Chapter 6: Interpreting the criminal environment

Target selection

‘I’ve been set a performance management plan. It is updated yearly.’ (intelligence manager)

‘I make my own decisions. I target the worst offenders.’ (analyst)

Two New Zealand intelligence professionals, quoted from Ratcliffe, J.H. (2005) 'The effectiveness of police intelligence management: A New Zealand case study', Police Practice and Research, 6:5, pp. 435-451.

Cope’s seven key variables

1. Nature of offence (the legal category of the crime)2. Location (space and place of crime)3. Time of offence4. Method of offence (modus operandi)5. Target details6. Victim characteristics7. Physical and social circumstances of the offence

ViCAP

Violent Criminal Apprehension Program After ten years, it was found that less than 10 per

cent of homicides were reported to ViCAP Original form had 189 questions

Threat assessments

National agencies such as SOCA, CISC and Europol use unclassified annual threat assessments to raise public awareness

Law-enforcement-sensitive versions used to inform law enforcement priorities and other relevant initiatives (legislation, regulation or policy)

Harm as a component of threat assessments Harm – the adverse consequences of criminal activity Metropolitan Police have four types:

Social• Negative physical, psychological or emotional consequences that

cannot readily be expressed in cash terms (as in homicide and assault) Economic

• Negative effects on an individual, community, business, institution, government or country (in as theft, counterfeiting and fraud)

Political• Negative effects on the political stability of a community or institution

(such as in corruption, loss of confidence in government or law enforcement)

Indirect • Secondary adverse consequences of criminal activities (such as

environmental damage from clandestine drug labs)

Offender self-selection

Offender self-selection may be a more ethical approach to offender targeting

Existing criminal triggers are used to identify more serious offenders

Offenders bring police attention on themselves

Self-selection example

Traffic wardens in Huddersfield, Yorkshire compared cars illegally parked in disabled bays with nearby legally parked cars. Illegal cars were:

nearly 10 times more likely to be of immediate police interest

at least 10 times more likely to be owned by someone with a criminal record, and

more likely to be driven by someone with a history of traffic violations

See Chenery et al. 1999

Playing well with others

Problems: Information sharing is a US priority after 9/11 but the

organization of police departments militates against it Small agencies rarely have the resources to address wider

concerns Memorandums of understanding are often convoluted and

take time to organize and approve

Playing well with others

Potential solutions: Informal networks spring up to work around bureaucratic

hurdles Joint task forces allow access to data from various agencies Wide dissemination of products that are not case-sensitive

can improve information sharing Liaison officers can overcome some problems

Intelligence requirements

Structured mechanisms that can aid information collation, especially when analysts collaborate

Strategic Intelligence Requirements Tactical Intelligence Requirements

Sheptycki’s organizational pathologies Digital divide - caused by incompatible information systems between

agencies Linkage blindness - where crime series cross agency boundaries Noise - low-quality information volume exacerbated by increased sharing Intelligence overload - lack of analytical capacity in the crime intelligence

system Intelligence gaps - caused by criminals operating in the spaces between

police agencies either hierarchically or geographically Duplication - caused by separate agencies keeping the same information on

isolated systems Institutional friction - between agencies with different missions, structures and methodologies Intelligence hoarding and information silos - caused by retention of

information until it is most beneficial to the information-holder Defensive data concentration - concentration of resources in one area to

address a short-term problem creates other organizational pathologies Occupational subcultures - both intra-agency as well as interagency

Sharing information – 2005 forum ideas Become intelligence-led Police chiefs should work closely with analysts Co-locate analysis and intelligence functions close to decision-

makers Articulate the analytical vision within the police department Make the case for integrated analysis Create integrated reporting mechanisms Develop informal information exchange mechanisms Consciously collect feedback and respond to criticisms Create an analysis users group Get over the whole security issue Develop technology solutions but do not fixate on them Be realistic about what can be achieved in your department

Nine analytical techniques in the NIM

1. Crime pattern analysis 2. Network analysis 3. Market profiles 4. Demographic/social trend analysis 5. Criminal business profiles 6. Target profile analysis 7. Operational intelligence assessment 8. Risk analysis 9. Results analysis

Strategic thinking Aims for a more ‘holistic’ view of the criminal

environment Uses techniques rarely taught in analysis classes

Futures wheels Competing hypothesis Force-field analysis Morphological analysis Ishikawa diagrams PESTEL(O) SWOT analysis Delphi analysis Scenario generation

(for descriptions and examples of these techniques, see Heldon 2004 and Quarmby 2004)

Futures work in crime analysis

For future work within a strategic intelligence environment to succeed, there must be:

An identifiable decision-making system to support; A will to think ahead in both the intelligence system and

the decision system to be supported; A will to apply the results in both the intelligence system

and the decision system to be supported Neil Quarmby (2004: 128-129)