Chapter-I

Introduction: The Nature of Authoritarian Regimes, Why and How the 'New Order' Came

into being in Indonesia, pp.l-33.

Chapter-1

Democracy can only work if it does not work, survive and endure only if its principles are violated. 1

-Nicolo Machiavelli

Democracy is a recent and rare phenomenon. Not a single democratic

government can be found in the nineteenth century, and it was not until the first

decade of the twentieth century that in two countries, Australia and New Zealand,

fully democratic regimes with firm popular control of governmental institutions

and universal adult suffrage were established? Keeping the recent origin of

modern democracy and the democratic regimes in mind, its growth in the 20th

century has been most spectacular. However, it should never go unmentioned that

there are a large number of governments, whose belief in democracy and

democratic principles has been minimal.

A democratic regime can be distinguished from a non-democratic one by

the broad application of the following criteria. It is all about political rights, such

as the right to participate in free and competitive elections, and civil liberties, such

as freedom of speech and association. A country to be broadly democratic must be

reasonably responsive to the citizens' wishes over a long period of time. However, '

such assertion usually does not go unchallenged. There are regimes that do not

comply with the broad criteria, and yet call themselves democracies. The often-

quoted argument refers to the non-western origin of democracy and asserts that

the principles emanating out of those western democracies can not be applied to

judge any regime's extent of democratization. This seems to be a fair argument.

Democracy, like other political concepts, is open to geographical influence.

1 Quoted in Combs, James E.and Nimmo, Dan, The Comedy of Democracy (London, 1996), p.l9. ·

2

However, the fact remains, a regime has to respond to some broad principles to be

accepted as a democracy. There has to be some unity over such principles.

The evolution of democracy in various nations followed diverse paths. In

some, it came automatically as an inheritance from the colonial government and in

some it evolved as a result of a movement from the below or as a result of

pressure from outside. "Where there is resistance to democratization- as for

instance, in Cuba, Myanmar (Burma), China and in many parts of the sub-Saharan

Africa- considerable direct or indirect international pressure is allegedly being

brought to bear on regimes to change their ways."3 This has been the way of

thinking of most western governments, international organisations, and

developmental agencies. They all believe that democracy is a good thing. They

seem to endorse Upset's view that, 'democracy is not only or ewn primarily a .

means through which different groups can attain their ends or seek the good

society; it is the good society in operation.' Such thinking has been emphasized by

writers iike Francis Fukuyama who would endorse, 'the universalisation of

western I i beral democracy is the final form of human development.'

Democracy is often associated with the process of modernization.

Theorists of modernization school of the 1960s defined modernization as "the

process of change towards those types of social, economic and political systems

that have developed in Western Europe and North America from the seventeenth ·

century to the nineteenth century and have then spread to the other European

countries and in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to the South American,

2 Goran Therborn, "The Rule of Capital and the Rise of Democracy", New Left Review (London), no.l03, May-June 1977,pp.ll-17. 3 Adrian Leftwich, "On the Primacy of Politics in Development", in Adrian Leftwich,ed., Democracy and Development, Theory and Practice (Cambridge, 1996), p.3.

3

Asian and African continents."4 Political modernists like Eisenstadt argued that

politically modern societies are "in some sense''5 democratic societies, in which

the ideal of political equality had been established. This had generally been a

result of structural change in both economic and social systems, as a result of

which the power, legitimacy and control of traditional rulers have been eroded by

the emergence and spread of wider or popular power and the requirements of

some degree of institutional accountability.

Given the fact that all forms of government aim at one major goal of

overall development, the interrelationship between development and democracy

can hardly be ignored. In the twentieth century, these two are highlighted together

as universal goals for national communities. Democracy is considered to be a

means, while development signifies an end. However, along with it present is the

concept of dissent, that is, to voice one's difference of opinion regarding the nature

or governance and mode of development. Values are shared, compromised and

bargained and a consensus is arrived at. "Shared values are a prerequisite to ·

democracy."6 A democracy, as a matter of fact, allows voicing of opinion, which

is in contrast to the way the regime runs its government. The fact remains that no

practical system of government could ever be entirely democratic. Every system

represents a definite pragmatism, that is, an Aristotelian mixture of democracy

(rule of the people) and Oligarchy (rule of the few). More of democracy and less

of oligarchy makes the system a democratic one and its opposite, that is, more of

oligarchy and less of democracy, makes it an authoritarian one.

4 S.N Eisenstadt, Modernisation: Protest and Change (New York, 1966), p.l. 5 ibid.,p.4. c. Syed Farid Alatas, Democracy and Authoritarianism in Indonesia and Malaysia: The Rise of the Post- Colonial State (London, 1997), p.20.

4

A democracy is always based on the concept of tolerance of 'dissent'.

Dissent can take the form of speeches, movements, publications, and strikes. It has .

also the potential of acquiring violent nature. It all, in finality, depends upon the

degree of disagreement and discontentment. A democracy allows this and hence,

there is little need of conceptualizing the concept of 'dissent' in a democratic

regime. An authoritarian regime, in contrast, poses a different problem.

The twentieth century is described as the age of authoritarianism. The

conventional definitions of autocracy, tyranny, and authoritarianism are quite

similar. However, autocracy and tyranny describe the nature of the ruler, while

authoritarianism refers to the nature of the regime and the structure of its .

management. An authoritarian regime may be a collective dictatorship, an

oligarchy,' or a military government. The term connotes collective rule, though

supreme power may be vested in a single person. "There is a clear distinction

between modern and early notions of authoritarianism. The early version was rule

by the few in the name of the few; modern authoritarianism is rule by the few in

the name of the many."7 Modern authoritarianism is further distinguished by the

scope and type of political support, control, mobilization and ideology. "Modern

authoritarianism depends on political elite, on popular support, and on political ·

mobilization, however limited, exclusionary, and restrictive, but above all on

specialized political structures and institutions."8

Thus, it can be safely said that the legal mechanisms for expressions of

dissent are absent in an authoritarian regime. A voice, different from what the

government th.inks right, is highly discouraged. And this discouragement can

7 Amos Perlmutter. Modern Authoritarianism: A comparative Institutional Analyses (London, 19SI).p.2. K i/Jid.

5

range from issuing of notification, banning such activities to the application of

coercive measures to throttle the voice of dissent. But all said. and done, it is

highly sceptical to say that dissent dies as a result. Like an amoeba that refuses to

die after multiple incisions, dissent remains, takes root and grows through

unofficial subtle means. Thus, dissent articulation in an authoritarian regime has

its uniqueness due to the varied forms it is forced to acquire.

Birth of Modern Indonesia:

The birth of the modem Indonesian nation took place as a result of a

revolution. Indonesia represents a classic case of colonial domination and its

overthrow through a violent revolution. Explaining the relationship between social

revolution and the state, Theda Skocpol writes, "The state properly conceived is

no mere arena in which socioeconomic struggles are fought <. ut. It is, rather, a set

of administrative, policing, and military organisation headed, and more or less .

well coordinated by an executive authority."9 A brief glance at the historical

setting and the subsequent happenings that necessitated freedom for the nation

will reveal that something very similar happened in case oflndonesia.

The Dutch arrived more than three hundred years before the independence

in 1945, seeking spices and wealth for an expanding empire. "In 1605, the Dutch

East Indies Company (VOC) uprooted the Portuguese from their stronghold in the

Spice Islands, now called the Moluccas, in Eastern Indonesia, and gradually

expanded its hold over the archipelago." 10 Their rule of three centuries had far .

reaching implications for the Indonesian communities dominated by

autochthonous groups in which the hereditary families wielded power and

9 Theda Skocpol, State and Social Revolution: A Comparative Analyses of France, Russia and China (Cambridge, 1979), p.29. w Adam Schwarz, Indonesia: A Nation in Waiting (Boulder, 1994), p.3.

6

authority. The Dutch used the indigenous aristocracy to run the administration and

to collect raw materials and collect revenues for them. The absolutist elements in

the community were strengthened at the expense of democratic values and

traditions.

There were attempts by the colonial powers to actively prevent the

creation of nationalism through suppression of nationalist organisations. However,

the first Indonesian organisation was established in 1908.

"The Budi Utomo (Pure Endeavour). movement was the first organized expression of culturally conscious Indonesians seeking to regain a better position in society. Founded in 1908 it was based on the assumptions that only those who could transform their ways of life to suit the changed circumstances were likely to gain a..'ld preserve an honourable status on the Indonesian community. Its aim was to have higher posts thrown open to Indonesians." 11

With the first stirrings of nationalist sentiment in the island of Java,

reformist Islamic groups such as Sarekat Islam (Islamic Union) and the

Muhammadiyah (Followers of Muhammad) were established. These were

attempts at creating mass based movements. This was accompanied by the

establishment of political parties such as the Indische Partij (Indies Party), ·

Indische ,'.'ociai-Democratische Vereniging (ISDV) or the Indies Social

Democratic Organisation which later became PKI (Indonesian Communist Party).

It can be mentioned here that PKI played a crucial role in the radicalization of

Sarekatlslam.

The most powerful nationalist organisation to emerge after Sarekat Islam

and the PKI was the Indonesian Nationalist Party (Partai Nasional Indonesia-

PNI). In 1927, n group of Dutch educated nationalists led by Sukarno founded the

PNL which successfully promoted the adoption of the trading language Malay as ·

11 Satyavati .lhaveri, The Presidency in Indonesia, Dilemmas of Democracy (Bombay, 1975), p.19.

7

the national language, Bahasa Indonesia. The party also conceived the national

flag and anthem that survive till today. The colonial onslaught on this party saw

the birth of three new organisations, Partai Rakyat Indonesia (Indonesian .

People's Party), Partai Indonesia (Partindo), and Golongan Merdeka

(Independence Group). Later Partindo was to dissolve to form a new party named

Gerindo (Gerakan Rakyat Indonesia- Indonesian People's Movement). In 1939

the major Indonesian nationalist organisations were brought together to form the

Federation of Indonesian Political Parties (Gabungan Politiek Indonesia- Gapi). 12

Thus, Indonesian nationalist struggle thrived under the banner of various

organisations. The Dutch tried to nip the bud of national awakening. However, it

tasted limited success. Indonesia found an active and pragmatic leader in young ·

Sukarno. The latter realised the importance of reconciling the three emerging

forces in Indonesia, namely Muslims, Communists and Nationalists. Each had

tried within its limited reach to challenge the authority of the Dutch and had

failed. "The Muslims followed a strategy of economic assault on the colonial

system, the Communists staged a premature revolution, and Sukamo's nationalists

had engaged in agitational politics."13 Recognizing and reconciling these three

important forces made the colonial authorities realise that time has come to start

giving Indonesians their due. Volksraad, a largely advisory, at best a semi- ·

legislative assembly was expanded to include those Indonesians who were willing

to cooperate with the authorities in return for modest political concessions.

The Dutch retreat and the Japanese invasion of the country gave the

nationalist struggle a new twist. The Japanese occupation turned out to be an

12 Syed Farid Alatas, n.6, pp.97-8. 11 U If Sundhaussen, "Indonesia: Past and Present Encounters with Democracy" in Lary Diamond, Juan J. Linz. Seymour Martin Lipset,eds. Democracy in Asia (New Delhi, 1989), p.426.

8

enormous boost for the cause of Indonesian independence. It demystified the

invincibility of the whites. The trained Dutch administrators were_largely replaced

by Indonesians officials, which served as their training period in sharpening their

skills and confidence. The exiled political leaders were released and allowed to

mobilise the masses for nationalist goals as long as they supported the Japanese

war effort. Indonesian youths were given paramilitary training and recruited into ·

either Japanese officered auxiliary units or an Indonesian home army, the PETA.

The Indonesian honeymoon with the Japanese. was brief and it was cut short by

the imperialist arrogance of the latter. Thousands of young Indonesians were

forcibly engaged by the Japanese for their military duty elsewhere in Southeast

Asia, many never to return. The wages of Indonesians who stayed back were

taxed to support the Japane~ ~ war effort. As a result of the large,..scale exploitation

export industries collapsed, inflation skyrocketed, and rationing led to black

markets and widespread corruption. After initially taking a benevolent view of ·

Indonesia's embryonic independence movement, the Japanese soon banned the

flying of the Indonesian flag and the playing of the national anthem. As one

Indonesian officer later commented, "Most Indonesians wished the Japanese had

never come in the first place. Theirs was indeed the most terrible rule twentieth

century Indonesians were made to suffer."14

This is exactly the backdrop, which needs to be kept in mind when the

analysis of Indonesian experience with self-governance was made. Indonesians

did not achieve independence until the Japanese surrendered on 14 August 1945

following the dropping of nuclear bombs on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

The fire of nationalism was high in the air when on 17 August 1945 Sukamo and

H Adam Schwarz, n.l 0, pp.4-5.

9

Hatta proclaimed independence. A constitution was promulgated and a cabinet .

formed. Within the promulgated presidential system of government, Sukarno

without much controversy assumed presidency, with Hatta as his vice-president.

However, what followed was not a smooth transition to democracy.

Notwithstanding the promulgation of the 1945 constitution, the Dutch

weres thinking in terms of occupying the political vacuum by reestablishing their

colonial regime.

"Eliminating the republic became their supreme endeavour. So long as the republic could not be smashed irreclaimably the Dutch began to circulate hideous lies about it: (i) there was no nationalism in the Indies which would always welcome back the sagacious colonial rulers, asserted many Hollanders, who were unrepentantly colonial minded; (ii) they dubbed the republican leaders as Japanese hirelings hindering a graceful resuscitation of Dutch power;(iii) tlie republican leaders, immersed in Japanese propaganda, while upholding totalitarianism; (iv)even if recognized the Republic was incagable of discharging the onerous responsibilities of administration." 5

·

Though all these claims were guided by a sense of sheer self-interest and in

the perceived superiority of the white skin, the last of the claims proved to be

prophetic. The following years revealed the incapability of the Indonesian

political leaders to provide a decent governance to the infant nation.

The Dutch reconquest was a lost cause. The former colonial power came

under increasing international pressure to relinquish its claims. The Hague

Agreement of 2nd November 1949 deprived the Dutch of any claim on Indonesia

and in December 1949 they gave up their control except on the western half of

the island ofNew Guinea. A Federal Constitution was drawn up for the Republic

of the United States of Indonesia in 1949, following negotiations with the Dutch

over a cease-fire.

-----·-· --- ---15 J.K. Ray, Trans(cr ofPower in Indonesia, 1942-1949 (Bombay, 1967), pp.61-2.

10

Indonesia's Experiment with Democracy:

This began the era of Indonesia's experiment with democracy. This

experiment of a farcical nature went on till 1957 when Indonesian politics took

another tum around. Before analysing the failure, the cause as to why Indonesia .

chose a democratic form of govemment can be dealt with. There were number of

reasons for this.

(i) Causes for Trading on Democratic Path:

All the newly independent nations of that time were great admirers of

democracy. Emerging from the long years of oppression, democratic principles

were promising them a breath of fresh air. Fighting the colonial masters over the

concept of liberty, equality and fraternity they found their commonality with the

idea of parliamentary democracy. And dem0cracy was the only form of·

government, by which the young could prove that they are also ·capable of

governing themselves as contrary to the belief created by their colonial masters.

Apart from these generalised explanations Indonesia had more specific and

contextual reasons to offer.

"Indonesia's decision to adopt democracy was influenced by the

attachment of a few individual leaders like Hatta and Sjahrir to the value of

constitutional democracy. These were the people who were at the helm of affairs

in the immediate post-independence period. Naturally their choice fell on the ·

democratic form of government for only in a democracy could they utilise their

skill and maintain their influence."16 "Given that the emerging elites in a colony

had heen nurtured in the democratic tradition of govemment and had come to

believe in democracy as an ideal to be cherished and achieved, these elites would

16 Baladas Ghoshal, Indonesian Politics 1955-59: The Emergence of 'Guided Democracy' (Calcutta, 1982), pp.2-3.

11

strive for an independent democratic post-colonial state because this is the model

best known to them." 17 It was also true that some democratic institutions were

already in place in the colonies long before independence. The appearance of

various councils such as Regency Councils, State Councils, the Volksraad and the

Federal Legislative Council, while being generally advisory bodies that conferred

little power upon the indigenous elite, nevertheless gave them an understanding

of the workings of democratic institutions. Thus, adoption of democratic ·

principles provided the Indonesians an opportunity to improve upon them.

Herbert Feith points out that national self-respect caused indigenous elites to

strive for democracy as this was one way that they could show the colonizers that

they were capable of self-government along democratic lines. 18

Adoption of parliamentary democracy had some practical considerations

as well. The 1945 constitution which unto the period of 'grant of independence'

governed Indonesia, though democratic but not providing for a parliamentary

system was used by the Dutch to brand Indonesia as pursuing dictatorship and ·

·hence many were influenced by the Dutch campaign against recognition of the

Indonesian state. In order to counteract the Dutch propaganda, the Indonesian

leaders felt the need to switch to the system of parliamentary democracy so that

they could convince the world of the genuineness of their government arising

from the wishes of the people. 19

/

However, Indonesia's experiment with parliamentary democracy was

marred by successive governments and their failure through intra-party divisions,

political factionalism, strife and mutual jealousies of the leaders. During the

period 1950-1 956, Indonesia witnessed six cabinets and the longest period of any

17 Syed Fnrid Alatas, n.6, p.lll. 18 Hcrberl Feith, The Decline o[Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca, 1982), p.44.

12

one cabinet was two years (Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet, July 1953-July 1955).

None of these cabinets had the true representative character since there were no .

elections since 1955 and the first elected government took office only in March

1956.

Reasons for the Failure of the Experiment:

Now the reason as to why parliamentary democracy could not flourish in

Indonesia can be discussed. The parliamentary set up instituted by the constitution

brought to the fore several conflicting trends that were in themselves contrary to

the very idea of parliamentary democracy. The failure of parliamentary

democracy was the result of forces and factors operating in Indonesia at that ·

period of time.

"'I he aftermath of the revolutionary period, heavy financial burden

involved in the treaty with the Netherlands, the weakness of the constitutional set-

up to contain the forces struggling for supremacy, the dissatisfaction in the army

and above ali the tendency of the people to look upto the president to pull them

out of the mess in which the country was thrown from time to time. These

contributed to the failure of parliamentary democracy in Indonesia."20

There was no doubt that parliamentary democracy was given a fair bit of

trial during that period of constitutional democracy. But, "parliamentary

supremacy according to the constitution was accepted only in principle, but not in

practice .... There were cases when decisions of parliament were challenged by

forces outside it. Again Parliament itself was not free from the influence of extra-

parliamentary forces like the President and the Army. Whenever any crisis

I'J Baladas Ghoshal, n.16, p.3. 211 S<~tyavati S. Jhavcri, n.ll, p.167.

13

occurred in Parliament, political parties tried to mobilise necessary support to

achieve their objectives." 21

Taking the argument to a different plain, Lucian W. Pye points out the lack

of an 'indigenous and traditional structure of national power in Indonesia. He says,

in case of Indonesia,

"the concept of national power and national administration was almost entirely foreign import. In terms of people's immediate understanding of power in their personal relationships, however, the Indonesians had more vivid traditional and mystical concepts of power than any of the other Southeast Asian peoples. Although the building of a sense of nationhood called for the use of European concept of power, the actual play of power in human relationships remained very traditional. Thus, political parties, national bureaucracies and the military services were all modeled on Western forms, but their practices followed the traditional rules of power relationships."24

While analysing the evolution of democracy and the maintenance of the same

in a post~colonial country, the historical circumstances under which post-colonial

state formation took place must be borne in mind. Democracy as a mode of

governance is essentially inherited from the colonial rulers. The indigenous elite,

educated in the western tradition and trained in the colonial administration, knew

only the democratic system as the best form. In many cases, the new democracies

were genuine, but failed to achieve stability and eventually declined only to be

replaced by authoritarian fonns. The maintenance of democracy has three

d. . 23 necessary con tt10ns.

11 Baladas Clhoshal, n.l6, p.4. ~~ Luci<~n W. Pye, Asian Power and Politics, The Cultural Dimensions of Authority (Havard, 1985), p.ll2. ~1 These three conditions have been elaborated by Syed Farid Alatas while analysing the evolution of democracy in Indonesia and Malaysia. For details see Syed Farid Alatas, n.6, pp.40-l.

14

(l)Absence of Armed Resistance:

The extent to which anned and mass resistance threatens the interests of the

state elite. and the dominant classes determines the stability of the democratic

state. In case of Indonesia mass resistance was not an important factor in he

struggle for independence. But armed resistance was widespread in Indonesia.

(2) An Internally Strong State:

A state must be strong enough to mobilize resources in situations when its

power is challenged. If a democratic state is internally weak, it can hardly

withstand pressure and will resort to suspension of democratic process at the

earliest.

(3) A High degree of Elite Cohesion:

The ruling elite must have mutual material and' ideological interests. They

must share similar class and ideological backgrounds. If this condition is satisfied

the state will not be plagued by intra-state conflicts and opposition that could

potentially challenge authoritarian state forms.

Post-colonial Indonesia was neither a strong state nor there was any degree of

elite cohesion. Narrow personal gains ruled over the noble desire to nourish the

infant nation with care. Herbert Feith reaffirms this:

"It was a feature of politics in the Indonesia of 1949-1957 that cabinet posts were .most eagerly sought. The prestige of a cabinet minister was extra-ordinarily high, despite the fact that his tenure was normally expected to be short. Indeed, only isolated individual leaders in politics, administration, or education were able to enjoy the degree of prestige, which was the lot of each and every minister while he was in office. Ministerial posts provided opportunities to help family members, to repay obligations to others, and to create new ones to one self. They also provided important sources of income, a car, a house, furniture, and purchasing facilities- and in some cases business opportunities and gifts."24

24 Herbert Feith. n.18,pp.l46-7.

15

Thus, when the population wished that the civilian leadership would bring it

stability and development, what it experienced belied its hopes .. Their lot never ·

improved after they got rid of the oppression of the Dutch and the Japanese.

J

It can also be said that belief in democratic principles was missing at least in

one leader, that is, Sukamo. He brought with him his belief in the constitution of

1945, when he became the President of Indonesia.

"Though the constitution of 1945 laid down that the supreme authority vested in the People's Consultative Assembly (Article 1, Paragraph 2), the President who was vested with executive powers (Article 4, Paragraph 1) was able to exercise considerable authority because of the transitional provisions in Article 4 which laid down that, until the formation of the above mentioned body, the Chamber of Representative and the Supreme Advisory Council (the three repositories of power besides the President) all state powers would be exercised by the President assisted by a National Committee. "25

Thus, when political situations changed and Indonesia adopted new

constitutions, there was a constant hankering on President Sukarno's part to go to

the good old days of 1945. This nostalgia, in a way, contributed to the failure of

democracy. Sukatno paid little attention to the necessary day to day administrative

tasks; nevertheless the democratic system was blamed for the collapse of the

economy and infrastructure.

Sukarno's advocacy of the 'return to the past arrangement' was tried to be

achieved through a dual strategy, that is, firstly, denunciation of the western

concept of parliamentary democracy and secondly, admiration ofthe past system

"Sukarno argued that '50 percent- plus one' western parliamentary practices

exacerbated rather than solved problems. Therefore, he advocated a 'democratic

practice' of the villages for Indonesia, while deliberations are held until consensus

25 Baladas Ghoshal, n.l6, pp.275-6.

16

emerges, in the spirit of 'gotong rojong' with himself as the trusted leader. This

notion of democracy appeared to fit traditional Javanese value systems in which

power is bestowed on one person, usually a Sultan."26 Suk~o is reported to have

said, "I have the right to declare a state of emergency during which I can govern

by decree, and to do so I do not need the consent of the parliament, though of

course I would always talk it over with the ministers before hand.'m

Period of 'Guided Democracy':

After the second Ali cabinet resigned on 14th March 1957, President Sukarno

immediately proclaimed a nation-wide state of war and siege under article 129 of

the 1950 constitution. As a result, the parliamentary system collapsed and the

cabinet functioned under the direction of the president. Consequently, Sukarno's

notion of a unique, indigenous form of democracy was readily embraced as more

fitting for Indonesia. This ushered in the period of "Guided Democracy" in

Indonesia. It meant a practice of returning to a system of personal rule, which

resembles Javanese feudalism than the chaotic d,:mocratic experiment of the

I 950s.

With the establishment of 'Guided Democracy', all the political parties, with

the exception of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI), were circumscribed and

depended directly on Sukarno for maintenance of the bureaucratic positions and

economic sinecures to which.they had grown accustomed. Their actual influence

was drastically curtailed. The other power centre in the country's politics was the

army. It was strongly anti-Communist, but opposed to the return of a

parliamentary system, which, it contended was responsible for Indonesia's

26 Clark D. Neher, South East Asia in the New International Era (Boulder, 1994), p.ll3. 27 George T. McKahin (ed), Major Governments of Asia, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963), p.570.

17 .

economic and political instability. Both the military and the PKI hated each other,

but preferred Sukarno to the outbreak of premature strife. This political situation

has been characterised as triangular in nature, with the military and PKI

occupying the bases of the triangle and Sukarno at the apex occupying the centre

of balance. 28

Although "Guided Democracy" was initially supported as an, Indonesian

antidote to a failed western system, the deterioration of the economy and the

administrative chaos that ensued undermined the unity Sukarno aimed to

establish. Sukarno spoke of the need to continue the revolution that brought

independence, mesmerizing the people with mass rallies and oratory laden with

compelling rhetoric but little else. Meanwhile, what the people needed was

stability, and to be fed. The country struggled under t\e burden of triple digit

inflation.29 Corruption was flagrant and the cost of living index rose from a base

of one hundred in 1957 to thirty-six thousand in 1965. Unemployment was

rampant and Communists were gaining strength as peasants and workers were

armed with Chinese weapons.30

Coup and Counter-Coup:

It was in the midst of such a confusion and mismanagement that the coup of

September 30,1965 occurred. The reason ·and the actual people behind the coup

are still a mystery and require a thorough investigation. However, suffice to say

for our purpose that General Suharto used PKI' s involvement to annihilate the

party as well as any other opposition to his regime. The coup was said to be led by

IX Allan A. Samson, "Indonesia" in Robert N. Kearney (ed), Politics and Modernisation in South and Southeast Asia (New York, 1975), pp.255-6. 29 Michael R. J. Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics under Suharto: Order, Development and Pressure .fi>r Change (London, 1993), pp.I-3. 3° Clark D.Neher, n.26, p.l 06.

18

elements of the PKI, which resulted ultimately in the decimation of the latter.

Many army officers, including chief of staff General Yani, were killed in the coup

attempt. Sukarno's refusal to blame the PKI for the coup provided the opportunity

to General Suhatto, "commander of the army's strategic reserve forces (Kostrad),

who, according to a standing order, acted in Yani's stead whenever the army

commander was out of town"31 to start an anti-Communist campaign in which

thousands of communists were killed. The reign of administration switched hands

and General Suharto emerged as the new leader of Indonesia.

The coup of 1965 aborted all chances of PKI's march to superiority and

established the army as the only centre of power in Indonesian politics. Sukarno

. reluctantly named Suharto army chief of staff. Suharto gradually acquired more

and more power and succeeded in shunting the once immovable Sukarno aside in

what might be called an incremental coup. In 1967 Suharto forced Sukamo into

retirement and proclaimed a 'New Order' for Indonesia.

Before looking at the 'New order' of Suharto, a brief analysis of Suharto's role

in the aborted coup can be made. It can be said that it has been played down

considerably. As mentioned earlier, Suharto was in command over the Jakarta

based amiy Kostrad, which was an elite, rapid deployment force designed to .

counter any insurrectiona~y moves by regional commanders. Before that

''returning from command of Eastern Indonesia, where he was involved in the

successful campaign to wrest West Irian from the Dutch in 1962, Major General

Suharto joined Nasution's staff in armed forces HQ .... with feelings in the army

running high over the murder of six generals on the night of 30 September,

31 Ulf Sundhausscn, The Road to Power, Indonesian Military Politics /945-1967 (Kuala Lumpur, 19S2) ,p. 207.

19

Suharto's decisive moves to restore order the following day earned him kudos he

would have found hard to accumulate under normal circumstances. "32

Theories About the Coup:

Speculations were rife regarding the role of PKI in the coup and its collusion

with the army. One of the many theories still doing circles is that the PKI had set

up a "special bureau, acting without the knowledge of the party central committee,

to foster ties with the military." 33 In sharp contradiction, another theory plays

down the role of the PKI in the whole affair. "The operation both in Jakarta and in

central Java was completely in the hands of military people, including some

belonging to the Air Force. Army troops were the ones who occupied strategic

points _in Jakarta, and abducted the generals."34 It blames the assassination of the

kidnapped generals on either the military people or young trainees under military

command. It is to be noted that the Communist daily, 'Harian Rakyat' in its 2nd

October issue had stressed the internal division in the army as the reason for the

whole affair. Writers like Harold Crouch and Peter Dale Scott bought the same

theory and stressed the rivalry between the pro-Sukarno Yani faction and the anti-

Sukarno Suharto and Nasution faction. Even the 'Cornell Paper' authored by Ruth

Me Vey and Benedict Anderson emphasised the same argument.

There are theories about the involvement of the CIA and other western

intelligence agencies. The CIA study titled '1965: The Coup that Backfired'

emphasised that in November 1964, the PKI established a clandestine organisation .

to penetrate and subvert the Indonesian armed forces. Even though the CIA called

the coup 'one of the worst mass murders of the twentieth century', it is a fact that

12 Michael JU. Vatikiotis, n.29, p.l7. JJ ihid..p.l8. 34 W.F. Wertheim, "Whose Plot? New Light on the !965 Events", Journal of Contemporary Asia (Noltingham), vol.9, no.2, 2nd Quarter, 1979, p.200.

20

the U.S. from as early as 1953, was interested in fermenting the regional crisis in

Indonesia, which induced Sukarno on 14 march 1957 to proclaim martial law. In

1957-58, the CIA infiltrated arms and personnel in support of the regional

rebellions against Sukarno. By August 1958, the military assistance programme to

Indonesia had reached the tune of twenty million dollars a year. The Cold War era

which pushed America to contain Communism in far corners of the world had

chosen Indonesia as a battle ground. Sukarno's sympathy for the Communists

must have rung alarm-bells in Washington. Ai one point of time Sukarno was

reported to have said that 'he would have no objection if Indonesia were to evolve

into a Communist state. ' 35 Thus, the non-Communist force with the capability of

.. obstructing the PKI, notably Nasution became the messiah to control the

Communist ivrces. In the years after 1958, U.S. trained Gen. Suwarto's

Indonesian Army Staff and Command School in Bandung (SESKOAD) received a

lot of attention from the Pentagon, CIA, RAND and also from the Ford

Foundation. SESKOAD's new strategic doctrine on Territorial Warfare was in a

way a counter-insurgency method. Thus, the organisation developed into an anti-

Communist centre, virtually a semi-state, independent of Sukarno's government.

Lyndon Johnson's accession to Presidency in the United States was marked by the

beginning of a more anti-Sukarno posture. It was a complete reversal of the policy

followed by the previous Kennedy administration. General Suharto being a

product of SESKOAD was a part of the whole conspiracy against the PKI. Thus,

when the internal struggle within the army resulted in the death of the pro-

Sukarno generals, it provided a golden opportunity to Suharto and company who

35 Donald Hindley. "Indonesian Politics 1965-1967: The September 30 Movement and the Fall of Sukarno", The World Today (London), vol.24, no.8 ,August I 968, p.346.

21

blamed the Communists entirely. What followed was a bloodbath.36 Reflecting the

'The West's best news for years in Asia.' 37

However, there are more number of theories about Suharto's role in the coup.

Writers like Michael R.J. Vatikiotis refer to an informal agreement among a group

consisting of Suharto, Dharsono, Kemal ldris and Sarwo Edhie Wibowo regarding

rotation of power among them after easing out Sukarno.38 However, this was a

pure miscalculation on their part and eventually. it was them, who were eased out

by Suharto. This person known for his cold and ruthless glare and a deep voice

accompanied by a passive style certainly emerged as the man of the hour. Another

finding insists that the coup originated with a move by officers loyal to Sukarno to

prevent pro-western generals from connivin s with the US and Britain to topple

Sukarno.39 If accepted, this theory points at the army's poor track. record of

intervention. The army was riddled with factionalism and hence, lacked a sense of

direction. Nasution's difference with Yani is an accepted fact and probably in

order to balance Yani's promotion as army chief in 1962, Suharto was given the

command of Jakarta based Army Kostrad. This theory also gains strength from

the fact that the army was involved in two unsuccessful coup attempts in 1952 and

1956. The 1952 incident has gone down as the famous '17 October Affair' when .

several senior officers attempted to pursuade Sukarno to dissolve the parliament.

In 1956, the acting Chief of Staff Zulkifli Lubis made a number of attempts to

ro = '6 For details of CIA's role in the 1965 affair refer to Peter Dale Scott, "The United States and the (J) fR ~ -t--. )verthrow of Sukamo, 1965-1967", Pacific Affairs(Vancouver), vol.58, no.2, Summer 1985, U) ~ ==~ ~p.239-64. ~~ m !!!!i!!i!!~ 37. "Vengeance with aSmile", Time(New York), 15 July 1966, p.26. 1--a co -1-- 38 Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, n.29, p.18 ~ ~ -

39 A paper written by Ruth McVey and Benedict Anderson in 1966 refers to this. A reference to this 'preliminary analyses' can be found in Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, n.29, p.19.

22

establish a military dictatorship. A year after, Sukarno had established his own

dictatorship through ''Guided Democracy''.

lt can be said that Suharto was a lucky man to be at the right place at the right

time. As the Kostrad commander he had the access to a sophisticated nation-wide

communications system at his headquarter. Being in the capital itself he was in

position to gain overall control taking advantage of the prevailing confusion.

Thus, he with a small group of supporters seized the opportunities as they

emerged without planning too much in advance .. The murder of six generals put a

seal of approval behind his actions against the communists. And from that point of

time he never looked back. Credit should also be given to him for the very fact he

held on to the position firmly and went on strengthening it as time progressed.

This was a. ~hieved in spite of the speculation that his health will not permit him to

continue for long. How he managed all that is, of course, a different story

altogether.

New Order Regime:

Suharto's 'New Order' government defined its main job in terms of re­

establishing order in Indonesian society. The social disturbance that the 1965 coup

heralded, called for a new approach to governance. A successful and effective

government always carries its population along with it. Not to mention the famous

quote, 'Some people can be fooled for all time, All people can be fooled for some

time, but all people can . never be fooled for all time'. Thus, Suharto, while

beginning the journey along the 'New Order' path tried to garner support from ·

different sections of society. And different sections supported him for different

reasons.

23

The expenence with parliamentary democracy in the 1950s and with .

Sukarno's 'Guided Democracy' in the first half of the decade had convinced many

of the military of the need for a much stronger government.

"With ex-Communist party members as notable exceptions, many groups felt that the new rules of the game could only be an improvement: these groups included civ~lian politicians happy to see the demise of "Guided Democracy", government economists, liberals hoping for a restoration of constitutional democracy, journalists and intellectuals happy to be freed from the ideological strictures of the Communist-linked People's Cultural Institute, Muslims pleased with the elimination of the Communists as a political force, businessmen excited at the prospect of an economic resurgence, and many others tired of ceaseless ferment. Some of these groups were to see their hopes fulfilled, others were to become gradually and then deeply disappointed.'"'0

The 'strong state', which the 'New Order' government aimed to establish, '

· · was to be relatively insulated from the interests of any particular ethnic, religious

or geographical group. It was believed that this was the essential condition of

present day industrialisation. Political order and development were perceived as

two sides of the same coin.

The consolidation of Suharto's administration, who became the acting

President in March 1967, showed all signs of an authoritarian regime namely,

centralization of authority within the army, control over the administrative

structure, less freedom for the people and the militarization of the bureaucracy.

And all this was done with an eye on every political dissident so as to make the

state of the nation entirely passive.

Suharto had realised the importance of a strong army. He never for a

moment forgot that it was with the army support that he came to power. He also

40 Adam Schwarz. n.IO, p.29.

24

never forgot that without the army's support his fate would not be much different

from that of Sukarno. But at the same time, he was intelligent enough not to allow

the army too much of leverage that might threaten his own position. His

consolidation of power, within the faction-ridden army, involved taking on one .

group at a time, isolating it and rendering it ineffective. This extremely effective

strategy paid off by narrowing down the number of groups exercising power,

which reposed ultimately in the Suharto faction.

"Under Suharto, power is not only centralized but also held in very few

hands. The President, in the final analysis, depends on the services of perhaps a

dozen key military officers each of whom presides in turn over tightly organised

and often mutually antagonistic pyramids of authority.'.41 David Jenkins in his

work 'Suharto and His Generals' talks ofthe inner core group which included ·

people like Lt. Gen. Ali Murtopo, Gen. Benny Murdani, Admiral Sudomo, Gen.

Amir Machmud, Gen. Yoga Sugama, Gen, Sudharmono, Gen. Darjatmo etc. Thus,

"Suharto' s style of leadership during the early years of the 'New Order' certainly

encouraged the belief that he followed an essentially patrimonial approach."42

Three pillars of Suharto's rule were Hankam, Kopkamtib and Eakin. Suharto

saw to it that these organisations are always headed by people who are loyal to

him. Whereas Hankam was an intelligence organisation, Kopkamtib which,

"originated in the compromise reached between Sukamo and Suharto on the ·

morning after the coup attempt in October 1965,"43 dealt with a wide range of

civilian dissidents namely PKI supporters, students and Muslim demonstrators.

"Newspapers required Kopkamtib permission to publish and on many occasions

41 David Jenkins, Suharto and His Generals, Indonesian Military Politics, 1975-1983 (Ithaca, 1984), p.20. 42 ihid. ,p.l6. 43 Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia (London, 1978), p.223.

25

this permission was temporarily and sometimes permanently withdrawn. In 1971,

Kopkamtib was entrusted with maintaining 'security and order' during the election

campaign and made many arrests to achieve this purpose. With virtually unlimited

power, the Kopkamtib was a key instrument in maintaining the government's

authority."44 Thus, Kopkamtib, a permanent martial law-like device enabled the

authorities to arrest and hold indefinitely anyone whom they suspected of

subversive activities.

A parallel body was Special Operations (Operasi Khusus, or Opsus),

which was built up by Gen. Ali Murtopo and was used for covert operation. Set up

in 1962, as an executive agency of General Suharto's Mandala Command for the

Irian campaign, it also played a key role in the negotiations to end the

confrontation with Malaysia (Konfrontasi), conducted political lobbying,

manipulated elections within political organisations and was a key· player in

organising the first New Order elections in 1971.45 The third important body was

Bakin, the State Intelligence Coordinating Body, which was a more clandestine ·

body. Established in 1967, this was a type of military dominated secret police with

responsibility for intelligence assessments and action aimed at the non-military

population, such as political parties, dissidents, the Chinese community, and

especially those who thought to be planning a Communist revival.46 Like Opsus, it

was originally constructed as a pro-Suharto organisation and operated in that

manner under the able leadership of General Benny Murdani.

The military officers in Suharto's company developed and expanded the

'dwifimgsi' or 'dual function' concept. This concept provided the theoretical

44 ihid. 45 Damicn Kingsbury, The Politics of Indonesia (Melbourne, 1988),p.65. 46 ibid .. p.66.

26

support to the military to expand its influence through out the government

apparatus, including reserved allocations of seats in the parliament and top posts ·

in the civil service. It can be mentioned here that 'dual function' owes its origin to

the then Chief of Staff General Nasution's 'half-way' or 'middle-way' speech at

the National Military Academy in Magelang, Central Java in November 1958.

There he said that:

"the Indonesian army would not follow the western model as a lifeless instrument in the hands of the government; on the other hand it should not take over the government as this would only lead to a series of coups and counter coups as in Latin America. Instead the armed forces should tread the 'middle way', participating in all areas of political and social life but not seeking to dominate the government."47

The Indonesian military never defended its expanded political role as a

temporary phase that would pass once an immediate crisis was Jver. On the

contrary, the message of 'dwi fungsi' was that the military's role in politics was to

become permanent.

(ii) Economy:

Indonesian economy, which was completely neglected under the

parliamentary period and also during the "Guided Democracy" period, warranted

urgent attention. Something quick needed to be done in the context of reining in

inflation, stabilizing the rupiah, getting a handle on foreign debt, attracting foreign

aid and encouraging foreign investment. The New Order government started

dismantling the limited economic foundations for independent capitalist

development, which had been haphazardly laid down during the ''Guided

Democracy" period. Nationalised foreign companies were denationalised and

foreign capital started playing a paramount role in the country's economy. The

47 Harold Crouch, "Indonesia" in Jakaria Hazi Ahmad and Harold Crouch, Military-Civilian Relations in Southeast Asia (Singapore, 1985), p.57.

27

'New Stabilisation Plan' of October 1966 authored under the auspices of the IMF,

abolished the preferential treatment given to the public sector. It also tried to

create a favourable environment for foreign capital investment by taking measures

such as a balanced budget, a strict limitation of government expenditure, a rigid

credit policy and abolition of the system of multiple exchange rates, which so far .

protected the domestic industries. The 'Law on Foreign Capital Investment', of

January 1967 provided complete free hand to the foreign companies to invest in

any sector of the Indonesian economy. Thus, the ·over all aim was to make

Indonesia a safe haven for foreign investors.48

At the helm of economic policy making were the forty odd economists

consisting the 'Development Cabinet'. With a uniform western capitalist vision,

this group started to 'fix the problem', which in a way reinforced the colonial

structure of the Dutch. Where as the foreign investment definitely received a .

boost, the micro economic indicators presented a dismal picture. It was the

development of a 'dependent economy' the ills of which will be dealt with in the

subsequent chapters.

(iii) Politics:

After reining in the economic front, Suharto set about creating a more

favourable political system. The idea was to restructure the political system in

such a way that it could no longer compete with the executive office for power.

The forms of government would stay, but those outside the executive branch·

would be steadily drained of influence. The military's effort to depoliticize the

political parties, under the 'New Order', included the following steps.

(i) Interfering in the election of party leaders.

48 For details see John Taylor, "Economic Strategy of the New Order", in John Taylor and others, eds., Repression and Exploitation in Indonesia (Nottingham, 1974), pp.l3-28.

28

(ii) Forming a government-backed party to contest elections.

(iii) Consolidating the opposition parties into two dissension-ridden groups.

(iv) Banning partisan activity at the local level.

(v) Staging symbolic national elections to legitimize the regime, and

(vi) Compelling parties to adopt the national ideology as their sole

organising platform.

In the immediate aftermath of Sukarno's overthrow, political parties still

held a commanding majority in the People's Consultative Assembly, 'or MPR, the

body authorised by the constitution to select a president and to which the

President was nominally accountable. However, this changed soon. In 1967, the

government formulated a law, which gave it the right to appoint one-third of the

representatives to the People's Assembly and more than one-fifth of tl1e sitting

parliament, known as the DPR. In addition, elections scheduled for 1968 were

postponed until a non-hostile parliament could be assured.

The government started interfering in the internal affairs of the political

parties. In April 1966, the Nationalist Party was forced to dismiss its pre-New

Order leaders and replace them with officials who were acceptable to the regime.

The Muslim groups had participated with the army in its attack on the

Communists. In return they expected a better treatment than what they actually

received.

"Leaders of the banned Masjumi party petitioned unsuccessfully for its reinstatement. What soon became clear was that the Military-Muslim partnership in the anti-Communist party crusade was a short-term marriage of convenience. On longer-term strategic matters, the two groups remained as far apart as ever. In 1968, Suharto authorized the formation of anew Partai Muslimin Indonesia, Parmusi, but the former Masjumi leaders were banned

from playing any part and a government nominee, Djaelani Naro, was subsequently elevated to chairman."49

29

In 1967, 'Golkar' was introduced as a new player on to the political stage ..

1t served as the government's own electoral organisation. It was a coalition of

some two hundred groups representing peasants, labour, bureaucrats, youth,

women, religion, regional associations and so on. In keeping with the army's

distaste for political parties and party politics, the new association was to be

referred to as a functional group. Later Golkar came to be dominated· by only the

army, bureaucracy and its own civilian wing, with the army remaining very much

the senior partner. The mass based groups present at the Golkar' s birth quickly

faded into insignificance, just as the masses disappeared from the political scene .

more generally.

As a continuation of the depoliticisation process the political parties were

never given any scope to represent popular opinion. They participated in the

elections as they thought it to be ideal to restore their positions as representatives

of people and to make parliament once again a, major governmental institution.

But the government was cautious enough not to let anything like that happen. The

opposition to Golkar was made so feeble that it had no chance of playing a major

role.

words:

R. William .Liddle summarises the whole situation in the following

"Although the election itself was conducted with scrupulous honesty, Golkar's campaign tactics were heavy handed on the extreme. Most civil servants and village officials were prohibited from campaigning for the parties of their own choice and instead were obliged to join and work for Golkar. Military officials became local Golkar chairmen ... Party candidate lists were screened and many names were removed from the ballot. Party

49 Adam Schwarz, n.l 0, p.31.

leaders, considered insufficiently sympathetic to military rule, were forced out of their party positions. Voters were required in some areas to register as Golkar members, were told that a vote against Golkar was a vote against the regime (or against the nation), that there would be no jobs or government services for opponents of Golkar, or that if the parties won the chaos of the massacre period of 1965-66 would retum."50

30

This sustained pressure ?n the political parties forced the party leaders to

support the government's draft on all major issues.

Elections were held in 1971. The top two vote-getters of the 1955

elections, the Nationalist Party and the Parmusi (the Masjumi's heir), had been

manipulated so blatantly that they lost all credibility with their pre-1966

supporters. Gvlkar won 63 percent of the vote. The Nahdlatul Ulama held on to

its 1955 performance claiming about 18 percent. Both the Parmusi and the

Nationalist Party claimed less than 7 percent.

In the following years, two major developments occurred which had far-

reaching consequences for the Indonesian polity. In 1973, nine political parties,

excluding the Golkar were forced to dissolve themselves and create two new

parties. Thus, the four santri-dominated Islamic parties formed the Partai

Persaluan Pembangunan or the United Development party. This step, a brainchild

of Ali Murtopo, Suharto's assistant for political affairs, a member of staf pribadi

(Spri), weakened the parties by fostering internal disunity. The former Nationalist

and Christian parties merged and formed the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI).

This added sophistication to the domination of Golkar and ensured that in future

elections 1971-like intervention won't be necessary. Suharto is reported to have

said, "With one and only one road already mapped out, why should we then have

nine different cars? The general Elections must serve the very purpose for which

50 R. William Liddle, "Participation and the Political Parties" in Karl D. Jackson and Lucian W. Pye, Political Power and Communications in Indonesia (California, 1978), p.183.

31

they are held, that is, to create political stability. Only those kinds of elections are

of value to us."51

The second development was the advancement of the concept of 'floating

mass'. Accordingly, people became a floating mass allowed to vote once in every

five years but otherwise refrain from political activity. This was accompanied by

restrictions on party activity in rural areas. Golkar too was affected by these

restrictions but it was much better able to maintain links with rural areas via the

army, which had a presence virtually in every village.

(iv) Bureaucracy:

The New Order regime, in order to set everything right that went wrong in

the previous regimes, dealt with the country's bureaucracy in the following

manner.

(a) The size of the bureaucracy was lessened. Suharto, cut the number of

ministers to fourth of what it had become in the late days of Sukamo's

regime.

(b )Suharto made his administration more loyal. Officials were recruited to

toughen the bureaucracy with an exoskeleton of military command.

(c)The president made the bureaucracy more active ... To improve their

performance, civil servants were given pay boosts, first selectively and

then across the board. 52

A new development that occurred side by side was the dominance of the

army in the government. The 'dual function' of the army that received

legitimization during the New Order saw overall army penetration in civilian

51 Adam Schwarz, n.IO, p.32. 52 Donald K. Emmerson, "The Bureaucracy in Political Context: Weakness in Strength" in Karl D. Jackson and Lucian W. Pye, n.50, p.82.

32

posts. "The data of 1980 show that ABRI' s quantitative pressure at the national

government level amounted to 53.3 per cent, at the provincial level 70.3 per cent;

district level 56.3 per cent; municipality 33.3 per cent, and for foreign service it

stood at 34.3 per cent.' ' 53

The economic development brought about changes in the social strata of

the country. It gave birth to_ an auxiliary class of officials: managers, technocrats,

technicians and professionals. The exclusion of this class from the strategic offices

of power, and the absence of any genuinely representative political structures or

rule of law have created antagonism between them and the military rulers.

Nevertheless, their general attachment to the existing economic order and the

relative privilege of their position have made them cautious of courting alliances

with the popular forces. 54 Though Indonesia is described as a 'bureaucra.ic polity'

or a 'bureaucratic dictatorship' by writers like Carl Jackson and Heri Akhmadi,

writers praising the overwhelming role of the military in the bureaucracy are not

way behind. They say that due to the pressure of the military the bureaucracy has

become rationalized, energized and more coercive in the pursuit of the goals of the

New Order.

This in brief is how Suharto ran his New Order government.

"To summarize: The New Order is neither a self-serving monolith, nor congeries of ·personalities and factions, but something in between these extremes. Bureaucratic pluralism exists, and not merely because of empire building by corrupt generals. The autonomy of relatively civilian led agencies is to an extent programmatic. So long as Suharto's and the armed forces' control over internal security is not disturbed, there is room for the least

53 Ibrahim Ambong, "Relationships Between the Indonesian Armed Forces and Golkar", Indonesian Quarterly(Jakarta), vo1.17, no.3, Third Quarter 1990, p.24l. 54 Richard Robison, "Culture, Politics and Economy in the Political History of the New Order", Indonesia (New York), no.31, April 198 I, p26.

penetrated departments to influence policy on'the broad subject of economic growth."55

33

Suharto allowed institutions to grow only to the extent that they did not

threaten his own position. An extremely pragmatic man that he was, Suharto kept

his eyes open to all such developments. He had built around him a coterie, which

knew that its interest is best served with Suharto in power.

55 Donald K. Emerson, "Understanding the New Order, Bureaucratic Pluralism in Indonesia", Asian Survey (California), vol.23, no.ll, November 1983, pp.1231-2.