Charles University COIN Presentation

Lessons from the Second Indochina

War

Lessons from the Second Indochina

War

Pacification and

Counterinsurgency in

Vietnam and Afghanistan

Pacification and

Counterinsurgency in


Advisory Experiences

FO & FAC, Combined Action Program, Phu Bai Vietnam 1965-1966Co Van, Vietnamese Marines, Vietnam 1966-1968

Battery Commander, Kilo 4/11, Da Nang 1968Senior Strategic Logistics Advisor, Baghdad, Iraq 2007

Civil Military Training Technology Advisor, Maridi, Sudan 2008USAID Field Program Officer, Delaram Afghanistan 2009-2010

Richard M. Cavagnol, Former Captain of Marines

Common Vision of Vietnam

Definition of Insurgency

using subversion and armed conflict while increasing insurgent control

an organized movement, a protracted politico-military struggle

An insurgency can be defined as:

designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of a constituted government to overthrow it

Older Concepts of Insurgencies

Partisan warfare which is supportive armed fighting by light troops

The idea of irregular troops operating behind an enemy line

Civil war which is between two sides under the same government and thus purely internal

Rebellion which is hostile antigovernment action in which the issue was quickly settled

Bandit warfare that is a way of life

Vietnam Revolutionary Warfare

The aim in Vietnam was to establish a new social order, a new way of life for the peasants

Chief effort was communication

Chief medium was specially-created cadres

Chief daily activity of cadres was agitation and propaganda work

Communication facilitated organization, which facilitated mobilization

“It is an imported product, revolution from the outside – grievances artificially created, liberation a deception.” – Douglas Pike

Revolutionary Warfare Leaders

Ho Chi MinhVo Nguyen Giap Pham Van Dong

Organization of PAVN Fighting Forces

Militia/Self-Defense Force, a semi-mobilized element organized along social structure lines (village, urban precinct) or economic enterprise (commune, factory, work site) (reserve force or registered military pool)

Traditionally the Vietnamese Communists have organized their fighting forces as a troika.

Main Force, that is, the regular Army, Navy and Air Force (standing armed forces)

Regional or Local Force, consisting of infantry companies with limited mobility and organize geographically (National Guard or standing reserve)

PAVN Soldier Profile

• Lived in an extended family arrangement that included several generations and collateral relatives

The prototypical, or composite, PAVN soldier in 1968: • Was 23 years old• Was born and raised in a village• Was a member of band co (poor for generations)• Was unmarried• Had less than five years formal education• Had a rural, agrarian background• Was one of five children

• Tended to resent "outsiders" in principle as well as urbanites or "city people"

PAVN Soldier Profile (cont)

• At age 20 or 21, he was drafted, received two months basic training, and was assigned to a unit

• Raised as a nominal Buddhist

• Singularly uninformed about the outside world, even other parts of Vietnam

• Believed in importance and strength of family

• Seldom questioned Party demands on him

• At age 9, joined the Ho Chi Minh Young Pioneers

• At 16, joined the Ho Chi Minh Young Communist League

• He was a tough disciplined combat fighter who preserved with stubborn determination often against hopeless odds

PAVN Soldiers

Strategy of the People’s War

To the dedicated North Vietnamese soldier dau tranh shaped his thinking, fixed his attitude, and dictated his behavior.

Dau tranh (struggle), which in Vietnamese, is a powerful, highly emotional term.

1. Dau tranh vu tranh (armed struggle), one of the basic forms of dau tranh, which can also be thought of as "violence program"

2. Dau tranh chin tri (political struggle), which might be termed "politics with guns" and consists of three van (action) programs

Dau tranh vu tranh (armed struggle)

The stated task of "armed” dau tranh is to:

Lower the enemy's prestige

Make the people rise up (in khoi nghia)

Destroy the local (host) governmental organization

Establish (VC) people's government administration where possible

Always be cast in a political context, never evaluated in simple military terms

Armed Cadre

Dau tranh chin tri (political struggle)

Van (action programs)

1.Dich van (action among the enemy) program (meaning non--military activities among the population controlled by the enemy that is in South Vietnam or in the United States)

2.Dan van (action among the people) program (meaning administration and other activities in the "liberated area")

3.Binh van (action among the military) program (meaning nonmilitary actions among the enemy’s troops), originally binh van-chinh van (B and C programs), chinh being "civil servant"

Việt cộng

Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) (Chính Phủ Cách Mạng Lâm Thời Cộng Hòa

Việt cộng appears in Saigon newspapers in 1956

Contraction of Việt Nam Cộng-sản, (Vietnamese communist)

National Liberation Front (NLF) (Mặt trận Dân tộc Giải phóng)

Việt cộng Cadre

New” revolutionaries recruited from the general South Vietnam population after 1956

“Old” Viet Minh fighters who remained in the South after the 1954 partition

“Regroupees” who left the South after partition, were trained in the North, and returned

Ethnic North Vietnamese infiltrated into the South to serve as technical specialist

Motivation of Viet Cong Soldier

Spirit of “nationalism”

Desire for reunification by any means

Hatred of “neocolonialists” and corrupt Diem regime

Varying degrees of coercion and peer pressure”

Desire for power and position in movement

System of rewards and advancement based on merit and performance

Spirit of independence (doc lap)

VC Rehearse for the Attack

Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI)

Clandestine Communist command-and-control organization in South Vietnam

Provided military and political direction to guerrilla war

• Recruited manpower for VC

• Engaged in subversion, terrorism, propaganda

• Collected taxes and supplies

• Gathered intelligence

Operated at all levels – national, provincial, district, and village – within South Vietnam

Viet Cong Political Cadre

Ngo Dinh Diem 1954-1963

Diem deposed Bao Dai and came Diem deposed Bao Dai and came to power in 1954to power in 1954

Army was under control of Army was under control of principal rival General Hinhprincipal rival General Hinh

Police were under control of Police were under control of gangster mob Binh Xuyengangster mob Binh Xuyen

SVN was economically depleted SVN was economically depleted after 8 years of warafter 8 years of war

Few government bureaucrats Few government bureaucrats were capable of making decisionswere capable of making decisions

Most of country controlled by Hoa Hao and Cao Dai

1 million refugees from North required resettlement

Emperor Bao Dai

Ngo Dinh Diem

Civil Guard

Created by presidential decree in April 1955

Primary function was to relieve the regular forces of internal security duties

Secondary missions of local intelligence collection and counter-subversion

Represented by two to eight companies in each province with eight mobile battalions controlled from Saigon

Reorganized into Regional Forces

Poorly equipped, poorly trained and poorly led

Civil Guard Basic Training Class

Self-Defense Corps

Established in April 1956 with 48,000 non-uniformed troops armed with French weapons

Primary function was to relieve the regular forces of internal security duties

Provide a police organization at village level to protect the population from intimidation

Units of four to ten men each were organized in villages of 1,000 or more inhabitants

Poorly trained, poorly equipped and poorly led

Reorganized into Popular Forces

Self-Defense Corps Recruits

Regional Forces/Popular Forces 1965

Regional Forces Popular Forces

What Pacification IS

• reduce the presence and influence of those who threaten the survival of the government through propaganda, terror and subversion

Pacification denotes an array and culmination of action programs designed to:

• extend the presence and influence of the legal central government

What Pacification IS NOT

A device for expanding Western presence throughout the country or imposing “New England town meetings” on local communities

A vehicle for making quantum jumps in A vehicle for making quantum jumps in standards of living or literacy ratesstandards of living or literacy rates

Washing babies, giving band concerts, or paying villagers for property destroyed through military operations

•Security situation deteriorating across South Vietnam

• Regroupment effort to create densely-populated areas in countryside along main transportation routes

• Concentrated population for better security

• Provided framework for social and economic development

• Consisted of villages of 300-500 families

• Program ineptly handled and mass resettlement caused resentment and backlash

• Program discontinued in 1961

Agroville Development (Khu Tru Mat)

1959-1961

• Objectives:− political− military− social− psychological− economic

•Adapted from British Briggs model in Malaya

Strategic Hamlet Program

•Unifying concept for strategy designed to:−Pacify rural Vietnam−Develop support among peasants

•Consist of villages consolidated and reshaped to create a defensible perimeter

Operation Sunrise 1961-1963

1961-1963

3. Establish infrastructure and services (BUILD)

•

1. Clear insurgents from area (CLEAR)

Strategic Hamlet Program Phases

2. Protect population in cleared area (HOLD)

4. Peasants support GVN (TRANSITION)

Strategic Hamlet Program

US impatience and intolerance with pace

Reasons for Failure

Inadequate planning and poor coordination

Absence of an overall strategy

Inadequate resources

Unrealistic timetable

Scarcity of trained competent personnel

Established hamlets not expanded out as government control consolidated (oil-spot theory)

Violent peasant backlash from forced changes, relocation from ancestral lands and burial plots

Inadequate ongoing progress evaluation

Ngo Dinh Diem Accomplishments

Offered only alternative to a Communist South Vietnam

Installed a representative government

Consolidated his regime and provided for 1 million refugees

Formed rural security forces to police countryside

Drafted a new constitution

Pledged to initiate reforms in land holding, public health, educationEstablished true national army

Ngo Dinh Diem’s Downfall

Policies alienated population, key religious, government and military leaders

Objective was maintenance of power, rather than “winning the hearts and minds”

Catholic president and ruling class in Buddhist country

Brutally repressed Buddhist uprising in 1963

Isolated from his people

Suspicious of all around him

Unable to delegate authority

Propensity for inflexibility

Post- Diem Period 1963 to 1965

Pacification inhibited by inflation, communal unrest, rivalries for power by generals

Diem and brother Nhu overthrown and killed in coup on November 1, 1963

Military governments could only deal with immediate insurgent threat

South Vietnam plagued by chronic political instability

Successive coups dismantled police and intelligence services

Increased US Involvement 1963-1965

March-April 1965 – Elements of the 3d Marine Division land at Da Nang to protect airfield

August 1964 – Gulf of Tonkin incident

March 1965 – ARVN losing one district capital and one battalion a week

January 1965 - Regular North Vietnamese Army units moved into South Vietnam

February 1965 – President Johnson authorizes “continuous limited airstrikes” against North Vietnam

June 1965 – Nguyen Cao Ky and Nguyen Van Thieu form government to reverse political slide

Diem and brother Nhu overthrown and killed in coup on November 1, 1963

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Da Nang Airfield July 1965

M-60 Defensive Position, Da Nang

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Situation 1965

• 3d Battalion 4th Marine Regiment landed at Phu Bai Vietnam in May 1965 to establish a TAOR

• The mission of 3/4 was to “occupy and defend assigned TAOR in the vicinity of HUE PHU BAI airfield and defend the 8th RRU compound…”

Situation Phu Bai – Sept 1965

Challenges Facing 3/4

• Original Phu Bai TAOR assigned to 3/4 was considered tactically undesirable because of the terrain to the north allowed enemy to approach undetected and mortar airfield and base

• Marines secured operation control of “A” Zone with population of 16,000 people

Challenges Facing 3/4

Phu Bai

• Phu Bai was an agricultural community made up of four hamlets and had a population of about 15,000

• “A” zone added additional 16,000 people

Phu Bai 1965

• Phu Bai was revitalized when Marines arrived in May 1965 but continued to be a target of the VC

Popular Forces

• Lack of interpreters made operational control of the Popular Forces (PF) platoons essential for population control

• Commanding General 1st ARVN Division gave operational control of six PF platoons to 3/4

Joint Action Company• LtCol Taylor and the staff of 3/4 developed a plan to

create a “Joint Action Company (JAC)” composed of Marines and Popular Forces

• A battalion officer and recent graduate of Vietnamese Language School was named Company Commander

• One T/O squad of Marines was hand picked from each of the four rifle companies to become a permanently organized unit – 1st Provisional Marine Platoon

• Six PF platoons were formed into a company and an ARVN officer named Company Commander

• The Marine platoon and PF company became the Joint Action Company with a Marine officer as the CO and the ARVN officer as the XO

Formation of the Joint Action Company

• All matters pertaining to the village are accomplished through, and in conjunction with, the village chief

JAC to CAC to CAP

• The Marine squad leader always consulted his PF counterpart

• The name of the Joint Action Company evolved to Combined Action Company with each of the village units called Combined Action Platoons (CAP)

• The village chief was kept apprised of all tactical operations

• In each village, the Marine squad leader was responsible for operations of the integrated unit

• Operationally his commands are passed through the PF platoon commander to the Vietnamese

CAP Units Around Phu Bai

3 4

CAP Units Around Phu Bai

Combined Action Program Patch

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“All Alone in Indian Country”All Alone in Indian Country”“All Alone in Indian Country”All Alone in Indian Country”

Alpha CAP Team House, Phu Bai 3

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Mission of the CAP Units

•Destroy the communist infrastructure within the platoon's area of responsibility

•Protect public security; help maintain law and order

•Organize local intelligence nets

•Participate in civic action and conduct propaganda against the communists

•Motivate and instill pride, patriotism, and aggressiveness in the militia

•Conduct training for all members of the combined-action platoon in general military subjects, leadership, and language

• Increase the proficiency of the PF so they could function effectively without the Marines

CAP Marine with Phu Bai Residents

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CAP Unit Operations

• Tactical Operations – Recon patrols, security patrols and ambushes (~20 per week)

• Intelligence – Reduced VC domination of the villages from 35% to near 0% and opened information flow

• Counterintelligence – CAP unit denied the use of the villages by the VC and propaganda dropped to near 0%

• Economic Influence – Became part of the community and assisted in civil action projects

• Psychological Operations – By word of mouth, CAP unit offers people friendship, civic action and protection as representatives of the South Vietnamese government

• Coordination and Liaison – Close contact was maintained with civil, military and police heads for mutual assistance in intelligence and operations

Shooting Concentrations for Village

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Marines and Village Chief

• 3/4 established radio communications with each village and hamlet chief who was linked with ARVN liaison in the Marine FSCC

• FO surveyed in and registered with smoke artillery concentrations in each village and were named for animals by the village chief

TIGERRAT

MONGOOSE

Military Assistance Command-Vietnam

MAC-V was United States' unified command structure for all US military forces in South Vietnam during the Vietnam War

MAC-V created 1962 to manage the increase in U.S. military assistance to South Vietnam

Assisted the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) Vietnam, controlling every advisory and assistance effort in Vietnam

Absorbed MAAG Vietnam to its command when combat unit deployment became too large for advisory group control

ARVN Advisors

Small teams, 2-6, of Americans, would be assigned to an ARVN unit, live with them, fight with them, and provide fire support

Often the ARVN commander would not heed the advisor’s tactical advice, or ask for it, but they wanted U.S. fire support and logistics support

Vietnamese Marine Advisors

1954-U.S. Marine Lieutenant Colonel Victor Croizat designated as the first Senior U.S. Advisor to the VNMC

Vietnamese Marines formed from colonial-era commandos (the 1st and 2nd Battaillons de Marche)

USMC advisory efforts permeated every aspect of VNMC training, force expansion, logistics, and field operations

Vietnamese Marines grew to division strength in 1968 and fought valiantly until the end

Co Vans

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VNMC Rigging 105s for Helicopters

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CH-47 with 105 and Ammo

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CH-54 Skycrane with Bulldozer

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Guns on Cleared Mountain Top

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Gunships Hitting LZ

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Go…Go…Go…!!!

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Vietnamese Marine Sweep Hill

Kilo 4/11 Hill 65 Da Nang 1968

Kilo 4/11 Operations Da Nang 1968

Chieu Hoi (“Open Arms”) Program

Offered amnesty to defecting Viet Cong

Many VC were die-hard believers in their cause

Others were coerced into fighting through intimidation or personal gain

More than 159,000 VC had defected by 1972

Defectors trained in a craft or given small piece on land to farm

Defectors volunteered to broadcast messages to former compatriots to encourage them to changes sides

Chieu Hoi Operation

Chieu Hoi Surrenders

Hoi Chanh in Training “Money for Weapons”

People’s Self Defense Force

During TET 1968, Vietnamese citizens requested weapons from the government to defend themselves, their families and their property from attack

People were furnished weapons and Peoples Self-Defense Force (PSDF) was formed

All able-bodied men in the age groups of 16-17 and 39-50, except those joining RVNAF on a voluntary basis

Males between 18-38 deferred from military service on grounds other than physical disabilityWomen and youth together with older men could volunteer for the PSDF and thousands responded

To provide the people with the means to defend their families, homes, and hamlets/villages in both rural and urban areas

To assist the National Police and Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam in maintaining security and public order and identifying the enemy

To promote community development activities for self-help and improvement of hamlets and village in both rural and urban areas

People’s Self-Defense Force

Welcome to Afghanistan

USAID - Afghanistan

USAID FPO DELARAM 2010USAID FPO GARMSIR 2009

Air Taxi Marine CH-53

FOB Delhi CP - Garmsir District

CAG TCAPF with Villagers

Route 1 Delaram District Center

ANP on Patrol

Out with SF Team

Out with MARSOC at Ghaziabad

USMC Female Engagement Team

FET Bringing Supplies for Girl’s School

Presentations at COIN Academy

Summary

Pacification andPacification and

Counterinsurgency in Counterinsurgency in

Vietnam and AfghanistanVietnam and Afghanistan

Pacification andPacification and

Counterinsurgency in Counterinsurgency in

Vietnam and AfghanistanVietnam and Afghanistan

The Nature of the Conflict

““First, organize revolts among the First, organize revolts among the peasant masses, then develop peasant masses, then develop guerrilla warfare from revolutionary guerrilla warfare from revolutionary bases in the countryside, and [finally] bases in the countryside, and [finally] launch attacks on towns.“launch attacks on towns.“

““First, organize revolts among the First, organize revolts among the peasant masses, then develop peasant masses, then develop guerrilla warfare from revolutionary guerrilla warfare from revolutionary bases in the countryside, and [finally] bases in the countryside, and [finally] launch attacks on towns.“launch attacks on towns.“

Troung ChinhTroung ChinhNorth Vietnamese North Vietnamese

LeaderLeader19581958

The Nature of the Conflict

"The struggle [is] in the rice "The struggle [is] in the rice paddies....in and among the people, paddies....in and among the people, not passing through, but living among not passing through, but living among them, night and day .... and joining them, night and day .... and joining with them in steps toward a better life with them in steps toward a better life long overdue.“long overdue.“

"The struggle [is] in the rice "The struggle [is] in the rice paddies....in and among the people, paddies....in and among the people, not passing through, but living among not passing through, but living among them, night and day .... and joining them, night and day .... and joining with them in steps toward a better life with them in steps toward a better life long overdue.“long overdue.“

Gen. Lew Walt ,USMCGen. Lew Walt ,USMCIII MAF CommanderIII MAF CommanderVietnam 1965-1968Vietnam 1965-1968

Lessons from Vietnam

Security

Security is a prerequisite for development

Develop local intelligence capability to identify and apprehend insurgent leaders early

Assure rural and urban police and counterintelligence forces operate within a framework of law and justice

Develop and employ aggressive small-unit tactics for regular and paramilitary units


Development

Focus development programs so they relate directly to the pacification effort

Engage the population and elicit from them a sense of involvement and participation

Exercise restraint in initial programming and arrange for accountability and follow-through by local officials (sustainability)

Avoid trying to transform host country institutions into replicas of some Western model

Address refugee issue and incorporate them into the military and civilian manpower pool


Governance

Convince the population they have a stake in perpetuating, not overthrowing, the governmentEstablish an effective presence in the form of competent local officials

Employ trained government cadre to close the gap between the government and the people

Redress genuine grievances at the earliest possible moment

Focus a portion of the pacification efforts on urban population centers


SimilaritiesDiem and Ky-Thieu governments was and Karzai government is corrupt, dysfunctional and incompetent

Both insurgencies were and are rural based

Insurgents enjoyed safe sanctuary behind long, rugged and uncloseable borders where enemy has uncontested power

Literacy in both countries hovers around 15%

Both countries have inhospitable and impassable terrain with few good roads

Both governments were and are perceived as illegitimate by a majority of the population


Similarities (cont)

Both countries experienced a decade North-South civil war afterwards

Both sides produced generations of experienced and highly skilled fighters and combat leaders

Both countries wracked by decades of European imperial aggression

Both wars are on Asian landmass, thousands of miles from the US, requiring super logistics

Terrain forces reliance on airpower for fire support and helicopters for transport and supply


Similarities (cont)

In both wars, enemy deeply infiltrated our bases and forced interpreters to inform on our moves

Heavy-handed, culturally-offensive U.S. troop behavior, and indiscriminate use of firepower turned rural villages into enemy recruiting sites

Neither the Viet Cong nor the Taliban were or are popular with support ~15%

North Vietnam received support from China and Russia, Taliban receive support from Pakistani ISI and wealthy Saudis


Similarities (cont)

Vietnam – DRV and VC motivated by nationalism and reunification narrative while U.S cast the war as a fight against the spread of Communism

Afghanistan - Taliban are fighting a religious war, a jihad as their overarching narrative, while the Coalition is fighting a secular campaign , a counterinsurgency

Total and complete misreadings of the motivations of the North Vietnamese and the Taliban

Less than 5% of U.S. forces had pacification in Vietnam and have reconstruction in Afghanistan as their primary mission


Differences

Afghanistan is a patchwork of ethnic groups while Vietnam had a national identity

In Vietnam, the U.S. was in total control of the war while in Afghanistan the “war of coalition” is hampered by fractured lines of authority and rules of engagement

In Vietnam, the enemy was monolithic; in Afghanistan, the insurgency is a complex network of networks

What Have We Really Learned?

Provincial boundaries were, and are, artificial administrative constructs

Administration by Province

Tribal Law resolves 95% of disputes by Jirga

Vietnamese identity was rooted in the xa (village) and ap (hamlet) while Pashtun identity is rooted in the woleswali (districts) and alaqadari (villages)

The district level is the only level of personal identity which matters in southern and easter Afghanistan

Clearing Operations

Viet Nam 1968 Afghanistan 2008


We continue the implied strategy of attrition via “clearing operations” (search and destroy)

“Big Army”

1. Clear a patch of worthless ground of insurgents

2. Turn over area to indigenous forces who cannot hold it or stabilize it

3. Do it all over again

Manpower pool for troops and tactical leaders is NOT enemy’s Achilles Heel

We talk the talk of counterinsurgency, but walk the walk of attrition


Troops-per-square-mile ratio is 1/32d of Vietnam

“Big Army” (cont)

• Kicking in doors

• Violating Pashtun honor code by searching compounds and women

• Collecting men of military age

Army fights the kind of war it likes to fight, rather than adapt its tactics to the kind of war it actually faces

In a revenge-based society, we continue:

• Inflicting unintended civilian casualties

We badly underestimate the enemy’s intelligence

Addressing Future Insurgencies

Implement a single manager approach similar CORDS (Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support)

Develop a pragmatic doctrine of pacification

Develop a common understanding of goals and objectives before commitments are made

Recognize that the host nation government unlikely to be effective or efficient

Use host nation’s own political and social systems to assure he keeps his side of the bargain

Recognize that our advice cannot change the nature of the host regime or its society

Requirements for SuccessRequirements for Success

Outsiders can contribute but cannot win an Outsiders can contribute but cannot win an unconventional war by themselvesunconventional war by themselves

God helps those that help themselvesGod helps those that help themselves

He will help only those who help themselvesHe will help only those who help themselves

He cannot help those who do not help He cannot help those who do not help themselvesthemselves

Douglas Pike, 1966

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