CHAPTER-III NYĀYA VIEW ON TRUTH AND ERROR
Transcript of CHAPTER-III NYĀYA VIEW ON TRUTH AND ERROR
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CHAPTER-III
NYĀYA VIEW ON TRUTH AND ERROR
3. Origin of Nyāya :
Nyāya is one of the six Hindu systems of thought and is very old. The
word ‘nyāya’ is derived from the Sanskrit root ‘i’ which means ‘to reach’, ‘to
arrive at’, which the prefix ‘ni’ which indicates certainty or rule. Originally it
was founded by Gautama who is also known as Akṣapāda. Ānviksikī Vidya
(science of criticism), Nyāya Darśana, Nyāya Sāstra, Tarka Śāstra, Pramāṇa
Śāstra, Hetu vidyā, Vāda vidyā, Gautamīya Śāstra, Akṣapāda Darśana , etc. are
some of its names in the long history . But in the present time there are two
very important branches of Nyāya, one is called prācina (the ancient one) and
the other is called navina (the modern or navya nyāya).
Nyāya literally means ‘going into a subject’, i.e., that analytical
reasoning by which the mind is led to a conclusion. The word ‘nyāya’
popularly connotes ‘right’ or ‘Justice’ and hence the Nyāya system is known
as the science of right judgement or true reasoning.1 Technically the word
‘nyāya’ means a syllogism2 (or a speech of five parts). It is a science of right
knowledge, pramāṇa sāstra.
3.1 Sixteen Philosophical topics of the Nyāya-sūtra :
The aim of the Nyāya to win the field of truth and then to secure it with
the fence3 of dialectics against the encroachment of error and sophistry. The
Nyāya philosophy deals with the heightened interest of the external world. It is
called a realistic school as it accepts sixteen categories or padārthas. Through
these categories their philosophy has developed. Vaiśeṣika recognizes seven
categories, and classifies all reals under them, the Nyāya recognizes sixteen
categories and includes all the seven categories of the vaiśeṣika Nyāya mostly
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accepts the Vaiśeṣika metaphysics. In the Nyāya system, the knowledge of the
sixteen categories was explained as a prerequisite for apavarga (liberation).
The term ‘category’ (padārtha) means here philosophical topic. Gautama, in
his Nyāya-sūtra, mentions a scheme of sixteen philosophical topics, these are –
1. The first category is pramāṇa. It is the way in which we come to know
anything truly and objectively.
2. Prameya is anything that can be known truly and objectively (or simply,
the knowable).
3. Saṁśaya is doubt or lack of certainty in which the mind oscillates
between the two alternatives.
4. Motive (prayojana) is the end of voluntary actions, which is the
attainment of good or the rejection of evil.
5. Dṛṣṭānta is any fact or state of affairs concerning which there is no
dispute, and which therefore serves as an instance of a general truth,
principle or rule.
6. Siddhānta is a theory or doctrine which is upheld by a person or school.
7. Avayava is a part, member, or organ of the Nyāya syllogism; an avayava
may be either a premise or conclusion of a syllogism.
8. Hypothetical reasoning (tarka) favours one of the two alternative
hypotheses by showing the absurd consequences of the other.
9. Nirṇaya is true and certain knowledge arrived at by the application of
only the legitimate and permissible means and method of knowledge.
10. Discussion (vāda) is a logical debate between a disputant and an opponent
with the help of five-membered inferences for the ascertainment of truth
without a desire for victory.
11. Wrangle (jalpa) is a seeming dispute or argument in which one or other of
the parties engages with the aim not of arriving at truth but merely of
winning the argument.
12. Cavil (vitaṇḍā) is a wrangle in which a person merely refutes disputant’s
thesis but does not establish his antithesis.
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13. Hetvābhāsa is something that is offered as a valid reason but is in fact not
so.
14. Quibble (chala) is refutation of an argument by taking a word in a sense
different from what is intended by the speaker.
15. Futility (jāti) is the employment of false and inappropriate analogies to
defend one’s own position or refute that of others.
16. Ground of defeat (nigrahasthāna) is the basis on which an argument is
lost, so in the course of an argument, one party demands that the other
concede defeat by showing that the latter has either grossly misunderstood
its own position (or that of the former) or is unaware of the implications
of its own thesis (or that of the former).
The Naiyāyika’s view is that by a thorough knowledge of these the
highest good (niḥśreyasa) is attained or supreme happiness is obtained by
knowledge of the above sixteen categories. The Nyāya holds that truth is
extrinsic to knowledge. They hold that the truth of our ideal depends on their
relations to facts and points out that this relation is one of agreement or
correspondence. The Vedānta and the Mimāṁsā theory is known as the theory
that truth is svataḥ whereas falsity is parataḥ. In contrast to this theory, we
have the Nyāya theory that both truth and falsity are parataḥ. Svataḥ and
parataḥ literally means ‘from within’ and ‘from without’ respectively.
Mimāṁsā-Vedānta theory holds that truth is intrinsic to knowledge. It may
mean on the one hand that the originating conditions of the truth of knowledge
are exactly the same as the originating conditions of the knowledge itself. It
also holds that the knowledge and its truth are apprehended together. Hence
‘intrinsic’ means both ‘intrinsic with regard to origin’ and ‘intrinsic with regard
to apprehension’, both utpattitaḥ and jñāptitaḥ. Knowledge arises as a result of
contact between the self and the non-self.4 According to Nyāya, knowledge is
not an essential but only an adventitious property of the self.5 Nyāya’s
fundamental definition of ‘knowledge is cognition, apprehension,
consciousness or manifestation of objects. It compares knowledge to the light
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of the lamp which reveals the lamp as well as the objects around it. That, light
is different from the lamp and the objects. Like, Nyāya also divides knowledge
into two broad sorts: preventative and representative.
3.2 Forms of svataḥprāmāṇya theory :
There are different forms of the svataḥprāmāṇya theory. It has mainly
two parts-one is concerned with the origin of truth and the other its
apprehension. Though they all agree that truth of a knowledge originates
precisely from those causal conditions which also give rise to the knowledge,
the different advocates of the svataḥprāmāṇya theory notwithstanding differ
amongst themselves as to the nature of the apprehension of the truth. So there
are differences among four different forms of the theory-the Prābhākara, the
Bhāṭṭa, the Miśra, and the Vedānta.
i) In Prābhākara theory, there is no positive error. Truly speaking, the
problem of truth and error is simply meaningless on his theory. On the
cognitive side all knowledge is true. But Prābhākara Mīmāṁsā
distinguishes three levels of truth and error :
In the broadest sense, the meaning of the term ‘truth’, is all awareness,
so all knowledge is true. In a narrower sense of the term, all awareness
other than memory is true. In a still narrower sense of the term, only
those knowledge’s are true that lead to successful practice whereas those
that lead to unsuccessful practice are false. According to Rāmanujācārya
there are three different kinds of truth: yathārtha, prāmāṇya and
samyakta. Yathārtha belongs to all awareness6 (including memory and
what ordinarily passes for erroneous apprehension), prāmaṇya to all
awareness7 excepting memory (but including even the so called
erroneous apprehension) and samyaktva only to such knowledge other
than memory which leads to successful practice.8
ii) Though Bhāṭṭa school agrees in the fundamental point of
svataḥprāmāṇya but there are difference also from the Prābhākaras. The
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Bhāṭṭa regards knowledge as an imperceptible activity and not as
something self-luminous. On the Bhāṭṭa theory, we come to know about
our knowledge through an inferential process. According to the Bhāṭṭas,
truth is apprehended svataḥ in the sense that the same inference from the
jñātata which makes us aware of a knowledge also makes us aware of
the truth of that knowledge. In the same factors of course, truth has its
origin which also give us rise to the knowledge but like the knowledge
its truth also remains unknown at the beginning.
There may arised a question here. What does the Bhāṭṭa mean by
‘prāmāṇya’? But Kumārila has not given anywhere a precise definition
of it. We could only fall back on the line : “tasmād bodhātmakatvena
svatahḥ prāptā pramāṇatā”9 which suggests the conjecture10 that also
for Kumārila, as for the Prabhākara, prāmāṇya is the same as
awareness-of-the-object (bodhātmakatva). In this sense, it is clear that
every knowledge is intrinsically true.
iii) The third form is the Miśra theory. It is ascribed to the school of
Mīmāṁsā associated with the name of Murāri Miśra none of whose
writings is handed down to us but who is mentioned in Nyāya and
Mīmāṁsā treatises.11 This school is represented as combining the Nyāya
doctrine of anuvyavasāya with the Mīmāṁsā theory of intrinsic truth.
There is no difference as to the origin of truth; in which all the three
Mīmāṁsā schools agree.
iv) Another form of the svataḥprāmāṇya theory is the vedantic theory. The
vedāntin’s conception of knowledge varies from the Mīmāṁsāka’s. In
the Advaita system, ‘knowledge’ means four things (a) a modification of
the inner sense (antaḥkaraṇavṛtti) or (b) consciousness as limited by a
modification of the inner sense (antaḥkaranavṛttyavacchinnacaitanya)
(c) the witness self (sākṣī) and at last (d) the pure undifferentiated
consciousness free from all limiting adjuncts and determinations.
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In the vedāntic theory, svataḥprāmāṇya means that the truth of a
knowledge is apprehended through the same sākṣī awareness through which
the knowledge itself is apprehended. However there is really a pertinent
question-what does the vedāntin mean by ‘prāmāṇya’?
The usual definition of ‘prāmāṇya’ are in terms of the uncontradicted
character (abādhitatvam) and the originality (anadhigatatvam) of a
knowledge.12 The Advaitin’s opinion is that tadvati tatprakārakatva is common
to both right knowledge and error and so does not constitute the sense of ‘truth’
in which all knowledge is intrinsically true (but not intrinsically false).
Madhusūdana is however emphatically clear on this point.13 The exact sense of
‘prāmānya’ in which the Advaitin could speak both of ‘svataḥprāmāṇya’ and
‘parataḥprāmāṇya’ to be specified in some other manner. There are two
suggestions-the one give us psychological account and saves the theory; the
other suggests a definition and renders the theory valid but analytically trivial.
Gaṅgeśa considers tadvatitatprakarakatva as the feature which distinguishes
right knowledge from error. On the otherhand, Madhusūdana and many
Advaita writers regard that it belongs to all apprehensions not excluding error.
There is reason, therefore, to suspect that the Naiyāyika and the Vedāntin do
not mean quite the same by ‘tadvatitatprakarakatva. One reason for this may
be that the Advaitin admits a false object which is the object of false
apprehension, so that e.g., the false silver does possess the generic character of
silverhood.
3.3 Theory of Parataḥprāmānya :
The theory of parataḥprāmāṇya, specially is upheld by the Nyāya
school. The notions of jñāna and prāmāṇya are the parts of the Nyāya theory
of parataḥ-prāmāṇya.
The Nyāya system gives us an elaborate discussion regarding the nature
of truth (pramā) and the means of such knowledge is pramāṇa. According to
the Naiyāyikas prama is a definite and assured knowledge of an object which is
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true and presentational in character. Various schools of Indian philosophy have
expressed divergent opinions with regard to the nature of pramā. Prof. D. M.
Datta seems to be perfectly right in his observation that “pramā is generally
defined as a cognition having two-fold characteristics of truth and novelty
(abādhitatva or yathārthatava and anadhigatatva), and that as regards the first
characteristic-truth-all schools of India philosophy are unanimous.”14 In second
characteristics, there is a difference of opinion. However, it is to be seen that
even those who hold truth as an essential criterion of knowledge differ amongst
themselves regarding the meaning of truth. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa is of the view that
pramā is that knowledge of objects which is free from doubt and illusion.15
Gaṅgeśa maintains that pramā is that which informs us of the existence of
something in a place where it really exists.16 For Śivāditya, it is the experience
of the real nature of things.17 Udayana in his Tātparypariśuddhi says “cognition
of the real nature of things is pramā, and the means of such knowledge is
pramāṇa” (yathārthanubhavaḥ pramā tatsādhanam ca pramāṇaṁ).
If we compare the Nyāya view of pramā with western thinking it is
similar to the correspondence theory of western Realists. In the West, this view
is termed as the pragmatic theory of knowledge. The Nyāya theory affirms the
correspondence theory of truth. Correspondence theory is that according to
which our knowledge of a given object is valid. According to it, the truth of
knowledge consists in its correspondence with objective facts (the real nature
of the object). In the Nyāya truth of all knowledge is a correspondence of
relations (tadvati tatprakāra). To know a thing is to judge it as having such-
and-such a character. By contrast, invalid knowledge lacks in such agreement
and correspondence. According to Nyāya, action and behaviour based on valid
knowledge lead to success and fulfillment. In addition while those based on
invalid knowledge lead to failure and disappointment. On the otherhand,
according to the Naiyāyika both truth and error can be proved only by fulfilled
and unfulfilled activity respectively. It might lead one into thinking that the
Nyāya theory of truth is also pragmatic. For example - I have the knowledge of
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milk as white in colour and ice as cold now my knowledge of milk as white and
ice as cold will be true if milk is really white and ice is really cold in the
objective world. The view that the existence and characteristics of external
objects are independent of the experiencing subject, the correspondence
between knowledge and the object of knowledge is in no way dependent upon
the knower.
The Naiyāyikas accept the view that every true awareness produces
successful action or that every false awareness produces unsuccessful action.
They hold that successful action can be produced only by a true awareness.
Hence, ‘being the producer of a successful action’ is a reliable mark from
which the truth of the awareness may be inferred. To sum up, it is clear that
Nyāya is realistic with respect to the nature of truth and pragmatic with respect
to the test or criterion of truth.
The value of the Nyāya system lies specially in its methodology or
theory of knowledge on which it builds its philosophy. One of the charges
against Indian philosophy is that it is based on religious authority and is
therefore, dogmatic. The theory of knowledge, formulated by Nyāya, is made
the basis not only of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika but also of other Indian systems with
slight modifications.
The Nyāya school of philosophical speculation is based on texts known
as the Nyāya-sūtra, which were written by Akṣapāda from around the second
century. The most important contribution made by the Nyāya school to modern
Hindu thought is its methodology to prove existence of God, based on the
Vedas. This methodology is based on a system of logic that, subsequently has
been adopted by majority of the other Indian schools whether orthodox or
heterodox.
3.4 Jñāna in Nyāya system :
In the Nyāya philosophy, knowledge is understood in a very wide sense.
Gautama does not find any difference between buddhi, upalabdhi and jñāna.18
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In this regard, Gautama suggests that knowledge stands for any conscious
determinate state and not necessarily referring to correct awareness alone. In
forms of determinate judgment, all knowledge must be expressible. It is
possible by the invariable association of jñāna and vyāvahara. It is the
conceptualised judgement which is of interest for the Naiyāyikas, Non-
conceptualised knowledge is not accepted as an independent form of
knowledge anywhere in Nyāya Philosophy. Gautama, Vātsyāyana and
Uddyotakara do not refer to this kind of knowledge. But, only Vācaspati in his
Tātparyaṭīkā traces the distinction between savikalpaka and nirvikalpaka jñāna
by interpreting the two words avyapadeśyam and vyavasāyātmakam contained
in the sūtra (1.1.4) to mean respectively nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka
perceptions.
The non-conceptualised stage is not a matter of perception or of direct
awareness.19 Therefore, to later Naiyāyikas, nirvikalpaka jñāna “is neither
pratyakṣa nor anumiti nor any other kind of anubhava, and can hardly come
under buddhi itself, as it gives rise to no vyavahāra. It can be neither pramā nor
apramā, for as it has no prakāratā neither the definition tadvati tat
prakārakatvam nor atadvati tatprakārakatvam applies to it.20
The Nyāya epistemology considers knowledge (jñāna) or cognition
(buddhi) as apprehension (upalabdhi) or consciousness (anubhava).
Knowledge may be valid or invalid. According to the Nyāya, knowledge is just
the manifestation (prakāśa) of objects. A knowledge is true when it
corresponds to the real nature and relations of its object, if not, it becomes
false. In the Nyāya system, the validity of knowledge is due to the efficiency of
the conditions of knowledge (karaṇaguṇa), while its invalidity is due to some
deficiency in those conditions (karaṇadoṣa). The efficiency or deficiency of
the conditions is constituted by certain positive factors. We cannot say that the
efficiency of the conditions of knowledge is simply the absence of defects in
them (doṣābhāva), or that their deficiency means only the absence of efficient
conditions (guṇābhāva). Hence efficiency and deficiency both stand for certain
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special positive conditions which modify the general conditions of knowledge
and make it true and false respectively.
3.5 Types of Correct Knowledge in the Nyāya School :
The Naiyāyikas accept four valid means (pramā) for obtaining valid
knowledge. All knowledge implies the subject (pramātā), the resulting
cognition (pramiti), and the means of knowledge (pramāṇa). Nyāya deals with
the highest state of knowledge. The Nyāya teaches that the highest good is
attainable only through the highest knowledge. Therefore, it is that the problem
of knowledge that finds an important place in the Nyāya philosophy. In the
Nyāya system, the four pramāṇas by which correct knowledge can be gained
are perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony.
3.5.1 Perception (pratyakṣa) :
Perception is the knowledge resulting from ‘sense-object’. It a very
important part of Gautama’s definition of perception. The object here signifies
substance (dravya), such as a table, a pot, a chair etc. It also signifies quality
(guṇa) such as colour (rūpa), hard or soft (sparśa), taste (rasa), smell (gandha)
and sound (sabda). The ‘object’ also includes pleasure and pain (sukha and
dukha) are directly cognized or perceived by us without the help of any sense
organ. The cognition of substance like a table and of quality like colour is an
External perception, but the cognition of pleasure or pain is an Internal or
mental perception.21
Pratyakṣa (perception) occupies the foremost position in the Nyāya
epistemology. Perception is defined by Akṣapāda Gautama in his Nyāya sūtra
(1, i.4) as a non erroneous cognition which is produced by the intercourse of
sense organs with the objects. Of course, the presence of the self, its contact
with the mind (manas), and the contact of the mind with the sense organs are
necessary factors, but the contact of the sense-organs with the appropriate
objects of the sense is the most essential factor in perception. Again perception
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is of two kinds, i.e., (i) laukika, ordinary or worldly and (ii) alaukika,
extraordinary or supernormal. The laukika perception is of six kinds, revealing
the objects having the five sensory qualities sound, touch, form, taste and smell
and the feelings of pleasure and pain (apprehended by mind). The alaukika
perception is of three kinds viz, sāmānyalakṣaṇa jñānalakṣaṇa and yogaja. In
sāmānyalakṣaṇa perception we become aware not only of the specific nature
of the object perceived but also of the nature of its genus which is not confined
to it. For example, when we are aware of the fire in a hearth, we also become
aware of the general nature of fire wherever else it may be present. In
Jñānalakṣaṇa perception we are not only aware of the particular sensory
quality in contact with our particular sense but also of some other quality of
another sense closely associated with which we are in contact. Viz, while
seeing a white piece of ice with our eyes we also actually feel the coolness of
it. The yogaja perception is another kind of alaukika perception. It is the
extraordinary and supernormal perception of a yogi who can directly, without
actual sensory contact perceive distant and hidden objects.
The founder of the Nyāya philosophy, Gautama or Akṣapada defines
perception as the knowledge which is produced by the intercourse of an object
with a sense organ, undefinable, determinate and in harmony with its object.
Pratyakṣa or perception (direct knowledge) is defined in Nyāyasūtra; 1.1.4:
“indriyārtha-sannikarṣotpannaṁ jñānam avyapadeśyam avyabhicāri
vyaavasāyātmakaṁ pratyakṣam”. This definition includes the following
factors:
1. Perception is a cognition (jñāna). According to Gautama, ‘perception is a
cognition’ i.e., the cognition of an object.
2. It arises from the sense-object contact (indriyārthasannikarṣā).
3. It is not due to words that is, it is inexpressible in words (avyapadeśya).
4. It is invariably related to the object that is, it is not erroneous
(avyabhicāri).
5. It is well defined or definite (vyavasāyātmaka).
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The specific feature of the definition of perception is the sense-object-
contact, which is accepted by many philosophical systems. We see that in the
Vaiśeṣika system, perception is described as knowledge which is conditioned
by the senses. The same view is expressed in Sāṁkhya system as “perception is
the direct cognition of an object by a sense-organ when the two come in contact
with each other”. In the Yoga system it is held that perception is especially a
cognition of the particularity of an object. For it, perception is ‘a mental
modification produced by sense impressions and mainly related to the specific
characters entering into the nature of the individual object of perception’. In
Mīmāṁsā system, perception is defined as ‘the cognition which is produced by
the efficient contact of the senses with their objects’. From all these definitions
of perception given by different philosophical systems, we see that the sense-
object-contact is the essential nature of perception.
3.5.2 Inference (anumāna) :
Inference (anumāna) is the second source of valid knowledge in the
Nyāya system. Inference is the means of knowing something through the
medium of the knowledge of some mark (liṅga) by virtue of a relation of
invariable concomitance (vyāpti) between the two.22
It is defined as that
cognition which presupposes some other cognition. It is knowledge which
arises after (anu) other knowledge. Indian logicians attach much importance to
inference mainly because it is accepted as a means of valid knowledge by all
the systems except Cārvāka.
Inference (anumāna) is said to be the source of anumiti (inferential
knowledge). Its another name is parāmarśa (consideration). Parāmarśa is
defined as knowledge of pakṣadharmatā with vyāpti. Pakṣadharmatā means
the quality of being a pakṣa. Pakṣa is that place or thing where some such
thing (sign) is present and indicates the presence of something else, which is
not actually perceived. The Nyāya system makes the valuable contribution to
inference. Gautama does not give any definition of inference. But Vātsyāyana
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gives an etymological definition of inference. According to Vatsyāyana, “It is
the knowledge of an object due to a previous knowledge of some sign”.23
This
view is also accepted by Jayanta24
and Gaṅgeśa.25
Inference is called anumāna because it is a kind of knowledge (māna)
which we get after (anu) some other knowledge i.e perception.26 It is mediate
knowledge of an object (e.g., a fire) derived through the medium of the
knowledge of a mark (e.g., a smoke) by virtue of the relation of invariable
concomitance between them. Inference is accepted by most of the Indian
philosophical systems. According to Buddhists, inference consists in the
perception of that which is known to be inseparably connected with another
thing. The Sāṁkhya, Yoga, Mimāṃsā and Vedānta systems also explain
inference as the knowledge of one term of a relation, which is not perceived,
through the knowledge of the other term which is perceived and is clearly
understood as invariably related to the first term. But according to Cārvāka,
inference cannot give us the validity of knowledge. It gives us probable
knowledge, so there remains a doubt. According to them all inferences are
doubtful.
There are three kinds of inference according to Gautama, i) pūrvavat, ii)
śeṣavat and iii) sāmānyatodṛṣṭa. But he has not define them anywhere in the
Nyāya-sūtra. Vātsyāyana offers two alternative interpretations of these terms.
i) A pūrvavat inference is the inference of an unperceived effect from a
perceived cause, e.g., the inference of future rain from the appearance of
dark heavy clouds in the sky.
ii) A śeṣavat inference is the inference of an unperceived cause from a
perceived effect; i.e., the inference of the fall of rain in the upper regions
of a river from seeing the river in spate. In this manner, these two kinds
of inference are based on the casual relation. But sāmānyatodṛṣṭa is
based on non-causal relation.
iii) A sāmānyatodṛṣṭa inference is the inference of an imperceptible object
from a perceived mark, which is known to be uniformly related to it.
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The movement of the sun is inferred from its different positions in the
sky, which are perceived, even as the movement of a person is inferred
from his different positions on earth. Uddyotakara and Viśvanātha
remark that sāmānyatodṛṣṭa inference is not based on the uniformity of
causation but on the non-causal uniformity.
Gaṅgeśa also accepts three kinds of inference (a) ānvayavyatireki, (b)
kevalanvayi and (c) kevalavyātireki.
(a) In anvayavyatireki inference, there is a universal affirmative relation of
the reason with the predicate as well as a universal negative relation
between them. For example-yatra dhūmaḥ, tatra vahniḥ as in the
mahānasa (kitchen); and if this is proved through negative example, as
yatra vahnir-nāsti, tatra dhūmo’pi nāsti, as in a lake, then this is called
anvayavyātireki anumāna. Here the vyāpti is established both positively
and negatively.
(b) In kevalānvayi where anvaya-vyāpti alone is possible and no vyatireka,
that is called kevalānvayi. In kevalānvayi inference, the reason (hetu)
has affirmative uniform relation with the presence of the predicate
(sādhya). It has an affirmative reason (anvayi hetu) which exists in all
similar instances (sapakṣa), and has no dissimilar instances (vipakṣa).
‘The jar is nameable, because it is knowable’. The reason ‘knowability’
exists in all nameable objects.
(c) Another inference, where only negative is possible and no positive, is
called kevalavyatireki. It depends upon a negative invariable
concomitance (vyatirekavyāpti) or uniform relation between the
absence of the reason with the absence of the predicate, which is
established by the method of agreement in absence. For example-what
is not different from the other elements has no smell. The earth has
smell. Therefore, the earth is different from the other elements. In this
inference, the reason ‘smell’ is the uncommon attribute of the subject
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‘earth’, it is co-extensive with the subject, there is no similar instance in
which it may exist. That is why it is called kevalavyātireki.
According to Annaṁbhaṭṭa, inference is of two kinds, viz, (a) inference
for oneself (svārtha) and (b) inference for others (parārtha).
(a) Svārtha, for oneself. It is meant to convince one’s own self about the
existence of an object. It is a mental process; i.e., a person happens to
see with his own eyes in kitchens and other common places smoke
always accompanied by fire, for which he comes to a conclusion that
wherever there is smoke, there is fire. Thus this is the psychological
process of inference for one’s own sake.
(b) Parārthānumāna is the inference for another. It is a logical process in
which we try to convince others of its truth by stating all the members
of a syllogism in a formal manner. There are five members of the
Nyāya syllogism, these are-pratijñā (proposition) the logical statement
which is to be proved e.g., the hill is on fire.27
Hetu is the second member of the syllogism. It states the reason for the
establishment of the proposition, i.e., ‘because the hill has smoke’.
Udāharaṇa is the third member of the syllogism which is a universal
proposition showing the invariable concomitance between hetu and sādhya;
e.g., wherever there is smoke there is fire as in the kitchen.
The fourth member upanaya is the application of the universal
concomitance to the present case, e.g., same kind of smoke which is
accompanied by fire.
In the last, nigamana is the conclusion drawn from the preceding
propositions, ‘the hill is on fire’.
These five parts make up a perfect demonstrative inference and leave no
doubt in the mind of the person. The above mentioned parts are accepted in
Sāṁkhya28 and Vaiśeṣika
29 systems also.
3.5.3 Comparison (upamāna) :
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Comparison (upamāna) is an independent source of valid knowledge. In
the Nyāya system, it is the third source of valid knowledge accepted by some
Indian systems like Nyāya, Mīmāṁsā and Advaita vedānta. When a new object
not seen or known before is recognised by perceiving a similarity in it with
something else known before and pointed out by somebody else in the past,
then this process is called upamāna accepted by Nyāya. It is the relation
between the names and the objects denoted by them. According to
Annambhaṭṭa: “upamāna is the source of our knowledge about the relation
between a word and its denotation”.
Comparison is the means of knowing an unknown object through its
resemblance with another well-known object.30 For example-one has seen dogs
but not a wolf, and he has been told that a wolf is similar in appearance to a
dog. So when he sees an animal in the forest which looks like a dog but it isn’t
one, and he surmises that it must be a wolf. Perception of similarity plays an
important part in upamāna. There are two factors involved in an argument by
comparison (1) the knowledge of the object to be known, (2) the perception of
similarity. According to Naiyāyikas, the first factor is the principal cause of the
knowledge, While the Navya Naiyāyikas regard perception of similarity more
important. But Uddyotakāra and Vācaspati’s view is that, in upamāna the new
knowledge takes place through the recognition not only of similarity but also of
dissimilarity. Gaṅgeśa also accepts these two kinds of comparison when he
defines comparison as “the knowledge that a word denotes the generic
character of an unfamiliar object which co-exists with its similarity or
dissimilarity with a known object”. Gautama says that upamāna as a distinct
and independent means of knowledge. But some systems of Indian philosophy
do not accept it as an independent source of knowledge. According to Cārvāka,
upamāna is not a pramāṇa at all, it cannot give us true knowledge about the
denotation of words as maintained by the Naiyāyikas.
On the nature of upamāna, the Mīmāṁsā and the Nyāya views are
fundamentally different. There is a minor difference between the Prābhākara
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and the Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṁsā. According to Prabhākara, similarity or
sādṛśya which is the object of upamāna, is an independent category, not
reducible to substance, quality, action and universal etc. on the otherhand,
according to Kumārila, it is nothing but an assemblage of common features. Of
course, the Advaita Vedānta view is identical with the Bhāṭṭas.
The Naiyāyikas define comparison (upamāna) as the knowledge of
similarity of an unknown object like a wild cow with a known object like a
cow. The knowledge is that the perceived wild cow is like the remembered
cow. The Mīmāṁsakas reject this statement of comparison. They point out that
the knowledge of the relation between a word and the object denoted by that
word is derived by verbal authority and not by upamāna.
Śabara defines upamāna as resemblance which brings about the
cognition of an object not in contact with the senses.31 Kumārila explains it as
the knowledge of similarity subsisting in a remembered object (e.g., a cow)
with an object (i.e., a wild cow) perceived. It is the meaning only-the ‘cow’
which was perceived by me in the past in a town is similar to this wild cow
perceived in a forest at present.32 The Prabhākaras remark that upamāna as the
knowledge of similarity as subsisting in an object not in contact with the sense-
organs brought about by the perception of similarity in some other object which
is perceived by the senses. The knowledge of similarity of the remembered cow
with the perceived wild cow is upamāna. Prabhākara’s view of upamāna is
identical with the view of Kumārila.
The Nyāya says that upamāna does not depend upon the quantity of
similarity, but it depends upon perceived similarity of an unknown object with
a well known object. The Naiyāyikas do not deny that upamāna sometimes
leads to false judgement. Hence we conclude with the Naiyāyikas view that
upamāna is an independent source of our knowledge of the denotaion of words.
But Bauddhas, Vaiśeṣikas and the Sāmkhyaits do not accept upamāna as an
independent source of valid knowledge.
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3.5.4 Testimony (śabda) :
Testimony is an important source of knowledge. It has been defined by
Gautama as ‘āptopadeśaḥ śabdaḥ’ which means the assertion of a reliable
person is what is meant by śabda.33
Śabda is defined by Nyāya as a statement
uttered by a trustworthy person (āpta). A trustworthy person is one who always
speaks truth. A trustworthy person may be a man or God who is always
trustworthy.
The Vedas are considered as authoritative because they are regarded by
the Naiyāyikas to be the words of God. In the same way the statements of any
wordly person will be authoritative when it is certain that the person is a
trustworthy one. Therefore, the validity of śabda pramāṇa depends on its being
based on the statement of a trustworthy person, human or divine. Annaṁbhaṭṭa
points out that śabda as a source of valid knowledge, it consists in
understanding the meaning of the statement of a trustworthy person.34
Gautama has rightly said that testimony (śabda) is of two kinds, these
are-dṛṣṭārtha or that relating to perceptible objects and adṛṣṭārtha or that
relating to imperceptible objects. Dṛṣṭārtha-these objects are found in this
world; and adṛṣṭārtha-these objects are found in the next world, such as
heaven, hell, transmigration etc. According to navya Naiyāyikas, testimony is
of two kinds-secular (laukika) testimony and scriptural (vaidika) testimony.
Secular testimony is the testimony of human beings, therefore may be true or
false. In vaidika testimony, we have the words of God. The Vedas are not
impersonal but personal, and these are created by God. So, valid on all points.
Hence all Naiyāyikas agree that śabda must be based on the words of
trustworthy persons, human or divine. All other systems of Indian philosophy
accept testimony as an independent source of valid knowledge, except the
Cārvāka, the Buddha and the Vaiśeṣika schools.
Among the four means of valid knowledge that Nayāya acknowledges
for the right cognition of the above mentioned prameya’s i.e., pratyakṣa
(perception), anumāna (inference), upamāna (comparison) and śadba (verbal
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testimony). Perception is considered to be the most important ‘because it alone
is self sufficient to allay doubt’.35
In the above four pramāṇas of Nyāya system, we find that testimony is
the knowledge of words while perception is due to sense-object-contact,
inference or anumāna to be the knowledge of invariable concomitance and
upamāna to the perception of similarity or dissimilarity. Now it is quite clear
that Nyāya system accepts the above four means of knowledge as distinct and
independent.
3.6 Stage of indefinite knowledge in the Nyāya Philosophy :
Besides these, Nyāya explains the nature of doubt, fallacy, truth and
error. Saṁśaya or doubt is a state of uncertainty. It is a form of invalid
knowledge. It is an indefinite knowledge which characterizes an object in
mutually conflicting ways. It arises from confusion of common qualities or
recognition of properties not common, conflicting testimony, irregularity of
perception as between a pool and a mirage, irregularity of non-perception, or a
lapse of memory. According to Gautama, saṁśaya or doubt is a conflicting
judgment on the precise character of an object.36
For example-some tall thing is
perceived, but one cannot decide whether it is a man or a post. The opinion of
the Naiyāyikas is that doubt is neither a true cognition nor a false one.
Vātsyāyana asserts that it is a wavering judgement where characters common
to many objects are discerned, but none of them is specific. Vātsyāyana
classifies doubt into five kinds. The first kind of doubt is the contradictory
knowledge (vimarśa) about the same object due to the apprehension of
common characteristics (samāna-dharma), i.e., when we perceive a tall object
at a distance and we are not sure if it is a man or a post or a tree-trunk; because
tallness is common to all of them. Secondly, it may arise from the cognition of
a peculiar and unique property; as when the cognition of sound makes us doubt
whether it is eternal or non-eternal because it is not found in eternal objects like
the soul nor in non-eternal objects like water. The third, form of doubt may be
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due to conflicting testimony, e.g., when the different philosophical theories of
the soul leave us in doubt as to the real nature of the soul. In fourth, it may be
caused due to the irregularity of perception. As for example; we perceive water
in the tank where it really exists but it appears also to exist in the mirage where
it really does not exist. Hence it leads to a doubt whether water is perceived
only when it actually exists or it does not. The fifth kind of doubt or lastly, it
may arise from the irregularity of non-perception, i.e., when we are not sure if
the thing we cannot see now really exists or not, since the existent also is not
perceived under certain conditions.37
With regard to the types of doubt, there is a difference of opinion.
Uddyotakāra and Vācaspati differ with Gautama and Vātsyāyana on this point.
The former two favour only three types of doubt. According to Gaṅgeśa, there
are only two sources of doubt; whereas Keśavamisra speaks of three sources of
doubt. In all cases of doubt, there is either the perception of common properties
or the cognition of something quite new and uncommon.
The Naiyāyika’s view is that doubt is neither a true cognition nor a false
one. As a mental state, doubt is shown to be different from both belief and
disbelief. It only raises a problem for thought. However, in doubt, we think of
two or more alternatives in regard to the same thing.
The Naiyāyika maintains that truth and falsehood both are extrinsic to
knowledge in respect of genesis as well as of ascertainment. The Nyāya theory
agrees partly with the Buddhist (in respect of the extrinsic nature of truth) and
partly with the Bhāṭṭa (in respect of the extrinsic nature of falsehood).
Truth and falsehood are specific qualities of cognition. A cognition is
the manifestation of some object, which depends on certain causal conditions.
The ascertainment of truth depends on some extraneous considerations just as
its production depends on some extraneous factors. There is no knowledge of
its truth or falsehood at the time of the origination of a cognition. When the
cognition of a blue object arises, the object is known to be blue; but the truth of
the cognition is not known at that time, and subsequently when it is known it is
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not known independently because such knowledge depends on fruitful activity
(pravṛttisāmarthya). Fruitful activity is the test of truth and fruitless activity
(pravṛttivisaṃvāda) is the test of falsehood.
All knowledge is a means to some practical end and from this place it
needs to be tested in order to attain practical success. When practical success
has been achieved one feels no doubt about it, because doubt is the motive
behind the ascertainment of truth. In the case of the first knowledge of water,
when water is seen, we expect that it will quench our thirst and if the expected
thing actually happens, e.g., if the cognition leads to a successful action it is
proved to be true and there is no cause for doubting the truth of the visual
cognition of water. In a general way, a visual perception of water reveals the
form of water and if the visual perception of water is verified by touching,
washing, bathing etc. then the perceived water is real. Even after a vigorous
and careful search we do not find any defect in the conditions, we can believe
that our volitional experience of successful activity is true.
3.7 Nyāya view of erroneous cognition :
The Nyāya account of error has been expounded by a galaxy of thinkers
beginning from Gautama (about 3rd century BC). The Nyāya theory of error or
illusion is known as the anyathākhyātivāda. The word ‘anyathā’ means
‘elsewise’ and ‘elsewhere’ and both these meanings are brought out in error.
The presented object is perceived elsewise and the represented object exists
elsewhere. They further maintain that knowledge is not intrinsically valid but
becomes so on account of extraneous conditions (parataḥ prāmāṇya) during
both validity and invalidity. According to this theory, an illusion manifests a
real object in the form of different object which is also real. An error or illusion
is the apprehension (khyāti) of an object as otherwise (anyathā) or as a
different object; it is misperception of an object (i.e., a nacre) as another object
(i.e., silver). Another name of this theory is viparītakhyāti or the theory of
erroneous cognition.
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According to Nyāya, an illusion is a misplaced fact. All the factors of an
illusory perception are real and perceived facts, but they are brought into a
wrong relation. For example, in the illusory perception of silver, we have an
actual perception of a certain locus and some silver, both as real facts. Here
error arises because the silver perceived at a different time and place, and
occupied by the perceived locus, namely, the shell. According to Alexander,
‘error consists in wrongly combining the elements of reality’.
According to Naiyāyika, the concept of error is logically not committed
to explain the perceptual error but is to show how error as such is nothing but
mere false characterisation. Nyāya points out that error is mere false
characterisation. The Navya Naiyāyika like Vācaspati, while discussing error,
refer to the instances of erroneous perception like shell and silver yet their
account of error as mistaking one for another (sadantaraṁ sadantarāt manā
gṛhyate)38
clearly indicates the logical implication of the theory.
In the Nyāya school, in illusion, something is perceived as other than
what it is, e.g., the nacre is apprehended as silver. It happens in this way; due to
defective eyesight, or insufficient light, or some other causes of person fails to
cognise a nacre as nacre and apprehends it as something bright as silver. It is
the manifestation of a real object in the form of a different object. The error lies
not in the indeterminate perception of the given but in the determinate
perception of it as worked up and modified by some representative elements.39
When we perceive the qualities of silver in a nacre, we have an illusion;
which is a single cognition of a perceptual character. A nacre in intercourse
with the visual organ vitiated by a defect and aided by the recollection of silver
is actually perceived as silver. There is first contact of sense with something
present before it. Due to some defects, the sense apprehends such general
features of the thing as its brightness, etc. but fails to discern its peculiar and
distinctive features. On the other hand, the general features being associated
with some other thing (e.g., silver) recall the memory images of the peculiar
properties of that other thing. The recollection of silver is owing to the revival
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of its impression by the perception of similarity (i.e., brightness). The Navya or
modern Nyāya explains it by jñānalakṣanasannikarṣa. So, in the case of
illusion, Naiyāyika accepts the jñānalakṣaṇapratyakṣa. There is an extra
ordinary intercourse through the medium of the idea of silver revived in
memory. The error comes in and the illusion arises when the silver that is
perceived elsewhere is referred as a predicate to the ‘this’ as its subject. It is the
determinate knowledge as qualified by ‘silverness’ (viśiṣṭajñāna).
In recognition (pratyabhijñā) in which we say ‘This must be the same
man who helped me in the tramcar yesterday. We see how certain presentative
and representative elements join together to make up one single perception. It
is also one kind of perception qualified by past perception. We see an object
and recognize it as having been perceived on a previous occasion, giving us a
knowledge of present objects qualified by the past.40
In it, we know
immediately that the thing we cognise is the same as that which was cognised
before. It is produced by memory and perception. Any ordinary valid
perception explains how a given sensum combines with associated ideas to
make up one percept. In illusion, the relation between the perceived ‘this’ and
‘silver’ is not objectively real. It is contradicted and sublated. So, it is clear that
the error lies not in the presentations concerned in the perception but in the
determination of one presentation by another given through association and
memory (jātyasaṁskārāt).
Jayanta Bhāṭṭa, a Naiyāyika, advocates viparītakhyāti theory of error.
According to him, mistake or error consists in misinterpreting a thing. It is to
be identical with the anyathākhyāti considered by other Naiyāyikas. While
refuting the Prābhākaras’ theory of akhyāti, he presents this theory. He
observes that an illusion is a single cognition of the nature of a positive false
knowledge. It is the false perception of one thing as a different thing. This
theory involved in an error is the manifestation of a real object in the form of a
different object.41
It is not a negation of discrimination between two cognitions.
It is a positive misperception. For example, a mother-of-pearl shell which has
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been mistaken for a piece of silver, and this knowledge is expressed as “This is
silver”. Now the question is, how such an illusion arises? According to the
older Naiyāyikas what we first perceive in the shell silver illusion is ‘those
qualities of nacre which are common to both nacre and silver’. Owing to the
perversion of the visual organ, we fail to perceive the peculiar qualities of the
nacre, then the perception of these common qualities reminds us of the peculiar
qualities of silver by association.42 Due to some perversion of the mind, the
recollection of silver produces the perception of silver; in contact with the
visual organ.
Some later Naiyāyikas (modern or Navya Naiyāyikas) introduced a
complicated form of perception for explaining illusion. They hold that the
“visual perception of silver in a nacre depends upon the extraordinary
intercourse through the idea of silver revived in memory by association”.
Through this intercourse, “the idea of silver reproduce in memory by
association produce the visual perception of silver.43
In explaining perceptual
illusion Gaṅgeśa finds a constant in memory providing the predication content,
the qualificational material. Gaṅgeśa analyses non-veridical sensory awareness
as a cognition whose predication content does not qualify the object connected
to the sense organ. According to Navya Naiyāyikas, in illusion the conch-shell
is mistaken for silver which exists some-where else and is perceived where
actually shell is present. Gaṅgeśa, the founder of the Neo-Naiyāyika School,
also advocates the doctrine of anyathākhyāti. He explains how a real object
existing elsewhere appears in consciousness in an illusion. According to him
there is an extra-ordinary intercourse with the visual organ and produces the
illusory perception of silver in a nacre. It is also complicated perception
through association. Gaṅgeśa’s opinion is that this extraordinary intercourse
through association (jñānalakṣaṇa-saṇnikarṣa). This is the only point how an
illusion is misperception of an object as a different object. The Nyāya explains
it by jñānalakṣaṇāpratyāsatti which means a kind of sense-object contact
brought about by the revival of the idea of past experience of an object.
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The school of the later Nyāya shows great ingenuity to explain the
perceptual character of illusory experience. That there is the attribution (āropa)
of false character to a perceived fact is true in illusion no doubt. But the
questions that arise are: how do we come to ascribe the false character? How
does this false character appears as something actually perceived in illusion?
The Nyāya maintains that an illusory experience is a single perception. It is not
a complex of perception and recollection with their distinction blurred by
obscuration of memory as Prabhākara thinks. Dr. S. C. chatterjee rightly points
out that “when we have the illusion of silver in a shell, we no doubt attribute
silverness to that shell which is not its proper locus, but at the same time it is
equally doubtless that the silver is somehow perceived and not merely
remembered in illusion.”44
This is also pointed out by A.C. Ewing. He maintains that, “the
difficulty in the case of perception is not the mere fact of error, but the demand
that we should hold both that what we immediately perceived numerically
identical with a physical object or a part of such an object and yet that it is
quite different.45 Therefore, we have to explain the perceptual character of
illusion to explain illusion. We should not try to explain it away.
It is a presentative cognition or perception and not a representative
cognition or recollection, the representative character of which has lapsed
owing to lapse of memory as Prabhākara holds.46 Kaṇāda defines false
knowledge (avidyā) as due to the defects of the sense organs and the defects of
impressions.47 Saṁkara Miśra illustrates the aphorism thus: false knowledge or
illusion is due to the sense organs tainted bodily by humours, and impressions
of past experience corrupted by the nonperception of the distinctive characters
of an object. Such the Vaiśeṣika also advocates the doctrine of anyathākhyāti
or viparītakhyāti.
Patañjali defines an illusion as false knowledge, which does not remain
uncontradicted.48 Nescience (avidyā) is a metaphysical error and consists in
knowing the non-eternal as eternal, the painful as the pleasant, the impure as
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pure, and the not-self as the self. Vācaspati Miśra also explains it as another
cognition opposed to a valid cognition and not a mere negation of it.49
The
Yoga maintains that a form of cognition is wrongly attributed to an external
object whereas the Nyāya-Vaśeṣika maintains that another external object is
wrongly attributed to an external object present to a sense-organ. The cognition
of silver is wrongly attributed to a nacre which is present to the visual organ in
the illusion of silver according to the Yoga.50 Thus Patañjali advocates the
doctrine of anyathākhyāti.
Pārthasārathi Miśra also advocates the doctrine of anyathākhyāti. He
explains the nature of illusion in the following way. The illusion of silver in a
nacre is not produced by the intercourse of a nacre with the visual organ. A
nacre is perceived as a bright object owing to its intercourse with the visual
organ, brightness being common to a nacre and a piece of silver; the peculiar
qualities of a nacre are not perceived due to the weakness of the visual organ,
then silver is remembered owing to the revival of the subconscious impression
of silver, then the nacre is perceived as silver which is only remembered owing
to some defect. Thus an illusion is produced by the intercourse of an object
with a sense-organ aided by the recollection of another object to which it is
similar.51
So we can decide that among the theories of perceptual error or
illusion the Nyāya theory of anyathākhyāti seems to be more acceptable than
any other.
This chapter concludes that Nyāya admits error only in the descriptive
sphere. In our discussion, we have seen that truth and error are two species of
knowledge. There is no knowledge in general; there is either true knowledge or
false knowledge. There is no man in general; therefore, there is either an
American or an Australian. Where there is neither guṇa nor doṣa there is not
even the causes of knowledge. So, there must be a specific factor which gives
rise to either truth or error. In this sense we can say that Nyāya theory of truth
and error is quite desirable. Nyāya attempts to give some solutions to the
problem of truth and error. The contribution of the Nyāya theory of
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epistemology is not inferior to any other theory of Indian philosophy. It must
be said Nyāya has definitely made a great contribution to this problem. Hence
it may be concluded that the Nyāya view on truth and error is the most
convincing theory than the other.
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References :
1. S.C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa, History of Indian Logic, p.40
2. Ibid
3. It is interesting to note that the same figure was used by the stoics also.
NS, IV. ii. 50
4. NS, I.2.4
5. R. Puligandla, Fundamentals of Indian Philosophy, p.184
6. “tasya sarvasaṁvitśadhāraṇatvāt.” (loc. Cit; p.2)
7. “anūbhūtiḥ pramāṇam.” (loc cit; p.2)
8. “yatra tu na (vyāvahāravisaṁvādaḥ) tatra samyaktvam.” (loc. cit; p-3).
9. Ślokavārtika, 2.53. 10. Sastri, loc. Cit; 68-9
11. Compare Gaṅgeśa in Prāmāṇyavāda, Gāgā Bhaṭṭa’s Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi,
Viśvanātha’s Siddhāntamuktāvalī etc., as quoted from “Gaṅgeśa’s
Theory of Truth, by J. N. Mohanty. p.11
12. Thuse,……… for……….. example,……… Vācaspati……… Miśra: “abādhitanadhigatāsandigdhabodhajanakatvaṃ hi pramāṇatvaṃ
pramāṇanām” (Bhāmatī, 1.4)
13. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, Advaitaratnarakṣaṇam (Advaitasiddhi edn, p.
29-30) compare also a modern writer Anantakrishna Sastri: s“Yadyapi
Vedāntinām mate tadvati tatprakarakatvarupaṁ prāmāṇyam
bhramasādhāraṇameva, tathāpi saṁvādipravṛttijanakatvaviśiṣṭaṃ tat
na tatsadhāraṇamiti (Paribhāṣāprakāśika on Vedāntaparibhāṣā
(Calcutta 1927, p .263).
14. D. M. Dutta, Six ways of knowing. p.20 (cal.1960)
15. avyabhicāriṇīmasandigdhāmarthopalabdhiṁ vidadhati; NM, 1-20
16. yatra yadasti tatra tasyānubhavaḥ, TC
17. tattvānubhavaḥ pramā, S. P.; p.101
18. buddhirupalabdhirjñānamityanarthāntaram, NS. 1.1.15
19. Viśvanātha pañcānana : Siddhānta-Muktāvali “Nirvikalpaka na
Pratyakṣaṁ Vaiśiṣṭyanavagāhijñānasya Pratyakṣam,” Nirṇaya Sagara
Edn; p.58
20. Y. B. Athalya: notes on TS, pp.218-219.Viśvanātha, in his Bhāṣā
Pariccheda, makes a similar comment, “non-conceptualised knowledge
is neither valid nor erroneous” (na pramā nāpi bhramaḥ syān
nirvikalpakam-St.135) vide. Also T.C, “Non-conceptualised knowledge
being beyond validity and invalidity, is rather practically useless” (
nirvikalpakañca pramāpramābahirbhūtameva, vyavahārāṇamgatvāt)-
pratyakṣa khaṇḍa, p.402.
21. indriyārtha-sannikarṣatpannam jñānam avyapadeśyam avyabhicāri
vyaavasāyātmakam; G.N. Jha-Indian Thought, vol. I, Allahabad, 1915,
p.39.
22. Gautama, Nyāya-sūtra, 1.1.5
23. Vātsyāyana, Nyāya Bhāṣya, 1.1.3
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24. Jayanta, Nyāya-Mañjarī, p.109
25. Gaṅgeśa, Tattvacintāmaṇi, Anumānakhaṇḍa, p.1-2
26. NBh; i 1.1, 5; NSār., PP; p. 2, 5; TSN., p.47.
27. Vātsyāyana, Nyāya-bhāṣya, 1.1.39.
28. Kapila, Sāṁkhya-sūtra, 5.27
29. Padārthadharma-Saṁgraha, p.114. (Praśastapāda, however, mentions
pratijñā, apadeśa, nidarśana, anusamdhāna and pratyamnaya).
30. prasiddhasādharmyāt Sādhyasādhanam upamānam. N.S., i.1.6.
31. upamānamapi sādṛśyasannikṛṣṭe rthe buddhimutpādayati. SB, p.37
under MS. 1.1.5
32. tasmādyat smaryate tatsyāt sādṛśyena viśeṣitam/prayemupamānasya
sādṛaśyam vātadanvitam// SV, upamāna, 37.
33. Gautama, Nyāya-sūtra, I.1.7.
34. Annaṁ Bhāṭṭa, Tarkasaṁgraha, p.73.
35. Vide, EIP, op.cit; p.222
36. N.S.; N.V., 1.1.23
37. NB. 1.1.23
38. Vide, S. Kuppuswamy Sastri, op.cit; p.132
39. NVT; 1.1.4
40. Nyāyamañjarī, PP; p.448-459. Suggested by Radhakrishnan, Iph, Vol.II,
p.70
41. N.M; I-166
42. Devaraja N.K. An introduction of Saṅkara’s Theory of knowledge. p.127
43. Ibid p.128
44. Chatterjee, S. C. The Nyāya theory of knowledge. p.35
45. Ewing, A.C. Mind, April, 1930, p.149
46. J. N. Sinha, Indian Psychology, vol-III, p.110
47. rajatam ity-anubhava eva na pramuṣita-smṛtiḥ. NM., p.182
48. viparyayo mithyājñānam atad-rūpa pratiṣṭham. Ys., i.8.
49. J. N. Sinha, Indian Psychology, Vol-III, p.112
50. Bhrama-sthale jñānā-kārasyaiva viṣaye samāropa iti bhāvaḥ, as quoted
from “Indian Psychology”; by Jadunath Sinha, p.112.
51. Ś D, Bombay, 1915, p.49
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