CHAPTER TWO

An Exposition of Kant's Dialectic with Reference to his Epistemology and Ontology

CHAPTER TWO

An Exposition of Kant's Dialectic with Reference to his

Epistemology and Ontology

In the present chapter, I shall discuss the dialectic of Immanuel

Kant In epistemological and ontological situations, as given in the

Critique of Pure Reason; Kant intends to undertake a non-empirical

enquiry into the capacity of reason. I would attempt to analyze that Kant's

discovery of the categories and the transcendental deduction presents the

very centre of his philosophic quest. I shall show that the fundamental point,

which is emphasized in Kant's dialectic, is that of the unresolved

contradiction in the form of Paraiogisms, Antinomies and Ideal of Pure

Reason. By this, he draws a limit to the applicability of the categories of

understanding. Reason, Kant opines, is required as the indispensable

corrective to the deficiencies of understanding.

I shall also attempt to show that by overemphasizing the moments

of distinctions and interpreting the subject of knowledge, the sources and

the means of knowledge and the object of knowledge, Kant adopts the

method of abstraction. However, while overemphasizing the moments of

contradiction, Kant underestimated the significance of a meeting ground

26

between two mutually contradictory concepts. I shall also attempt to

show that it is precisely due to this failure that Kant could not resolve

the complexities of Paralogisms, Antinomies and the Ideal of Pure

Reason.

In the end, I shall attempt to develop Kant's 'Enlightenment

rationality', which lies at the roots of his claims for human freedom and

autonomy.

The dialectic of reason is presented in the third part of the Critique of

Pure Reason entitled as 'Transcendental Dialectic'. This transcendental

dialectic is the logical presupposition of the other two parts of the Critique of

Pure Reason i.e. 'Transcendental Aesthetic' and 'Transcendental Analytic'.

So, a brief account of the earlier two sections is also taken into account for

developing a clear perspective of the 'Transcendental Dialectic'. The

fundamental problems discussed here are the basic preoccupations of the

epistemological position of Kant.

In Critique of Pure Reason, Kant starts his epistemic quest by

undertaking a non-empirical enquiry into the capacity of reason, yet

rejecting pure rationalism when he says that:

27

"Human - reason has this peculiar fate that in one species of its

knowledge, it is burdened by questions it is not able to ignore, but which

as transcending all its powers, it is also not able to answer"l.

The perplexity into which reason falls is not deliberate, rather is

very much inherent in its nature. It begins with principles (which it has

no options save to take up) in the course of experience, and which this

experience at the same time abundantly justifies in using. Rising with

their aid (since it is determined to this also by its own nature) to ever

higher, ever more remote conditions, it soon becomes aware that in this

way - the question never ceasing - its effort must always remain

incomplete; and it therefore finds itself constrained to reset the

principles which overstep all possible empirical employment and which

yet seem so unobjectionable that even ordinary consciousness readily

accepts them. But by this process, Kant comments:

" ... human reason precipitates itself into darkness and

contradictions, and while it may indeed conjecture that these must be in

some way due to concealed errors, it is not in a position to be able to

detect them for, since the principles of which it is making use transcend

I Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Pure Reason, (tr.) N. K. Smith, 1973. (London, The Macmil1an Press Ltd.), Preface to the first edition, p. 7.

28

the limits of experience, they are no longer subject to any empirical

test.,,2 This presents the thrust of Kant's formulation of the dialectic of

reason.

In dialectic, Kant discusses such questions which human - reason

can neither comprehend nor reject. Reason cannot comprehend these

issues, because it cannot present them in reality. Reason cannot avoid

these issues, because they arise out of the very nature of reason itself. In

this way, we can say that Kant present a critique of 'reason' itself in

order to resolve it. In order to discuss these issues, let us begin with the

first two sections of the Critique of Pure Reason.

These two sections hinge on Kant's answer to one question:

How is scientific knowledge possible and to what extent?

To answer this, we have to go into the details of Kant's

epistemological position. The answer, Kant found, lies in the exposition

of 'sensibility' in the 'Transcendental Aesthetic' and the exposition of

'understanding' in 'Transcendental Analytic'. Thus, 'sensibility' and

'understanding' are the two faculties that constitute the possibility,

2 Ibid, p. 7

29

validity and extent of knowledge. In this context, Kant himself says in

Critique of Pure Reason:

"Objects are given to us by means of sensibility, and it alone

yields us intuition; they are thought through understanding, and from

understanding arise concepts. But all thoughts must, directly or

indirectly, by way of certain characters, relate ultimately to intuitions

and, therefore, with us, to sensibility, because in no other way can an

object be given to US.,,3

As quoted above, objects, according to Kant, are given to us by

means of sensibility. But sensibility cannot create the objects. It merely

refers to a reality, which is completely independent of mind. In other

words, it cannot cause the 'origination' of or construct an object of

reality- it can simply refer to the 'beginning' of its human-cognition.

This reality is known, in Kant's critical philosophy as the thing-in-itself,

which affects our senses and thereby, furnishes the materials for our

cognition. Kant defines the notion of thing-in-itself as, "It is the ground

3 Ibid., p. 65.

30

and cause of all appearances. It affects our senses and thereby furnishes the

material element in our cognition.,,4

But, here, the question arises that why was Kant so tempted by the

view that our knowledge originates from two elementary sources of the

mind? To answer this question, we need to go into the backdrop of the

Kant's critical theory. Perhaps the following remark by Kant about two

of his philosophical predecessors can provide us sufficient clarification.

In his own words: "Leibnitz intellectualized appearances, just as

Locke ... sensualized all concepts of understanding ... instead of seeking

in understanding and sensibility two sources of representations, which,

while quite different, can supply objectively valid judgments of things

only in conjunction with each other ... ,,5 Kant, therefore, takes up the

position of reconciliation between rationalism and empiricism by saying

that only the assertion about human-cognition based upon two sources

can take us beyond the rationalist and empiricist errors in the theory of

knowledge and bring about a reconciliation between the two.

It is precisely in this context that Kant prescribes 'sensibility' as

the faculty of intuition and 'understanding' as the faculty of concepts.

4 Singh, R.P, Kant and Hegel: Methodology, Ontology, Epistemology, Dialectic and Ought, 1990 (New Delhi, Galaxy Publications), p. 2 s Ibid., p.271

31

Through intuition, objects are glven and through concepts, they are

thought. Sensibility furnishes the manifold materials which are

absolutely chaotic and incomprehensible, while understanding gives

them a unifying form and renders them comprehensible.

Sensibility, thus, gives rise to intuitions to which the categories of

understanding are applied. There must, Kant insists, be a 'form' in which

this sensible intuition is posted and ordered. And that 'form' itself

cannot be derived from the sensible intuition and must, therefore, be

apriori in nature. In this context, he says:

" ... there are two pure forms of sensible intuition, serving as the

principles of apriori knowledge, namely, space and time.,,6

Kant discusses space and time, in the first part of the Critique of

Pure Reason entitled as Transcendental Aesthetic, as 'forms of intuition'

under two heads - metaphysical and transcendental. In the former

exposition, he tries to show that space and time are apriori in nature,

which means that they cannot be derived from sensible intuition, and

secondly, every manifold of sensible intuition has to be received by the

mind in the form of space and time. Kant regards space and time as

unitary one, because he says very insistently that we can represent one

6 Ibid., p. 67.

32

space and one time in which various spatial and temporal manifestations

are received.

In this context, Kant seems to be essentially following Newton

(1642-1727). This claim is supported even by N.K.Smith as he tells us,

"Newton, he (Kant) believes, has determined in a quite final manner the

principles, methods and limits of scientific investigation"? In the context

of Kant's commitment, in the first Critique, to show how the scientific

knowledge is possible as well as in the first two sections of the Critique,

Kant seems to be influenced by Newtonian physics.

However, he denies the concepts of absolute space and time

independent of the perceiving mind (as held by Newton). He believes

that, in no sense, space and time, are independent of the perceiver (i.e.

absolute in nature) and so, " ... if the subject or even only the subjective

constitution of senses, in general, be removed, the whole constitution·

and all the relations of objects in space and time themselves would

vanish.,,8 Thus, for Kant, space and time are always mind-dependent in

nature.

7 Smith, N.K., A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, 1918 (London, Macmillan and Company), p. v 8 Ibid., p. 82.

33

He, therefore, regards space and time as 'transcendentally ideal',

by which, he means that they are not independent realities and cannot be

applied to thing-in-itself. He says,

" ... We can indeed say that space comprehends all things that

appear to us as external, but not all things-in-themselves by whatever

subjects they are intuited .... we deny to time all claims of absolute

reality; that is to say, we deny that it belongs to things absolute, as their

condition or property, independently of any reference to the form of our

sensible intuition; properties that belong to things-in-themselves can

never be given to us through the senses.,,9

In this way, thing-in-itself is abstracted from sensibility, because

space and time are denied their independent existence and are considered

as 'transcendentally ideal'. At the same time, Kant regards space and

time as 'empirically real', because every manifold of sensible intuition

has to be received in the form of space and time.

Sensibility, which is posited and ordered in the form of space and

time, becomes the object of our cognition. It is here that Kant adopted

the view of the empiricists that all human-cognition begins with and

terminates in sensibility. This view was originally adopted from the

9 Ibid., pp. 72-73.

34

distinction between pnmary and secondary qualities In the material

things. Galileo (1564-1642) was the first to have introduced this

important distinction. Descartes (1596-1650), Newton and Locke (1632-

1704) incorporated it in their own thoughts. Following Galileo, Newton

draws a distinction between primary qualities such as extension and

inertia, and the secondary qualities such as colour and taste etc. which

are sensations induced by the primary qualities.

However, this view got its full expression only in Locke's concept

of a 'material substance' with primary and secondary qualities and three

kinds of knowledge viz. sensitive (for matter), intuitive (for mind) and

demonstrative knowledge (for God). One of the best exponent of this

philosophy was Bishop Berkeley (1685-1753), whose position was

known in the history of philosophy by the simple name- 'Subjective

Idealism' with two kinds of knowledge viz. finite and infinite.

Berkeley's main philosophical tenet was that things ordinarily conceived

as existing in the external or material world is nothing but our own

'sensations' or 'bundles thereof', which, being mental after all, are also

called by him 'ideas' or 'collection of ideas'. This line of the argument

ultimately culminates in Berkeley's philosophical successor David Hume

(1711-1776). Hume' s position is known as 'Neutral Monism' and

35

'Solipsism'. Here, he expounds that apart from our sensations or bundles

thereof, we cannot know anything like the so-called material substance

and the individual self and that is why, there is no knowledge as such.

However, it would not be wrong to say that there is no stronger

empiricist view than that which opens Kant's Critique of Pure Reason,

that all thoughts must directly or indirectly relate ultimately to intuitions

and therefore, with us, to sensibility, because in no other way can be

object be given to us.

Here, Kant seems to differ fundamentally from all rationalists,

particularly Descartes, who regarded sensibility as a faculty of obscure

and confused knowledge. In fact, in his famous book Discourse on

Method and Meditations, Descartes begins with his method of doubt

only when he denies the reliability of sensibility by saying that, "I have

sometimes found that these senses played false, and it is prudent never to

trust entirely those who have once deceived US."IO

Thus, in the process of scrutinizing the faculty of sensibility,

Descartes arrives at the conclusion that it is prudent not to trust such

things. But quite in opposition to Descartes, Kant maintains that

10 Descartes, Rene, Discourse on Method and Meditations, (tr.) F.E.Sutcliffe, 1979 (Penguin books), p.96.

36

'thought' or 'categories' can never yield objects - they can determine of

objects in so far as they are given in sensibility. In this context, he

(Kant) writes:

"The categories cannot of themselves gIve us any knowledge ...

that they come to here real significance is due to fact that they are

brought to bear upon empirical intuitions, and have to be employed in

this manner, since otherwise proper knowledge of sense - given would

remain an impossibility.,,11

In spite of maintaining an empiricist bend in the context of

'sensibility', Kant maintains that the empiricists have failed to

demonstrate that the experience also furnishes the means by which

sensibility is organized. In the empiricist tradition, for instance, David

Hume states that no universal and necessary connection can be found in

the sphere of the knowledge of 'matter of fact'. According to him,

whatever appears to be necessary in 'impressions' and ideas' can be

formed by the 'laws of association' based on customary transitions,

habits etc. Hume, thus, does not confine human - cognition on secure

grounds. Against Hume, Kant attempts to show that 'universality' and

'necessity' are applicable to sensible intuitions without arising from

II Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Pure Reason, (tr.) N.K.Smith, etc., pp. 87-88.

37

them. And Kant tries to establish this point in the 'transcendental

deduction of the categories of understanding'.

For the formulation of these categories of understanding, Kant

attempts to define them as the transcendental conditions through which

understanding seeks to satisfy its thrust to systematic unity of the

materials given in sensibility. These categories are those of quantity,

quality, modality and relation. They are, he emphasizes, not inductive

generalization, but deducted from the concepts of the 'logical

employment of understanding'. In this way, he applies the method of

abstraction for the formulation of these categories.

The categories, Kant opines, are the original pure concepts of

synthesis that the understanding contains within itself apriori. And

universality and necessity is possible only by virtue of the categories.

The constitution of knowledge by means of the categories is regarded by

Kant as the activity of human-mir.d because-

"...... it is, after all, we ourselves who are responsible for the

formation of general concepts. Conceptions are something which the

mind produces actively, and it is precisely in this respect that they differ

from perceptions. In so far, therefore, as we exercise our power of

entertaining general ideas, we must be said to have gone entirely

38

beyond the state of mere acceptance of the given. activity.,,12 To put it in

simple words, we may say that our ability to render the 'given'

comprehensible to ourselves and to illustrate it, under the guidance of

general words, is an expression of genuine intellectual activity.

Further, he says, - " ... the order and regularity in the appearances,

which we entitle nature, we ourselves, introduce. We could never find

them in appearances, had not we ourselves or the nature of mind

originally set them there." 13

In this way, the common structure of the human-mind, Kant

designates as 'transcendental unity of self - consciousness'. It consists

of the forms of intuition (space and time) and forms of understanding

(the categories) which, for him, are not static but forms of operation that

exist only in the act of apprehending and comprehending sensible

intuitions. The forms of intuition synthesize the multiplicity of

sensibility into spatio - temporal order. By virtue of the categories, the

results of the spatio - temporal order are brought to universal and

necessary relations of cause-and-effect, substance and reciprocity and so

12

13

Cassirer, H. W., Kant 's First Critique: An Appraisal of the Permanent Significance of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, 1968 (London, George Allen and Unwin Ltd.), p. 55.

Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Pure Reason, etc., p. 147.

39

on. And this entire complex is unified in the transcendental apperception

which relates all experience to the 'thinking Ego', thereby, giving

experience the continuity of being 'my experience'.

Thus, we may infer that what Kant calls the highest synthesis of

transcendental consciousness, is the awareness of an 'I think' which

accompanies every representation. In this context, Kant says:

"It must be possible for the 'I think' to accompany all my

representations: for otherwise something would be represented in me

which could not be thought at all and that is equivalent to saying that the

representation would be impossible or at least would be nothing to

me.,,14

This transcendental consciousness is the logical presupposition of

all knowledge. It is defined as the "vehicle of all concepts and so is

always included in conceiving of the these latter, and is itself

transcendental." IS

The knowledge which is thus, derived is what Kant calls as the

'synthetic apriori'. As synthetic, it amplifies the concept of predicate

and as apriori, it expresses universality and necessity. And Kant prefers

14

IS

Ibid., pp. 152-3.

Ibid., p. 154.

40

that what we require In knowledge is such ampliative cognition that

possesses the essential characteristics of universality and necessity.

But our knowledge, according to Kant, has its own limitations.

That is to say, the categories of understanding cannot be applied beyond

the sphere of actual and possible sensible intuitions. And if there is an

attempt to apply the categories of something that cannot be given in

sensible intuitions, there arises a 'transcendental illusion'. This is the

point where we come to Kant's exposition of Dialectic.

By dialectic, Kant means, the 'logic of illusion'. In order to

explain illusion, he first distinguishes it from probability and

appearance. Probability is based on insufficient ground and can provide

only partial truth, but it is never deceptive and it is quite correct that

senses do not err - not because they always judge rightly but because

they do not judge at all. In the same way, the categories of

understanding would by themselves never fall into error. But there is no

other source of knowledge except these two. Therefore, an illusion can

be found in the judgment, i.e., only in the selection of the object to our

understanding.

There are three kinds of illusion, namely logical, empirical and

transcendental. A logical illusion arises entirely from the lack of

41

attention to the logical rule. As soon as attention is paid, the logical

illusion immediately disappears. But empirical and transcendental

illusions are unavoidable even if their illusory nature has been exposed.

In other words, they have a tendency to persist even when they are

clearly shown to be illusory. An empirical illusion, for example, the sea

seems to be higher at the horizon than at the shore, cannot be prevented

even if it is proved that we see it through higher light rays. A

transcendental illusion can also not be prevented, because it "... carries

us altogether beyond the empirical employment of categories and puts us

off with a merely deceptive extension of pure understanding."t6 Since

the correct employment of the categories is that they can determine the

sensible intuitions. So they have no validity to determine something

which can never be given in sensible intuitions. A transcendental illusion

arises only when a judgment is made on what is transcendent or beyond

the realm of our experience e.g. notions of the soul, the world and the

God. Since what is transcendent can never be given in sensible intuition,

so a transcendental illusion can neither be proved nor disproved.

In his 'Transcendental dialectic', Kant mainly discusses the

transcendental illusions and tries to expose the illusions of

16 Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Pure Reason, etc., p. 298.

42

transcendental judgments. But a transcendental illusion is something

which the transcendental dialectic can never be in a position to avoid.

That is why, it can neither be proved nor disproved.

Kant states that understanding cannot use its concepts to formulate

judgments on what is transcendent. It is reason alone which can do so.

But as a matter of fact, reason is incompetent to evolve any concept

entirely on its own. Reason, therefore, seeks the support of the

categories of understanding. And consequently, there arIses a

transcendental illusion. The locus of a transcendental illusion, therefore

lies in the reason itself. It is, therefore, necessary to discuss the nature

and status of 'reason' as distinct from 'understanding'.

In Kant's terminology, the ideas of reason are regulative whereas

the concepts of understanding are constitutive in nature. The crux of

Kant's dialectic consists in exposing those tendencies which attempt to

overstep the experience and thus to precipitate into Paralogisms,

Antinomies and Ideal of Pure Reason. Such a tendency in Kant's

terminology is the characteristic of traditional metaphysics. That is why,

in Kant's critical philosophy, metaphysics is not possible, what is

possible is only physics.

43

It is on the basis of the above discussed process of human­

cognition that Kant says, - "All our knowledge begins with the senses,

proceeds from thence to understanding and ends with reason beyond

which there is no higher faculty to be found in us for elaborating matter

of intuition and bringing it under the highest unity of thought." 17

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant has used the term 'reason' in

three diverse senses. First, by reason, he means, the apriori concepts,

which are used in the whole cognitive process. Secondly, reason is wide

enough to cover the entire formal element of knowledge, but still

includes understanding in it. And thirdly, he uses the term 'reason' in a

still narrower sense as a special faculty, like intuition in the' Aesthetic',

and understanding in the 'Analytic'. Reason, in this sense, is called the

'Faculty of Principles' as understanding is the 'Faculty of Rules'.

Besides it, in his 'Enlightenment Project', Kant uses reason for the

humanity's emancipation.

In order to know the functions of reason, it is necessary to explain

its relationship with understanding. Reason has no direct concerns with

the matter given in sensibility. The understanding, throughout the use of

categories, unifies the manifold supplied by the sensibility. Reason seeks

17 Ibid., p. 300.

44

to unify the concepts and judgments of understanding. Thus, while the

faculty of understanding is directly related to objects, the faculty of

reason relates itself to objects only indirectly - i.e. through

understanding. Reason, thus, works only through understanding. As

perceptions are unified by the categories into experience, so the

knowledge of experience needs higher unity - that of reason in order to

form a well-connected system. This is supplied to it by the ideas which

do not relate directly, to the sensible objects. The ideas are required as

the guides to the understanding. That is why, in Kant's terminology, the

'Ideas of reason' are regulative whereas the 'concepts of understanding'

are constitutive in nature.

Another important function of reason is that it is always trying to

grasp the absolute totality. But, practically speaking, this absolute

totality or the unconditioned is never to be met in experience. As a

result, concepts of understanding are incapable of determining the

unconditioned. And, when reason, with the assistance of the concepts of

understanding, tries to apprehend the unconditioned, it fails to present it

in reality. This unconditioned can only be regarded as an 'idea'.

Consequently, there arises a 'transcendental illusion', which consists in

the conviction that the idea of unconditioned must represent itself in

45

reality. Kant claims to expose this illusion. In his View, the idea of

unconditioned is only a demand of reason, because reason is not satisfied

with what is merely conditioned and seeks to get the imitations of the

unconditioned.

However, nothing corresponding to the unconditioned can be

presented in reality, because whatever can be presented in reality is

always unconditioned. Here comes Kant's ontological framework in

which, he explains the concept of noumenon by distinguishing it from the

phenomenon. These are two totally separate spheres with no mediating

transitions. While the noumenon is completely free from the applicability of

the categories like quantity, quality, modality and relation, it is phenomenon

where these categories hold sway. In the context of this duality in

ontological position, Kant writes, "Appearances, so far as they are thought

as objects according to the unity of categories, are called phenomenon. But

if I postulate things which are mere objects of understanding and which

nevertheless, can be given as such to an intuition ... such things would be

entitled noumenon". 18

Thus, we can say that the 'transcendental illusions' have their seat

in reason itself, because reason tries to imitate the noumenon, but fails

18 Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Pure Reason, etc., pp. 265-6.

46

to present it in reality. In this way, we see that the 'ideas of reason' are

central to Kant's transcendental dialectic. They are the 'concepts of the

unconditioned' .

But reason is not satisfied with the series of conditions. It seeks to

determine the unconditioned, to determine the grounds of the

conditioned. There are, according to Kant, three species of relation

according to which reason seeks to realize its demand for the

unconditioned:

(i) through categorical synthesis in one subject;

(ii) through hypothetical synthesis of the members of a series;

(iii) through disjunctive synthesis of the part in one system.

From the three kinds of relations, Kant proceeds to deduce the

three ideas of the unconditioned which reason offers in order to guide

and complete the work of understanding. The three kinds of relation -

categorical, hypothetical and disjunctive - lead us to the unconditioned

in three different ideas. From the categorical, we get the subject which is

never itself a predicate. From the hypothetical, we get the pre­

supposition which, by itself, presupposes nothing. From the disjunctive,

we deduce such an aggregate of the members of the division of a concept

47

as requires nothing further to complete the division. "These are as

follows:

(i) The absolute unity of the thinking subject (Soul)

(ii) The absolute unity of the series of conditions of appearance

(World)

(iii) The absolute unity of all objects of thought in general (the

being of all beings - God). ,,19

The idea of soul renders all subjective phenomena intelligible to

us. The idea of the world explains all objective experience. The idea of

God is necessary to explain the co-operation of mind and external world

In one experience. Thus, they are not separate, but form a system. It

should also be remembered that Kant discusses immortality in

connection with the soul, freedom is connection with the world and God

in connection with the being of beings. Thus, the ideas are generally

known as immortality, freedom and God.

These ideas of reason have nothing corresponding to them in the

possible experience. Hence, it can be said that we have no knowledge of

the ideas of reason. But when we think that ideas are capable of

19 Singh, R.P., Dialectic of Reason: A Comparative Study of Kant and Hegel, 1995, (New Delhi, Intellectual Publishing House), pp. 35-36.

48

determining their objects, we get three parts of metaphysics: namely,

rational psychology, rational cosmology and rational theology. They are

products of what Kant calls three 'pseudo-rational inferences'. He calls

the first kind of inference about the soul - the Paralogism of Pure

Reason, the second kind of inference about the world - the Antinomy of

Pure Reason and the third kind of inference about the God - the Ideal of

Pure Reason. I shall attempt to discuss them one-by-one as follows:

I shall begin with the Paralogisms. A logical paralogism IS a

fallacious syllogism. A transcendental paralogism is a fallacious one in

which an invalid conclusion is drawn from a transcendental ground. The

transcendental ground employed in rational psychology is the judgment

'I think'. It is the transcendental ground of all concepts.

Kant states that 'I think' is the "vehicle of all concepts and

therefore also of transcendental concepts, and so is always included in

conceiving of these latter, and is itself transcendental.,,2o This'!, as a

thinking being signifies "the rational doctrine of the soul, in as much as I

am not here seeking to learn in regard to the soul anything more than can

20 Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Pure Reason, etc., p. 328.

49

be inferred, independently of all experience, from this concept'!' so far

as it is present in all thought.,,21

In Kant's view, 'I think' IS the logical presupposition of all

cognition and it is the final condition of every act of cognition. But 'I

think' or the transcendental consciousness, can never be given in

sensible intuitions. And if categories are applied to it, there arises a

paralogism. The judgment 'I think' contains no knowledge of the'!,.

The fallacy arises when certain conclusions are drawn from 'I think'

namely -

(i) that the soul is substance,

(ii) that it is simple,

(iii) that it is a person,

(iv) that it is in relation to possible objects in space.

Out of these four paraiogisms, the first three are discussed by Kant

with the same arguments that the qualities of being a substance, simple

and personal can never be applied to the judgment 'I think'. On this

basis, Kant, while accepting Cartesian premise that 'I' is the thinking

ego, rejects Descartes' claim that 'I think' is a substance. The fourth

21 Ibid., p. 328.

50

paralogism is concerned with the relation of the objects to the soul.

Here, Kant tries to reject the subjective idealism of Berkeley and

attempts to justify his transcendental idealism.

In the first paralogism, Kant says, "That, which is the absolute

subject of our judgments, is substance. I, as a thinking being, am the

absolute subject.... Therefore, I, as thinking being (soul), am

substance. ,,22

The fallacy, Kant argues, involved in the judgment consists in the

fact that the category of substance can be applied to an object given in

sensible intuition. The soul, as thinker, is a subject because it is which

thinks and hence it cannot be predicated of anything. But from the fact

that soul is a subject, it does not follow that it is also a permanent

substance. It is therefore, an invalid conclusion that the soul is a

permanent substance.

In the second paralogism, Kant says, "That the action of which

can never be regarded as the concurrence of several things acting is

simple. Now, the soul, or the thinking 'I' is such a being".23

22

23

Ibid., p. 333.

Ibid., p. 335.

51

Kant here argues that the 'I' is a simple substance because the

action which forms the 'I' is not a concurrence of several things.

Therefore, the proposition "soul is simple" is an analytic proposition.

But nothing can be derived from an analytic proposition. It is, therefore,

a mistake to prove that the soul is a simple substance from the simplicity

of the soul.

In the third paralogism, Kant says, - "That which is conscious of

the numerical identity of itself at different times insofar a person. Now,

the soul is conscious etc. Therefore, it is a person. ,,24

Kant's criticism of the third paralogism is exactly like the

criticism of the preceding two paralogisms. The fallacy is due to a

confusion between the logical and the actual identity of the soul. The

self-identity of the soul, throughout all its experiences, is only a logical

identity of the soul. One cannot deduce the real identity of the

underlying soul. The third paralo£ism is, therefore, an invalid

conclusion.

In the fourth paralogism, Kant says, - "That, the existence of

which can only be inferred as a cause of given perception has a merely

doubtful existence. Now, all other appearances are of such a nature that

24 b lid., p. 339.

52

their existence is not immediately perceived, and that we can only infer

them as the cause of given perception. Therefore, the existence of all

objects of the outer senses is doubtful. ,,25

The paralogism is concerned more with the nature of the objects

of perception than with the soul. Kant argues that if it is maintained that

'only what is in ourselves can be perceived immediately, and that my

own existence is the sole object of a mere perception', then what we

directly perceive is the self and its states, and the external objects -

falling altogether outside the self - cannot be directly perceived and can

only be inferred from our perceptions. But such an inference can give us

no knowledge of objects external to us, because we can not determine

whether the cause of our perception lies within us or outside us.

Therefore, the existence of external objects may be doubtful. This

uncertainty is called the identity of appearances and the doctrine which

maintains this is called by Kant as 'Idealism'.

In exposing the fallacy in this argument, Kant offers a refutation

of idealism. The argument he proffers are that the external objects are

empirically real and they have their existence only in appearances. As

things - in themselves are unknown and unknowable, we can know the

25 Ibid., p. 344.

53

external objects, not as they are in themselves, but as they appear to us.

"Thus, what Kant refutes is not idealism as such but only the subjective

idealism of Berkeley.,,26

Against the subjective idealism, Kant supports empirical realism

in that he considers the undoubted existence of things as appearances.

Contrary to Berkeley, Kant propagates transcendental idealism according

to which outer appearances are mere representations which exist in us

for if they exist in us, how can we call them as outer? For Kant, they are

outer only in the sense that they consist of representations which relate

their objects in space in which all things are external to one-another. But

since space itself is in us, so the outer appearances are not

transcendentally outside us, but only empirically so. Kant, in this way,

attempts to show the invalidity of the fourth paralogism.

Thus, we see that merely from the analysis of self-consciousness

we cannot drive the knowledge of self as an object - whatsoever. No

synthetic apriori knowledge is possible of the self, because it cannot be

given in sensible intuition. To say that the soul in simple, is a substance,

has personality and is in relation to objects is to base the soul on the

fallacy of ambiguous middle term.

26 Singh, R.P., Dialectic of Reason: A Comparative Study of Kant and Hegel, etc. p. 38.

54

After discussing paralogisms, Kant illustrates four pairs of

Antinomies of Pure Reason. In each antinomy, there is a thesis, with

supporting arguments, and antithesis, with supporting arguments. By

combining the thesis and the anti-thesis, we obtain an antinomy. Kant

emphasizes that both have equal importance and neither can be regarded

as correct exclusively.

The thesis of the antinomies study such question as:

(i) The world has a beginning,

(ii) The soul is a simple substance,

(iii) There is freedom and -

(iv) There is an Author of the World

If the views expressed in the theses are taken to be correct, it would be

dogmatism of Pure Reason. It is, therefore, necessary to consider the views

expressed in counter-position. The antithesis of the antinomies discuss such

questions as- the world has no beginning, the self is a complex thing, there is

no freedom and there is no Author of the world. But it would be dogmatism

of empiricism. We must, therefore, regard both the theses and the antitheses

as equally important, so that we may not be alleged of dogmatically

asserting one position and denying the counter-position.

55

In the context of the thesis and the anti-thesis of the first antinomy,

it has to be noted that the world stands for anything which assumes

space and time as infinite. And the question that Kant asks is whether the

things in space and time are finite or infinite? The thesis reads: "The

world has a beginning in time, and is also limited as regards space.,,27

Kant does not claim that the thesis can be established consistently. On

the contrary, he states the opposite in the antithesis, - "The world has no

beginning in time and no limits in space. ,,28

Both thesis and antithesis are proved only by refuting one with the

other. But Kant finds an inconsistency in both the thesis and the

antithesis because when it is said either that the world has a beginning,

or that it has no beginning then it is implied that the world is given as a

whole. Now, if the world is thing-is-itself, then it is invalid to apply any

category to it. But if the world consists of appearances, then again it is

invalid to suppose that the series of appearances can be given in their

entirety. Therefore, Kant states that the conflict between thesis and

antithesis is not real. It is the 'dialectical opposition' in which both the

alternatives are illusory.

27

28

Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Pure Reason, etc., p. 396.

Ibid., p. 396.

56

In the context of the second antinomy, it has to be noted that both

and anti-thesis assume space as infinitely divisible. The question is

whether things in space can be divided infinitely or not? The thesis

reads, - "Every composite substance in the world is made up of simple

parts and nothing anywhere exists save the simple or what is composed

of the simple.,,29 But the antithesis says, - "No composite thing in the

world is made up of simple parts and there nowhere exists in the world

anything simple".3o Consequently, there is nothing simple but what is a

composite substance.

Here, both the alternatives are illusory, because they imply that the

world is given as an infinite whole. But the world as a whole cannot be

given in reality. For Kant, it is only a dialectical opposition in which

both the alternatives are illusory.

However, in the case of third antinomy, Kant does not reject either

of the alternatives. In fact, in the third antinomy, Kant uses causality is

two different senses - one of which supports the thesis and other

supports the antithesis. The thesis says - "Causality in accordance with

laws of nature is not the only causality which the appearances of the

29

30

Ibid., p. 402.

Ibid., p. 402.

57

world can one and all be derived. To explain these appearances, it is

necessary to assume that there is also another causality, that of

freedom".31 It is argued that in the field of appearances, every event is

caused by a preceding event and that in turn, by another preceding event,

and so on. But there must be a first cause in order to regard a beginning

of the events. It is, therefore, necessary to maintain a free causality

which is not caused by anything else. Kant asserts that it is the only

thing-in-itself which is not caused by anything else whereas everything

is caused by it.

But in the antithesis, Kant says, - "There is no freedom; everything

10 the world takes place solely in accordance with laws of nature.,,32

Here, it is argued that everything in nature is determined by the laws of

cause-effect relationship - There is an endless causal chain which cannot

be completed and it is impossible to conceive a free causality. On this

basis, there is no freedom in the sensible world.

In the thesis of the fourth antinomy, Kant says; "There belongs to

the world, other as its part or as its cause, a being that is absolutely

31

32

Ibid., p. 409.

Ibid., p. 409.

58

necessary.,,33 It is argued that whatever is conditioned reqUlres the

unconditioned for its complete explanation. The unconditioned must be

antecedent to what is conditioned in time. Therefore, the unconditioned

must belong to the some temporal world where conditions exist. And the

antithesis reads, "An absolutely necessary being nowhere exists in the

world, nor does it exist outside the world as its cause.,,34 Here, it is

argued that if there exists an absolutely necessary being from which a

series of contingent events originate, then it would be self-contradictory

because it (the necessary being) cannot be necessary if its parts are

contingent. Further, if it is assumed that a necessary being exists outside

the world and is the cause of the events in the world, then it must act in

time and for acting in time, it must exist in the world. But it goes against

the proposition that a necessary being exists outside the world.

Therefore, a necessary being can exist neither in the world, nor outside

the world.

Here, the conflict between the thesis and the antithesis is a

dialectical opposition in which both the alternatives are illusory. The

33

34

Ibid., p. 415.

Ibid., p. 415.

59

unconditioned necessary being, according, to Kant, can never be

presented in reality and must, therefore, be regarded as an idea.

Thus, "In the antinomies, there is no formal fallacy and there is an

opposition between them. This show that human-understanding

trespasses its limitations and ventures beyond into the unknowable. This

proves that valid knowledge is confined to the phenomena and must not

be extended beyond into the noumena". 3S

Having considered the subjective-unity of self-consciousness and

the objective unity of the world, Kant proceeds to consider the 'Idea of

God'. Kant says that if we are to know anything definitely, we must

know all that is possible in general. And that will be the entirety of all

possible predicates. But here, the question arises that what is the entirety

of all possible predicates?

As a matter of fact, we can say that 'a thing is' only on the basis

of the various expressions through which it undergoes- It means the

entirety of all possible predicates. This entirety of all positive predicates

is not a mere aggregate, rather it is the ground of all finite realities. In

other words, it is the 'Being of all beings'. Kant describes this entirety as

3S Masih, Y., A Critical History of Western Philosophy, 1994, (Delhi, Motilal Banarasidas), p. 330.

60

the 'transcendental idea' as it is far removed from experience and is

determined by ideas alone. When this ideal is hypostatized, that is to say,

when personality is attributed to it, we conceive of it as 'God of

Theology' .

But there is no justification of it, though we are inevitably led to

it, for personalizing what is merely an ideal. We are definitely wrong in

thinking of the ideal as actually existing. But there is a tempting reason

for committing this error. Whatever is given in experience is contingent

and conditioned and we are not satisfied with that. Human-reason

demands an unconditioned and the transcendental ideal of reason and it

is only the idea of God, which fulfills this demand. Thus, one is

inevitably led to accept that the highest reality is not merely an ideal, but

a necessary existence. What is a mere demand of reason is transformed

into actual divine being i.e. God.

Kant, however, does not accept the arguments given by

theologians for the existence of God. He formulates three arguments

through which the existence of God may be proved in theology, viz.

ontological, cosmological and physico-theological. The ontological

argument can be credited to St. Anselm (1033-1 109) and then to

Descartes. This argument states that the existence of God can be traced

61

from the idea of a 'Perfect Being'. Kant refutes this argument by

exposing the contradiction between the concept of a thing and its real

existence. He argues, "Being is obviously not a real predicate, that is, it

is not a concept of something which could be added to the concept of a

thing".36 He says that the concept of a thing does not necessarily prove

its existence as well.

The cosmological and physico-theological arguments are

established on the ground that everything in this world is finite and

limited, and has a cause, which in tum, has a cause and so on. Further, it

is maintained that the series of cause cannot be infinite and therefore, the

first term in the series must be uncaused and that is God. Kant refutes

this argument by exposing the contradiction between finitude and

limitation (in the beginning) and evasion of experience and existence of

a mere concept (in the last). He argues that while this argument starts

from the experience of finitude and limitation, but later it "abandons

experience altogether, and endeavors to discover from the mere

concept ... ,,37

36 Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Pure Reason, etc., p.504. 37 Ibid., p. 509.

62

Thus, we have seen that the categories which make experience

possible are inapplicable to these noumenal entities (of soul, world and

the God). As such, human cognitive knowledge is always confined

within the sphere of phenomena alone. And whenever we attempt to

apply the categories of understanding to the transcendental, we get

nothing, but the transcendental illusions.

In this way, it can be said that the transcendental dialectic is a

'study of illusions'. It exposes the errors and flaws inherent in the

dogmatic systems of philosophy. So, Kant draws a limit to the extent of

human-cognition. It is the transcendental dialectic reason that makes

reason self-critique and self-reflective in nature. This limit-riddled

constitution of Pure Reason necessitates the emergence not only of the

Practical Reason for moral pursuits, but also of the Judgment for

aesthetic experiences. Thus, Kant's transcendental philosophy has given

rise to three 'limited theories' in the three Critiques. There is also an

emancipatory sense of self-critique and self-reflection in Kant's

transcendental philosophy.

This concept could further be elaborated with the help of Kant's

brief but seminal article in the Berlinischer Monatssschrift. December

1783 issue, entitled Beanwortung der Frage: Was is! Aufklaerung? or

63

"Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?" In this, Kant says,

"Enlightenment is the coming out of man from his self-imposed

immaturity. Immaturity IS the incapacity to serve one's own

understanding without direction (Leitung) from another. This immaturity

is self-imposed; Reason itself languishes, not because it lacks

understanding; what it lacks is resolution and courage; it is unwilling to

serve itself (Sapere aude! Habe mut) Take courage to serve your own

understanding. This is therefore the Motto (Walspruch) of the

Enlightenment. ,,38

Until enlightenment, the integrating intellectual principle was

placed in theology i.e. the belief in God. But now, the enlightenment

threw out that integrating principle and positioned human-reason on that

place. This attempt to get rid of 'self-imposed immaturity' is both self-

critique and self-reflection with the aim to attain emancipation.

Emancipatory self-reflection IS dependent on glvmg a rational

reconstruction to human-reason.

38 Kant, Immanuel, Was ist Aujklaerung: Thesen und Dejinitionen, 1986 (Reclem Stuttgart), p.9, (tr.) Singh, R.P., "Editor's Note: Transcendental Philosophy as a Limited Theory", The Philosophical Heritage of Immanuel Kant, (ed.) Singh, R.P., 1989 (New Delhi, Om Publications), p. 27.

64

In other words, Enlightenment develops reason to the such an

~xtent that it becomes autonomous in nature and gets rid of restraints

from traditions and authority. The way to Enlightenment, Kant

emphasizes, is not to search for a mentor or authority in Thinking, in

Willing and in Feeling. Rather, Kant has placed freedom and maturity

(Muendigkeit) at the centre for Enlightenment and contrasted it from

tutelages. In an atypical manner, Kant says, "When the question is

asked: do we live in an enlightened epoch (Aufgeklaerten Zeitalter), then

the answer is. No, but rather in an epoch of Enlightenment (Zeitalter der

Aujklaerung).,,39 This is possible only by regarding 'Reason' as the

supreme faculty.

However, it is essential, here, to point out that the procedure Kant

has adopted to indicate his transcendental dialectic is abstract in many

ways. Its abstraction in rational psychology consists in Kant's attempt to

declare the soul as logical presupposition and not as a living, dynamic

and acting self which is as simple as it is complex in its cognitive

process. In the case of antinomies, Kant treats the problem of antinomies

separately with an attempt to avoid any moment of a meeting transition.

Similarly, in case of the existence of God, Kant treats 'existence' in a

39 Kant, Immanuel, Was is! Aujkiaerung, etc, p. 96.

65

very limited sense designating it to the extent an object is given to us in

sensibility.

The transcendental dialectic of Kant made a great stir. Post - Kantian

developments have always been an attempt to overcome Kantian limitations

in the field of dialectic. Since the basic issues in Kant's dialectic of reason

are presuppositions of the entire Kantian epistemological and ontological

issues, a reaction against Kant requires a reinterpretation of all these issues.

Hegel does the same. He has undertaken Kantian enterprise, but he interprets

the concepts developed by Kant in an entirely different manner. As a result,

the issues concerning dialectic are embodied in an entirely new

epistemological and ontological framework in Hegel's philosophy.

66