Charles Taylor’s Criminal Network: Exploiting

Diamonds and Children

Janna Lipman

PUBP 710

Louise Shelley

May 11, 2009

Table of Contents

Introduction......................................................................................................................... 3 Background on Conflicts in Western Africa....................................................................... 4

Conflict in Liberia........................................................................................................... 4 Conflict in Sierra Leone.................................................................................................. 6 International Community Intervention ........................................................................... 7

Charles Taylor’s Criminal Network and Finances.............................................................. 9 Charles Taylor and Allies ............................................................................................... 9 West African Natural Resources: History and Exploitation ......................................... 11 Taylor Financial Operations ......................................................................................... 13 Policy Implications for Taylor’s Criminal Network..................................................... 15 Policy Implications for Conflict Diamonds .................................................................. 18

Backlash for Child Soldiers .............................................................................................. 21 Policy Implications for Child Soldiers.......................................................................... 22

International Criminal Court Case Against Taylor ........................................................... 24 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 25 Appendix........................................................................................................................... 28 Sources.............................................................................................................................. 31

Introduction

Former President of Liberia, Charles Taylor, led one of the most prolific criminal

networks throughout Western Africa (see Figure 1), leading to violence and influencing

conflicts throughout Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire, and Burkina Faso.

Through corruption and a desire to obtain wealth, often from natural resources, the state itself becomes a functioning criminal enterprise. In these cases the state, while receiving the international benefits of being a state (the ability to issue recognized diplomatic passports; maintain shipping and airplane registries; control border entry and exit points; and collect taxes), plays host to, and participates with, a variety of non-state actors to achieve its goals (Farah n.d., par. 3).

By asking how certain international policies measure against enhancing capacities to

respond to the failed state and breakdown of rule of law in Liberia, this paper is divided

into five distinct sections. To begin, this paper examines the links between the corruption

of Taylor’s criminal network and diamond trafficking and researches the impact of how

the illicit diamond trade influenced trafficking in humans, specifically the use of child

soldiers and prolonged the West Africa conflicts. Next, this study provides an important

baseline of the brief history of the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone, reviewing

Taylor’s relationships with non-state actors. “The bureaucratic collapse and elite conflict

in Liberia did not liberate society from oppressive state power, but cleared the war for

individual state officials to regain personal power through new arrangements with

internal and external actors” (Reno 1997, 494). Following the history, the research

analyzes Liberia’s shadow state economy of using natural resources to finance the wealth

and political ambitions of Charles Taylor. This paper will then discuss Taylor’s use of

child soldiers in Liberia and the influence on using child soldiers in Sierra Leone.

Finally, this paper will discuss the international policy implications on the exploitation of

natural resources during conflicts, the illicit weapons trade, and human rights violations

of children.

Background on Conflicts in Western Africa

To gain control of the diamond fields, which are particularly attractive because they are alluvial and require very little investment in order to exploit, Taylor launched two interwoven wars. The first was in Liberia, and the second was in neighboring Sierra Leone, with even richer diamond fields. Both wars were marked by a devastating level of brutality, including ritual executions, the abduction of thousands of children who were drugged and taught how to kill, the widespread use of rape as a weapon of terror and control, and the mutilation of civilians (Farah n.d., par. 7).

As Farah states above, Charles Taylor and his push for power directly influenced two

wars in West Africa so this paper will concentrate on those specific wars in Liberia and

Sierra Leone. Additional wars in West Africa such as Cote d’Ivoire may be mentioned to

demonstrate Taylor’s financial network relationships.

Conflict in Liberia

Violence and conflict proved evident through Liberia’s history, even as Liberia

was considered among one of the most prosperous and stable democracies in Africa

(Farah 2004, 20). However, this paper will concentrate specifically on The Great War

from 1989-2003. During this time, warlord Charles Taylor led the violent efforts to oust

President Samuel K. Doe and eventually led to his election as President.

The brutal civil war that engulfed Liberia, following Charles Taylor’s invasion in December 1989, has left an indelible mark on the history of this West African state. The six-year struggle led to the collapse of what was already an embattled economy; to the almost complete destruction of physical infrastructure built over a century and half of enterprise and

oligarchic rule; to the killing, maiming, and displacement of more than 50 per cent of the country’s estimated pre-war population of 2.5 million; and to an unprecedented regional initiative to help resolve the crisis (Sesay 1996, 395).

In 1989, Charles Taylor, former director-general of Liberia’s General Services

Agency and leader of the National Patriotic Front for Liberia (NPFL), launched an

insurgency against President Doe and within 5 months, the NPFL controlled 90% of the

country (Levitt 2005, 206). Taylor’s attack represented the disgust for Doe’s regime

characterized by sustained levels of brutality, dramatic economic decline, political

immobilization, and purges of real or imagined enemies (Sesay 1996b, 36). The NPFL

gained members through the reconciliation of several ethnic tribes; however, the

insurgency focused on attacking those tribes that benefitted from association with

President Doe, causing intense ethnic violence throughout those first months (Ellis 1999,

78). Doe sought assistance from the international community, calling on the United

Nations, however was unable to received assistance due to NPFL support from the

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) member states, specifically

Burkina Faso and Cote d’Ivoire (Levitt 2005, 207). ECOWAS ultimately provided

Cease-fire Monitoring Group forces (ECOMOG) to end the conflict and human rights

violations (Ibid.). ECOMOG forces proved ineffective as NPFL’s guerilla splinter group,

the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) kidnapped Doe and then

shot, beat, and mutilated him on September 9, 1990 (Ibid.).

With the assassination of Doe, several Liberian political groups created the

Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) with the backing of Nigeria. Taylor,

backed by Cote d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, and Libya, still controlled the majority of

Liberian territory and refused to acknowledge IGNU (Ibid., 208). In 1993, the United

Nations established the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) while the war

continued. “Taylor’s thirst for state power was unquenchable and far greater than the

international community’s to forestall the conflict. For Taylor, peace without power was

simply not an option” (Ibid., 209). In 1997, after the fourteenth peace agreement,

elections were held where Charles Taylor was declared President in a landslide victory;

however the next years were not peaceful as Taylor’s government and armed forces

committed human rights violations (Ibid., 211).

Conflict in Sierra Leone

In 1991, the conflict in Sierra Leone escalated when the Revolutionary United

Front (RUF) launched a war in the Eastern side of the country to overthrow the

government. For the next five years, fighting continued between the Sierra Leonean

government and the RUF. During this time, the Sierra Leonean military overthrew the

government and control of the diamond mines transferred from government to the RUF

and back. “The RUF had been founded in 1991 as part of the strategy of Libyan leader

Mu’ammar Gadhafi to spread revolution across Africa” (Farah 2004, 10). RUF leader,

Foday Sankoh met Gadhafi in Libya where he trained at the World Revolutionary

Headquarters along with Liberian Charles Taylor (Ibid., 24).

In 1998, the United Nations (UN) established the United Nations Observer

Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) “to monitor the military and security situation, as

well as the disarmament and demobilization of former combatants” (UNOMSIL n.d., par.

1). In 1999, the government and the RUF signed the Lomé Agreement, establishing an

international peacekeeping force with the UN and the Economic Community of West

African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and organized the United Nations Mission

in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). UNAMSIL “assist[ed] in the implementation of the

disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan” (UNAMSIL n.d., par 1). “By early

2002, UNAMSIL disarmed and demobilized more than 75,000 ex-fighters, including

child soldiers” (UNIOSIL n.d., par. 20).

International Community Intervention

Throughout the Liberian civil war, besides Taylor’s allies, there was a lack of

international intervention; however, the civil war had wider regional and international

implications. “One significant issue was external financial and military support for the

belligerent parties” (Sesay 1996b, 38). As previously mentioned, part of this stemmed

from the influence of Cote d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso with the UN Security Council. As

close allies to Taylor, both nations were content to assist Taylor in gaining control of

Liberia.

There is evidence that Cote d’Ivoire, Libya, and Burkina Faso provided the training, money and weapons for Charles Taylor and his rebels. Libya provided most of the weapons, oil and money; Burkina Faso contributed men and training; Cote d’Ivoire was not only Charles Taylor’s major conduit for supplies and reinforcement, but also the country that prevented any discussion of the Liberian conflict in the Security Council in the first year (Ibid.).

While Taylor had the backing of Libya, Cote d’Ivoire, and Burkina Faso, Doe was

backed by Nigeria and the United States (US), with the US providing military advisors.

However, through hostage takings and killings by both the rebel group and government

troops, outside intervention was discouraged (Ibid.). The UN Charter does not have a

specific provision for peacekeeping missions, however has adapted the Charter to

establish missions only if there is neutrality and impartiality, trained and experienced

multinational forces and the use of force only in self-defense (Ibid., 36). Along with these

provisions, a UN peacekeeping mission must also have the consent or the invitation of

one or all of the disputing parties (Ibid.).

US history with Liberia, Liberia was founded by former US slaves, and US

interest in intelligence apparatuses predicted the US would intervene and stop the fighting

(Sesay 1997, 38). During Doe’s regime, US ties were strained due to the brutality,

mismanagement and corrupt bureaucrats and politicians, yet the US financed Liberia

initially due to Liberia’s support for the US during the Cold War (Ibid., 39). As Liberia

moved to bankruptcy, the US attempted to assist, however the government’s corruption

forced the US to abandon Liberia and decrease assistance, militarily and monetarily

(Ibid.). US policy declared the Liberian conflict to be an internal conflict and required no

direct outside intervention (Ibid., 40).

Through all this, when US and then UN intervention did not occur in Liberia,

intervention was left to ECOWAS, the regional organization in West Africa. ECOWAS

formed a peacekeeping force, the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and sent

troops in to maintain security. The UN decided not to intervene, however did impose

sanctions on arms in November 1992 as imposed initially by ECOWAS (Ibid., 41). UN

missions focus on neutrality, regional organizations also strive for neutrality, however in

Liberia, ECOWAS never achieved neutrality. “This regional peacekeeping force was

both corrupt and at times militarily incompetent. It was not neutral and never perceived

as such by the warring parties. Its prowess at looting was such that Liberians began to

say, that ECOMOG stood for “Every Car Or Moveable Object Gone”” (Jett 1999, 134).

Charles Taylor’s Criminal Network and Finances

Through many relations all over the world including West Africa, the Middle East

and the United States, Charles Taylor controlled Liberia for several years. Prior to his

Presidential election, the NPFL controlled many industries within Liberia and the

diamond mines in Sierra Leone. Once in power, Taylor maintained power over the

natural resources, increasing his influence and wealth. Throughout the civil war, Liberia

existed as a shadow state, state defined by personal rule and the ruler’s manipulation of

external actors’ access to formal and clandestine markets through global recognition of

sovereignty allowing government institutions to be undermined (Reno 2000, 434-35).

Charles Taylor and Allies

Charles Taylor was born in 1948 to an Americo-Liberian family, the elites of the

freed slaves who founded the country (PBS n.d., par. 3). After finishing college in the

United States, Taylor returned to Liberia in 1980 and worked under President Doe as the

director for the General Services Agency controlling Liberia’s budget. Accused of

embezzling between $900,000 and $1million, Taylor was sent to prison in the United

States (Ibid., par. 13). After escaping from prison, Taylor was next found to be in Libya,

trained in Gadhafi’s World Revolutionary Headquarters, where he befriended Cote

d’Ivoire ruler Felix Houphouet-Boigny, Burkina Faso President Blaise Compaore, RUF

leader Foday Sankoh, and a gallery of local and foreign businesspersons (Ibid., par. 15).

These relationships provided important links that allowed Taylor’s criminal enterprise to flourish. The network was also crucial in providing entrée to criminal elements from Liberia into other state structures. One of his closest confidants, Ibrahim Bah, escorted diamond buyers and weapons merchants to Burkina Faso, Niger, Cote d’Ivoire and elsewhere to do business (Farah, n.d., par. 6).

Taylor embraced these relationships, which provided his armies with the necessary

weapons to maintain control in Liberia. “The Liberian civil war was launched from

neighboring Cote d’Ivoire, and that country and Burkina Faso were the conduits for most

of the weapons used by at least one of the rebel factions” (Jett 1999, 59). Additionally,

“Charles Taylor helped found and train the RUF and let Sierra Leonean rebels use Liberia

for its resupply routes” (Farah 2004, 17). Through Taylor’s patronage, the RUF

successfully kept Sierra Leone in conflict for ten years of destruction and brutality. “The

RUF became infamous for maiming and killing by chopping off the arms, breasts, hands,

legs, tongues, and heads of their victims, and it was responsible for the deaths of untold

thousands of innocent people” (Rosen 2005, 60).

Besides neighboring countries, Taylor garnered relationships with different

businesspersons throughout the world. Some of these businesspersons included Russian

weapons dealer, Viktor Bout, also known as the “Merchant of Death”.

[Bout] had two important assets that set him apart from other traffickers: a private fleet of about 50 aging Russian-made aircraft, acquired as the Soviet bloc crumbled, and the ability to procure not only weapons, but advanced weapons systems (anti-aircraft, anti-tank systems, attack helicopters), on short notice (CIJ 2005, 23).

Taylor and Bout started working through Sanjivan Ruprah, a Kenyan in Taylor’s inner

circle, when Taylor decided he needed attack helicopters to challenge the newly formed

rebel group, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) (Farah 2004,

39). Besides working for years in West Africa, Bout also had connections to the Taliban

in supplying weapons and also running and maintaining Ariana Airlines, the Taliban’s

official airline (CIJ 2005, 24).

Under Taylor’s patronage, international arms dealers operated along side al Qaeda operatives, Israeli mercenaries, Hezbollah diamond merchants, Russian and Balkan organized crime figures and South African mercenaries. Because he controlled the borders, Taylor and his security apparatus were able to guarantee that even wanted criminals could enter and exit with impunity (Farah n.d., par. 5).

Other connections Taylor developed included Leonid Minin, a Ukrainian-Israeli citizen

who specialized in surplus weapons stock from Kiev; Aziz Nassour and Samih Osailly,

Lebanese diamond merchants with connections with former Israeli military officers and

Russian merchants; Balkans’ weapons trader, Slobodan Te_ic; and Iranian weapons

dealer Ali Kleilat (CIJ 2005, 27).

West African Natural Resources: History and Exploitation

West Africa is rich in many different natural resources. Liberia boasts resources

including diamonds, bauxite, timber, coffee, iron, gold, and rubber. Additionally, Sierra

Leone is ripe with diamonds minds. During the conflict in Liberia, President Doe and

then Charles Taylor benefitted from the natural resources, creating wealth for the banks

and themselves. “Taylor’s associates preside over an export trade in diamonds, timber,

gold and agricultural products. Taylor pioneered a network of foreign forms to exploit

and market these resources, to finance military conquests and to control economically

useful territory” (Reno 1995, 113). Additionally in Sierra Leone during the 1980s, former

President Siaka Stevens allowed several Lebanese merchants a monopoly on diamond

mining; however, Stevens controlled the merchants through tax collections and

provisions of security, increasing funds in the government’s bank accounts (Snyder and

Bhavnani 2005, 582). However as time went on and the Lebanese merchants increased

their wealth, they stopped seeking government assistance for security and instead hired

their own personal armies, declining to pay taxes and leading to Stevens’ downfall

(Ibid.).

Table 1 depicts different conflicts from 1990-2000 that were linked to resource

wealth. “Many observers have suggested that resource wealth can lengthen a conflict if it

enables the rebels to fund themselves and hence continue fighting instead of being

crushed or forced to the negotiating table” (Ross 2004, 43). As Reno (2000) states, the

economy in Liberia is a shadow economy, where the warlords hired foreign firms or non-

state organizations to perform services originally allotted to state bureaucracies.

Between June 1990 and August 1996, the combatants signed fourteen peace accords, thirteen of which failed. One important reason for these failures was that the warring parties – or at least, significant factions within them – feared they would lose access to Liberia’s resource wealth. This fear reduced the incentive of the parties to comply with the terms of the agreements (Ross 2004, 53).

The wealth obtained by the warring parties in controlling the economic resources was

greater incentive for them than obtaining peace (Adebajo 2002, 47). This wealth gave

them power over others and they were content to keep things that way.

The same was not true for Sierra Leone as peace negotiators included provisions

for rebel leaders to continue to control portions of the nation’s wealth under a unity

government (Ibid., 54). However, even with the provisions of resource control, the RUF

did not sign the accords at that time due to encouragement from Liberia to continue the

conflict, retain control of the natural resource wealth and allow Liberia to have access to

the diamond mines (Ibid., 56). “Rebel groups in Sierra Leone and elsewhere enrich

themselves through the sale or exchange of diamonds, economic interests not only shape

the conflict, but, if the economic advantage of fighting outweighs that of peace,

perpetuate it as well” (Ross quoting Sherman 2004, 44).

Table 1. Civil Wars linked to resource wealth, 1990-2000

Country Duration Resources

Afghanistan 1992-2001 Gems, opium

Angola 1975-2002 Oil, diamonds

Burma 1983-95 Timber, tin, gems, opium

Cambodia 1978-97 Timber, gems

Congo Republic 1984- Oil, gold, coca

Colombia 1997 Oil

Congo, Dem. Rep. 1996 Copper, coltan, diamonds, gold, cobalt

Congo, Dem. Rep. 1997-99 Copper, coltan, diamonds, gold, cobalt

Indonesia (Aceh) 1976- Natural gas Liberia 1989-96 Timber, diamonds, iron, palm oil, cocoa,

coffee, marijuana, rubber, gold

Peru 1982-96 Coca

Sierra Leone 1991-2000 Diamonds

Sudan 1983- Oil

Note: Separatist conflicts are listed in italics (Ross 2004,48)

Taylor Financial Operations

Throughout the Liberian conflict, Taylor controlled about 90% of Liberia,

including the natural resource wealth by focusing on commercial enterprises to assist

with financing. It is estimated Taylor made between anywhere between $105-450

million from 1992-2003 (CIJ 2005, 19; Duffield 2000, 82). Focusing first on the sale of

mining machinery from an abandoned German-operated ore company, Taylor then

collaborated with Firestone Tire and Rubber to cooperate in rubber production and

marketing, organizing rubber workers in exchange for communication facilities (Reno

1995, 114). Taylor then turned his attention to the timber trade, swapping arms for

timber. Establishing a “Forestry Development Authority”, Taylor collected cash for

timber licenses and rough log export taxes (Ibid.). Through the timber trade, Taylor

made an estimated $23 million from 1997-2003 (CIJ 2005, 18).

Another major financial operation for Taylor was through a joint venture on the

Liberia-Guinea border, the Nimba Mining Company (NIMCO), a consortium of North

American, European and Japanese mining firms. Through partnerships with the Liberian

American Swedish Minerals Company, the Liberian Mining Cooperation, and the African

Mining Company of Liberia, railroad passage in the port city of Buchanan stayed open

for shipments of iron ore, allegedly netting Taylor $10 million a month for the railroad

services (Reno 1995, 114). Through these connections with transnational foreign

companies, Taylor was able to exercise political authority, generating a “warlord

economy” worth approximately $200-250 million a year. (Bellamy, Williams and Griffin

2004, 190-91). With this wealth, Taylor’s “war effort did not suffer greatly from his

inability to command sovereignty over the Liberian state because he was able to wield a

commercial empire and insulate himself from his enemies” (Ibid., 191). This in turn

helped him to underwrite RUF’s invasion into Sierra Leone and gain additional wealth

through the Sierra Leone diamond mines (Reno 1995, 115).

The diamond business in Sierra Leone started in the 1950s by the Sierra Leone

Selection Trust (SLST), owned ultimately by the South African company De Beers

Consolidated Mines, Ltd (Campbell 2002, 17). After World War II, Sierra Leonean

miners learned of the fortune in diamonds and became independent and illegal operators

in the sale of diamonds. As political tensions increased in Sierra Leone prior to

independence, diamonds increased this tension. “More diamonds were smuggled away

than were exported, robbing the country of taxes and contracts that could have been used

to build roads, utilities, and medical and educational facilities” (Ibid., 21). As the RUF

waged war against the Sierra Leonean government, starting in 1991, they slowly claimed

control over the diamond mines and to the ability to trade the diamonds for weapons.

“Because of their diamond wealth, throughout most of the war the RUF was better armed

than its adversaries. Diamonds bought Kalashnikovs by the hundreds, Browning 12.7-

millimeter heavy machine guns by the dozens, and ammunition in million-block orders”

(Ibid., 63). RUF rebels relied on Taylor to trade their diamonds for weapons and Taylor

in turn sold the diamonds to merchants exporting diamonds to Belgium (Ibid.). From

1997-2003, it is estimated Taylor accumulated approximated $40 million per year from

diamonds (CIJ 2005, 17).

Additional wealth accumulated by Taylor came from the Liberian maritime

registry system. The registry covers a third of the world’s shipping tonnage, more than

1,700 vessels. “The flag of convenience lets American shippers hire crews outside

American wage and labor laws; the ships can be reflagged and made available to the US

military in times of war” (Global Policy Forum 2003, par. 7). In 1999, Taylor fired the

Virginia company that ran the registry for 50 years and set up a new one generating a

steady flow of income averaging about $18 million a year.

Policy Implications for Taylor’s Criminal Network

Taylor’s association with illicit weapons traders and diamond smugglers as well

as the shadow economy within Liberia, demonstrated many policy implications,

specifically with international trade and commerce.

Unlike parallel trade in legal goods, war economies usually link into transcontinental smuggling and other gray commercial networks to satisfy

their special requirements. Today’s so-called warlords or failed states may act locally; but they have to think globally. In this respect, a high level of complicity among international companies, offshore banking facilities, and Northern governments has assisted the development of war economies (Duffield 2000, 84).

Taylor focused on global connections, using companies throughout the world to invest in

Liberia’s natural resources and provided a market for illicit goods including drugs and

weapons; however, Taylor also made sure he maintained final control and profits of the

government backed subsidies. “The absence of agencies that can enforce an autonomous

notion of legality also generates opportunities for politicians to use more innovative

means to control natural resources and translate them into political tools” (Reno 2000,

58). New crime groups, especially in conflict regions, such as Charles Taylor’s network

in Liberia, have forged alliances with terrorist organizations due to inefficient,

nonexistent or corrupt law enforcement agencies and governments (Shelley 2005, 103).

Additionally, as Taylor controlled the borders, smuggling routes were able to remain

intact and undetected.

From the international commerce side, Liberia not only provided resources to be

smuggled, but also provided Liberian corporate identities in one day without the need to

list officers, owners or shareholders (Campbell 2000, 64). Liberia also provided a “safe

harbor for anyone wishing to keep aircraft sheltered from scrutiny. Once an airplane is

registered in Liberia, it can be based in another country and used anywhere in the world,

often leaving little evident of its travels” (Ibid.). This proved extremely useful for Viktor

Bout who owned many airlines and aircraft and was able to easily register them and

thwart regulators (Ibid., 65).

In Sierra Leone, then head of state, Valentine Strasser, sought foreigners

representing state and non-state organizations to manage the shadow state’s global

relations. International organizations sought to help Strasser to keep the RUF from

obtaining power through provisions of debt relief (Reno 2000, 503). Sierra Leone

represents a wide range of formal and informal roles for external actors – among them

Strasser’s and Taylor’s foreign backers – that exploit changes in post-cold war global

commerce (Ibid., 504-05).

Most sanction against Liberia, specifically during Charles Taylor’s regime did not

occur until the end of the conflict. “The United Nations slapped bans on Liberian

diamond exports in 2001 and on timber two years later, saying the resources were being

used to fuel war in the region” (Global Policy Forum 2006, par 2). Weapons embargo

sanctions were initially issued in 1992 and additional sanctions freezing assets and travel

restrictions on those that posed threat to the peace process were introduced in 2003

(Global Policy Forum n.d., par.2).

Additional policy implications follow the lack of communication among US

government agencies, the lack of research into terrorist group financial networks from

regular commercial goods to illicit trade of weapons and drugs and the lack of resources

to interconnect the financial networks. Douglas Farah, a journalist from the Washington

Post, points out the lack of intergovernmental agency communication and coordination in

his book Blood From Stones (2004). While in West Africa in 2001, Farah discovered the

links between conflict diamonds, Charles Taylor, Viktor Bout, the Taliban, al Qaeda and

many others. While most of the US government focused on counterterrorism efforts

before and after 9/11, al Qaeda was laying the groundwork of establishing foundations in

the US to finance their efforts. “Al Qaeda’s resourcefulness allowed its financial

structure to survive a near complete military defeat in Afghanistan. The size of al

Qaeda’s bankroll after 9/11 remains a mystery. Estimates range from $30 million to

$300 million” (Farah 2004, 7). However, the “terrorist-transnational crime relationship

extends beyond the generation of profits or provisions of logistics, but goes to the heart of

the relationship between crime groups and the state” (Shelley 2005, 104). In Liberia,

Taylor’s regime is the crime group, exploiting legal norms and procedures and enhancing

the only functioning economy, the shadow economy (Ibid., 105).

In the aftermath of 9/11 and in recent years, more efforts have been made to

“follow the money”, however there is a long way to go. “Still, knowledgeable sources

say, more than two years after 9/11 the United States remains far behind in the race to cut

off the flow of money, the lifeblood of terrorism, although cooperation among some

government agencies has improved” (Ibid., 198).

Policy Implications for Conflict Diamonds

In 2001, the UN issued sanctions against diamond exporting in Liberia, as the

international community recognized diamonds were fueling the conflict, providing goods

for the trade of weapons. At this time, about thirty-five countries began meeting to

discuss the economic impact of buying and selling conflict diamonds. Previously, “the

practice of selling rough stones outside the boundaries of established taxes and exporting

structures for the sake of funding insurgencies against legitimate African governments

was well established and accepted by the diamond-producing and –importing countries of

the world, but it was never, ever discussed in public” (Campbell 2004, 114-15). However

due to the brutality seen in the West African countries, diamonds were being viewed in a

different light, becoming “synonymous with death and mayhem” (Ibid., 115).

As the conflicts and diamond trafficking in Liberia and Sierra Leone forged on, in

December 2000, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution recognizing diamonds as

a direct contribution to prolonged conflict and increased prosperity within the conflict

zone and throughout the world (UN n.d., par. 1). Additionally, negative marketing

within the diamond industry sprang to public attention as Amnesty International –France

developed advertisements focused on Valentine’s Day and making sure people do not

buy “blood diamonds” (IANSA 2006, par. 6).

The result from the negative marketing and the meeting of the thirty-five

countries was the establishment of the Kimberley Process. The Kimberley Process

became the procedure for certifying diamonds as “clean” or not from conflict zones and

also sought a plan to cut off the flow of diamonds from rebel group (Ibid., 115-16). In

2003, the group adopted the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), which

developed the requirements for certification including country of origin, alpha code

number, date of issuance, date of expiration, validation of certificate from exporting

authority, among others (KP 2003, par. 2). In 2006, the Kimberley Process conducted a

review of the KPCS resulting in significant contributions to the end of diamond

trafficking in certain post-conflict areas.

In the case of Sierra Leone, the KP review visit found that that the certification system had facilitated greater control over the diamond industry and reduced smuggling through the monitoring and control of diamond exports. The review visit estimated that the official system is now capturing up to 80 percent of production. According to Sierra Leone’s official export statistics, the total value of exports increased from US$26 million in 2001, to US$155 million in 2004, and US$142 million in 2005 (KP 2006, 23).

Overall, the Kimberley Process has 49 members representing 75 countries, accounting for

99.8% of the world’s rough diamond production (KP n.d., par. 3).

Recent reviews of the KP demonstrate that while some countries have improved

the certification process and government controls, most nations have a long way to go.

“An analysis of the United Nations’ (UN) Commodity Trade Statistics (Comtrade)

database reveals that an illegal trade in rough diamonds worth $10.2 million may be

taking place between Kimberley Process participant and non-participant countries,

allowing illicit diamonds to evade regulatory controls aimed at keeping out conflict

diamonds” (Global Witness 2007, 1). .Several organizations call for stronger processes

and controls for the Kimberley Process, including stronger government controls, regular

cross checking of statistical data within different systems, better coordination between

law enforcement and customs and border control, and better requirements for diamond

companies to track their data and have regular audits (Ibid., 1-2).

With the call for more oversight, the Kimberley Process has implemented a few

measures such as the expulsion of Congo-Brazzaville from the KP after the country could

not account for millions of exported diamonds. However, the expulsion of a country

from the process does not address the problem of illicit diamond trade, but may

potentially increase diamond trafficking. As of 2008, Cote d’Ivoire is the only country

since the KP conception that it has addressed. “The KP has tried to address the issue

through field visits and through additional recommendations to participants, but none of

these measures have put an end to the illicit flow. There has been strong reluctance by

governments and industry to meaningfully increase oversight and monitoring of the trade

in Ivorian conflict diamonds” (Global Witness 2008, 2). KP members are not reporting

infringements and are not auditing records as they should (Ibid., 4). Again, members of

the KP need to focus efforts on enforcement and pushing for better government controls

and legislation. Without the buy-in of the member state governments, the illicit diamond

trade will continue to prosper. .

Backlash for Child Soldiers

One of the heart wrenching consequences of the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra

Leone included the use of child soldiers in both conflicts. As per the United Nations, the

definition of a child soldier includes:

Any child - boy or girl - under 18 years of age, who is part of any kind of regular or irregular armed force or armed group in any capacity, including, but not limited to: cooks, porters, messengers, and anyone accompanying such groups other than family members. It includes girls and boys recruited for sexual purposes and/or forced marriage. The definition, therefore, does not only refer to a child who is carrying, or has carried weapons (UNICEF 1997, 8).

In addition, Wessells (2006) “emphasizes war as a source of opportunities for

children, who willing[ly] join armed groups to obtain things – protection, a sense of

family, education and training, power, money, or a sense of purpose, among others-

denied to them in civilian life” (31). Children are vulnerable and easily malleable and in

times of conflict, additional factors can contribute to their recruitment as soldiers

including poverty, education and employment, family and friends, politics and ideology,

and culture and tradition (Brett and Specht 2004, 4).

Adolescence is a time of vulnerability with the uncertainties and turbulence of physical, mental and emotional development. It is also a time of opportunities with greater freedom, developing understanding of one’s own identity and place in the community and society, and a new capacity to make choices and to take on responsibilities (Ibid., 3).

In 2005, the Coalition to Stop Child Soldiers reported 8,000 children were fighting as

soldiers with 20,000 more estimated to be involved in DDR programs throughout West

Africa (Coalition 2006, 1). In Liberia, NPFL and the United Liberian Movement for

Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO) consistently used children under the age of eighteen,

including thousands of children, including thousands of children under fifteen (Human

Rights Watch 2004, 1). The estimate of child soldiers used in Liberia is between five and

fifteen thousand with children making up anywhere between 25-75% of the fighting

forces (Pan 2003, par. 8). In Liberia, “enterprising strongmen find that cultivating a

personal following among people exploited in the past, especially youth, offers them

better prospects for personal gain than does loyalty to old patrons” (Reno 1997, 494).

“Modern-day conflicts are particularly lethal for children because little or no

practical distinction is made between combatants and civilians” (Machel 2001, 1).

Taylor used child soldiers to form a special unit called the “Small Boys Unit” (Pan 2003,

par. 7). In Sierra Leone, these small boys units were recruited into both the RUF and the

government forces (Kuper 2004, 219). In both countries, children were also forced to

work in the diamond mines.

Policy Implications for Child Soldiers

In 1989, the UN General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Rights of the

Child (1989 CRC) resulting in legal and policy initiatives that cover child trafficking,

labor, prostitution, abduction, imprisonment, health, education, discipline, family

relations and freedom of expression (Ibid., 3). Besides the 1989 CRC, additional policies

should consider International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Human Rights

Laws (IHRL), specifically the fundamental rules that protect civilians in situations of

armed conflict (Ibid., 23-24). While IHL and IHRL focus on all civilians, the 1989 CRC

details guidelines for special treatment for children civilians, giving them additional

protection and assistance against indecent assault, health, and family rights (Ibid., 35-37).

Additional provisions within the 1989 CRC focus on child combatants and ensuring they

are not subject to the “death penalty for offences related to the conflict which were

committed when they were under 18” (Ibid., 47).

In 2000, the UN adopted the Optional Protocol on the Rights of Children,

specifically Child Soldiers and children in armed conflict, designed to protect children

from the recruitment into armed forces and labor trafficking (UNHCHR n.d., Article 2).

Besides highlighting children’s rights during and after conflict, the 1989 CRC also

developed rules for the prevention of the use of child soldiers in conflict, specifically

focused on recruitment.

“Although strictly speaking, neither conscription nor deployment of children aged 15 to 17 is illegal (except in those countries that have ratified treaties such as the 2000 Optional Protocol on Child Soldiers), such activities could be in breach of the prohibition on employing children in work harmful to their health or dangerous to life” (Ibid., 49).

On the first day the Optional Protocol was adopted by the General Assembly, 61

countries signed the protocol. “Currently, 126 countries have ratified the Optional

Protocol on the involvement of children in armed conflict; and 130 States have ratified

the Optional Protocol on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography”

(HREA 2009, par. 12). With signing the Optional Protocol, nations agree to look at

national legislation is guaranteed the rights as outlined in the protocol such as the right to

life, education and special treatment (Ibid., par. 2-4).

International Criminal Court Case Against Taylor

After the ceasefire, the government of Sierra Leone and the UN established

Special Court for Sierra Leone to try people accused of war crimes and crimes against

humanity. Initially thirteen indictments were issued, however two were withdrawn after

the death of the accused and five have been completed (SC-SL n.d., par. 2-3). The

indictment of former Liberian President Charles Taylor is currently in the prosecution

phase, having started in 2007 (Ibid., par. 4). Taylor is facing eleven charges relating to

terrorizing the civilian population, murder, sexual violence (rape and sexual slavery),

physical violence (cutting off limbs), using child soldiers (under the age of 15),

enslavement (forced labor) and looting (Reynolds 2007, par. 13). The prosecution

brought in former government officials under Taylor as well as former RUF rebels to

testify against Taylor and describe occurrences of the eleven different charges in the

Sierra Leone conflict (Trial 2008, par. 1-20).

The International Criminal Court (ICC), established in 2002 based on the Rome

Statute for a “permanent, independent Court to investigate and bring to justice individuals

who commit the most heinous violations of international law and human rights, namely

war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide” (Arieff, Margesson, and Browne

2008, 1-2). The ICC has ongoing investigations for Northern Uganda, the Democratic

Republic of Congo, and the Darfur region of Sudan. On July 14, 2008, the ICC requested

a warrant for Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir (Ibid., 1). Precedent for ICC cases was

set by International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda as well as

the Nuremburg and Tokyo trials after World War II, however there is a distinction

between the tribunals and current ICC cases in that the ICC was established by

multilateral treaty and is a permanent tribunal; it is not a UN entity (Ibid., 5). While the

ICC follows past tribunals for precedent, the ICC can also learn from Sierra Leone’s

Special Court case of Charles Taylor. A concern for cases of ongoing or recently

resolved conflicts centers around the tenuous peace process and whether the cases may

upset the fragile peace process (Ibid., 26). However, with the case of Charles Taylor, he

is the first former African head of state to stand trial (Hudson 2008, par. 5). Perhaps

because he is not the former head of Sierra Leone, but the head of state for Liberia, the

trial has been proceeding smoothly, with minimal challenges.

Conclusion

During his regime, Charles Taylor exploited Liberia and neighboring West

African countries, people and resources, for his own power and wealth. These countries

suffered not only tremendous lose of life, as many hundreds of thousands were killed

throughout the conflicts, but the countries also suffered from providing many basic

human rights needs including shelter, security, healthcare, and education. Taylor retained

his power and wealth through cultivated relationships with other heads of state and

commercial organizations assisting in the exploitation of his people and resources. These

relationships provided not only resources to sell goods, but also provided weapons to

rebel groups, prolonging the conflict and influencing armed groups to use children as

soldiers.

Revenues from the African diamond trade have been used to find weapons acquisitions and have contributed to the devastating prolonging of conflicts and hostilities to such an extent that the trade has destabilized other governments. Not only do these conflicts result in disruption of economic activity and political instability, but also these conflicts rely on

the recruitment of child soldiers to fill the ranks of armies and militias (Grant 2007, 121).

International policies for diamond trafficking, weapons trafficking, and child

trafficking have provided meager measures and controls to governments and the

international community to implement such as the Kimberley Process and the Optional

Protocol on the Rights of the Child. Without stronger and cohesive international policies

and enforcement for illicit trade and trafficking, warlords like Charles Taylor will

continue to exploit countries, people, and resources increasing the chances for conflict

and weak governments and economies.

As a result of the above research, formal and informal institutions need to mitigate

the fragmented policy decisions by failed nation-state governments, especially once

conflict ends. However, this is an ongoing debate within the international community,

who is responsible for providing cohesion to policies? The United Nations? The United

States? Would the ICC or the World Bank affect change in policies as well? Overall, it is

a combination of all these organizations to assist failed nation-states, economically,

socially and politically. The United Nations has a job unto itself to coordinate its own

efforts and understand the dynamics of power within its own organization as analyzed by

the lack of international intervention in Liberia. When states fail, they lose exclusive

boundaries and central authority as demonstrated in Liberia and the neighboring countries

of West Africa. How can this be avoided or enforced in the future? Further research

needs to investigate social transformation of new wars to understand how common

beliefs, perspectives and interests make conflicting parties want to change and endorse

rule of law, liberal economics, and governance structures and end potentially end

conflict. This is a challenge when faced with transnational crime and corruption,

especially in shadow economies such as Liberia, where warlords are content to maintain

their power and wealth and do not need to change.

Appendix

Figure 1: West Africa

http://www.mytravelguide.com/g/maps/West-Africa-map.gif

Figure 2: Diamond Mining in African Conflicts

http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/754788.gif

Figure 3: Diamond Mines in West Africa

http://www.allaboutgemstones.com/images/map_conflict-diamonds_w-africa.jpg

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