166

CHAPTER - IV

REFLECTIONS OF NYAYA-VAISESIKA ON

ËYURVEDA-BASED ON CARAKA

SAêHITHË.

167

Concept of pram¡¸as in Ëyurveda

Ever since it's very origin Ëyurveda has concerned itself

with the cause, symptoms, and remedies of diseases. Knowledge

of these three aspects of diseases was considered as essential in

medical practice and this is got only through the pram¡¸as

(sources of valid knowledge). In generally Ëyurveda speaks

about four means of knowledge. Viz., Ëptopade¿a (testimony of

trust worthy person), pratyakÀa (perception), anum¡na

(inference), and yukti (reasoning).

Every system of Indian thought, whether philosophical or

medical hold its own epistemology so as to provide a precise

opinion, regarding its metaphysical and ontological doctrines.

The means of valid knowledge occupies a pivotal position in

168

these systems, since it is always described as the only instrument

for understanding the real nature of things.

According to Caraka, the things are in this world be either

existent ( sat), or non-existent (asat), they can be investigated by

the four pram¡¸as viz., Testimony of a trust worthy person,

(¡ptopade¿a), perception (pratyakÀa), inference (anum¡na) and

the coming to a conclusion by series of syllogisms of probability

(yukti).1

Ëptopade¿a (verbal testimony)

+É{iɺiÉÉ´ÉiÉ –

“®úVɺiɨÉÉ䦪ÉÉÆ ÊxɨÉÖÇHòɺiÉ{ÉÉäYÉÉxɤɱÉäxÉ ªÉä * ªÉä¹ÉÉÆ ÊjÉEòɱɨɨɱÉÆ YÉÉxɨɴªÉɽþiÉÆ ºÉnùÉ

* +É{iÉÉ& ʶɹ]õ ʴɤÉÖrùɺiÉä iÉä¹ÉÉÆ ´ÉÉCªÉ¨ÉºÉƶɪɨÉ * ºÉiªÉÆ, ´ÉIªÉÎxiÉ iÉä Eòº¨ÉÉnùºÉiªÉÆ

xÉÒ®VɺiɨÉÉ& *” 2

Those who are free from rajas and tamas and endowed

strength of penance and knowledge, and whose knowledge is

defectless, always uncontradicted and true universally in past

169

present and future are known as ¡pta (trust worth person). Such

neither have any deficiency of knowledge nor would they

willingly say anything untrue. They must be considered as

absolutely trusty (¡pta), and their testimony may be regarded as

true.

PratyakÀa (perception)

“+Éi¨ÉäÎxpùªÉ¨ÉxÉÉälÉÉÇxÉÉä ºÉÊzÉEò¹ÉÉÇiÉ |É´ÉiÉÇiÉä *

´ªÉHòÉ iÉnùÉi´Éä ªÉÉ ¤ÉÖÊrù& |ÉiªÉIÉÆ ºÉÉ ÊxɯSªÉiÉä*” 3

Perception is the knowledge which arises by the contact of

self, sense organs mind and sense objects, is called perception.

This contact of the sense with the object is regarded by

Cakrap¡¸i as being of five kinds,4 viz., 1. Contact with the

dravya (substance, called samyoga; 2. contact with the gu¸as

(qualities) through the thing (samyukta-samav¡ya) in which they

inhere by samav¡ya (inseperable) relation; 3.contact with the

gu¸as (such as color, etc.) in the generic character as universals

170

of those qualities, e.g. colouredness (r£patva), which exist in the

gu¸as in the samav¡ya relation; this is called samyukta-

samaveta –samav¡ya since the eye is in contact with the thing

and the colour is in the thing by samav¡ya relation, and in the

specific colour there is the universal colour or the generic

character of colour by samav¡ya relation; 4. the contact called

samav¡ya by which sounds are said to be perceived by the ear:

the auditory sense is ¡k¡¿a and the sound exists is ¡k¡¿a by the

samav¡ya relation, and thus the auditory sense can perceive

sound by a peculiar kind of contact called samaveta-samav¡ya; 5.

the generic character of sound as the sound universal (¿abdatva)

is perceived by the kind of contact known as samaveta-

samav¡ya. Cakrap¡¸i further notes that the four kinds of contact

spoken of here are the real causes of the phenomenon of

perception; In reality, however, "knowledge that results as the

effect of sense-contact" would be sufficient definition of

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pratyakÀa; so in the perception of pleasure though none of these

contacts are necessary, It Is regarded as a valid case of direct

perception. Contact with the self is, of course, necessary for all

kinds of cognition.5 Here it is easy to see that above theory of

perception is of the same type as that formed in the Ny¡ya

System. The nirvikalpaka perception is not taken into

consideration, for there is nothing corresponding to the term

avyapade¿a in the Ny¡ya-s£tra.6

Anum¡na (Inference)

“|ÉiªÉIÉ{ÉÚ´ÉÈ ÊjÉÊ´ÉvÉÆ ÊjÉEòɱÉÆ SÉÉxÉÖ¨ÉÒªÉiÉä *

´Éþ̼xÉMÉÚføÉä vÉÚ¨ÉäxÉ ¨ÉèlÉÖxÉÆ MɦÉÇnù¶ÉÇxÉÉiÉ **” 7

Inference must be based on perception; by which the

concomitance of the hetu can first be observed, which is of three

kinds as following:-

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1. From effect to cause - by perceiving the effect to cause

can be inferred such as by seeing a pregnant woman sexual

intercourse is inferred

2. From cause to effect - by seeing a cause effect can be

inferred such as by fruit is inferred.

3. Inference by associations other than that of cause and

effect, as the inference of fire from smoke.

Yukti (reasoning).

“¤ÉÖÊrù& {ɶªÉÊiÉ ªÉÉ ¦ÉÉ´ÉÉxÉ ¤É½ÖþEòÉ®úhɪÉÉäMÉVÉÉxÉ *

ªÉÖÊHòʶÉEòɱÉÉ ºÉÉ ¶Éä¹ÉÉ ÊjÉ´ÉMÉÇ& ºÉÉvªÉiÉä ªÉªÉÉ **” 8

Yukti is defined as when our intelligence judges a fact by

a complex weighing in mind of a number of reasons, causes or

considerations, through which one practically attains all that is

desirable in life, as virtue, wealth or fruition of desires, we have

what may be called yukti.

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Cakrap¡¸i say that this is not a reality of the nature a

separate pram¡¸a; but it helps other pram¡¸as, so it is counted as

a pram¡¸a. For instance Caraka says that forecasting of a good or

bad harvest from the condition of the ground, the estimated

amount of rains, climatic conditions and the like. Cakrap¡¸i

rightly says that a case like this, where a conclusion is reached as

the combined application of a number of reasoning, is properly

called Íha and is current among the people by this name. It is

here counted as a separate pram¡¸a. That is why further in other

context only three or four pram¡¸as have been mentioned

eliminating yukti.

The Buddhist writes á¡nta RakÀita in discussing Carakas

doctrine of yukti as separate pram¡¸a, holds that yukti consist in

the observation that, since, when this happens that happens, and

since there is no proposition equivalent to the proposition with a

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d¤À¶¡nta, or example, in Ny¡ya inference ( eg. whatever is smoky

is fiery, as the kitchen).

Cakrapani however, points out that these criticisms are all

beside the point, since yukti, according to Caraka, is not k¡rya

k¡ra¸ata from tad-bh¡va bh¡vita, It is arriving at a conclusion as

a result of a series of reasonings, But it is important to note that

Caraka speaks of three kings of pram¡¸as viz., pratyakÀa,

anum¡na, and ¿abda and describe anum¡na as being tarka

depending on yukti. By this statement he states that the means of

investigation are only these four and noneless, by this statement

he rejets the like arth¡pati, saÆbhava etc. acceptance in certain

quarters.

Pram¡¸as and diagnosis.

Caraka says that, deciding a course of action becomes

faultless if the entire disorder is examine from all aspects priority

with the threefold sources of knowledge collectively, because no

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knowledge is derived about the entire object by a part of its

source. Out of these three sources of knowledge, first of all

knowledge is obtained from authority. Thereafter examination

proceeds with perception and inference because if there be no

authoritative material before named what one would know from

perception and inference.9

one proceeding to acquire knowledge about the facts

relating to the disease, should examine with perception applying

all the sense organs for all the sense objects except in respect of

taste such as gurgling sound In intestines, cracking sound in

joints and finger nodes, characters of voice and other sounds in

the body should be examined with ears, colour, shape, size,

luster, normal and abnormal characters of the body, and other

visual objects unsaid here, should be examined with eyes. The

taste of the patients body though a sense object, should be

comprehended with inference because it's acquisition with

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perception is not feasible, hence one should know the taste of the

patients mouth by interrogating him, abnormal taste of body by

retreating of lice, sweetness of body by approaching of flies, the

doubt about internal hemorrhage as to whether it is pure blood or

blood affected with pitta is removed by feeding the sample of

blood to crow or dog. If they eat it, it is pure blood otherwise

affected one - this should be known with inference. In this way,

other tastes in body parts may be inferred. Smell normal or

abnormal, in all body parts of the patient should be examined

with nose. Similarly touch, normal or abnormal, with the hand.

Cakrap¡¸i further clarifies that there are three means for

knowing the specific features of diseases that is authority

perception, and inference.10

Here Yukti is not mentioned

separately as it is included in inference. These three pram¡¸as

jointly or singly are applicable for diagnosis.11

177

Ëyurveda in its own way interprets the law of causation

and the method of induction in the context of disease. As regards

the law of causation, two principal kinds of inference were

adopted by Ëyurvedic physicians in the diagnosis of diseases (a)

cause to effect, in which a disease was inferred from previous

causes, and (b) effect to cause, by which a specific malady was

attributed to certain conditions and habits of the patient. In

addition, there was another type of inference in which a disease

was diagnosed through early indications of its symptoms. A

fourth type of inference was based on the study of variations in

symptoms due to multiplicity of causes.

The principle of causality was first from a practical

necessity applies in Ëyurveda. Thus, If it is known that a person

has been exposed to sudden cold or has enjoyed a heavy feast

then, since it is known that cold leads to fever and over feeding

to indigestion, with the very first symptoms of uneasiness one

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may at once infer that the patient is likely to get fever or to have

diarrhea or acute indigestion, or if it is known that the patient has

a strong diarrhea then it can similarly be inferred that he has

eaten indigestible articles. Thus the two principle kinds of

Inference which were of practical use to the Ëyurveda

physicians were inference of the occurrence of a disease, i.e.,

from cause to effect and inference of the specific kinds of

unhygienic irregularity from the specific kinds of disease of the

patient, i.e., from the effect to the cause. The other and third kind

of inference is that of inference of disease from its early

prognostications (p£rva-r£pa).

In the method of induction three types of knowledge were

employed namely, the cause and effect relations (nid¡na),

invariable prognostication (p£rvar£pa), and concomitant

variation (up¡¿aya).12

The method was indispensable for

diagnosis of diseases, ascertainment of their causes, and

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prescription of cures. Caraka insists that the physician should

examine carefully the causes of diseases by the application of all

these methods, so that they may be ascertained from their visible

effects. Caraka give examples of a number diseases and the

causes of prognostications by which their nature can be

ascertained, i.e., One cause produces several disorders or

sometimes only one, like wise, one disorder is caused by many

factors and sometimes many disorders are caused by those ones.

For instance, from rough substance arise fever, giddiness,

delirium etc, and sometimes fever only. Likewise, many factors

which as rough etc, cause only fever, while sometimes they

produce many disorders in addition to fever.13

Hence it is evident that the determination of the nature of

causes and effects and the inference of facts or events of

invariable concomitance were in indispensable necessity for the

Ëyurveda physicians in connection with the diagnosis of disease

180

and the ascertainment of their causes and cures. It is stated by

Cakrap¡¸i that it why Caraka divides inference into three classes,

from causes to effect, from effects to causes and from the

association of other kinds of invariable concomitance. According

to Ny¡ya, in its fundamental work states that the inference is

described here for the diagnosis as same being of three kinds,

viz., p£rvavat ( causes effect), ¿eÀavat (from effect to cause),

samanyato d¤À¶a ( inference from similarities).14

Logical reflections in medical assemblies

Logic was used in Ëyurveda not only in diagnosing

disease but also in the debates which they had with one another.

The logical and dialectical speculations concerned in medical

assemblies which used to be held for the advancement of

knowledge and for overcoming opponents. Both Caraka and

Su¿ruta followed the Ny¡ya method in their argument with

181

opponents. The Caraka saÆhit¡ was an outcome of such logical

deliberations in medical assemblies.

The art of carrying dispute successfully was considered as

an important acquisition among medical practitioners. These

disputes conducting under so many terms used in it, but those

technical terms found only at the Ny¡ya systems of literature.

According to Caraka a good physician should have gain

mastery of eight aspects of Ëyurveda viz., contents of tantra,

sth¡na, adhy¡ya, and pra¿ana and their scope. The physician

should be able to interpret any part of the text and recapitulate

the main points when necessary. In debate the physician would

often encounter people with inadequate knowledge. The students

should attain high proficiency through discussions and debate

under the guidance of their teacher.

Caraka, says that the wise who wishes to be a physician

should, first of all, examine the treatise with reasoning and

182

keeping in consideration his seriousness or otherwise in the

work, result, after effects, place and time. various treatises on

medicine are found in society from amongst them one should

select that which is great, used by eminent and wise men, full of

ideas, respects by authorities, intelligent and beneficial to all the

three types of disciples (dull, mediocre and intelligent), free from

the defect of repetition, coming down from the sages, with well

composed introduction, discussion and conclusion, having firm

base, free from weak and difficult words, having abundant

expressions, with traditional ideas, devoted mainly to arriving at

the essence of ideas, having consistent ideas, with demarcated

topics easily comprehensible, and having definitions illustrated

with examples such treatise like the clear sun enlightens the

entire subject while warding off the darkness (or ignorance ).15

183

It is very important for a physician to have clear and

correct knowledge and for this a clear idea of the method of

study, teaching and discussing and also of means etc. is essential.

There after Caraka discuss once the pupil settled, on an

instructor, it became the guruji term to test. i.e., the teacher

should have clear idea of the subject, should have seen the

practical application, be skilful, amicable, pure, having practical

experience, well equipped, possessing all the senses in normal

condition acquainted with (human) constitutions, well versed in

courses of actions, having his knowledge un censured, free from

conceit, envy, anger, forbearing, fatherly to disciples, having

qualities of a good teacher and capable of infusing

understanding. the teacher possessing such qualities inculcates

physicians, qualities in his disciple in a short time like the

seasonal cloud providing good crop in a suitable land, i.e., during

a six-month period of probation the teacher identified the

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students strengths and weakness and ensured that he was peace,

noble preserving intelligent, etc. and found the student was fit.16

The guru-disciple relationship was thus originally marked

by a high degree of mutuality. At the outset each tested the other;

once instruction began, each taught the other, the guru learning

more about humans and human nature with each student taught.

The bond between teacher and student was much stronger than

the bond that exists today between teacher and student, because

today instructions has become an article of commerce. In the past

the disciple was expect to respect the guru as much as, or more

that, his own present, because the guru caused the disciple to be

'reborn'. These type of intense emotional relationship between

guru and disciple made it easier to knowledge to be transmitted

from one to the other.

The first part of the eighth chapter of Vim¡nasth¡na,

Caraka described about the detailed form of the physician and

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disciples, like mentioned above, and after that he discussed the

detailed form of the discussion made by such a students and

gave compulsory instructions to the disciples.

The student recited text and commentary, and the guru

solved difficulties and transmitters trade secrets. On occasion the

disciples would sit together with the guru to ask questions, and

he would respond by expounding on the various points of view

that had previously been proposed by other authorities,

concluding with the point of view he felt worthiest. Experts also

used to meet together for seminar on specific subjects, those

meetings and debates reinforced the students facility with the

laws of rhetoric can so helped to clarify their understandings and

provided them with opportunities to learn new things from

opponents. Winning a debate improved one's reputations. These

disputations were conducted according to on strict rules by the

following methods described here.

186

The history of Indian logic of Dr. Satish Candra

Vidy¡b£Àan gives us a detailed reference about the doctrines of

discussion that found in Caraka- SaÆhit¡ which are the contents

of Ny¡ya system. In this work he states that "Caraka is a general

name for the ancient ¿akh¡s (branches) of the Ëyurveda, as well

as for the teacher of those ¿¡kh¡s. The word "Caraka" signifies

according to P¡¸ini a person who study the Veda ( i.e. the ¿¡kh¡s

of the Yajurveda).

Caraka the father of Ëyurveda accepts some doctrines of

Medh¡tithi Goutama's Ny¡ya system. The doctrines as we find

them in the Caraka SaÆhit¡ are treated under three heads. Viz.,

1. K¡ry¡bhiniv¤thi, the aggregate of resources for the

accomplishment of an action.

2. Par¢kÀa, the standard of examination

3. SaÆb¡Àa - vidhi, or v¡da-vidhi, the method of debate.

187

Among them Pr¢kÀa ( examination) should be conducted

under the four heads, Viz ¡ptopade¿a, pr¡tyakÀa, anum¡na and

yukti, reappearing with a little modifications from Medhatithi's

view. It is undoubtedly clear that saÆbhaÀa-vidhi was the

principal topic of ¡nviÀiki.17

The art of carrying on a dispute successfully was

considered an important acquisition among medical practitioners.

Thus we have a whole set of technical terms relating to disputes

such as never found in any other literature, excepting the Ny¡ya

system. In Caraka SaÆhit¡ the place of vim¡na the eighth

chapter called the "RogabhiÀag- j¢t¢ya- vim¡na" almost as whole

as developed to this purpose.

There are four terms are referred to the connection with

disputes in the Ny¡ya-s£tra, viz., tarka, v¡da, jalpa and vita¸·a.

Tarka is said to be the same as £ha, and this is explained as a

process of reasoning carried on in one's mind before one can

188

come to any right conclusion. It is a name for the subjective

weighing of different alternatives on the occasion of a doubt

before a conclusive affirmation of denial (nir¸aya) is made.

Disputes are said to be of three kinds, v¡da, japa and vita¸·a.

V¡da means a discussion for the ascertainment of truth, Jalpa a

dispute in which the main object is the overthrow of the

opponent rightly or wrongly, and vita¸·a a dispute in which

attempts are made to discover the faults of the opponent's thesis

without any attempt to offer any alternative thesis. V¡da is thus

essentially different in its purpose from jalpa, and vita¸da; for

v¡da is an academical discussion with pupils, teachers, fellow-

students and persons seeking truth solely for the purpose of

arriving at right conclusions, and not for fame or gain. 18

Jalpa, on the other hand, is that dispute which a man carries on

while knowing himself to be in the wrong or unable to defend

189

himself properly from his opponents except by trickery and other

unfair methods of argument.

Caraka says that, a physician should hold discussion

(saÆbh¡Àa) with other medical men. Discussion increases zeal

for knowledge (saÆharÀa) clarifies knowledge, provides

dexterity, improves power of speaking, illuminates fare, removes

doubt in scriptures if any, by repeating the topics, and creates

confidence in case there is no doubt, brings for the some new

ideas neither to unknown the reason is that whatever secret ideas

are gradually delivered by the teacher pleased over the devoted

disciple, the same are expressed by him in enthusiasm during

discussion in order to gain victory.19

Hence the expert

recommends the discussion with the specialists. These discussion

are of two classes, friendly ( sandh¡ya saÆbh¡Àa) and hostile

(vig¤hya sambh¡Àa).20

A friendly discussion is hold among wise

and learned persons who frankly and sincerely discuss questions

190

and give their views without any fear of being defeated or of the

fallacies of their arguments being exposed. For in such

discussions, even though there may be the fallacies described, no

one would try to take advantage of the other, no one is jubilant

over the other's defeat and no attempt is made to misinterpret or

misstate the other's views.21

Caraka then proceeds to give instructions as to how one

should behave in an assembly, where one has to meet with

hostile disputes. Before engaging one self in a hostile discussion

with an opponent a man ought carefully to consider whether his

opponent is inferior (para) to him and also the nature of the

assembly (pariÀat) in which their discussion is under taken. A

pariÀat may be learned (jµ¡navati) or ignorant (m£·ha), and

those again may be friendly (suh¤t), neutral ( ud¡s¢na) or hostile

(pratinivi˦a).22

When an opponent is to be judged, he is to be

judged from two points of view, intellectual and moral. Thus, on

191

the one hand, it has to be considered whether he is learned and

wise, whether he remembers the texts and can reproduce them

quickly and has powers of speech, and on the other hand,

whether he is of an irritable temperament, or of a fearful nature,

etc. A man must carefully consider whether his opponent is

superior to him in these qualifications or not.23

When a man has to enter into a dispute with his equal, he

should find out the special point in which his opponent is weak

and attack him there and should try to corner him in such

positions as are generally unacceptable to people in general. 24

Caraka then proceeds to explain a number of technical terms in

connection with such disputes. Like the Ny¡ya, Caraka divides

such hostile disputes (v¡da) into two classes, jalpa and vita¸·a.25

Pratijµa, is the enunciation of a thesis which is sought to be

proved, e.g. "The puruÀa is eternal".26

Sth¡pana is the

establishing of a thesis by syllogistic reasoning involving

192

propositions with hetu, drÀ¶¡nta, upanaya and nigamana.27

Thus

the above thesis (pratijµa), " The puruÀa is eternal", is to be

supported by a reason (hetu) "because it is uncreated", by an

example (drÀ¶¡nta), "The sky is uncreated and it is eternal" by a

proposition showing the similarity between the subject of the

example and the subject of the thesis (upanaya), viz. "just as the

¡k¡¿a is uncreated, so the puruÀa is also uncreated" and finally by

establishing the thesis (nigamana), " therefore the puruÀa is

eternal. 28

Pratisth¡pana is the attempt to establish a proposition

contrary to the proposition or the thesis put forth by the

opponent.29

Thus, when the thesis of the sth¡pana is "puruÀa is

eternal " the pratist¡pana proposition would be "PuruÀa is non-

eternal," because "It is perceivable by the senses", and "The jug

which is perceptible to the senses is non-eternal" and "puruÀa is

like the jug, "So "PuruÀa is non-eternal".

193

Caraka defines hetu as "the cause of knowledge" (hetur

n¡ma upalabdhi- k¡ra¸aÆ) and the cause of knowledge is the

pram¡¸as of pratyakÀa aithihya and aupamya.30

The definition of

hetu in the Ny¡ya-s£tra refers only to the perceived hetu in the

case of inference, through a similarity to which a relation is

established by inference.31

Here Caraka points out that a hetu may be either

perceived, inferred or formed by analogy or from the scriptures,

but in which ever way it may be formed, when it leads to

knowledge, it is called a hetu. Thus, when he is say, " The hill is

fiery, because it smokes" ({É´ÉÇiÉÉä ´ÉμxɨÉÉxÉ vÉڨɴÉCi´ÉÉiÉÂú) the smoke is

the hetu, and it is directly perceived by the eye. But when he say,

" He is ill, because he is of low digestion", the hetu is not

perceived, but is only inferred, for the fact of one's being in low

digestion cannot be directly perceived. Again, when It is said,

"PuruÀa is eternal, because it is uncreated" (ÊxÉiªÉ: {ÉÖ°ü¹É:

194

+EÞòiÉEòi´ÉÉiÉÂú) the createdness (k¤takatva) is the hetu, but it is

neither perceived, nor inferred, but accepted from the test of the

scriptures. Again, in the proposition, "his face is most beautiful

because it has been compared with the moon" (+ºªÉ ¨ÉÖJÉÆ EòÉxiÉiɨɨÉ,

SÉxpùÉä{ɨÉi´ÉÉiÉÂú) the fact of being compared with the moon is the hetu

and it is known by upama. Thus Carakas definition of hetu does

not really come into conflict with that of Goutama, he is only

says that a hetu may be discovered, by any of the pram¡¸as, and

by which ever pram¡¸a it may be discovered, It may be called a

hetu, if it is invariably and un-conditionally (a-vin¡-bh¡va)

associates with the major term (s¡dhya).32

Caraka then proceeds to describe uttara,33

which is in

purport the same as the j¡ti of the Ny¡ya-s£tras. Thus one may

say that the feeling of cold in a man must be due to his being

affected by snow, dews, or chilly air, because effects arise from

causes similar to them, in reply it may be said that effects are

195

dissimilar from their causes, since a burning fever may often be

an effect of cold. 34

Caraka doesn't mention the long list of j¡ti described by

Ny¡ya-s£tra and the commentaries in any phase in description.

An example (d¤À¶¡nta) is that on which the common folk

and the learned are of the same opinion, since examples involve

facts which are perceived by all and known to all, e.g., the fire is

hot, water is liquid, the earth is firm. A sidh¡nta, or conclusion,

is that to which one could arrive after a searching enquiry and

demonstrations by proper reasons. This sidh¡nta is of four

kinds,35

viz., 1) sarva-tantra-sidh¡nta or conclusions accepted by

all, e.g. "There are causes of diseases, there are diseases, curable

ones can be cured", (2) prati-tantra sidh¡nta, or conclusion,

which are not accepted by all, but are limited to particular books

or persons, e.g. Some say that there are eight rasas others say that

there are six some say that there are five senses, others that there

196

are six, (3) adhikara¸a siddh¡nta, or conclusions which being

accepted or proved, other conclusions also become proved or

accepted. eg. If It is proves that emancipated souls. do not reap

the fruits of karma, as they are without any desire, then the

doctrine of the suffering of the fruits of karma, emancipation, the

existence of soul and existence after death will have to be

considered as reputed abhyupagama-siddh¡nta, or conclusions

which are accepted only for the sake of an argument, and which

are neither examined critically nor considered as proved.36

áabda- is a collection of letters which may be of four

kinds, viz.,37

(1) d¤À¶¡rtha of experienced purport (e.g., "The

doÀas lost their equilibrium through three causes): (2) ad¤À¶¡rtha-

unperceivable purport (e.g. “there is after life, there is

emancipation”), (3) satya, or truth, that which tallies with facts

(eg. "There is Ëyurveda, there are means for curing curable

diseases" an¤ta, the opposite of truth, untruth.38

Sam¿aya, or

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doubt, occurs with reference to things about which no certainty is

attained. Thus those who are unhealthy and inactive die soon,

whereas those who are healthy and active live a long life. So

there is doubt whether in this world death happens timely or

untimely, Prayojana, or the object of action, Is that for which

anything is begin, Thus one may think that, if there is untimely

death, he shall form healthy habits and leave off unhealthy

habits, so that untimely death may not touch him.39

Savyabic¡ra means variability, e.g. " This may or may not

be a medicine for this disease"40

Jijµ¡sa means experimenting,

medicine is to be advised after proper experiments (jijµ¡sa).

Vyavas¡ya means decision (ni¿caya), eg. "This is a disease due

to predominance of v¡yu ; this is the medicine for this disease.

Arthapr¡pti is the same as the well known arth¡patti, or

implication, when on making a statement, some other things

which was not said becomes also stated, it is a case of

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implication, e.g. The statement "This disease cannot be cured by

allowing the patient to take his normal food and drink, implies

that it can be cured by fasting, or if it said, "he should not eat

during the day," this means that "He should eat during the

night."41

SaÆbhava is the source from which anything springs, eg.

the six dh¡tus may be considered as the saÆbhava of the foetus ;

wrong diet, of disease ; and right course of treatment, of health.

Anuyojya means a faulty answer which omits such details

should as should have been given in the answer, e.g. This

disease, can be cured by purificatory action." Such an answer Is

faulty, as It does not state whether the purification should be

made by vomiting or purging. Ananuyojya is what is different

from anuyojya is a question put by a learned man in a discussion

as an enquiry about the reason for a thesis put forward by a

learned colleague. E.g. a learned man says, "PuruÀa is eternal"

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and another learned man asks, "what is the reason?" such a

question is called anuyojya. A counter-question is called

anuyoga. A counter-question, such as "what is the reason for

you’re asking such a question" is called pratyanuyoga.42

V¡kya-doÀa, or faulty statement, is of five kinds, viz.,

ny£na, adhika, anarthaka, ap¡rthaka and viruddha.43

Ny£na or

the fault of omission, is that in which any of the five propositions

necessary for a syllogism is omitted. It may also be applied to

those cases in which, when a statement has to be supported by a

number of reason, only one is offered and other are omitted,

materially affecting the strength of the support of the eternality

of puruÀa viz., beginninglessness, not being the product of any

effort, unchangeableness, etc. Proposing to give all those reasons

and giving only one, is and instance of ny£na. Adhika is where

when Ëyurveda is being discussed, the opponent makes

irrelevent references to learned works on politics or the art of

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government. It may be also mean cases where words or

statements are needlessly repeated. Such a repetition is of two

kinds, verbal repetition is the repetition of the same word, while

the other is the repetition of the sense only, though different

words may be used.

Anarthaka and ap¡rthaka mean the use of meaningless and

unconnected words or expressions. Virudha, or contrary

statement, means the making of a statement contrary to the

example (drÀ¶¡nta-virudha) or the accepted conclusion

(sidd¡nta), e.g. cold water is hot, for so is fever, or when a

medical man ( vaidya) say that medicine does not cure diseases.44

Samaya-virudha is the making of any statement against the

accepted conclusions of any particular ¿¡stra. Thus, for example,

if a M¢m¡Æsaka says that animals should not be sacrificed, it

will be against his acceptance doctrine that animals should be

sacrificed. Or, if in any system of philosophy treating of

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emancipation (mokÀa ¿¡stra) it be said that injury to living beings

is good, then this is against the accepted tenet of the ¿¡stra.

V¡kya-pra¿aÆsa is that kind of statement in which the faults

mentioned above in v¡kyadoÀa do not occur.45

Chala means a rejoinder in which the statement of the

opponent is willfully misinterpreted. It is of two kinds, v¡k-chala

and s¡m¡nya-chala.46

The word nava means "nine" as well as

"new" and if, when one says about one's opponent, "This

physician is navatantra" (has newly learnt his texts), and the

opponent replies, " I have not nine text- books, I have one text"

the other person objects, " I do not say you have one text, I say

that you are navabhyasta-tantra" (have newly learnt the texts),

navabhyasta-tantra" might also mean "read nine times" ; and then

the opponent might well say " I have several times read the texts,

and not nine times, as you say." This is an example of V¡k-

chala.47

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Again, when a physician says " medicine cures diseases,"

the opponent may take the most general characteristics o f the

terms and say that the above statement come to this, that an

existent entity cures another existent entity; and, if this is so, then

since bronchitis exists (sa´k¡ÀaÅ) and consumption exists.

(SankÀayÅ) bronchitis, being an existent entity, must cure

anotherr existent entity, consumption. This is called s¡manya -

chala.48

Fallacious (a-hetu) are three kinds, Prakara¸a-sama,

Sam¿aya- sama and Var¸yasama.49

Prakara¸a-sama is where

that which is given as the hetu remains to be proved. Thus, when

it is said that, since the self is different from the body, it is

eternal, and because the body is not endowed with

consciousness, which are offered as the hetu, are themselves to

be proved ; in Ny¡ya-prakara¸a-sama is where two opposite

hetus exist in a thing, so that nothing can be affirmed by either of

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them. It shows that this prakara¸a-sama is different from the

prakara¸a-sama of the Ny¡ya-S£tra.

Saƿaya-sama is that which is the cause of doubt is

offered as the hetu for a particular conclusion, e.g. This person

quotes a passage from Ëyurveda is he or he not a physician.

Even a man who is not a physician might have heard a passage

somewhere and quoted it. Now, therefore, quoting a passage

from Ëyurveda leaves us in doubt as to the man’s being a

physician or not. If this itself is offered as the hetu for a

particular conclusion and if it is said, “He is a physician because

he has quoted a passage from Ëyurveda.” It becomes a case of

SaÆ¿aya-sama as an instance of j¡ti ; but the former is a case

where a doubt is not removed because of the fact that the thing

about which anything is affirmed possesses two opposite

qualities, so that no affirmation can be made on the strength of

any of these characteristics. Here, however, Saƿaya-sama is

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used in the sense that what is itself doubtful is adduced as the

reason for a particular conclusion.

Var¸ya-Sama is where an affirmation is made about a thing on

the strength of another affirmation which itself remains to be

proved and is hence in the same condition as the previous

affirmation, e.g., “Buddhi is non-eternal, like sound, as it is un-

touchable, like the latter”. But the non-eternality of sound stands

as much in need of proof as that of Buddhi, and the former

affirmation cannot be made on the basis of the latter. This fallacy

is similar to the j¡ti called S¡dhya-sama and same as the fallacy

S¡dhya-sama of Goutama, According to Goutama S¡dhyasama is

where the hetu itself remains to be proved. Thus in the argument

“Shadow is a substance because it moves”, the movability of

shadows is a doubtful point and is itself in need of proof. Does a

shadow move like a man, or is it that because the covering entity

205

moves that at different places the light is veiled and this gives

rise to the formation of shadows at different places.

At¢ta K¡la50

– is that in which that which should be said first is

said later, e.g., the thesis, or pratiµja, should be states first and

the conclusion or nigamana, last ; if instead the nigamana is

stated first and the pratiµja after, then we have the fault of

K¡l¡t¢ta .

UpalaÆba (Criticism) : is the finding fault with the hetus, also

called a-hetu, as described above or hetv¡bh¡sas.51

Parih¡ra

(reply) means the reply given to the objection pointed out by an

opponent ; e.g., the self is eternal, since no long as it remains in

the body it shows signs of life, and, when it is away, though the

body still remains the same, yet there is no sign of life ; therefore

the self is different from the body and is eternal.

Pratijµ¡h¡ni (to give up one’s thesis) is where, being concerned,

by the opponent, one is forced to give up one’s original thesis.

206

Thus one may start with the thesis that puruÀa is eternal.

Abhyajµ¡ (to bring a counter-charge) is that in which a disputant,

instead of refuting the charge brought against him by his

opponent, charges his opponent with the same defects.52

Hetv¡ntara (dodging with wrong reason) is where, when the

cause of some root fact (prak¤ti) is asked, the reply refers to the

cause of the modifications or manifestations (vik¤ti) of that root

fact.53

Arth¡ntara (wrong answer) is where, when the definition

of one thing (e.g., fever) is asked, a definition of another thing

(e.g., diabetes) is given.54

Nigraha-sth¡na is where, in a learned

assembly, a statement, though thrice repeated is not understood

by the opponent. Caraka counts among the nigraha-sth¡na is

where, in a learned assembly, a statement, though thrice

repeated, is not understood by the opponent. Caraka counts

among the nigrahasth¡nas many of the cases which have already

been enumerated and described. Thus he counts over and about

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pratijµ¡h¡ni, abhyajµa, k¡l¡t¢tavacana, ahetu, ny£na, adhika,

vyartha, anarthaka, punarukta, virudha, hetv¡ntara, and

arth¡ntara .55

After this Caraka further explain some topics for the

knowledge of physicians because he thinks that is very necessary

for a mastery of the subject-matter of Ëyurveda. If, if after

knowing well k¡ra¸a, kara¸a, k¡ryayoni, k¡rya, k¡ryaphala,

anubandaÅ, de¿a, k¡la, prav¤tti, and up¡ya one proceeds for

some action, he obtains the desired fruit and subsequent benefit

in what without any great effort.

K¡rana (doer) is who does a thing, he is the cause and agent.

Kara¸a (instrument) is that which sense as equipment for the

doer making offer for performing the action.

K¡ryayoni (original source) is that which is converted In to

action after transformation.

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K¡rya (act) is that with the object of performing which the doer

proceeds

K¡ryaphala ( result of act) Is that with the object of which the

action is performed

Anubandha (after effect) is that which essentially enjoins the

doer as after effect, good or bad, of the action.

De¿a (place) is location

K¡la (time) is transformation.

Prav¤tti (inclination) is the effort for the action. This is also

known as k¡rya, karma, yathna, k¡ryasam¡raÆbha

Up¡ya (procedure) is excellence of the first three factors, kara¸a

etc. and their proper management leaving aside the k¡rya,

k¡ryaphala and anubandha. Procedure leads to performance of an

action and thus it is said as up¡ya.

209

Thus Caraka explained the terms used the course of debate,

he says that the debate among physicians should be held only on

(topics of) Ëyurveda and not elsewhere. Here the statements and

counter - statements in details and also all the arguments have

been mentioned in the eighth text. After keeping them in mind

one should speak something and not anything which is irrelevant,

unscriptural, unexamined, inappropriate, confided or un

pervasive, He should speak everything with reasoning. All the

conflicts of debate, is endowed with reasoning, are devoid of

malice and promote the (cause) medicine due to its property of

enhancing the excellence of intellect because undamaged

intellect leads to success in all actions.

History of Indian Logic Dr.S.C.Vidyabh£Àan states that the

Su¿ruta SaÆhit¡ pointed out in this connection that the Uttara-

tantra mentions thirty-two technical terms helpful to physicians

in refuting the statements of hostile criticism and in establishing

210

their own points, which are called tantra-yukti. But these

technical terms are maxims for the interpretation of textual topics

like the maxims of M¢m¡Æs¡, and are not points dispute or

logical categories.

The differences between tantra-trayi and anviÀika is that

while the former refers to the laws of thought, the latter refers to

technical modes of expression in medical science in general and

in the Su¿ruta-SaÆhita in particular. The scientific methods of

argument find in the Caraka SaÆhita are found to have employed

in the Ny¡ya system of philosophy than in these of polity or

medicine.

Besides these S.C.V. states that the doctrines of ËnviÀiki

evidently did not constitute a part of the original Ëyurveda of

Punarv¡sa Ëtreya, and that those doctrines seem to have been

incorporated into the Caraka-SaÆhita by the redactor Caraka, in

whose time they were widely known and studied. S.C.V. states

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that Caraka and AkÀap¡da borrowed the doctrines from

Medh¡thithi Goutama, but while Caraka accepted them in their

crude forms, AkÀap¡da pruned them throughly before they were

assimilated in the Ny¡ya-S£tra.56

Vai¿eÀika and Ëyurveda

The concept of Pad¡rthas in Ëyurveda

The knowledge of Ny¡ya-Vai¿esika dar¿ana is an

inevitable part In Ëyurvedic studies. Ny¡ya-Vai¿esika

contributes extensively to the Ëyurvedic theories. Basic

principles of Ëyurveda is constructed from different

philosophical thought, and many of them have been modified

and make it suitably to Ëyurveda. Among them, Ëyurveda has

remarkably to Vai¿eÀika dar¿ana here, some of them discussed

the following portions.

A categorical commitment is essential for any systematic

study. Different Schools of Indian thought generates categories

212

its own way. There are so many Pad¡rthas common to all

Philosophies. In Ëyurveda Caraka SaÆhit¡, Caraka beginning

his treatise enumerates six entities, which are the fundamental

categories of Ëyurveda viz., S¡m¡nya, Vi¿eÀa, Gu¸a, Dravya,

Karma, Samav¡ya.57

Among the categories mentions above S¡m¡nya and

Vi¿eÀa acquires a practical significance in Ëyurveda a cardinal

principle of treatment of vitiated doÀas. Cakrap¡¸i clearly states

that the categories are mentions by Caraka is belonging to the

Vai¿eÀika dar¿ana, and also says that the change behind the order

is that the specific necessity of Ëyurveda.58

S¡m¡nya (Generality) and Vi¿eÀa (Particularly)

“ºÉ´ÉÇnùÉ ºÉ´ÉǦÉÉ´ÉÉxÉÉÆ ºÉɨÉÉxªÉÆ ´ÉÞÊrùEòÉ®úhÉÉÆ *

¿þɺɽäþiÉÖʴɶÉä¹ÉºªÉ |É´ÉÞÊkɯû¦ÉªÉºªÉ iÉÖ **”

213

Similarity of all substances is always the cause of increase

and dissimilarity the cause of decrease, Both effect by their

application.

“ºÉɨÉÉxªÉ¨ÉäEòi´ÉEò®Æú, ʴɶÉä¹ÉºiÉÖ {ÉÞlÉEòi´ÉEÞòiÉ *

iÉÖ±ªÉÉlÉÇ Ê½þ ºÉɨÉÉxªÉÆ, ʴɶÉä¹ÉºiÉÖ Ê´É{ɪÉǪÉ& **”59

i.e., similarity brings unity while dissimilarity causes

diversity. Again, similarity purpose (or action) while

dissimilarity has opposite one.

The concept of S¡m¡nya and Vi¿eÀa is of great importance

in Ëyurveda and that is why list of six pad¡rthas starts with

S¡m¡nya and Vi¿eÀa.60

In the first verse , Caraka gives this

applied definition “S¡m¡nya invariably causes increase while

Vi¿eÀa causes decrease in all substances”.

Interpreting the word ‘Sarvad¡’ Cakrap¡¸i says that it

means in all times in relation both ever-moving time as well as

214

conditional states61

interpreting the word ‘sarv¡bh¡v¡n¡m’

Cakrap¡¸i says that here ‘Sarva’ means ‘all’ and ‘Bh¡va’

means those which are existing such as Dravya, Gu¸a and Karma

and not those which are created.62

Thus the products increased by

‘parthiva dvya¸uka’ with the similarity of eternal ¡toms of

p¤thvi etc would not be covered by this.

Cakrap¡¸i emphasizes that ‘causation of increase’ is the

feature of S¡m¡nya and not only the generic similarity. For

instance, both the flesh to be eaten and that of the body are

generically similar but it wouldn’t do because in that case the

flesh should increase even in those who do not eat meat. Hence,

‘causation of increase’ is the feature of S¡m¡nya.63

This is

actually not the definition but statement of the feature applicable

in Ëyurveda. Actual definition is he declare that the second

definition mentioned above.64

215

Cakrap¡¸i further emphasizes that here ‘S¡m¡nya’ should

be taken in technical sense as one of the six pad¡rthas and not

loosely in sense of similarity because in that case the present

statement would be superfluous.65

But, as will be seen later, in

applicant sense, S¡m¡nya is reduced to Tulyatva (similarity) in

Ëyurveda.

Cakrap¡¸i says that is a general statement of dravyas. But

in his view, the present case is quite different because it is not

enumeration or statement but an applied definition. In fact,

‘causation of increase’ is the specific character and as such

definition S¡m¡nya.

According to Cakrap¡¸i, S¡m¡nya causes increase but it is

not only the cause of increase because it may be effected by

similar entities as well such as increase of agni and intellect by

ghee. On the same basis, some divide S¡m¡nya in two types –

Ubayav¤tti (bilateral) and ekav¤tti (unilateral). The former is

216

applicable in similar entities while the latter in dissimilar ones.66

But, really speaking, unilateral similarity is only a form of Vi¿eÀa

and cannot be taken as S¡m¡nya.

Cakrap¡¸i’s view that S¡m¡nya causes increase but

increase is not always caused by S¡m¡nya can’t be acceptable

because it would create chaos and the purpose of Caraka’s

statement would not be served. In scientific point of view, causal

relation between two entities should be established in such a way

that cause is inferred from the effect and vice versa. Thus there

must be invariable concomitance of S¡m¡nya and v¤dhi.

Accordingly, the definition can be put in both ways, S¡m¡nyaÆ

v¤dhikaram’ and ‘V¤dhik¡ra¸am S¡m¡nyam’. In this way one

would not be S¡m¡nya to effect the increase but would also

infer the causation of S¡m¡nya by observing increase.

Cakrap¡¸i further says that S¡m¡nya causes increase only

when there is no contradicting factor. For instance, the properties

217

like sour etc. in am¡laka fruit do not increase similar properties

of pitta because of being contradicted by the inherent cooling

effect of the fruit. In the like manner, the cases of drugs

pacifying all the three doÀas may by explained. The increase by

dissimilar entities like that of intellect and digestive fire by ghee,

and also aggravation of v¡ta caused by anxiety, increase of

semen by emotional determination and application of aphrodisiac

pastes on sole of feet etc. may be explained with prabh¡va . The

increase caused by S¡m¡nya would be effective in case of the

similar cases such as flesh would cause increase of flesh and not

of blood because it is Vi¿eÀa and not S¡m¡nya in respect of

flesh.

Commencing on the feature of Vi¿eÀa. Cakrap¡¸i says that

as the features of Vi¿eÀa defined in Vai¿eÀika are not of much

use in medicines, Cakra has given causation of disease as

distinguishing feature of Vi¿eÀa. The word ‘Vi¿eÀa means that

218

which is distinguished.67

For instance, though gavedhuka is

S¡m¡nya in respect of other gavedhuka grains, it is Vi¿eÀa in

respect of flesh because in the latter there is no generic attribute

of gavedhuka. In the same way, flesh in S¡m¡nya for flesh, but

Vi¿eÀa in increase should also be understood as in absence of

contradictory factor like that of S¡m¡nya such as the cases of

ma¸·aka etc. Contrary to v¡ta etc. do not pacify v¡ta etc.

because of their inherent unwholesome effect.

Like two types of cause (similar and dissimilar) of increase

in S¡m¡nya, Vi¿eÀa may also be grouped into two –

Viruddhavi¿eÀa (antagonistic dissimilar) and aviruddhavi¿eÀa

(non-antagonistic dissimilar). The frame acts directly whereas

the latter does indirectly. Here the former is meant by Caraka

through the latter also exerts the same effect eventually. Though

the non-antagonistic dissimilar does not replenish the decaying

tissue elements due to dissimilarity. The decrease in such case is

219

indirect because of non-replenishment of tissues undergoing

katabolism such as by constructing dam on a river, there is

natural fall in water level upward course.

Interpreting the last quarter of the verse, Cakrap¡¸i says

that the both (S¡m¡nya and Vi¿eÀa) exert their effects only on

contact with the body,68

otherwise they would remain ineffective.

Secondly, to effect equilibrium of dh¡tus, both of them act

simultaneously otherwise by one-sided action of S¡m¡nya there

may be increase on one side leading to disequilibrium.69

For

instance, sweet and unctuous dravyas pacify v¡t¡, on one side,

they also increase kapha by S¡m¡nya so as to maintain the

balance otherwise there may arise pathological conditions of

v¡takÀaya and kaphav¤dhi.

“ºÉɨÉÉxªÉ¨ÉäEòi´ÉEò®Æú ʴɶÉä¹ÉºiÉÖ {ÉÞlÉEòi´ÉEÞòiÉ”-This is taken by

Cakrap¡¸i as definition of S¡m¡nya and Vi¿eÀa. S¡m¡nya is that

which produces idea of oneness. For instance, the idea which

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causes oneness in several cows in different places and times is

S¡m¡nya.70

The same is applicable in respect of action (cook

etc.) and qualities (white etc.). On the contrary, Vi¿eÀa in respect

of horses because of making distinction.71

Similarly, the generic

attribute of flesh increase the same due to similarity but it

behaves as a decreasing factor for v¡ta due to Vi¿eÀa. However,

the same being non-antagonistic dissimilar to blood etc. does not

cause such decrease rather it may increase them due to similarity

in quantity.

The second half of the verse is taken by Cakrap¡¸i as

supporting argument for the first one. He interprets that S¡m¡nya

means similarity and Vi¿eÀa as the reverse. E.g., dissimilarity.72

Cakrap¡¸i conclude this topic with remark that in order to

avoid details the subject has been dealt with only in respect of its

application to Ëyurveda. Those who are interested in

(philosophical) details may go through the Vai¿eÀika Philosophy.

221

According to Vai¿eÀika Philosophy, S¡m¡nya and Vi¿eÀa

are relative terms73

and they are limited to dravya, gu¸a and

karma only.74

Pra¿astap¡da has defines S¡m¡nya as that which

produces idea of oneness whereas Vi¿eÀa is that which

discriminates.75

According to its field of jurisdiction S¡m¡nya is

said to be of two types – para (superior) and apara (inferior).

Satta (existence) itself is para while dravyatva, gu¸atva and

karmatva are paras¡m¡nya. The latter three are at the same time

both S¡m¡nya in respect of the members in S¡m¡nya for p¤thvi

etc but is Vi¿eÀa to gu¸atva and karmatva. Technically speaking,

Vi¿eÀa is used only to denote the discrimination between ¡toms

which stands at the terminal point and are eternal but secondarily

it is used to denote discrimination in dravya-gu¸a etc. too and

such is called as Bh¡kta (secondary).76

The later authors have

also accepted a third type of S¡m¡nya as ‘par¡para’ which is

both para as well as apara such as dravyatva is para in relation of

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p¤thvi etc. but is apara in that to satt¡.77

Para is that having wider

extent while apara is that having narrower one.78

In

Siddh¡ntamukt¡vali , S¡m¡nya is defined as that which, being

eternal, is inherently related to more than one.79

In pratibimbatva commentary on the TarkasaÆgraha,

S¡m¡nya is said as generic attribute and Vi¿eÀa as self-

discriminating.80

Bh¡Àaparicheda also takes S¡m¡nya as J¡ti but

V¡tsy¡yana while interpreting the aphorism of Gautama

(ºÉ¨ÉÉxÉ|ɺɴÉÉÎi¨ÉEòÉ VÉÉÊiÉ&) distinguishes S¡m¡nya from j¡ti though in

the aphorism there is no such indication. V¡tsy¡yana says that

which produces idea of sameness in different individuals but

does not discriminate them mutually is s¡m¡nya whereas j¡ti is a

type of s¡m¡nya which produces non- difference in some but

difference from some others.81

223

According to this definition, s¡m¡nya is purely s¡m¡nya

whereas jati performs functions of both s¡m¡nya and vi¿eÀa.

Thus the statement ‘ºÉɨÉÉxªÉ ʴɶÉä¹ÉÉä VÉÉiÉÒ:’ is very meaningful.

Now if we look at the statement of Caraka on this topic, it

is evident that ‘ºÉɨÉÉxªÉ¨ÉäEòi´ÉEò®Æú’, ‘ʴɶÉä¹ÉºiÉÖ {ÉÞlÉCi´ÉEÞòiÉÂ’, is the

definition tallying with that given in Vai¿eÀika philosophy but

Caraka extended it further and said that as s¡m¡nya and vi¿eÀa

cause oneness and discrimination respectively the exhibit

consequent effects of additions and subtraction on body tissues

when applied. Thus Caraka has remarkably been able to apply

the philosophical concept to the realm of human body in relation

to its physiology and medicine. It is to be noted that in the

definition propounded in philosophical texts there is emphasis

only on the idea of sameness and discrimination whereas Caraka

has made it as background for evolving his own concept of

S¡m¡nya as applicable to medicine.

224

Dravya (Substance)

In order or enumeration of pad¡rth¡s, gu¸a comes after

S¡m¡nya and Vi¿eÀa but again it is superseded by Dravya

because of the latter being the substratum of the former. Caraka

defines substance : that where action and quality exist and which

becomes an inherent cause of them, is a substance.82

Here

Cakrap¡¸i’s explanation is the following : existence means

existence in relation of inherence. By this, only a substance can

become the inherent cause of substance, quality and action. As

quality and action cannot produce an effect in relation of

inherence in their own, they are not inherent cause. ‘Having

action’ in the definition of substance is only to exclude the other

five categories, quality etc. and not ‘simultaneously’ to exclude

to dissimilar categories (quality). A further question may arise

that when a pot at the first moment of its origination exists

without any quality, then the definition of substance ‘having

225

quality’ is non-pervasive. Here the solution suggested by

Cakrap¡¸i is that, as at the second moment quality must come

therein, so the capacity of having quality is there is in the pot.

And in this capacity the expression ‘Having Quality’ must be

explained. Cakrap¡¸i now refers to the Vai¿eÀika S£tra as to

show Ka¸¡da also used the same expressions to define

substance:

“ÊGòªÉÉ´ÉiÉ MÉÖhÉÉ´ÉiÉ ºÉ¨É´ÉÉʪÉEòÉ®úhɨÉ pù´ªÉÆ ” 83

It is to be noted that the above explanation of Caraka’s

definition of substance totally corresponds with the Vai¿eÀika

explanation.

The number of substances mentioned Caraka SaÆhit¡ is

nine and it corresponds with the same number of substances

mentioned in the Vai¿eÀika á¡stra. The only exception between

the two á¡stras is the change in order of the enumeration of the

substance. In Caraka they are kha (¡k¡¿a), air fire, water and

226

earth, soul, mind time and direction. In Vai¿eÀika the sequence

of the categories are earth water, fire, air and ¡k¡¿a, time

direction, soul and mind. 84

“JÉÉnùÒiªÉÉi¨ÉÉ ¨ÉxÉ& EòɱÉÉä Ênù¶É´ªÉ pù´ªÉºÉÆOɽþ&

ºÉäÎxpùªÉÆ SÉäiÉxÉÆ pù´ªÉÆ, ÊxÉÊ®úÊpùªÉ¨ÉSÉäiÉxɨÉ **” 85

In short ¡k¡¿a etc. (¡k¡¿a, v¡yu, tejas, ap, and p¤thvi), self,

mind, time, space are dravyas (substances). Dravya having sense

organs is sentient while that without it is insentient.

In Caraka verse dravyas (substance) have been enumerated

as kha (Ëk¡¿a) etc. (Paµca mah¡bh£ta) , Ëtman, mana, k¡la and

dik. Cakrap¡ni raises the question why Ëtman in spite of being

the chief, is not enumerative the first. It is slowed by the

argument that in medicine, the body, being the seat of health and

disease, is more pertinent and as such the factors constituting

body such as ¡k¡¿a etc. have been said first and not Ëtman

because it is devoid of disorders.

227

Gu¸a (quality)

Gu¸a has been defined that which exists in relation to

inherence, which is Ni¿ceÀta and which becomes a cause is

quality.86

On this the explanation by Cakrap¡¸i is the following

by saying existence is relation of inherence, ¡k¡¿a etc. which are

pervasive substances and are motionless are being excluded. One

with activity indicates the finite substance which becomes the

substratum of the action. So they cannot be the quality. By

‘being a cause’, generality, particularity and inherence which

cannot be the causes, are excluded.

Now it may be argued that definition of the quality is

inclusive, as it does not pervade all qualities, e.g., the dimension

of the ubiquitous substances, colour of the substances in the final

aggregate (antyavayavin), and the like. They cannot be the

causes, and hence ‘being a cause’ is partly unproved. Therefore,

its meaning should be ‘having generality’ which is invariable in

228

the causes being positive entity. This type of causality exhausts

generality etc. as generality cannot have any further generality.

Cakrap¡¸i now gives another explanation of ‘being a

cause’ for a quality. As the efficiency of ‘being a cause’ in

qualities other than dimension of a ubiquitous substance, the

colour of a substance in the final aggregate and the like are seen,

so the capacity of being the causes in the unseen cases are also to

be admitted. Hence there is no question of being partly unproved

for causality of quality. The dimension of a ubiquitous substance

can be a cause of the yogic perception, so its causality cannot be

negated. Though this kind of causality (k¡ra¸atva, a generality)

may exist also in generality etc. , but by the expression existence

in relation of inherence (samav¡yin) generality etc. are excluded.

Because the expression Samav¡yin means to be a substratum

(¡dh¡ra) , where something exists in relation of inherence as

well as ‘to be contained (¡dheya) somewhere in the same

229

relation’. So the ubiquitos substances that can only be the

substrate in relation of inherence and the generality etc., that can

only be ‘contained’ in the same relation are exclude as qualities.

Besides these Caraka mentioned forty-one qualities.

Cakrap¡¸i has grouped these properties in three categories;

Vai¿eÀika (specific), S¡m¡nya (general) and Ëtmagu¸a

(spiritual).87

The specific properties are sense objects – sound,

touch, vision, taste and smell which are specifically related to

¡k¡¿a , v¡yu, agni, ap and p¤thvi respectively.88

Gurv¡di gu¸as are twenty in number guru-lakhu, ¿¢ta-

uÀ¸a, snigdha-r£kÀamanda-t¢kÀa¸a, sthira-ara, m¤du-ka¶hina,

vi¿ada-piccila , ¿lakÀa¸a-khara, sth£la-s£kÀma, and s¡ndra-

drava. These are the S¡m¡nya gu¸as as they formed generally in

p¤thvi etc.89

Buddhi is intellect which included sm¤ti (memory), Cetan¡

(consciouness) dh¤ti, (restraint), aha´k¡ra (ego) qualities. Par¡di

230

gu¸as are paratva, aparatva, yukti, saÆkhya, saÆyoga, vibh¡ga,

p¤thaktva, parim¡¸a, saÆsk¡ra and abhy¡sa. They are also

general properties but comparatively they are not so important

and as such are placed at the end.90

Karma (action)

According to Caraka Karma (action) is the response

(movement) originated from volition. Thus essentially it is

biological response. Action in Caraka is Ce˦ita (i.e., activities of

living beings) where effort (prayatna) stands as its very cause.91

Cakrap¡¸i mentions of some who explain action to be the cause

of effort. He also notes that though effort is narrated to be the

cause of action, the term prayatna is used in Ëyurveda as a

synonym of karma.

231

On another occasion i.e., to explain the Caraka verse

(s£tra1.52)

“ºÉƪÉÉäMÉä SÉ Ê´É¦ÉÉMÉä SÉ EòÉ®úhÉÆpù´ªÉÉxÉÉʸÉiɨÉ *

EòiÉÇ´ªÉºªÉ ÊGòªÉÉ Eò¨ÉÇEò¨ÉÇ xÉÉxªÉÉnù{ÉäIÉiÉä **”

Cakrap¡¸i says in this verse, karma is defined. Karma is

the causative factor in conjunction and disjunction and does not

require another factor (for the initiation or performance).92

This

is evidently on the definition given in the Vai¿eÀika philosophy.

Pra¿astap¡da has further elaborated it.93

Samav¡ya (Inherence)

Samav¡ya is ap¤thakbh¡va (inseparableness) as of Bh£mi

(p¤thvi) etc. with their qualities.94

Cakrap¡¸i say ap¤thakbh¡va is

ayutasiddhi (invariable co-existence) as of part and whole,

quality and substance, action and active, attribute and that

232

possessing the same.95

It is not possible to comprehend the whole

etc. on eliminating the part etc.

‘P¤thvi’ is substratum of may residing qualities and as

such is the symbol of substratum. On the other hand, ‘Gu¸a’ is

used for the entity of secondary importance. Thus the above

definition may be placed in other words as –‘Samav¡ya’ is the

inseparableness existing between ¡dh¡ra (substratum) and

¡dheya (dependent).96

This is confirmed by Pra¿astap¡da in

Vai¿eÀika.97

This excludes the relation of Samav¡ya between

p¤thvitva and gandharvatva which though inseparable are not

related as substratum and dependent.

The Su¿ruta SaÆhit¡ like each and every other system of

Indian knowledge is no exception to the acceptance of five bh£ta

dravyas to obtain substances, obviously things here for

preparation of medicine or body to which it is applied. Already

in the fortieth chapter of S£trasth¡na , while going to define

233

dravya (substance), rasa etc., Su¿ruta says that a substance is to

be endowed with action and qualities and to be an inherent cause.

This is the same the idea the Vai¿eÀika hold to define a

substance.

Concept of Dravya in Ëyurveda

The study of Dravya is the essence of Ëyurveda. Dravya

generally means 'Substance' but in Ëyurveda it is specifically

used in the sense of 'Drug' a substance employed as a medicine.98

The assumption in Indian medicine is that there is no substance

in this world which cannot be employed as medicine, but that

one should know how and when to make use of it and in what

measure.

Indian medicine borrows the concept of dravya from the

Ny¡ya-Vai¿eÀika system, which recognize nine categories. of

rudimentary and non-specific substances : the five primary forms

of matter ( earth, water, air, fire and ¡k¡¿a) soul, mind, time, and

234

space, of these the first five (viz. forms of matter), are available

for sensory perception, while the other four are not. The entire

world has come in to being and functions on the ground work of

those substances.

Dravya is defined as the foundation for qualities (gu¸a)

and action (karma) and as the combinative cause (samav¡ya

k¡ra¸a) wherein qualities and actions exist. The relation between

substances and qualities is inherent, inseparable and perpetual.

There can be no substances which does not have a quality and no

action exists without substance ; quality, therefore, is the

associate cause of both substance and action. It reveals that

Ëyurveda is a study of substance ( Dravya) based on quality and

action. The primary of the substance is brought out by Caraka –

saÆhit¡ "There can be no maturation (P¡ka) without potency (

virya), and no potency without taste (rasa), and there can be no

235

taste without substance (dravya). Therefore, substances are

primary and most important.99

In Ëyurveda 'Substance' is specifically defined as

constituted by five primary forms of matter (paµca-bhautika)

earth, water, fire and ¡k¡¿a, Drugs as substances share this

characteristic with the human body- mind complex, which can be

diseased.

There are several classifications of substances. The nine

primary substances (the five forms of matter, soul, mind, time,

and space) are described a causal (k¡ra¸a), while the entire

world of objects is described as emergent or as effect (k¡rya).

The objects of the world, although constituted by all five primary

forms of matter are identifiable by the prevalence of one or the

other of the forms.

The guiding principle is objects are discrete owing to the

excessive presence of one of the forms of matter (=iEò¹ÉæÇhÉ iÉÖ

236

´ªÉ{ÉnÂù¶É:') Substance are also classified into living beings ( chetana,

organic) and non-living thing (acetana inorganic).100

living

beings are equipped with sense-organs while non living matter

does not have this facility. The presence of consciousness is what

explains the capability of sensations ( sendriya) among the living

being.101

In the case of non-living matter, consciousness being

absent, sensations are impossible (nirindriya). Soul (¡tma)

becomes conscious only on account of its association with the

body and the sense organs. living beings are further classified

into beings in which consciousness is only latent (anta¿cetana

such as plants and trees) and beings in which consciousness is

both latent and explicit ( bahir-anta¿cetana, such as animals and

human being). The former group is also called immobile

(sth¡vara) and the latter mobile (jangama).

237

There is another classification based on how substances

originate. Substances derived from plants and trees (udbhida or

vanaspati-ja). include roots, bark, sap, gum, secretion, leaves,

sprouts, flowers, bud, thrones, fruits, bulbs, oil extracts and burnt

powders. They are divided into four major groups; (a) plants and

trees which have fruits but no visible flowers (vanaspati) : (b)

creepers and climbers which grow on the support of a tree or

which spread on the ground (virudha) and (c) plants the lives of

which are over as soon as they yield fruits (auÀadhi).

Substance derived from mobile living beings (jangama)

include milk, butter, honey, skin, bone flesh, blood, bone-

marrow. flesh-marrow, urine, horns, hoofs, nails, hair and

excretions. Living beings are classified into four groups. (a) born

out wombs (jar¡yuja, viviparous) like animals and human; (b)

born of eggs (a¸·aja oviparous). like reptiles and birds, ( c) born

of sweat and slime (svedaja) like worms and insects ; and ( d)

238

born from the earth (udbhija) like frogs and fireflies. Substances

derived from sources other that the two aforementioned, that is,

those obtained directly from the earth (p¤thv¢-janya), like metals,

minerals, salts sand and precious stones from another sub-

group.102

The classification of substances into food (¡h¡ra) and

drugs (auÀada) is also significant. Articles of food value are taste

dominated (rasa pradh¡na) and are meant primarily to sustain

and nourish the body constituents. Drugs, on the other hand, are

dominated by intense, moderate or meager potency (v¢rya-

prad¡na) and are meant to create new conditions in the body

which either maintain health or cure diseases by correcting the

malefic influences by v¡ta, pitta and kapha.

In case of diseases, it is recommended that drugs must be

administered first, and with the diseased condition has been

brought under control, articles of food that are suitable for

239

recovery and nourishment of the weakened body constituents

need to be indicated. Pharmaceutical preparations (kalpa).

therefore, include both drugs and food.

The three fold classification of substances in terms of their

effects (prabh¡va) actually refer to drugs and food articles. Some

substances help in eliminating or reducing the malefic influences

of the three doÀas (doÀa pra¿amana) some, on the other hand

serve to excite or derange the doÀas, and bring about disorder in

the normal function of the seven body constituents or dh¡tus

(dh¡tu prad£Àa¸a or kopana) some substances, however, help

maintain normalcy (svasta -hita) they are the articles of food or

diet that one is accustomed to take, and those that are conducive

to one's well being.

Substance are also classified in terms of the six taste

groups (rasa skanda): sweet, sour, saline, bitter, astringent and

pungent. Substances are again grouped into eight (heavy, light,

240

cold, hot , coarse, soft, intense and unctuous) or two (cold and

hot) groups in terms of drug -potency.103

Principles of medicinal preparation

An important aspect of Indian medicine dealing with

the identification, description, and classification of drugs.

(pharmacology) and also the preparations, and administration of

drugs, (viz., pharmacy, baiÀajya). This aspect has been

recognized as the foremost among the eight limbs of the present

day Ëyurveda : pharmacology, diagnostics, therapeutics, major

surgery, minor surgery. psychotherapy, toxicology and

pediatrics, (Dravyagu¸a, Nid¡na, Keyacikits°, áalya, á¡l¡kya,

Bh£ta vidya, Ëgadatantra kaum¡ra b¤tya)

The foundation of this aspect is to be formed in the concept

of substance (dravya), as crystalized in the Ny¡ya-Vai¿eÀika

system. The science of pharmacy aims at retaining the medicinal

properties of the ingredients of drugs with necessary

241

modification .This modification, Caraka declares, is brought

about by dilution, application of heat, clarification,

emulsification, storing, maturing, flavoring, impregnation, and

preservation, as also by the material of the receptacle. As for as

medicine is concerned, among the categories of existence,

substance is the most important, for the other categories are

dependent upon it. Substances are known by the properties they

possess (gu¸a) and the action they cause in the organism (karma)

the science of dravya-gu¸a, therefore, inquires into the nature of

substances and the medicinal value they have in order to preserve

the health of the individual as well as to care the discusses that he

may suffer from. Substances, from this point of view,

comprehend both article, of food (¡h¡ra) and drugs (auÀada).

In a substance are to be found five categories of existence

(paµcapad¡rtha): properties (gu¸a), tastes (rasa), systemic

changes (vip¡ka), potencies (v¢rya) and specific effects

242

(prabh¡va). Each of which discharges its own function. This

aspect of Ëyurveda deals with all these details. Brodly, however,

three details are recognized drugs (dravya) their therapeutic

properties (gu¸a) and their pharmacological actions ( karma).

Drug: Substances which have medical property are broadly

classified into three groups. ( 1) articles of food (¡hara) (2)

medicinal preparations or drugs (auÀadha) and (3) poisons (viÀa)

The basic idea is that besides the actual drugs, food as well as

poison can be employed for therapeutic ends.

Drugs listed in the classical pharmacological works

include animal products (pr¡¸ijanya) , substance from the plant

kingdom (vanaspati janya), and minerals and metals (Khanija),

Drugs of vegetable origin are classified according to the this kind

of country they are grown in, and the soil where the drug grown

is an important consideration. In accordance with the

paµcabhaut¢ka theory, the soil can be one of five types

243

depending on the predominance of the primary element.

(mah¡bh£ta).104

Concept of mind, Indriyas and Indriy¡rthas

Life is defined as a combination of ¿ar¢ra (body) indriya

(senses) manas (mind) and ¡tma (soul) According to Ëyurveda

indriya and indriy¡rthas are considered as evolved from

paµcamah¡bh£tas,. and also this is the theory postulated by

Vai¿eÀika. The five sense organs (paµcendriyas) are formed

mainly of one particular bh£ta and the sense it perceives is the

specific quality of that particular bh£ta. Su¿ruta has accepted the

theory of evolution as postulated by S¡Ækhya Philosophy.

“{É\SɦÉÉèÊiÉEòÉiÉÒÎxpùªÉÉ{ªÉɪɴÉæænäù ´ÉhªÉÇxiÉä iÉlÉäÎxpùªÉÉÌlÉ:*”105

In Caraka saÆhit¡ ¿ar¢rasth¡na, Caraka deals the science

relating to human body in respect of its cause, origin,

maintenance, growth etc. A human body is regarded "as a

modification of the five elements. Ether, air, fire, water and

244

earth. ‘Kh¡dhi’ indicate them, which include five senses as well,

cetana, is consciousness consisting of soul associated with

mind.106

The concept of puruÀa is accepted by the Vai¿eÀika

system and is utilized in medicine. The same Àa·dh¡tuka puruÀa,

is define by Su¿ruta.107

The word puruÀa is derived as that who lies in the body.108

Pure consciousness is also known as puruÀa but this is not

so practical from the point by view of medicine which deals with

the Àa·dh¡tuka puruÀa.109

Though the word puruÀa is applied to all living beings,

mainly it is used for human being which is the most important

all.110

Again from the division of constituents he is known as

possessing twentyfour entities such as mind ten sense organs,

five sense objects and prak¤ti ( matter) consisting of eight entities

( Avyakta, mahat AhaÆk¡ra and five tanm¡tras).

245

Here manas (mind) is defined with its specific character

and properties. Conjunction of mind with sense senses in the

invariable factor in perception. If mind is there perception is

there, or the other hand, if mind is absent, perception is also

absent.111

Thus by law of agreement in presence an absence,

mind is proved as cause of perception. similar definition are

found in the mind Ny¡ya-Vai¿eÀika.112

In language, Carakas

definition looks closer to that of Vai¿eÀika.

“ÊSÉxiªÉÆ Ê´ÉSÉɪÉǨÉÚÁÆ SÉ vªÉäªÉÆ ºÉÆEò±{ªÉ¨Éä´É SÉ*” 113

The objects and functions of mind are mentioned. Cintya,

vic¡rya, £hya, dhyeya and sa´kalpa, these five are the objects of

mind.

Cintya is the consideration about worth doing or otherwise.

Vic¡rya is that of critical analysis about rightness or otherwise.

Íhya is conjecture or hypothesis is about emotional and

246

thinking. Sa´kalpya is that about which merit or demerit it is

consider.

Concept of Sukha and Dukha

According to Vai¿eÀika philosophy the concept of sukha

and dukha as a result of the interaction between Ëtma, Indriya

manas, and indriyarthas is sukha (Happiness) and Dukha are

produced. (+Éi¨ÉäÎxpùªÉ¨ÉxÉÉälÉÇ ºÉÎxiÉEòiÉÇ ºÉÖJÉnÖùJÉä)114

Accepting this Caraka says that, happiness and misery

arise due to contact of the self, sense organ, mind and the sense

objects but when the mind is steadily concentrated to the self,

both case to exist due to non-initiation and a supernatural power

comes forth in the person. This state is known as yoga by the

expert sages.115

Cakrap¡¸i explain that the use or contact of senses etc. is

the cause of happiness and misery and is proved as such by an

‘anvayavyatir®kha’ (law of agreement in presence and absence)

247

because, in spite of existence of senses and their object, if contact

is here, effect is present otherwise not.

Concept of MokÀa

In Vai¿eÀika s£tra Ka¸¡da says:-

“iÉnù¦ÉÉ´Éä ºÉƪÉÉäMɦÉÉ´Éä |ÉÉnÖù¦ÉǴɶSÉ ¨ÉÉänùÉ:”116

When the activity in mind which is responsible for the

maintenance of he body becomes absent, samyoga of Ëtma with

that a body also become absent and when no other body is

further taken up by the ¡tma, salvation taken place. i.e.. The

Vai¿eÀika also regards bondage as due to ignorance, and

liberation as due to knowledge. The soul due to ignorance

performs actions. The actions lead to merit and demerits they are

due to attachment or aversion and aim at obtaining pleasure or

avoiding pain. if actions are inconformity with the Vedas

injunctions they lead to merit, if their prohibited by the Veda

248

they lead to demerit. The merit and demerit Individual soul make

the unseen moral. According to the law of Karma, one reap the

fruits of actions one has performed. This ad¤À¶a guided by the

God, emperies, motion to the ¡toms and leads to creation for the

sake of enjoyment or suffering of the individual soul. As long as

the soul will go on performing actions it will be bound.

To get rid of bondage the soul must stop actions liberation

comes through which knowledge. When actions stop , merits

and demerits stop gradually the soul is separated from the

feelings of the mind the body realize, its own pure nature that is

liberation which is absolute cessation of all pains.

Accepting that Caraka says.

“¨ÉÉä iÉÉä ®úVɺiɨÉÉä ¦ÉÉ´ÉÉiÉ ¤É±É´ÉiEò¨ÉÇ ºÉƸɪÉÉiÉ *

ʴɪÉÉäMÉ: ºÉ´ÉǺÉÆɪÉÉMÉè®ú{ÉÖxɦÉÇ´É =SªÉiÉä**” 117

249

MokÀa ( emancipation) is possible by absence of rajas and

tamas, destruction of the potent past deeds and detachment from

all the (source) conjunction. It is also said as absence of rebirth.

i.e., Ëyurveda accept that salvation is attained when the two

doÀas of mind Rajas and Tamas are reduced, and the effects of

karma are also reduced, the bondage of Ëtma with body and

mind ceases exist, and that state is called salvation. Activity in

mind in produced by Rajas and Tamas.

Concept of God

Ka¸¡da in his Vai¿eÀika sutra has not envisaged any God. But

later on, commentators like Pra¿astap¡da, accepted the existence

of God. Effect of karma In the previous dispensations of life

attached to Ëtma is called Ad¤À¶am (unknown) in Vai¿eÀika

philosophy. Ka¸¡da has attributed in it the initiation of activity.

250

and there fore no God was envisaged. Pra¿astap¡da postulated

that action is initiated due to desire of God.

This ad¤À¶am is known as Daivam in Ëyurveda.

“ÊxÉÌnù¹]Æõ nèù´É¶ÉɤnùäxÉ Eò¨ÉÇ ªÉiÉ {ÉÉè´ÉÇnäùʽþEò¨É …..” 118

MokÀa there is no such an aciton the effect of which is not

to be suffer or enjoyed by the individual who does it. Diseases

caused by such karmas are capable of nullifying the effect of

treatment. They spontaneously subside when the effect of

treatment. They spontaneously subside when the effects of k¡rya

are reduced as a result of sufferings.

Principles and theories postulated by Vai¿eÀika dar¿ana has

been accepted by alk branches of science that developed in India.

In Ëyurveda, JyothiÀa, V¡sthuvidya, even in music and dance

those principle are made use of. Therefore there is a saying in

sanskrit.

“EòÉhÉÉnÆù {ÉÉÊhÉxÉҪɶSÉ ºÉ´ÉÇ ¶ÉɺjÉÉä{ÉEòÉ®Eò¨É *”

251

NOTES

1 C.S.Su., XI-17

ÊuùÊ´ÉvɨÉä́ É JɱÉÖ ºÉ´ÉÈ ºÉSSÉɺÉSSÉ& iɺªÉ SÉiÉÖÌ´ÉvÉÉ {É®úÒIÉÉ - +ɺÉÉä{Énäù¶É& ,

|ÉiªÉIɨÉ , +xÉÖ¨ÉÉxÉÆ , ªÉÖÊHò¸ÉäÊiÉ **

2 C.S.Su. XI – 18,19

3 Ibid., XI, 20.

4 ºÉÊzÉEò¹ÉÇʨÉÊiÉ ºÉƤÉxvÉÉiÉÂ, SÉ ºÉƤÉxvÉ& - ºÉƪÉÉäMÉ&, ºÉ¨É´ÉɪÉ&, ºÉƪÉÖHòºÉ¨É´ÉɪÉ&, ºÉƪÉÖHòºÉ¨É´ÉäiɺɨɴÉɪÉ& ,

ºÉ¨É´ÉäiɺɨɴÉɪÉ&, ʴɶÉä¹ÉhÉʴɶÉ乪ɦÉɴɱÉIÉhÉÉä ¦ÉÉärù´ªÉ& *

252

5 C.S.Su. XI, 20.

6 The definition of pratyakÀa given in C.S.Su. XI, 20 is

+Éi¨ÉäÎxpùªÉ¨ÉxÉÉälÉÉÇxÉÉè ºÉÊzÉEò¹ÉÉÇiÉ |É´ÉiÉÇiÉä * ´ªÉHòÉ iÉnùÉi´Éä ªÉÉ ¤ÉÖÊrù& |ÉiªÉIÉÆ ºÉÉ ÊxɯûSªÉiÉä **

the definition of pratyakÀa in Ny¡ya S£tra is as follows :-

<ÎxpùªÉÉlÉǺÉÆÊxÉEò¹ÉÉæi{ÉzÉÆ YÉÉxɨɴªÉ{Énäù¶ªÉ¨É´ªÉʦÉSÉÉÊ®ú ´ªÉ´ÉºÉɪÉÉi¨ÉEÆò |ÉiªÉIÉÆ *

7 C.S.Su., XI, 20.

8 Ibid, XI, 25

9 ÊjÉÊ´ÉvÉäxÉ Jɱ´ÉxÉäxÉ YÉÉxɺɨÉÖnùªÉäxÉ … |ÉiªÉIÉÆ, +xÉÖ¨ÉÉxÉÆ SÉ; ÊjÉÊ´ÉvÉÉ SÉÉ ºÉ½þÉä{Énäù¶ÉäxÉ * C.S.Vi., IV, 5.

10 |ÉiªÉIÉiɺiÉÖ JɱÉÖ ®úÉäMÉiÉi´ÉÆ ¤ÉÖ¦ÉÖiºÉÖ& … <ÊiÉ |ÉiªÉIÉiÉÉä%xÉÖ¨ÉÉxÉÉnÖù{Énäù¶ÉiɶSÉ {É®úÒIÉhɨÉÖH¨É **

C.S.Vi. IV, 7.

11 ÊjÉÊ´ÉvÉÆ JɱÉÖ ®úÉäMÉʴɶÉä¹ÉÊ´ÉYÉÉxÉÆ ¦É´ÉÊiÉ ; iÉtlÉÉ - +É{iÉÉä{Énäù¶É&, |ÉiªÉIÉÆ, +xÉÖ¨ÉÉxÉÆ SÉäÊiÉ *

C.S.Vi., IV,3

12 iɺªÉÉä{ɱÉΤvÉÌxÉnùÉxÉ{ÉÚ´ÉÇ°ü{ÉʱÉRÂóMÉÉä{ɶɪɺÉÆ|ÉÉÎ{iÉiÉ& * C.S.Ni., I, 6.

13 C.S.Ni., I, 27-32.

14 N.S., I. 1.5.

15 C.S.Vi., VIII. 3.

16 Ibid, VIII. 4.

17 H.I.L., p. 26-28

18 ´ÉÉnÆù SÉ ÊxÉhÉǪɡò±É|ÉÉÎ{iÉ®äú´É ….. Ê´ÉvÉÖ®úÉi¨ÉÉ̦ɮú¦Éänù * ò N.M., p.594.

19 ºÉƦÉɹÉÉÊ´ÉÊvɨÉiÉ >ðv´ÉÈ ´ªÉÉJªÉɺªÉɨÉ& ʦɹÉEÂò ʦɹÉVÉ ºÉ½þ … EÖò¶É±ÉÉ& * ò C.S.Vi., VIII, 15

20 ÊuùÊ´ÉvÉÉ iÉÖ JɱÉÖ iÉÊuùtºÉƦÉɹÉÉ ¦É´ÉÊiÉ - ºÉxvÉɪɺÉƦÉɹÉÉ , Ê´ÉMÉÞÁºÉƦÉɹÉÉ SÉ ** Ibid, 16.

21 iÉjÉYÉÉxÉÊ´ÉYÉÉxÉ´ÉSÉxÉ|ÉÊiÉ´ÉSÉxɶÉÊHòºÉÆ{ÉzÉäxÉÉEòÉä{ÉxÉäxÉÉxÉÖ……<iªÉxÉÖ±ÉÉä¨ÉºÉƦÉɹÉÉÊ´ÉÊvÉ& ** Ibid, 17

22 iÉjÉ ÊjÉÊ´ÉvÉ& {É®ú& ºÉÆ{ÉtiÉä- |É´É®ú& |ÉiªÉ´É®ú& ºÉ¨ÉÉä SÉÉ, MÉÖhÉÊ´ÉÊxÉIÉä{ÉiÉ& xÉi´Éä´É EòÉiºxªÉäxÉ ** Ibid, 19

23 Ibid, VIII, 23.

24 |ÉiªÉ´É®äúhÉ iÉÖ ºÉ½þ …….. {É®ú¨É´É®ú¨ÉʦɦɴÉäSUôÒQɨÉ ** Ibid, 21

25 ….. ºÉ SÉ ÊuùÊ´ÉvÉ& ºÉÆOɽäþhÉ – Vɱ{É& , Ê´ÉiÉhb÷É SÉ * Ibid, 28.

26 |ÉÊiÉYÉÉ xÉÉ¨É ºÉÉvªÉ´ÉSÉxÉÆ ; ªÉlÉÉ – ÊxÉiªÉ& {ÉÖ¯û¹É <ÊiÉ ** Ibid, 30.

253

27 ºlÉÉ{ÉxÉÉ xÉÉ¨É iɺªÉ B´É |ÉÊiÉYÉɪÉÉ ½äþiÉÖoù¹]õÉxiÉÉä{ÉxɪÉÊxÉMɨÉxÉä& ºlÉÉ{ÉxÉÉ ** Ibid, 31.

28 It is easy to see that C.S. admitted in a syllogism all the five proportions that

are admitted in the Ny¡ya S£tra.

29 +lÉ |ÉÊiɹ`öÉ{ÉxÉÉ xÉÉ¨É ªÉÉ iɺªÉÉ B´É |ÉÊiÉYÉɪÉÉ Ê´É{É®úÒiÉÉlÉǺlÉÉ{ÉxÉ * Ibid, 32.

30 ½äþiÉÖxÉÉǨÉÉä{ɱÉΤvÉEòÉ®úhÉÆ ; iÉiÉ |ÉiªÉIɨÉ , +xÉÖ¨ÉÉxɨÉ , BäÊiÉÁ¨É , +Éè{ɨªÉʨÉÊiÉ * Ibid, 33.

31 =nùɽþ®úhɺÉÉvɨªÉÉÇiÉ ºÉÉvªÉºÉÉvÉxÉÆ ½äþiÉÖ& iÉlÉÉ ´ÉèvɨªÉÉÇiÉ * N.S., I.1.34,35

32 ½äþiÉÖ¶SÉÉÊ´ÉxÉɦÉÉ´É˱ÉMÉ´ÉSÉxÉÆ ªÉtÊ{É , iÉnùÉ{ÉÒ½þ ˱ÉMÉ|ÉOÉɽþEòÉÊhÉ |ÉiªÉIÉÉÊnù|ɨÉÉhÉÉxªÉä´É

ªÉlÉÉäHò ½äþiÉÖ¨ÉÚ±Éi´ÉäxÉ ½äþiÉֶɤnäùxÉ ¤ÉÉärù´ªÉ¨É * C.K.

33 =kÉ®Æ xÉÉ¨É ºÉÉvɨªÉÉæ{ÉÊnù¹]äõ ….. BiÉiÉ ºÉÊ´É{ɪÉǪɨÉÖkÉ®ú¨É ** C.S.Vi., VIII.36.

34 ºÉÉvɨªÉÇ´ÉèvɨªÉÉǦªÉÉÆ |ÉiªÉ´ÉºlÉÉxÉÆ VÉÉÊiÉ& ** N.S.I.2.18.

35 ʺÉrùÉxiÉÉä xÉÉ¨É ºÉ ªÉ& ……<ÊiÉ SÉiÉÖÌ´ÉvÉ& ʺÉrùÉxiÉ& ** Ibid, VIII.37.

36 All these sidh¡ntas are occur under the name in the Ny¡ya S£tra. N.S. I.1.28-31.

37 ¶É¤nùÉä xÉÉ¨É ´ÉhÉǺɨÉɨxÉɪÉ& ºÉ SÉiÉÖÌ´ÉvÉ& … +xÉÞiɶSÉäÊiÉù ** C.S, VIII.38.

38 The first two divisions, d¤À¶¡rtha and ad¤À¶¡rtha occur in the Ny¡ya S£tra,

ºÉ ÊuùÊ´ÉvÉÉä où¹]õÉoù¹]õÉlÉÇi´ÉÉiÉ * N.S. I.1.8.

39 Prayojana which means pleasure and pain, is referred to in the Ny¡ya S£tra,

I.1.1, though it is now here critically examined.

+lÉ |ɪÉÉäVÉxÉÆ – ªÉäxÉ |ɪÉÖHò& |É´ÉiÉÇiÉä iÉiÉ |ɪÉÉäVÉxÉÆ * * N.B. p.6.

ºÉÖJÉ|ÉÉÎ{iÉ nÖù&JɽþÉÊxÉ * * N.V.

40 +xÉèEòÉÎxiÉEò& ºÉ´ªÉʦÉSÉÉ®ú& * * N.S. I.2.5.

ÊxÉiªÉ& ¶É¤nùÉä%º{ɶÉÉÇiÉ ….* * N.B. p.73.

41 Cakrap¡¸i says that Caraka does not think that arthapr¡pti is a separate

pram¡¸a; it is a case of inference, and hence is not included in the list of

pram¡¸as.

42 +lÉÉxÉÖªÉÉäVªÉ¨É - +xÉÖªÉÉäVªÉÆ xÉÉ¨É ªÉuùÉCªÉÆ ´ÉÉCªÉnùÉä¹ÉªÉÖHÆò iÉiÉ * C.S.Vi. VIII.50.

+xÉxÉÖªÉÉäVªÉÆ xÉɨÉÉiÉÉä Ê´É{ɪÉǪÉähÉ ; ªÉlÉÉ - +ªÉ¨ÉºÉÉvªÉ ** Ibid, 51.

254

+xÉÖªÉÉäMÉä xÉÉ¨É ºÉ ªÉiÉ iÉÊuùtÉxÉÉÆ iÉÊuùtè®äú´É ºÉÉvÉÈ iÉxjÉä iÉxjÉèEò®äú¶Éä ´ÉÉ |ɸxÉEònäù¶ÉÉä ´ÉÉ

YÉÉxÉÊ´ÉYÉÉxÉ´ÉSÉxÉ|ÉÊiÉ´ÉSÉxÉ{É®úÉIÉÉlÉǨÉÉÊnù¶ªÉiÉä * ªÉlÉÉ –‘ÊxÉiªÉ& {ÉÖ¯û¹É& <ÊiÉ |ÉÊiÉYÉÉiÉä ªÉiÉ {É®ú& ‘EòÉä ½äþiÉÖ&’

<iªÉɽþ, ºÉÉä%xÉÖªÉÉäMÉ& ** Ibid, 52.

|ÉiªÉxÉÖªÉÉäMÉÉä xÉɨÉÉxÉÖªÉÉäMÉÉä xÉɨÉÉxÉÖªÉÉäMɺªÉÉxÉÖªÉÉäMÉ& ; ªÉlÉÉ - +ºªÉÉxÉÖªÉÉäMɺªÉ {ÉÖxÉ& EòÉä ½äþiÉÖÊ®úÊiÉ ** Ibid, 53.

43 ´ÉÉCªÉnùÉä¹ÉÉä xÉÉ¨É ªÉlÉÉ Jɱ´Éκ¨ÉzÉlÉæ xªÉÖxɨÉ , +ÊvÉEò¨É , +{ÉÉlÉÇEò¨ÉÂ, ʴɯûrÆù SÉäÊiÉ& …<ÊiÉ ´ÉÉCªÉnùÉä¹ÉÉ& **

Ibid, 54.

44 Ibid, VIII.54.

45 Ibid, VIII.55.

46 Uô±ÉÆ xÉÉ¨É {ÉÊ®ú¶É`ö¨ÉlÉÉǦÉɺɨÉxÉlÉÇEÆò ´ÉÉM´ÉºiÉÖ¨ÉÉzɨÉä´É ….. BiÉiÉ ºÉɨÉÉxªÉSUô±É¨É ** Ibid, 56.

47 Ibid.

48 Chala is treated in the Ny¡ya S£tra exactly on the same lines as here.

“´ÉSÉxÉ Ê´ÉvÉÉiÉÉä%lÉÇÊ´ÉEò±{ÉÉä{ÉiªÉÉUô±ÉÆ ’’ This is divided into three classes, v¡k chala,

s¡m¡nya chala and upac¡ra chala.

49 N.S.I.2.4

+½äþiÉÖxÉÉÇ¨É |ÉEò®úhÉɺɨÉ& , ºÉƶɪɺɨÉ&, ´ÉhªÉǺɨɶSÉäÊiÉ * C.S.Vi. VIII.57.

50 +iÉÒiÉEòɱÉÆ xÉÉ¨É ªÉiÉ {ÉÚ´ÉÈ ´ÉÉSªÉÆ iÉiÉ {ɶSÉÉiÉ =SªÉiÉä * C.S Vi.VIII.58.

51 ={Éɱɨ¦ÉÉä xÉÉ¨É ½äþiÉÉänùÉä¹É´ÉSÉxÉÆ , iÉlÉÉ {ÉÚ´ÉǨɽäþiÉnùÉä¹ÉÆ ½äþi´ÉɦÉɺÉÉ ´ªÉÉJªÉÉiÉÉ& * Ibid. 59.

52 This corresponds to Mat¡nuµja of the Ny¡ya S£tra

“ |ÉÊiɹÉävÉÆ ºÉnùÉä¹É¨É¦ªÉÖ{ÉäiªÉ |ÉÊiɹÉävÉÊ´É|ÉÊiɹÉävÉä ºÉ¨ÉÉxÉÉä nùÉä¹É |ɺÉRÂóMÉÉä ¨ÉiÉÉxÉÖYÉÉ *” N.S

53 +ʴɶÉä¹ÉÉäHò ½äþiÉÉè |ÉÊiÉʹÉräù ʴɶÉä¹É ʨÉSUôiÉä ½äþi´ÉÉxiÉ®Æú <ÊiÉ xªÉÉªÉ ºÉÚjÉÆ , We hear of a het-antara

that seems to be different from this.

54 This is also mentioned in the Ny¡ya S£tra (|ÉEÞòiÉÉlÉÇnù|ÉÊiɺÉƤÉxvÉÉlÉÉÇxiÉ®Æú) N.S., V.2.7

55 |ÉÊiÉYÉɽþÉÊxÉ |ÉÊiÉYÉÉxiÉ®Æú … ʺÉrùÉxiÉÉä ½þÉäi´ÉɦÉɺɶSÉ ÊxÉOɽþºlÉÉxÉÉÊxÉ * N.S., V.2.1.

…… iÉSSÉÉ ÊjÉ®úʦÉʽþiɺªÉ …… SÉ ÊxÉOɽþºlÉÉxÉÆ * C.S.Vi., VIII.65.

56 H.I.L., p.25,26.

57 ºÉɨÉÉxªÉÆ SÉ Ê´É¶Éä¹ÉÆ SÉ MÉÖhÉÉxÉ pù´ªÉÉÊhÉ Eò¨ÉÇ SÉ * ºÉ¨É´ÉɪÉÆ SÉ iÉVYÉÉi´ÉÉ iÉxjÉÉäHÆò Ê´ÉÊvɨÉÉκiÉiÉÆ *

255

C.S.Su., I.28,29.

58 C.S.Su., I.44.

59 Ibid., I.45

60 Ibid., I.28

61 ºÉ´ÉÇvÉÉ ºÉ´ÉÇκ¨ÉxÉ EòɱÉä ÊxÉiªÉMÉä SÉÉ´ÉκlÉEäò SÉ * Ck.

62 ¦É´ÉÎxiÉ ºÉkÉɨÉxÉ֦ɴÉxiÉÒÊiÉ ¦ÉÉ´ÉÉ& pù´ªÉMÉÖhÉEò¨ÉÉÇhÉÒiªÉlÉÇ& , xÉ iÉÖ ¦É´ÉxiªÉÖi{ÉtxiÉ <ÊiÉ * Ck.

63 iɺ¨ÉÉnÂù ´ÉÞÊrùEòÉ®úhɱÉIÉhÉi´ÉäxÉ ºÉɨÉÉxªÉÆ ´ÉÞÊrùEòÉ®úhÉʨÉiªÉÖHò¨É * Ck.

64 BiÉSSÉ ´ÉÞÊrùEòÉ®úhÉÆ ºÉ¨ÉÉxªÉºªÉ xÉ ±ÉIÉhÉÆ, ËEò iÉÁÉǪÉÖ´ÉænùÉä{ɪÉÉäÊMÉxÉÉ vɨÉæhÉ ÊxÉnæù¶É& , ±ÉIÉhÉÆ iÉÖ

“ºÉɨÉÉxªÉ¨ÉäEòi´É®Æú” <ÊiÉ EòÊ®ú¹ªÉÊiÉ * Ck.

65 ªÉä iÉÖ ºÉ¨ÉÉxɨÉä́ É ºÉɨÉÉxªÉʨÉÊiÉ EÞòi´ÉÉ pù´ªÉÉtä´É ºÉɨÉÉxªÉ¶É¤näùxÉÉʦÉnùnùÊiÉ, iÉä¹ÉÉÆ ¨ÉiÉä ºªÉÉÊnùiªÉºÉƤÉxvÉÉlÉÇi´ÉÆ

|ÉEò®úhɺªÉ ºªÉÉiÉ * Ck.

66 <½þ SÉ ºÉɨÉÉxªÉºªÉ ´ÉÞÊrùEòÉ®úhÉi´ÉʨÉiªÉÖSªÉiÉä, xÉ iÉÖ ºÉɨÉÉxªÉ¨Éä́ É ´ÉÞÊrùEòÉ®úhÉʨÉiªÉÖSªÉiÉä ,

iÉäxÉɺɨÉÉxÉÉnùÊ{É PÉÞiÉÉxÉ ¨ÉävÉɪÉÉ ´É¼xÉä¶SÉ ´ÉÞÊrù& |ɦÉÉ´ÉÉnäù´ÉÉä{É{ÉzÉÉ * Ck.

67 Ê´ÉʶɹªÉiÉä ´ªÉÉ´ÉiÉÇiÉ <ÊiÉ Ê´É¶Éä¹É& Ck.

68 |É´ÉÞÊkÉ& |É´ÉiÉÇxÉÆ ¶É®úÒ®äúhÉÉʦɺÉƤÉxvÉ& <ÊiÉ ªÉÉ´ÉiÉ * B´ÉƦÉÚiÉÉ |É´ÉÞÊkÉ&

vÉÉiÉÖºÉɨÉÉxªÉʴɶÉä¹ÉªÉÉä́ ÉÞÇÊrù¿ÉºÉä EòÉ®úhÉʨÉiªÉlÉÇ& * Ck.

69 iÉäxÉ Eäò´É±ÉºÉ¨ÉÉxÉÉä{ɪÉÉäMÉÉrùÉiÉÖ́ ÉÞrùªÉÉ vÉÉiÉÖ´Éè¹É¨ªÉÆ, Eäò´É±ÉʴɶÉä¹ÉÉä{ɪÉÉäMÉÉSSÉ vÉÉiÉÖIɪÉÉrùÉiÉÖ´Éè¹É¨ªÉ ;

ªÉÖMÉ{ÉiÉ ºÉ¨ÉÉxÉ Ê´Éʶɹ]õpù´ªÉÉä{ɪÉÉäMÉÉiÉ |É´ÉÞÊkÉvÉÉÇiÉÖºÉɨªÉ°ü{ÉÉ ¦É´ÉÊiÉ * Ck.

70 BEòi´É´ÉÞÊrùEò®Æú ºÉɨÉÉxªÉÆ , ªÉxÉnäùEòɺÉÖ Ê¦ÉzÉnäù¶ÉEòɱÉɺÉÖ MÉ´ÉÉÊnù´ªÉÊHò¹ÉÖ ‘+ªÉÆ MÉÉè®úªÉÆ MÉÉè&

<iªÉÉÊnù|ÉEòÉ®úÉ BEòÉEòÉ®úÉ ¤ÉÖÊrùºiÉiÉ ºÉɨÉÉxªÉ¨É * Ck.

71 {ÉÞlÉCi´ÉEÞòiÉ ´ªÉÉ´ÉÞiɤÉÖÊrùEÞòiÉ * Ck.

72 iÉÖ±ªÉÉlÉÇiÉÉ BEòºÉɨÉÉxªÉ°ü{ÉÉlÉÉÇxÉÖªÉÉäÊMÉiÉÉ , Ê´É{ɪÉÇªÉ <ÊiÉ +iÉÖ±ªÉÉlÉÇiÉÉ * Ck.

73 ºÉɨÉÉxªÉÆ Ê´É¶Éä¹É <ÊiÉ ¤ÉÖrùªÉ{ÉäIɨÉ * V.S. 1.2.3

74 ºÉɨÉÉxªÉʴɶÉä¹ÉÉ{ÉäIÉÆ pù´ªÉMÉÖhÉEò¨ÉǨÉÖ * Ibid.1.8.6

75 º´ÉʴɹɪɺɴÉÇMÉiɨÉʦÉzÉÉi¨ÉEò¨ÉxÉäEò´ÉÞÊkÉ BEòÊuù´É¾þ¹´ÉÉi¨Éº´É°ü{ÉÉxÉÖMɨÉ|ÉiªÉªÉEòÉÊ®ú º´É°ü{ɦÉänäùxÉÉvÉÉ®äú¹ÉÖ

|ɤÉxvÉäxÉ ´ÉiÉǨÉÉxɨÉxÉÖ´ÉÞÊkÉ|ÉiªÉªÉEòÉ®úhɨÉ * P.B.

256

76 BiÉÉÊxÉ iÉÖ pù´ªÉiÉÉnùÒÊxÉ |ɦÉÚiÉÊ´É{ɪÉÆi´ÉÉiÉ |ÉÉvÉÉxªÉäxÉ ºÉɨÉÉxªÉÉÊxÉ º´ÉɸɪÉʴɶÉä¹ÉEòi´ÉÉnÂù ¦ÉCiªÉÉ Ê´É¶Éä¹ÉÉJªÉÉÊxÉ*

Ibid

77 ºÉɨÉÉxªÉÆ ÊuùÊ´ÉvÉÆ |ÉÉäHÆò {É®ú\SÉÉ{É®ú¨Éä´É SÉ *

pù´ªÉÉÊnùÊ´ÉEò´ÉÞÊxɺiÉÖ ºÉkÉÉ {É®úiɪÉÉäSªÉiÉä **

{ɮʦÉzÉÉ iÉÖ ªÉÉ VÉÉÊxÉ ºÉè´ÉÉ{É®úiɪÉÉäSªÉiÉä *

pù´ªÉi´ÉÉÊnùEòVÉÉÊxɺiÉÖ {É®úÉ{É®úiɪÉÉäSªÉiÉä * Ibid.

78 ú{É®úi´É¨É +ÊvÉEònäù¶É´ÉÞÊkÉi´É¨É , +{É®úi´ÉÆ +±{Énäù¶É´ÉÞÊkÉi´É¨É * S.M.

79 ÊxÉiªÉi´Éä ºÉiªÉxÉäEòºÉ¨É´Éäiɺ´É¨É * SM

80 ºÉ¨ÉÉxÉÉxÉÉÆ ¦ÉÉ´É& (VÉÉÊiÉ& ) , º´ÉiÉÉä́ ªÉÉ´ÉiÉÇEòi´ÉÆ Ê´É¶Éä¹Éi´É¨É * P.B.C.

81 ªÉÉ ºÉ¨ÉÉxÉÉÆ ¤ÉÖÊrù |ɺÉÚiÉä ʦÉzÉä¹´ÉÊvÉEò®úhÉä¹ÉÖ ªÉªÉÉ ¤É½ÚþxÉÒiÉ®äúiÉ®úiÉÉä xÉ ´ªÉÉ´ÉkÉÇxiÉä ªÉÉä%lÉÉæ%xÉäEòjÉ

|ÉiªÉªÉÉxÉÖ´ÉÞÊkÉÊxÉʨÉkÉÆ iÉiÉ ºÉɨÉÉxªÉ¨É * ªÉSSÉ Eäò¹ÉÉÎ\SÉnù¦ÉänÆù Eò®úÉäiÉÒÊiÉ iÉiÉ ºÉɨÉÉxªÉʴɶÉä¹ÉÉä VÉÉÊiÉÊ®úÊiÉ *

N.B

82 ªÉjÉÉʸÉiÉÉ& Eò¨ÉÇMÉÖhÉÉ& EòÉ®úhÉÆ ºÉ¨É´ÉÉ滃 ªÉiÉ * C.S.Su., I.51

83 V.S.

84 {ÉÞÊlÉ´ªÉ{iÉäVÉÉä´Éɪ´ÉÉEòɶÉEòɱÉÊnùMÉÉi¨É¨ÉxÉÉÆ漃 xÉ´É pù´ªÉÉÊhÉ* T.S.

85 C.S.Su., I.48.

86 ºÉ¨É´ÉÉ滃 iÉÖ ÊxɶSÉä¹]õ& EòÉ®úhÉÆ MÉÖhÉ& * C.S.Su., I.51.

87 +xÉäxÉ ÊjÉÊ´ÉvÉ +Ê{É ´Éè¶ÉäʹÉEòÉ& ºÉɨÉÉxªÉ +Éi¨ÉMÉÖhɶSÉÉäÊqù¹]É&* Ck.

88 iÉjÉÉlÉÉÇ& ¶É¤nùº{ɶÉÇ°ü{É®úºÉMÉxvÉÉ&, BiÉäSÉ ´Éè¶ÉäʹÉEòÉ& , ªÉiÉ& +ÉEòɶɺªÉè´É ¶É¤nù& |ÉÉvÉÉxªÉäxÉ ,

´ÉɪÉÉä®äú´É º{ɶÉÇ& |ÉÉvÉÉxªÉäxÉ , B´É¨ÉMxªÉÉÊnù¹ÉÖ °ü{ÉÉnùªÉù& Ck.

89 BiÉä SÉ ºÉɨÉÉxªÉ MÉÖhÉÉ& {ÉÞÊlÉ´ªÉÉnùÒxÉÉÆ ºÉÉvÉÉ®úhÉi´ÉÉiÉ * Ck.

90 BiÉä SÉ ºÉɨÉÉxªÉ MÉÖhÉÉ& +Ê{É xÉÉ{ªÉÖ{ɪÉÖHòi´ÉÉkÉlÉÉ ¤ÉÖÊrù |ÉÉvÉÉxªÉÉSSÉÉjÉÉxiÉä |ÉÉäHòÉ& * Ck.

91 C.S.Su., I.82

92 ºÉƪÉÉäMÉä SÉ Ê´É¦ÉÉMÉä SÉ ªÉÖMÉ{ÉiÉ EòÉ®úhɨÉ * Ck.

93 BEòpù´ªÉ¨ÉMÉÖhÉÆ ºÉƪÉÉäMÉʴɦÉÉMÉä¹´ÉxÉ{Éä¹ÉEòÉ®úhÉʨÉÊiÉ Eò¨ÉDZÉIÉhɨÉ * V.S.I.1.17

BEòpù´ªÉi´ÉÆ IÉÊhÉEòi´ÉÆ …. |ÉÊiÉÊxɪÉiÉ VÉÉÊiɪÉÉæÊMÉi´É¨É * P.B.

257

94 ºÉ¨É´ÉɪÉÉä%{ÉÞlÉM¦ÉÉ´ÉÉä ¦ÉÚ¨ªÉÉnùÒxÉÉÆ MÉÖhÉè¨ÉÇiÉ& * C.S.Su., I.51

95 +{ÉÞlÉEò¦ÉÉ´É& +ªÉÖiÉʺÉÊrù& ºÉ½èþ´ÉɴɺlÉÉxÉʨÉÊiÉ ….. Ck.

96 iÉäxÉÉvÉÉ®úÉhÉɨÉÉvÉäªÉèªÉÉä%{ÉÞlÉM¦ÉÉ´É& ºÉ ºÉ¨É´ÉɪÉ& * CK.

97 +ªÉÖiÉʺÉrùÉxÉɨÉÉvÉɪÉÉÇvÉÉ®ú¦ÉÚiÉÉxÉÉÆ ªÉ& ºÉƤÉxvÉ& * P.B.

98 ºÉ´ÉÈ pù´ªÉÆ {ÉÉ\VɦÉÉèiÉÊEò¨Éκ¨ÉzÉlÉæ* C.S.Su., 26.

99 {ÉÉEòÉä xÉÉκiÉ Ê´ÉxÉÉ ´ÉÒªÉÉÇiÉ …. ¸Éä¹]õiɨɨÉ º¨ÉÞiɨÉ * S.S.Su.

100 …..iÉSSÉäiÉxÉÉ´ÉnäùSÉxÉÆ SÉ * C.S.Su.26.10

101 D.G.V., p.19

102 Ibid, p.22-28.

103 Ibid., p.28-32

104 Ibid.

105 S.S.Sa., 1

106 C.S.Sa., I.16

107 SÉäiÉxÉɹɹ]õÉ <iªÉjÉ SÉäiÉxÉɶɤnäùxÉ …. * Ck.

108 {ÉÖÊ®ú ¶É®úÒ®ä ¶ÉäiÉä <ÊiÉ {ÉÖ¯û¹É& * Ck.

109 xÉ SÉäiÉxÉÉ vÉÉiÉÖ°ü{É& {ÉÖ¯û¹ÉÊSÉÊEòiºÉɪÉɨÉʦÉ|ÉäiÉ ---- ÊSÉÊEòiºÉÉʴɹɪɺiÉÖ ¹ÉbÂ÷vÉÉiÉÖEò B´É {ÉÖ¯û¹É& * Ck.

110 +ªÉ\SÉ {ÉÖ¯û¹É¶É¤nùÉä MÉ´ÉÉnùÉ´ÉÊ{É ¹ÉbÂ÷vÉÉiÉÖ ºÉ¨ÉÖnùɪÉä …. MÉ´ÉÉnùÉè {ÉÖ¯û¹É¶É¤nù& * Ck.

111 ±ÉIÉhÉÆ ¨ÉxɺÉÉä YÉÉxɺªÉ¦ÉÉ´ÉÉä ¦ÉÉ´É B´É SÉ * <ÊiÉ ÁÉi¨ÉäÎxpùªÉÉlÉÉÇxÉÉÆ ºÉÊzÉEò¹Éæ xÉ ´ÉiÉÇiÉä * C.S.Sa., I.18

112 ªÉÖMÉ{ÉVYÉÉxÉÉxÉÖi{ÉÊkɨÉÇxɺÉÉä ʱÉRÂóMɨÉÂ* N.S., I.1.16

+Éi¨ÉäÎxpùªÉÉlÉÇ ºÉÊzÉEò¹ÉÇYÉÉxɺªÉ ¦ÉÉ´ÉÉä%¦ÉɴɶSÉ ¨ÉxɺÉÉä ˱ÉMɨÉ * V.S., III.2.1

113 C.C.Sa., I.20-21.

114 V.S., V.2.16

115 C.S.Sa., I.8.

116 V.S., V.2.18

117 C.S.Sa., I.142.

118 C.S.Sa., I.116-117.