CHAPTER V JINNAH AND THE FORMATION OF

PAKISTAN

CHAPTER V

JINNAH AND THE FORMATION OF PAKISTAN

Cripps Proposals

After the Lahore Resolution, Jinnah tried to win British

sympathy by offering the League's support for the war, provided the

British would not succumb to the Congress pressure. He also

reminded the British that the League would revolt if the Congress was

placated. The League's policy was undoubtedly to ensure that an

independent Pakistan was created at the same time that India should

get her freedom. On this occasion, and in all the subsequent

negotiations with the British Government and the Congress, Jinnah

advanced three basic demands : (1) the League should be regarded as

the sole spokesman of Muslim India; (2) the creation of Pakistan as an

independent state should be accepted in principle; and (3) in any

interim government that was formed, the Muslims, represented by the

League should have equal representation with the Hindus if the

Congress came in, otherwise they should have a majority of seats,

since the main burden and responsibility would be borne by the

Muslims in that case.1 Jinnah's strategy was successful and the

Viceroy stated that "Britain would not contemplate transfer of their

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responsibilities to any system of government whose authority is

directly denied by large and powerful elements in India's national

life."2

The Congress saw in these statements the Britain's intention to

hold India in bondage indefinitely. The Congress ministers` in all the

provinces resigned in October 1939, and Gandhi started the individual

Civil Disobedience Movement on 17 October 1940. Meanwhile the

Japanese attack on Pearl Habour in December 1941, brought the war

to India's door. Soon the British government sent Sir Stafford Cripps,

Lord Privy Seal of the War Cabinet, to make an all - out effort to

enlist the support of India in waging the war. Sir Stafford Cripps

came with the proposals came to be called Cripps Offer. The Offer

provided for Indian independence after the war and conceded the right

of self-determination to the provincial units. This meant that the

provinces were free to remain within India or opt out of the Indian

Union. Thus it also meant that the provinces where Muslims were in a

majority could presumably form their own federation - Pakistan - in

due course. V.P Menon says that "it was really the death - blow to

Indian unity."3 The Offer was rejected by the INC and the Muslim

League for different reasons. The Congress felt that the acceptance

beforehand of the novel principle of non - accession for a province

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was a severe blow to the conception of Indian unity and it would

create difficulties in the way of the Indian states merging themselves

into an Indian Union.4 On the otherhand, the League was not ready to

compromise on the question of creating an independent Pakistan. It

felt that though the possibility of Pakistan was recognized by

implication, the proposals embodying the fundamentals were not open

to any modification and therefore no alternative proposals were

invited. In view of this rigidity of the attitude, the proposals were

unacceptable to the League. Moreover, the proposal to establish a

single constitution - making body with the primary object of creating

one Indian Union relegated Pakistan to the realm of remote

possibility.5 Thus both the Congress and the League turned down the

proposals.

Jinnah - Churchill: Understanding and Collaboration

With the Japanese threatening to invade India, the Congress

could not remain a passive spectator to such a possibility. At the same

time the British remained highly obstinate, and Jinnah deliberately

obstructive. Gandhi, convinced that the British presence in India

would render communal settlement impossible, realized the urgency

of the two communities coming together when the British power came

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to an end in India. Gandhi's efforts to win over Jinnah in the past

several times ended in failure. In fact Jinnah had been in constant

touch with Churchill who considered the Hindu - Muslim feud as the

bulwark of British rule in India.6 It was only when the Japanese threat

loomed large on the horizon that Churchill sent Sir Stafford Cripps to

India. The Congress rejection of the Cripp's proposals pleased him so

much so that he told the British public as well as the American

officialdom that Congress had been out to sabotage the war efforts and

they were sympathetic to the Allies.

Jinnah aligned himself with Churchill in the vilification

campaign against the Congress.

The Congress retaliated strongly against this. It passed, on 8

August 1942, the well - known Quit India resolution, demanding

immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal by the British

regardless of the consequences.7 The Muslim League deplored the

decision arrived at by the AICC and opined that the movement was

directed "not only to coerce the British government into handing over

power to a Hindu oligarchy and thus disabling themselves from

carrying out their moral obligations and pledges given to the Muslims

and other sections of people of India from time to time, but also to

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force Muslims to submit and surrender to the Congress terms and

dictation"8 The League further described it as not only anti - British

but also anti-Muslim, and exhorted the Muslims to abstain from any

participation in the movement and requested the help of the

government to suppress it. This pleased the British so much so that it

brought about an unholy alliance between the British and the League,

and the Viceroy facilitated the installation of League governments in

Assam and Sind.9

In this context it is to be noted that the persons who contributed

in no small measure to the breakdown of relations between the INC

and the British were Winston Churchill and Lord Linlithgow. It was

really wrong on the part of Linlithgow to declare that India was ipso

facto at war against the Axis powers when Congress was ruling

provinces in India. Churchill's overbearing, prejudicial and biased

attitude brought immense hardships to the people of India. He

denounced the INC as a Hindu party dominated by the Hindu

priesthood and caucus. Lord Amery, who was Secretary of State for

India from 1940 to 1945 under Churchill, said that when it came to the

idea of giving anybody self - government, he was unreasonable and

silly.10 It requires to be noted that Churchill and the other members of

the Conservative Party refused to consider efforts made by the British

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Labour Party and the Indian National Congress (INC) at constitutional

advance.11 When it was pointed out that the dominionhood proposed

by Lord Irwin was in line with the enlightened traditions of the Raj,

Churchill could not control his anger. He was of the opinion that if

self - government or dominion status was granted to India, it would

revert to fierce racial and religious dissension. It was but Britain

which saved India from barbarism, internecine war and tyranny.12

Amery records that during one of his talks with Churchill, the latter

burst out: "I hate Indians. They are a beastly people with a beastly

religion."13 His insensitivity and contempt for the political aspirations

was incredible, when even imperialist conservatives like Leo Amery,

Lord Zetland and Lord Linlithgo were in favour of a constitutional

settlement in India.

Gandhi- Jinnah Talks

Gandhi, Azad, Nehru, Patel and hundreds of their colleagues

were arrested within hours of Congress proclaiming Quit India.

Rajagopalachri, who did not participate in the movement, was spared.

He proposed a formula to end Congress-League deadlock wherein he

suggested that the Congress should accept the League's demand for

self - determination of Muslim - majority areas and reach an amicable

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settlement with it.14 The All- - India Congress Committee rejected

this resolution, 120 voting against and 15 for it and this resulted in his

resignation from the Committee. Nevertheless, Rajagopalachari, two

years later, again made a move for a Congress - League

understanding, and a correspondence followed between Gandhi and

Jinnah. Gandhi in his correspondence conceded that the claims of the

North-Western and Eastern parts of India in which Muslims were in

an absolute majority to set up two sovereign independent states,

provided it is ascertained through the votes of the adult population of

the areas or through some equivalent method. At the same time the

Treaty should contain provisions for safeguarding the rights of the

minorities in the two states, and also it should provide for the efficient

and satisfactory administration of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Internal

Communications, Customs, Commerce and the like which should

continue as matters of common interest between the contracting

parties. After reaching an agreement on these aspects, the two parties

would decide upon a common course of action for the attainment of

independence of India.15 Jinnah could not accept these proposals

because of two reasons: 1) He wanted to incorporate the whole of

Bengal and the Punjab in Pakistan, though the Muslims in these

provinces had only a narrow overall majority, and were a minority in

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many districts. He feared that a plebiscite of all inhabitants would

have gone against the very idea of Pakistan, and so he demanded that

only the Muslims should vote at the plebiscite. 2) He wanted a

completely sovereign Pakistan, with no restrictions whatsoever on its

authority.16 Thanks to the gulf of difference in approach of the two

leaders, the talks turned out to be a failure. However, the fact that

Gandhi had gone to Jinnah's house fourteen times increased the

importance of Jinnah, and it added to his Muslim following too.

The Simla Conference

Gandhi- Jinnah talks were held when Lord Wavell was the

Viceroy. With the change of fortunes of the war in Europe in favour of

Britain and allies, Churchill's labour ministers and more importantly,

the American President Franklin Roosevelt advised Churchill to be

more accommodative. Thus on the expiry of the extended term of

Lord Linlithgow, Lord Wavell was appointed as the Viceroy with the

understanding that the new incumbent would adopt a conciliatory

approach towards the Congress. Lord Wavell had hoped that Gandhi-

Jinnah talks would not end on a note of complete futility.17 The

breakdown of Gandhi-Jinnah talks convinced him of the urgent

necessity of the intervention of the British government for evolving a

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solution to the Indian problem. The position at the warfront was that

Germany would be beaten by the end of the year and the war with

Japan would end about six months later. In the circumstances, Indian

political question required urgent attention, and the promises made to

India redeemed. The end of the war would result in "general

demobilization, dispersal of labour from war industries, and the

winding up of war establishments, involving large-scale

unemployment and discontent".18 Wavell now set about the task of

inducing the Indian leaders to enter the Central government. In these

matters, all the Governors too nursed the same opinion as that held by

Wavell.

Wavell expressed his opinions in his letter to the Prime

Minister, which was, infact, a dialogue with the War Cabinet about

what he termed as the future of India.19 He reminded Churchill that

"we cannot put back the clock and must deal with existing conditions

and pledges; and am clear that our present attitude is aggravating the

mischief".20 Wavell felt that the failure of Gandhi-Jinnah talks created

a very favourable situation for his Majesty's Government to take the

initiative in the matter. This led to the Viceroy and his team going to

London for discussions which in turn led to the convening of the

Simla Conference in June 1945.

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To facilitate the participation of the Congress, the members of

its Working Committee were released. The main objective of the

conference was to form a new Executive Council which would

represent the important communities represented by 'caste Hindus' and

Muslims in equal proportion. It would be an entirely Indian Council,

except for the Viceroy and the Commander-in-chief, who would retain

his position as War Member. Even the portfolio of the External affairs

would be placed in charge of an Indian member of the Council, so far

as the interests of the British India are concerned.21 The British

Cabinet had given its consent to conduct the conference of various

leaders representing the broad spectrum of Indian political opinion.

The Working Committee of the Muslim League held from July

6-14, 1945 at Simla, considered the letter from Viceroy's private

secretary to Jinnah, asking him to send him a list of members of the

Muslim League who should be included in the proposed Executive

Council. Jinnah in his letter to the Viceroy dated July 7, 1945 said that

"the Muslim members of the proposed Executive Council should be

chosen from the Muslim League, subject to a confidential discussion

between Your Excellency and the President of the Muslim League,

before they are finally recommended by you to the Crown for

appointment." 22 Wavell could not accept Jinnah's plea and he wrote to

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Jinnah that he could not give him a guarantee that all the Muslim

members of the proposed new council should necessarily be members

of the Muslim League. 23 Jinnah refused to send a list of names unless

such a guarantee was given and wrote to Wavell that it was impossible

for the League to depart from its fundamental principles. Jinnah stuck

to his stand and pointed out that it was impossible for the Muslim

League to co-operate unless (1) all the Muslim members were from

the League and (2) the Governor-General's power of veto were

reinforced by a special safeguard for the Muslims within the council.

For instance, the provision that decisions objected by the Muslims

should not be taken except by a clear two third majority. 24

The Viceroy, who could not accept either of the conditions,

declared that the conference had failed and he made it clear that "the

responsibility for the failure is mine".25 The conference thus

foundered on the League's claim that it alone represented the Muslims

and that it alone had the right to nominate Muslims to the Executive

Council. Jinnah challenged the national character of the Congress and

described the Congress as a party of the Hindus. On the other hand,

the Congress felt that as a national party it could put forward a panel

of names consisting of Muslims, Hindus, Parsis, Christians and others.

Jinnah then put forward the argument that the League and the

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Congress had an entirely different angle of vision. "The Wavell

proposals ---- called upon us to make the severest sacrifice. If we

accept this arrangement, the Pakistan issue will be shelved and put in

cold storage indefinitely, whereas the Congress will have secured …

a clear road for then advance towards securing Hindu national

independence of India." 26

Jinnah's demand for 50 percent representation for Muslims and

parity between Muslim and non Muslim members proved to be

another obstacle in the path of a settlement. Jinnah held that all the

other minorities, such as the Scheduled Castes, Sikhs and Christians

had the same goal as the Congress. Their goal was and could not be

different from or otherwise than that of a united India. Moreover they

were, ethnically and culturally, very closely knitted to Hindu society.

27 Jayakar commented on Jinnah's demand of parity between Muslims

and all other interests put together, ie., 50 for Muslims and 50 for the

rest of India when parity between caste Hindus and Muslims had

already been given, as a mathematical monstrosity that 27 equals 73. 28

In fact Jinnah in this case discounted the parity formula which had

been universally recognized as a very big concession to a minority at

the expense of the majority. He justified his position by arguing that

the Muslims would still be in a minority in the Executive Council for

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the representatives of the other minorities were likely to vote with the

Hindus than with the Muslims on matters on which Hindus and

Muslims might differ. 29 Tribune in its editorial asserted that the

responsibility for the failure of the Simla Conference rested with only

one man, Jinnah. The British newspaper Daily Sketch said that "the

immediate cause of the failure of the negotiations ought to be laid at

the door of Mr. Jinnah". The News Chronicle also expressed the same

view: "The responsibility for the failure of Simla was not Lord

Wavell's. It was Mr. Jinnah's and Mr. Jinnah's alone"30 Hindu also

expressed the same point: "We endorse the well-nigh universal verdict

that the Muslim League's unbending and persistently negative attitude

has been solely responsible for the breakdown of negotiations. 31

Amery suggested to Viceroy that the best course open now

would be to test the representative character of each party by holding

elections to the provincial and Central legislatures. Wavell had

discussion on this matter with Lord Pethick-Lawrence, who replaced

Amery as Secretary of State for India. After that he held discussions

with the Indian Committee of the Cabinet, chaired by the Prime

Minister Wavell, who recognized that procrastination would be

dangerous, and that the loyalty of the Indian soldiers and officers

could no longer be taken for granted, took the immediate step of

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ordering the elections to the provincial and central legislatures. The

Congress demanded that the election should be on the basis of adult

suffrage. But under presure the Congress gave up that end. Nehru,

Patel and Azad failed to realize that by whipping up the religious

frenzy the Muslim League would sweep the poll in the reserved

constituencies, which would confirm his claim of being the sole

spokesman for his community. The results only confirmed what had

been apparent during the previous few years. In the Central

Assembly, the League captured every seat that was reserved for

Muslims. Congress captured all the remaining elective seats. In the

Provincial Assembles, the Congress obtained an absolute majority in

all the Hindu-majority provinces and in the Muslim-majority

provinces of the NWFP.

The Muslim League captured 428 out of the 492 Muslim seats

in the Provincial Assemblies, as compared with the 109 it had won in

the elections of 1936. The Congress leadership succumbed to hold

fresh elections on restricted franchise which helped Jinnah. Jinnah at

the same time used every communal device to win elections.

The Congress proceeded to form ministries in all the eight

provinces where it was in the majority. Two provinces, such as

Assam and the NWFP, claimed for Pakistan also included in this list.

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In Bengal, Sind and the Punjab, the Muslim League was the largest

party but it did not have absolute majority. In Bengal, the Muslim

League formed the government with the support of independents and

Europeans. In Sind, though G.M. Syed could muster a non-Muslim

League majority, the Governor asked the Muslim League to form the

government. In Punjab, a coalition was formed with Khizr Hyat Khan

as premier supported by the Congress and the Sikhs. This showed that

though the Muslim League had won almost all Muslim seats in the

provinces, it could not form a government in any Muslim-majority

province. In spite of the fact that the Muslim votes were cast on the

issue of Pakistan, the League could not hope to form the government.

Jinnah had to do something more drastic to gain Pakistan for Muslims.

The Cabinet Mission

Clement Attlee, the new British Prime Minister, was determined

to part with India in friendship and invite it to join the British

Commonwealth of Nations as an equal partner. He declared that the

Britain would hand over power to Indian representatives at the latest

by June 1948. With this end in view, he sent to India a special

Mission of Cabinet Ministers which included Lord Pethick -

Lawrence, Secretary of State for India, Sir Stafford Cripps, President

of the Board of Trade, and Mr. A.V. Alexander, First Lord of the

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Admiralty.

The announcement of the Cabinet Mission was welcomed by all

parties in Parliament. It also brought about a sudden improvement in

the atmosphere in India. The Congress advised its followers to trust

the mission, have patience and keep the peace. The Muslim League

was suspicious as the pronouncements did not mention the issue of

Pakistan. The Viceroy, it must be noted, worked with the mission

throughout their stay in India. In effect he was a member of the

mission. The mission in the first three weeks after its arrival,

interviewed a large number of public men and women, including party

leaders - provincial as well as all-India representatives of minorities

and special interests, princes and their ministers. What really

mattered, however, was the issue between the Congress insistence on

the unity of India and the Muslim League demand for Pakistan. So

the Mission had to carry on negotiations almost exclusively with these

two parties.

The League wanted a Pakistan comprising the six provinces of

Assam, Bengal, Punjab, NWFP, Sind and Baluchistan, although it

would include large areas in which the Muslims were in a minority. It

contented that the areas in which the Muslims in the minority should

be included to make Pakistan administratively and economically

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workable. The partition on this basis would not solve the question of

communal minorities, as the Pakistan thus formed would include a

very considerable proportion of non-Muslims. The Hindus and Sikhs

of these areas could use every argument which the Muslims were

using against their inclusion in a Hindu - dominated India. The only

alternative thus was to divide Punjab and Bengal and confine Pakistan

to those areas of the provinces in which the Muslims constituted a

majority. This would bring about a Pakistan in which its two parts

would be separated by some seven or eight hundred miles. 32

The Muslim League wanted to accept the principle of Pakistan

unequivocally before its participation either in an interim government

or in constitution making machinery. On the other hand, the Congress

was for taking immediate steps for forming an interim government

and a Constituent Assembly. The Congress was for 'Quit India', while

the League was for 'Divide and Quit'. The Congress believed that a

solution would come about if the British was out of the way. Some of

the League leaders were proclaiming their readiness to shed the last

drop of blood to make Pakistan a reality. Such was the distrust

between the two parties that the possibility of an agreement between

them sank almost to zero.

In this context, the Mission placed before the Presidents of the

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two organizations, a proposal which might lead to an agreement. It

was as follows: "A Union Government dealing with the following

subjects: Foreign affairs, Defence and Communications. There will be

two groups of provinces, the one of the predominantly Hindu

provinces and the other of the predominantly Muslim provinces,

dealing with all other subjects which the provinces in the respective

groups desire to be dealt with in common. The provincial

governments will deal with all other subjects and will have all the

residurary sovereign rights." 33 Both the Congress and the Muslim

League were invited to send four negotiators to meet the Mission and

the Viceroy together to discuss the possibility of an agreement on this

basis. The Congress thereupon nominated Abdul Kalam Azad,

Jawaharlal Nehru, Sardar Patel and Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan. The

League negotiators were Jinnah, Nawab Mohammad Ismail Khan,

Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan and Sardar Abdul Rab Nishtar.

Two days after the commencement of the Conference, the

Mission submitted the proposed points for agreement between them.

It envisaged a constitutional structure in three-tiers: Union, Groups

and Provinces. The Union would deal with Foreign Affairs, Defence,

Communications, Fundamental Rights and would have the powers to

obtain for itself the finances required for these subjects. The

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legislatures of the Union would be composed of equal proportions

from the Muslim-majority provinces and from the Hindu-majority

provinces, together with representatives of the States. All the

remaining powers would vest in the provinces, but groups of

provinces might be formed which may set up their own Executives

and Legislatures. And the Groups might determine the provincial

subjects which they desire to take in common. The Constitution of the

Union and the Groups would provide that any province might by a

majority vote of its Legislative Assembly call for a reconsideration of

the terms of the Constitution after an initial period of 10 years and at

10 yearly intervals thereafter. 34

The Mission hoped that if the Muslim-majority provinces were

able to group themselves into organizations, they need not fear that

their separate culture and way of life would be submerged under a

Hindu majority. The scheme would give them advantages of Pakistan

without the disadvantages inherent in the division of India. As for

Congress, the Mission hoped that Congress would consent to the

formation of Groups, as a weak union was far better than the

vivisection of the country.

Though both parties had been prepared to make considerable

concessions, each was careful not to compromise its own fundamental

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principles. The Congress, which initially opposed the formation of

groups, now was prepared to allow the formation of groups, provided

it would not impair the strong federal union it was bent upon

achieving. Moreover the Congress was inflexibly opposed the

question of parity between the Hindu and Muslim provinces in the

Union Legislature and Executive. The Congress proposed that a single

Constituent Assembly should first draw up the Union Constitution,

and after that the provinces might form groups to decide the

Provincial Constitutions for their group and, if they wished, a Group

Constitution.35 The Muslim League, on the other hand, insisted that

there should be two constitution - making bodies. Then the

constitution - making bodies of the Hindu and Muslim India would sit

together to set up a Union dealing with Foreign Affairs, Defence and

Communications necessary for defence. It would also decide two

points about the Union-whether the Union should have a legislature or

not and the method of providing the Union with finance. The League

refused to contemplate a union with power to impose taxation. It

further demanded that "no decision, legislative, executive or

administrative, shall be taken by the Union in regard to any matter of

controversial nature, except by a majority of three-fourths".36

Since the negotiations with party leaders did not result in an

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agreed solution, they put forward their own suggested solution, laying

down the principles and procedure for the framing of India's

constitution through a duly elected Constituent Assembly, and a

scheme for the formation of an Interim Government at the Centre. It

was a compromise between the Pakistan and United India ideologies,

and it was as follows:

(1) There should be a union of India, embracing both British India

and the States which should deal with the following subjects : Foreign

Affairs, Defence, and Communications; and should have the powers

necessary to raise the finances required for the above subjects.

(2) The Union should have an Executive and a Legislature constituted

from British Indian and States' representatives. Any question raising a

major communal issue in the Legislature should require for its

decision a majority of the representatives present and voting of each

of the two major communities as well as a majority of all the members

present and voting.

(3) All subjects other than the Union subjects and all residuary powers

should vest in the Provinces.

(4) The States will retain all subjects and powers other than those

ceded to the Union.

(5) Provinces should be free to form groups with Executives and

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Legislatures, and each group could determine the Provincial subjects

to be taken in common.

(6) The Constitutions of the Union and of the groups should contain a

provision whereby any Province could by a majority vote of its

Legislative Assembly call for a reconsideration of the terms of the

Constitution after an initial period of ten years and at ten-yearly

intervals thereafter. 37

To meet the Muslim aspirations, there would be below the

Union, a sub-federation of three groups: Group A consisting of the

Provinces not claimed for Pakistan, section B of the Punjab, the

NWFP, Sind and Baluchistan, and section C of Bengal and Assam.

Assam was added despite the fact that it did not have a Muslim

majority. The powers of governance and legislation were vested in

these groups with a view to appeasing Jinnah and giving him the

essence of Pakistan. This was a long - term scheme. Integral to it was

the short- term scheme for the formation of an interrim government.

The initial reception of the scheme was favourable.

Gandhi stated that it was the best document the British government

could have produced in the circumstances. The Mission had come all

the way from England to devise the easiest and the quickest method of

ending the British Rule.38 Congress also spoke almost on similar

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lines. Gandhi had some doubts regarding the grouping of the

provinces but Cripps told him that as the contents of their plan were in

their final form they should be accepted or rejected as a whole. Jinnah,

having realized that the British meant to quit India whether there was

agreement with League and Congress, or not, told Woodrow Wyatt,

Private secretary to Cripps, that the British should remain as the

binding force in the Indian Centre for some 15 years and deal with

defence and foreign affairs for Pakistan and Hindustan consulting the

Prime Ministers of each State."39 The Mission, despite the rumblings

within the Congress and the League, hoped it could bring the two

parties to an agreement.

The Congress and the Muslim League, after analyzing the

various aspects of the Mission's statement, accepted it with

reservations. The Congress insisted on a strong centre, and was not

in favour of the groupings of provinces which were given most of the

powers. On the other hand, the League found in the groupings the

fulfillment of their aspirations. Jinnah, however, was distressed at the

fact that there was no parity for the League with the Congress at the

centre. As far as the interim government was concerned, he was not

ready to compromise on two points: 1) there should be parity between

the Congress and the League, and (2) as far as the nomination of the

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Muslim members was concerned, he should have the sole right to

nominate them. The Mission was not ready to submit to these two

demands of Jinnah.

Though the Congress accepted the Mission Plan, some of its

followers stood in the way of its acceptance. The inclusion of North

West Frontier Province, a stronghold of the Congress, in group B and

Assam, not a Muslim- majority province, in Group C invited

objections from them. The inclusion of Assam in group C was

opposed by the local leaders of Assam headed by Gopinath Bardolai.

This brought about a change in the attitude not only of Gandhi but

also of Nehru and Patel. Their opposition to the inclusion of Assam in

Group C countermanded the provision of grouping. Jinnah and his

men accepted the Mission Plan just because they could convince their

followers that the grouping of provinces in the north-west and north-

east would give them ample scope for converting these areas into

Pakistan. In fact both the Congress and the Muslim League were not

at all sincere in their acceptance of the plan. Azad alone was positive

and he held that the question of Indian freedom had at last been settled

by negotiation and agreement and not by methods of violence and

conflict.40

No sooner had Nehru taken over as Congress President from

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Azad, he brought about a change in the hopeful atmosphere his

predecessor Azad had created. Nehru declared that the Congress had

made no commitment to the plan of the Cabinet Mission except to go

into the Constituent Assembly. If the British tried to impose the

treaty, the Congress would tear up the treaty. As regards grouping,

the big probability was that there would be no grouping. Section A

would definitely decide against grouping. There was 4 to 1 chance of

the NWFP deciding against grouping. It was highly likely that Assam

would also decide against grouping with Bengal. "This grouping

business approached from any point of view does not get on at all".41

Nehru's reaction was quite uncalled for. Even Patel felt that he

should have exercised circumspection. Jinnah, having felt betrayed,

told the Mission that he could not consult the Congress anymore.

Jinnah saw Nehru's statement as indicative of the militant Congress

designs. He felt that the Congress by virtue of its majority in the

Constituent Assembly, would modify the plan as it pleased, and thus

jeopardize Muslim interests. Azad felt that all his efforts were

rendered futile by Nehru's statement. In the light of these

developments, Azad felt that a meeting of the Working Committee

must be held immediately to review the situation, and accordingly the

committee met on August 8. In the Working Committee, Azad pointed

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out that it was wrong to say that Congress was free to modify the plan

as it pleased.42 The Congress Working Committee (CWC) now passed

a resolution assuring the League that Congress was not at all against

grouping. Its objection was confined to the contention that a province

should not be forced into entering a group. Jinnah, thereupon, alleged

that the Congress was always out to hoodwink the Muslims. They

agreed to one thing and went back on it as soon as it did not suit them.

Jinnah called a meeting of the Council of the League which called

upon the Muslim nation to stand to a man behind their sole

representative and authoritative organization, the All-India Muslim

League (AIML), and to be ready for every sacrifice. The Council also

directed the Working Committee "to prepare forthwith a programme

of direct action to carry out the policy enunciated above and to

organize the Muslims for the coming struggle to be launched as and

when necessary".43 The League put the whole blame on the Congress.

It stated that the Muslim India had exhausted without success all

efforts to find a peaceful solution to the Indian problem by

compromise and constitutional means, while the Congress was bent

upon setting up Caste-Hindu Raj in India with the connivance of the

British.44

224

The Interim Government

The Direct Action Day witnessed murder, arson, rape and

looting, especially in Calcutta which witnessed the worst massacres.

By calling 'Direct Action', Jinnah had abandoned the constitutional

methods by which he always swore. The Suhrawardy-led League -

dominated coalition ministry did nothing to prevent the massacre in

which thousands of innocent Hindus and Muslims lost their lives. Its

repercussions were felt in neighbouring Bihar. There the Hindus

resorted to a virtual genocide of Muslims. Statistics revealed that

more Muslims were killed than Hindus.45 Had Gandhi not come to

their rescue, more Muslims would have been killed.

Wavell was appalled at the spectacle of communal violence that

he witnessed when he visited some of the riot-affected areas. He

decided that as long as he was the Viceroy of India, he would do all in

his power to prevent any more massacres of that kind. He would be

abdicating his responsibilities if he did not make a supreme effort to

bring the two communities, Hindu and Muslim, together and persuade

them that working together was the only sure way to freedom.46 He

decided to put into effect the form of the interim government which

was the short-term part of the Cabinet Mission's Plan. The Congress

claimed that it had accepted long-term plan and as such entitled to

225

form the interim government. It insisted that as the League rejected

the long term plan and embarked on the Direct Action, it was

disqualified from entrusting with power. Wavell believed that law

and order could not be brought under control without League's

participation in the interim government.

Jinnah, however, refused to join the interim governments

unless and until two of his conditions were fulfilled. One, parity of the

League with the Congress, and two, League should alone have the

right to nominate Muslim members. Wavell told Jinnah that he could

not accept those demands. Attlee asked Wavell not to lose time and

instal an interim government without delay, though it meant the non-

participation of the League. Wavell asked Nehru to bring a team into

the interim ministry. Early in September an interim government came

into being, with Nehru as Vice-president. Among the Congress

nominees were a Congress Muslim and two independent Muslims.

When the new members of the interim government assumed office,

the Leaguers throughout India hoisted flags on their houses and places

of business.

However the League could not stand aside while the Congress

consolidated its power through the interim government. Jinnah soon

made discussions and correspondence with Wavell and Jawaharlal

226

Nehru on the conditions for the League's entry into the government.

The major points at issue were : the right of Congress to nominate a

'Nationalist Muslim' to one of its quota of seats, the method of settling

communal issues, and the distribution of portfolios. Nehru said that

"the Congress has the right to appoint a Muslim out of its quota ….

The Congress position in regard to the Nationalist Muslims and the

smaller minorities should not be challenged by you".47 Lord Wavell

supported the views of Jawaharlal Nehru to the extent of insisting that

each party must be equally free to nominate its own representatives.48

However, League decided to accept the offer and put forward five

names : Liaquat Ali Khan (Finance), I.I. Chundrigar (Commerce),

Abdur Rab Nishtar (Communication, Post and Air), Ghazanfar Ali

Khan (Health) and Jogendra Nath Mandal (Legislative). The

inclusion of a scheduled caste Hindu belonging to Ambedkar's

organization, Jogendras Nath Mandal, was intended to challenge the

right of the Congress to speak for the untouchables. It was infact a

retaliation for the Congress insistence on keeping one of its Muslims

in the government.

At the time League joined the interim government, Jinnah had

promised to summon the League Council for formal acceptance of

Mission's statement of 16 May and the Muslim League's entry into the

227

interim government was on this condition.49 But after the

reconstitution of the interim government, Jinnah refused to summon

the League Council on the plea that the "the Congress never had, nor

have they even now, accepted the statement of May 16" as it had

chosen to interpret the scheme in its own way.50 There was again a

deadlock. So the British government invited Lord Wavell to come to

London for consultation on the Indian political situation. He was

asked to invite two representatives of the Congress, two of the Muslim

League and one of the Sikh community to accompany him. The

discussion lasted only for four days, but no agreement was reached.

The Cabinet Mission had already made it clear that it was compulsory

for the provinces to enter the sections in the first instance, and only

after the first elections under the new constitution could the right to

opt out be exercised. The Cabinet Mission had throughout maintained

that the decisions of the section should be taken by a simple majority

vote of the representatives in the sections and the Congress view that

"the provinces had the right to decide both as to grouping and as to

their own constitutions" was unwarranted.51 If the Congress still

entertained doubts, the point could be left to the decision by the

Federal Court. The British government further made it clear that

"should the constitution come to be framed by a Constituent Assembly

228

in which a large section of the Indian population had not been

represented, His Majesty's Government could not contemplate forcing

such a constitution upon any unwilling parts of the country".52 The

All-India Congress Committee, meeting on 5 January 1947, decided to

accept the interpretation of the British Government. However, it made

it clear that procedure adopted in the sections must not involve any

compulsion of a province and the right of the Sikhs in the Punjab

should not be jeopardized. In the event of any attempt at such

compulsion, the province or part of a province has the right to take

action as might be deemed necessary inorder to give effect to the

wishes of the people concerned.53 This held out the threat of a

partition of the Punjab, Bengal and Assam, a thing vehemently

opposed by the Muslim League. The working committee of the

Muslim League in its meeting on 31 January 1947, decided that the

above revolution in malafides as the Congress had undermined the

whole basis of the Mission's plan by the conditions it again imposed.

In the circumstances, it demanded that plan should be declared to have

failed and the Constituent Assembly forthwith dissolved.54

Notwithstanding the boycott of the League, the Constituent Assembly

met as scheduled, and proceeded with its deliberations.

229

Meanwhile the Calcutta killings had started a chain of events

resulting in brutal communal violence in different parts of the country.

The Congress and the Muslim League had become like two

irreconcilable horses pulling a chariot in opposite directions. The

Direct Action and its resultant communal violence dashed the hopes of

harmony between the two political elements and communities in

India. The British government felt that such a situation could not be

suffered to continue any longer. A firm decision as to the future of

India should be taken at once, and the period of transformation made

as brief as possible. Accordingly on 21 February 1947 the Labour

government announced in the House of Commons that Britain was no

longer interested in keeping India under its control and that it was the

government's definite intention to grant independence, transforming

power to responsible Indian hands by a date not later than June 1948.

It was also announced that if by that time a constitution was not

framed in accordance with the proposals contained in the Cabinet

Mission's statement of 16 May 1946, it would have to consider "to

whom the powers of the central government in British India should be

handed over, on the due date, whether as a whole to some form of

Central Government for British India, or in some areas to the existing

provincial governments, or in such other way as may seem most

230

reasonable and in the best interests of the Indian people."55 Another

important decision taken was to replace Lord Wavell with Lord

Mountabatten, who would be entrusted with "the task of transferring

to Indian hands responsibility for the government of British India in a

manner that would best ensure the future happiness and prosperity of

India".56

Lord Mountabatten assumed the office of the Governor-General

on 24 March 1947. Attlee had instructed Mountabatten that it was the

definite objective of the government to obtain a unitary government of

both British India and the princely states through the medium of a

Constituent Assembly set up and run in accordance with the Cabinet

Mission's plan of 16 May 1946. It was also instructed that neither the

Indian National Congress nor the All - India Muslim League was to

be compelled to accept the plan. No sooner had he been appointed

than he occupied himself in the study of Indian problems. He held

discussions with the prominent leaders like Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru

and Jinnah to assess the political situation in India in its proper

perspective.

Jawaharlal Nehru welcomed Mountabatten's appointment as

Viceroy of India. On the other hand, Jinnah, who heard of

231

Mountabatten 's friendship with Nehru, was doubtful whether the new

Viceroy would appreciate his stand on partition. Mountabatten found

Nehru "most sincere".57 His first impression of Jinnah was that "he

was in a most frigid, haughty and disdainful frame of mind".58

Mountabatten found Jinnah "a psychopathic case, hell bent on this

Pakistan".59 Mountabatten knew that Gandhi's influence was

enormous and that he could reach nowhere if Gandhi was against him.

In the second meeting with Mountabatten, Gandhi told the former to

"give the Muslims the baby instead of cutting it in half. Place three

hundred million Hindus under Muslim rule by asking his rivals Jinnah

and his Muslim League to form a government." 60 When this was

conveyed to the Congress Party, they refused to consider it.

Mountabatten, it must be noted, tried to make the Mission Plan

acceptable to Jinnah. With regard to Jinnah's demand that the

provinces of Punjab and Bengal should be given to Pakistan

undivided, Mountabatten told Jinnah that the argument that the

country should be divided but Bengal and Punjab provinces should

remain united was illogical. Mountbatten pointed out that the

argument about the two provinces should apply with even greater

force to the country as a whole. He also expressed the view that the

united India could play a great role in the world, but a divided India

232

would not even rank as a second class power.61 Another strategy used

by Mountbatten to dissuade Jinnah from insisting on a separate

Muslim state was that Jinnah would get only a truncated Pakistan

which would be almost unworkable. Muslims would get the whole of

Punjab and Bengal, if the Muslim League would accept the plan, and

it would be a really workable Pakistan. 62

It was thought by wishful thinkers in the Congress that Jinnah,

confronted with the prospect of a truncated Pakistan would throw in

his hand and accept the Mission's plan. There was scarcely any hope

that the Plan could succeed in its object of reconciling the demands of

the two parties. The long wrangle over compulsory grouping and the

growing deterioration in communal relations, made it impossible to

bring about any kind of compromise. As for the British, it failed in

shocking the parties into a settlement. In the interim government, the

two blocks were not on speaking terms and took mutually antagonistic

positions.

Mountbatten fully realised that the Cabinet Mission Plan was

unworkable and partition of India was inevitable. The rapid

deterioration of communal relations convinced him the need of taking

quick decisions. In this context, the question of the fate of minorities

233

of the Punjab and Bengal arose. Jinnah's demand that the Punjab and

the Bengal should be transferred without divided to Pakistan was

bluntly opposed by the Indian National Congress. The Congress took

the firm stand that the non-Muslims in the Punjab and Bengal living in

districts contiguous to India and forming a majority of populations in

these areas, must be given the option to choose between Pakistan and

India. At length Jinnah had to concede to the division of these

provinces. In fact it requires to be noted that in the atmosphere of

mutual district and wrangling, sign of a long-term settlement was

coming with the Congress resigning itself to partition of India. But the

Congress wanted the partition of Bengal and the Punjab also. Nehru

emphasised this point when he said that the Muslim League could

have Pakistan if they wanted, but on the condition that they did not

take away other parts of India which did not wish to join Pakistan.

Though Jinnah and the Muslim League adamantly stood for the

division of India, the Congress, which stood for a united India in the

beginning, gradually came to accept the partition. The Congress

officially referred to partition in March 1947 when the Congress

Working Committee resolution held that Punjab (and by implication

Bengal) must be partitioned, if the country was divided. The final

concession to the League's demands came in June 1947 when the

234

Congress accepted the partition under the 3 June Plan. The acceptance

of Pakistan by the Congress was the result of the failure of the

Congress to draw in the Muslim masses into the national movement

and stem the surging waves of Muslim communalism. The virtual

collapse of the Indian Government made Pakistan inevitable. Patel

stated in the All India Congress Committee meeting on 14 June 1947

that Pakistan was functioning in the Punjab, Bengal and in the Indian

Government. The Indian Government was turned into an arena of

struggle. And Finance Minister Liaquat Ali Khan hamstrung the

functioning of other ministries.

In April 1947 the Congress leaders told Mountbatten that they

came to the conclusion that there was no alternative but to accept

partition. The Congress leaders offered various arguments for

accepting partition. The Congress leadership stressed that partition

was the people's choice. Gandhi said in this context : "They have

taken the course because they realised that it was not possible to get

around the Muslim League any other way... We tried hard....but they

refused to come into the Constituent Assembly."63 Nehru also referred

to the League's, unwillingness to be part of India.64 Another argument

is that the partition of India was agreed to by the Congress leaders in

the hope of averting a civil war between Hindu and Muslims. But the

235

irony was that partition resulted in an acuter form of civil war. Thus it

can be seen that the Congress, later on became the advocate of

partition. Gandhi who said that if the Congress wished to accept

partition, it would be over his dead body, also changed his stand : "He

was still not openly in favour of partition but he no longer spoke so

vehemently against it... For over two hours I pleaded with him, but I

could make no impression on him." 65 As for Jinnah, though he was at

first upset at getting what he called "a moth-eaten Pakistan," he was

happy that he founded a State where his will would prevail. He was

not bothered about its truncated form, and the two wings separated by

hundreds of miles of Hindu territory.

Mountbatten then proceeded to London on 18 May to seek the

advice of the British Cabinet. He came back to New Delhi on 31 May

to announce the British government's acceptance of the principles of

partition, which would be effected probably on 15 August 1947. The

Plan which came to be known as the Mountbatten Plan consisted of

the proposals: 1) Partition of India was inevitable, 2)The

representatives of the Muslim majority districts and those (excluding

the European member) representing the rest of the province, in the

Legislative Assembly of both Bengal and Punjab, would meet

separately and decide by a simple majority vote whether their

236

respective province was to be divided or not. If either part decided in

favour of partition, it would be done. In the event of the partition

being decided upon, each part would the decide whether to join the

existing Constituent Assembly in Delhi or the new Constituent

Assembly to be set up, 3) Sind and Baluchistan would decide which

Constituent Assembly to join 4) The Muslim majority district of

Sylhet would decide by means of referendum as to whether it would

join East Bengal or remain in Assam, 5) Regarding the North-West

Frontier Province, there was to be a referendum to ascertain whether it

would opt for Pakistan or not, 6) The major political parties have

repeatedly emphasised their desire that this should be the earliest

possible transfer of power in India. It became easy for the power to be

transferred much earlier than the date fixed by the statement of

February 20. Accordingly, ... His Majestry's Government proposes to

introduce legislation during the current session for the transfer of

power this year on a Dominion Status basis to one or two successor

authorities according to the decision taken as a result of this

announcement." 66

This was a period of intense political maneuvering between

Jinnah and the British. Throughout the period, Lintethgow encouraged

Jinnah to put forward his demands and supported them at the most

237

crucial stages of the prosecution of war. The Indian National

Congress was sidelined and driven into the wilderness, forcing it to

launch the Quit India Movement. The labour initiatives of 1939-40

were given a neat burial by Linthgow with the blessings of the

conversation led government in Britain.

Many Jinnah’s biographers and supporters opined that Jinnah

did not want Pakistan. Nor was he infavour of partition, Jinnah’s

demand for Pakistan was in fact a bargaining exercise and it was the

adamant attitude of the Congress which forced him to demand

Pakistan. A close scrutiny of his speeches after 1943 reveals that there

was no ambivalence on his part with regard to his demand for

Pakistan. All his speeches were suffused with a single idea: the

acceptance of Pakistan first, discussion later.

Gandhi- Jinnah talks brought out the contradictory and

irrational attitude of Jinnah on such issues as national identity, right

of self- determination and democratic system of governance. Jinnah’s

statements were used by Churchill and his coterie to remind the

English people how ridiculous it was to grant self- government to

Indians. These talks reveal that by that time Jinnah had emerged as the

Defender of the Faith. Not even the great social reformers like Shah

238

Waliullah, Syed Ahmed Brelvi, Jamaluddin Afghani and Sir Syed

Ahmed Khan could galvanise the support of the Muslims as Jinnah

did.

Notes and References

1 Sir Maurice Gwyer and A.Appadorai (ed.), Speeches and

Documents of the Indian Constitution: 1921-47, Vol. I, p.iii.

2 Speeches by the Marquess Linlithgow, Vol. I, pp. 238-42.

a. This was a period of intense political manoevering between

Jinnah and the British. Throughout the period, Linlithgow

encouraged Jinnah to put forward his demands and supported

them at the most crucial stages of the prosecution of war. The

Indian National Congress was sidelined and driven into the

wilderness, forcing it to launch the Quit India Movement. The

labour initiatives of 1939 - 40 were given a neat burial by

Linlithgow with the blessings of the Conservative-led

government in Britain.

3 V.P. Menon, The Transfer of Power in India, p.438.

4 The Civil and Military Gazette, 12 April, 1942.

5 Latif Ahmed Sherwani, Pakistan Resolution to Pakistan,

1940-47, p.58-59.

6 R.J.Moore, Churchill, Cripps and India, 1939-1945, p. 28.

239

7 Sir Francis Low (ed.), The Indian Year Book, 1943-44,

pp. 810-811.

8 The Indian Annual Register (1942), Vol. II, p.283.

9 Rafiq Zakaria, The Man who divided India, p.88.

10 Martin Gilbert, Road to Victory, p.5.

11 John Barnes and David Nicholas (ed.), The Empire at Bay: The

Leo Amery Diaries, 1929-45, p.881.

12 Ibid., Introduction, pp. 10-11.

13 Ibid., p. 852.

14 The Indian National Congress Resolutions, 1940-46 (All -

India Congress Committee), p.28.

15 The Hindustan Times (Daily), October, 1944, pp. 26-27.

a. Gandhi- Jinnah talks brought out the contradictory and irrational

attitude of Jinnah on such issues as national identity, right of self-

determination and democratic system of governance. Jinnah's

statements were used by Churchill and his coterie to remind the

English people how ridiculous it was to grant self - government

to Indians. These talks reveal that by that time Jinnah had

emerged as the Defender of the Faith. Not even the great social

reformers like Shah Waliullah, Syed Ahmed Brelvi, Jamaluddin

Afghani and Sir Syed Ahmed Khan could galvanise the support

of the Muslims as Jinnah did.

16 Ibid., p. 29-31.

17 Penderel Moon (ed.), Wavell, The Viceroy's Journal, p. 9.

18 V.P. Menon, op.cit., p.10.

240

19 Wavell, op.cit.., pp. 94-99.

20 Ibid.

21 N. Mansbergh (ed.), The Transfer of Power, Vol. V, p. 1122.

22 S.S. Pirzada (ed.), Foundations, Vol.II, p.502.

23 Ibid.

24 D.N. Panigrahi, India's Partition: The Story of Imperialism in

Retreat, p.264.

25 Government of India, Home Department, Poll (I) Branch, File

No. 97/45-poll(F) 1945, National Archives of India.

a. Jinnah 's biographers and supporters opined that Jinnah did not

want Pakistan. Nor was he in favour of partition. Jinnah's demand

for Pakistan was in fact a bargaining exercise and it was the

adamant attitude of the Congress which forced him to demand

Pakistan. A close scrutiny of his speeches after 1943 reveals that

there was no ambivalence on his part with regard to his demand

for Pakistan. All his speeches were suffused with a single idea:

the acceptance of Pakistan first, discussion later.

26 Ibid.

27 The Indian Annual Register (1945), Vol.II, pp. 137-39.

28 Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi: The Last Phase, Vol. I, p.137.

29 The Hindu (Daily), 15, July, 1945.

30 The Tribune (Daily), 24, July, 1945.

31 The Hindu (Daily), 15, July, 1945.

32 E.W.R. Lumby, The Transfer of power in India 1945-47, p.76.

241

33 Sir Maurice Gwyer and A. Appadorai, op.cit., Vo.II, p.572.

34 Ibid., p.572-73.

35 Papers Relating to the Cabinet Mission to India 1946, pp. 21-22.

36 Ibid., pp. 20-21.

37 Sir Maurice Gwyer and A. Appadorai, op.cit., pp. 580-81.

38 The Harijan, 20 May, 1946.

39 Stanley Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan, p.271.

40 S.K. Majumdar, Jinnah and Gandhi : Their Role in India's Quest for Freedom, pp. 225-26.

41 The Indian Annual Register (1946), Vol. II, pp. 145-47.

42 S.K. Majumdar, op.cit., pp. 228-29.

43 Sir Maurice Gwyer and A. Appadorai, op.cit., p.621.

44 Ibid.

45 Rafiq Zakaria., The Man Who Divided India, p.120.

46 Jaswant Singh, Jinnah: India-Pakistan-Independence, p.389.

47 The Indian Annual Register (1946), Vol. II, Pp. 267-68.

48 Ibid., pp. 273-74.

49 Ibid., p. 281.

50 Ibid., pp. 277-79.

51 Ibid., p. 301.

52 Ibid.

53 The Indian Annual Register (1947), Vol. I., p.115.

54 Ibid., pp. 147-51.

242

55 Ibid., pp. 142-43.

56 Ibid.

57 Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman, p. 250.

58 N. Mansergh and Penderel Moon (eds.), The Transfer of Power 1942 -47, Vol.X, p. 137.

59 Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre, Freedom at Midnight, p.105.

60 Rafiq Zakaria, op.cit., p. 135.

61 Ibid., p.134.

62 Ibid.

63 Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi (CWMG), Vol. LXXXVIII, pp. 73-75.

64 Selected works of Jawaharlal Nehru, SWJN, Second Series, Vol.III, p.134.

65 Abul Kalam Azad, India Wins Freedom, p.203.

66 The Indian Annual Register, Vol. I, pp. 143-146.

243