent with provisions within the CSDP, the ESS and the JAES. TheAMANI AFRICA Cycles in the context of the EURORECAMP tool area direct result of the provisions made in the peace and security clusterof the Joint Strategy. In this regard, the JAES aims

to strengthen and promote peace, security, democratic gover-nance and human rights, fundamental freedom, gender equality,


sustainable economic development, including industrialisation, andregional and continental integration in Africa.

(JAES, 2007)

The EURORECAMP is further linked to Proposal 6 of the Action Planfor the implementation of proposals related to the EU concept forStrengthening African Capabilities. It aims to support the integrationof ASF brigades at a continental level and support the development ofthe African Peace Support Trainers Association (APSTA). As this chapterwill show, EURORECAMP goes beyond a simple Europeanisation of theFrench RECAMP to include the participation of other non-Europeanactors. Importantly, it includes the participation of African actors, adimension needed to fulfil the ownership criteria of change, and this iswhat makes the AMANI AFRICA Cycles unique. EURORECAMP is a newtool that retains the education and training component (and best prac-tices) of the French RECAMP. One of the noticeable changes in the shiftfrom RECAMP to EURORECAMP is that, whereas France had designedthe entire process of RECAMP, with EURORECAMP there is a new struc-ture for decision-makers. Essentially, the new decision-makers currentlyin training now include African personnel. To reiterate, execution ofEURORECAMP would be incomplete without the African counterpartsengaged in the AMANI AFRICA Cycles.

Essentially, the thing that animates EURORECAMP is the AMANIAFRICA Cycles. The necessity of joint action by the EU and the AUtherefore constitutes part of the process of transformation in EU–Africa relations. During the negotiation process that finally led to theAMANI AFRICA Cycle I (and the subsequent Cycle II), the AU madethree central demands as part of the conditions of the cooperation withthe EU regarding the ASF. The first demand was that the project betruly continental, thereby ensuring that the AU, rather than Africanstates or sub-regional organisations, acted as the main coordinationcounterpart to the EU in Africa. This demand allowed the AU as aninstitution to assert its authority in the area of peace and security.In making and achieving this demand, the AU also asserted regionalactorness – i.e., Africa’s regional interests on behalf of African states.Second, the AU requested that the process and product be owned byAfricans. So rather than directly training African armed forces, theEuropean partners’ responsibility is to train the trainers, who then usethe knowledge gained in their local context to help their troops pre-pare for multidimensional peace support operations. Third, the AUdemanded that the EU, rather than France, lead the European side of


the partnership. The role of the EU was necessary because, accordingto sources in the EU and the AU, the history of colonialism lingerswhen it comes to issues of peace and security.3 Further, requesting thatthe EU as a whole take the lead for European partners allowed broaderparticipation by other EU member states. Following the establishmentof EURORECAMP, the process of cooperation between the EU and AUbegan informally in November 2007, just before the EU–Africa Sum-mit of 2007 in Lisbon, Portugal, followed by the subsequent launch ofAMANI AFRICA Cycle I.

The training undertaken under the AMANI AFRICA Cycles aims todefine and effectively execute the problems of command and con-trol within Africa’s peace support operations architecture. It also aimsto ensure that the various actors contributing to the ASF are wellintegrated. In addition to training troops and the heads of peace mis-sions (which constitute a significant part of both Cycles), the aimis also to make the decision-making processes clearer and strategi-cally sound.4 The implementation of the AMANI AFRICA Cycles thusrelies on a network of African Training Centres (ATCs). These centresinclude the Bamako Peacekeeping Centre, the Kofi Annan InternationalPeacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Accra, Ghana, the Inter-national Peace Support Training Centre in Karen, Kenya, and otherregion-specific national training centres (EU Council Secretariat, 2009).Additionally, EU member states offer military and civilian peacekeepingat national training centres in Italy, France and Hungary, as well as inother countries. AU (through the peace and security department) and EU(through the EU delegation to the AU) personnel jointly lead the Cycle.France is the framework nation. This means that France is the Europeancountry responsible for the overall coordination of the EU’s contribu-tions to the AMANI AFRICA Cycles. By giving the role of frameworknation to France, African and European partners acknowledge the pre-vious expertise of French personnel in managing training programmesin Africa. As framework nation, France heads the EU Planning Team,currently in the person of M. Bernard Rambaud. As director, Rambaudis supported by representatives from other member states, includingBelgium, the United Kingdom, Italy and Spain. The mission to achievea functional ASF has also involved the UN. This involvement ensuresa strong tripartite alliance between the EU, the UN and the AU. Sincethe UN has the main responsibility for ensuring international peaceand security, its involvement in the AMANI AFRICA Cycle is hardly sur-prising. Additionally, the UN has the most experience in peace supporttraining and the implementation of missions.


As part of its role in the tripartite alliance, the UN has contributed aseconded team of six personnel from the Department of PeacekeepingOperations. The official designation of this team is the African UnionPeacekeeping Support Team (DPKO–AU PST). The UN’s involvement isobvious to the extent that the AU’s peace operations are part of thebroader response to international security threats. A panel led by theItalian diplomat Romano Prodi submitted the recent report commis-sioned by the UN Secretary-General (Prodi Report, 2008). The Prodireport argued for greater integration between international securitystructures (the UN) and regional agencies (the AU). This report is anaddendum to the United Nations Panel on Peacekeeping Operationsreport (the Brahimi Report).

The Prodi Report, however, highlights the challenges to regionalpeacekeeping and peace support operations, by taking on the issue ofpredictable funding. In the Report the panel called for the reform of theUN’s peace operations funding system. The current system only allowsthe UN to fund peacekeeping when the UNSC expressly mandates amission (Prodi Report, 2008). Because AU member states, as UN mem-bers, pay dues that go towards peacekeeping, the Prodi Commission’sinvestigative team believe that a system in which a few countries onthe Security Council have the power to determine how the funds arespent was irregular.5 According to the UN’s current rules, for instance,an endorsement or acknowledgement of an AU mission is not enoughto secure the necessary funding.6 The difficulty in securing the UN’s sup-port has been a key motivator for the AU to develop its own capabilitiesand funding sources.

The creation of EURORECAMP and the implementation of theAMANI AFRICA Cycles have been influenced by events at the interna-tional level. The UN, in particular, has played the most crucial role inshaping this context. In 1992 the former UN Secretary-General BoutrosBoutros-Ghali published the report Agenda for Peace. This highlightedthe new demands of global peace and security. In his report Boutros-Ghali highlights four areas of activity as responses to international peaceand security (types of peace operations). They include:

1. Preventative diplomacy, which refers to the efforts designed to pre-vent conflict among actors or to prevent the escalation of violence incases where there is already evidence of crisis.

2. Peacemaking, which refers to those actions promoting the agree-ments between the conflicting parties (Boutros-Ghali, 1992), such asmediation.


3. Peacekeeping, which refers to activities such as humanitarian assis-tance and election monitoring missions: i.e., civilian and militaryengagements (Diehl, 2008, p. 11).

4. Post-conflict peace-building (Gomes, 2008, p. 114). Peace-buildingremains a contentious term; however, Boutros-Ghali explains it as‘the creation of a new environment’ beyond the cessation of hos-tilities through peacekeeping (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). Peace-buildingtherefore connotes a longer-term commitment to peace than isavailable through traditional peacekeeping models.

Often the terms ‘peacemaking’, ‘peacekeeping’ and ‘peace-building’ areused interchangeably; however, it is important to note the distinctionbetween these concepts. Additionally, new understandings of securitynecessitate that peace support operations consider these distinctions inthe planning and execution of missions.

The proposals in this report reaffirmed the provisions of the UN Char-ter, especially Chapters VI and VIII. Chapter VI of the UN Charter,which deals with the peaceful settlement of disputes, recognises therole of regional organisations in helping to resolve disputes and pre-serve international peace and security. Through the implementationof EURORECAMP–AMANI AFRICA, both the AU and the EU can meetthe demands of the UN’s provisions. Further, since Chapter VIII, inparticular, allows regional arrangements or agencies to deal with ‘inter-national peace and security as are appropriate for regional actions’,both the EU and the AU are effectively able to claim their securityactorness in international security through the implementation of theAMANI AFRICA Cycles. The changes in the international context ofpeacekeeping and peace support operations have therefore enabledthe design and implementation of EU support to the development ofthe ASF.

The prominent role of the UN in the AMANI AFRICA Cycle pro-cesses does not prevent the participation of other actors, as evidencedby the attendance and offers made at the AMANI AFRICA Contribu-tors Conference in February 2009. Countries such as Canada, Norwayand Japan also invested in AMANI AFRICA Cycle I. Additionally, NATO,like the EU and the UN, has been a key partner. Despite the partic-ipation of other partners, the EU, including the member states andthe European Commission, have contributed the most to the process.The Commission sponsors the African Peace Facility. Of the �300 mil-lion allocated to Africa as part of the 10th European DevelopmentFund (2008–2010), �20 million was earmarked for capability-building.


A portion of this fund is held in a trust fund for use in theEURORECAMP–AMANI AFRICA process. In 2007 the EU Peace and Secu-rity Committee decided that the framework nation for EURORECAMP’sAMANI AFRICA Cycle, France, should manage a trust fund for the activ-ities of AMANI AFRICA. A board manages the fund, and the director,who is also the board president, administers it.

In addition, within the framework of the EURORECAMP and outsidethe immediate training processes, the EU through the EU delegationto the AU assists in less technical administrative capacity-building as itsupports regional integration in Africa. While it has been argued thatthe EU seeks to export its regional model, what we find is a purposiveforeign policy of learning and sharing lessons of regionalisation, andthrough the delegation office, the EU takes advantage of the opportunityfor exchange. At the EU’s Addis Ababa office, a military adviser is onhand to share best practice regarding the constitution with the militarycommittee. The establishment of a viable AU Military Staff Committeewill contribute in the long term to problems of command and controlwithin the AU security architecture.

The EU is an important component in the development of Africa’sability to deal with security threats. The EU’s role is important becauseit contributes the most, monetarily and in terms of expertise, to trainingAfrican personnel. ‘The EU has the means, willingness and experiencethe AU needs to develop its structures’, and through EURORECAMPit uses these.7 While EU personnel may not always have an easy rela-tionship with AU personnel, there is a clear sense that the AU prefersthe EURORECAMP approach to programmes proposed by the UnitedStates, for instance, in the context of the AMANI AFRICA Cycles, butalso beyond that (Haastrup, 2012).

One obvious example is AFRICOM. However, there is a clear mistrustof US overtures, and many see the AFRICOM as a way in which theUnited States continues the so-called War on Terror à l’Américain (seeHaastrup, 2012) or as a Trojan horse to deter Chinese influence on thecontinent. Where countering Chinese influence is the reason for UnitedStates involvement, African states are resentful of perceived interferencein the economic development prospects provided by the Chinese. ThisUnited States approach does not sit well with African leaders, and con-sequently the majority of US military engagement in Africa remainsbilateral with poorer African countries, as evidenced by its recent droneprogrammes. The persistence of bilateralism challenges the attempt tomake security in Africa continental. Nevertheless, it reveals how thebehaviour of external partners can challenge local imperatives – in this


case, the drive towards regional integration. In addition, it reveals theemerging position of Africa (and its regional apparatuses) as an area ofstrategic interest.

The organisation of the AMANI AFRICA Cycles through EURORECAMPis distinctive in its aims, even if those aims are not always met. The EU’saims are to support the AU, thereby promoting ownership, partnershipand equality. As a European programme, EURORECAMP incorporatesmany of the recommendations proposed by critics of earlier Britishand French capability-building programmes. The broader contributionof the AMANI AFRICA Cycle I and, in time, Cycle II is the intentionto create a viable component of the APSA, the ASF, which indepen-dently addresses security challenges resulting from humanitarian crisesas a well as violent conflict without needing to wait for external sup-port, as tends to be case, most recently with the French interventionin Mali. Because regional security is simply a part of the internationalsecurity continuum, we can view the AMANI AFRICA Cycles as beingcontributory tools to international security.

4.2 The process that Europe built: Institutions and actors

The basis of the AMANI AFRICA Cycles is linked to various institutionaldimensions in Africa and Europe and the realities of the internationalsecurity system. These realities have related regional and internationaldimensions inasmuch as the challenges to human security such as inter-nally displaced people and refugees in spill over state borders in Africancountries. These human security challenges potentially affect issues suchas irregular migration, which have been linked to insecurity in Europe.Thus, regional security challenges in Africa are connected to those inthe international community. Insecurity in Africa is therefore not solelyAfrica’s problem (Lamambra, 2009).8 This link between regional insecu-rity in Africa and international security is one of the core reasons whythe international partners such as the EU and the United States agree tosupport the African peace and security initiatives.

Since the formalisation of the EU–Africa relationship in the area ofsecurity, the AMANI AFRICA Cycles are the initial tool through whichthe AU seeks to increase its peace support capabilities. The developmentof the ASF is very important because, at its best, it will integrate the secu-rity apparatuses of the five regional economic communities as they sharethe same training modules. The ASF exemplifies the interconnectednessof regional and global security challenges and thereby necessitates a sup-port system that goes beyond Africa. This is where a framework like


EURORECAMP and the AMANI AFRICA Cycles show that there is addedvalue in multiple countries working together to achieve the AU’s aimsfor the ASF.

EURORECAMP was conceived to support the ASF by providing asource of predictable funding (for training), knowledge or logisticalexpertise of peace support operations and a well-functioning institu-tional infrastructure, including better coordination between the AU andRECs. According to the AU’s commissioner for peace and security, Com-missioner Lamambra, the lack of these three provisions has ‘an erosiveeffect on Africa’s ability to effectively resolve conflicts and prevent freshones’ (Lamambra, 2009). Despite the AU’s comparative advantage in theAfrican peace and security arena, due to its personnel contributions, anddespite its political legitimacy, its lack of the provisions above makes itamenable to partnering within frameworks such as EURORECAMP.

The framework within which EURORECAMP exists and in which theAMANI AFRICA Cycles are being implemented, like most aspects of EU–Africa relations, has a historical dimension. Although the AU and part-ners formally launched the AMANI AFRICA Cycle in November 2008, itsorigins date back to 1997. I contend that the events and processes subse-quently evaluated were essential precursors to EURORECAMP as a wholeand the AMANI AFRICA Cycle. Without them, the opportunity for coop-eration on capacity-building for security would not have arisen when itdid and in the way it did. Consequently, we now turn to address the roleof some EU member states, particularly the so-called Big 2, France andthe United Kingdom. The section particularly addresses the impact ofthe prior relations between the member states and African states, as wellas cooperation among EU member states on the eventual establishmentof EURORECAMP and the implementation of AMANI AFRICA by assess-ing the early efforts to consolidate the resources earmarked for peacesupport training and capacity-building in Africa.

In 1998 the United Kingdom proposed the P3 initiative as a con-sortium with France (RECAMP) and the United States (ACOTA). Thepurpose of the consortium was to engage in a more focused and sys-tematic approach to the implementation of training for peace supportoperations for Africans. The initiative allowed the participation of allAfrican states; however, it was not a regional strategy from the Europeanand African perspectives. It therefore differs from EURORECAMP, sincethe latter emphasises a truly (inter-)regional dimension. The followingdiscussion focuses on the component programmes of the P3 initiative,highlighting the role of certain states in instigating donor support forAfrican efforts.


France officially launched RECAMP in 1998. It was France’s attempt to‘Africanise’ the face of the peace support operations on the continent,which had previously been dominated by non-African peacekeepers.In its attempt at ‘Africanisation’, France also introduced a new systemof security defence whereby African troops could respond to Africansecurity threats rather than rely on French intervention. Obviously,France’s engagement in Africa is longstanding, as shown by its rolein the initial basis for EU–Africa relations and its active role in thetransformation of RECAMP. RECAMP, however, was deeply politicallymotivated. It aimed to legitimise the French security presence in Africa.Unlike EURORECAMP, France’s ‘Africanisation’ concept lacked equality,partnership or ownership because French officials rather than Africansplanned and implemented the programme, based on French interests.Nevertheless, RECAMP was unique. Unlike other French security inter-ventions in Africa prior to 1998, the concept made no distinctionbetween former French colonies and non-colonies, thereby broadeningFrench relations with other African nations. France pitched RECAMP asa ‘mechanism to establish an open partnership to strengthen Africanpeacekeeping capacity, in terms of training, equipment and exercises’(RECAMP Website, 2009).

One of the four principles of the RECAMP programme ismultilateralism. Multilateralism has been taken to mean receiving finan-cial contributions from other donor countries such as Japan, Argentinaand Canada, among others. However, the design of RECAMP and itsimplementation have been the domain of France alone. Receiving con-tributions from other countries has survived the Europeanisation ofthe process within EURORECAMP. Further, these countries also engagesubstantively within the EURORECAMP process beyond their financialcontributions. RECAMP focused on training and support for peace mis-sions through instructional courses and training in African regionalpeacekeeping centres (Scorgie, 2007). Unlike EURORECAMP, how-ever, RECAMP emphasised the military characteristics of peacekeepingrather than the currently advocated broader outlook of military, policeand civilian forces. As a respondent notes, ‘procedures and doctrinesused during [. . .] exercises were not multidimensional.’9 Nevertheless,RECAMP was an innovation within the context of EU–Africa relationsin that its aim was to develop African states’ independent capabilities(Scorgie, 2007).

The United Kingdom lacked the sort of security presence that Francehad in Africa during the Cold War period, as it did not directly par-ticipate in any bilateral interventions in Africa until 2000, when it


intervened in the civil war in Sierra Leone. However, it also partici-pated in enhancing the peace support capabilities of African troops. TheBritish component of this programme was the UK African PeacekeepingTraining Support Programme.

Unlike France, the United Kingdom provided training to sub-regionalorganisations’ peace support missions as well as individual countries. Forexample, the United Kingdom provided training to the Economic Com-munity of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) operationin Liberia (see Walpole, 1998 for more details).

In many cases, the provision of training for African peacekeeperswas intended to prepare them for being part of the multinationalUN peacekeeping force. By 2001 internal changes within the UnitedKingdom government’s bureaucracies had made the training of Africantroops a joint remit of the Department of International Development,the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Ministry ofDefence (MoD).10 The sharing of responsibilities in the area of peacesupport operational training is indicative of the new understanding ofinsecurity and the necessary multidimensionality of the response tosecurity threats. The British training component is a key componentof the AMANI AFRICA Cycle. Within the new EURORECAMP frame-work, the United Kingdom continued its support of the KAIPTC, theGhanaian Staff and Command College and the Kenyan Staff Collegeand Peace Support Training Centre (DFID, 2004). However, it is alsonoted that because of recent budget cuts due to the 2008 financial cri-sis there has been a reduction in the overall level of support for theKAIPTC.

Despite the different contexts of their engagement in Africa, though,there were some similarities between the French and British initiatives.These similarities made cooperation attractive to both countries. Sim-ilarly to the French programme, the British train individual leadersand test the effectiveness of the training cycle through multinationalpeacekeeping exercises based on practised scenarios.

The first instance of cooperation between EU member states occurredwhen the United Kingdom and France jointly provided the funds toproduce an English/French peacekeeping dictionary. Additionally, theyalso sponsored the secondment of African officers to the United NationsDepartment of Peacekeeping Operations (UN DPKO) for further training(Walpole, 1998). An assessment of how France and the United King-dom collaborated shows that cooperation between France and UnitedKingdom was possible and successful because the two countries main-tained a division of labour between them. Further, the arrangement


was such that neither country upstaged the other in an attempt togain preferential treatment or a privileged position within the Africancontext.

Although a non-EU member, the United States plays an importantrole as the third partner in the P3 initiative, which is the first build-ing block towards joint donor operations. In addition, in its role as aninfluential member of the G8, the United States has been a key drivingforce in promoting joint operations among donor countries in supportof building African capabilities. Furthermore, the United States is a keypartner within AMANI AFRICA.

There are two main reasons why P3 is important to this analysis ofthe EURORECAMP’s role in the AMANI AFRICA Cycles. The first is itssuccess as a cooperative initiative between two core EU member states,and the second is the role its members later played in mobilising sup-port for EURORECAMP. One of the key reasons the P3 cooperationworked was that each country formed a component of the initiativerather than the training process being completely centralised. The dif-ferent role played by each of the participants allowed each country toretain its perceived interest and maintain its privileged position withinAfrica. While duplication was eliminated, no one programme super-seded any of the others. This formula would become important forEURORECAMP on the European side of the partnership, as EU mem-ber states still jealously guard their sovereignty on matters of security.The ability of each partner to own a component of the EURORECAMPwas one of the reasons why the EU member states agreed to cooperatewith each other.

In addition to the success measured in terms of the ability of thesethree donors to cooperate, the United Kingdom, France and the UnitedStates played important activist roles in persuading other donor coun-tries to contribute and participate in capability-building programmesfor African peace support operations. While this activist role within theEU eventually led to EURORECAMP, much of the groundwork was laidwithin the G8 institution.

At the Canadian summit of 2002, the G8, or group of eight leadingindustrial nations (with the EU represented), adopted the G8 AfricanAction Plan, which pledged support for African efforts to ensure lastingpeace and security. The action plan guaranteed the AU,

financial and technical assistance so that, by 2010, African coun-tries and regional and sub-regional organisations [sic] are able toengage more effectively to prevent and resolve violent conflict on


the continent, and undertake peace support operations in accordancewith the United Nations Charter.

(G8 Action Plan, 2002, p. 4)

Following the establishment of the AU and the commitment to buildthe ASF, the African states held discussions with international partnersto ask for their assistance. Part of this process involved engaging withthose donors who had a previous relationship with African states, suchas the United Kingdom, France and the United States. The result ofthis was a formal request to the G8 in June 2003, at the Evian sum-mit, to ask for assistance to defray the costs of building the ASF. Thisfirst overture was unique in that it was made by an AU representativerather than by individual states. It embodied the African states’ com-mitment to regionalism through security cooperation. With the activelobbying of the P3 countries and the EU representations, particularlythe European Commission and Council Secretariat, the G8 countriespledged their support for the AU initiative and committed to the ‘con-tinuation of funding, training and enhanced co-ordination of activities’(Kent and Malan, 2003). The G8 welcomed the prospect of engaging inAfrican security, bearing in mind that by 2003 the United States andsome of the EU member states with historically privileged positions inAfrica’s international relations – particularly Belgium, France, Portugal,the United Kingdom and Germany – had a growing concern about theinfluence of China in Africa (see Diebert, 2008 for expressions of morerecent concerns).

The result of these initial dialogues with the G8 was the JointAfrica/G8 Action Plan to Enhance African Capabilities to undertakePeace Support Operations (2003). In response, the G8 called for a moregradual approach to the implementation of the ASF by identifying keybuilding blocks, which targeted the specific aims of building Africancapabilities to launch peace support operations (Joint Africa/G8 ActionPlan, 2003; see also Kent and Malan, 2003, p. 74). The Action Plan setsout the precise aims of the partnership and emphasised African own-ership of the process. Further, it acknowledged other ongoing trainingprogrammes undertaken by the G8 on the assumption that these wouldbe components of the G8–Africa partnership.

The role of the G8 negotiations is important because it presents thefirst concise and robust platform for discussions on the initiatives ofEU member states,11 institutions and African requests for cooperation(Scorgie, 2007, p. 13). The G8 is a forum through which EU member


states and institutions work together in the context of their internal andexternal relations arrangements such as the ESS and the Joint Africa–EU Strategy to multilateralise their external relations and cooperationwith Africa in the area of peace and security. Additionally, the G8’s deci-sion to cooperate as a single entity also reflects another early attempt toconsolidate and coordinate donors’ contributions to African capacity-building efforts within a framework that allowed African institutionsto retain some ownership of the processes.12 Not surprisingly, the G8relied on the knowledge and experience of the P3 members to for-mulate new ideals and responses, which reflects how the processes ofinstitutionalisation work with particular actors. Finally, the G8 agree-ment served as the second building block, after the P3 initiative, towardswhat is now EURORECAMP, and the first phase of implementation,AMANI AFRICA Cycle I.

Since 2003, developments to support African training and capabilitiesfor peace operations have accelerated. The shifting attitudes to security,the purpose of peace support operations and the role of regional organ-isations in maintaining international security have supported thesedevelopments. These shifts in attitude have occurred at international(especially through the UN), regional (both European and African) andnational (especially in Europe) levels.13

France, the European pioneer for African capabilities’ support, hassought to strengthen its own national position within the EU. In 2002it began the process of Europeanising the RECAMP concept or process.In preparation, it sought to adapt RECAMP to the African states’ require-ments and introduced a continental dimension through dialogue withthe AU.14 The French government was aware of RECAMP’s weaknesses,including its lack of integration with African sub-regional organisa-tions, which at the time had the primary task of enforcing peace inthe region. First, it included the participation of international organisa-tions, including the UN and EU and non-governmental organisations;however, there was still no reference to a broad regional framework orfurther integration of African resources. As one EU official remembers,‘we did not talk about the ASF at that time. There was not really any talkabout APSA either. Nor the AU.’15

By 2005 France had reshuffled its troops and trainers to fit with theseven sub-regions identified by the AU in accordance with the guar-antees the G8 had made in the Action Plan. In the same year, formerFrench president Jacques Chirac also announced the desire to includeRECAMP in the former European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)


framework as the ‘operator of reference’ for other EU member states’programmes. The reorganisation of RECAMP in 2005 reflects the will-ingness of the French government to make the process more adaptableto a continental approach. In addition, it showed France’s ambition tobe the vanguard for European security integration while maintaining itsposition in Africa.

In the United Kingdom the Prime Minister, Tony Blair, declared 2005the ‘year of Africa’. Following the publication of the report, Our Com-mon Interest, by the Commission for Africa (CFA),16 Africa became afocal point for debate within the United Kingdom among developmentand security practitioners. The report emphasised the need for develop-ment agencies to work with the AU in particular. It also made the cruciallink between development and security, emphasising the role develop-ment plays in the prevention of violent conflict (CFA, 2005, p. 153).Further, it laid out the framework on which the United Kingdom’sLabour government intended to engage with Africa on developmentand security initiatives. The CFA emphasised the role of the regionalorganisations, including the EU and AU, in ‘preventing and resolv-ing violent conflict’ (CFA, 2005, p. 153). Thus, the British governmentclearly supported the expanding role of the EU in engaging in issues ofpeace and security in Africa. It further supported the inter-regional struc-ture of peace and security cooperation insofar as it provided the UnitedKingdom with a role to play.

Tony Blair played a crucial role in promoting the panel’s reportto other EU member states through inter-governmental networks, EUinstitutions and the G8 grouping. Following in the footsteps of theUnited Kingdom, Germany announced its own initiative, Partnershipwith Africa, established in 2005. Horst Köhler, the German president atthat time, announced the initiative. Germany conceived this partner-ship as part of its broader development strategy, although it includedsupport for the AU and its peace and security objectives. Germanyis unique in that, while it uses its European heritage to promote thepartnership with Africa, it relies more on the G8 mechanism than theEuropean Commission. Nevertheless, the prioritisation of Africa’s peaceand security by the Big 317 fed into the supranational psyche, which cul-minated in the adoption of the EU Strategy for Africa by the EU Councilin 2005.

Following the end of the Cold War, the EU began to strengthen itsability to participate in the fields of foreign security and conflict preven-tion as a single entity.18 Although the member states had different viewsas to what developed European capabilities would look like, it was nev-ertheless an aspiration of the EU to be an international security actor.


In 2004 the EU Peace and Security Committee adopted the ESDP ActionPlan for Africa (EU Council, 2004).19 The Action Plan outlined practicalrecommendations that would later contribute to the establishment ofan EU delegation to the AU, which included sending liaison officers toAddis Ababa and providing expert training in political affairs and peaceand security.

The following year the Council adopted the Common Position Con-cerning Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in Africa.20

The Common Position is a declaration by EU member states, whichhighlighted the international dimension of regional peace and securityin Africa. The document emphasised the commitment of EU memberstates and institutions to supporting the AU’s objectives of ‘peace, secu-rity and stability in the continent’ (EU Council, 2005).21 Further, theCommon Position highlighted the fact that cooperation on securitywas part of existing relations with the view to developing longer-termpartnership. The impact of the institutional presence of the EuropeanCommission and the General Secretariat of the Council, in particular,in the proceedings has led to the adoption of a more comprehensiveprogramme.

Specifically, emphasis was placed on inter-regionalism where possi-ble concerning the EU’s cooperation with Africa on peace and security.The EU has been instrumental in promoting this method of engagementrather than bilateral relations. Between 2005 and 2008, when the JointAfrica–EU Strategic Partnership was being negotiated between the EUand Africa, the EU member states also negotiated among themselvesthe acceptable terms of Europeanising the RECAMP process – termswhich were based on the principles of inter-regionalism. FollowingPresident Chirac’s announcement, the French government requestedthat the EU’s PSC evaluate the proposals for a Europeanised RECAMPconcept/process. The PSC asked the General Secretariat and the Com-mission to design a ‘concept for strengthening African capabilities forthe prevention, management and resolution of conflicts’ (Council ofthe European Union, 2006b). The final version of the concept, as pre-sented to the PSC in July 2006, identified three categories of measuresto enhance the EU’s response. These measures include:22

1. Improved coherence, consistency and coordination within the EU,and especially among its peace and security programmes. This wouldinclude developing a support and coordination structure for the EU.

2. Ensuring a consistent source of financial support for African peaceand security initiatives through the APF, and the Regional InitiativeProgrammes (RIPs). The RIPs support the integration of RECs into the


APSA. THE APF should be complemented by other financial supportthrough the CFSP/ESDP budgets.

3. Support for African capabilities through the training of Africans,using EU member states’ existing facilities and transforming theRECAMP and other member states’ programmes23 to deliver EUpolicies.

Following internal negotiations within the EU, the former High Repre-sentative for the CFSP, Javier Solana, appointed General Joana to thepost of Special Adviser for African Peacekeeping Capabilities in theGeneral Secretariat of the Council. His primary task was to overseethe Europeanisation process of RECAMP. While the implementation ofAMANI AFRICA highlights cooperation between the EU and the AU,and among the EU member states, the implementation process is notwithout its challenges.

4.3 Challenges to cooperation

There are three main threats to the aims of the AMANI AFRICA pro-cess. They are: the attitudes of EU member states; the problem ofunequal contributions stemming from shortcomings in the AU/Africa’sorganisational structure; and other international factors.

The main purpose for which EURORECAMP was created is to ensurethe convergence of EU member states’ programmes and to consoli-date strengths in order to ensure less confusion for the African sideas the AMANI AFRICA Cycles are being implemented. Effectively,EURORECAMP was intended to further security integration within theEU. It also provided a way to manage the EU’s resources through adivision of labour that avoids unnecessary duplication. However, thereality is that, although there is unwavering support for the initiative,there are different conceptions of participation and commitment lev-els among the member states of the EU. Because the member statesof the EU form an integral part of AMANI AFRICA, any problems inthe articulation of their commitments create problems for the wholeprocess. It would seem, as Brummer (2006) suggests, that, despite itsbest intentions, a fundamental impediment to Europe’s security perfor-mances is that ‘the security interests of EU member states diverge.’ Thiscontinued divergence, which is manifested in performance, constitutesone of the central challenges to the EU’s role in the implementationof AMANI AFRICA. In particular, I examine the attitudes of key EUmember states, including the United Kingdom, Germany and France,


the so-called Big 3, to the EURORECAMP tool and participation inAMANI AFRICA.24

The United Kingdom, which we discussed in the context of its owntraining programmes, is committed to the development of Africa’scapabilities. However, the British are resistant to forgoing bilateral pro-grammes (Bagayoko, 2007, p. 12).25 That is to say, the British support acontinental approach but would rather not give up bilateral privileges,which keep the United Kingdom’s relationships with its former coloniesrelatively intact. According to Bagayoko (2007), the United Kingdomresists the idea of a new centralised office to serve as a clearing-housefor all of EU–Africa’s peace and security policies that include mem-ber states. The British fear a situation whereby EU arrangements willovertake national ones, which could make the EU more relevant thanthe nation-state in the area of foreign security engagement. This fearis a resonant theme in British engagement in EU external relations,even when we see more British collaborative participation in general,as in its support for French intervention in Mali. Fundamentally, theUnited Kingdom is content to engage in security matters as part of anEU contingency when the General Secretariat of the Council and theCommission at the EU level only act as organisers and fact-finders – theUnited Kingdom is content, in other words, as long as the status quo isnot threatened.

This attitude in the context of EU–Africa cooperation is consistentwith the United Kingdom’s general position towards the integrationof security within the EU. Most studies on British attitudes towardsEU security integration contend that the United Kingdom’s actionsare guided by its commitment to NATO as well as its ‘special rela-tionship’ with the United States (see Whitman, 2006b). Consequently,when security integration within the EU is seen to undermine contin-ued member states’ primacy and challenges NATO, successive UnitedKingdom governments have tended to remain cautious. The UnitedKingdom’s commitment to NATO and its special relationship with theUnited States is thus potentially detrimental to the aims and objec-tives of the inter-regional cooperation between the EU and AU onpeace and security, even as the United States has started a campaignof bilateral engagement in Africa’s security landscape. The unwaveringcommitment to NATO and the United States leaves room for unnec-essary duplication among EU member states’ activities in Africa. Mostimportantly, and perhaps not sufficiently highlighted, it underminesthe AU’s vision, which seeks to consolidate peace and security at thestrategic continental level.


Although Germany too had colonies in Africa and maintains strongties to Namibia and Ethiopia, for instance, it does not share thesame sort of history that the United Kingdom, France, Portugal andBelgium do with Africa. Yet, as one of the so-called Big 3, its inter-ests, perceptions and dispositions are important for continued EU–Africa inter-regionalism in the policy area of security. German interestsin Africa in the post-independence era consist mostly of develop-ment assistance to some African countries. Germany’s relationship withAfrican countries is a good example of typical donor–recipient relation-ship. Unlike some other EU member states, Germany is a newcomer tothe field of peace support operations. It is trying to make its own inde-pendent mark in the area of peace and security. Germany has thereforeembarked on bilateral cooperation with the AU to develop the capacityof the AU’s peace and security department by providing staff trainingand advisory services in both the AU and RECs. Germany’s preferencefor bilateralism is not at the cost of its investment in EURORECAMP,especially the implementation of AMANI AFRICA; indeed Germany iskeen to help the AU develop its peace support capabilities within aninter-regional framework and commits a substantial amount of moneyto the process (see El-GhassimWane et al., 2010). Further, its componentpart of the AMANI AFRICA Cycle is to develop the police and civiliancomponents of the ASF, making Germany relevant in both Cycles I andII. Two things are clear from the level and method of German support.First, it prioritises the development of civilian components of securityover other hard-security components of EURORECAMP. The official doc-uments of the German government have repeatedly emphasised therole of the GTZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit)now GIZ in implementing the Federal Foreign Office Initiatives. Second,although this component is clearly a part of Germany’s commitments toEURORECAMP and is presented as such within the EU, Germany’s doc-uments present its support of the ASF as a German initiative rather thanan initiative that is also part of an EU cooperation engagement (GTZ,2008).

This suggests that Germany would rather continue its bilateral rela-tions with African states even when engaging in new security coopera-tion, just as the United Kingdom and France have already done (Federal,Foreign Office, 2009). The main change in the German approach isthat it also engages with African states through the AU. Additionally,building a relationship with African institutions allows Germany to optout of proposed EU initiatives when unhappy with British or Frenchmotives.


One reason for Germany’s reluctance to engage in security actionsunder the EU banner is common knowledge among EU academics andpractitioners.26 Some EU officials suggest27 that Germany suspects thatEURORECAMP is not truly a partnership of Europeans and African butrather a continuation of France’s foreign policy in Africa. Essentially,they view EURORECAMP as just a Europeanisation of the RECAMP pro-cess in order to re-legitimise France’s position in Africa.28 So, ratherthan being seen as evidence of a maturing of the external relations pro-cesses of the EU, the position of France as the EU’s framework nationwithin EURORECAMP proves to sceptical German policy-makers thatEURORECAMP is France’s way of entrenching its influence in Africaand legitimising its neo-colonial aspirations. Thus, security remains thelowest common denominator in EU integration, and making memberstates’ policies more coherent continues to be problematic.

Throughout this chapter, France’s role in the creation of theEURORECAMP framework is very apparent. Aside from the fact thatin its first incarnation it was a French programme, France’s role as theframework nation immediately makes it the most important Europeanactor in the process. However, France’s leadership position in thisendeavour has its disadvantages, as evidenced by the attitudes of bothGermany and the United Kingdom. The suspicions of the United King-dom and Germany certainly help to restrain French ambitions; however,they could also constrain France, to the point where the EU and theAMANI AFRICA Cycles are unable to take full advantage of France’sexpertise in the area of peace and security in Africa. As the most activeformer colonial power in Africa during and after the Cold War, Francehas an advantage that neither the United Kingdom nor Germany has.

Evidently, the continued support of EU member states for Africa’speace and security capabilities depends on the extent to which eachcan overcome their suspicions of the others about its motivations forsupporting the AU. This challenge goes beyond the EURORECAMPframework and will persist beyond the AMANI AFRICA Cycle. Indeed,it is a perennial challenge within the EU, and it affects the EU memberstates’ ability to integrate more fully in the areas of foreign and securityrelations.

The challenges of EURORECAMP go beyond the problems of cohe-sion and competition within the EU. The completion of the 2008–2010(Cycle I) of AMANI AFRICA, although deemed mostly successful, wasdelayed. Nevertheless, the challenges arising from this delay, especiallyfrom the AU, strained EU–AU relations and called into question thepotential for transformation in EU–Africa relations. A central challenge


for the AU is its still embryonic organisational infrastructures, whichpresent problems on different fronts. As an organisation that beganoperations barely ten years ago, the AU has created an ambitious taskfor itself. Moreover, security is the area in which it has invested themost in terms of expertise, expense and time. Although implement-ing the AMANI AFRICA functions on the basis of equality between thetwo institutional partners, the EU and AU, the AU is far less developedthan the EU in its capacity to plan and organise the daily demandsof a partnership, and even less so in terms of the demands of theAMANI AFRICA exercises. During the first AMANI AFRICA Cycle, whilethe AU’s work was commended, the organisation did not perform at itsoptimum levels.

This in turn affects the overall the process, and Africa’s regionalactorship. Many see the under-capacity of the AU as the growing painsof a new organisation. Nevertheless, this reality can jeopardise the AU’sownership of peace and security processes.29

The literature on the emergence of the ASF further notes that thecentral challenge to implementing peace support operations in Africais financial: i.e., there are financial constraints preventing the success-ful and timely launch and operation of peace missions. Neethling,for instance, argues that, unlike other regions, Africa has the requiredpolitical will and troops to engage but no funds (Neethling, 2005).

However, some of those with inside knowledge of EU–Africa relationscontend that the biggest impediment to Africans dealing with Africanproblems – i.e., local ownership – is the lack of political will amongsome African states.30 Despite the shift in the pan-African philosophyfrom non-intervention to non-indifference,31 African politicians havenot engaged with the debates about the role of the AU in taking overmatters of (peace and) security in the continent. Yet, for the sake offurther integration and ownership on the part of Africa, African leadersespecially need to commit to the aims of the AU and, by extension,its core security mechanism – APSA. The inability of some AU memberstates to commit to the AU and APSA is a hindrance to achieving theelements of transformation by taking ownership of the processes.

It has indeed been argued that some of the financial constraints notedin the literature are as a result of the lack of political commitmenton the part of many of the leaders. The link between political com-mitment and financial constraints is crucial to the function of the allaspects of APSA since the AU does not have independent funds. Con-tinued reliance on donor funds will further compromise the aspirationof ownership. Thus, political will, in addition to financial constraints,


contributes to the problems of launching successful peace support oper-ations. Further, the limited expertise of the AU and its inability fully toutilise existing capacities remain fundamental hindrances for EU–Africarelations, especially in security.

The lack of commitment, together with internal incoherence, is com-pounded by the fact that the AU does not have enough people to do itsjob properly. The lack of AU capabilities was noted by every respondentinterviewed and a reality that is witnessed daily within the compoundsof the AU in Addis Ababa. The AU’s current recruitment process exacer-bates the situation. The process is too long and cumbersome, as it takesan average of 18 months. Furthermore, in this area the EU supports sev-eral AU staff working within the peace and security structure. Membersof the AU bureaucracy know these problems, and while they are takingsteps to deal with them, with the assistance of external partners, thesluggish pace at which changes are occurring is delaying the work thatcan be done in the area of peace and security, where it is most needed.

In addition, the RECs have yet to be fully integrated into APSA. Thelack of full integration has caused tension between bureaucrats in theAU headquarters and those in the REC offices. These tensions betweenthe AU and some of the RECs hamper day-to-day operations. The AUfor its part believes it has primary jurisdiction on matters of security,while some of the RECs believe they can offer more to the AU, basedon their experience and institutional evolution. The resolution of thesetensions will require further clarification on issues of mandates and legalauthority and who does what – i.e., demarcation between the AU’s andthe REC’s responsibilities – for the ASF to function effectively once it hasbeen established.

Further, concerning the preparations for the brigades that makeup the ASF, some of the RECs have had difficulties with integratingthe civilian components of their brigades during the initial phases ofAMANI AFRICA Cycle I. The difficulty in integrating the civilian com-ponents has contributed to several delays in the implementation ofthe EURORECAMP process. The lack of a civilian element would havedefeated the aim of multidimensionality for which EURORECAMP hasbeen designed and, inevitably, the full function of the ASF (Dersso,2009; Pirrozi et al., 2012). Importantly however, the goal of the currentAMANI AFRICA Cycle II is to remedy this shortcoming.

According to Colonel Debrah of the AU, the ASF has not been fullyintegrated into other aspects of the peace and security architecture.While there is a lot of attention paid to building the ASF, it is unclearhow it fits seamlessly into the whole peace and security architecture.


The uncertainty is problematic for EU–Africa relations since EU com-mitments require a broader support for the entire architecture (citedin Dersso, 2009). If the operationalisation of the other aspects of theAPSA challenges the function of the ASF, then the EURORECAMP frame-work and AMANI AFRICA Cycles could undermine broader process ofEU–Africa security cooperation.

Additionally, similar to its predecessor, the OAU, the lack of meri-torious joining conditions/criteria for membership of the AU poses achallenge to progress in the area of peace and security in Africa. Unlikethe EU, which requires a prospective member state to fulfil (at the veryleast) the conditions of the Copenhagen criteria for membership, theAU is a club for all African states with the exception of Morocco. Theonly observed criteria for membership in the AU (as with membershipin the OAU) are that a country must be African, must be sovereign andmust not impinge on the sovereignty of another country.

It is still not widely accepted that the AU may intervene in a countryunless the country in question has invited that intervention.32 While inprinciple the notion of non-indifference suggests intervention in casesof humanitarian crises, this is in reality contingent on the permission ofthe host government, which may itself be the cause of the crisis. Becausethe AU is the sum of its members in terms of peace and security, theformation of the AU potentially works against the very interests it triesto promote.

The recent financial crises of 2008 and recession in the partners’ coun-tries raised concerns about ongoing contributions to EURORECAMPand the building of capacity for APSA more broadly. Although Africaneconomies on the whole are not tightly enmeshed in global financialsystems, the impact of the crisis still resonates in the form of slashedaid contributions, remittances and foreign investments by the coun-tries in the Western hemisphere. With reference to EURORECAMP, forinstance, during AMANI AFRICA Cycle I, the United Kingdom withdrewits support for the KAIPTC.33

A further challenge created by the international sphere comes fromthe organisation of international security itself. While the UN Chartermakes provisions for the actions of regional organisations in mattersof peace and security, more clarity is needed concerning precise man-dates. The UN Security Council retains the right of forceful interventionin international affairs. However, because of the failure of the UN inRwanda through its lack of response, African states no longer intend towait for UNSC mandates when a situation is deemed urgent. Peace oper-ations in Somalia, the Sudan and Mauritania reflect the determination


of the AU to respond to African crises. The commitment to this responseis apparent even when the means and resources are limited.

It must therefore be assumed that, until there is no conflict situa-tion, the last challenge cannot be mitigated as the AU will do what isrequired. One AU official said, ‘if our house is on fire, will we not do allwe can to put the fire out? Will we just stand aside and wait for a firebrigade that may never come?’34 This sums up current African think-ing on security crises on the continent – Rwanda has taught Africa notto rely on the international community, as it may let them down. TheASF is intended to respond to events outside the immediate remit ofChapter VIII of the UN’s Charter. The legalities thus have to be clari-fied (Dersso, 2009).35 This situation raises the interesting issue of howregional security governance fits within the international security archi-tecture where decision-making is the purview of the five permanentmembers of the UNSC.

Related to the challenges discussed above, EU and AU officials citedthe lack of donor coordination as a major problem for the dailyfunctioning of the AMANI AFRICA Cycle.36 EURORECAMP is quite sig-nificant in that it is the closest the international partners have come tohaving one voice on an issue they have already committed. Yet, as oneAU official noted, ‘we spend so much time just coordinating the partner-ship rather than doing the real work; we need a special office dedicatedjust to partnership.’37 External partners inundate the APSA with offersof contributions and donations; however, the AU’s Peace and SecurityDepartment suffers structural deficiencies that make the department aninefficient coordinator. The lack of efficiency affects the work of theentire APSA, including AMANI AFRICA, thereby leaving the bulk ofthe coordination to the EU delegation to the AU. This situation fur-ther endangers the principle of ownership in EU–Africa relations. Yet,by acknowledging this possibility, the EU delegation to the AU makesa concerted effort to accept direction by the AU even when things gooff-schedule.

EU officials have also expressed frustration at the slow pace withwhich donor coordination takes place once any coordination is agreed.Respondents in the European Commission admit that part of the prob-lem is the EU member states, as discussed above, but they also blame iton mixed messages from the AU. One EU official, for instance, notes anincident in which the AU denied that a Portuguese contribution wasneeded for the AMANI AFRICA Cycle at an informal Portuguese–AUmeeting when the opposite was true.38 In addition to being unable tokeep up with the demands of receiving contributions, the AU also finds


it difficult to account for the money and other resources contributed bythe EU. The result of the lack of accountability has sometimes resultedin the reluctance of the EU (and other donor agencies) to make futurecommitments to the AU since these partners are also accountable totheir electorate and parliaments.

Evidently there are issues to be resolved on both sides of the partner-ship. The AU has to develop better bureaucratic capacities to respondadequately to the requirements of receiving contributions and the part-nership consortium managed by the EU must follow through on com-mitments with tangible actions and more cohesiveness and coherencein its approach to capability-building in Africa.

For all the challenges arising from the EURORECAMP framework andthe implementation processes of AMANI AFRICA, especially Cycle I, thegoal of assisting the AU to build this phase of the ASF has been moreor less successful. Success, of course, is measured by the move towardsa change in the status quo, and this case has shown evidence of thistransformation.

4.4 Conclusion

The EURORECAMP framework and the training undertaken in the con-text of the AMANI AFRICA Cycles reflect a unique case of cooperationon security between the member states of the EU and the AU withintheir respective regions and with each other. This cooperation relieson new, broad understandings of international security that are foundwithin the frameworks of the security–development nexus. The linkingof development with security has helped to re-conceptualise how peaceand security are organised within the EU Brussels establishment. It hasallowed closer cooperation between the European Commission and theGeneral Secretariat of the Council in areas traditionally reserved for EUmember states. Together, actors within the EU work to plan and imple-ment relevant components of the AMANI AFRICA Cycles in Brusselsthrough the EU working group. Further, EU institutional actors coor-dinate the work of the Council Secretariat and the commitment of EUmember states’ contributions to capability-building in Africa throughthe office of the Special Adviser for African peacekeeping capabilities.

Additionally, the creation of the unique EU delegation to the AU,whose mandate originates from both the Commission and the Coun-cil, is further evidence of collaborative engagement within the EU.Further, the implementation of AMANI AFRICA Cycles has encour-aged the practice of multilateralism as the process has incorporated


the participation of institutions such as the UN, NATO and individ-ual non-EU countries, such as the United States, Canada and Norway.Finally, concerning the EU, the creation and implementation of theAMANI AFRICA Cycles and EURORECAMP have transformed internalEU dynamics so that EU member states work together within a com-prehensive framework with each playing a relevant role. Consequently,the notion of burden-sharing is apparent in the implementation of theAMANI AFRICA Cycles.

The implementation of the First Cycle also addresses the cooperationdynamics between the EU and Africa; and in particular the AU. Theprocess represents a distinct embracing of inter-regionalism rather thanbilateral relationships. Within the broader framework of EU–Africa rela-tions, EURORECAMP, the AMANI AFRICA Cycles constitutes a changein how EU member states relate to African states on matters of secu-rity. While power asymmetries remain between the EU and AU, the AU’sability to contribute to the function of the cooperation process by insist-ing on some conditions of implementation is evidence of the erosion ofthe strict donor–recipient relationship. Through experiences and lessonslearned from previous bilateral programmes, the EU and AU haveforged an exclusive instance of cooperation that champions partnershipin security without necessarily compromising the jealous hold of thenation-state in this arena. Indeed, the arrangement of EURORECAMPperhaps confirms the continued importance of EU member states’ rolesin international security and to achieving inter-regionalism.

In addition to examining a unique alliance on peace and security,the study of the AMANI AFRICA Cycles reveals the evolved methods ofimplementation, which is a reflection of the transformation from a bilat-eral to an inter-regional security engagement. Contrary to reports aboutthe EU’s ineffectiveness in the area of security, AMANI AFRICA revealsthe EU as a new type of institutional contributor to the internationalsecurity architecture. The EURORECAMP framework strives to givemuch-needed legitimacy to Western governments. This is, at least, theperception of EU member-state governments as they seek to convinceAfrica that the malignant colonial legacy is gone and new engagementsare based on partnership and mutual good will. Time will tell whetherthe image of Europeans as good-will ambassadors and equal partners isfully accepted by African countries. Presently, supporting AU initiativesrather than imposing condition of cooperation is a step in the rightdirection.

While this chapter has carefully outlined the aims and processes ofthe AMANI AFRICA Cycles and organisation through EURORECAMP,


particularly the impact on the formation of the ASF, the analysisalso addresses the key issues raised here in relation to the trans-formation of EU–Africa relations through security cooperation. TheAMANI AFRICA Cycles reveal the intricacies of the inter-regional rela-tionship, the nature of international cooperation on security and theEU’s external role in international security. The introduction of securitycooperation as an explicit aspect of EU–Africa inter-regional relationshas allowed for a shift in the implementation of the European train-ing programmes to improve African capabilities. The EURORECAMP andAMANI AFRICA Cycle I have been able to allow for better coordinationamong EU member states, thereby reducing duplication.

The change from bilateral relations to inter-regional ones has, how-ever, taken advantage of the existing relations and bureaucracies, asevidenced by the role of EU member states and the EU bureaucraciesin negotiating the EURORECAMP framework and implementing theAMANI AFRICA Cycles. At the same time, the shift to inter-regionalismhas transformed those bureaucracies. For example, changes have intro-duced new offices such as the EU delegation to the AU and the officeof the Special Adviser for African peacekeeping capabilities, to help dealwith the new areas of cooperation within EU–Africa relations. The newsecurity cooperation has especially fostered these bureaucratic changes.

Additionally, EURORECAMP has allowed for the broader participa-tion of EU countries such as Finland, whose previous engagement withAfrica had been limited to its involvement in external development poli-cies in a handful of countries.39 In addition to broadening interregionalcooperation, EURORECAMP has deepened interregional cooperationas implementation methods call for an in-depth knowledge of coun-tries and regions in Africa as well the bureaucratic arrangements of EUmember states. Further, through EURORECAMP and the implementa-tion of the AMANI AFRICA Cycles, the EU’s commitment to Africa hasincreased. Not only does the EU delegation to the AU represent the EU,but it also conducts daily briefings with the ASF headquarters. As practi-cal evidence of deepened integration based on EURORECAMP planningand implementation, towards the end of May 2009 the EU delegationoffice relocated from offices shared with the European Commission’srepresentation. The delegation office is now located in the building nextto the offices of the ASF staff, behind the AU compound.

The challenges to the AU’s peace and security architecture are substan-tial and therefore the eventual outcomes of EURORECAMP – i.e., theability of the ASF to conduct independent mission – must be monitoredclosely. As one EU official notes,


It’s not ideal that we [. . .] work on the build up [sic] of the APSA andat the same time a lot of attention has to be absorbed by Somalia,by Comorros, by Mauritania, by whatever crises you want to name.If you compare that to the lack of staff in the African Union and theover-burdening of key personnel in the African Union [. . .] that isprobably the biggest challenge in the AU.40

The implementation of the AMANI AFRICA Cycles is a visible exampleof regional cooperation within the EU and the AU, and interregionalcooperation between the EU and Africa, which builds on previous rela-tions. Indeed, the characteristics of the EURORECAMP framework andAMANI AFRICA Cycles are clear examples of path-dependent processeswithin the EU–Africa institution. However, through its implementa-tion mechanisms and the infrastructures on which it depends, theEURORECAMP framework reflects a transformation of prior relationsthat is more political and closer to an equal partnership. This trans-formation process involves strategies and practices explicitly designedto allow the AU to take ownership for the AU to take ownership ofdecision-making and implementation of African peace and securityinitiatives.

5Scapegoats and Heroes:Establishing a Small Arms Regime?

Introduction

Today, some consider the use of guns to be just as dangerous as, if notmore dangerous than, nuclear weapons. According to the UN:

Small arms and light weapons destabilize regions; spark, fuel andprolong conflicts; obstruct relief programmes; undermine peace ini-tiatives; exacerbate human rights abuses; hamper development; andfoster a culture of violence

(UN Office at Geneva, July 2010)

Furthermore, the UN defines small arms as ‘any man-portable lethalweapon that expels or launches, is designed to expel or launch, or maybe readily converted to expel or launch a shot, bullet or projectile bythe action of an explosive’ (UN, 2001). Small arms are the most readilyavailable weapons used by state and non-state actors in violent con-flicts. It is estimated that approximately 875 million small arms are incirculation, of which legitimate security forces (Stohl and Hogendoorn,2010) hold only around 291 million. Small arms are easy to handle andacquire, inexpensive and easy to replace and repair. The ease with whichsmall arms can be acquired makes them the weapon of choice for rebels,illegal paramilitary groups, terrorists and criminal gangs. In addition,the proliferation of small arms has also been cited as a direct contrib-utor to conflict, crime, violence, suffering and human development inAfrica (News 24, 2005; IANSA, Saferworld, and Oxfam, 2006; Small ArmsSurvey, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006).

This chapter examines EU support for African initiatives to con-trol the illicit flow of small arms and light weapons (SALW)1 or

112

Scapegoats and Heroes: Managing Small Arms Regime 113

micro-disarmament in Africa. Recent efforts to tackle the challenges ofsmall arms in Africa signalled a change from previous EU interventions.The EU has placed small arms control at the heart of its conflict preven-tion strategies, especially those strategies that support African regionalinstitutions. I argue, however, that EU practices, in the context of itsrelationship with Africa, reflect a path-dependent process rather thana shift. Both the EU and African states, independently and throughregional organisations, agree in principle that establishing lasting peaceand enforcing security in Africa rely on the eradication of the illicittransfer and use of small arms.2

The chapter is divided into five sections. First, it assesses the prob-lem of small arms in Africa and the initiatives introduced to tackle theillicit proliferation of small arms. This section, then, describes and eval-uates the intended process of mainstreaming and its intended impacton peace and security in Africa as well as peace and security institu-tions. Mainstreaming is ‘a comprehensive process which ensures that anissue and approach is systematically addressed across all strategies, pro-grammes and initiatives undertaken by any agency or process’ (Sherriff,2005). Second, it provides a context for the current EU–Africa initiativeto combat the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. It focuseson EU frameworks and actions in the area of small arms control. Third,it examines the recent pan-African initiative, an intended example ofchanges in EU–Africa relations. Fourth, it confronts the challenges ofEU support for African small arms initiatives. Finally, it concludes witha case study of EU–Africa cooperation by highlighting the impedimentsto substantive changes in EU–Africa cooperation on small arms control.

5.1 How do you solve a problem like small arms?

Controlling the illicit transfer of arms within national, regionaland international contexts is known as micro-disarmament. Micro-disarmament is a field that emerged in the 1990s, and it is defined asan ‘umbrella concept designed to include the control of light weaponsthrough counter-proliferation activities through the inception of inter-national regimes and through attempts to search for and destroy extantinventories’ (Carr, 2000). These control measures are also referred toas ‘small arms interventions’. The practice of micro-disarmament goesbeyond internal small arms control measures, which involve the collec-tion and destruction of weapons. It also includes tracking and measuresput in place to prevent trafficking and illegal sales of firearms on theblack market. International and regional organisations, such as the UN,


the EU and, increasingly, the AU, have driven the development of thisfield.

In Africa, where some of the poorest people in the world live in(post-)conflict societies and those states that have been described as fail-ing states, the acuteness of the small arms problem is evident. To besure, Africa is not the only region that feels the devastating effectsof small arms. It is a global problem, with negative consequences inLatin America and the Caribbean, the Middle East and Eastern Europe.However, Africa is worst affected by SALW. Indeed, many of the con-flicts in Africa are primarily fought with small arms. Many of theseweapons were originally from developed countries and were surplus torequirements; consequently, they were dumped in Africa, where theyfuel crippling conflicts.

The challenge of small arms in Africa is two-sided: supply anddemand. Often the focus of small arms research and control is the sup-ply side of proliferation. This includes programmes aimed at controllingthe import and export of weapons, monitoring existing stockpiles andtracking the movement of weapons. Essentially, the supply side of smallarms proliferation focuses on sale and transfers. One African expert,however, argues that Africa’s challenges have to do with the demandside of proliferation: that is, what drives people to own guns?3 Theanswer to this question relates to other aspects of human insecurityon the continent. In Africa, private citizens often obtain their weaponswhen the state cannot secure their safety or livelihoods. Often theseguns have been circulated illicitly.4 It is in this environment of statefragility and uncertainty that violence thrives.

Aside from fuelling conflicts, weapons are easily available when vio-lence has ceased, and this impedes the aim of achieving lasting peace.For example, in Burundi, a post-conflict society, the prevalence of smallarms prevents democratic norms such as the rule of law from function-ing fully, despite general progress in other areas (IRIN, 2006). Accordingto police sources, unemployed civilians make a living by hiring out gunsto criminals (IRIN, 2006). Problems with arms are particularly commonin West Africa, which is home to a plethora of illegitimate armed groups(Florquin and Berman, 2005).

In African countries such as Côte d’Ivoire and Nigeria, small arms fuelinternal insurgency in the northern and southern regions, respectively(Hazen and Horner, 2007). In oil-producing Nigeria, the proliferationof small arms and the consequent violence are directly attributable tothe recent drop in the production of crude oil. Small arms aid the expe-diency of indiscriminate kidnappings and the frequent harassment of


oil workers (Hazen and Horner, 2007). While insurgents claim to befighting for a greater share of oil wealth, their activities have furtheredunderdevelopment as cuts in oil production also limit the economicgains derived. In this context, the control of small arms by the state’ssecurity forces is seen as an essential component of securing peace andachieving stability in the country.

In the past, controlling small arms and tackling the trafficking of themacross borders have often been within the ambit of African nationalgovernments. Additionally, the sub-regional organisations provided thenormative framework for tackling the illicit transfer of arms while thenational governments were tasked with creating concrete structures andimplementing policies that curb the flow of arms (see Table 5.1).

Since 1999, African leaders have made stopping the flow of ille-gal arms on the continental a priority.5 However, these indigenousframeworks are part of an overall international strategy to control smallarms, despite their regional focus. Hence they have occurred in parallelwith the UN’s political and policy instruments.

Since the mid-1990s, international partners have supported imple-menting these initiatives, especially the EU, including the memberstates and European Commission. While European and African actorsacknowledged existing national and sub-regional actions, they alsonoted that more cooperation and coherence were necessary amongAfrican states (Djinnit, 2006). The Sirte Declaration was issued at ameeting of African leaders in Libya. It called for greater regional integra-tion in Africa, as well as the establishment of a new regional structure.African leaders also requested the convening of the Conference on Secu-rity, Stability, Development and Cooperation in the Continent. Theconference, which took place in 2000, prominently featured the issueof SALW as a direct threat to peace and security on the continent(OAU, 2000).

Between 1999 and 2001, African states worked towards a cohesiveframework of reference to tackle the issues of SALW in Africa as part ofan international effort. In December 2000, the African heads of state metonce again to endorse the Bamako Declaration on an African CommonPosition on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of SmallArms and Light Weapons. While the Bamako Declaration formed a partof Africa’s preparation for the 2001 United Nations Plan of Action (UNPoA), it was also important for being the first African-initiated continen-tal statement on small arms. The declaration delineated the differentroles of national, regional and international actors. The Bamako Dec-laration recommended the creation of national agencies to oversee the


Table 5.1 African sub-regional frameworks to halt small arms proliferation

Africa sub-regionalframeworks

Date Policies Region

Economic Communityof West African States(ECOWAS)

1998 Voluntary moratorium onthe import, export andmanufacture of small arms inthe ECOWAS region.

West Africa

Nairobi Declaration 2000 Provides a comprehensiveframework to combat theSALW, which contribute toprolonged conflicts, politicalinstability and armed crimein the region.

Horn of Africaand Great Lakesregion

Nairobi Protocol 2000 Legally binding on countriesin the Horn of Africa andGreat Lakes regions. ForbidsSALW ownership anduse among the civilianpopulation.

Horn of Africaand Great Lakesregion

SADC Declaration 2001 Reinforced the commitmentof southern African states tofighting small arms, but notlegally binding.

Southern Africaand DRC

SADC Protocol 2001 This is a legally bindingdocument which prohibitscivilian ownership or use ofall types of small arms andlight weapons.

Southern Africaand DRC

ECOWAS Conventionon Small Arms andLight Weapons

2006 Legally binding measurewith monitoring mechanismaimed at reducing guns andgun violence in Africa. Morecomprehensive than themoratorium and enforceable.

West Africa

destruction of surplus arms and confiscated weapons (Vines, 2005). Allthese also coincided with the creation of the AU.

Since Bamako and the establishment of the AU, African states havesought to coordinate their efforts better within one holistic networkhoused in the AU’s peace and security department. This has been a


critical point, since SALW are considered a peace and security issue andthe central ambit of the AU. However, the nature of SALW issues alsonecessitates a micro-approach at national and regional levels. Further,some of the sub-regional organisations in Africa have more experienceof tackling SALW issues. One of the core aims of African efforts on SALWis therefore the strengthening of national and especially sub-regionalstructures within a broad continental framework. According to one AUofficial, the role of the AUwill primarily be to assist with better coordina-tion between all the regions, by setting up programmes in regions wherethey are non-existent and ensuring that all the regions have matchingcapabilities, which means that all the regions must be able to initiateeffective control measures.6 So, as part of its remit as a norm-settinginstitution, the AU aspires to lead the mainstreaming of small armscontrol into the continental peace and security-related initiatives.7 Thisaspiration is consistent with the view that the peace and security mech-anisms of the regional economic communities constitute the buildingblocks of APSA.

The PSC Protocol unequivocally communicates the urgency of thesmall arms challenge. It further emphasises the need to halt prolifer-ation within African borders. The PSC Protocol therefore gives the AUthe continental mandate to plan, design and implement continent-wideinitiatives relating to SALW issues. The nature of the continent-wide ini-tiatives is in the proposal stage in the Continental Strategy, a draft ofwhich is awaiting approval.

The key feature of the pending continental strategy is the mainstream-ing of small arms interventions into APSA (Hamzaeva, 2009). Both theEU and the AU (including the member states) have endorsed the main-streaming approach to micro-disarmament.8 This process addresses theimpact of SALW as an issue that cuts across institutions, sectors andpolicy areas, which emphasises the nexus between security and develop-ment. It thus bridges the gap between the interventions and institutionscommitted to the different phases of conflict, including prevention,management, resolution and post-conflict reconstruction.

Importantly, the mainstreaming that is proposed by SALW strategiesconsiders the early stages of conflict: during conflict prevention as muchas later stages. Practitioners who work in the field of small arms controlcontend that it is best to start small arms intervention processes earlier,since such intervention could potentially halt the onset of conflict.9

Yet the concept of mainstreaming small arms strategies at the variousstages of the conflict is not prevalent in the written discourse on small


arms practices. Often there is still a bias in favour of micro-disarmamentactivities occurring in the last phase of the conflict cycle: during post-conflict reconstruction. The implementation of these activities usuallyoccurs through Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR)programmes and/or Security Sector Reform (SSR) projects.

DDR is a three-pronged process involving: the collection, documenta-tion, control and disposal of small arms and their munitions; the formaldischarge of combatants; and the integration of ex-combatants to civil-ian status with adequate opportunities for a sustainable livelihood. DDRhas seen exponential development, particularly since the end of theCold War. The UN, as of 2013, which currently has ten programmesin Africa, Asia-Pacific and Central America (UNDDR Website, 2013),promotes DDR.10 Although DDR programmes recognise the intercon-nectedness of the socio-economic, political, military and humanitariandimensions of small arms issues, the purpose of DDR processes is ‘tocontribute to security and stability in post-conflict environments’.11

An approach targeting post-conflict reconstruction rather than a main-streamed approach to the earlier phases of conflict misses a vitalopportunity to prevent armed conflict.

Further, DDR programmes are often planned in the context of broaderpeacekeeping operations, which means the Department of Peacekeepingtakes the lead on planning and implementation, supported by otherUN agencies (UNDDR website, 2013). Despite the intention of rein-tegrating former combatants into society, the organisation of DDRprogrammes through the UN does not emphasise the involvement oflocal institutions or the broader community affected. Understandably,many post-conflict societies lack the viable institutions to deal with thedemands of the DDR. However, the involvement of local institutionsand groups is important to the sustainability of rehabilitation and con-tinued provisions for former combatants. Thus, beyond the fact that alack of coordination with local actors reinforces a top-down approachand discounts the principle of ownership, the lack of local ownershipjeopardises the progress of sustainable peace.

The gaps in DDR have contributed to the development of SSR pro-grammes. SSR programmes or initiatives present a broader frameworkfrom which micro-disarmament procedures are being undertaken. SSR‘is the process of reordering state security structures – military, police,and intelligence – to better fit the threat they face and the societythey serve’ (Donald and Olonisakin, 2001). According to Hänggi, how-ever, SSR remains an ambiguous concept, as its implementation isbroad and includes many types of activity (Hänggi, 2004; Wulf, 2004;


Caparini, 2005). Despite the conceptual ambiguity, aid agencies, inter-national organisations and practitioners use the concept to describethe building of democratic institutions intended to promote the ruleof law and increase security. These include justice institutions suchas the police, military and legal system (OECD/DAC, 2001; Donaldand Olonisakin, 2001; DFID, 2002). The core distinction between DDRand SSR programmes is that, while the focus of DDR is on ensuringthat ex-combatants fit into a peaceful society, the focus of SSR is onbuilding institutions. The SSR concentrates on reforming the military,police and intelligence services and those who oversee them in post-conflict societies. Specifically, well-planned SSR programmes emphasisethe importance of building justice institutions that support democracy,human rights and the rule of law. The aims of the SSR projects aretherefore generally broader than the aims of DDR programmes.

Although often within DDR and SSR frameworks, micro-disarmamentinitiatives can occur outside them. For instance, Muggah (2009) notesthat micro-disarmament programmes have grown independently ofDDR programmes since the 1990s. However, they still form the bulkof small arms control interventions. DDR programmes and SSR projectsattempt to address the challenges associated with the illicit proliferationof small arms. However, both have their drawbacks. DDR programmesare often criticised for not addressing the ‘demand’ aspect of SALW:i.e., for not addressing the reasons why groups accumulate weapons.SSR projects are criticised for their broadness, which marginalises thecontrol of small arms (Muggah et al., 2005; Atwood et al., 2006;Brauer and Muggah, 2006). These criticisms are noted as the maincontributors to the failure of many DDR and SSR programmes. As thetwo main approaches to micro-disarmament, the enactment of DDRand SSR are often designed as part of the post-conflict reconstruc-tion strategies. They therefore undermine commitments to conflictprevention.

The concept of mainstreaming should not, however, be seen as a blan-ket enforcement of micro-disarmament frameworks across every policyarea. Rather, mainstreaming SALW issues into a broad range of relatedissues encourages a realistic and holistic approach to the broader impactsof SALW. These include their negative impact on the implementationof economic and social development strategies, criminality, conflictescalation, peace negotiations and the post-conflict environment. Fur-ther, there is evidence that EU-supported initiatives which adopt themainstreaming approach have been rewarded with tangible successes.12


In the context of the AU, mainstreaming would involve the inte-gration of counter-proliferation activities into the major componentsof APSA with a renewed focus on conflict prevention and manage-ment. The process is innovative in its application because it moves awayfrom the typical small arms interventions occurring during post-conflictreconstruction. As envisioned in the AU, a mainstreamed approachwould allow for interventions before, during and after conflict. A main-streamed approach to SALW control is different from all other controlinitiatives. The mainstreaming approach prioritises building small armscontrol mechanisms into the whole of the APSA rather than seek-ing implementation as a single self-contained initiative. Consequently,an effective strategy that is mainstreamed would aim to mitigate thenegative impacts of SALW before (early warning), during (conflictmanagement) and after conflict (conflict resolution and post-conflictreconstruction).

I. Building SALW into Conflict Prevention: the Continental EarlyWarning Scenario

While previous post-conflict interventions may have been appropriate,their continuation is not useful, given that Africa needs earlier interven-tion. In many cases, this intervention is necessary to prevent large-scaleconflict (Laurance, 1999; Greene, 2005).13 In a scenario where practicefollows policy, the need for post-conflict reconstruction engagementscould be minimised. Given the importance ascribed to early micro-disarmament intervention, one area that would benefit immensely froma mainstreamed approach, which connects conflict prevention to smallarms control, is the CEWS of APSA.

Until recently, the discourse about micro-disarmament or small armscontrol did not include its incorporation into early warning systems.Often the practices of disarmament processes and other small arms con-trol measures favour short- to medium-term programmes that take placeafter the cessation of violence. However, small arms initiatives incorpo-rated into an early warning system presume a long-term commitmentto lasting peace, which occurs beyond the cessation of violence. For thisreason, prolonged dependence on external partners is not sustainable,and local solutions are required to create the tools and implement thenecessary measures.

Practitioners in academia and civil society organisations (CSOs) havelong identified the linkages between outbreak, escalation, resurgenceand intensity of conflict to the ‘proliferation, accumulation, availabilityandmisuse of small arms and light weapons’ (Laurance, 1999). However,


small arms interventions have not been a priority in planning earlywarning tools. It has been recommended that, as part of an integratedmainstreamed approach to small arms, early warning systems requireweapons-specific initiatives that use operational indicators in the pre-vention stages of the conflict cycle. These operational indicators linksmall arms supply to an effective early warning system. They include:monitoring insecure arsenals and weapons theft, in particular, whichmay reveal an arms build-up, and also monitoring the movements ofgroups such as known rebel organisations within a country with thepotential to launch violent attacks (Laurance, 1999).

In the AU, the CEWS is in its early stages and derives its mandatefrom the Protocol Establishing the Peace and Security Council. Theearly stage of CEWS’s development makes it a suitable entry point toadapt small arms interventions using a continental approach. The CEWSframework is

defined around three iterative and interactive phases or steps:(1) ongoing information collection and monitoring, (2) conflict andcooperation analysis, and (3) formulation of policy and responseoptions.

(African Union, 2008)

Additionally, accurate information derived from monitoring and datacollection for an early warning system – such as increased movement ofweapons, monitoring border activities and coordinating with nationaland regional institutions – helps to identify the causes of a conflict,predict its outbreak and halt conflict escalation (Austin, 2003). Thecreation of a CEWS is significant in that it constitutes a significantchange in how African states approach conflict and conflict prevention.As part of the shift from non-intervention to non-indifference, the earlywarning mechanism is set up as a tool of the PSC, which is chargedwith anticipating and preventing disputes and conflicts (PSC Protocol,Art. 7, 1, a).

The focal point of the CEWS is the Situation Room, which formspart of the Conflict Management Department and Post-Conflict Recon-struction Division (CMD) and serves as an observation and monitoringcentre. In theory, the staff of the Situation Room should be trained asspecialists involved in collecting systematic data on small arms and armsmovements on the continent. The specialised training of the SituationRoom staff on arms movement could aid in monitoring early warn-ing indicators. By incorporating the micro-disarmament or small arms


control initiatives into the early warning system, the AU can fulfil inpart the aim of mainstreaming SALW into APSA.

The international partners of African institutions who support con-flict prevention have welcomed the mainstreaming approach. Theseinclude EU member states such as Germany and Britain, the G8 andthe European Commission. Indeed, the European Commission andmember states have committed their support for such an approachas part of their broader commitment to support the implementationof APSA.14 Additionally, member states have highlighted the value oflinking micro-disarmament initiatives to early warning systems in theirdevelopment assistance to Africa.

The Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ),15

the German government’s technical cooperation programme, has con-tributed substantively to the development of early warning systemsin Africa’s RECs. Through training, funding and experimenting withnew software technology, Germany supports strategies that include anexplicit reference to small arms controls (Federal Foreign Office, 2009).The aim of this support is the improvement of the sub-regional mecha-nisms and conflict prevention capabilities, as well as the promotion of amainstreamed approach to small arms issues.

The overall commitment of the EU to small arms initiatives in Africais detailed in the JAES. The JAES aims to support small arms controland conflict prevention based on inter-regional cooperation. In thisroadmap for cooperation, the EU is both a supporter and a guardianof AU efforts to develop the ability to control small arms on the conti-nent. More than supporting an approach, the EU (both the Commissionand member states) has committed itself on paper to work through theAU. If this commitment is implemented, it will constitute a change fromprior relations.

5.2 Leader of the pack: The EU & the fight againstsmall arms

Controlling the proliferation of small arms is clearly a priority forinternational security actors. The types of intervention programmes dis-cussed above have come about only through a system governed byagreements and policies that are international, regional and national.The UN set the tone in 1995, when it brought the issue to the forefrontof international security and development politics through the UN Gen-eral Assembly Resolution (A/RES/50/70).16 Subsequent expert meetingsculminated in the 2001 UN conference and framework, which governed


the illicit transfer of small arms. In 2001 the UN adopted the Programmeof Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in SmallArms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects (UNPoA). The UNPoA servesas the central framework for tackling SALW proliferation, and it is polit-ically binding on all UN members. In addition, there is the Protocolagainst Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts andComponents and Ammunitions, which focuses on arms used to commitcrimes.

The UN policy instruments encourage local solutions to tackle theproblems of small arms and light weapons. Additionally, the UNPoA rec-ommends the commission of regional agencies to implement the solu-tions to the proliferation of small arms, thereby supporting regionalapproaches to small arms control. The UNPoA has been the centralframework for European countries in their efforts to stop the spreadof illicit weapons. Accordingly, European states subscribe to politicallybinding policy instruments within the framework of the Organisationfor Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the EU.

The European Commission and EU member states use interna-tional, regional and national instruments in support of their externalsmall arms initiatives (see Table 5.2). The perspective gained from EU

Table 5.2 EU micro-disarmament policy instruments

EU policy instrumentsfor SALW

Year What it does

The EuropeanConventionon the Control ofthe Acquisition andPossession of Firearms byIndividuals

Adopted1978;came intoforce1982

A political document and not legallybinding. It recommends arms control.

OSCE Principles onConventional ArmsTransfers

1993 OSCE adopted these principles with theview to avoid those arms transfers thatmay aggravate or prolong conflict,endanger peace, be used for thepurposes of repression, violate humanrights or be used outside legitimatedefence and military needs.

Wassenaar Arrangement 1995 Established to promote transparencyand greater responsibility in transfersof conventional arms. Forty countriesare currently members.

124

Table 5.2 (Continued)

EU policy instruments forSALW

Year What it does

EU Programme forPreventing and CombatingIllicit Trafficking inConventional Weapons

1997 The document recognises thenegative impact of SALW onsecurity and human suffering andcommits to greater coordinationand cooperation among EUmember states on SALW action.

European Union JointAction on SALW

1998/2002 Framework adopted as guidance forEU institutions and member statesto tackle the threat of small arms.Updated in 2002.

EU Code of Conduct onArms Exports

1998 A political agreement that furtherdevelops the common criteria forarms export control.

EU Development CouncilResolution on Small Arms

1999 The document reaffirms theprevious commitments of the EUand further requested memberstates to include SALW into theirdevelopment policies, especiallythe ACP countries.

OSCE Document on SALW 2000 A politically binding agreementthat includes ‘provisions forinformation exchanges on SALWimports and exports as well ascriteria for exports, imports,stockpile management, and surplussmall arms destruction’. Thisagreement is only binding amongOSCE member states (Naval TreatyImplementation Programme,2010).17

The Cotonou Agreement 2000 The agreement constitutes an EUdevelopment commitmentto African, Caribbean andPacific Group of countries.It also highlights the EU–ACPcommitment to eradicating illicitSALW.

OSCE Document onStockpiles of ConventionalAmmunition

2003 An agreement of OSCE memberstates in which they recognise thatammunition and weapons causeconsiderable damage to security.Member states commit to reducingthe availability of ammunition.


European SecurityStrategy (ESS)

2003 While it does not directly mentionSALW, the ESS keeps conflictprevention at the heart of its strategy.Further, SALW issues are relevant tofour key threats identified: organisedcrime, regional conflicts, terrorism andstate failure.

European Consensus onDevelopment

2005 The EU commits itself to arms exportcontrols with the aim of reducing theinstances of violence and conflictaggravation in its partner countries.

Strategy to Combat IllicitAccumulation andTrafficking of SALW andtheir Ammunition (EUSALW Strategy)

2005 Builds on previous instrumentsand advocates a comprehensiveapproach. It identifies Africa as itspriority area for tackling the illicittrafficking and accumulations of SALW.

institutional documents is that the illicit spread of small arms hampersthe development efforts of the European Commission and EU memberstates. Further, small arms increase insecurity in areas where memberstates have strategic and historical interests.

In addition to its development and aid responsibilities, the EU viewsSALW intervention as a matter of practical security and moral responsi-bility. This view arises because its member states include some of thelargest arms producers in the world and generally contribute to thechallenge of small arms proliferation.18 Although bound by commonframeworks, EU countries are governed by different national policies asto which countries or regions receive small arms. Research has shownthat selling weapons is ‘big business’ and profit sometimes outweighsthe security imperative of micro-disarmament (Levine and Smith, 2000).The sale of small arms can therefore be in the economic national inter-ests of developed countries, despite its negative impact on developingcountries. The rise of neo-liberalism, which espouses deregulation andfree trade as the key to development, further exacerbates the difficultyof reconciling economic interests and moral duty. An economic sys-tem that allows free movement of goods helps governments and armstraffickers ferry weapons into conflict zones. The lack of consistency inpolicies means that the EU contributes substantially to the problem ofproliferation.

EU member states have also contributed to bilateral programmeswith specific African countries and institutions to eradicate smallarms proliferation and aid micro-disarmament initiatives. France hasidentified the illicit traffic of small arms as a fundamental problem of


international security. It has therefore been a French priority to con-tribute to small arms control. French support is usually in the formof monetary contributions. For instance, France contributed �487,000towards the ECOWAS moratorium through Programme for Coordina-tion and Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED) and afurther �381,000 over four years through the UN Regional Centre inLomé. More than other member states, France channels the fundingfor small arms through regional organisations such as the EuropeanCommission and OSCE rather than through direct development or con-flict prevention programmes, as is the case with Germany. France alsoworks through the UN agencies but tends to balance these multilateralcommitments with regional ones vis-à-vis the EU.

As one of the other core member states on matters of security, theUnited Kingdom too has its own small arms schemes. While the UnitedKingdom acknowledges its membership of the EU as integral to itsown outlook on small arms and light weapons (DFID et al., 2000a),it still prefers to work outside the common European frameworks.The most prominent of its schemes is the Transfer Control Initiative(TCI). The TCI ‘seeks to prevent irresponsible transfers, such as thosethat might exacerbate instability, conflict or repression’ (Greene andKirkham, 2007). Indeed, the United Kingdom seems to have developedthe TCI because it believed that the EU Code of Conduct did not go farenough.

Since the creation of the TCI, the United Kingdom through theTCI has sponsored workshops and seminars that promote small armscontrol on a regional basis, believing that regional approaches are moresuitable than a one-size-fits-all model. The result is that, despite a gen-eral rhetoric in support of EU activities, the United Kingdom spendsthe majority of its resources on self-initiated schemes. Consequently,well-intentioned United Kingdom programmes work at cross-purposesto the expectations of African-owned initiatives implemented throughthe EU–Africa institution. Smaller EU countries such as Sweden andthe Netherlands and their civil society organisations are also commit-ted to the eradication of small arms, although on a bilateral level withindividual countries.

Although all legislative frameworks and treaties are binding on EUmember states and institutions, the majority of the small arms initia-tives undertaken on behalf of ‘the EU’ have been designed and led bythe European Commission. The Commission’s support for SALW con-trol programmes around the world goes back as far as 1992. Since theearly 1990s, through its budget and the EDF, the European Commission


has spent approximately half a billion Euros and contributed bilater-ally or multilaterally to 19 projects as part of the previous CFSP budget(Dicorrado-Andreoni, 2006). Africa has been a major beneficiary of EUefforts to combat the proliferation of SALW.

However, the European Commission dealt with small arms issues inAfrica on a case-by-case basis. The European Commission, especiallyDG Development19 and DG External Relations (RELEX),20 funded smallarms and light weapons interventions in self-contained programmes orbased on requests from developing countries. Small arms interventionswere therefore part of a broader development framework, and they werebilateral.

In the past two decades, the reality of the small arms problem, aswell as the European Commission’s increased capabilities and instru-ments, has meant that small arms are considered both a developmentand a security issue. In acknowledgement of this realisation, someSALW projects have been funded as joint initiatives between the Coun-cil (the corpus of the member states and the General Secretariat) andthe European Commission, using the CFSP budget rather than the EDF.In spite of the fact that the EU classifies small arms initiatives as bothdevelopment and security interventions, the European Commissionusually acts as a single donor agency, while member states have theirown separate programmes. Since the Commission often takes the leadon the ‘EU’ initiatives, small arms initiatives are treated as developmentrather than security concerns.

Before adopting the Strategy to Combat Illicit Accumulation and Traf-ficking of SALW and their Ammunition in 2005, the EU relied on looseregional frameworks and international instruments. One such regionalinstrument was the 1997 EU Programme for Preventing and Combat-ing Illicit Trafficking of Conventional Arms. This framework consistedof EU contributions to the UNPoA negotiations. Although a positivestep in tackling small arms proliferation, the EU Programme was notlegally binding. Consequently, the EU member states relied on theirexisting policy and the UN policy instruments. Further, like other inter-vention instruments on small arms, it focused on providing assistanceto post-conflict societies and fragile states.

In 1998, the EU Joint Action on Small Arms became the first sub-stantive step towards a more integrated framework. This Joint Actionreinforced the EU’s commitment to international and regional coopera-tion to reduce small arms accumulation and decrease existing surpluses(Council of the EU, 1999).21 The European Commission played anactivist role by getting the EU member states to agree to the Joint Action


in the Council.22 One result of the Commission taking on this role is thatthe institution has long considered SALW issues its domain. Althoughthe EU member states readily acceded to the Joint Action as a com-mon ground for their small arms control initiatives, the agreement didnot compel more integration among member states. The lack of inte-gration meant that many programmes were implemented in parallel toEuropean Commission-implemented programmes.

In 2000, coinciding with the final negotiations regarding the UNPoA,the development of the AU and the expansion of EU external relationsinstruments, EU member states became more confident about includ-ing security concerns in their external relations tasks. This increasedconfidence resulted in the comprehensive 2005 SALW strategy. Thisstrategy is binding on all member states and focuses on Africa as anarea of priority. The strategy functions within the broader frameworksof the European Security Strategy and existing EU development, con-flict prevention and security and defence initiatives and policies. Thestrategy explicitly links the illicit circulation of SALW to conflicts, ter-rorism, organised crime and state failure, which are all seen as directthreats to the EU. The SALW strategy ‘serves as political guidance forall EU activities’, making it part of the broader EU external relations(European Commission, 2008). From the foregoing, the EU views theproblem of small arms and light weapons as a direct contributor to fourout of the five threats identified in the ESS (European Security Strategy,2003). Essentially, the EU SALW strategy is a tangible example of the EUmember states’ commitment to UNPoA guidelines, which recommendcomplementarity at the regional level. African states are seeking to adoptthe model of regional complementarity on small arms eradication.

The external commitments of the EU are dedicated to the finan-cial assistance and technical development of regional capabilities forsmall arms control. While these programmes are often self-contained,they have seen the EU working with the UN, regional organisationsand non-governmental organisations, including those in Africa such asECOWAS secretariat, the Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA), basedin Nairobi, Kenya, and SADC, for southern Africa. The EU, for instance,has been funding the activities of RECSA through the Instrument forStability (IfS), which is a crisis response mechanism to support long-term peace-building and capacity-building projects. RECSA is a specialistcivil society organisation, which supports the East African commu-nity in establishing a sub-regional framework on small arms controlin the region. RECSA is charged with coordinating national efforts ‘toprevent, combat and eradicate stockpiling and illicit trafficking in small


arms and light weapons in the Great Lakes Region and Horn of Africa’(RECSA website). Further, between 1992 and 2006, the European Com-mission through the EDF has supported wholly or partly more than 50small arms control initiatives in Africa. However, these contributionswere made without regard for broader coherence among initiatives.Rather, they were created to tackle specific issues as they arose (EuropeanCommission, 2006).

As an advocate of a mainstreamed approach to small arms controland micro-disarmament in Africa, the EU has sought to support Africaninitiatives that promote this approach. The EU (including the Commis-sion andmember states) supports early-stage interventions in small armscontrols initiatives. This support exists despite the fact that the prac-tices of most interventions occur during post-conflict reconstruction.In supporting a system that incorporates these strategies into conflictprevention frameworks and institutions in Africa, the EU is effectivelyshifting its modus operandi on matters of small arms and light weaponsin Africa.

Because a mainstreamed approach is also a long-term approach, inter-national partners can better contribute to eradicating the small armsproblem by enabling local institutions and communities to carry outthe appropriate initiatives. Consequently, in 2009 the EU pledged to‘enhance capacity building, networking, cooperation and exchange ofinformation on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) [. . .] as well asfight against illicit trafficking’ (General Secretariat of the Council, 2009;Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009). It is in the spirit of this pledgethat the European Commission (on behalf of the member states) first ini-tiated negotiations to support the creation of a pan-African small armsinitiative designed in full cooperation with the AU. The critical question,however, is whether this initiative contributes to helping African-led ini-tiatives to create a continental framework and promoting the changesin EU–Africa relations suggested in the JAES.

5.3 Supporting African ownership through partnership?The pan-African initiative

Following the adoption of the JAES in December 2007, representativesfrom the AU and the European Commission met to discuss the possi-bility of EU support for a continental small arms initiative. This requestwas different from previous EU small arms engagements in Africa. First,it came from the AU, although it had the support of African countries.


Second, it requested support for a continental strategy, rather than bilat-eral support from national governments. Third, by instigating thesenegotiations under the aegis of JAES, the expectation from the AU wasthat the result of negotiations would come from the EU as a whole.On the latter point, the AU expected a coordinated European approachwith the EU member states and Commission together.

In December 2009, AU officials from the DSD presented the firstdraft of an Africa small arms strategy for representatives from the RECsto review and produce a final version in January 2011. At the time,the proposed AU SALW strategy sought to harmonise previous Africanregional and national positions within a broader global framework,while regional developing small arms control capabilities within the AU.

At the time the strategy was initially proposed, it sought to synchro-nise small arms interventions across the activities and components ofAPSA. The strategy sought to provide synergy and flexibility across thedifferent peace and security sectors since previous guidelines for com-bating the scourge of small arms on the continent was fragmented.In essence, the AU was seeking to make small arms control a core partof other security interventions rather than a separate programme. As wesee in previous small arms control programmes sponsored by the EU,often disarmament and reintegration programmes were conducted onan ad hoc basis. Further, since cooperation between the EU and Africaon the issues of SALW is driven by the central principle of local own-ership, it was important that the EU take a step back in this process asan observer in the development of AU capabilities to address small armsissues.

Ideally, the EU would be an adviser during ongoing AU intra-regionaldeliberations, providing the support necessary to realise the aims ofthe AU. This role is entrenched in the JAES, which guides the currentrelationship between the EU and Africa on matters of peace and secu-rity (EU–AU, 2007). Consequently, the actual process of institutionalmainstreaming in Africa is left to the abilities of the peace and secu-rity department of the AU, particularly the DSD. However, despite theprogress made on a first draft, the final draft has taken over a year tomaterialise, and in the interim the EU seems unsure about how it willsupport this strategy.

At these initial stages, the pan-African initiative was envisioned to besimilar to the Plan of Action for the Implementation of the PCASED.This was the main implementation support for the ECOWAS mora-torium on small arms. The difference would be that, rather thanECOWAS implementing the small arms initiative, the AU would takethe helm.


In 1998 the EU, through its member states, including France and theUnited Kingdom, and the Commission provided substantial funding toECOWAS to implement the Moratorium on Importation, Exportationand Manufacture of Light Weapons in West Africa. This particularinitiative has been highlighted as a model for future EU–Africa coop-eration on small arms control. The ECOWAS moratorium has beenlauded as a successful instance of a mainstreamed approach in EU–Africa cooperation on issues of small arms as part of a broad institutionalframework.

At the end of the Cold War, ECOWAS identified the proliferation ofSALW as a central challenge to human security. The sub-regional organ-isation further considered the problem a regional challenge and soughtto tackle it within an international and multilateral framework. The 15member states of ECOWAS adopted the moratorium. The moratoriumwas pitched as part of a broader security and development frameworkspearheaded by the UN initiative, PCASED. The process of this initiativecontributed to the dialogue preceding the Programme of Action in 2001.The moratorium was executed over an initial five-year period, thoughwith PCASED serving as the overall framework (see Box 5.1).

The main success of the moratorium and its implementation throughPCASED was that it had clear parameters and addressed the multi-faceted nature of SALW issues. Further, the specific focus on SALWensured that micro-disarmament was not marginalised, despite thebreadth of PCASED. Additionally, by having nine areas of support

Box 5.1 PCASED support for ECOWAS moratorium

• Establishing a culture of peace• Training programmes for military, security and police forces• Enhancing weapon controls at border posts• Establishing a database and regional arms register• Collecting and destroying surplus weapons• Facilitating dialogue with producer suppliers• Reviewing and harmonising national legislation and adminis-

trative procedures• Mobilising resources for PCASED objectives and activities• Enlarging membership of the Moratorium

Source: PCASED Plan of Action (1998).


through the framework of PCASED, the ECOWAS moratorium waseffectively mainstreamed into different areas, which promoted devel-opment and security within the ECOWAS region. The ECOWAS mora-torium therefore served as a successful case of mainstreaming SALWwithin the African institutional context. Additionally, it confirmedthe value that the EU had placed on this approach in its engage-ment with Africa.23 The parameters of the ECOWAS moratoriumimplemented through PCASED provided an exportable model forthe AU.24

The AU proposal for a pan-African initiative was to conduct a map-ping exercise or a precursor to the actual continental strategy ratherthan a formalised programme in itself. At the initial stage, the proposalintended to establish to help ascertain what the main small arms issueswere in Africa, specifically, and to highlight ideas for integrating smallarms control into the whole of the APSA. Naturally, the AU was intendedto drive this process forward. However, due to a shortage of resources,the AU delegated the initial mapping exercise to RECSA, also a mem-ber of the AU steering committee on SALW. Subsequent deliberationstook place in the context of the steering committee, to share ideas onwhat should go into the mapping document. In 2009 the idea of a pan-African initiative was within the ambit of the AU (AU Meeting Minutes,2009).

In March 2010, however, the European Commission with RECSAunveiled a continental small arms initiative independent of an AU strat-egy. The initiative, Fight against Illicit Accumulation and Trafficking ofFirearms in Africa, was launched in Nairobi, Kenya, not as an AU-ledinitiative but as a donor-initiated programme (see Box 5.2). Essentially,this new programme, which had a three-year duration, was consistentwithmost programmes previously commissioned by the European Com-mission. RECSA was chosen to implement the initiative because the EUalready had experience working with this organisation, which had pre-vious success implementing small arms control initiatives in the EastAfrican region context.

Initially a pan-African initiative was proposed as a mapping exerciseor a precursor to the continental strategy. Its aim was to ascertainwhat the main small arms issues were in Africa and to generateideas for integrating small arms control into APSA. Naturally, the AUwas intended to drive this process forward. However, due to a short-age of resources, the AU suggested that the RECSA be contracted tocarry out the initiative.25 These deliberations took place in the con-text of a steering committee where African sub-regional organisations,


Box 5.2 Pan-African initiative: Fight against IllicitAccumulation and Trafficking of Firearms in Africa

Commenced: 8th March 2010Duration: 3 Years

Main Partners: European Union and Regional Centre for SmallArms Control (with AU)

Objectives:– To support the African Union in fighting the scourge of small

arms in Africa by increasing the institution’s implementingcapacity.

– To create National Focal Points and National Action Plans andto connect the relevant civil society organisations.

– ‘To strengthen the African Regional Police Chiefs Organiza-tions’ (RPCOs) and the capacity of and cooperation betweennational, regional and continental law enforcement agencies tofight cross-border illicit trafficking in firearms . . . ’

Expected Results (source Project Summary)

– Establishment of NFPs, development and adoption of NAPsenabled.

– RPCOs strengthened.– Capacity and cooperation between national law enforcement

agencies (police, border guards and customs) improved withinand among countries.

– Cooperation with dedicated/specialised bodies for the collec-tion of data on illicit transport of Small Arms and LightWeapons (SALW) improved.

– Exchange of information through databases and electronicrecord keeping in each sub-region enhanced.

– The basis to enable the strengthening of an African Union (AU)Continental Police Organization.

the European Commission and the UN are represented (AU MeetingMinutes, 2009).26

According to one official in the AU, however, both the design andthe implementation process of the pan-African initiative as unveiled


in March were not as envisioned by the AU.27 First, the AU repre-sentatives felt short-changed by the European Commission. Althoughinitially consulted about the pan-African initiative, once the deci-sion was made to have RECSA support the AU, the AU was left outof EU–RECSA negotiations. The initiative therefore came as a sur-prise to members of the steering committee, who were oblivious ofbilateral negotiations between the Commission and RECSA. Second,these negotiations were carried out outside the framework of the JAES.This omission is apparent because the European delegation to the AUtasked with implementing the JAES was also unaware of these develop-ments, despite the presence of a dedicated officer in charge of liaisingbetween the whole of the EU and the AU. Additionally, unlike thesupport for PCASED, the EU member states were not involved in theprocess.

Additionally, the European Commission contracted out the pan-African initiative to a consultant of its choosing. The Commissioncontracted the consultant without the input from the AU or the RECs.Further, the current initiative does not refer to the existing APSA orconflict prevention as an aim for a continental strategy. Indeed, this ini-tiative does not support that aim. The initiative undermined the conceptof ownership as proffered in JAES. Further, it also challenged the AU’sattempts to mainstream small arms initiatives since the AU is depen-dent on international partners. The discontent felt by African officialsconcerning the pan-African initiative is only a microcosm of a deeperand broader dissatisfaction with Europe’s approach to support for smallarms control in Africa.

5.4 External challenges to African initiatives

The officials involved in EU–Africa cooperation on peace and securityconstantly insist that the future success of economic and social devel-opment in Africa through conflict prevention, management and resolu-tion relies on effective small arms controls (see EU SALW strategy).28

Yet the predominant focus of many EU, mostly Commission, pro-grammes for micro-disarmament occurs during post-conflict recon-struction. EU programmes have this focus despite the fact that theEU has also committed to targeting the proliferation and traffickingof small arms as part of its conflict prevention strategies and prac-tices (European Commission, 2001; Cameron, 2005). Further, as seenwith the pan-African initiative, the role of the AU is vague in theCommission’s execution of support for African-led initiatives. There is


tension, then, between the EU’s stated aims and its implementationprocesses.

Undoubtedly, the Commission was able to demonstrate actornesswith regard to small arms and light weapons. Yet the process has yieldedtensions in security cooperation between regional actors in Europe andAfrica. Further, it tests the prospects for transforming existing EU–Africarelations. Tensions arise from three main sources. The first is the lack ofinstitutional resources on the part of the AU. The second is the lack ofintegration of small arms control within the EU itself, due to competi-tion among the core actors. The third is the tendency to go with thefamiliar modes of practice in small arms control, otherwise known aspath-dependency. These areas of tension challenge the ability of the EUto support the AU in its aims.

The motivations behind the creation of the AU are well intentioned,and well known. However, the institution suffers from a lack of coordi-nation that affects its ability to be an efficient representative of Africaninterests. For instance, despite the importance attributed to main-streaming small arms into the CEWS by various officials, the CEWS’simplementation framework does not mention SALW indicators.29 Thedivision responsible for small initiatives is separate from the one respon-sible for the continental early warning system, and there are currentlyno formal linkages for coordination.30 One official further admitted thatat present the majority of the relationships between the small arms con-trol experts and CEWS staff is based on their informal relationships.Moreover, the official noted that small arms control is only one aspectof the CEWS and therefore not central. AU SALW experts reiterate theimportance of small arms control initiatives to the continental earlywarning system, but they admit that the early warning culture and thesmall arms culture need to be further integrated to yield positive resultsfor African peace and security.

Another challenge posed by incorporating micro-disarmament mea-sures earlier in the conflict cycle comes from challenges to the main-streaming process. A central problem is that there is no clarity as tohow mainstreaming would work. The absence of mainstreaming fromthe CEWS implementation framework is further evidence of the prob-lem. Indeed the information and literature on mainstreaming are quitesparse. However, those, such as Andrew Sherriff, who have studied main-streaming in the context of development and humanitarian processesargue that mainstreaming SALW is tedious for the institution (Sherriff,2005). Yet, the conflict prevention organs of the AU peace and securityarchitecture permit the inclusion of small arms initiatives as conflict


prevention mechanisms through a mainstreaming approach to SALW.The flexible nature of APSA will therefore make mainstreaming easier.Further, given that the AU and the APSA mechanism are still new, theyare in a unique position to incorporate new strategies into the functionof the continental early warning system.

Apart from these problems, there is also the matter of the limited capa-bilities of the AU. This continues to be a core challenge for the whole ofAPSA. The inability of the AU to cope with an initial mapping projectencouraged the European Commission to continue with its existing pat-tern of bilateral relations with RECSA. Furthermore, until more staff isdedicated to the complex issues of small arms control, implementingstrategies through the AU will be slow. Given the situation as it is, thereis an obvious mismatch between the aspirations of the AU and its abilityto implement a continental control on small arms and light weapons.

The internal dynamics of the EU further exacerbate this mismatchbetween reality and aspirations. In Europe, there is also fragmentation.The fragmentation within Europe is arguably more pronounced thanthe AU’s in the sense that, as the dominant partner, the EU has a largerimpact on the processes of EU–Africa cooperation. There are two dimen-sions to this fragmentation: one is in relation to policy coherence, whilethe other is about coordination. This fragmentation contributes to thechallenges of implementing small arms control within the AU.

One of the main impediments to mainstreaming SALW strategies forthe EU is the fragmentation of EU support for small arms. Much ofthe fragmentation has to do with the competition between memberstates and the European Commission. Given that small arms con-trol programmes were often executed as part of development aid, theEuropean Commission has often been the main implementer. However,the European Commission rebuffed the attempts by member states tointegrate small arms issues further within the CFSP. The lack of institu-tional clarity has led to squabbling between the EU Council, memberstates and the Commission over competence in the area of small armscontrol. So, rather than coordinate, the European Commission suedthe Council in 2005 through the European Court of Justice (ECJ) toclarify which party had primary competence on small arms issues.The Court found in favour of the European Commission. The Courtreasoned that in situations where a primary security purpose cannotbe proven, the First Pillar (so, the Commission) had precedence. TheEuropean Commission treats small arms interventions as a way in whichto retain some power in EU external relations. The European Commis-sion’s pursuance of power is important since member states retain most


of the power on matters related to foreign policy and security. How-ever, the attitude of the member states suggests that the approach ofthe Commission towards small arms control is viewed as a threat to theinter-governmental nature of security.

Consequently, although Derks and More argue that the ECJ casehelped with clarifying ‘the division of competencies between the Firstand Second Pillars when it comes to external activities’ (2009, p. 6), itwas also a major drawback for Commission and member state coordina-tion. I contend that the cases fundamentally affected the will, especiallyamong the EU member states, to formulate a more cohesive approach tosmall arms control in its external relations. The EU member states haveabandoned further efforts for coordination. Core EUmember states suchas the United Kingdom and Germany continue to run parallel bilateralprojects. In doing so, the EU does not fulfil the aims of inter-regionalsecurity cooperation. Further, because the individual country support is‘piecemeal’ and only focuses on one aspect at a time, it is difficult for theAU to mainstream small arms across all aspects of its peace and securityarchitecture, as this objective requires a comprehensive approach.

In most cases, member states’ efforts are still more visible than thoseof the European Commission. For instance, the work of the Germantechnical agency coincides more with the vision of mainstreaming thatthe AU small arms experts want to adopt. However, most of that worktakes place on a bilateral level with a few African countries. Nevertheless,the agency has the experience of supporting sub-regional institutions.Currently, Spain is also bidding to support the AU’s efforts at small armscontrol. The AU officials who felt bypassed by the planning of the pan-African initiative have welcome interests from EU member states.

However, EU member states are implementing their schemes in paral-lel to European Commission-led initiatives rather than in conjunctionwith them.31 This existence of parallel schemes causes unnecessaryduplication on the part of the EU, which is frustrating for the AU offi-cial dealing with small arms. The lack of coordination among EU actorsalso requires the duplication of briefing meetings and donor requests,which takes time away from the actual work of small arms control. TheAU representatives on arms were particularly taken aback to learn thatthe EU delegation to the AU was not aware of the European Commis-sion’s launch of the pan-African initiative. As the delegation office isincreasingly seen as the AU’s point of contact with Brussels, the lackof information was further seen as evidence of the EU’s lack of desireto implement an African-owned initiative that would reflect equalityand partnership between the EU and AU. In reflecting on the current


EU small arms control efforts, the lack of coordination between the EUmember state programmes and EU institutional commitment does notbode well for support of the AU.

In those cases where the Commission attempts to support other com-prehensive initiatives, it falls short of expectations, especially fromthe AU. For instance, in the current pan-African initiative there is nomention of integrating small arms control into conflict prevention mea-sures. For AU officials, this is not surprising, given that EU Commissionofficials had not consulted their AU counterparts on the document.Additionally, RECSA lacks the continental mandate that the AU has inthe RECs. RECSA lacks a clear mandate because the EU, rather thanthe AU, eventually commissioned this particular pan-African initia-tive. Therefore the pan-African initiative potentially impacts negativelyon the regional integration of micro-disarmament measures in Africa.It is disturbing if the Commission’s best efforts actually underminethe vision of the EU’s core African partner, the AU. Acknowledgingthe harmful effect of the pan-African initiative on regional integrationefforts is not to suggest that the pan-African initiative harms efforts atsmall arms control – indeed using RECSA is generally seen as a goodthing32; however, it may also detract from the urgent need to integratesmall arms strategies directly into APSA.33

In addition to the contradictory relationship with the AU, the EU’ssmall arms control initiatives, which were promoted and implementedby the European Commission and the member states, are being con-tradicted by the member states’ small arms sales practices. In 1998, byacceding to the EU Code of Conduct on Export of Arms, it appeared thatthe EU was moving in the right direction and fulfilling its internationalsecurity obligation to control the spread of illicit small arms. Signing theCode of Conduct was important since five EU states (France, Germany,Italy, Sweden and the United Kingdom) accounted for a third of all smallarms transfers between 1994 and 2001 (Grimmett, 2002).34

5.5 Conclusion: The grass is not always greener

In evaluating recent developments in EU–Africa cooperation, particu-larly small arms control, it is apparent that the relationship remainsmore or less the same. Despite advances made by European partners intheir approach to small arms control, the EU (through the actions of theCommission) contributes to the maintenance of the status quo. In thisposition, African institutions are not true partners but continued recip-ients and implementers of donor preferences. Although early examples


such as the support for the ECOWAS moratorium suggested changes inEU–Africa cooperation, cases such as the pan-African initiative illustratethe tendency for things to remain as they are. In addition, recent pro-grammes such as the EU SSR programme in Guinea-Bissau illustrate thepreference of EU actors to maintain a donor–recipient relationship withAfrican partners.

The inability of the EU to change its approach on issues of SALWdespite the rhetoric stems in part from internal coordination chal-lenges within the EU. These challenges include the unwillingness of EUmember states to Europeanise their policies on small arms and the Com-mission’s strong desire to retain control of the small arms policy area.Consequently, Germany and Britain’s governments continue to havetheir own parallel programmes, although they are segregated from theEuropean Commission’s programmes. This segregation also means thatthe country programmes are also not integrated into EU support for theAU or pan-African initiatives since the Commission has been grantedthe mandate to implement EU–wide small arms initiatives.

Without coherence, it is difficult to support the AU in mainstreamingsmall arms initiatives. The divergent initiatives within the EU are dif-ficult to adapt to each other when there are no systemic or systematicprocesses across the whole of the EU’s external relations programmes.The lack of a ‘joined-up’ approach among EU actors makes it difficult toimplement necessary SALW initiatives successfully. Furthermore, practi-tioners in the field of small arms and light weapons have pointed outthe discrepancies between the EU’s trade and development policies, asthey affect small arms and light weapons and are a further example ofthe far-reaching consequences of incoherence.

As one experienced micro-disarmament practitioner noted, the gen-uineness of the AU’s aspiration is apparent however, implementationalso relies on the external partner’s support being given in a cohesivemanner.35 The process of mainstreaming small arms issues and priori-tising conflict prevention mechanisms is the focus of this chapter, andits ultimate aim should not be forgotten: creating a safe, peaceful andsecure environment free of arms. It is therefore important that the EU’ssupport is aligned with African initiatives to curb the flow of arms.

Concerning the pan-African initiative, which has been touted asemblematic of the changes in EU–Africa relations, evaluation of the casehas shown that it falls short. While there is a reference to helping theAU, the rest of the commitment reflects the Commission’s agenda ratherthan a joint programme with the AU. The initiative also makes no men-tion of integrating national and regional mechanisms into a continental


framework. Additionally, while the initiative places a lot of emphasison regional police involvement, the security dimension to small armscontrol in Africa is absent from the initiative. By ignoring the ‘hard’security aspect of small arms control in this initiative, the Commissionhas succeeded in keeping small arms a development issue. Making smallarms solely a development issue, however, contravenes both the EU’sand the AU’s assertions that small arms challenges are at the intersectionof security and development rather than development alone. In this waythe European Commission reinforces its role primarily as a developmentdonor.

While EU support for African-led peace and security initiatives hasbeen ongoing for over ten years, there has been no coherence in termsof small arms control. With the establishment of the EU SALW strat-egy in 2005 and the JAES in 2007, in theory the discourse on smallarms was less dependent on specific programmes but rather integratedinto external relations packages. Indeed, the EU does consider its smallarms interventions, such as the SSR programme in Guinea-Bissau, to bewithin the JAES framework. However, it is still the case that the EU’s prac-tices in the area of small arms are confined to specific issues as they arise,which is inevitable during the transition and post-conflict reconstruc-tion phases. New approaches to small arms interventions, which reflectchanges in EU–Africa relations, must respect the parameters of the newagreement, and consider African institutions as partners. Thus far, thechanges in the EU’s approaches to Africa’s aims for small arms controlare minor and do not contribute any substantive change to the smallarms control agenda. Inasmuch as AU initiatives rely on the support ofthe EU, the EU needs to be clearer and have a more focused strategy forcomprehensive support that meets the present challenges of preventingviolent conflicts. Additionally, this support has to show that the prioritywill be for local ownership and that it will be directly inputted into theconflict prevention strategies and institutions of the African continent.The inability to achieve coherence diminishes the effectiveness of theimmense contributions that the EU makes to international peace andsecurity.

6Change in Motion: Evolutionbetween Layering and Conversion

Introduction

In this book I have tried to assess whether security cooperation hascontributed to changes in EU–Africa relations. Framed within the con-text of an institutionalised inter-regionalism, the book conducts theexamination of EU–Africa relations as a process of shared norms, val-ues and practices, thereby constituting an institution. In the precedingtwo chapters, two examples of security cooperation were examined toillustrate the extent of the changes occurring within the institutionof EU–Africa relations. These two cases focused on the EU’s effortsto support the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) of theAU through capability-building for: (1) peace support operations (theAMANI AFRICA Cycles); and (2) the fight against the illicit accumula-tion and trafficking of SALW. While both cases are reflective of the EU’scommitment to APSA, they have resulted in different outcomes. Fur-ther, the extent to which the two cases have been transformative of thestandard operating procedures (SOPs) of EU–Africa relations also varies.

The objective of this chapter is to assess further the implications ofthe two cases previously discussed, and their prospects for changingEU–Africa relations. Specifically, this assessment is undertaken with aview to understanding the conditions under which security cooperationhas contributed to equality, partnership and ownership in EU–Africa secu-rity cooperation. These three principles are assessed in terms of wherethe locus of decision-making lies in EU–Africa cooperation, in addi-tion to the shift from bilateralism to inter-regionalism and the equalparticipation of EU actors as counterparts to the AU. I argue that sub-stantive changes in EU–Africa relations through security cooperationare more likely when EU actors adopt division of labour as a planning

141


and implementation strategy, on the one hand, and the ability of theAU to exercise its regional actorship, on the other. The chapter cate-gorises the type of institutional changes within EU–Africa relations andespecially revisits the typologies of layering and conversion highlightedin preceding chapters. First, it identifies and evaluates the similaritiesand differences between the two cases. Second, it outlines the extent towhich changes have occurred in EU–Africa relations through the lensof security cooperation. Third, the chapter proposes that a division oflabour arrangement within the EU is the key to fulfilling the obligationto promote and practise the principles of change. Fourth, the chapterhighlights the challenges of a division of labour framework, given theexisting EU structure and the state of development of the EU’s mainpartner, the AU. The chapter concludes with a characterisation of thechanges achieved in recent EU–Africa security cooperation.

6.1 Comparing cases: EU–Africa security cooperation

In assessing the contribution of security cooperation to change in EU–Africa relations, the two case studies met three criteria:

1. They are both defined within the framework of the EU–Africapartnership and dialogue.

2. They are both oriented towards a specific international security goal,including conflict management and the eradication of illicit SALW.

3. In each case, both the EU and AU contribute through physicalactivity, financing and dialogue.

These two cases further represent the new types of security coopera-tion undertaken by the EU in Africa, which are explicitly co-owned.Based on the two case studies, the first impression is that EU and AUactors approach security cooperation with a shared agenda. For instance,both cases are being implemented under the aegis of the JAES. So,unlike previous capacity-building programmes and despite the existenceof a EURORECAMP framework, the AMANI AFRICA Cycles are imple-mented through the AU and without preference for particular countries.Additionally, rather than a training programme for peacekeepers morebroadly, the AMANI AFRICA Cycles support African-owned initiatives,in this case the development of the ASF, to meet the defined needsof regional security in Africa. Similarly, the intent behind the pan-African initiative is to be encompassing. Unlike previous small armsprogrammes on the continent, the initiative targets the whole continent

Change in Motion: Between Layering and Conversion 143

rather than specific countries. It supports the work of the AU primar-ily through funding. It differs from previous EU engagements in Africa,which were directly implemented by the EU as donors. Further, the newapproach is intended to defer to the AU’s priorities in building a smallarms non-proliferation regime.

Further, regarding similarities, both EU and AU actors emphasise thelink between security and development in the implementation of bothcases. In the case of the AMANI AFRICA Cycles, this link is initiallyemphasised during the design of the concept, in the context of trans-forming EURORECAMP to RECAMP. The programme was designed toinclude the training of multidimensional brigades to undertake com-prehensive peacekeeping, civilian (police) and humanitarian missions,and post-conflict peace-building on behalf of the AU. By moving awayfrom the emphasis on traditional peacekeeping and having a broaderambit for peace support operations, the AMANI AFRICA Cycles con-sider the changing nature of conflict stemming from intra- ratherthan inter-state grievances affecting the very livelihoods of the citi-zens. As such, the EURORECAMP framework and AU’s approach tosecurity suggest a human security approach rather than traditionalsecurity. Similarly, the framework for the pan-African Fight againstthe Illicit Transfer of Small Arms straddles that gap between securityand development. Previously considered the domain of developmentpractitioners, especially within the EU and among European Commis-sion officials, small arms control has also become a goal for securityexperts, which is the case within the AU. New opportunities for micro-disarmament are being identified, putting small arms control at theheart of conflict prevention. This linkage between security and devel-opment, however, has resulted in different outcomes for the twocases.

In the case of conceptualising the AMANI AFRICA Cycles, linkingdevelopment with security has helped re-conceptualise how peace andsecurity are organised within the EU Brussels establishment. It hasallowed closer cooperation between the European Commission andthe General Secretariat of the Council to engage in areas tradition-ally reserved for EU member state capitals. Together, actors withinthe EU work to plan and implement their relevant components ofAMANI AFRICA using the provisions of EURORECAMP and the EUworking group in Brussels. The work of the Council Secretariat andthe commitment of EU member states’ contributions to capability-building in Africa through the office of the Special Adviser for AfricanPeacekeeping Capabilities provide further evidence of this cooperation.


Additionally, the creation of the unique EU delegation to the AU, whosemandate originates from both the Commission and the Council, isfurther evidence of collaborative engagement within the EU.

In contrast, the explicit initiation of small arms control into the secu-rity domain has resulted in competition among the EU actors. Initiallyconsidered solely a development issue, the Commission claimed emi-nent domain when it came to proposing and implementing EU–widesmall arms strategies as part of its development policies in Africa. Essen-tially, the European Commission acted as a separate donor when itcame to administering small arms initiatives in African countries. Thisapproach to small arms initiatives is consistent with the European Com-mission’s approach to many development activities. This separatenessexists despite complete consensus among the member states that smallarms control was a priority for security in Africa, especially conflictprevention.1 However, the dispute between the European Commissionand the Council illustrates the competition and lack of coordinationamong EU actors, despite their having similar goals. The resulting courtcase and judgement, which has privileged the position of the EuropeanCommission over that of the Council, underscored the rivalry betweenthe two organs and also seemed to create tension between the seem-ingly complementary development and foreign and security policies.This rivalry has implications for cooperation with external partners (seeTable 6.1 for a tabular representation of the similarities and differencesbetween the two case studies).

Table 6.1 Characteristics of the AMANI AFRICA cycle and SALW support

AMANI AFRICA SALW

Administered within the frameworkof the JAES Peace and Securitycluster

Yes Yes

Capacity-building programmes Yes YesExample of security–developmentnexus

Yes Yes

Multi-actor engagement Yes Yes/NoInitial AU Involvement Yes NoCompetition among EU actors(Commission and member states)

No Yes (obvious)

Internal EU Coordination(Commission and member states)

Yes No

Division of Labour among EU andother actors (Commission,member states and UN)

Yes No


In analysing these two examples of recent EU–AU security coop-eration, it is evident that there are challenges. The core differenceof these challenges has to do with where they originate. The chal-lenges of AMANI AFRICA arise from the implementation of the projectitself rather than the design of the cooperation effort. Thus, the EUand African actors have a relatively good relationship and share thesame aims for African peace support capabilities but face operationalchallenges within the capacity-building process. Consequently, civilsociety has in practice been mostly excluded from the implementationof AMANI AFRICA Cycle I, and dialogue between the RECs and theAU is not as frequent or constructive as it ought to be. Nevertheless,the African and European actors more or less accept an inter-regionalapproach to cooperation. The challenges of small arms control, on theother hand, arise from the design of the cooperation effort itself ratherthan the implementation of the pan-African initiative, which moreor less has had an essentially positive impact on small arms processin Africa. I would therefore suggest that while the challenges arisingfrom the implementation of AMANI AFRICA, especially Cycle I, areendogenous, those we’ve observed in relation to small arms control areexogenous.

The extent of these challenges affects three other inter-related areaswhere we see divergences between the case studies. They include thelevel of multi-actor engagement, the level of internal EU coordinationand the extent of competition among EU actors. Multi-actor engage-ment is a continued aspiration of the EU as it seeks multilateralism inits external relations. For the AU, this engagement is a necessity as itseeks to build its capabilities and international networks. Multi-actorengagement is therefore part of the design of the JAES.

In the implementation of the AMANI AFRICA Cycles, we see theengagement of multiple stakeholders. First, there were the EU mem-ber states, including the Big 3 and those with prior interests in Africa.There were also newer EU member states, such as Hungary. In addi-tion, non-European members of the G8, such as Japan and the UnitedStates, as well as the NATO command, were invited to participate,using their resources to support an EU–Africa cooperation endeavour.Further, the European Commission and Council through the EU del-egation office provided operational support together with the Peaceand Security Department of the AU. The design of EURORECAMP–AMANI AFRICA therefore promoted multi-actor engagement within andoutside Europe.

The pan-African initiative case study partly supports a multi-actorenvironment. The AU, the RECs, the European Commission and the


RECSA have initially been working together to formulate a strategy,coordinating with relevant authorities at national and sub-regional lev-els on the African continent. Although the initial act of creating atrilateral arrangement between the AU, the European Commission andRECSA is unprecedented, the absence of EU member states is obviousand is evidenced by the parallel process in which they are engaged.The continued parallel processes of EU member states jeopardise theinter-regionalisation of security and the continental/holistic approachto security being promoted by the AU. This situation also inadvertentlyundermines African institutions since parallel initiatives fail to supportwhat Africans want. Consequently, the notion of African ownershipwithin the EU–Africa cooperation is tenuous at best.

One of the hindrances to multi-actor engagement is competitionamong the relevant actors. One of the successes of converting RECAMPto EURORECAMP is that the EU member states came together with thesole aim of supporting the AU. To be sure, each state wants to main-tain its relevance or position in Africa. For instance, France successfullybid to be the framework nation within EURORECAMP without opposi-tion from Germany or the United Kingdom. This result was despite theformer’s initial misgivings about France’s intentions in Africa. Further,the European Commission was willing to share expertise on its knowl-edge of the AU and served as the initial clearing-house for EU–Africacooperation before operations shifted exclusively to the EU delegationto the AU. Actors were allowed to use their comparative advantage ofcapabilities support to contribute to the whole project.

The lack of competition in a specific cooperation area among memberstates has been useful for the daily administration of implementation.For instance, it is easier to brief member states about a specific devel-opment without having to placate them too. Further, with everyoneon the same page, there are fewer chances of contradictions in exter-nal relations policies and there is more likely to be better coordination.In addition to this, the European Commission does not feel left out ofsecurity proceedings since the administration of EURORECAMP relies onboth Commission and Council officials at the EU delegation to the AU.

Competition or turf war among EU actors is not new in EU exter-nal relations. However, it affects relations with third parties. When theECJ ruled in favour of the European Commission to undertake activitiesrelating to small arms, this was seen as a coup for the Commission. Derksand More (2009, p. 6), further note that the so-called ‘ECOWAS case’clarified the division of competencies between the European Com-mission and the Council. This clarity, however, did nothing to quell


competition; rather, it increased it. This split was evident in the designand initial implementation phase of the pan-African initiative. TheCommission is willing to act alone because it has the mandate fromthe ECJ, and the member states choose not to engage with the Com-mission for fear of marginalisation by the Commission. Hence, whilecompetition is not obviously adversarial, member states are less willingto coordinate their policies on small arms control with or through theCommission.

The two case studies have also shown that the AU finds it difficult tofulfil its part of the security cooperation. This difficulty is due in part tothe newness of the institution and the lack of resources. It has also beensuggested that the lack of engagement by African countries make thework of the AU more difficult. This is a core deterrent to change withinthe EU–Africa institutions, since inter-regionalism depends on effectiveregional actors.

However, the situation of the AU is a given, known to both Africanand EU partners. Indeed, it is because of this that the EU has agreed tosupport the development of AU peace and security capabilities. What,then, is the guarantee that cooperation can succeed: i.e., lead to changeand deliver on the commitments? The answer mostly rests in the EU’sability to coordinate internally. As the partner with ample resources andexperience, there are expectations of the EU to be able to deliver on itspolicy priorities in an effective manner. However, maintaining efficiencyand delivering expectations has been difficult because external relationswere spread over the three pillars among actors who often competedagainst each other for relevance.

The case of the AMANI AFRICA Cycle I suggests that, when the EUas the dominant partner is internally organised, the chances of sup-porting the AU’s own aims are increased, even when not completelyrealised. Such internal organisation requires that EU actors – the mem-ber states and the Brussels institutions – have an integrated approachto the same issue. Further, because the actors all contribute to theprocess, they are all relevant and there is less need for them to com-pete with each other. Unlike the EURORECAMP and AMANI AFRICA,at the first stage of implementation, the European Commission’srole within the pan-African initiative is very similar to previous pro-grammes wherein the Commission acts as a donor in the same wayas, and in parallel to, EU member states. This duplication creates newproblems for cooperation, especially given that the AU is still lim-ited in its capabilities to coordinate all its external partners’ inputeffectively.


Additionally, it can be confusing for the AU to know whom to dealwith.2 Within the EU delegation to the AU, there is a political adviserassigned to small arms control partnership with African institutions. Theremit of this small arms official includes supporting the AU and theAfrican RECs to develop effective control initiatives. However, there islittle evidence that this work is done in harmony with their EuropeanCommission counterparts. Further, this official has not been present atAU Steering Committee Meetings on Small Arms. Thus, although theintention of the pan-African initiative may be to support the work of theAU, it currently operates outside the framework of an inter-regionalisedsecurity system.

I argue, then, that the challenges to security cooperation caused byprogramme design (as with EU support for small arms in Africa) are moredifficult to address and less conducive to change than the proceduralones (as found in the implementation of the AMANI AFRICA Cycles).The challenges of programme design fundamentally affect the abilityof the EU–Africa institution to fulfil its purpose within the new inter-regional framework: that is, equality, partnership and ownership. Thecontinued mismatch between the EU’s aims of conflict preventionthrough small arms control and the lack of coordination betweenthe main EU actors has a stalling effect on the progress of EU–Africarelations. Despite new strategies and policies, the lack of coherencebetween arms export policies and small arms controls impedes thepotential of the EU’s support for regional security in Africa. Fromthe foregoing, it is evident that the outcome of the small arms con-trol cooperation contrasts with the implementation processes of theAMANI AFRICA Cycles. This difference in outcomes begs an additionalquestion: under what conditions can EU–Africa security cooperationmove towards change?

A key objective of this chapter is to ascertain why the EURORECAMPtool and, importantly, the implementation of the AMANI AFRICA CycleI have largely yielded positive results where security cooperation is con-cerned but the fight against small arms proliferation still falls short. Theanalysis of both cases of security cooperation suggests that achievingsubstantive change in EU–Africa relations requires a particular type ofinstitutional organisation among EU actors. This institutionalisation ischaracterised through a system of division of labour prior to the imple-mentation of a particular project or process. This process is importantfor the EU because it is the dominant partner in EU–Africa relationsand therefore tips the scales, affecting the outcome of the collaborationprocess significantly.


6.2 Division of labour as a model for EU external securityactorness

Division of labour is a principle (and practice) that originates from thefields of economics and sociology. This principle is found in the worksof Adam Smith (Wealth of Nations) and Emile Durkheim (The Division ofLabour in Society), respectively. Division of labour in those contexts hasbeen used to explain the organisation of labour in society. Typically, itdescribes the social interaction of workers in relation to their specificorganisation and society. Further, it involves breaking down a complexprocess, so that an individual or a group undertakes each component ofthe whole.

Smith argued that by instituting division of labour on the produc-tion line, technical efficiency is derived in the product. Further, suchspecialisation saves time and duplication (Smith, 1804). For Durkheim(1984), the central argument is that division of labour is universal andcreates solidarity within society. The reason for this solidarity is thateach component compensates for the limitations of each of the othercomponents, so that all actors perceive the common goal as mutu-ally beneficial. In the same way, division of labour among actors ininternational relations can theoretically yield solidarity inasmuch as thecommon goal is seen as being in the interests of each actor.

In international relations practice, the principle of the division oflabour has been used in two contexts: aid effectiveness in developmentassistance and, more recently, burden-sharing among internationalsecurity actors. In studies of development assistance, the principle ofdivision of labour is linked to the idea of aid effectiveness (see Schulz,2007). The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) and the AccraAgenda for Action (2008) introduced the principle to the internationaldevelopment fora. The core argument is that the ‘fragmentation of aidat global, country and sector level impairs aid effectiveness’ (Paris Dec-laration 2005, p. 6). So to ensure effectiveness, harmonisation throughdivision of labour has been suggested. Harmonisation in this contextrefers to the use of donor countries’ comparative advantage within acertain sector or in a country, with the aim of making the delivery ofdevelopment aid more effective (Paris Declaration, 2005).

As a development aid donor, the EU, especially the Commission, isno stranger to proposals for a division of labour and complementarity.With development policies being less contentious than security policies,the European Commission has spearheaded the drive to make EU devel-opment policies less fragmented. There have been several documents


Table 6.2 Declarations of division of labour in EU policy frameworks

Key policy documents Year

European Consensus on Development 2005EU Guiding Principles on Complementarity andDivision of Labour

2006

EU Code of Conduct in Development Policy 2007EU Toolkit for the Implementation ofComplementarity and Division of Labour inDevelopment Policy

2009

which explicitly outline division of labour as a goal of EU externaldevelopment relations or which imply this (see Table 6.2).

While there is no formal definition for division of labour itself withinthese EU declaratory statements, the concept involves more than justcoordination. With better coordination, we can expect member statesto agree in principle that they will not have parallel programmes. Thiscommitment, if implemented, ought to mean less duplication and per-haps more effectiveness; however, neither is guaranteed. Member statesmay view parallel interests as more vital and instead choose to pursuethose.

Since development constitutes a component of new peace and secu-rity engagements, the application of the division of labour is alsorelevant in the context of EU–Africa security cooperation. One of thebenefits of the division of labour is evident in the EURORECAMP–AMANI AFRICA case. While a single foreign policy may be desir-able, it is not necessary to effectiveness if division of labour can beachieved.

I. Forging EU Foreign Policy through Division of Labour

The notion of division of labour has also recently found resurgence ininternational security regarding the shared burdens between the EU,NATO and, especially, the UN (Croft et al., 2000; Lindley-French, 2006;Whitman, 2004, 2006b). There is growing consensus within the EU andNATO, for instance, that both institutions would benefit from coordina-tion based on individual strengths. For instance, the EU has strength incivilian–political operations, while NATO’s strength remains in militarydefence. In order to realise this division of labour, it has been arguedthat the interests of the actors have to be aligned. This requires ‘polit-ical will and the removal of mistrust and lack of confidence from theEU–NATO equation’ (Douti, 2007).


The concept of division of labour is also useful for the internal organ-isation of EU support for African security capabilities. By organising itscontribution to security through a division of labour among memberstates and EU institutions, the EU is able to contribute to internationalsecurity in a positive way. Stephen Keukeleire has defended this idea.According to Keukeleire, division of labour among EU actors will enablethe EU to move beyond the quest for a ‘common’ foreign policy todeliver a more operational foreign policy (Keukeleire, 2007, pp. 3–4).He further contends that this move is necessary given the difficulty ofovercoming the different foreign policies of member states and short-comings not legally addressed in the constitutional treaties (Keukeleire,2007, p. 4). According to Keukeleire, the expertise of small groupswithin the EU institutions who have specialised knowledge of specificissues, sectors, countries or regions is advantageous for EU securityactorness.

In the context of internal EU security cooperation, what division oflabour proposes is that the EU (member states and EU institutions) cre-ates a common strategy or plan wherein each actor fulfils a componentof that mission (see Figure 6.1). In this scenario the component part ofeach actor is the actor’s main interests. Hence, the result of workingoutside the common plan is costlier than working within it. In this

Lead (memberstate)

Other memberstates

Europeancommission

Generalsecretariat ofthe council

Internal division of labour within the EU

Figure 6.1 Division of labour: component parts creating the whole


scenario the problematic actor will be going against its interests, thusjeopardising the entire mission. Further, the actor also risks alienatingthe external partner and allies if it falls short of it commitment to fulfila component of the mission. Additionally, within the common strategy,each actor is treated as integral to the process – the Commission doesnot supersede the member states or vice versa.

The aim of division of labour is more than just efficiency. I con-tend that division of labour has been necessary to the progress towardstransformation in EU–Africa security relations. It has been argued thatcurrent interventions to attend to the deficit of the EU as an interna-tional security actor often ignore a nuanced approach to problems ofcommon interests and lack of political will (Keukeleire, 2007, pp. 6–8).Although the literature on division of labour in security is still in itsinfancy, non-governmental agencies working on Africa rightly note thatuncoordinated policies undermine the efforts at peace and security inalready fragile conditions (Faria and Ferreira, 2007).

Admittedly, the lack of common interest and lack of political willdisrupt the ability of the EU to forge common foreign policy. ‘Big’ inter-national issues, such as the invasion of Iraq in 2003, are illustrative.However, these alone do not account for the underwhelming perfor-mance of the EU in relation to developing countries. Keukeleire suggeststhat a lack of affinity for a particular foreign policy issue could be toblame for the lack of EU action. For instance, Africa has been, and inthe near future will continue to be, a foreign policy priority for France.Using Keukeleire’s logic, rather than impede France or slow down itsforeign policy aims, it is more useful to allow France to use its com-parative advantage in the region to further the EU’s aims. This logic wasemployed in the formation of the EURORECAMP and subsequent imple-mentation of AMANI AFRICA Cycles. This logic is further reinforced insome analyses of the European External Action Service (EEAS) (Averyet al., 2007; see also Keukeleire, 2007).

The benefits of EU division of labour in its external security relationsare evident when examining the example of the AMANI AFRICA Cycles.Here EU member states used their network of resources within theEU, UN, NATO and the G8 to support capability-building for the ASF.At present, AMANI AFRICA Cycle II, due to the involvement of multipleparticipants, is the only comprehensive process supporting the build-ing of the ASF. Division of labour has therefore ensured that there is noduplication among the international donors, and it presents less of abureaucratic challenge to the donors and especially to the AU’s abilityto manage external contributions.


Additionally, division of labour ensures that the relevant internationalinstitutions work together for the goal of peace and that no one insti-tution is overburdened by its commitments. Designing cooperation asdivision of labour also puts more pressure on international donors tofulfil their obligations and counters free riding. For instance, althoughItaly has consistently fallen short of its international aid commitmentsin the past, it fulfilled its limited obligations to the EURORECAMP andtraining within the AMANI AFRICA process. It has provided trainingfacilities and personnel to the EURORECAMP team. By being part ofthe whole rather than one of many, contributors know they will beheld accountable if they do not deliver, as they may jeopardise thewhole endeavour. Division of labour as created by EURORECAMP for theAMANI AFRICA Cycles has fostered close relations between the interna-tional donors through shared knowledge interest in African peace andsecurity. Despite the benefits of arranging EU external relations or for-eign policy using the concept of division of labour, achieving this withinthe current EU is challenging.

6.3 Challenges to division of labour within theEuropean Union

There are four related dimensions, which prove problematic to main-taining a division of labour in EU external relations. The first is thecontinued effect of the pillar structure on the EU’s external relations.The second is the position of the actors in relation to each other. Thethird challenge is one of international cooperation, which is about thediffering interests of nation-states. The fourth and final challenge is theidea that security remains a sacred area of policy, which member statesprefer to control for themselves.

Concerning the first challenge, although the pillar system has ceasedto exist under the Lisbon Treaty, creating cohesive external relationsremains a problem for the EU. Sources within the EU note that exter-nal relations integration, despite the creation of the EEAS, will remainproblematic for several years. The reason given is that there will be diffi-culty ‘marrying’ the different ‘institutional culture’ of Commission andCouncil employees.3 According to Whitman, ‘creating a new institu-tional ethos’ in the EEAS will be challenging (Whitman, 2010, p. 3).The retention of certain functions from the old pillar structure, includ-ing procedures and staffing conditions, will further exacerbate switchingover to the EEAS (Whitman, 2010). In effect, although the names havechanged and new institutions have been built to foster a more cohesive


foreign policy strategy for the EU, the practice of external relations ismore or less the same.

Regarding the relation of EU actors to each other, there are two sub-challenges. In the context of EURORECAMP, for instance, Germany wasreluctant to participate in the reformed European tool not because it didnot believe in its merits but because France was leading as frameworknation. France’s prior relationship with African countries, its formercolonies, continues to affect its credibility. There are those within theEU who fear that EU resources are being used to promote French ratherthan EU (or African) interests. This challenge is particularly difficult tocounter since France still vigorously pursues its relationship with itsformer colonies, as is evident in the recent in the narrative being con-structed in the aftermath of its intervention inMali in early 2013. Franceis thus often accused of neo-imperialism in the process (Charbonneau,2008).

Another challenge to division of labour within the EU is the uneasyrelationship of the Council, the member states and the Commission.Rivalry arises when one actor feels less relevant than the other. Thesmall arms case study revealed the European Commission to be theproblematic actor when it came to implementing small arms controlstrategies. By suing the Council for predominant competence on theimplementation of small arms initiatives, the Commission has alien-ated member states. Essentially, it backfired! While acknowledging EUframeworks championed by the Commission, member states such asGermany and the United Kingdom chose not to integrate their pro-grammes with Commission-led programmes. This reaction to the ECJ’sruling shows that member states prefer being at the top of the hierarchywithin the EU security architecture. However, so does the Commission.

Being shunned by member states, and in attempting to exercise itsown power, the Commission also left out a crucial actor in new EU–Africa security cooperation, the EU delegation to the AU.4 In bypassingthe EU delegation, which is the AU’s main point of contact, the EU sendsa confusing message to its AU partners. As one AU official noted, hehad requested the inclusion of the EU delegation’s small arms expertat subsequent meetings between the Commission and the AU. Appar-ently, the requests made to the EU through the delegation office had notbeen considered by the Commission since dialogue was limited. Whenconsideration for equality among institutional actors is unavailable, EUactors are unlikely to institute division of labour as their paradigm forexternal relations. Unfortunately, the unlikelihood of division of labourhas negative consequences outside the EU.


EUmember states, like other nation-states in the international system,have specific interests shaped by geography, history and necessity. Manyworks on EU external relations have argued that this is where the prob-lem of coordination in EU external relations lies. The third challenge istherefore about the difficulties of aligning EU member states’ interests(Keukeleire, 2007). This alignment is arguably the most difficult chal-lenge to meet as it concerns the very identity of the state itself. WhereEU member states perceive that their interests are not being served, theyaim to correct the situation even at the expense of an ‘EU’ foreign policyor existing external relations commitments.

These tensions are evident within EU–Africa relations especially withregard to newer EU member states. Many of the newer EU mem-ber states, most of which are from Eastern Europe, have little or nointerest in Africa.5 Among them there is the sense that the inter-ests of a few member states, at the expense of important non-EUcountries, drive the EU’s commitment to Africa. Neighbourhood coun-tries have greater proximity to the EU, and most of them aspireto join the EU in the future. Unaligned interests create a problemof internal coordination between member states. In the situationwhere interests are unaligned, the EU member states with interestsin Africa may find it easier to continue bilateral policies outside theEU. The non-alignment undermines security cooperation through inter-regionalism, as well as the motivation to engage in division of labourpractices.

Keukeleire (2007) proposes the division of labour in EU foreign pol-icy through a flexible system of Core Groups (or EU Liaising Groups).These Core Groups will consist of the highest foreign policy officialswithin the EU as well as Foreign Affairs Ministers from member statesthat can contribute to that particular area of foreign policy. In theflexible Core Group model suggested by Keukeleire, uninterested mem-ber states do not have to decide on matters they neither understandnor wish to understand (2007, p. 13). The idea, then, is that differentissue areas will have different Core Groups. Indeed, a similar constructhas led to successful cooperation on EURORECAMP, and implementa-tion of the AMANI AFRICA Cycles with African partners. The case ofthe EURORECAMP/AMANI AFRICA Cycles reinforces the notion thatmember states are still central to decision-making on security. Yet italso exemplifies the potential for division of labour among EU memberstates. It is reflective of less competition among member states and insti-tutions, more internal coordination within the EU and more multi-actorinvolvement, giving rise to multilateralism.


Keukeleire further states that the Commission can be excluded wherethe focus of the Core Group is ‘military crises management or if it isconcerned with strategic military matters’ (2007, pp. 13–14). However,excluding the Commission on the basis that a matter is perceived to beirrelevant to its mandate would be an error in judgement if the quest isfor more integration within the EU as a whole. The perception that theCommission is irrelevant when these matters are under discussion is afalse one. Often Commission representatives have the country knowl-edge and the expertise to assist and advise the Council and memberstates on how to proceed within a specific terrain. Personnel from theCommission played a significant role in day-to-day dialogue with theAU at the inception of the EU delegation office to the AU. Their inclu-sion in the implementation of the AMANI AFRICA Cycles has servedto integrate Council representatives and Commission representatives inthe field. It would therefore be important for this to be replicated at theheadquarters in Brussels.

Despite the role of the Commission as the problematic actor in thesmall arms example, member states are often the obstacle to divisionof labour on peace and security issues. This is evident regarding thefinal challenge. Security as part of foreign relations remains jealouslyguarded. If member states are unwilling to summon the will power tocontribute to strategies jointly, based on comparative advantage andspecialisation, attaining a foreign policy for the EU based on divisionof labour is impossible. Without political will, the implementation ofEU external relations commitments through a division of labour modelbecomes irrelevant. Although division of labour allows the EU mem-ber states to bypass the urgent need for a single foreign policy, withoutpolitical will, EU foreign policy is un-actionable. Additionally, domesticsentiment towards the existence of and participation within the EU willalso play a crucial role in member states’ further involvement in the EU’sexternal role.

Resolving the challenges identified will be critical to the role of theEU as an international security actor in the 21st century. It is nolonger enough to separate external relations into different spheres: onethat is Community-based, such as development policy, and one thatis inter-governmental, such as security. The two have been shown to bemutually dependent, and they require an integrated approach. However,each sphere currently represents two different images of the EU that maybe difficult to reconcile. As one EU military official notes, in order fordivision of labour to work for EU–Africa relations, ‘the EU must decidewhat type of actor it is: is it an NGO with altruistic motives, just there to


support the AU, or is it a Governmental Organisation there to promoteits own interests. [. . .] At the moment, it is trying to do both.’6 Find-ing the right balance between supporting the AU and promoting ‘EU’interests is important to the EU’s image as a progressive internationalsecurity actor. Without addressing its internal limitations, however, theEU remains limited in its ability to be a more effective internationalactor.

The challenges addressed here further the argument that, through theachievement of division of labour, change or something akin to it willoccur. On the one hand, it transforms the nature of the external rela-tions structure of the EU and consequently the nature of EU–Africarelations. On the other, division of labour also transforms the policyoutcome of cooperation.

6.4 Security as change: Between layering and conversion

In evaluating change within EU–Africa relations, it is useful torely on expressions found in the recent scholarship on historicalinstitutionalism explored in Chapter 2. Traditionally, one of the ben-efits of historical institutionalism had been its ability to highlight theendurance of patterns and practices within an institutional framework(Pierson, 2004). However, the reality of institutional evolution has redi-rected recent studies in this field to theorise about change (Thelen, 2003,2004; Hacker, 2004; Streeck and Thelen, 2005).

In the books How Institutions Evolve (2004) and Explaining Institu-tional Change (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010), the authors suggest thatendogenous factors have a greater effect on institutional change thanexogenous ones. In examining the case of security cooperation withinthe institution of EU–Africa relations, it is true that changes occurringwithin the international system after the Cold War had a big signif-icant impact on the re-examination of insecurity in Africa as well ason redefining security to include new approaches such as human secu-rity and new concepts within this broadening and deepening of securitysuch as the security–development nexus. The traditional conceptions ofchange within the historical institutionalist literature would argue thatthe end of the Cold War constituted a critical juncture for EU–Africarelations, without which the changes (however limited) which we nowsee could not have occurred. While Thelen’s argument about institu-tional evolution does not discount the impact of a critical juncture suchas the end of the Cold War, her approach, the one adopted here, sug-gests that substantive changes happen beyond those critical junctures.


Rather, those types of deep and lasting change occur because of eventsthat are internal to the institution itself. The evidence from the exam-ples explored here strongly supports Thelen’s claims. Thus, while theinternational environment may have been conducive to security coop-eration in EU–Africa relations, it is the increased strength of EU securitycapabilities, in addition to the re-organisation of regionalism in Africa,that has most affected the changed processes we see today.

In the overall context of international relations and internationalcooperation, the inclusion of security cooperation in 2000, the EU Strat-egy for Africa in 2005 and the JAES in 2007, and more recent strategies,especially Horn of Africa and Sahel, have been internally significant forEU–Africa relations. Moreover, these internal milestones can be viewedas incremental rather than ‘shocks’ as they have not caused dramaticupheavals among the core actors. These incremental changes have nev-ertheless affected the direction of EU–Africa relations to varying degrees.It is in this context that mechanisms of institutional evolution, layeringand/or conversion are relevant to the study of contemporary EU–Africarelations.

As introduced earlier in this book, layering is ‘the grafting of new ele-ments onto an otherwise stable institutional framework. Such amend-ments [. . .] can alter the overall trajectory of an institution’s develop-ment’ (Thelen 2004, p. 35). The period of politicisation until 2000 isemblematic of evolution through layering where the primary institu-tional framework being used was the EU–ACP relationship. By pursuinga new relationship with the OAU and subsequently the AU, based onnew goals, the EU–Africa institution aspired towards institutional con-version as a means of evolution. Conversion is ‘the adoption of newgoals or the incorporation of new groups into the coalition on whichinstitutions are founded can drive a change in the functions these insti-tutions serve or the role they perform’ (Thelen, 2004, p. 36). The extentto which this conversion has been realised has been an overarchingconcern of this book. The evidence from broad consideration of EU–Africa relations, and especially the cases highlighted here, suggests thatconversion has not been realised.

In Chapter 1, I identified and defined the three principles of changein EU–Africa relations that it was hoped to achieve. They are equality,partnership and ownership. Indeed, the observance of these principlessits at the heart of whether security cooperation between the EU and AUsuggests a shift from prior relations. The in-depth account of the twocase studies offers a wealth of information from which we can ascertainthe impact of security cooperation on the three principles (see Table 6.3).


Table 6.3 Observing change in EU–Africa relations through security cooperation

AMANI AFRICA CYCLES SALW

Equality Yes/No Yes/NoPartnership Yes NoOwnership Yes/No MaybeChange? Yes Yes/No

As a principle of change, equality is a core aspiration of new EU–Africarelations and the intended result of partnership. First articulated at theEU level in the 2005 EU Strategy for Africa, equality is an indicator alsointernalised by EU member states. For instance, sources close to for-mer Prime Minister Tony Blair emphasised the administration’s desirethat all British foreign policy in Africa should reflect an equal relation-ship (Forsyth, 2008). French foreign policy towards Africa also suggesteda change that moved towards a more equal relationship with Africanstates, both bilaterally and through the AU (Nabakwe, 2003; Chafer,2002). This was certainly a driving principle when proposing the shiftfrom RECAMP to EURORECAMP and the process of implementing thetwo AMANI AFRICA Cycles.

The core impetus as articulated by European partners for the shiftto a more equal relationship was that it would yield a more mutuallybeneficial relationship for both the EU and Africa. Hence, equality wasperceived to be a quality that would change EU–Africa relations forthe better. Over all, EU–Africa security cooperation shows that somedegree of equality has been achieved in EU–Africa relations. In examin-ing the implementation of the AMANI AFRICA Cycles, we find that theEU is very sensitive to the preferences of the AU. The peace and secu-rity department of the AU has as much say in the daily organisation,training and capacity-building as the EU. Indeed, this activism is some-times detrimental to the process since the AU does not have the sameresources and internal decision mechanisms that have been devised forthe European representatives at the delegation offices in Addis Ababa,Paris and Brussels.

The division of labour employed by the European counterpartswithin the EURORECAMP tool helps to mitigate some of the short-comings of the African side. While the implementation of theAMANI AFRICA Cycles encourages equality, the significant advance-ment of the European side, which can be advantageous for efficiency,also impacts on equality. For instance, the EU has been more vociferous


about needing other partners to ensure multilateralism through theinterregional process. While the AU agrees with the assessment thatother partners would benefit its capability-building projects, it has notalways promoted this type of multilateralism. Although the AU seeksfunding from external partners, it is not always willing to give thesepartners access to its own planning processes. This obstinacy is con-sistent with the culture of secrecy in intelligence and other securitymatters. This is, of course, in contrast to the transparency advocatedin Europe and North America. This difference in approach has some-times put the EU and AU partners at odds with each other. The tendencyfor the EU to demand transparency on collaborative projects and EU-funded initiatives can, however, be seen as rendering the relationshipunequal.

Regarding the pan-African initiative and overall cooperation on smallarms, acknowledging the AU as the EU’s partner signalled the movetowards equality. However, the practice challenges this initial impres-sion. In bypassing the AU in favour of RECSA, the European Commis-sion gave the impression to the AU that it was not competent to be apartner. This, AU officials felt, could have been remedied if there wasbetter communication among EU agencies such as the EU delegationand the AU.

Apart from being a desirable principle in itself, equality is also a com-ponent of the new EU–Africa partnership (EU-AU, 2007). Partnershipis determined by the continued institutionalisation of political dia-logue and cooperation, and it is another aspiration of current EU–Africarelations. Partnership is a ‘move away from a traditional relationship’(EU-AU, 2007). The new drive towards partnership identifies 2000 as thechanging point from previous relations with the Cairo Declaration andAction Plan. Empirically, partnership would mean African preferencesare incorporated into decisions about Africa, changing the dynamic ofthe relationship. Rather than simply absorbing European requests inexchange for development aid, partnership would involve consensus onissues which enhance development, peace and security.

In examining whether security cooperation has contributed to part-nership and in what ways this has happened, the two case studiesyield two different results. When examining the implementation ofthe AMANI AFRICA Cycles, elements of partnership as defined withinthe parameters of the goals of the EU–Africa institution are observ-able. In the first instance, the AMANI AFRICA process emphasises theimportance of consensus among the EU and AU partners. Indeed,the success of the Cycles depends on true partnership among the


actors. Further, by actively participating at every stage of the plan-ning and implementation, partnership is possible. For the most part,then, AMANI AFRICA Cycle I and the ongoing Cycle II exhibit thecharacteristics expected from an EU–Africa partnership.

Concerning small arms cooperation, partnership is more difficultto observe. For instance, in 2010, although the EU claimed thatit was implementing the EU SSR Guinea-Bissau (including micro-disarmament) mission in the context of the JAES, this claim was notborne out. Although supported by the Common Security and DefencePolicy (CSDP), it was implemented solely by the European Commission.The EU at no time consulted the AU about how to best approach thesituation in Guinea-Bissau. One AU official noted the AU Commission’sdisappointment at the seeming exclusion.7 The EU countered AU con-cerns by asserting that the government of Guinea-Bissau invited EUparticipation, not EU–AU engagement. This alibi, however, reinforcesthe idea that the SSR project was another programme implemented bya donor to a country recipient. In this example, the EU bypassed theaims of inter-regionalism in favour of existing patterns of a bilateralengagement in Africa. The lack of local input created a vacuum whenEU practitioners decide to leave.

In August 2010, the EU suspended its activities in Guinea-Bissau, cit-ing the insecurity of its staff. Yet the job was not complete and thesecurity sector in Guinea-Bissau remains precarious. Having a local part-ner such as the AU could have been useful to the EU. Unlike the EU,the AU is required to stay until it establishes a workable security situ-ation within its member states since insecurity here has consequencesfor African regional security. However, the EU can opt out wheneverit chooses, which is exactly what has happened. Presently, it is diffi-cult to gauge what the benefit of the EU’s lonely engagement in SSR inGuinea-Bissau. Instead, the very limited progress in this country’s polit-ical landscape has been as a result of the concerted effort of the UN–AU(and ECOWAS) partnership with some contribution by the EU in thiscontext (UNIOGBIS, 2012). It would seem, however, that the EU learnedthis lesson, and subsequent engagements, as we see in the EU TrainingMissions (EUTMs) and programmes commissioned under the new Sahelstrategy, include prior consultation with the AU.

Achieving ownership, if it could be done, would arguably be the mostimportant change in EU–Africa relations. Achieving ownership, mean-ing the local control of policy design and implementation, has beendifficult. I have shown that, when there are disagreements over pol-icy choices between international partners, the tendency is for the


dominant partner to see ownership as ‘commitment to policies, regard-less of how those policies were chosen’ (de Renzio et al., 2008, p. 2).For instance, despite the inter-regionalisation process of security whichbegan in 2000, the partnership of European and African actors was notofficially forged until 2007. Even then, it was only on paper, with noindication of how this would translate into practice. Given the institu-tional challenges the AU faces, effectiveness is sometimes traded off forownership, wherein the AU loses control of key decision-making oppor-tunities, as in the pan-African initiative. In doing this, Africa’s partners,such as the EU, rob the AU of the opportunity to empower itself andAfrican institutions.

The SALW case study is a classic example of the dominant partners’‘commitment to policies, regardless of how those policies were chosen’(de Renzio et al., 2008, p. 2). In this case, the failure to ensure properownership of the process for Africa has been detrimental to the Africanvision for small arms control. As soon as the AU expressed difficultywith implementing the European Commission’s pan-African initiative,the Commission regressed into old practices. It chose a contractor it feltcomfortable with, by using RECSA. Further, the Commission chose notto utilise other EU resources such as the EU delegation to the AU, andleft the AU out of the final stages of negotiations. Arguably, had theAU been involved in the process, it would have done the same thingsas the European Commission, but it did not have the opportunity tobe involved. The edging out of local actors for the sake of efficiency wasconsistent with past practices of SALW interventions in Africa, where theEU is simply a donor whose primary concern is simply to fulfil the per-ceived objectives of the mission without regard for the immediate andfuture implications of leaving out the local voice (see Carbone, 2010).Further, it undermines the aims of regional/continental integration onsmall arms issues in Africa since RECSA lacks a continental mandate.8

All these three principles are mutually constitutive, and for the successof each one the EU–Africa institution needs the other two.

6.5 Conclusion: Change on a continuum

This chapter has offered a detailed analysis of the two examples of secu-rity cooperation and the extent to which they contribute to changesin EU–Africa relations. In assessing the case studies, it is apparent thatchange is not a rigid category; rather, at this stage of EU–Africa rela-tions, it is a moving target. Whereas the EU’s support for the ASF suggestschanges in EU–Africa relations through security cooperation, EU support


for building the AU’s small arms capabilities is less positive. The uneven-ness of change within the policy area suggests a middle way where thecontribution of security cooperation to changes in EU–Africa relationsis both static and in motion.

The aim of new EU–Africa relations as outlined in the JAES is toalter the existing framework through the eight partnership areas. Whilethe aim of the JAES is conversion, the research evidence suggests secu-rity cooperation in recent EU–Africa relations is still partly based onlayering. This being the case, security cooperation illustrates changeswithin EU–Africa relations as being on a continuum between layeringand conversion (see illustration in Figure 6.2).

The evidence from the case studies also suggests that, in cases wherethe EU–Africa relations are moving towards this change, positive resultsare being yielded. It is evident from comparing the case studies thatboth the EU and the AU have a role to play in changing EU–Africa rela-tions. However, the role of the EU as the dominant partner has a morepronounced impact on the transformation of EU–Africa relations. Theinability of the EU to fulfil its commitments as an actor within the insti-tution (EU–Africa relations) adversely affects the AU’s ability to be anactive, equal partner.

The two cases show different outcomes despite being based on thesame inter-regional framework, the JAES. The comparative analysishas identified the conditions under which change has been possible.It reveals that the changes in EU–Africa security relations have beenmore likely when the EU contributions are organised through a divi-sion of labour among EU actors and when the AU is able to participatesignificantly in the design and implementation of a particular pro-cess. Division of labour tends to reduce competition, since each actoris viewed as a constituent part of the whole and the actors’ interestsare aligned. Whereas new initiatives have introduced the potential forchanges in the EU–Africa relations, the potential is only realised when adivision of labour model is instituted. While the EU remains the domi-nant partner as a result of its capabilities vis-à-vis the AU, its position is

Layering

Security cooperation EU–Africa relations

Conversion

Figure 6.2 Illustrating security as change in EU–Africa relations


not necessarily malevolent. On the contrary, where the EU acknowl-edges its position and its potential impact on the ability to achievelocal ownership and promote partnership and equality, the EU–Africainstitution tends to be more transformative.

Change remains an aspiration of recent EU–Africa relations. Both theEU and its African partners intend for each of the eight cooperationareas in the JAES to contribute to this change, which makes securitycooperation relevant for assessing changes in EU–Africa relations. Thishoped-for change is determined by the extent to which African actorscan engage in active partnership through equality and ownership. It fur-ther relies on the EU to support African-led initiatives and to considerthe local knowledge of the Africa partners. Over all, this assessment ofthe two case studies highlights the usefulness of using the analyticalframework of institutionalised inter-regionalism to assess the aspiration ofchange in the context of recent EU–Africa security cooperation.

Conclusion: TransformationDeferred?

This book has thus far examined the contribution of security coop-eration to changes in EU–Africa relations by addressing new securitycooperation between the AU and the EU and its implications for trans-forming EU–Africa relations, and the broader integration of securitypractices on the continent. A core argument of the book is that currentsecurity cooperation in EU–Africa relations is an outcome of the insti-tutionalisation of prior processes. Consequently, the book develops anappropriate analytical frame, institutionalised inter-regionalism, throughwhich it has examined contemporary EU–Africa relations. The precedingchapters have further highlighted the fact that the inter-regionalisationof security creates an opportunity for a new sort of relationship betweenthe two partners. This original contribution is a systematic analysis ofthe evolution of EU–Africa relations, highlighting newer processes ofinternational security cooperation.

This conclusion reviews and reiterates my impressions of recentEU–Africa security cooperation, its implications for the evolution ofEU–Africa relations and new security cooperation. This book broadlyaddresses four main issues. First, it highlights the continued significanceof member states for the successful construction and implementation ofEU foreign policy arrangements with other regional actors. Second, itcharts the emergence of the AU as a key security actor in internationalaffairs. Third, it shows the processes of institutionalisation in EU–Africarelations even through the acceptance of new structures and ongoingcooperation. Finally, I highlight the renewed importance of new stud-ies in regionalism for broader IR and international security concerns inorder to understand ongoing changes within the global political system.

This conclusion proceeds as follows. First, I highlight the keylessons for EU–Africa relations, observed through the study of security

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cooperation. This will help locate the content of this study within thebroader scholarship of the EU’s external relations, highlighting not onlythe role of relevant actors within the EU, especially EU member states,and the process of EU–Africa relations but also the increased importanceof Africa’s international relations. It especially draws attention to thepotential for the EU’s security actorness without a unified European for-eign policy. Subsequently, I explore avenues for further areas of researchon EU–Africa relations, EU external relations and the increasing role ofthe AU as an international actor. I then assess the ongoing prospects forEU–Africa relations under the Lisbon Treaty.

Making sense of change in EU–Africa relations

The in-depth analysis of cases illustrating security cooperation inChapter 6 reveals that security cooperation’s contribution to changein EU–Africa relations is uneven. Whereas EU member states were ableto coordinate their efforts to support the ASF despite the military ele-ment, and to effect some changes in their approach to Africa, the caseof small arms was less successful in modifying how existing relationswork. The unevenness in the potential to transform overall EU–Africarelations is, of course, limited by the fact that the scope of this workhas been limited to the assessment of security cooperation. It there-fore cannot speak to overall change in EU–Africa relations withouthaving assessed the other seven cooperation areas. Nevertheless, theassessment of this increasingly important area of cooperation offersa tangible exposition of EU–Africa processes towards transformativechange.

From the onset, this book has sought to elaborate on the potential ofsecurity cooperation as institutional change. The results of this analysisof this security cooperation are certainly not linear in that we cannotchart an even course for change, or of cooperation either. Nevertheless,this process of discovery has been particularly useful for exposing thefactors affecting the EU–Africa institution generally, and the specificones that have led to the subsequent prioritisation of and coopera-tion on peace and security issues. However, while a factor such as thereinvigoration of the pan-African agenda has resulted in a new type ofrelationship within the EU–Africa institution, substantive changes haveonly occurred after security cooperation was instituted. For instance, theAU is able to exhibit ownership of peace and security practices after theprocess of security cooperation had already started. Indeed, the AU isable to exhibit regional actorship following international support andcommitment for its peace and security aims. Further, the exercise of


new EU capabilities and the shift towards division of labour (within theEU) are necessary to the demands of cooperation. The complex natureof change within the EU–Africa institution suggests that, while securitycooperation produces changes in EU–Africa relations, these changes alsoreinforce the process of security cooperation.

Over all, the examinations of two examples of capability-buildingprocesses showed that several factors affect the degree of change in EU–Africa relations. Although the EU accepts the AU as a credible partner,the limited resources and capabilities of the AU impede activities thatreinforce inter-regionalism, active partnership and local ownership. Thelimited resources of the AU were a challenge when the European Com-mission initially approached it. The inability of the AU to contributesufficiently to a partnership with the Commission led to the prioritisa-tion of the RECSA as the African partner on the pan-African initiative.Nevertheless, the EU also has a significant role to play in contributingto changes in EU–Africa relations, especially as the dominant partner.

The cases confirmed that, in addition to historical relationships, priorinterests within the EU member states guide new commitments forsupport. When the member states, with the support of the EuropeanCommission, are committed to a particular security aim, they are will-ing to use their resources through the EU. In evaluating EURORECAMP,for example, because France and Britain had the previous experience ofworking together, it was easier to get both to replicate that experience.Although Germany articulated its initial commitment through the G8,its commitment to continental conflict preventionmade EURORECAMPa relevant avenue through which to support the AU. Prior areas of inter-est therefore provided the additional impetus for coordination amongEU member states.

Additionally, change within Africa, such as the AU’s increased willing-ness to work with the EU, has enabled changes in EU–Africa relations,especially the inter-regionalisation of the EU–Africa institution. A goodillustration of the increased acceptance of the EU as a key external part-ner of the AU is the growth of the EU delegation to the AU. In April2009 the number of officials representing the EU at the delegation officewas less than 20. In the same period, the EU delegation to AU sharedspaces with the Commission delegation in Ethiopia. A year later, the EUdelegation office had moved closer to the AU in its own office spaceand had more than 50 staff members.1 According to officials from thedelegation office, the working relationship between the EU and theAU has improved because the delegation office is able to translate theAU’s demands to the EU institutions in Brussels and to member states’capitals.


The ability to communicate African demands through the delegationhas improved African ‘ownership’ within joint EU–Africa collabora-tions. Whereas in the past the EU initiated decisions about partnershipthat affected both the EU and Africa in Brussels, the ongoing processof consultation and negotiation between the AU and the EU delega-tion office is gradually changing this status quo. In the EURORECAMPAMANI AFRICA case study, the military personnel based in the EU del-egation to the AU acts as the intermediary between Brussels and AddisAbaba. As the EU delegation is able to experience first-hand the needs ofthe AU, they can make a better appeal to the EU institutions in Brussels.However, in the case of small arms, where the EU delegation to theAU has been absent from negotiations between the European Commis-sion and the AU, AU officials feel African needs are not being met withthe broader context of the JAES and inter-regionalisation of relationsbetween Africa and Europe.

Regions, regionalism, inter-regionalism: Actors andinternational cooperation

The findings presented in this monograph have implications for thestudy of international organisations in international relations gener-ally. The role of EU member states in the design and implementa-tion of relevant security processes has heavily influenced the progresstowards change through security cooperation. Since the EU does nothave independent capabilities, this involvement of national capitalsis consistent with managing security within the EU. Further, whenthe member states initiate a process in which they can choose theirroles as part of a collective effort, there are increased chances of ful-filling EU obligations to external partners. Additionally, in addressingsecurity cooperation through inter-regionalism, member states suchas the United Kingdom, France and Germany, supported by Italy,Spain and Portugal, significantly influence the ability of the EU toengage in international security. Aside from the commitment to divi-sion of labour, individual commitments to treating the African con-tinent as a whole have contributed to elevating the status of theAU as the key and equal partner in EU–Africa relations. Addition-ally, since 2005, the emphasis on empowering African countries thathas emerged as part of the discourse of foreign policy in individ-ual member states has also contributed to its adoption of partnershipand ownership principles at the regional level. Consequently, althoughthe parameters of new EU–Africa relations guide the cooperation


processes, the EU member states have provided active agency withinthe institution.

In the case of the AMANI AFRICA Cycles, the EU was able to supportthe ASF as well as achieve changes in EU–Africa relations. Achievingchange through support of African initiatives – i.e., local ownership –was a main objective for peace and security cooperation. In contrast,despite the individual member states’ commitments to eradicating thescourge of small arms, the perceived challenge of the European Com-mission means that this policy area remains bilateral. One AU officialexpressed surprise at Spain’s approach to supporting small arms initia-tives within the AU despite the ongoing dialogue with the EuropeanCommission.2 Pursuing individual small arms policies not only impedesintegration of policy in the EU, but also imposes the same disintegrationon the AU, since the AU has to cater to individual partners, rather thana single one – the EU. The fragmentation of the AU’s attention strains itslimited resources to engage with external partners. Further, it confirmsthe idea that increased security capabilities for the EU for the presentand immediate future will continue to rely on the political will of theEU member states.

The key role of member states does not discount the role of theEU institutions such as the Commission and the General Secretariatof the Council (GSC). They assist in shaping member states’ interestsand responses to challenges in international security. For instance, theEuropean Commission, which managed the EU relations with the ACPgroup of countries, has been integral to providing general guidelinesand objectives for the EU–Africa dialogues. Furthermore, the Commis-sion has played a substantial role in defining the parameters of ‘divisionof labour’ within the EU. Similarly, the Special Adviser on AfricanPeacekeeping and his staff based in the GSC and the EU delegation to theAU are integral to designing, planning and implementing the Europeanposition within the implementation of AMANI AFRICA.

The European Parliament has its own positions on Africa, and on secu-rity within the EU. Often, the Parliament commissions projects on EUexternal relations and perceptions of EU external relations. However, thepresent research did not reveal the Parliament to be a significant actorin the construction or implementation of EU–Africa security coopera-tion. Despite the role of the Commission and the Council, the ultimatedecision on creating a regional position on security cooperation withexternal partners rests with the member states themselves.

Undoubtedly, the AU has also contributed to the change and stasisin EU–Africa relations. The very existence of the AU has been a core


motivator for the changes in EU–Africa relations. The prioritisation ofpeace and security within the AU has further created an amenable envi-ronment for the EU to engage in security cooperation with Africaninstitutions. Although the EU engages with the AU and other Africaninstitutions and countries in other policy areas, such as developmentassistance and trade, peace and security currently represents its highestinvestments.3 However, the lack of complete integration of the RECsinto the APSA hinders the full ownership of African initiatives. Yet,despite these shortcomings, the AU has proved to be an effective advo-cate for peace and security in Africa. Given the pressing challenges ofsecurity in places such as the Sudan and Somalia, where the AU isactively engaged, external partners admit that, over all, the AU’s actionshave been impressive.4 In demanding ownership of peace and secu-rity, the AU has initiated a possible metamorphosis of Africa’s role ininternational relations.

Some of the economic literature on regionalism has contended thatregionalism will replace comprehensive cooperation among actors inthe international system, in the form of multilateralism (Bhagwhati,1992; Winters, 1996; Koopman, 2003). The findings presented herewould generally disprove this argument. In both of the cases examined,the quest for EU–Africa security cooperation led to the involvement ofmore actors. The implementation of the AMANI AFRICA Cycles illus-trates the EU’s potential to practise effective multilateralism, a specificaim of the European Security Strategy (ESS, 2003).

As for the role of the EU in international relations, I have alsohighlighted the importance of external actors in the construction,implementation and outcomes of EU foreign policies. Whereas moststudies of EU external relations focus on negotiations within the EU,here I show that the action recipient – that is, the actor affected bythe EU’s policies – also has an impact on policy outcomes. Empiri-cal evidence from the research presented here shows that the lack ofintegration on the part of the AU, and its limited capabilities, had anegative impact on the progress towards change. Additionally, it hasalso affected the progress in establishing both a fully operational ASFand a continental small arms strategy mainstreamed within conflict pre-vention plans. The institutionalised inter-regionalism framework is able toaccount not only for the existence of other partners but also for howprior actions in those partnerships can influence EU–Africa relations.Further, an institutionalist approach to patterns of international coop-eration links the activities on one level (among EU member states andwithin Africa) to a second level (the inter-regional level between the


AU and the EU). Over all, the findings of this research suggest that theEU is able to implement its external relations commitment without aunified foreign policy. This is possible when it works within existingresources, especially the prior interests of member states and supportiveEU institutions.

Beyond Europe and Africa: Reflecting back, lookingforward

In this book I have covered a variety of related topics, although myfocus has been on examining the conditions under which changesare occurring within the unique international institution that is EU–Africa relations. Additionally, I have also examined the processes ofinter-regionalism, the historical context of current EU–Africa relationsthat yields new patterns of international cooperation. Importantly, inthis book I also highlight the opportunities and limitations of the newregional integration process in Africa vis-à-vis the AU. Yet the evaluationof the new security processes in EU–Africa relations has also raised issuesand highlighted intellectual and empirical paths beyond the immediatescope of this work.

The empirical dimension of this book has revealed an increasing rolefor the EU delegation office to the AU in the implementation of EU–Africa relations. The EU delegation to the AU has become a necessaryintermediary between the AU and the EU in Brussels. It is the firstintegrated EU representation mandated by both the Council and theCommission. Consisting of over 50 officials, now including memberstates’ secondments, it is essentially the first EU Embassy.

One issue that would have linked in to the desire for change inEU–Africa relations is the inclusion of gender perspectives on security.In particular, the way in which security institutions, such as the APSA,being developed by the AU and EU acknowledge gendered insecuri-ties, especially issues such as sexual violence, the exclusion of womenfrom public life and hyper-masculinisation within militaries is essen-tial to ensuring security for all. Indeed, both the AU and the EU havecommitted to this objective in their external relations (Valenius, 2007;FAS, 2008; Gya, 2009). While the prioritisation of gender is, admit-tedly, unacknowledged within the examples of security cooperationpresented here, this is simply illustrative of its lack of integration withinsecurity cooperation arrangements. This is, of course, disappointingespecially since the Second (JAES) Action Plan acknowledges that gen-der is a fundamental cross-cutting issue that had been ignored in the


implementation of the First Action Plan. While new provisions forincluding gender perspectives in all EU external relations and withinthe AU’s processes are now under way, the implications of this withinEU–Africa relations, if any, are not yet evident.

In focusing on security cooperation implemented between the EU andthe AU, there is the potential limitation of overlooking other continuingmethods of cooperation, including EUmember states’ bilateral relations.Here, however, the acknowledgement is made that existing relationshipsbetween EU member states and particular African countries influencethe level of commitment to African issues during European negotiations.For example, the JAES was the main priority for the Portuguese Presi-dency of the EU in 2007. According to one official, Portugal’s interestsvis-à-vis its former colonies in Africa played a role in Portugal’s campaignfor a comprehensive EU–Africa strategy.5 Further assessment of EUmem-ber states’ position on African issues could be insightful in forecasting adivision of labour within the EU. Similarly, I have narrowly focused oncapacity-building support for the AU rather than other EU actions, suchas the EU Training Mission in Somalia, or EU Capabilities in Sahel Niger,a civilian mission to improve the capabilities of the security forces fromNiger, among others. Although these are useful examples of EU securityengagement in Africa and increase our knowledge of the developmentof the EU’s operational capabilities, these cases cannot help to evaluatethe deeper issue of evolution, transformation or change in EU–Africarelations.

Because the focus of this book has been the relationship between tworegional actors, its findings offer a glimpse into one area of regionalactorness. There is, however, the potential for studies in EU–Africa rela-tions to contribute to the literature on comparative regionalism bycomparing the African experience, which started out as a political pro-cess, to the European experience, which started as an economic process(see Haastrup, 2013a).

Finally, Rudy Baker (2009) has noted that IR theorists and practi-tioners have not appreciated the usefulness of new institutionalist per-spectives for the field. However, the new institutionalism literature hasproved useful at examining ‘bounded systems’ such as inter-regionalismwithin the international system. The analysis of the potential fortransformation undertaken within this monograph offers insights intothe function of inter-regionalism as a mode of cooperation withinthe international system and its effect on other processes, such asmultilateralism.


Deferring change

At the conclusion of the field research for this book, an EU officialadmitted that the First Action Plan of the JAES had been too ambitious.It would seem that the institutional capabilities of the AU had beenoverestimated. Additionally, the EU overestimated its own ability to bea cohesive or consistent actor in security towards Africa. There is stillmuch to learn about EU–Africa relations in general, and about the secu-rity cooperation in particular, as both the EU and the AU continue theimplementation of the Second Action Plan and prepare for the ThirdAction Plan. The implementation of the Second Action Plan is seen asa test for the EU’s external relations apparatuses, given the new LisbonTreaty, which intends to increase the impact of the EU in the world.However, while the Lisbon Treaty provides the legal framework for fur-ther integration within EU external relations, only time will tell howmuch impact its provisions will have on EU–Africa (security) relations.

To conclude, the current peace and security cooperation undertakenby the EU and AU is emblematic of the long history of relations betweenthe EU and Africa; yet it also represents an evolution of the historicalrelations and the increased roles of regional actors within the interna-tional security architecture. In this book I have undertaken a carefulappraisal of current cooperation in the context of existing relations.I apply a historical institutionalist approach to the inter-regional EU–Africa relations. Through this framework, I have explored the impactthat changes in international relations have had on EU–Africa relations.These changes, including the end of the Cold War, violent conflictsin Africa, the formation of the AU and better coordination amongEU member states and institutions, have contributed to incrementalchanges within EU–Africa relations.

In this book we see that the inter-regionalisation of security has intro-duced something new into EU–Africa relations. Substantive changes inthese relations are, however, dependent on the importance of the AU asAfrica’s interlocutor, the increased capabilities of the EU and the betterorganisation of those capabilities, as well as the conditions in the inter-national system promoting renewed engagement in African peace andsecurity. Consequently, transformation is unattained. I have argued thatdivision of labour within the EU’s security apparatus is critical to furthereffectiveness and progress, which would allow African ownership, activepartnership between the EU and Africa and the continued considerationof African institutions in the decision-making processes of – changes


in – the EU’s external relations towards Africa. So far, transformativechange, which alters existing unequal EU–Africa relations, has not (yet)happened insofar as security cooperation is concerned, and included inthe broader inter-regional engagement.

New arrangements under the Lisbon Treaty and increased AU capa-bilities could hasten change. However, given the pressing security chal-lenges that African leaders need to deal with on the continent, buildinginstitutions and inter-organisational relations do not always feature aspriorities. Further, the political will of all the actors involved, especiallyEU member states, is central to further change. The EU’s long-standingrelationship with Africa and its increasing participation in internationalsecurity engagements make the EU a viable international actor, albeitone with much to do and learn. Yet, despite recent EU training missionssuch as the one to Somalia and the one in Mali, the economic cri-sis in Europe and continued charges of neo-colonial interventions maycontinue to prevent an active engagement. Further, the role of the AUas Africa’s intermediary has developed through its security cooperationwith external partners, especially the EU.

I have attempted to highlight the practice of the human securityapproach in EU–Africa relations and the prioritisation of a continentalapproach to security in Africa. Further, EU–Africa security cooperationrepresents new patterns of international cooperation through inter-regionalism. Over all, security cooperation contributes to changes inEU–Africa relations, although it does not transform those relations.Importantly, however, these changes also reinforce the processes of secu-rity cooperation, thus further entrenching the EU within the Africansecurity landscape.

Notes

1 Introduction: Continuity and Change in EU–AfricaRelations

1. Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998) characterise securitisation as the extremepoliticisation of an issue. Specifically, an issue or a referent object that is pre-sented as being existentially threatening to security may require emergencymeasures that justify actions outside of the normal bounds of political proce-dure. For an issue to be securitised, it must also be committed to a speech act:i.e., the rhetoric of actors will persistently link the existential threat to moretangible security concerns. So, those arguing that development has been secu-ritised see the linking of underdevelopment to insecurity as a securitisation ofdevelopment.

2. Former Director-General, Development Dieter Frisch recollects in The Courier,November 1997, how subsequent to his conversation with former EthiopianPresident Mengistu about the indignity of forced population transfers, theadministration claimed to have halted the transfers.

3. MDGs include: end to poverty and hunger; universal education; genderequality; child health; maternal health; combat HIV/AIDS; environmentalsustainability; global partnerships.

4. Strategic culture has been defined as ‘the persisting (though not eternal)socially transmitted ideas, attitudes, traditions, habits of mind and preferredmethods of operation that are more or less specific to a particular geograph-ically based security community that has had a necessarily unique historicalexperience’ (Gray, 1999, p. 53).

5. The criterion based on Smith’s (2004b) measure of cooperation.

2 Evaluating a Contemporary Institution: EU–AfricaRelations

1. The EU currently has ongoing dialogues in Asia (through ASEM), in Africa(through the EU–Africa Summit and the AU) and in Latin America (throughthe Latin America, the Caribbean and the EU summit). It also has strategicpartnerships in Africa and Central Asia and existing agreements with the ACPgroup (cf. Hill, 1998; Smith, 2003).

2. Here I do not consider the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) aregional organisation but rather an inter-governmental alliance or networkof independent states.

3. In both Africa and Latin America, leaders have consistently called for deeperregional integration.

4. In addition to the EU member states and the Commission, the members ofASEM include the ASEAN Secretariat, China, Japan, Republic of Korea, India,

175

176 Notes

Mongolia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Laos, Myanmar (Burma), Pakistan, Norway,Switzerland, Australia, Bangladesh, New Zealand, Singapore, Russia, Thailand,Vietnam and Brunei.

5. Michael E. Smith’s (2004) Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy provides acompelling argument for how external policy cooperation in the EU isinstitutionalised despite the inter-governmentality of the process.

3 Regionalising Security: The APSA and External Partners

1. For a more comprehensive analysis of this structure within the AU, see: Engeland Gomes Porto (2010); Chapter 2 in Tavares (2010); Francis (2006); andAbass (2010).

2. The EU’s first intervention in the DRC, Operation Artemis, was a short-termmilitary mission which was followed by others in central Africa and in Africamore broadly.

3. Morocco had left the OAU and is absent from the AU due to the disputedstatus of Western Sahara. However, it enjoys a special status with the AU andhas access to many of the benefits of AU membership, including the AfricanDevelopment Bank.

4. Interview, African Union, Peace and Security Division, Addis Ababa, 29 April2009.

4 EU Support for the ASF: AMANI AFRICA Cycles

1. While EURORECAMP refers to the framework through which the EU organ-ises its support for building ASF capabilities, the actual implementationprocesses are called AMANI AFRICA Cycle I (2008–2010) and Cycle II (2011–ongoing).

2. English translation: The Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities.3. Interview, 30 April 2009, AU, Addis Ababa.4. Interview, EU Council DG E, 18 June 2009, Brussels.5. Interview, UNDPKO African Union Peacekeeping Support Team, 30 April

2009, Addis Ababa.6. Interview, UNDPKO African Union Peacekeeping Support Team, 30 April

2009, Addis Ababa.7. Interview, EU Delegation to the AU, 30 April 2009, Addis Ababa.8. There are several sources that defend the need to link regional security

concerns to international security. See Regional Security and Global Gover-nance: A Proposal for a ‘Regional–Global Security Mechanism’ in Light of theUN High-Level Panel’s Report, Graham and Felício (2005); Regions and pow-ers: the structure of international security, Buzan and Wæver (2003); The UnitedNations and the Maintenance of International Security: A Challenge to Be Met,Sutterlin (1995); ‘Examining West African Regional Security from a Rela-tionship between States and Armed Groups: A Study for Regime ChangeDynamics in Liberia’, Yamane (2008).

9. Interview, European Union Council DG E, 19 June 2009, Brussels.10. For more information, see the African Conflict Prevention Pool, available at:

http://www.operations.mod.uk/africa/ACPPInfDoc.pdf.

Notes 177

11. With the exception of Canada, Japan, the United States and Russia, the G8is made up of EU member states.

12. Other efforts include the P3 initiative. This was an amalgamation ofthe training programmes of France, the United Kingdom and the UnitedStates.

13. See other discussions on the UN Reform, including J. Freiesleben et al., Man-aging Change at the United Nations; J. Freiesleben, ‘A Look at the TransitionalApproach to Security Council Reform’.

14. Interviews: European Union Council, 13 January 2009, Brussels; AfricanUnion Peace and Security Department, 15 April 2009, Addis Ababa; UnitedNations DPKO-AU.

15. Interview, European Union Council, DG E, 18 June 2009, Brussels.16. The Commission is often referred to as the Blair Commission.17. Germany, France and the United Kingdom.18. The Maastricht Treaty (1992), the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) and the Nice

Treaty (2002) all contributed to the further integration of security within theEuropean Union.

19. Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of the ESDP. Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Action%20Plan%20for%20Civilian%20Aspects%20of%20ESDP.pdf.

20. CP 2005/304/CFSP. EUR-Lex, the Official Journal of the European UnionAvailable at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2005:097:0057:0062:EN:PDF.

21. CP 2005/304/CFSP. EUR-Lex, the Official Journal of the European Union.Available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2005:097:0057:0062:EN:PDF.

22. See Council Conclusions on Strengthening African Capabilities for thePrevention, Management and Resolution of Conflicts, 2760th GEN-ERAL AFFAIRS Council meeting. Brussels, 13 November 2006. Availableat: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Capabilities_Africa_20.11.pdf.

23. In addition to France and the United Kingdom, Portugal also had a bilateralprogramme with former Portuguese colonies.

24. These three EU member states are known as the Big 3 because they are thekey drivers within the EU on matters relating to the CFSP or the ESDP.

25. Interviews: EU Commission, 9 January 2009, Brussels; Portuguese PermanentRepresentation, 8 January 2009, Brussels; EU Council DG E, 13 January 2009,Brussels.

26. Interviews: EU Institute for Security Studies, 19 January 2009, Paris; EUCouncil DG E, 13 January 2009, Brussels.

27. Interviews: European Commission, DG RELEX, Brussels, 8 January 2009; EUCouncil DG E, 13 January 2009, Brussels.

28. See: Chafer (2002) article ‘Franco–African Relations: No Longer So Excep-tional’? African Affairs; Marchal 1998 article ‘France and Africa: The Emer-gence of Essential Reforms?’, International Affairs, for discussions aboutpost-1994 Franco-Africa relations.

29. Interviews: EU Delegation to the AU, 24 April 2009, Addis Ababa; EU Com-mission, DG Development, 9 January, 2009, Brussels; ECDPM, 12 January2009, Brussels.

178 Notes

30. Interviews: EU Delegation to the AU, Military Personnel, 13 July 2010, AddisAbaba; African Union, Peace and Security Department, 13 July 2010, AddisAbaba; Institute for Security Studies, 14 July 2010, Addis Ababa Office.

31. See ‘From non-intervention to non-indifference: the origins and devel-opment of the African Union’s security culture’, Williams (2007); ‘Fromnon-interference to non-indifference: the emerging doctrine of ConflictPrevention in Africa’, Mwanasali (2008); The African Union’s Transitionfrom Non-Intervention to Non-Indifference: An Ad Hoc Approach to theResponsibility to Protect?’, Murithi (2009).

32. Despite the reluctance of some AUmember states to accept the new principleof non-indifference, the AU has successfully intervened in cases of unlawfulchange in governments and in cases where a government is not functioning,as in Somalia.

33. Interview, UN DPKO, 29 April 2009, Addis Ababa.34. Interview, AU Peace and Security Secretariat, 22 April 2009, Addis Ababa.35. A UN official from the UN African Support team raised a similar concern.

Interview, UN DPKO, 29 April 2009, Addis Ababa.36. This is not a unique problem to EU–Africa Relations. See ‘Aid Co-ordination

in Africa: A Review’ Adams (1989); ‘Keeping a tight grip on the reins: donorcontrol over aid coordination and management in Bangladesh’, Buse (1999);Donor coordination and the uses of aid, Bigsten (2006).

37. Interview, AU, Defence and Security Division, 27 April 2009, Addis Ababa.38. Interview, EU Delegation to AU, Military Personnel, 13 July 2010, Addis

Ababa.39. Finland’s bilateral development relations in Africa were confined to Ethiopia,

Kenya, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia (Ministry for Foreign Affairs ofFinland). Through EURORECAMP, Finland is more involved in both EU andAfrican regional processes.

40. Interview, EU Delegation to the AU, 14 April 2009, Addis Ababa.

5 Scapegoats and Heroes: Establishing a Small ArmsRegime?

1. SALWs will be referred to as ‘small arms’ for short, fire-arms or guns in someinstances.

2. Interviews: AU, DSD, Addis Ababa, 15 April 2009; European Commission,Brussels, 9 January 2009; AU, DSD, Addis Ababa, 19 July 2010.

3. Interview, AU, Conflict and Security Division, 13 July 2010.4. Interview, AU, Conflict and Security Division, 13 July 2010.5. OAU Decision on Small Arms, July 1999. Available at: http://www.

ploughshares.ca/libraries/Control/OAUdecisionJuly1999.html.6. Interview, AU, DSD, Addis Ababa, 15 April 2009.7. Interview, AU, Defence and Security, Addis Ababa, 15 April 2009.8. Interviews: European Commission, Brussels, 9 January 2009; AU, DSD, Addis

Ababa, 15 April 2009.9. Interviews: AU, DSD, Addis Ababa, 15 April 2009; European Commission,

Brussels, 9 January 2009; Centre for Peace Studies, University of Bradford,UK, 29 September 2009; Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa, 8 May2009; European Commission, Brussels, 9 January 2009; AU, DSD, Addis

Notes 179

Ababa, 15 April 2009; Centre for Peace Studies, University of Bradford,UK, 29 September 2009; Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa, 8 May2009.

10. Country Programmes. Available at: http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php.

11. Muggah (2009) notes some limited instances of DDR interventions in thepre-conflict and during conflict contexts.

12. Examples of these include the EU’s support for the Cambodian governmentand ECOWAS moratorium.

13. Interview (Owen Greene), Centre for Peace Studies, University of Bradford,United Kingdom, 29 September 2009.

14. Interview, European Commission, Brussels, 9 January 2009.15. GTZ is now part of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale

Zusammenarbeit (German Agency for International Cooperation) or GIZ.16. UN resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, available at: http://

daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N96/760/63/PDF/N9676063.pdf?OpenElement.

17. Naval Treaty Implementation Programme (2000). ‘OSCE Document on SmallArms and Light Weapons’ Compliance Alliance Programme. Available at:http://www.ntip.navy.mil/oscw_salw.shtml.

18. Germany, France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Italy and Swedenare, respectively, the 3rd, 4th, 6th, 7th, 9th and 10th top arms exporters inthe world.

19. This is now Development and Cooperation (DEVCO) under EUROPEAID.20. This has now been transformed to the European External Action Service.21. This Joint Action was updated in 2002 (see Council Joint Action 2002/

589/CFSP).22. Interview, European Commission, Brussels, 9 January 2009.23. Interview, European Commission, Brussels, 9 January 2009.24. Interview, AU, Addis Ababa, 15 April 2009.25. Interview, AU, DSD, Addis Ababa, 19 July 2010.26. Interviews: AU, DSD, Addis Ababa 15 April 2009; European Commission,

Brussels, 9 January 2009, AU, DSD, Addis Ababa, 19 July 2010.27. Interview, AU, DSD, Addis Ababa, 19 July 2010.28. Interview, AU, Addis Ababa; Interview European Commission, DG ER/A/4

Brussels; 9 January 2009; European Commission (External Relations), 8 Jan-uary 2009.

29. See the Framework for the Operationalisation of the Continental EarlyWarning System. Available at: http://www.africa-union.org/root/AU/AUC/Departments/PSC/PSC/CD/5_Framework.pdf.

30. See the Framework for the Operationalisation of the Continental EarlyWarning System. Available at: http://www.africa-union.org/root/AU/AUC/Departments/PSC/PSC/CD/5_Framework.pdf.

31. Correspondence, GTZ, Eschborn, 20 October 2009.32. Interview, AU, DSD, Addis Ababa, 19 July 2010.33. Interview, AU, DSD, Addis Ababa, 19 July 2010.34. It is difficult to ascertain the precise number of small arms produced and

exported by these countries, as such information is shrouded in secrecy.35. Interview, Centre for Peace Studies, Bradford, United Kingdom, 29 September

2009.

180 Notes

6 Change in Motion: Evolution between Layering andConversion

1. In various ways, Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom have allidentified the proliferation of illicit guns and ammunition as a hindrance toconflict prevention and development in Africa within their national policies.

2. Interview, AU, Defence and Security, Addis Ababa, 19 July 2010.3. Interview, EU delegation to the AU, Political Affairs, 13 July 2010.4. It is unclear why the Commission chose not to apprise the EU delegation to

the AU of its intentions since all AU requests to the EU are communicated toboth the Commission and the Council.

5. Interviews: DG RELEX, European Commission, Brussels, 8 January 2009; EUCouncil, DG E VIII, Brussels, 13 January 2009. It should be noted, however,that Hungary contributed to the EURORECAMP–AMANI AFRICA process.

6. Interview, EU delegation to the AU, Military Personnel, 13 July 2010.7. Interview, AU, Defence and Security, Addis Ababa, 13 July 2010.8. Interview, AU, Defence and Security, Addis Ababa, 19 July 2010. One AU offi-

cial noted that, because RECSA lacks a continental mandate, the AU has hadsome trouble convincing the other RECs that RECSA is right for this job. Thishas especially been the case with RECs, such as ECOWAS, which already haveextensive experience with small arms control initiatives.

Conclusion: Transformation Deferred?

1. Interview, EU delegation to the AU, Political Affairs, 13 July 2010.2. Interview, AU, Defence and Security, 19 July 2010.3. This includes commitments to conflict prevention initiatives, which are also

associated with development cooperation.4. Interview, EU delegation to the AU, Peace and Security, April 2009.5. Interview, Portuguese permanent representation to the EU, Brussels, 14 Jan-

uary 2009.

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Index

Note: Letters ‘f’, ‘n’ and ‘t’ following locators refer to figures, notes and tablesrespectively.

AASM, see Associated African Statesand Madagascar

Abass, A., 176nAbuja Treaty, 74ACOTA, see African Contingency

Operations and TrainingAssistance

ACP group, 12–15, 17, 50, 169, 175nACRI, see African Crisis Response

InitiativeAction Plan for Civilian Aspects, 177nAdams, M. E., 178nAddis Ababa, 2, 55, 71–2, 74, 90, 99,

105, 159, 168Adler, E., 62AEC, see African Economic

CommunityAfrica Command (AFRICOM), 77African Contingency Operations and

Training Assistance, 77African Crisis Response Initiative, 77African Economic Community, 74African Peace and Security

Architecture, 21, 61, 66, 69, 141components of, 21, 28–9, 69f

African Peace Facility, 20African Peace Support Trainers

Association, 86African Standby Force, 21, 84brigades, 86civilian components of the, 102

African Training Centres, 87African Union Peacekeeping Support

Team, 88, 176nAgenda for Peace, 88agenda-setting, level of, 42Aggarwal, V. K., 49, 50aid effectiveness, 149aid fatigue, 13

aid packages, 51Akokpari, J., 46, 67altruistic do-gooder, 38altruistic motives of NGOs, 156AMANI AFRICAadvancement of EU side, 159aims, 109challenges, 85characteristics, 144tdivision of labour, 152–3elements of partnership, 160EURORECAMP role, 95EU’s role, 87, 100, 169functioning of, 107implementation of, 85, 87–9, 92,

100, 102, 108–10, 111, 145,148, 155–6, 159–60, 169–70

integral part, 100international peace, 87international security, 87, 89key component of, 94multiple stakeholders, 145origin of co-operation, 85Portuguese contribution, 107threats to, 100training cycles, 84UN role, 89

Amsterdam Treaty, 177nAMU, see Arab Mahgreb Unionanarchic system, 39anti-government ‘rebels’, 2APF, see African Peace FacilityAPSA, see African Peace and Security

ArchitectureAPSTA, see African Peace Support

Trainers AssociationArab League, 2Arab Mahgreb Union, 47Arab Spring, 1–2

226

Index 227

Arab world, 76Argentina, 93armed conflict, 17–18, 118arms control, international, 39arms export policies, 148Arthur, W. B., 57Arusha agreement, 10, 65ASEAN, see Association of Southeast

Asian NationsASF, see African Standby ForceAsia–Europe Meeting (ASEM), 49Aspinwall, M., 52Associated African States and

Madagascar, 9Association of Southeast Asian

Nations, 49asymmetrical power, 41ATCs, see African Training Centresatrocities, 65, 82Atwood, D., 119AU Military Staff Committee, 90AU mission in Somalia (AMIS), 38AU Non-Aggression Common Defence

Pact, 68AU Post-Conflict Reconstruction and

Development, 68AU’s African Peace Fund, 20AU Steering Committee Meetings on

Small Arms, 148authoritarian governments, 64autocratic governance, 46autonomous capabilities, 82autonomous military capabilities, 48AU–UN cooperation, 80Avery, G., 152

Babarinde, O., 12, 15Bachmann, J., 6Bagayoko, N., 6, 101Baker, R., 172Bamako Declaration, 115–16Bamako Peacekeeping Centre, 87Baptism by Fire, 40Barcelona process, 17Barnett, M., 62Barry, D., 62Belgium, 8, 87, 96Bello, O., 17Berman, E. G., 114

Big 2, 92Big 3, 98, 101–2, 145, 177nBigsten, A., 178nbilateral commitments, 17bilateral cooperation, 102bilateral engagement, campaign of,

101bilateral intervention, 93bilateralism, 102, 141persistence of, 90

bilateral projects, 137bilateral relation, 1, 22, 99, 109–10,

136, 172mismatch of, 3

bi-regional arrangement, 49Black American, 63Blair Commission, 177nblanket enforcement, 119Bossuyt, F., 42Boutros-Ghali.,B., 88, 89Brahimi, L., 62Brahimi Report, 62–3Braithwaite, A., 13Brauer, J., 119Bretherton, C., 6, 39, 40Brown, S., 6Brown, W., 11Brummer, K., 100burden-sharing, notion of, 109bureaucratic arrangements, 110bureaucratic changes, 110Burundi, post-conflict society, 114Buse, K., 178nBush, G. W., 77Buzan, B., 62, 175n, 176n

Cairo Declaration, 4, 16, 19, 160Cairo Summit, 19calculus approach, 53–4Cameron, F., 44, 134Campbell, H. G., 78Campbell, J. L., 59Camroux, D., 49Canada, 93Canadian summit, 95capabilities–expectations gap, 35–8, 41capability-building for the ASF, 152Caparini, M., 119Carbone, M., 162

228 Index

Carr, C. D., 113Centre for Conflict Prevention,

Management and Resolution, 64CEWS, see Continental Early Warning

SystemCFSP, see Common Foreign and

Security PolicyChafer, T., 159, 177nCharbonneau, B., 154Chinafriendship with Africans, 79impact on AU structure, 52influence in Africa, 96presence in Africa, 78quest for energy resources, 78strategic partnership, 76peace support missions

contribution, 79external partnership with APSA,

76Choice for Europe, 33civilian components, 102, 105civilian crises management, 37civilian missions, 37civil protection, 46civil society, inclusion of, 81civil society organisations, 19, 44, 120,

126, 133CJTF, see Combined Joined Task Forceclimate change, 20Clinton, B., 77Code of Conduct, 124, 126cohesiveness, 44Cold War, 15, 18, 26, 62, 66, 93, 103aftermath of, 18, 64challenges for international donors,

15emergence of, 22end of, 3, 15, 26, 62, 64, 98, 118,

131, 157, 173international system after the, 26,

157collaborative engagement, 108,

144colonialism, 10, 63history of, 87

colonial legacy, 109combat-ready multidimensional

brigades, 27

Combined Joined Task Force, 77COMESA, see Common Market for

Eastern and Southern AfricaCommon Foreign and Security Policy,

15, 179nCommon Market for Eastern and

Southern Africa, 47Common Security and Defence Policy,

16, 161Commonwealth states, 10, 43communism, 11comprehensive framework, 109conception of power, 41–2Conference on Security, Stability,

Development and Cooperation inAfrica, 7, 68

confiscated weapons, destruction of,116

conflict cycle, phase of, 118conflict management, 70, 120, 142interconnectedness of, 5

Conflict Management Department,73, 121

Conflict Prevention and EarlyWarning Division, 73

conflict resolution, 70, 120Congo, police action, 38Congressional Research Service,

78constitutional treaties, 151Constitutive Act, 46, 67–8, 70–1, 74constructivism, 6continental early warning system, 69continental peace and security-related

initiatives, 117conventional arms transfers, OSCE

principles, 123Convention of the Association of

Overseas Territories, 8Copenhagen criteria, 106Cornish, P., 18Cotonou Agreement, 15–16, 18, 58,

124The Courier, 10, 12, 175nCroft, S., 150cross-border refugees, 64crude oil, drop in the production of,

114

Index 229

CSDP, see Common Security andDefence Policy

CSSDCA, see Conference on Security,Stability, Development andCooperation in Africa

Dannreuther, R., 6David, D., 57DDR (Disarmament, Demobilisation

and Reintegration), 118–19, 179ndecision-making, 24, 31, 37, 45, 57,

87, 107, 111, 141, 155, 162, 173deeper regional integration, 175nDenmark, accession of, 11De Renzio, P., 25, 162development aid donor, 149developmental progress, 13development assistance, political

nature of, 15development framework, 127, 131de Wilde, J., 175nDerks, M., 137, 146Dersso, S., 72, 105, 106, 107Deutsch, K., 45, 62Diebert, M., 96Diehl, P. F., 89division of labour, 149–53aim, 152bilateral policies, 155challenges, 153–7component part, 151fEU foreign policy, 150–3multi-actor involvement, 155non-alignment, 155unlikelihood of, 154

Donald, D., 118, 119donor coordination, 178ndonor countries, 93donor funds, 104donor–recipient paradigm, 1–3, 6, 9donor support, 92Douti, P., 150Duffield, M., 6, 62Durkheim, E., 149

Division of Labour in Society, 149

EAC, see East African Communityearly warning system, 120–2, 135–6East African Community, 47

ECCAS, see Economic Community ofCentral African States

ECD, see European Consensus onDevelopment

ECOMOG, see Economic Communityof West African States MonitoringGroup

economic aid engagementEconomic Community of Central

African States, 47Economic Community of West

African States, 47, 66, 116, 146economic concerns, 3–4economic crisis, 174economic development, 11, 13, 15,

86, 90Economic Partnership Agreements, 36Economic, Social and Cultural

Council, 68ECOSOCC, see Economic, Social and

Cultural CouncilECOWAS, see Economic Community

of West African StatesEDF, see European Development FundEdwards, G., 18, 49EEAS, see European External Action

ServiceEEC, see European Economic

CommunityEgypt, 46election monitoring, 89EMIFCA, see EU–MERCOSUR

Interregional Framework forCooperation Agreement

Engel, U., 46, 67, 176nEnglebert, P., 13equalitycentrality of, 24ownership, 19, 24, 26, 141, 148, 158partnership, 19, 24, 26, 141, 148,

158principle of, 24

ESDP, see European Security andDefence Policy

ESS, see European Security StrategyEthiopia, 11, 66–7, 77, 83, 102, 178n

230 Index

EU–Africa relations, 2–16, 31, 51, 106,139–42, 155–9, 161–5, 167–71

aim of, 25assessment of, 22, 32, 36capacity-building programmes, 84changes in, 159tcritical juncture for, 157donor–recipient paradigm, 29formalisation of, 91inter-regionalism, 60new institutionalist approaches, 31principles of change in, 158security cooperation, 23, 31, 106,

141–8, 150, 159, 164–5, 169–70transformation, 30

EU–MERCOSUR InterregionalFramework for CooperationAgreement, 50

EU Peace and Security Committee, 90,99

Euro Mediterranean Partnership, 17European Consensus on

Development, 16, 125European Development Fund, 8, 89European Economic Community, 8European External Action Service, 84,

152European political integration,

stagnation of, 33European Security and Defence Policy,

16, 97European Security Strategy, 5, 125European Union as a Global Actor, 39EURORECAMParrangement of, 109capability-building programme, 29challenges, 85, 103component of, 95creation of, 84, 88, 109decision-making, 86design of, 145education and training, 86establishment of, 87Europeanisation process, 86, 93eventual outcomes of, 110execution of, 86framework, 84–5, 94, 103, 106,

108–11, 142–3Germany’s commitments, 102

hard-security components of,102

Hungary’s contribution, 180nimplementation, 105, 109, 147investment in, 102mobilising support for, 95origin of cooperation, 85purposes of, 100RECAMP transformation, 85–8security integration, 100

EU missions and operations, 75tEU security engagement, 4, 9, 172EU Strategy for Africa, 24, 98, 158–9EUTMs, see EU Training MissionsEU Training Missions, 161, 172ex-combatants, integration to civilian

status, 118expectations, 35Explaining Institutional Change, 26, 58,

157external partnerships, 76–82China, 78–9European Union, 81–2United Nations, 79–81United States, 76–8

external policy, 15, 176nexternal security engagement, 18

Faber, G., 12fact-finders, 101Faria, F., 152Farrell, M., 44favouritism, 11Fawcett, L., 43, 44, 50Felicio, T., 176nFerreira, P. M., 152financial crisis, 2008, 94Finland’s bilateral development,

178nFlorquin, N., 114Fogarty, E. A., 49, 50Foreign and Commonwealth Office,

94foreign policy, 5, 15–18, 31, 33–6, 38,

40, 77, 90, 103, 137, 150–6, 159,165–6, 168, 171

coherent, 35common, 36, 38, 152division of labour, 150–3

Index 231

operational, 151unified European, 166United States, 77

foreign security engagement, 101Forsyth, J., 159Forwood, G., 10FranceAfricanisation, 93neo-colonialism, 10relationship with Africa, 154Svengali-like engagement, 11

Francis, D. J., 176nFranke, B. F., 74Fraser, A., 25Freiesleben, J., 177Frisch, D., 13

G8, 95–8, 122, 145, 152, 167, 177nGaddafi, M., 1, 67Georgetown Agreement, 12geo-strategic importance, 15, 34Germanybilateral relations, 102small arms controls, 122technical cooperation programme,

122Gibert, M., 6Gilson, J., 49Ginsberg, R. H., 39, 41Girvan, N., 25Global Peace Operation Initiative

(GPOI), 77Gomes, S., 89Gomes Porto, J., 46, 67, 176nGomez, R., 34, 35Goutier, H., 11, 12, 13, 14Graham, K., 176nGray, C. S., 175nGreen Paper, 14, 17Greene, O., 126Greener, I., 120Greve, P., 62Grimmett, R. F., 138Guinea-Bissau, 11, 66, 139–40, 161Gya, G., 171

Haas, E. B., 33Haastrup, T., 8, 17, 18, 22, 23, 44, 69,

71, 77, 90, 172

Hacker, J. S., 25, 57, 59, 157Hall, P. A., 53, 54, 56, 59Hamzaeva, S., 117Hänggi, H., 49, 118Hay, C., 42, 53, 56Hayatou, A., 72Hazen, J. M., 114, 115He, Y., 79Hettne, B., 44, 45, 49, 50, 60, 67Hill, C., 35, 175nHIV/AIDS, 46, 67, 175nHogendoorn, E. J., 112Holland, M., 39Honke, J., 6Horner, J., 114, 115How Institutions Evolve, 26, 157Howell, J., 6human dignityinclusion of, 14preservation of, 14

human insecurity, 13, 114human rights, 14, 20, 64, 66, 72, 85,

119human security, 6–7, 26, 64, 66–7, 83,

91, 131, 143, 157, 174Hurwitz, A., 5Hutchful, E., 7hybrid mission, 80Hyde-Price, A., 38hypermasculinisation, 171

IfS, see Instrument for StabilityIkenberry, G. J., 56illegal arms, 115illegal paramilitary groups, 112illegitimate armed groups, 114illicit accumulation, 27, 132, 141illicit proliferation, 113India, 76indifference policy, 64insecure arsenals, monitoring, 121insecurity, re-examination of, 26, 157institutional capabilities, 64, 82, 173development of, 27

institutional evolution, 25, 105, 157–8institutionalisation of security, 55institutionalised polity, 44–5

232 Index

institutionalismanalysis, 56–7constructivist, 54discursive, 54empirical, 53–4feminist, 54historical, 25, 28, 31–2, 55–60, 157international, 53–4network, 54normative, 53–4rational-choice, 54sociological, 54–5

institution of operation, 45instrument for stability, 128integration process, evolutionary, 45integration theory, 32–3, 35intense regionalisation, absence of, 50interest representation, 53Inter-governmental Authority on

Development, 47intergovernmental nature of security,

37inter-governmental negotiations, 55internal conflicts, 64, 66internal consistencies, 13internal decision mechanisms, 159international framework, 131international identity, normative

elements, 37international relations, realist

approach, 38international security, 6, 21, 27, 36,

64, 74, 82, 89, 97–8, 106–7, 109,122

burden-sharing, 149challenges in, 169EU’s contribution, 151EU’s engagement in, 30EU’s role, 41, 110, 156EU’s participation in, 174governance of, 62political concerns of Africa, 2progressive, 157realities of, 91regional actors, 173regional entities, 62regions as actors in, 62region-to-region interactions, 51resurgence in, 150

small arms, 126threats, 88

interregional arrangements, 51inter-regional cooperation, 19, 39, 61,

101, 122institutionalism approach, 55new kind of, 19

inter-regional engagement, 22, 174inter-regional framework, 102, 163inter-regionalisation, 4, 21–3, 146,

162, 165, 167–8, 173inter-regionalism, 3–4, 28, 32, 39,

48–52, 56, 59–60, 99, 102,109–10, 141, 147, 155, 161,164–5, 167–8, 170–2, 174

empirical concept, 28, 32, 59–60extending to international security,

48–52external relations promotion, 50form of, 55function of, 52, 172group-to-group, 49hybrid, 50institutionalised, 28, 32, 59–60, 141,

164–5, 170merger with institutionalism, 32new institutionalist approach,

52–60premise of, 3prioritisation, 48pure, 50structures play, 51types of, 49

inter-regional pairings, 51, 59inter-regional political dialogue, 16intra-regional deliberations, 130intra-state conflicts, 5, 46, 66, 71challenges of, 46

Ireland, accession of, 11Italy, 87, 138, 168

Jaboeuf, V., 17JAES (Joint Africa–EU Strategy), 4,

19–21, 29, 58, 76, 81, 83, 85–6,122, 129–30, 134, 140, 142, 145,158, 161, 163–4, 168, 171–3

areas of cooperation of the, 20components of, 20continuity of priorities, 21

Index 233

mandate of, 27security nexus of, 4

Japan, 76, 93Jegede, A., 70Johansen, R., 5

KAIPTC, see Kofi Annan InternationalPeacekeeping Training Centre

Kazakhstan, 50Kent, V., 96Kenya, 10Kenyan Staff College and Peace

Support Training Centre, 94Kerr, P., 5, 7Keukeleire, S., 42, 151, 152, 155, 156Kirkham, E., 126Klingebiel, S., 76Kofi Annan International

Peacekeeping Training Centre, 87Koopman, G., 170Kunz, R., 42Kyrgyz Republic, 50

labour model, 156Lake, D. A., 31Lamambra, R., 91, 92Lansdaberg, C., 67Laurance, E., 120, 121Lavenex, S., 42legislative frameworks, 126Lenzi, G., 18Levine, P., 125Lewis, D., 24liberal inter-governmentalism, 33–4,

37, 40, 55liberalist approach, 39liberalist school, 33liberalist traditions, 6, 39liberal peace complex, 62Libyaintervention in, 2, 78NATO intervention in, 80

Lind, J., 6Lindley-French, J., 150Lisbon EU-Africa summit, 19Lisbon Treaty, 153, 166, 173–4lock-in effect, 57Lomé Declaration, 66Lomé III agreement, 14

Lomé IV, 14–16mid-term review of, 15trade/aid relations, 16

Lowndes, V., 54Lukes, S., 42Luxembourg, 8Lynch, C., 79

Maastricht Treaty, 15, 177nMacNaughtan, J., 42Mahoney, J., 23, 25, 26, 58, 59, 157Malan, M., 96Mali, training missions, 22Malloch Brown, M., 5Mandaza, I., 67Manners, I., 36, 37, 41mapping document, 132March, J. G., 52Martinsen, P. M., 18Masire, K., 65MDGs, see Millennium Development

GoalsMearsheimer, J. J., 38membership criteria for AU, 106metamorphosis, 170Meunier, S., 37micro-disarmament, 113, 118–20,

122–3, 129, 131, 134–5, 138, 161approaches to, 117, 119imperative of, 125opportunities for, 143small arms, 123t

militarised interventions, 37military adviser, 90military capabilities, 36–7military credentials, 40military crises management, 156military intervention, 2, 71legitimacy of, 63

military training of African troops, 38Millennium Development Goals, 18,

20, 175nMoravcsik, A., 33, 34More, S., 146Morgan, P., 38, 39Morgan, P. M., 31Morgenthau, H., 41Mozambique, end of conflict, 66Muggah, H., 119

234 Index

Muggah, R., 119, 179nmultidimensional framework, 85multilateral commitments, 126multilateralism, 3, 93, 155, 160, 172effective, 81, 170

multiple equilibria, 58Murithi, T., 67, 70, 178nMwanasali, M., 66, 178nMwaura, C., 70

Nabakwe, R., 159Nairobi Declaration, 116Namibian independence, 66NATO, see North Atlantic Treaty

OrganisationNaval Treaty Implementation

Programme, 179nNeethling, T., 104negotiation process, 86neo-colonial aspirations, 103neo-colonial interventions, 174neo-colonialism, accusations of, 9neo-functionalism, 33, 37neo-imperialism, 154neo-realists, 38Netherlands, 8, 10, 126Neutral Military Observer Group, 65new institutionalism, 31, 51–6new regionalism, 48, 67adherents of, 48rise of, 67

Ngwawi, J., 78Nicolaidis, K., 37Nigeria, 10–11, 46, 68, 72, 83Nigerian Civil War, 10NMOG, see Neutral Military Observer

Groupnon-coercive power, 42nonergodicity, 57non-intervention, 63–5, 104, 121non-military solutions, conflict of, 71non-state security actions, 39non-traditional security threats, 48, 78normative agenda, 14normative power, 36–7, 41North, D. C., 56North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 2,

78–81, 85, 89, 101, 109, 145, 150,152, 175n

north–south relations, 2, 24–5asymmetry in, 11

Nrumah, K., 63nuclear proliferation, 39nuclear weapons, 112

OAU, see Organisation of AfricanUnity

OAU Charter, 21, 63–4oil wealth, 115oil workers, 114–15Olonisakin, F., 118, 119Olsen, G. R., 17, 18, 19, 59Olsen, J. P., 52Onwuka, R. I., 57Operation Artemis, 176nOrganisation for Security Cooperation

in Europe, 123Organisation of African Unity, 15OSCE, see Organisation for Security

Cooperation in Europeoverarching, 3, 81, 158ownership criteria, 86ownership principles, 118, 168

pan-African initiative, 113, 130,132–4, 137, 138–9, 142, 145,147–8, 160, 162, 167

pan-Africanism, 46, 63ideas of, 46philosophy of, 67

Paris Declaration, 149partnership, 19, 24, 50, 98–9, 160, 168path-dependency, 25, 57, 111, 135PCASED, 126, 130–2, 134peace and securityownership of, 104, 166, 170prioritisation of, 170

Peace and Security Secretariat, 73,178n

peace fund, 20, 69, 71, 74peacekeeping, 51, 71capabilities, 62, 70, 108, 110civilian, 87comprehensive, 143deficiencies in the, 63English/French, 94international context of, 89military characteristics of, 93

Index 235

multinational, 94regional, 88shortcomings of, 62traditional, 89, 143

peace missions, 66, 87, 93–4, 104peace negotiations, 119peace operations, 5, 21, 46, 68, 71, 77,

80, 86–9, 92–3, 95–7, 102, 104–5,141, 143

African training, 97agreement between the conflicting

parties, 88capabilities for, 97election monitoring, 89humanitarian assistance, 89new environment creation, 89preventive diplomacy, 88types of, 88–9

Peace Support Operations Division, 73Peace Support Training Centre, 87Peake, G., 5Permanent Representatives

Committee, 68Peters, B. G., 53, 57philanthropic donations, 71Pierson, P., 25, 57, 58, 157Ploch, L., 77pluralistic community, 45policy coherence, 136policy dialogues, introduction of, 13policy implementation, challenges of,

6political correctness, 70political crises, 13political dialogue, institutionalisation

of, 160political influence, 78political integration, 3, 33political interaction process, 53–4political legitimacy, 92political neutrality, 13Portugal, 87, 96, 168positive feedback, 57–8positive spillover, 33post-Cold War, 23, 66, 68post-colonial discourse, 6post-conflict reconstruction, 46, 68,

70, 117–20, 129, 134, 140

Post Conflict Reconstruction Division,73, 121

poverty, 4–5, 13, 18, 24, 46, 64, 67, 82,175n

power asymmetries, 109powerlessness, 65PRC, see Permanent Representatives

Committeepreferential trade, 9, 12preferential treatment, 15, 95preventative diplomacy, 88problematic assessment, 37Prodi, R., 88Prodi Commission, 88proxy regimes, 22PSC Protocol, 7, 68–9, 71, 74, 117, 121PSOD, see Peace Support Operations

DivisionP3 initiative, 92, 95, 97, 177npush factors, 76

rationalist explanation, 55realist approach, 38–9RECAMPdesign and implementation, 93Europeanisation, 86, 99–100, 103French security interventions, 93multilateralism, 93principles, 93P3 initiative, 92reorganisation of, 98transformation to EURORECAMP,

85–91recruitment process, 105RECSA, see Regional Centre on Small

ArmsRECs, see Regional Economic

Communitiesrefugees, 65, 91Regelsberger, E., 49regional apparatuses, 91regional capabilities, 43–8Regional Centre on Small Arms,

128–9, 132, 134, 136, 138, 146,160, 162, 167, 180

Regional Economic Communities, 20,25, 73

regional framework, 97Regional Initiative Programmes, 99

236 Index

regional institutions, 35, 51, 81,121

regional interests, 86regional interlocutor, 43, 82regionalisationelements of, 50EU’s, facets of the, 45sharing lessons of, 90

regionalism, 3, 22, 26, 28, 31–2, 39,43–4, 48–51, 56, 59–60, 63, 67,96, 141, 158, 165, 168–70,172

central aim, 43comparative, 172concept, 32definition, 44revamped, 67soft, 43

regional organisations in Africa, 47tregional peace operations, operational

capabilities, 28regional securitycommitment to support, 18creation of a, 64development of, 28, 61, 63EU’s support for, 148

region-building, ideological project of,44

region formation, 44–5region-ness, 44–6, 49–50elements of, 50level of, 44–5

region-to-region interactions, 51relational power, classical form, 42renaissance, 67repercussions, 2resurgence, 120, 150Rio Group, 50RIPs, see Regional Initiative

ProgrammesRPF, see Rwandan Patriotic FrontRuiz-Gimenez Arrieta, I., 65, 71Rwandan genocide, 15, 17, 65–6, 82Rwandan Patriotic Front, 65

SACU, see Southern African CustomsUnion

SADC Declaration, 116

SADC, see Southern AfricanDevelopment Community

Sahel strategy, 17, 161Schickler, E., 58Schmidt, V., 53Schmitter, P. C., 33Schneider, G., 52Schulz, N. S., 149Scorgie, L., 93, 96Security Communities, 62security–development nexus, 5–6, 26,

108, 157security engagement, 17, 81, 150, 172,

174security governance, reform, 70security nexus, 4security sector reform, 5, 118security threats, 78, 84, 93ability to deal, 90

self-reinforcement, 57–8separateness, 144sequencing, 58sexual violence, 171Sherriff, A., 113, 135Sicurelli, D., 22, 37Sierra Leone, 66, 68, 94single donor agency, 127Sirte Declaration, 115small armsaccumulation, 127aid, 114, 125challenge of, 114, 119, 125code of conduct, 138conflict prevention, 120–2, 148conflict zones, 125control agenda, 140control experts, 135control initiatives, 122, 128–9, 132,

135control interventions, 119control mechanisms, 120control partnership, 148control programmes, 136culture, 135ECOWAS role, 131eradication of the illicit transfer, 113EU’s control initiatives, 138EU’s joint action, 124EU’s strategy, 125, 140

Index 237

external challenges, 134–8framework for tackling the illicit

transfer, 115illicit guns, proliferation of, 180nillicit transfer, 112–13, 123indicators, 135micro-disarmament, 123t, 125pan-African initiative, 133policies, 169priority for international security,

122sales practices, 138Spain’s support to control, 137stockpiling and illicit trafficking,

128strategy, 128, 130survey, 112trafficking of, 27, 113, 134UN policy instruments, 123UN’s political and policy

instruments, 115UNPoA, 123

Smith, A., 149Wealth of Nations, 149

Smith, K. E., 34, 50, 175nSmith, M. E., 23, 37, 55, 56, 175nSmith, R., 125societal infrastructure, rebuilding, 5socio-economic development, 15, 22Söderbaum, F., 6, 36, 44, 45, 49, 67Solemn Declaration, 68Somalia, 4, 22, 38, 62, 64, 66, 70,

76–7, 79–80, 106, 111, 170, 174,178n

African troops mission, 66AU mission, 37–8CJTF, 77conflict in, 15economic concerns, 4EU training mission, 172, 174hybrid mission, 80peace operations in, 79, 106security challenges, 170training missions, 22US engagement, 76violent conflicts, 64

Sörensen, J. S., 6South Africa, 11, 46, 66–7, 72, 83South America, 76

Southern African Customs Union, 46Southern African Development

Community, 47, 66South Korea, 76sovereignty, 17, 25, 63–4, 95, 106Soviet Unioncollapse of, 14, 64support for proxy regimes, 22threats to security, 22

Spain, 87, 137, 168–9SSR, see security sector reformStake, R. E., 27Stälgren, P., 36, 44standard operating procedures,

53state capabilities, 36state-centric notions, 36state fragility, 15, 46, 67, 114state sovereignty, 21Steinmo, S., 52, 53, 56, 59Stohl, R., 112Strange, S., 41, 42strategic culture, 18, 175nStreeck, W., 25, 58, 157structural deficiencies, 107structural power, 42–3structure–agency debate, 54Sturman, K., 72sub-regional institutions, 137sub-regional mechanisms, 74sub-Saharan Africa, colonial division

of, 10supranational entity, 63surplus arms, destruction of, 116sustainable livelihood, 118Sutterlin, J. S., 176nSweden, 126System of Stabilization of Export

Earnings from Mining Products(SYSMIN), 12

Tajikistan, 50Tanzania, 10Tavares, R., 176nTaylor, R. C. R., 53, 54, 56, 59TCI, see Transfer Control Initiativeterritorial integrity, 21, 82terrorism, 6, 21, 39

238 Index

Thelen, K., 23, 25, 26, 56, 58, 59, 157,158

theoretical assertions, 41Tieku, T. K., 46Tiruneh, B. T., 70, 71trade-aid relationship, 18traditional approaches, 7traditional conceptions of power,

42Transfer Control Initiative, 126trans-regional arrangements, 49Treaty of Rome, 8–9, 19trilateral forum, 78trust fund, 90turf war, 146Turkey, 76Turkmenistan, 50

Uganda, 10UN–AU integration, 81UN Charter, 51, 63, 82, 89,

106UN DPKO, see United Nations

Department of PeacekeepingOperations

UNDP, see United NationsDevelopment Programme

UNECA, see United Nations EconomicCommission for Africa

unemployed civilians, 114Unified Combatant Commands, 77United Kingdom, 1–2, 11, 18, 68, 87,

92–6, 98, 100–3, 106, 126, 131,137–8, 146, 154, 168, 177n,179–80n

accession to EEC, 11Big 2, 92internal changes, 94intervention in Sierra Leone, 68membership to EU, 126peace support missions, 94P3 initiative, 92self-initiated schemes, 126support to KAIPTC, 94training to ECOMOG, 94year of Africa (2005), 98

United Nations Department ofPeacekeeping Operations, 72,94

United Nations DevelopmentProgramme, 6

United Nations EconomicCommission for Africa, 73

United Nations Security Council, 65United StatesACOTA, 92ACRI, 77AFRICOM, 77AMANI AFRICA, 95anti-terrorism priorities, 77armed forces, 77concern about Chinese influence,

96dependence on African oil, 77drone programme, 78external partnerships, 76–8foreign policy, 77idea of a new centralised office,

101military intervention, 2military operations in Africa, 77partnership with Africa, 98P3 initative, 95relations with NATO, 101support for proxy regime, 22war on terror, 90

UNPoA, 123, 127–8Uzbekistan, 50

Valenius, J., 171Van Creikinge, T., 43Van Hoeymissen, S., 79Vines, A., 116violent conflicts, 15, 18, 64, 112, 173Vogler, J., 6, 39, 40

Wæver, O., 62, 175n, 176nWalpole, A., 94Waltz, K., 38Wane, E., 71War on Terror, 5, 77, 90Wassenaar Arrangement, 123weapons theft, 121Wenping, H., 78West Germany, 8Wheeler, N., 63, 79Whitfield, L., 25Whitman, R., 18, 101, 150, 153

Index 239

Williams, P. D., 13, 46, 72Wincott, D., 56Winters, L. A., 170women exclusion from public life,

171Wulf, H., 118–19

Yamane, T., 176nYaoundé I, 9–11Yaoundé II, 10–11Yin, R., 26Young, E. T., 17Youngs, R., 17

Charting Transformation through Security: Contemporary EU-Africa Relations

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