CHAPTER IV

UNITED STATES_:, CANADA AND BORDER SECURITY

MEASURES AFTER 9/11

The Canada-United States borders over the centuries was considered existing <?nly as a

demarcation lines between the two countries, Canada and U.S. share the longest borders

and until recently, the 49th parallel as it is known was a major point of entry of people and

goods. During the nineties after the formation ofNAFTA trade between the two countries

flowed uninterrupted. UntU September 11, 2001, Canadians had not thought much or

very hard about border they share with the US. Nor had public authorities shown

significant concern. There was no compelling imperative to contemplate it, particularly in

this global age. Ideas passed through it, money poured over it and millions of people

crossed it each year.

However, the events of September 11, 2001 changed the way in which the two countries

looked at the borders. For United States Canada- U.S borders was the major entry point

for the terrorists as reports of terrorist entry into U.S. from Canada was considered the

cause of the attacks. Border closure and security across the border was considered most

important for U.S. Post September 11; the border has changed beyond recognition. It is

everywhere and everything. Issues now include enhanced security, protection of privacy

rights, who they want as citizens, how open the border should be to political refugees

(Daniel Drache, 2004: viii). The panic that the closure caused was a cause of concern for

the Canadian government as Canada faced the blame of terrorist safe haven. "In the days

and weeks following 11 September 2001, rumuors spread that some of the terrorists had

entered the United States from Canada. Although these proved to be false, the view

gained credence that American security was dangerously exposed along its northern,

'undefended' border." (Joel. J. Sokolsky, 2005:35)

It was an assessment furthered and encouraged by widespread criticism in Canada that

for years Ottawa had failed to take the terrorist threat seriously, especially by its failure to

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properly control and monitor its immigration policies. Canada has 85 percent of its

foreign trade dependent on access to the US market, the Canadian government

immediately realized that it now had a stake in American homeland security. As

Desmond Morton observed, "Canada's priority today is as it has been throughout our

history, to do what we must do to niake the Americans feel secure on their northern

border. American may remember 9/11; we remember 9/12, when American panic closed

the US border and shock our prosperity to its very core."(Desmond Morton, 2004)

In fact, the world's longest undefended border was never unimportant. It has been at the

centre stage in North America in the exercise of power and international cooperation. For

Americans it embodies the indivisibility of their national sovereignty and paramountcy of

homeland security. It is symbolically as important as the constitution and the presidency.

"For Mexicans their frontier with the United States is the most iconic of institutions,

inescapable and insurmountable linking together two radically different societies,

economies and cultures in a thousand different ways. It embodies all their ambitions,

pride, fears and insecurities; a remarkable contrast with the Canadian belief that its border

is largely invisible and unchangeable" (Daniel Drache, 2008: 69) It is perhaps

paradoxical that the prominence of borders and border controls in North America has

sharply increased in an era otherwise defined by the breaking down of borders through

the continental economic integration. Indeed, borders and border control politics defines

the relations between the NAFTA partners (David G. Ragland, 2003: 675-95).

In the immediate aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, the concept of border

security took on a new and unfamiliar meaning for Canada. Canadians were long used to

the idea of a demilitarized, "undefended border." At the same time, the need for a

protected and monitored border had long been apparent when it came to issues such as

transnational crime, illegal immigration, and gun trafficking. The change immediately

after September 11 did not involve invention of the concept of border security, rather a

profound shift in focus of the governments towards borders.

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This Chapter examines the borders between Canada and United States after 9/11. The

study focuses on the borders before the terrorist attacks how the two countries were

cooperating during the Post Cold War period of the 1990s, economic integration through

NAFf A; border security was not a matter of serious concern to both countries as the

economies of the two countries were ever integrating, and how the event of 9/11 changed

the way border became a security issue for the US. How Canadian border policy in the

early crisis months after September 11 was fashioned on the need to strengthen security

controls at the border and to reach a renewed understanding with the United States about

a secure and open border, open at least to the right kind of trade and the right movement

of people and goods. There were concerns about the disruption to bilateral trade and

integration which continued, despite efforts both on the part of governments and

businesses to mitigate the additional costs and risks imposed by enhanced border security

procedures. The border security-trade issue has strong competition from other bilateral

policy agenda including Canada's military role in Afghanistan after 9/11. How removing

of trade impediments has arguably been a higher priority for the Canadian government

t}lan for the American government in the post-9/11 period, while compelling evidence

that enhanced security has significantly thickened the Canada-US border. This chapter

examines the factors that led Canada to engage in the smart borders process with the US

and assess the importance of Canada's initiation, negotiation and signing of the Smart

Border Declaration (SBD) with the US on December 12, 2001 and Safe Third Country

Agreement later.

Canada - US Border Control in the Pre 9/11 Era:

The orientation of a country is a very complex matter, involving not only geography itself

but also history and culture as well as, more specifically, a country's foreign policy

traditions and habits of diplomacy. Nonetheless, certain fundamental things can be said.

Any geographic space is altered by the conscious outlook of the human intelligence,

individual and collective, residing in the corporeal entity, or "body," of the people

occupying it. As was written long ago by Immanuel Kant, "our geographical knowledge,

and even our commonest knowledge of the position of places, would be of no aid to us if

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we could not, by reference to the sides of our bodies, assign to regions the things so

ordered and the whole system of mutually relative positions" (Kant, 1929 [1768]: 22-23,

quoted in Tuan, 1977: 36, Alan K. Henrikson, 2000: 132)

Malcolm Anderson (1997: 29) suggests that "frontiers are, after all, political institutions

with defining functions and 'what they are' and 'what they represent' is 'constantly

reconstituted'. As such, 'developed states are no longer greatly concerned about changing

the location of frontiers to their advantage, but they are intensely concerned with the

function of frontiers and the purposes they serve" Gibbens, whose late-twentieth-century

study of the meaning and significance of the Canadian-American border 'sheds useful

light on the more general comparative experience within borders, borderlands, ·and

transnational regional integration.' With reference to the Canada-US border, Gibbens

concluded that, in the late twentieth century, 'meaning and significance', or differing

national 'perceived' and 'symbolical' aspects of the bordering process, contributes to the

lack of transnational regional integration. (quoted in Heather Nicol, 2005: 770)

For the United States the northern border with Canada has historically been low

maintenance. For much of the twentieth century, State Department officials saw no

reason to have a Canadian desk for addressing relations with Canada in a systematic

fashion. In Washington, the U.S.-Canada relationship fell into a grey zone, neither totally

foreign nor domestic; it belonged somewhere in between. In 1867, the fathers of

Canadian confederation decided to do whatever they could to stop a North American

political union from emergency in the aftermath of the American Civil War, a war, by the

way, in which thousands of Canadians fought on the Union side. After 1945, and after

expo '67, their successors aspired to build a Canada distinct from the United States but

not antagonistic to it. Long after the British connection had becqme mainly sentimental;

all Canadians appeared to want a high degree of policy autonomy and a level of

prosperity reasonably close to the average in the Unite~ States. "Many seemed also to

favor the construction and maintenance of a fairer, cleaner, and safer society than the one

they perceived to exist to the south. To achieve such objectives, the more practiCal minds

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among them knew that the country needed a novel kind of border with the United States.

(Luis W. Pauly, 2003:95-96)

Canada was assumed to be part of the U.S. homeland perimeter in North America for

American security, energy and investment purposes since Mackenzie King signed the

Ogdensburg Treaty in 1940 and formalized in the Hyde Park Declaration a year later.

This was the rather "unalarming" beginning of the U.S. Homeland Defence for the

continent. Still, Canadian anxieties around sovereignty required that it be treated as a

separate country for commerce, social policy, migration and trade. US-Canada border

controls during most of the twentieth century can be characterized as low intensity, low

profile and low priority. Border control issues rarely took centre stage in bilateral

relations. There was minimalist and low visibility approach to border policing, and was

mutually convenient and tolerated, and persisted into the 1990s. The boom in the legal

commercial flows across the border in the post NAFTA era overshadowed illegal flows,

including the smuggling of drugs, cigarettes, migrants and arms.

The Clandestine side of the expanding US-Canada trading relationship was largely kept

out of the national political spotlight and never turned into a significant source of cross­

border tension. Both countries exercised mutual restraints to avoid politicizing illegal

border crossings while at the same time expanding and deepening cross-border law

enforcement cooperation. Some new border controls initiatives were launched, new

technologies were relatively modest steps considering the sheer size of the border and the

volume of border crossings. Meanwhile, conveniently for the bilateral relationship, US

border worries and policing resources focused southward. The contrast to the lack of

controls at the northern border was dramatic. Heather Nicol, (2005:771) points out

"While there are other cooperative arrangements between Canada and the United States,

particularly in the area of, transportation and environment, many of these remain sectoral,

regulated and at times vaguely defined. Some amount to little more than understandings,

others to cost-sharing initiatives. NAFf A remains perhaps the most broadly based and

significant basis of binational cooperation between Canada and the United States, but it is

not a blue-print for continental integration."

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Hristoulas observes, NAFTA was part of a larger attempt to promote rules and norms of

interactions between states, and was part of a longer and stronger tradition of bilateralism

in various other sectors such as security. (Athanasios Hristoulas, 2003) But the end result

of increased trade, even before 9/11, was that, in many ways the Canada-US border itself

has become more, rather than less, open to national scrutiny initiatives as NAFTA

evolved. For example, those involved in cross-border trade raised the concern, in the year

2000, that borders had hardened, not softened, with the implementation of the NAFT A

agreement. The border-crossing process became a more onerous process where

"as Customs revenues decrease because of the falling duty rates, an additional

focus has been placed upon border controls. Goods imported into Canada must

be 'reported at the border, properly classified under the Harmonized System

(HS), identified in terms of their proper origin, properly valued, and clearly and

legibly marked in accordance with Canada's marking rules. If these steps are not

carried out, penalties and other more severe consequences can result". (CAIE,

2000:1)

Canada actually set the bilateral agenda on the border long before 9/11 and because it

was institutionally more nimble than the US government. For years Canada had been

urging Washington to undertake joint measures that would improve border security and

increase border efficiency. (Clarkson, 2003:81)

To briefly examine these prior agreements, in 1995 Canada and the US signed and began

working to implement the Canada- US Accord on Our Shared Border (SBA, Appendix

3). The Accord addressed concerns raised by both countries regarding customs, as a

result of the challenges faced by both governments in facilitating commercial traffic.

(Christopher Sands, 2004: 56) The SBA recognized the need for both governments to

modernize rules, processes, and facilities at the border to facilitate trade and traveL It

called upon the two governments to create a border "that permits commercial goods to

flow easily between both countries."(GOC, Canada-US of America Accord on Our

Shared Border) By promoting a joint approach to the management of the border, the two

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countries could achieve the common objective of enhancing bilateral trade. Following the

signing of the SBA, both countries appointed a joint steering committee to. develop an

action plan in support of the objectives of the SBA.

The second bilateral border initiative was the April 1997 Border Vision Initiative (BVI,

Appendix 4) which sought to facilitate greater information-sharing and coordination.

between Citizenship and Immigration Canada and the US Immigration and Naturalization

Services (INS), particularly at land border crossings, with respect to illegal immigration.

(Sands, 2004:56) The BVI adopted a three-pronged approach to addressing immigration

issues. This involved finding solutions off-shore before people arrived in Canada,

coordinating visa policies and procedures more effectively, and enhancing cooperation

inland. (GOC, 2000, Performance Report for the Period ending March 31) These features

of the BVI were built upon by the Smart Border Declaration (SBD) with the commitment

to establish compatible immigration databases and to promote further intelligence

coordination. This was further advanced with the signing of the Safe-Third Country

Agreement in December 2002 that was established on the principle that refugee claimants

would have to file for refugee status in the country in which they first arrived rather than,

for example, arriving in the US, and then applying for refugee status in Canada.

The third agreement, the Cross Border Crime Forum (CBCF, Appendix 5), was

established by the two countries in September 1997. This agreement was created to

encourage law enforcement agencies in both countries to work together more effectively

to combat transnational crime issues such as smuggling, telemarketing fraud, money­

laundering, missing children, and cyber-crime. It also established procedures for the

formulation of bi-national threat assessments and created Integrated Border Enforcement

Teams (IBETs) (Sands, 2004: 56) IBETs are a multi-agency police team that works to

target, interdict, and prevent cross-border criminal activity. In order to facilitate these

objectives, customs and police agents share information across the border. These goals

were advanced in the SBD by the fourth guiding principle of the Action Plan which

committed both governments to expanding the role of the Integrated Border and Marine

Enforcement Teams {IBET/IMET); ensuring comprehensive and permanent coordination

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of law enforcement, anti-terrorism efforts, and information sharing; establishing joint

teams to analyze and disseminate information and intelligence, and to producing threat

and intelligence assessments. (SBD, 2001, Appendix 1)

Finally in October 1999, the Canada-US Partnership Forum (CUSP) was created in order

to promote high-level dialogue among governments, border communities, and

stakeholders on border management. (CUSP, 2000) Both Prime Minister Chretien and

President Bill Clinton endorsed three guiding principles to border management:

'streamlining', 'harmonizing', and 'collaborating' on border policies and management;

expanding cooperation to increase efficiencies in customs, immigration, law enforcement,

and environmental protection at and beyond the border; and collaborating on threats

outside Canada and the US.(GOC, DFAIT) Significantly, the risk management approach

to border transactions encompassed in the CUSP found its way into the SBD, and more

importantly, lies at the basis of how both countries' immigration and customs agencies

have operated since 9/11.

An important impetus for all of these earlier agreements had been a need to promote

further coordination and cooperation to facilitate commercial trade between Canada and

the US. In other words, Canada had been promoting the development of a smarter border ~

with the US since the mid-1990s, mainly for economic objectives. After the initial post

9/11 criticisms from some US officials about Canada's supposed lax border and

immigration policies had subsided, (note) 2 the two governments built upon a coordinate

2 NOTE: The criticisms mainly came from the media, such as Fox news anchor Bill O'Reily, but were

repeated and enforced by many US Senators and Congressmen who raised concerns over the security of the northern border. Former Clinton ambassador to the United Nations Richard Holbrooke called Canada "a Club Med for terrorists" and the television program America's Most Wanted claimed that all nineteen hijackers had entered the US from Canada, a fact that was constantly repeated by some US news outlets. US secretary of State Hillary Clinton was also quoted as repeating this ill-informed rJ1Yth. This fact was constantly refuted by the Canadian government and was finally acknowledged as a myth by the US State Department in its annual survey of global terrorism covering the--Year 2001. These myths are well documented in Whitaker, "Securing the "Ontario-Vermont border": Myths and realities in post-9/11 Canadian-American security relations". Ms. Clinton has since reversed her position and legislation was introduced that would see the appointment of a northern border co-coordinator at the DHS who would focus exclusively on increasing security on the northern border without harming trade. In Sheldon Alberts, "Clinton joins border fight," Kingston Whig-Standard, 21 April 2005.

122

relationship that was already well entrenched. The SBD sought to clarify and expand

upon these previous commitments.

However, pre-9/ll, the concern seemed to be more with Canadian laxity on organized

crime than on lax security concerning potential terrorists. A year later, a December 2000

headline read, "President Clinton singles out Canadian immigration policies for making it

easier for international gangs to conduct illegal activity in the U.S." (Siskin's 2000,

Immigration Bulletin December 22,). As Doris Meissner, former Commissioner of the

U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), wrote, "Immigration as a threat to

national security was not at or near the top of anyone's list." (Doris Meissner, 2001-:1)

Just before 9/11, the Mexican President, Vicente Fox, met with George Bush to declare ,

that integrating and harmonizing the migration issue was a top priority for his country, a

view that President Bush endorsed. This was at the same time that a meeting with

Canadian immigration officials to discuss coordination and integration with respect to

border issues was cancelled by the United States. Harmonization with Canada was indeed

not a priority.

The radical shift in emphasis from the Mexican to the Canadian border took place only I ·after 9/11 and began by contrasting the former focus on preventing people from wading

across the Rio Grande or hiking across the scorching desert that borders the U.S. and

Mexico, to a new focus on securing the longest unguarded border in the world, the border

between Canada and the United States, against terrorists. In contrast to pre- 9/11, George

Bush, on October 29, 2001, ordered his officials to begin harmonizing customs and

immigration policies with those of Canada as well as Mexico to ensure ''maximum

possible compatibility of immigration, customs and visa policies." According to Bush's

spokesperson, Campbell Clark (2001). "Bush aims to tighten continent's borders U.S. bid

to harmonize immigration and customs puts heat on Chretien" On October 31, 2001,

Allan Thompson of the Ottawa Bureau of the Toronto Star reported that "Canada and the

U.S. were edging towards establishing a common security perimeter by establishing joint

screening procedures to stop security threats at the source."

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Former Canadian Immigration Minister, Elinor Caplan, had said was that, "We need to be

able to develop a network where we share information overseas so that we can better

protect our continent" in implementing a common objective, "stopping those who pose

any kind of security threat from coming to Canada or the U.S. to begin with." In fact,

Caplan insisted that current Canada/U.S. discussions stop short of harmonizing all

policies and focus instead on information sharing. "Let there not be any

misunderstanding. Canadian laws will be made right here in the Canadian Parliament,"

Caplan said. "This dire~tive from the President of the United States to his people is

completely consistent with what our approach has been and that is to share information,

to stop people from coming." The evidence suggests that this expression of Canadian

nationalism had no part in her demotion from Minister of Citizenship and Immigration to

Revenue Minister. The fact is the Prime Minister and other ministers have been very

skitti~h even about the phrase 'security perimeter.' (quoted in Adelman, 2002)

Audrey Macklin, after examining the issue, concluded that the 'security perimeter' is a

discursive security blanket, "one that furnished comfort by conjuring up a visual image

around which people can deposit their anxieties" (Audrey Macklin, in Daniels et al.,

2001:386). The issue of a common security perimeter linked with the refugee and

migration issue has generally been traced to Paul Cellucci, the United States ambassador

to Canada. He became the most vocal exponent who initially was interpreted as urging

the two countries to harmonize their immigration and refugee laws. However, in the

Globe and Mail of November 1, (2001: AlO), Paul Celluci was quoted as saying: "As

people come from overseas, we want to have these common security efforts, and the

compatibility on security efforts would be helpful. But I don't think anyone is saying you

have to have exactly the same immigration policies." In fact, there have been no efforts to

harmonize immigration policies. 9/11 has had virtually no impact on Canadian

immigration policies. The overall total for immigrants remained the same, though there

was a small shift within the categories to increase the numbers of skilled workers as well

as parents and grandparents within the family class.

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Before 9/11, Canadians had already developed a concern with refugees and security

issues. The House of Commons Report, Refugee Protection and Border Security: Striking

a Balance, was tabled in the House of Commons in March 2000. Bill C-11: The

Immigration and Refugee Protection Act contains clauses related to refugees and security

issues, such as provisions for condensing the Security Certificate Protection Procedure.

These clauses were drafted before 9/ll though the I:3ill received Royal Assent on

November 1, 2001 to come into force in June 2002. Thus, in Canada, the Immigration

and Refugee Protection Act already evinced a significant concern with security. The

same could be said of the United States. The United States brought the Krouse-Perla

Report to the American Congress on terrorism and recognition technology was tabled on

June 18, 2001, almost three months before 9/11. It specifically referred to refugees as

potential terrorists.

Stephen Flynn (2004: 187) has noted, "Before September 11, half of .the northern

border's 126 official ports of entry were left unguarded at night. Typically, orange cones

were simply put up in the centre of the roadway to signal the border crossing was

closed." Canada made great efforts to remain outside the orbit of the US border anxieties.

Canada has been largely insulated froni America's often wild and unpredictable tilting at

illegal immigration, drug trafficking and more recently, foreign terrorism although not

without a great deal of effort and skilled diplomacy. One downside of the neglect of the

border was the failure to sufficiently invest in much needed basic infrastructure and

upkeep for the ports of entry to function well. The beginning of American interest in the

security of the Canadian border actually had its origins when the World Trade Center

bombers of 1993. It appeared to have used forged Canadian immigration papers to gain

access to the United States, and after Ahmed Ressam was captured by U.S. customs

officials in December 1999 trying to enter the United States with a carload of explosives

as he tried to cross into Washington State on a ferry from Victoria, British Columbia in a

plan to bomb the ~os Angeles airport. (Howard Adelman, 2002: 20)

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Canada -US Border Security Policy Since 9/ll:

In the immediate aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, the concept of border

security took on a new and unfamiliar meaning for Canada. Canadians were long used to

the idea of a demilitarised, "undefended border." At the same time, the need for a

protected and monitored border had long been apparent when it came to issues such as

transnational crime, illegal immigration and gun trafficking. Although Canadians have

long complained of being ignored and taken for granted by the United States, they were

often treated as if the border did not exist and Canada was the 51st state, after 9/11 they

quickly discovered that the only thing worse than no attention is negative attention.

Marking and maintaining the border had been such a low priority that it had famously

been dubbed "the longest undefended border in the world." This openness, which had

historically been a source of high anxiety, Canada now found itself in the awkward and

unfamiliar position of being perceived ¥ a potential security threat. The porosity of the

border would now become highly politicized and intensely scrutinized, giving Canada a

heavy dose of the kind of negative attention in the US media and in Washington policy

debates that Mexico had long experienced and grown accustomed to. (Peter Andreas,

2005:454) This new intense scrutiny of the northern neigbour by the US is termed by

Andreas as 'Mexicanization' of the Canada-US border and cross-border relation.

Christopher Rudolph, (2008: 186) pointed out that "the 9111 attacks increased the

salience of counterterrorism as a policy imperative in Canada (from the standpoint of

self-interest), but expressed interests continue to focus on building a more open border.

An inability to increase security along the border and allay American concerns would no

doubt put this goal in jeopardy. The tremendous back ups at key points along the border

~ in the days following 9/11 made this perfectly clear."

What changed immediately after September 11 did not involve an invention of the

concept of border security, rather a profound shift in focus. There were two elements to

this shift, both new. One was the urgent need to seal the border against imminent

transnational terrorist threats, whether they involved the movement of terrorist

individuals and cells, the transfer of money, the passage of weaponry, the protection of

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cross-border critical infrastructure, or the movement of dual-use technology. The national

security prerogative behind the effort to combat terrorism at the border was based on an

appreciation of the need both to protect Canada and to prevent Canada from being used

as a portal to the United States, or elsewhere, for terrorist activities. Both prerogatives

were ultimately written into Canada's national security strategy framework d9cument,

issued by the Paul Martin government in April 2004. (CNSP, 2004)

The American security imperative had the upper hand in the days immediately after

September 11. The result on the Canadian side of the border was the snared and long

lines of transport trucks, the diminution of cross-border tourism and a heavy, if short­

lived, economic impact in lost business transactions. The restoration of a greater degree

of normality to the border following September 11 was a relief, but did not undercut the

message of the early post 9/11 experience. Security could really trump trade. The

Canadian government early on found itself engaged in the task of selling an image of

strengthened border security to the American public and of batting back false border

threat stories. This campaign began immediately after September 11, in the face of media

concoctions on both sides of the border that some or all of the September 11 hijackers

had come from Canada and it has continued ever since (Michael Kergin, Washington

Times, 2003:)an 16).

Many things look different for Canada in this security-obsessed age of strategy, might,

and law. The Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Public Health and Bio-terrorism

Preparedness Response Act of 2002, and the Patriot Act of 2001 have placed

management of the Canada-U.S. border directly under congressional and executive

authority in ways that are unprecedented. (Homeland Act, 2002) All have had their

authority renewed by the U.S. Congress by 2005 and this revolution in security policy ' .

will outlast the Bush presidency. These other along side measures authorize police and

intelligence authorities to expand electronic surveillance ·and detain and remove aliens

suspected of engaging in "terrorist activity." Daniel Drache, (2004: 11) pointed out that

"Canadian sovereignty will be more contested because the Homeland security doctrine is

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proactive, aggressively single minded, consciously comprehensive and largely self

reliant."

New security measures have been put in place on the Canadian side of the line.

Immediately following the terrorist attacks, Former Prime Minister Jean Chretien told

reporters in October 2001 "the laws of Canada will be passed by the parliament of

Canada. (Jessica Reaves, 2001) Similarly, former Canadian immigration minister Elinor

Caplan insisted that US-Canada policy discussions will be about information sharing

rather than harmonization: "Let there not be any misunderstanding. Canadian laws will

be made right here in the Canadian parliament" (Howard Adelman, 2004: 111 ).

Nevertheless, the incentives under conditions of asymmetrical interdependence were

clear: either take stronger measures to enhance border security or risk a universal US

hardening of the border, with potentially devastating economic consequences. Canadians

interpreted a post 9/11 warning by secretary of state Collin Powell as a thinly veiled

threat: "some nations need .to be more vigilant against terrorism at their borders if they

want their relationship with the US to remain the same." (Peter Andreas, 2005:457)

Ottawa ordered a high state of alert at the border crossings. Since then, it has enhanced

the level of security at airports, added new funding for detection technologies and

personnel, initiated legislation to combat the financing of terrorism, and frozen the assets

of known terrorist groups. Two thousand officers of the Royal Canadian Mounted Poiice

were also deployed to border patrol and counter terrorism tasks.

Tougher immigration control measures have included the introduction of a frayd resistant

resident card for new immigrants, increased detention capacity and deportation activity,

greater security screening for refugee claimants, and a tightening of the visa regime­

including adding a requirement that Saudi and Malaysian visitors obtain visas. The most

substantial changes in Canadian law have been the 2001 Anti-terrorism Act, and the 2002

Public Safety Act, which have given new surveillance and enforcement powers to police

and security agencies. Canadians breathed a collective sigh of relief when it turned out

that none of the 19 hijackers entered the United States from their country- a point that

Canadians officials made sure to emphasize repeatedly. Nevertheless, the US-Canada

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border was a ready-made political target for those who blamed lax border controls for

America's vulnerability to terrorism. The openness of the US-Canada border became a

political prop. Senator Byron Dorgan [Department of National Defense (DND)] at the

congressional hearing on northern border security said that, "This is America's security at

our border crossings," America can't effectively combat terrorism if it doesn't control its

borders. (Herald, 2001)

Although the focus was the US-Canada border and the issue was terrorism, the new

border security disclosure echoed the older and more familiar drug and immigration

control disclosure that has characterized US border relations with Mexico. Peter Andreas

is of the view that, "Not unlike their Mexican counterparts, Canadian officials have

attempted to impress and appease Washington with new security initiatives, while at the

saine time repeatedly emphasizing the importance of national sovereignty and policy

making autonomy and trying to avoid the impression that their policy changes reflect

conforming to US pressures and expectations"(2005:456).

Daniel Drache (2008:71) is of the view that,

"Post-September 11, the border is expected to operate like a Kevlar vest, stopping everything in its path, without hindering the free movement of goods and services. What an abrupt turnaround from an age of free trade 1,vhen openness was everything and security only a secondary consideration. Of course, it cannot be both, a security-tight border and a border geared for commerce with minimum restrictions at the same time. Eventually one must dominate the other. Ottawa has yet to absorb the fact that the commerce-first border that every business leader worked so hard to achieve is yesterday's stOJy. North America 's elites believed that they had settled the management of the two borders for at least a generation and that the NAFTA consensus could not unravel. The commercial border was to be out of public sight and out of mind and they could get on with the business of business. A decade later how short-sighted they were. North America is not evolving towards a European style of arrangements. Relations between Canada and the United States and Mexico and Washington are cooler than ever. The United States is pursuing a traditional policy of regional bilateralism striking deals with Canada and pressuring Mexico on immigration, the investment and border security. "

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Canada-US Smart Border Declaration: Canadian border policy in the early crisis

months after September 11 was fashioned on the need to strengthen security controls at

the border and to reach a renewed understanding with the United States about a secure

and open border, open at least to the right kind of trade and the right movement of people

and goods. At the highest level, negotiations over a new framework for the border were

handled by John Manley, the Deputy Prime Minister, and his American counterpart in

charge of homeland security policy, (then Governor) Tom Ridge. These discussions

ultimately led to the signing of the Canada-US Smart Border Declaration on December

12, 2001.

The implications of 9/11 were crystal clear, John Manley told the Toronto Star "I felt that

the greatest risk to Canada as a result of Sept.ll ... was to the economy." (quoted in Greg

Weston Toronto Sun, 20 September 2001: 7) The urgency with which he negotiated the

30-point border action plan with U.S. Homeland Security Director, Tom Ridge was thus

driven by economic necessity, and by a desire to show that Canada would keep up its end

of the confidence bargain, "to enhance security of our undefended border while

facilitating the legitimate flow of people and goods." (quoted in Allan Thompson,

Toronto Star, 9 September 2002:A6)

The Declaration talked about the inter-relationship between public security and economic

security, a theme that would persist in all subsequent discussions of Canada-US border

security. It used the phrase "zone of confidence against terrorist activities" to describe the

plan for the strengthened border. The Declaration came with a more detailed Action plan

for implementation, which originally included 30 points, and has now risen to 32 (Smart

Border Plan,2005,Appendix 2). With the Action plan the two governments made clear

that future border security measures would be driven by a need for harmonization of

policies and integrated efforts. The Action plan was based on "four pillars":

>- the secure flow of people;

>- the secure' flow of goods;

>- secure infrastructure; and

~ coordination and information sharing.

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All of these initiatives built on previous efforts, even the one least in the public eye,

intelligence sharing. The Smart Border Declaration was designed to reinforce and

augment existing measures for protecting the Canada-US border. It served Canadian

interests by demonstrating a commitment to beef up border security, while it retained a

focus on facilitating the movement of people and goods. The American interest was

served by this demonstration of a Canadian commitment to meet American security

demands, and to work in close partnership. It might also be said that American support

for a reinforced but traditional border security strategy was enhanced by the fact that US

security strategy was already looking well beyond the continental boundaries of the US.

The Smart Border Declaration (SBD) went on with implementation of the Free and

Secure Trade Program (FAST) and NEXUS programs and with the funds allocated

towards border infrastructure in the Border Infrastructure Fund (BIF). The FAST

program is a joint Canada-US program that is recognized by both countries and is being

implemented on both sides of the border. The FAST program was a breakthrough

because prior to 9/11 the US had been reluctant to agree to it. Canada was able to

illustrate to the US that better risk management programs, such as FAST, would allow

both governments to focus their resources on identifying and dealing with potential risks

rather than spreading their resources too thin. The FAST program supported moving pre­

approved eligible goods across the border quickly and verifying trade compliance before

goods reached the border. It is a harmonized commercial process offered to pre-approved

importers, carriers, and registered drivers NEXUS is a border program designed to

simplify land border crossing for pre-approved, low-risk travelers. Once applicants to the

program are approved, NEXUS members are granted an expedited entry process while

traveling across the Canada-US border by land, air, or water.

By December 2001, when the Smart Border Declaration was signed the US was engaged

in its campaign to destroy the Taliban regime and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and had

begun to define an offensive, forward strategy in its global war on terror. The American

"border" was being moved out into the world. On December 17, 2004 Smart Border

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Action Plan Status Report was taken out. (DF AIT, 2005) This status report was the fifth

since the signing of the Smart Border Declaration.

In September 2002, the Canadian Prime Minister and American President met to discuss

progress on the Smart Border Action Plan and asked that the Smart Borders process be

expanded to cover new areas of cooperation, such as bio-security and. science and

technology. Canada and the United States have agreed to develop common standards for

the biometrics that they use and have also agreed to adopt interoperable and compatible

technology to read these biometrics. In the interest of having cards that could be used

across different modes of travel, they have agreed to use cards that are capable of storing

multiple biometrics. The two countries had also worked with the International Civil

Aviation Organization (ICAO) to approve and adopt international standards for the use of

biometrics in travel documents. This international .cooperation allowed ICAO to

announce, on May 28, 2003, that the facial recognition biometric had been selected as the

globally interoperable biometric. ICAO also certified two other biometrics for secondary

use (iris recognition and fingerprints).

Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative: The U.S. has re-assessed its policy of

facilitating the easy mobility of Canadians into the U.S. and of its own citizens returning

from Canada, requiring passports as the only acc.eptable form of identifi.catio~ at the

border. A product of the American Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of

2004, the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI) requires all travelers (including

Americ.an citizens) to present a passport or equivalent documentation whep. entering the

United States. Originally the WHTI was to come into force for air travel on December

31, 2006, and a year later for all land crossings. Due to lobbying efforts by the Canadian

government and its allies within the United States, as well as the Department of

Homeland Security's inability to implement the programme on that schedule, these dates

changed several times .. The WHTI was to be fully implemented by July 2009, when

Canadians would be required to present their passports for all forms of travel to the

United States. The Canadian government was hoping that it would be able to negotiate

the use of alternative documents, like enhanced driver's licences, un~er the program. The

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WHTI became a m~or issue in Canadian-American relations in the spring of 2005.

(Kitchen, Veronica and Sasikumar Karthika, 2009: 164)

The Canadian government had expressed strong opposition to implementation of an

automated entry and exit data system at northern ports of entry. Notwithstanding,

Canadian citizens are exempt from some of the program requirements. For example,

Canadian nationals and some Canadian landed immigrants are not required to present a

passport, and are often not required to obtain a visa (Section 212(d) (4)) of the INA)3

Moreover, Canadian nationals are generally not required to obtain an 1-94 form

(Arrival/Departure Record). if they are entering the U.S. temporarily for business or

pleasure. (8 C.F.R. §235.1(f) (i)).) Canadians who enter the U.S. for purposes other than

business or pleasure (e.g., employment, trade and diplomatic activities, etc.) are issued an

'I-94 form but may be able to omit their passport number and visa information from the,

form, if they have not visited outside the Western Hemisphere. (68 Federal Register 292,

293 citing 8 C.F.R. §212.1) 4

Elected officials at all levels of government and business lobby groups felt compelled to

counter the passport requirement. They launched a lobbying effort in the United States,

finding allies in border states. The Canadian Embassy in Washington DC lobbied

Congress, and the Canadian foreign ministry cautioned that the two countries needed to

rethink the issue of border security, while delaying implementation of the WHTI.

(Sheldon Alberts, The Vancouver Sun, 11 Feb 2006: Cll) The Canadian government

also highlighted the economic impact of the decision on the U.S.: Canadian visitors

added $10.9 billion to the American economy in 2003. The lobbying efforts were

successful, and by September 2006, the U.S. Congress agreed to postpone the

3 Section 2l2(d) (4) of the INA permits the Attorney General and the Secretary of State acting jointly to

. exempt certain foreign nationals from the documentary requirements to enter the United States. 22 U.S.C.

§4L2 {allowing the Secretary of State and AG to waive Canadian nationals' visa and passport requirements

if they have not visited outside the Western Hemisphere).

4 68 Federal Register 292, 293 (citing 8 C.F.R. §212.1).

133

requirements for land entry. Lobbying by Canadians continued in an effort to make sure

the deadline was extended and to press for concessions on the requireme~t for Canadians

to show passports. (K.itchen.Veronica and Sasikumar, Karthika, 2009:165)

Safe Third Country Agreement: There appears to be less of an incentive for the United

States to enter a bilateral third country agreement with Canada, since the flow of asylum

seekers generally moves toward Canada from the United States. Indeed, one United

States State Department official suggested that the Safe Third Country Agreement

{STCA, Appendix 7) is something that "Canada wants and that we are willing to agree to

as a trade-off for other important counterterrorism measures." (United States House of

Representatives, Subcommittee on Immigration, 2002; Gallagher, 2003: 15) Reluctance

towards deeper integration and harmonization in this area is also evidenced in practice.

The 'United States' treatment of the 'Maher Arar' case suggested wariness with Canada's

commitment to the war on terrorism and may have also hinted at a reluctance to turn over

individuals who appear on American antiterrorist watch lists. A report by the Center for

Strategic and International Studies suggested that "by refusing to send [Arar] to Canada,

the US government appears to have believed Canada would let ~ar walk free, or at a

minimum fail to gain any information from him" (Belelieu, 2003: 7).

The premise of the STCA is that, vis-a-vis each other, the U.S. and Canada are "safe third

countries". In other words, a person fleeing persecution in their country of nationality

(the first country) who enters the U.S. or Canada (the second countries) in transit to make

an eventual refugee claim in either the U.S. or Canada (the third countries), will be turned

back by the country in which he or she intended to make a refugee claim and be forced to

make that claim in the country of transit. Refugee claimants who arrive directly in

Canada without transiting through the U.S. are allowed to make refugee claims in

Canada. The political inertia involved may explain the lag in implementing the Safe

Third Country Agreement. The agreement was signed on December 5, 2002, but was not

implemented until December 29, 2004. Under the terms of the agreement, refugees

claimants are required to submit their claim in the first country they enter, either the

United States or Canada (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2004). In addition to

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being limited in scope (including only Canada and the United States), the agreement had

qther limitations. An exception to the agreement exists for refugee claimants attempting

to enter Canada from the United States if they have family in Canada or if they are an

unaccompanied minor. In addition, the agreement applies only to land border crossings. It

does not include claims processed at airports or in the country's interior.

The Safe Third Country Agreement is a significant development in border management

and it definitely suggested that increased collaboration between the United States and

Canada is possible. However, there were many obstacles facing the creation of a more

expansive North American security perimeter regime.

For Canadians, immigration and border policy preferences are based on a number of

goals:

~ maximizing the economic gains from migration;

~ upholding Canada's liberal humanitarian tradition by offering protection for

refugees and for those who are fleeing persecution and require asylum;

~ facilitating the social integration of new immigrants;

~ and, maintaining border control as a component of homeland security.

If measured against its intended purpose to reduce the number of refugee claims made in

Canada, the STCA has exceeded its expectations. Refugee claims made at land border

ports of entry dropped by 50% from 3,494 claims in the first six months of 2004 to 1, 762

claims made in the same period in 2005. Total refugee claims in Canada, including land

borders, inland claims and claims made at airports are down from 25,474 in 2004 to a

projected number of claims of 17,000 in 2005. Of note, while the number of claims made

at the land border has dropped dramatically, the number of inland claims, claims made by

persons already present in Canada, did not decline as significantly, raising the suspicion

that at least some of the refugee claimants ineligible to enter Canada under the STCA are -,

fmding alternate means of entering Canada in order to make inland claims. The STCA

lowered the numbers of refugee claimants making claims in Canada across all

nationalities but, from nationality to nationality, the impact of the STCA varies greatly.

Claims by persons who are not from moratoria countries dropped most dramatically and,

135

among . the non-moratoria nationality claimants, the refugee claims by Colombians

dropped the most, from 3,521 claims in 2004 to a projected 944 claims in 2005. Refugee

claimants from Somalia, Sri Lanka, Peru, Guatemala, and Turkey were all similarly

affected by the STCA. Whether one agrees or not with the premise of the STCA and its

implementation, there can be little disagreement that the STCA has impacted persons of

different nationalities differently. (David C. Koelsch, 2006)

North American security perimeter: Each of the North American partners came to the

concept along different vector, but the Canadian origins of the idea were significant. The

notion of a North 'American security perimeter was given an initial push by the private

sector, especially the Canadian Council of Chief Executives. Its president, Tom

D' Aquino, had urged the business council to take up this cause in the aftermath of

September 11. D' Aquino presented an action plan at the Canadian Council of Chief

Executives' Annual General Meeting on January 14, 2003 and labelled the effort the

"Security and Prosperity Partnership" (Thomas D' Aquino, 2003). Some of D' Aquino's

strategic plan was to find its way into the eventual announcement of the North American

Security and Prosperity partnership, especially the emphasis on deepening economic

integration and the strong inter-relationship between the economic and security

foundations of any post-9/11 relationship between the North American states. D' Aquino

saw September 11 as both a catalyst and an opportunity to move Canada and the US into

a tighter economic and security relationship. The focus was very much on bilateral

relations, but with some attention paid to Mexico, seen as a North American partner but

with a historical relationship to the US wholly different from that of Canada-US relations.

The D' Aquino action plan was also marked by a note of pragmatism, arguing against

radical changes to the political foundations of the relationship between three sovereign

states and in favour of a flexible model of bilateral and on occasion trilateral measures.

D' Aquino and the Council of Chief Executives were convinced that Canada would have

to take the lead in forging a new North American partnership. They saw themselves. as

fighting a post 9/ll version of the battle over free trade that led to the Canada-US Free

Trade Agreement and ultimately NAFT A. There was some old business, particularly

136

removing th~ frictions still occasioned by trade protectionist disputes, but lots of new

business, including one of D' Aquino's five priority areas: "reinventing the border."

(Thomas D' Aquino, 2003:6) This meant going beyond the model offered by the Smart

Border Declatarion of December 2001, which was seen as too rooted in tradition. Going

beyond meant embracing the concept of a North American security perimeter while

transforming the Canada-US border in to what was called a "shared checkpoint within the

Canada-US economic space" (Thomas D' Aquino,2003:7) North American economic and

security relationshi~ came with the publication of a major paper in April2004, entitled

"New Frontiers: Building a 21st Century Canada-United States Partnership." The April

2004 paper also swung its attention much more firmly to the economic integration

agenda, and away from ambitious plans for security cooperation. The CCE retained its

call for a reinvigoration of Cariadian military capabilities, but in the aftermath of the Iraq

war, distanced itself a little from its early enthusiasm for a common global strategy with

the .United States, while stressing the need for strengthened Canadian- American

continental defence cooperation. Interestingly, none of the 15 key recommendations of

the April paper specifically concerned border security.

The Security and Prosperity Partnership: In late November 2004, Prime Minister Paul

Martin and President George W. ·Bush agreed to a bil<iferal Security and Prosperity

Partnership (SPP) during the latter's visit to Ottawa. This Partnership built on the Smart

Border Declaration and 30-point Plan of Action which were established in December

200 l. This bilateral SPP agreement was trilateralized in March 2005 during a meeting

between President Bush, Pres.ident Vicente Fox of Mexico, and Prime Minister Martin at

Waco, Texas (White House, 2005) A key element of the SPP is that it is trilateral in

concept, but it allows any two countries to move forward on an issue, creating a path for

the third to join later. Prime Minister Stephen Harper became part of the discussion at a

leaders' meeting in Cancun in March 2006, and then hosted the SPP Trilateral Summit in

Montebello in August 2007 (Office of the Prime Minister, 2007). One of the five key

priorities identified by the leaders at the Cancun meeting was the· creation of "smart,

secure Borders," with the objective of completing the following activities within 24

months:

137

~ Collaborate to establish risk-based screenmg standards for goods and people,

which rely on technology, information sharing, and biometrics;

~ Develop and implement compatible electronic processes for supply chain security

that use advanced electronic cargo information to analyze risk and ensure quick

and efficient processing at the border;

~ Develop standards and .options for secure documents, to facilitate cross-border

travel;

~ Exchange additional law enforcement liaison officers to assist in criminal and

security investigations; and,

~ Develop coordinated business resumption plans at border crossings, to ensure

legitimate trade continues.(Office of the Prime Minister, 2006)

On February 23, 2007, ministers from the three countries met in Ottawa where they

issued a final communique which established a· senior level coordinating body to

prioritize and oversee emergency management activities, including emergency response,

. critical infrastructure protection, border resumption in the event of an emergency, and

border incident management (Ministers Responsible for the Security and Prosperity

Partnership ofNorth America, 2007).

Canada's Budget 2008 (Canada.intemational.gc.ca) commits $174 million over the next

two years to ensure Canada has the best equipment, infrastructure, regulations, and

cooperative frameworks in place to maximize the security and efficiency of the Canada­

U.S. border.

);> $75 million to ensure that the Canada Border Services Agency has sufficient

resources to deliver innovative border services reflective of current economic

realities and an evolving security environment.

);> $14 million to expand the joint Canada-U.S. NEXUS program.

);> $7 million over the next two years towards federal activities supporting provinces

and territories planning to introduce Enhanced Driver's Licences (EDLs).

138

>- $29 · milli~n towards a . stronger North American partnership through the

advancement of priorities under the Security and Prosperity Partnership identified

· by Leaders in Montebello, Quebec in August 2007.

>- $26 million to introduce the use of biometric data in Canada's visa-issuing process

to accurately verify the identity of foreign nationals entering ~anada.

>- $15 million over the next two years to maintain and expand the Great Lakes/St.

Lawrence Seaway Marine Security Operations Centre, an important contribution

to the security of the Great Lakes/St. Lawrence Seaway region.

>- Introducing a higher-security electronic passport by 2011.

This investment builds on the almost $10 billion that Canada has spent on border security

and law enforcement since 2000.

Border Security and Canada-United States Trade After 9/11:

In the days following the attacks; the thirty plus mile line up of vehicles at some border

crossings, consisting mostly of trade-related vehicles, made Canadians realize the

severity of the issue. Also, the crossing times for trucks increased from 1-2 minutes to

10-15 hours. It was apparent to Ottawa, because of the. drastic US response, which

included the tightening of border controls and the toughening of the policy discourse

about borders and cross-border flows that Canada needed to act. (Peter Andreas, 2003:2)

The imminent border crisis created a sudden sense of insecurity among Canadians,

defined in economic terms. (Report of the Auditor General of Canada, 2004:3) The

Canadian government was extremely concerned that the high security alert at the border

would have irreparable consequences for the Canadian economy. Canadians had always

recognized the necessity of an open border with the US, but they now realized how

vulnerable the border was to' disrupted trad~ flows in times of crisis. Action was

necessary to restore and preserve this critically important trading relationship.

In response to the emerging border issue, the House of Commons Standing Committee on

Foreign Affairs and International Trade immediately conducted hearings and published a

139

report entitled Towards a Secure and Trade-Efficient Border. Published in November

2001, the report outlined nine recommendations for Canada regarding the Canada-US

border, including particular measures it believed would be required to ensure an open and

secure border with the US. The Committee highlighted the extensive economic linkages

between the two countries and described its work as

"imperative in order to signal the urgency of a resolution of border problems to

policy-makers" and made a number of suggestions that " .. . could facilitate trade

across the border while ensuring security. " (Report of House of Commons

Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2001:6)

The most important recommendations called for border issues to be resolved by building

upon arrangements and methods established prior to 9/11 and creating a high-level

summit of senior US and Canadian political leaders and officials to discuss border

management issues. It was envisioned that out of these discussions would come a plan to

develop a revitalized bilateral border management plan that would render the cross­

border flow of goods and services more efficient.

The Committee also recommended that Canada examine the feasibility of constructing

pre-clearance facilities for commercial traffic, reactivating programs such as the Customs

Self-Assessment Program (CSA), NEXUS, and CANP ASS that had been designed in

earlier years to improve border risk management and ease traffic congestion. These

programs deserve a brief description. The concept of the CSA program was in place prior

to 9/11 but had never been fully implemented or agreed to.by the US. It was implemented

in December 2001 with the signing of the SBD, permitting Canadian businesses, once

pre-screened, to adopt a streamlined accounting and payment process for all imported

goods. It also created a streamlined clearance process for eligible goods when an

approved carrier and driver are registered with the Commercial Driver Registration

Program (CDRP). The- CDRP is a program designed to assess the identity and

background of carriers and drivers. The streamlined clearance process of the CSA

program also allows for the clearance of eligible goods based on the identification and

validation of the approved importer, approved carrier, and registered driver.

140

The Government's response to the November 30, 2001 Commons Standing Committee

report, prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DF AIT),

recognized the necessity of acting immediately on the border issues facing both countries.

The response affirmed that many of the Committee's recommendations woul~ be

addressed with the full implementation of the SBD Action· Plan and would be supported

with the resources allocated to various measures as indicated in the December 2001 and

future budgets. (Report of House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs

and International Trade, 200 l)

Given the interdependent yet asymmetrical nature of the trading relationship between

Canada and the US, it is evident that a near or complete border closure following 9/11

would have had irreparable consequences for the Canadian and US economies alike. But

such a situation would have unquestionably done more damage to the Canadian

economy. This economic reality, forced Canadian leaders to respond and resulted in two

major initiatives: the creation of the Borders Task Force (BTF) in the Privy Council

Office (PCO) and the eventual signing of the SBD were the steps Canadian leaders took

in order to prevent a severe economic crisis in Canada.

Enhanced security imposed at the Canada-US border in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist

attacks has been cited by many as contributing to a "thickening" of the border and

thereby to a slowing, if not a reversal, of closer economic integration between Canada

and the United States (Goldfarb, 2007) Various explicit and implicit costs of border

security procedures implemented post-9/11 have been identified and, in some cases,

quantified. The available evidence on costs has tended to focus on the direct and indirect

consequences of longer and less predictable waiting times for shipments to cross from

Canada into the United States. Longer waiting times contribute to increased expenditures

on variable inputs such as fuel and drivers' hours, as well as more rapid depreciation of

trucks and related capital equipment. Greater uncertainty associated with the time

required to send shipments across the border can potentially increase costs in a variety of

ways depending upon how manufacturers and shippers respond to this uncertainty.

141

The extent of Canada's trading relationship with the US, its most important trading

partner, is well documented. It is estimated that approximately $1.9 billion in trade

crosses the Canada-US border every day, (GOC, DFAIT) along with approximately

40,000 commercial shipments and 300,000 people. By 2003, 80.8% of Canadian exports

were going to the US and Canada's bilateral trade surplus with the US in 2004 stood at

$84.9 billion. (GOC, DFAIT, Fifth Annual Report on Canada's State of Trade) Canada is

also the number one foreign market for goods exports for 39 of the 50 states, and ranked

in the top three for another 8 states. (A Strong Partnership: The Canada-US Trade and

Investment Partnership) The magnitude and potential vulnerability of this relations~ip

was magnified immediately following 9/11. The 30 mile line-ups and heightened state of

alert at border crossings drew attention to the importance of the border and its sensitivity

to events beyond Canada's control.

Specifically, September 11 was noted as posing "a threat to the largest trading

relationship in the world" and threatened to "accelerate the global economic slowdown

· that had been apparent even before 9/ll." (speech, October 26, 2002) In response to this

threat, Prime Minister Chretien noted the ability of the

"Canadian economy to withstand the shock of9111 with extraordinary resilience"

and with its "partnership with the United States ... [to} ensure that [the]

economy will not be held hostage to the threat of terror. " (Speech, October 26,

2002)

The Smart Border Accord, implemented in September 2002, was put in place to ensure

the Canada-U.S. border would remain "open for business, but closed to security threats,"

again highlighting the importance of the economy. This is significant in that as time drew

away from the events of September 11, the emphasis on economic tssues grew

increasingly prevalent. (Erin E. Gibbs Van & Alison J. Sherley 2005:652)

Canada's economic elites are not good readers of the mood of the U.S. Congress. In an

address to Canadian chief executives in Washington, James Carville, a former

142

presidential advisor, described the fallout from Ottawa's decision not to send troops to

Iraq as a "pothole." No one in Washington talks about retaliation. Canada's business

leaders are gripped by a non-existent problem. Tom D' Acquino, head of the Canadian

Council of Chief Executives, finally admitted that cross-border ties have not deteriorated,

and was forced to retreat from his earlier warnings about the dire consequences facing

Canadian exporters from Ottawa's decision not to back the Bush invasion of Iraq

(Simpson, 2003: B1).

In 2006, 79 percent of Canada's exports were sent to the U.S. and 65 percent of imports

came from that country. Fifty-two percent of Canada's GDP is accounted for by the U.S.

trade. (Statistics Canada, 2007) The U.S. is also the biggest foreign investor in Canada

and the most popular destination for Canadian investments. Canadian historian Desmond

Morton emphasized the two-front war Canadians face, confronting terrorism as well as

the American reaction to terrorism: "Americans may remember 9/11; we must remember

9/12, when American panic closed the U.S. border and shook our prosperity to its very

core." (Joel Sokolsky and Philippe Lagasse', 2006: 17) Morton's comment highlights the

economic imperatives for Canada to ensure that Americans do not come to perceive

Canada as a security problem. (Veronica Kitchen and K. Sasikumar, 2009: 159)

Noble observes that "The threat of a protectionist "Fortress America" mentality appears

to have receded in the light of cooperation along the two American borders since 9/11.

However, this assessment may be considered overly optimistic in light of a report tabled

by North American business leaders at the Montebello Summit, which expressed

concerns about the "need to make borders within North America as safe and transparent

as possible." (North American Competitiveness Council, 2007) It is unknown what

would happen in the event of another 9/11 type of attack on the United States,

particularly if any of the terrorists gained access to the United States through Canada or

Mexico.· At a minimum, there would be the type of short-term interruptions which

characterized the American response to 9/ll.

143

A Fortress America mentality would rely on existing borders as the best place to maintain

controls. It could entail increased delays in the flow of people and goods from north and

south of the United States, and thereby threaten the economic security of two large

trading partners of the United States and a large amount of American investment in those

countries. Creating ·a Fortress America would be very expensive and would put the

emphasis of control in the wrong area. Control should be maintained at the perimeter

points of access to North America, which are not across the two land borders, but at

airports and ports. Noble (2008) fear that the United States Congress has decided to

spend a lot of money on controlling the two borders, for example, by building a physical

fence along the southern border and an electronic fence along the northern border. (John

J. Noble, 2008: 175-176) As Michael Byers notes, "attempting to secure a frontier that is

nearly nine ~ousand kilometers long is a fool's errand that will cost the American

taxpayer dearly .... Fences might make for good neighbours, but ~arriers are not good for

making or keeping friends" (Byers, 2007: 214).

Given the contradiction between NAFTA's trade-expanding mandate, which lowered

national borders, and Washington's security policy, which raised barriers between the

U.S. and its two neighbours, it is remarkable that no trinational summit was held to deal

with the emergency resulting from the American trade blockade following the Al Qaeda

attacks. NAFTA has not generated. a continental governance able to cope either with

common critical trade issues or with more general problems facing the three North

American states. The unilateral measures taken by the United States to ensure its own

security with little consideration given to its northern or southern neigbours' interests

illustrates the power asymmetry existing at the continental level. These measures further

affirmed that NAFT A, originally a useful policy instrument to the United States, could

easily be sacrifict::d by Washington to more urgent policy imperatives. Unlike the

European Union's elaborate supranational institutions created to manage that co!ltinent's

integration, North America remains one hegemon and two peripheries which are capable

of exercising only partial control over their domestic political fortunes.(Stephen Clarkson

and Roopa Rangaswami, 2004: ll-12)

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Storer (2006) conducted a statistical analysis of the degree to which bilateral trade flows

between the two countries fell short of expected levels in the period after 9/11. This study

provided estimates of trade shortfalls for both US exports to Canada and US imports from

Canada at an aggregate level, as well as separately for the largest US land ports. The key

finding was that exports to and imports from Canada were lower than they would have

been if not for the events of 9/II. While the shortfall for US exports to Canada was

largely eliminated by the middle of 2005, a significant shortfall for Canadian exports to

the United States has persisted beyond this period.

Globerman and Storer (2008) find that there was a statistically significant "shortfall" in

US imports from Canada in the immediate post-9111 period. That is, holding other

determinants of US imports from Canada constant in a relatively simple gravity model,

US imports from Canada were substantially lower than they would otherwise have been

given the values of the control variables in the gravity model. While this import shortfall

became smaller over the post-9/11 period, there was still a statistically significant

shortfall by 2005 (Quarter 2), the end of the sample time period. U.S. exports to Canada

returned to a normal level by 2004. But Canadian exports, between 2001 and 2007;

declined 15 to 20 per cent because of the hardened border, according to U.S. business

Prof Steven Globennan.

Burt finds little evidence in his aggregate export equation model of statistically

significant shortfalls in Canadian exports to the United States, either in the period

immediately after 9111 or in later time periods. He does find evidence of statistically

significant trade shortfalls for some individual commodities and ports, but he attributes

those shortfalls to factors other than increased border security post-9/11. Burt argues that

his results are unsurprising in light of his interpretation that increased costs to trucking

companies associated with post-9/11 security developments have been relatively small,

and that infrastructure improvements and decreased passenger traffic at the border have

reduced waiting times and therefore the aSsociated costs of border delays.(Michael Burt

2009)

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According to one estimate, a truck crosses this border every 2.5 seconds-amounting to

45,000 trucks and 40,000 commercial shipments every day. Immediately following 9-11

and the ensuing clampdown, the result was a dramatic slowing of cross-border traffic.

Delays for trucks hauling cargo across the U.S.-Canadian border increased from 1-2

minutes to 10-15 hours, stranding shipments of parts and perishable goods. Automobile

companies, many of which manufacture parts in Ontario and ship them to U.S. assembly

plants on a cost-efficient, just-in-time basis, were particularly vulnerable. Ford closed an

engine plant in Windsor and a vehicle plant in Michigan due to part shortages. Massive

traffic jams and long delays also characterized the U.S.-Mexico border, where an

estimated 300 million people, 90 million cars, and 4.3 million trucks cross the border

annually. (Peter Andreas, 2003) While border delays are now not as long as immediately

following the attacks, heightened security concerns can have a chilling effect on cross­

border exchange. Put differently, security can become a new kind of trade barrier. Indeed,

the United States' response immediately after 9/11 was the equivalent of imposing a trade

embargo on itself, observes Stephen Flynn. (2002) While the long-term process of North

American integration has not been reversed, it has certainly been complicated by the

squeeze on the cross-border transportation arteries that provide its lifeblood.

The Ottawa economic consulting firm, Global Economics, says there has been an eight

per cent negative impact on the export of services to the U.S. and an almost 13 per cent

negative impact on the import of travel services. "The benefits Canada derived from the

FTAINAFTA have been substaqtially eroded," concludes a 2008 commentary from

Global Economics. Canada-U.S. expert Colin Robertson, who teaches at Carleton

University, has urged Ottawa to protect bilateral trade by adopting "a smart approach to

integration, including a complementary approach on immigration and refugee policy;

harmonization of standards and regulations; and a robust. security arrangement that

includes law enforcement and intelligence sharing." Former trade minister David

Emerson's recommendation is simpler. He believes Canada should diversify its trade

"because 80-per cent reliance on a country that can't stop whacking us with protectionist

initiatives is too much." (Ba:bara Yaffe, Vancouver Sun, September ll, 2009)

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The Canadian state, has demonstrated considerable resistance to greater levels of

integration with the United States, at the same time that it has became increasingly open

to cross-border trade under NAFT A. This resistance is based upon a national-identity

discourse that relies upon distancing the Canadian state from its larger neighbours to the

south. At the same time, however, the national security discourse which has emerged in·

the Canada and the United States following from 9111, has failed to close borders to

increasing levels of economic integration, and must accommodate the need for a degree

of openness to the heightened levels of cross-border trade under NAFT A. As a result,

there has been considerable reorganisation and reorientation of borders within North

America. It is simply inaccurate to view the continent as a place where borders have

. remained unyielding to the broader forces of globalisation. If the. role of borders in

maintaining security while facilitating trade has resulted in an increased awareness of,

and concern with the Canada-US border, the latter is not simply a continuation of 'old­

fashioned state-centred geopolitical concerns' but is instead a newly-fashioned post-9/11

response to the ramifications of globalised trade and terrorism. (Heather Nicol,2005:767-

768)

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