Chapter - V

CHAPTER: V

CONTEMPORARY DEBATE

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The controversy of ‘ends and means’ in contemporary

perspective centered on Leon Trotsky, leading Marxist thinker of

the 20th century, and John Dewey, liberal and American

pragmatic philosopher. In late 1930’s they entered into a debate

on ‘ends-means’, which is highlighted by the liberal philosopher

George Novack in his article titled “The Liberal Morality” in self-

edited book on “Their Morals and Ours: Marxist versus Liberal

View on Morality”.

Trotsky on Morality

Trotsky views philosophy as idealistic form from the classical

period. This idealism in its progress tried to secularise morality by

freeing it from religious sanctions.1 According to Trotsky, Hegel

was a remarkable step in this direction. The secular moral

philosophy getting out of the religious shackles was forced to

ground itself. Idealism, nevertheless, for Trotsky ushers in change

and for him, change is an inherent condition of social reality that

cannot stop and for this reason change has advanced civilization,

enlightened culture and scientific knowledge. In the same

manner, philosophic ideas too have been changing and reached

the rational and secular basis of moral philosophy. In

secularisation morality has been disconnected from heavenly

ideas and evolved with the changing needs. Historical materialism

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is an attempt to provide scientific explanation for the origin and

substance of moral codes, their social functions and limitations.

Trotsky sarcastically critises moral philosophy by saying,

“…moralists wish that history should leave them in

peace with their little books, little magazines,

subscribers, common sense, and moral copybooks.

But history does not leave them in peace. It cuffs

them now from the left, now from the right”.2

From the philosophical point of view the sanctity of moral

principle like, ‘Do not kill’ are justified, but self-defense is

exempted. According to Trotsky the State nevertheless reserves

the authority to transforms the ‘obligatory’ moral principle ‘Do not

kill’ into its opposite.

However, there is a contradiction of moral sanction in

liberal thinking, because in liberal society there are exceptional

grounds of getting immunity from punishment after committing

violence or crime and in case of State organised violence the

immunity that is, contradiction of the moral sanction ‘Do not kill’ is

absolutely applicable and the State has given the right ‘officially’

like in case of war the highest duty of an army is to destroy and

kill the greatest number of people.

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Trotsky points out that the moral judgments are deduced

from some moral sense assumed to be universally given, which

leads to,

“…the acknowledgment of a special substance, of a

“moral sense”, “conscience”, some kind of absolute

which is nothing more than the philosophic –

cowardly pseudonym for God. Independent of “ends”,

that is, society, morality, whether we deduce it from

eternal truths or from the “nature of man”, proves in

the end to be a form of “natural theology””.3

Trotsky asserts that in divine revelation the priests long ago

discovered reliable moral criteria. But now the secular priests

speak about endless moral truths without giving their original

source. If, as is claimed, these truths are eternal and endless,

they should have existed not only before the appearance of man

upon the earth but also before the evolution of the solar system.

Trotsky argues that the theory of eternal morals can not survive

without God.4 Trotsky goes on to argue,

“Bourgeois evolutionism halts impotently the

threshold of historical society because it does wish to

acknowledge the driving force in the evolution of the

social forms: the class struggle. Morality is one of the

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ideological functions in this struggle. The ruling

class forces its ends upon society and habituates

it into considering all those means which

contradict its ends as immoral. That is the chief

function of official morality. It pursues the idea of the

“greatest possible happiness” not for the majority but

for a small and ever diminishing minority. Such a

regime could not have endured for even a week

through force alone. It needs the cement of morality.

The production of this cement constitutes the

profession of the petty–bourgeois theoreticians and

moralists. They radiate all the colors of the rainbow

but in the final analysis remain apostles of slavery

and submission” [Italics in the original, highlighted

added].5

As a Marxist, Trotsky points out that the bourgeois moralists live

in the idealized memories of yesterday and waiting for its return.

But they do not know that morality is a function of class struggle

and democratic morality corresponds to the phase of liberalism

and progressive capitalism that intensifies the class struggle.

According to Trotsky, this latest phase definitively and

permanently destroyed this morality and replaced it with fascism

on one side and the morality of proletarian revolution on the

other.6

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Marxists argue that morality is the product of society and

changes with its development. Marxist argues that morality has

little impact since it only serves social interests are contradictory.

Morality, for Marxists more than any other form of ideology has

class character and develops with it; there is nothing permanent

or unchanging about it as claimed by the idealist philosophers.

Trotsky argues that though some basic moral principles

exist, evolved in the development of mankind and necessary for

the functioning and maintainance of every collective body but

their influence is extremely limited and unsuitable. The maxim

that moral norms are obligatory for all looses its influence with the

sharpening of the class struggle. The norms of moral obligatory,

is in reality filled with class, that is, antagonistic in content.7

Marxist assertion, like Engels, the theoretical justification of

morality is the product of the economic stage of a society at

particular point of time. Because of the human civilization, the

civilized society is now moving in class antagonism and it will

continue because of morality which is basically a class morality.

The concept of morality is justified either by the domination or

interests of the ruling class or by the oppressed class. For this

reason, morality has become powerful enough and it has

represented the revolt against this domination and further the

interests of the oppressed.8 However, Trotsky argues,

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“A society without social contradictions will naturally

be a society without lies and violence. However,

there is no way of building a bridge to that society

save by revolutionary, that is, violent means, the

revolution itself is a product of class society and of

necessity bears its traits. From the point of view

“eternal truth” revolution is of course “anti-moral”. But

this merely means that idealist’s morality is counter-

revolutionary. That is, in the service of the

exploiters”.9

Marxists, including Trotsky, argue that religious, or broadly any

morality alluding to heavenly givenness can not be claimed in a

society that only human morality can exist which stands above

class antagonism and tries to overcome class antagonism. Thus,

Marxists materialistic explanation for the changes and diversity in

moral judgments also provides the justification for new ones.10

Dewey on Morality

The pragmatists view is that social life has to be given priority to

evolve a genuine morality which can produce effective social

action. From the pragmatists point of view a society is divided by

antagonisms where people appeal to different moral demands

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and different moral judgments imposed by the contending

classes. If this fact is ignored the end of morality is bound to be

either imaginary or unreal and actions emanating from it will be

harmful as consequences or ends. Novack points out pragmatists

view and argues,

“The pragmatists…Moral theory is…their substitute

for conventional religion…it provides their major

means of defense and offense against a thoroughly

materialist approach to social problems”.11

Novack asserts that pragmatists consider moral theory as their

substitute for conventional religion. In this sense he points out

Dewey’s view that the significance or worth of any action, is to be

judged solely by its ends or consequences. It is not the intention,

motive or aim of an individual but the concrete ends which flow

from action. For him, morality is an unconcealed activity having

ends instead of as a mere inner personal attribute.12 The moral

worth for Dewey depends upon as Novack points out, “goodness

of heart”.13 However, Novack highlights the moral approach of

pragmatism and argues,

“A scientific approach to morality should be able to

inform us, not only that exploitation is evil, but why

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the rich must act that way in the first place and

thereby indicate how the evils of exploitation can be

removed. This is not an individual but collective

social problem”.14

In this sense, Dewey argues that individual actions are

necessarily or unavoidably subordinate to social action and that

morality is permanently biund up with social conditions and ends.

The pragmatists do not rely on any endless deep-seated or

transcendental truth as a sanction for moral standards. Novack in

support of the pragmatist argues,

“Whatever actions tend to increase wealth and

equalize its distribution, extend democracy and

freedom, institute peaceful relations, open more

opportunities for more people, enhance their

sensitivities, add to their understanding, etc. are

good. If they have the contrary consequences, they

must be condemned as immoral”.15

As an example Novack refers to exploitation which according to

the pragmatist principle would be wrong for it deprives, divides,

and oppresses the people. He points out that pragmatists would

require that exploiters should be made to realise that they should

either correct themselves or be corrected by the community. He

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points out that for Dewey, force is wrong and has harmful in its

ends and therefore it must not be resorted to or should only be

employed if absolutely necessary. Novack himself is of the view

that class conflict is wrong and it should be replaced by class

harmony or collaboration and togetherness

The pragmatists consider that the highest aim of human

morality is the self-realisation of each individual, the development

and perfecting of the human personality.

Trotsky on Ends and Means

Trotsky as a Marxist argues that dialectical materialism does not

know dualism between ends and means. The ends are

determined by the historical movement with means subordinated

to the end which in turn can be means for some other end. The

dialectical view of ends and means was explicated in the second

chapter of this thesis that we not only show the end but show the

means also which is closely interlinked and go with one another.

‘Ends’ and ‘means’ are expressed by Marxists, entirely in terms of

dialectical interdependence and argue that the end determines

the means. However, the immediate end may become the means

for a further end.

Indeed Marxist dialectical materialism depicts a dynamic

process that changes as it proceeds endlessly. The proportional

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influence and interaction between the ideal and the actual gives

birth to means, which in its turn, through this dynamic process,

becomes harmonious with the end. In short, the relation between

ends and means in Marxist thought does never imply that any end

justifies any means and vice versa. Marxists argue that the nature

of the means is determined by the nature of the end in the given

historical situation. Ends and means are inseparably connected

with one another in such a way that the nature of means, whether

it is violent or non-violent, changes in accordance with the nature

of the ends.

Arguing on the liberals own moral principles, Trotsky states

that if neither personal nor social ends can justify the means then

obviously, they make the criteria from outside the historical

society. If liberals are not taking the criterion from practical

relations to the society; hardly they will pick it from heaven.

Dewey on Ends and Means

Dewey argues that means are means which function in an

intermediary position like the middle term of a categorical

syllogism. Dewey also understanding that the commonly held

dualism of ends and means is done with. The term ‘end’ is merely

a series of acts viewed at a distant stage and the term ‘means’ is

merely the series viewed at an earlier one.

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For Dewey the means within our power are just a matter of

habit. The projections of the end are the elements that hinder this

habit. It is also the primary means in its realisation. The habit is

pushing forward and moves anyway toward some end, whether it

is a plan as an end-in-view or not. In the second chapter of this

thesis this view of Dewey was portrayed by explicating that ends

and means as two names of the same reality. The terms do not

distinguish the reality but the judgment which makes it moral and

non-moral.16

In Dewey ‘end’ is used in two senses, that is, the final

justifying end and ends that are themselves means to this

conjectured final end. Dewey points out that Trotsky does not

anywhere claim that some ends are but means, which

nevertheless is certainly implied in the Marxists statement that

some ends lead to domination of man over nature, etc.17 As is

pointed out in the second chapter of this thesis. Dewey argues

that ends are literally endless coming into existence as new

activities occasion some new ends. The endless end is a way of

saying that there are no ends which is finally self-enclosed.

Dewey asserts that the relation between ends and means

is clearly bound up in a temporal relation. He argues that ends

are in the future, whereas means are in the present. Therefore,

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implying that we can control the means, but not on the ends.

Dewey says,

“…the foolishness of conceiving ends apart from

means. On the contrary, ends must be judged, and

evaluated in the light of available for their

attainment…the means to be used might well require

an excessive amount of effort, or might well in some

different way involve the sacrifice of other ends or

other means”.18

Dewey argues that the distinction between ends and

means arises in surveying the course of a proposed line of action,

a connected series in time. The ‘end’ is the last act we think of

and the ‘means’ is the acts to be performed prior to it in time. To

reach an end we must take our mind off from it and attend to the

act which is next to be performed. We must make the end.19

There is a belief in Dewey in plurality of changing, moving

and individualised ends. The criterion for distinguishing ends and

means may be interrogated. Dewey in turn points out that an end

is the relational quality of a set of activities, which confers or

presents order upon them and insures their continuity; such a

quality is ordinarily synthesised by focusing some particular

foreseeable outcome of the same set of activities in some

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moment of the future. Any aspect of experience which precedes

that moment and is related as a part to the whole must be

considered a means.20 Dewey argues,

“…ends can be valued apart from appraisal of the

things used as means in attaining them. The sole

alternative to the view that the end is an arbitrarily

selected part of actual consequences which as “the

end” then justifies the use of means irrespective of

the other consequences they produce is that desires,

ends-in-view, and consequences achieved be valued

in turn as means of further consequences” [Italics in

the original].21

Gotesky argues that Dewey’s concept of end-in-view is not

necessarily an end. We try to restrict ends to those ends-in-view

which include some kind of rational justification. Ends-in-view that

are concerned with interest, desire, want, etc. are not as such

ends; they are simply matters of concern or interest. For example,

to want an apple is an end-in-view, but it may not, in our mode of

talking, be called an end unless, it involves some kind of

justification such as wanting an apple because it has a particular

taste or quality which is not found in other fruits.22

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Dewey distinguishes ‘end-in-view’ from ‘ends’ as

accomplished result conceived as plan. A plan is never ultimate

and final, never an ‘end-in-itself’. A plan is rather a means to an

end. For example, the plan an architect employs while building a

house, whose instrumental function as a device is useful in

regulating the actual procedures of the construction that requires

no further explanation. However, this does not make it impossible

to continue to distinguish between ends and means. We may say

that such a plan serves as a means for building, while ‘building’ is

itself a means for having the house.

But Dewey argues that ends are ends-in-view arising out of

natural effects or consequences. We like some of the

consequences and dislike others. Therefore, attaining or averting

similar consequences are to be classed as ends. These

consequences constitute the meaning and value of an activity as

it is deliberated on.

For Dewey ends-in-view are taken to be valued as good or

bad on the ground of their serviceability. They are appraised as fit

or unfit, proper or improper, right or wrong, on the ground of their

requiredness in accomplishing this end.23 Any content that the

end-in-view possesses comes from the means, not from abstract

ideals. The content of the end as an object held in view is

intellectual or methodological; the content of the attained end as

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consequence is existential. No physical object may be considered

a means unless it is used in some human activity to accomplish

some end.

Dewey asserts that if ends-in-view are entirely apart from

means, there is nothing absurd, nothing ridiculous, in his

procedure, for the end attained, the existing result is just the end

desired. Dewey emphasises that it is only after an assessment of

the means in relation to its alternatives it is possible to evaluate

the attained end.24 Dewey argues,

“They [moralistic persons] deny that consequences

have anything at all to do with the morality of acts.

Not ends but motives they say justify or condemn

acts. The thing to do, accordingly, is to cultivate

certain motives or dispositions, benevolence, purity,

love of perfection, loyalty. The denial of

consequences thus turns out formal, verbal. In reality

a consequence is set up at which to aim; only it is a

subjective consequence. “Meaning well” is selected

as the consequence or end to be cultivated at all

hazards, an end which is all-justifying and to which

everything else is offered upon in sacrifice. The result

is a sentimental futile complacency rather than the

brutal efficiency of the executive. But the root of both

evils is the same. One man selects some eternal

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consequence, the other man a state of internal

feeling, to serve as the end. The doctrine of meaning

well as the end is if anything the more contemptible

of the two, for it shrinks from accepting any

responsibility for actual results. It is negative, self-

protective and sloppy. It lends itself to complete self-

deception” [Italics in the original].25

For Dewey, moral end is that something we cannot attain,

since for him this is a stage of fancy where something agreeable

and desirable is primarily transmitted through establish channels

of authority. In fact, for him, ends are determined by fixed habit

and the force of circumstance.26 Dewey argues that ends are

morally irrelevant which is true only in the sense that any act is

always likely to have some end which could not have been

foreseen, even with the best will in the world.

Dewey argues that moral will is an end in itself, not a

means to something else. For him, every person is equally an end

in himself which is a quality that marks off a person from a mere

thing. We use things as means and subordinate them to our own

purposes such as, stones, timber, heat, and electricity and so on.

But if we use a person as a means to an end then we violate the

very existence of human being. It means that we treat the person

as a slave and reduce her/his status merely to physical objects.

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Balndshard points out that there are no such things as

intrinsic values or ends in themselves. Balndshard feels that

Dewey will reply that this is what it implies and admits that end is

determined by the facts which are also means. Dewey, however,

argues that value of ends is thought of and in other cases the

value of means.27

Debate between Dewey and Trotsky

Dewey in his article “Means and Ends” remarks that the relation

of ends and means has been a bargaining issue in moral

philosophy, as well as in political theory and practice. Novack

says,

“For Dewey, ends and means are independent. But

he believed that these two terms merely condition to

one another; either one can determine the other or

be predetermined by the sufficient material

conditions. The one is as conditional and

hypothetical as the other.

“For example, exploitation is bad and must be

eliminated. But for Dewey it may be uprooted in any

number of ways: by class struggle, by class

agreement or by a combination of both. None of

these means are decisive for accomplishing the

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desired aim: the abolition of capitalist exploitation

such is the abstract theoretical position”.28

In contrast, Trotsky lays no emphasis on means,

“…the means itself can be a matter of indifference

but that the moral justification or condemnation of the

given means flows from the end. Thus, shooting in

itself is a matter of indifference; shooting a mad dog

that threatens a child – a virtue; shooting with the aim

of violation or murder – a crime”.29

For Trotsky the maxim ‘end justifies the means’ naturally, raises

the question what justify the end. He answered that in practical

life as in the historical movement the ends and the means

constantly change positions. He gives an example that a machine

under construction is an ‘end’ in the production and when it enters

into the factory it may be transformed into a means.30

The pragmatists seem to agree with the Marxist and argue

that those who contend that ‘end justifies the means’ is morally

perverted doctrine, Dewey on this point asks that if ‘end does not

justify the means’ then what does? Dewey asserts that it is the

only end that can justify the means.31 On the other hand, Marxists

argue that means have no moral weight and do not enter into the

moral scales, only the ends can count. Novack argues,

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“Many liberal moralizers contended that, if means

were justified only through their usefulness in

achieving ends, the most vicious practices were

licensed and the gates opened to the totalitarian

abominations of Stalinism”.32

Trotsky can be cited as representative of Marxist view.

Trotsky had the quality of being not only a Marxist with

worries about setting up a practical regime but was a

thinker in his own rights. The differences between Stalin

and Trotsky sprang from this very dispute that latter was

involving himself in interpretative exercise. Trotsky could

therefore argue that all means were not proper in the class

struggle but only those which really lead to the liberation of

mankind. Novack points out Marxists view and argues,

“Permissible and obligatory are those means, we

answer, which unite the revolutionary proletariat, fill

their hearts with irreconcilability to oppression, teach

them contempt for official morality and its democratic

echoers, imbue them with consciousness of their

own historic mission, raise their courage and spirit of

self-sacrifice in the struggle”.33

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Trotsky categorically explains that to achieve an end the

permissibility of means depends on its removal of social

oppressions which can only be achieved through revolution. It is

irreconcilably counteracts not only religious dogma but all kinds of

idealistic fetishes, these philosophic gendarmes of the ruling

class. It deduces a rule for conduct from the laws of the

development of society primarily from the class struggle and this

is the law of all laws.34 Here Dewey points out,

“This increase of the power of man over nature,

accompanying the abolition of the power of man over

man, seems accordingly to be the end –that is, an

end which does not need itself to be justified but

which is the justification of the ends that are in turn

means to it” [Italics in the original].35

The pragmatists then view the Marxist justification of means

through the notion of liberation of man from which it follows that

for Marxists not all means are permissible as has been

misunderstood by non-Marxists. Dewey’s reading Trotsky on this

point is cared for Trotsky argues,

“When we say that the end justifies the means, then

for us the conclusion follows that the great

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revolutionary end spurns those base means. And

ways which set one part of the working class against

other parts, or attempt to make the masses happy

without their participation; or lower the faith of the

masses in themselves and their organization,

primarily and irreconcilably, revolutionary morality

rejects stervility in relation to the toiters, that is, those

characteristics in which petty – bourgeois pedants

and moralists are thoroughly steeped”.36

Trotsky settles the liberals inquiry on whether the Marxists insist

on class struggle against the capitalists all means are

permissible, for which including lying, frame-up, betrayal, murder,

and so on. Trotsky denies that the end justifies any or every

means; he still insists that a means can be justified only by its end

and argues that the base ends will justify the base means.37

Dewey, however, not satisfied argues against the Trotsky on the

ground of inevitability and historicity present in the Marxists view,

“…examination of history – just as an assertion that

the Newtonian laws are the final laws of physics

would preclude further search for physical laws – it

would not follow, even if it were the scientific law of

history, that it is the means to the moral goal of the

liberation of mankind. That it is such a means has to

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be shown not by “deduction” from a law but by

examination of the actual relations of means and

consequences; an examination of mankind as end,

there is free and unprejudiced search for the means

by which it can be attained” [Italics in the original].38

Novack argues that every law is limited by the nature of the reality

and deals with its own nature as a human and historically

developed formulation which is relative and conditional character,

which may be one aspect of its content. If we assume that the law

is true then it is absolute for the processes and phenomena

covered in the area of its operation.

For example, the Marxists view of the laws of the class

struggle is valid only under the condition of class society. Before

primitive culture, society divided into classes and these laws were

not only inapplicable but unthinkable. At the other end of the

historical process, as class society disappears in the socialist

future, these laws will gradually lose their field of operation and

wither at the roots. But Dewey argues,

“…a law of history determines the particular way in

which the struggle is to be carried on certainly seems

to tend toward a fanatical and even mystical devotion

to use of certain ways of conducting the class

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struggle to the exclusion of all other ways of

conducting it…noted that means were deduced from

a supposed scientific law instead of being searched

for and adopted on the ground of their relation to the

moral end of the liberation of mankind”.39

Novack argues against Marxists view,

“In reality, class struggle methods are simply

inconsistent with his in–between position where he is

pulled in opposite directions by the antagonisms,

between capital and labor, ‘white and black’”.40

He asserts that social relations are both relative and absolute in

application. The relativity is based upon the changing and

contradictory course of social evolution from primitive collectivism

through civilization on to socialism. The Marxists absolutism is

based upon the central role that the antagonism of class interests

plays in the structure and activity of civilized society.41 For

Novack, the real relations of classes and their roles in capitalist

society are determinative. He asserts,

“The ends of classes, and of their members and

movements, are actually determined by their material

needs and interests. These arise from the parts they

play in social production and their stake in specific

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forms of property. Thus the collective end of the

capitalist class in the United States is to preserve

and extend their economic system. That is their

primary end. And it determines the conduct of

persons belonging to that class, just as it conditions

the lives of everyone in our society” [Italics in the

original].42

Selsam points out that Dewey and Huxley oppose the genuine

movement towards socialism only on the ground that means

determine the end, and since the necessary means are not

satisfactory to them; they remain content with the capitalist world

with its poverty, unemployment, and aggressive wars. They

ignore one thing, that the means necessary for the attainment of

socialism then they are by product of capitalism.43 The point

Selsam is trying to emphasis that the means available to attain an

end are embedded in the then existing condition and therefore

adopting them may amount to accepting them hindering the

attainment of the goal.

Dewey argues that for Marxists, the choice of means is not

decided on the ground of an independent examination of

measures and policies with respect to their actual objective

consequences. Means are deduced from an independent source,

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an alleged law of history which is the law of all laws of social

development.44 But Dewey goes on to argue,

“…genuine interdependence of means and ends

does not automatically rule out class struggle as one

means for attaining the end. But it does rule out the

deductive method of arriving at it as a means, to say

nothing of its being the only means. The selection of

class struggle as a means has to be justified, on the

ground of the interdependence of means and end, by

an examination of actual consequences of its use,

not deductively. Historical considerations are

certainly relevant to this examination. But the

assumption of a fixed law of social development is

not relevant” [Italics in the original].45

Dewey asserts that liberation or emancipation may be consistent

with the principle of interdependence of ends and means.

Accordingly Dewey argues that a thorough examination of the

means is required to ascertain what Marxists actual objective

consequences will be that is in to show that they do really lead to

the liberation of mankind. It is at this point that the double

significance of end becomes important. As far as it means

consequences actually reached, it is clearly dependent upon

means used, while measures in their capacity of means are

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dependent upon the end in the sense that they have to be viewed

and judged on the ground for their actual objective ends.

Dewey argues that an end-in-view represents the idea of

final ends, in case the idea is formed on the ground of the means

that are judged to be most likely to produce the end. The end in

view is thus itself a means for directing action, for example, a

man’s idea of a house to be built is not identical with end in the

sense of actual outcome but is a means for directing action to

achieve that end.46 However, Dewey as detailed above argues,

“…the idea of the liberation of mankind as the end-in-

view, there would be an examination of all means

that are likely to attain this end without any fixed

preconception as to what they must be, and that

every suggested means would be weighed and

judged on the express ground of the consequences it

is likely to produce” [Italics in the original].47

He asserts that the use of means that can be shown by the

Marxists are in its nature leads to the liberation of mankind as an

objective end or consequence.

Novack argues that the revolutionary morality of scientific

socialism is effective and progressive because it equips the

labouring masses with the kind of outlook and values they need

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for emancipation. It generalises and justifies in theory the cause

they strive for is just. It explains the aims of their efforts and

illuminates the kind of means required for their realisation.

Novack points out the ancient moralist view that you shall know

the truth and the truth shall make you free.48

Dewey argues that means to be used are not derived from

consideration of the end, that is, the liberation of mankind, but

from other outside sources. He claimed that to be an end – the

end-in-view, the liberation of mankind is thus subordinated to the

class struggle as the means by which it is to be attained. Instead

of interdependence of ends and means, the end is dependent

upon the means but the means are not derived from the end.

Since the view that it is the only means is reached deductively

and not by inductive examination of the means–ends in their

interdependence, the means, that is, the class struggle, does not

need to be critically examined with respect to its actual objective

consequences. For Dewey, the end-in-view, as distinct from

objective consequences, justifies the use of any means in line

with the class struggle and it justifies the neglect of all other

means.49

Dewey points out that orthodox Marxists having allegiance

to the ideals of scientific socialism depend heavily on the

objective relations of ends and means method of attaining the

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class struggle as the law of historical change. The set up created

by the Marxist attitude derived from the law of deduction from

ends to means makes all moral questions, finally to be attained,

meaningless and futile, For Dewey human ends are interwoven

into the very texture and structure of existence. But Trotsky, as a

materialist, asserts that not human ends but class ends are

objectively woven into the very texture and structure of social

existence under certain historical condition.50

Dewey asserts that to be scientific about ends, does not

mean to read them out of laws, whether the laws are natural or

social. For him, orthodox Marxism shares with orthodox

regionalism and with traditional idealism the belief that human

ends are interwoven into the very texture and structure of

existence the concept of which is inherited from Hegel.51

Dewey explains that increasing the power of man over

nature, the abolition of the power of man over man seems to be

the end, that is, an end which does not need itself to be justified

but which is the justification of the ends that in turn are means to

it. For him, Marxists may accept this formulation of the end and

hold that it expresses the moral interest of society – if not the

historic interest and not merely and exclusively that of the

proletariat.

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Dewey criticises the Marxist conception of ends that

Marxist theory of social practice clearly implies a discontinuity of

ends and means. For him, the presumed means are not

considered; and the assumption that the means will in fact

achieve the expected end is not questioned. Consequently,

Marxists regard themselves as absolved from the responsibility of

considering the actual ends of promoting class conflict. 52

Dewey further criticises Trotsky’s view that Marxists are

absolutistic in appealing to fixed laws for their choice of means in

social action. He claimed that Trotsky’s view is not empirical or

scientific but idealistic and religious because Trotsky imposes his

desired aims upon social development and acted as through that

human ends are interwoven into the very texture and structure of

existence.53

As a materialist, Trotsky never said that human ends are

interwoven into nature’s existence. But he asserts that class ends

are objectively woven into the texture and structure of social

existence under certain historical and social frameworks and

circumstances.54 Novack explains Dewey’s view,

“…society does not have to a determinate texture

and structure that any general laws on the objectives

of class can be obtained from an analysis of social

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development and subsequently used to calculate

their conduct as a basis for action.

“If there are no definite laws governing the

activities of classes, there can be no necessary

means, like the class struggle, to attain social

objectives. If there are neither ascertainable laws nor

prescribed means, then what takes their

place…many different kinds of means, and in

principle almost any means, may achieve the end-in-

view. If you don’t know where you are going or what

you are really up against, any road will presumably

take you there”.55

Dewey goes on to argue that the Marxists can make no moral

sense consistently with their premises or means. If history leads

by an inevitable sequence to an inevitable end then there is no

determination of ends or means by way of discrimination and

selection. However, he argues that the end is the outcome of

procedures of judgment than is the end of water spilling over a

dam.56

However, Novack argues that the clash of incompatible

ends determines the means employed by the contending forces.

The historical course of struggle leads toward the final showdown

in which one of the decisive polar classes emerges victorious

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over the other. Marxists consciously work for the supremacy of

the working people.57

The class ends are definite and clear, even if they are not

always grasped or stated with precision by the representative of

capital and labor who are obliged to act in accordance with them

by the environing circumstances of their socio-economic

situations, as these develop from one stage to the next. In this

sense, Novack argues,

“Dewey, too, regarded these [social oppression] as

the worthiest of objectives. Trotsky further stated that

all those means that contributed to the realization of

these aims are morally justified. So far, there was no

disagreement between Marxist and the pragmatist”.58

In this sense Novack points out Trotsky’s view and asserts,

“…the only force in modern society capable of

carrying through this job was the organized working

class. The only way labor can eliminate oppression

and complete the conquest of nature was by

developing to the very end its struggles against the

capitalist beneficiaries and upholders of economic

privilege”.59

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Novack asserts that Trotsky is not right in assigning the

fundamental task of social reconstruction in our epoch to the

workers. According to Novack, this is a matter of common

concern which is better than is preferred to any special class

interests. All people of good will from the topmost level of society

to the lowest should be mobilised in joint effort to secure

collective control over nature and our economy.

Dewey claimed that Trotsky also made a mistake in his

exclusive reliance upon the prosecution of the class struggle as

the means of arriving at the desired goals. For Dewey, ways and

means other than of sharpening the contradiction between the

capitalists and workers not only as good but will also bring better

results.60

Dewey argues against the Marxists view of using the logical

method and scientific procedure, and points out that Trotsky’s

method of reasoning is incorrect, because he deduced the

means, the class struggle from his reading or misreading of the

course of social development. By illegitimately erecting the class

struggle into the supreme and absolute law of history, Trotsky

actually subordinated the ends to a particular means instead of

permitting the ends to determine the means and he has derived

the means by an examination of actual consequences of its use.

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This is the only genuinely scientific approach which takes into

account the real interdependence of the two factors.61

Here Novack argues that in deduction, the extraction of

particular conclusions from general rules. Dewey counterposed

the procedure of induction, the arriving at generalisations on the

basis of repeated or duplicated instances. However, Novack

points out for Dewey Trotsky did actually derive his means

arbitrarily and only through deductive method. Novack argues,

“To be sure, Trotsky did explicitly evaluate means by

reference to the laws and needs of the class

struggle. These laws, however, were not freely

created and imposed upon society by the Marxists.

They had been drawn from a prior comprehensive

study of social processes over many generations by

strictly scientific methods. The laws of class struggle

are first of all empirical generalizations developed

from analysis of the facts presented by the history of

civilizations…” [Italics in the original].62

Novack interrogates the grounds on which one can select a set of

means over others. Dewey’s reply is that previous knowledge and

experience is to be used in the process of selection. But these are

never adequate or decisive. Their significance is demonstrated

only by what flows from their use.

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The ends emerge only after the choice of means is made.

But the question is why the choice of means cannot be guided

and determined by the lessons drawn from the accustomed ends

of the past. For the pragmatist no amount of predetermination is

over definitive; determination comes only after the act and only for

that particular act.63

Dewey’s understanding is that the individual functions in a

given socio–economic framework and that individual morality is

bound up with public codes of conduct. For him, social ends are

ultimately decisive in moral matters. But what conditions actually

do, and what ought to, decide what means will produce the

desired ends then Dewey asserts

“…informed or “creative intelligence” has to step in

and do the job”.64

In choice of means and obscuring of ends, Dewey fulfilled a

specific social function as a philosophical representative of those

liberal middle class elements who wish to be the supreme

mediators and moderators of class conflict in our society. In their

choice of ends and means the revolutionary Marxists for whom

Trotsky spoke likewise fulfill their role as champions of the

fundamental, long–range interests of the working masses. The

ends and means both in practice are determined by their class

functions and allegiances.65 Novack points out that the objective

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historical end of the middle classes which is according to Dewey’s

conception of the subject. He then argues on t he point,

“In the domain of theory their function is to deny the

crucial importance of the class struggle, its necessity

and its fruitfulness if properly organized and directed.

In practice, they usually strive to curb its

development by the working class while its enemies

remain unrestricted and powerful. This is a

hopelessly reactionary task in social science, politics,

economics – and morality”.66

In the ‘ends-means’ controversy debate, however, we have found

that both Dewey and Trotsky agree on the maxim the ‘end

justifies the means’ and the terms ‘ends’ and ‘means’ are

interdependent. Dewey on the maxim ‘end justifies the means’

argues that neither ends nor means can be justified by the

alleged deliverances of reasonable standards of consequence, or

a moral sense, or some brand of eternal truths. They can be

justified only by their actual results and he holds that the end in

the sense of consequences provides the only justification that can

be found for means employed. Nothing else can make means

good or bad but the outcome of their use.67

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References

1 Trotsky, L: Their Morals and Ours, p. 12.

2 Ibid. p. 10.

3 Ibid. p.12.

4 Ibid. p.11.

5 Ibid p.15.

6Ibid. p.18.

7 Lukes, L: Marxism and Morality, p.23 – 24.

8 Novack, G: Liberal Morality, p. 60.

9 Ibid. p. 27.

10 Ibid. p. 60.

11 Novack, G: Liberal Morality, p. 60 – 61.

12 Dewey, J: Quest for Certainty, p. 06.

13 Ibid. p. 61.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid. p.61.

16 Dewey, J: Human Nature and Conduct, p. 36.

17 Dewey, J: Means and Ends, p. 52.

18 Visalbergi, A: Remarks on Dewey’s Conception of Ends and

Means, p. 737.

19 Ibid. 34 – 35.

20 Visalbergi, A: Remarks on Dewey’s Conception of Ends and

Means, p. 743.

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21 Dewey, J: Theory of Valuation, p. 42.

22 Gotesky, R: Means, Ends-in-view, Anticipations and Outcomes,

p.86.

23 Dewey, J: Theory of Valuation, p. 47.

24 Ibid. p. 40 – 41.

25 Dewey, J: Human nature and Conduct, p. 231.

26 Dewey, J: 235 – 236.

27 Blandshard, B: Reason and Goodness, p. 173-173.

28 Novack, G: Liberal Morality, p. 68.

29 Trotsky, L: Their Morals and Ours, p. 12 – 13.

30 Ibid. p. 14 – 15.

31 Dewey, J: Democracy and Education, New York,

Macmillan, 1916, p. 124.

32 Ibid. p. 73.

33 Ibid.

34 Ibid. p. 36 – 37.

35 Dewey, J: Means and Ends p. 52.

36 Trotsky, L: Their Morals and Ours, p. 37.

37 Ibid. p. 23.

38 Ibid. p. 55.

39 Ibid. p. 52.

40 Novack, G: Liberal Morality, p. 69.

41 Opp. Cit. p. 71.

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42 Ibid. p.71.

43 Selsam, H:

44 Dewey, J: Means and Ends, p. 54.

45 Ibid. p. 54 – 55.

46 Ibid. p. 52 – 53.

47 Ibid. p. 53.

48 Novack, G: Liberal Morality, p. 73 – 74.

49 Dewey, J: Means and Ends, p.62.

50 Ibid. p. 56.

51 Ibid.

52 Gounilock, J: John Dewey’s Philosophy of Value, p. 177.

53 Ibid.

54Novack, G: Liberal Morality p. 69.

55Ibid. p. 69 – 70.

56 Gounilock, J: John Dewey’s Philosophy of Value, p. 177.

57 Ibid. p. 72.

58 Opp. Cit. p.62

59 Ibid.

60 Ibid. p. 62 – 63.

61 Ibid.

62 Ibid.

63 Ibid. p. 70.

64 Ibid. p.71.

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65 Ibid. p. 72 -73.

66 Ibid. p. 72 – 73.

67 Novack, G: Liberal Morality, p. 73.