CHAPTER 6

CONDUCT OF BATTLE

(STANAG 2082, STANAG 2083, and STANAG 2104;

SEASTAC3 2082 and SEASTAG 2083; SOLOG 49R, SOLOG 128,

and SOLOG 130)

Section 1.

6-1, scope

This chapter presents the fundamentals of of-fensive and defensive operations. Operationsunder nuclear and nonnuclear conditions arecompared, arid the impact of biological andchemical operations is discussed. Paragraphs6-7 through 6+2 deal with operations inwhich maneuver of combat units is not too se-riously reduced by use of nuclear weapons.Paragraphs 6-53 through 6-56 present opera-tional doctrine for an environment in whichextensive use of nuclear fires drastically re-duces the ability of ground forces to maneuver.

GENERAL

6-2. Purpose of Battle

m Battle is fought with the ultimate purposeof defeating an enemy. It is fought by a combi-nation of offensive and defensive actions, Intheir broadest sense, the terms “offense” and“defense” include the entire range of tacticaloperations.

b. The commander selects that combinationof offensive and defensive action that will mosteffectively accomplish his mission. A commandmay conduct an offensive, even though largeportions of the force are employed defensively.Conversely, the defense depends for success onthe use of part of the force offensively.

Section IL COMPARISON OF NUCLEAR AND NONNUCLEAR WARFARE

6-3. General

The conduct of both nuclear and nonnuclearwarfare is based on the application of combatpower in accordance with the principles ofwar. The difference between nuclear and non-nuclear warfare arises primarily from the in-creased combat Power provided by nuclearweapons; from a sharply inureased vulnerabil-ity of troops and installations in the nuclearefivhmnment; and from the measures requiredto counteract this increased vulnerability, toinclude inoreaaed security requirements for nu-clear weapons and their associated. deliveryand support units, In general, the difference isas Mleoted in the subparagraphs below.

a. A~em of Reqmna~bU$tg and In$ere8t, Tootl%et their vulnerability, forces operating in a

nuclear environment must be dispersed to min-imize presentation of targets remunerative tonuclear weapon attack. The extent to whichunits can be dispersed depends on the capabili-ties of each element to accomplish its mission,Determination of the extent of dispersion com-patible with capability to perform the assignedmission is a command responsibility. Force dis-persion requires assignment of increased areasof responsibility. TO operate effectively in dis-persed formations, the force must possess a re-liable control system and sufficient mobility t~make maximum use of the increased combatpower of nuclear weapons, Increased areas ofresponsibility broaden areas of interest, In anonnuclear environment, with its attendant re-duction in available firepower, the vulnerabil-

AQO 6818A 6-’

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ity of forces is less, the area that can be con-trolled is smaller, and greater concentration offorces is required. Consequently, the areas ofresponsibility and interest are smaller.

b, Dispersion. Because the dispersion re-quired by a nuclear environment invites defeatin detail, dispersion of tactical units, commandand control facilities, and combat service sup-port installations must be governed by currentand planned operations. Dispersion is propor-tional to the level of employment of nuclearweapons; therefore, limiting factors such asthe following must be considered:

(1)(2)(3)(4)

support(5)(6)(7)

forces.(8)

The assigned mission.Control of subordinate units,Adequacy of combat intelligence.Responsiveness of the combat servicetystem.Weather and terrain.Mobility of forces,Nature and disposition of enemy

Density and location of the civilianpopulation.

c. Mobility. In the nuclear environment,combat forces must be highly mobile to reducevulnerability, facilitate control of extendedareas of respons]%ility, provide mutual sup-port, maintain freedom of action, and exploitthe effects of nuclear fires. The increased mo-bility required by the nuclear environment alsohas application in the nonnuclear environment,although not always to the same degree, Thereduced firepower of the latter environment,together with the more restricted areas of re-sponsibility and the greater concentration offorces, may not present the frequent opportun-ities for deep, exploiting maneuver that char-acterize the nuclear environment.

d. Fire and Matieuuer. Army units fight bycombining fire and maneuver, This is a tech-nique of establishing a base of fire and a ma-neuvering force. These two distinct forces haveseparate missions. The mission of the base offire is to reduce the enemy’s capability to inter-fere with the movement of the maneuver forceand, within its capabilities, to destroy theenemy. The base of fire may consist of smallarms, mortars, artillery, armed helicopters,tactical air, and naval gunfire. Tanks may be

used in the base of fire when terrain preventstheir employment in the maneuvering force.The mission of the maneuvering force is toclose with and destroy the enemy. This forceconsists of infantry and armor, as available. Ineither nuclear or nonnuclear environment, fireand maneuver must receive equal considerationby the commander in determining the appro-priate combat power to be applied. As the fre-quency of employment and the yields selectedbecome greater, the effects of nuclear weaponsbegin to saturate the battle area, and maneu-ver elements find it increasingly difficult to ma-neuver decisively without prohibitive losses.However, success accrues to the combatantwho can maneuver first with a force capable ofexploiting the firepower employed.

e. Tempo @ Operations. The combination ofnuclear firepower and increased mobility sig-nificantly accelerates the tempo of operationsin the nuclear environment. Engagement offorces is of shorter duration and is character-ized by extreme violence. Deep, decisive objec-tives are sought, causing the battle to be wagedin great depth, In nonnuclear warfare, thetempo is more deliberate; engagements thatmay be decided in a matter of hours in the nu-clear environment may require several days,

f, Air Defense. The destructive power that isinherent in a single hostile aircraft or missilearmed with nuclear weapons increases air de-fense requirements under conditions of nuclearwarfare,

g. Organization for Combat. Dispersion, mo-bility, vulnerability, and tempo of operationsaffect the organization for combat. In the non-nuclear environment, greater centralization ofcontrol is practicable, particularly the controlof fires, combat support, and combat servicesupport. The commander can exert greater per-sonal direction of the course of battle, givingmore deliberate and detailed instructions to hissubordinates, both before and during opera-tions. In a nuclear environment, the opposite istrue. Combat forces tend to operate semi-inde-pendently under mission-type orders. Directsupport artillery units may be attached to thecombat elements when distances and cieploy-ments dictate decentralization of controL Thecontrol of comb~t support and combat service

. -- .... .

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support units is similarly decentralized to asignificant degree. With longer lines of com-munications dictated by increased dispersionfactors, the vulnerability of those lines of com-munications to attack and interruption re-quires even greater integration of tactical andcombat service support planning, Althoughmodern communications systems permit the in-terchange of essential orders and information,the commander must place greater reliance onthe initiative, integrity, courage, and profes-sional ability of his subordinate commanders.The trend is toward decentralization, but thecommander must be able to extend sufficient di-rection to the course of battle to provide guid-ance and prevent the force f mm becoming dis-organized.

h. Radiation Eflects and Combat E#ic&mey.Commanders of units operating in a nuclearenvironment must consider the effects of radia-tion on the combat efficiency of their unilx andtheir ability to accomplish an assigned mission.Detailed guidance to meet a widely varyingrange of radiation exposure is available in FM8-12 to assist commanders in estimating theprobable effects given levels of exposure willhave on a unit’s combat efficiency. However,commanders require a guide that meets theirneeds for interpreting available data. The fol-lowing may be used as a guide:

(1) Provided that no appreciable dose (75rad or less) has previously been received, 5 rador less in 24 hours is a low dose (negligiblerisk) and is acceptable during routine opera-tions. IIowever, more than 5 rad per day, or 75rad in a 30-day period, should be consideredunacceptable. Moderate and emergency riskcriteria are discussed in FM 3=-12.

(2) If a unit receives a cumulative dose of76 to 150 rad, the commander should regardthis unit as having received a dose that is notdangerous but is approaching the threshold forthe onset of combat ineffectiveness, especiallyif the unit receives this dose within a short pe-riod (minutes to a few hours). If the combatsituation permits, a unit in this categoryshould be exposed less frequently and to alesser risk than a unit that has not been ex-posed or that has received a cumulative dose ofless than 75 rad. All further exposures in this

range are considered moderate and emergencyrisks,

(3) If a unit receives a cumulative dose ofmore than 150 rad, the commander should re-gard this unit as potentially ineffective, and ex-posure to additional radiation will probably re-sult in a progressive increase in unit ineffec-tiveness and in probability of death for someof the personnel. If the combat situation per-mits, such a unit should not be exposed to addi-tional radiation for at least 2 months to permitample observation of actual state of health bythe surgeon and reclassification of units to aless serious radiation status category,

i. CasuuZties. In operations where nuclearweapons are employed, commanders and staffsat all echelons must anticipate sudden, severe,personnel losses within very short periods oftime. These losses may be to an extent thatcauses the combat effectiveness of both enemyand friendly forces to be destroyed temporar-ily. Thus, Army forces must be trained and in-doctrinated in rapid reorganization and in theemergency treatment of mass casualties withminimal professional medical assistance.

j. Nuclear Strike Warnings. Employment ofnuclear weapons in support of ground forcesinvolves possible risk to friendly forces. Inplanning a nuclear strike, the commander mustconsider the requirement to provide appro-priate prestrike warning to all friendly forceswho may be affected by the strike. The respon-sibility for dissemination of nuclear strikewarning (STRIK WARN ) messages rests withthe commander executing the strike. Com-manders authorized to release nuclear strikes “will insure that strikes affecting the safety ofadjacent or other commands are coordinatedwith these commands in time to permit dissem-ination of warnings and the taking of protec-tive measures. Warning of an impending strikewill be initiated no earlier than is necessary tocomplete the warning. Details and approvedformat for STRIKWAR~ messages are con-tained in FM 101-31-1.

k, Denial of Nuclear Weapons.(1) In nuclear warfare, preventing the

enemy from capturing friendly nuclear weap-ons is vitally important. Equal)y important ispreventing the enemy from using these weap.

ons if he should capture them. Denial of nu-clear weapons to the enemy will be governedby the following doctrine:

(a) The primary means of denial is themaintenance of adequate weapon security.

(b) The primary objective of denial isto make the weapons tactically useless to theenemy.

(o) The most desirable form of denialof a threatened weapon is the physical removalof the weapon from the area of the threat; i.e.,local repositioning or evacuation.

(d) In an emergency when no form ofnuclear weapon relocation is possible or advis-able, and gainful and expeditious employmentof the weapon against the enemy is impossible,destructive denial becomes necessary.

(e) Nuclear weapons are of sufficientimportance, sensitivity, and scarcity to dictatethat the standing operating procedures fortheir denial become the personal concern of thecommander. His decision is required on proce-dures in each area under varying circum-stances of operation. These procedures shouldcover all details necessary for the executing in-dividual, to include-

1. Origin of the decision to carry outemergency denial.

%?.Step-by-step procedures, includingdifferences inprocedures that may bemquiredin movement, in firing position, in a position ofreadiness, or at a storage site,

3. Instructions for the location ofnecessary denial equipment to insure ready ac-cessibility under all circumstances of storage,movement, in a position of readiness, and infiring configuration.

(2) For details on denial of nuclear weap-ons, see FM 6430-1.

6+. ~d?$ of tk of hkkr wea~n$To provide a framework for subsequent discus.sion on the conduct of battle, the phrases “re-stricted scale of use of nuclear weapons” and“unres~rk%ed scale of use of nuclear weapons”are used. These terms are necessarily relative,because there is no sharp differentiation be-tween them.

(z,The phrase “restricted scale of use of nu-olear weapons$’ is used to denote a range of op-

erational environments wherein the employ-ment of nuclear weapons, in both quantity andyield, is selective and wherein the effects there-from do not reach a level that will materiallyreduce the ability of combat units to maneu-ver effectively,

b, The phrase “unrestricted scale of use ofnuclear weapons” is used to depict a level ofemployment of nuclear weapons that is suffl-ciently high to degrade appreciably the effec-tiveness of maneuver by combat units.

6-5. Biological and Chemical OperatiwwThe decision to use biologicacal and toxicchemical agents rests with the President. Theprinciples, policies, and concepts applicable tothe employment of biological and chemicalagents are continued in FM 101-40,

64. Biological and Chemical Munitionsa. The capabilities of biological and chemical

munitions and the tactics and techniques oftheir employment are covered in FM 3-10, FM3-1OA, and FM 3-1OB.

b. Biological and chemical munitions may beemployed effectively in either the nuclear ornonnuclear environment. They are an addi-tional means available to the commander to ac-complish his mission. Biological and chemicalagenta are capable of producing large numbersof casualties. Dispersion to meet nuclearthreats has limited value in countering a largearea biological and chemical attack. Althoughsome agents have a contaminating effect on themateriel for considerable periods of time, biol-ogical and chemical agents do not destroyphysical facilities or materiel.

(1) Biological weapons are characterizedby delayed casualty efiects. They may be usedprofitably in tactical operations where planscan be phased to exploit their delayed effects;e.g., h advance of airborne, airmobile, and am-phibious operations and in retrograde opera-tions. Because of their potential for large areacoverage, biological weapons may also be ex-tremely effective against strategic targets,

(2) Chemical munitions have considera-ble applicability to tactical operations. Afterrelease of control, commanders have maximumflexibility in employing chemical agents. Vary-

ing casualty effects can be achieved by the em­ployment of lethal or incapacitating agents, Unmasked target personnel or those with known poor biological and chemical discipline are particularly susceptible to an attack with agents employed for respiratory effects. Against masked targets or those with excellent biological and chemical discipline, agents de­signed for skin penetration are more suitable. Lethal agents are appropriate when relatively high death rates are desired, Incapacitating agents are appropriate when the use of lethal agents is not desirable; e.g., when enemy troops are intermixed with the civilian popula­tion. The use of tliese agents may permit the securing of physical facilities intact without the widespread destruction that results from nuclear and high-explosive fires.

(3) These munitions may be of particular applicability in the nuclear environment when it is desired to inflict mass casualties without the creation of obstacles produced by nuclear weapon blast effects or by radiological contam­~nation. Chemical agents, in a contaminating role, may be effectively employed in denial and barrier operations and against targets that are to be bypassed.

c. Biological and chemical muriit]ons have the greatest effect when their employment is coordinated with the scheme of maneuver; other fires; and special operational plans, such as barrier plans, Such employment fosters the

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full exploitation of the combined dfects of fire and maneuver.

d. The commander’s decision for employment of biological and chemical munitions requires consideration of the following factors in the planning process:

(1) Local weather conditions, particu­larly wind speed, direction, and air stability have considerable bearing on the decision to employ these munitions.

(2) Troops must be prepared to react promptly in exploiting the effecb of these mu­nitions.

(3) Special intelligence efforts, individual and unit protective measures, and thorough training are required to reduce the effective­ness of enemy biological and chemical attack.

(4) When protective clothing and equip­ment must be worn by troops for long periods of time, their combat effectiveness is lowered. The criteria for wearing individual items of protective clothing and equipment are outlined in FM 21-40.

(5) Air mobility becomes increasingly im­portant as a means of crossing contaminated areas.

(6) Harassing chemical fires can produce a significant reduction in the combat effective­ness of enemy troops. Conversely, an excessive or inappropriate use of these fires tends to im­prove the biological and chemical discipline of the target personnel.

Section Ill. OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

6-7. General

Since the initiative is a condition in which a commander retains the capability to apply his resources to influence the battle, offensive oper­ations are preferred to defensive operations be­cause the initiative lies with the attacker. The commander possessing the initiative is able to take actions that restrict his opponent to coun-Wing actions. Commanders should seek every opportunity to gain the initiative. Bold and ag­gressive employment of combat power, the achievement of surprise, or the exploitation of enemy errors or weaknesses serve to gain the initiative. Once gained, every effort must be ex­pended to retain it. Continuous application of

force and psy~hological operations against those parts of enemy units least capable of withstanding attack, the neutralization or de­struction of the enemy’s means of influencing the situation, and the prompt exploitation of successful actions serve to retain the initiative. The initiative is retained by commanders who conduct actions rapidly and decisively and who have alternate plans ready for implementation. Offensive operations are undertaken to carry the battle to the enemy. The purpose of offen­sive operations is to accomplish one or more of the following:

O. Develop the situation. b. Defeat enemy forces.

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c. Secure territory or terrain.d. Deprive the enemy of required resources.e, Divert the enemy’s attention from other

areas.

-8. Considerations Affecting OffensiveOperations

a, The commander visualizes offensive opera-tions in terms of time and space. His estimateof the situation indicates the particular combi-nation of factors offering the highest assur-ance of success. This analysis also includes anevaluation of the pertinent elements of combatpower.

b. In offensive operations, the most decisiveresults are achieved by strong, mobile, exploit-ing forces. Offensive missions frequently haveterrain objectives, although an enemy forcemay be designated as an objective. To reach anobjective, a force goes through, over, or aroundthe enemy.

c. A nuclear environment favors the use ofsmall, highly mobile combat forces moving onthe ground, through the air, or both. Theseforces make every effort to maintain their for-ward movement. Enemy forces are destroyedby fire; bypassed; contained; or, where neces-sary, reduced by assault. The plan of attack isdesigned either to divide the enemy force anddefeat it in detail or to concentrate it to the ex-tent that it can be destroyed by nuclear weap-ons. If it becomes necessary for the commanderto concentrate his force, he does so only at thedecisive point, in close proximity to the enemy,and for the shortest practicable time. Under anonnuclear environment, greater concentrationof maneuver forces may be acceptable. To in-sure rapid execution of the attack, the com-mander exploits fully all means of tactical mob-ility,

d. In situations in which opposing maneuverforces seek a tactical advantage, the com-mander must react with maximum speed.These situations may develop in the movementto contact, the meeting engagement, the recon-naissance in force, and the exploitation. Otheroperations, such as attack of an organized orfortified position, permit a more deliberate,planned, and coordinated attack, undertakenafter thorough reconnaissance, methodical

evaluation of relative combat power, acquisi-tion and development of targets, mcl analysisof all other factors affecting the situation. Al-though such attacks are frequent in nonnu-clear warfare, they occur less frequently in nu-clear operations.

6-9. Maneuver in the Offense

h offensive operations, attacking forces aremaneuvered to gain an advantage over theenemy, to close with him, and to destroy him,The commander may orient his attack on thefront or flank of the enemy. To accomplishthis, there are three basic forms of maneuverin the attack: the penetration, the frontal at-tack, and the envelopment. A double envelop-ment, a turning movement, and an encircle-ment are variations of the envelopment.

G Penetratti In the penetration, the mainattack passes through the principal defensiveposition of the enemy. The purpose of the ma-neuver is to destroy the continuity of theenemy force, divide it, and defeat it in detail. Asuccessful penetration requires the concentra-tion of superior combat power at the point se-lected for breaching the enemy defenses. It isappropriate when strong fire support is availa-ble, when the enemy is overextended, or whenhis flanks are unassailable. If sufficient prepon-derance of combat power is available, a multi-ple penetration may be launched. In such cases,the attacking forces may converge on a singledeep objective, or they may secure independentobjectives. When it is impracticable to sustainmore than one penetration, the one enjoyingthe greatest possibility of success is exploited.After the enemy position has been breached,additional forces are committed as necessary towiden the breach, destroy the defending forces,and exploit the initial success by securing vitalobjectives deep in the hostile rear.

b. The Frontul Attaak. The frontal attackstrikes the enemy all along his front. It is em-ployed to overrun and destroy a weaker enemy.This form of maneuver is appropria@ forcorps and higher levels of command,

c. I!Wvdopnwwt. In an envelopment, themain or enveloping attack passes around orover the enemy’s principal defensive positionsto secure objectives that cut his escape routes

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and subject him to destruction in position fromthe flank or rear, This is accomplished bystriking an assailable flank and by avoidingthe enemy’s main strength en route to the ob-jective. A supporting attack fixes the enemy toprevent his escape and reduce his capability ofreacting against the main effort by forcing himto fight in two directions simultaneously. Insome situations, the supporting attack al-so deceives the enemy concerning the loca-tion or existence of the main attack. The en-velopment is facilitated by superior mobilityand by surprise. Aircraft are particularly valu-able in increasing the mobility of the envelop-ing force. Aircraft provide the means for tacti-cal parachute assault or for moving airmobiletactical forces to facilitate the rapid securingof envelopment objectives, Large-scale opera-tions of this type may, in fact, execute the ma-neuver in the form of a tactical vertical envel-opment, The success of an envelopment is de-pendent to a large extent on the ability of thesupporting attack to fix the enemy. When thesituation permits a choice in the type of ma-neuver for the main attack, the envelopment isusually preferable to the penetration because itoffers a better opportunity to apply combatpower to the greatest advantage.

(1) A variation of the envelopment is thedouble envelopment. In this maneuver, the at-tacker seeks to pass simultaneously aroundboth flanks of the enemy. The attacking forcemust have superior combat power and mobil-ity, and precise coordination afid timing are re-quired. Deficiency in any of these factors maysubject the attacking force to defeat in detail.

(2) Another variation of the envelopmentis the turning movement. In the turning move-ment, the attacking force seeks to pass aroundthe enemy, avoiding his main force, to securean objective deep in the hostile rear. The pur-pose of this maneuver is to force the enemy toabandon his position or divert major forces tomeet the threat He is then destroyed at a timeand place of the attacker’s choosing. A sup-porting attack may be required to iix theenemy, as in an envelopment; however, a turn-ing movement need not alwa~ be accompaniedby a supporting attack. Since the force execut-ing the turning movement is usually out of

supporting distance of other elements of theforce, it must be sufficiently mobile and strongto operate independently. Air transport is par-ticularly applicable for movement and initialsupport of this maneuver, Mobility superior tothat of the enemy, as well as secrecy and de-ception, enhances the opportunity for success-ful accomplishment of a turning movement.

(3) A third variation of the envelopmentis the encirclement. This maneuver offers thegreatest possibility for fixing the enemy in po-sition and permits his systematic capture ordestruction. The encirclement is a diflicult ma-neuver to execute because it requires the exe-cuting force to have a numerical superiorityand mobility much greater than is normal, Thispreponderance of forces and greater mobilitymaximize the element of surprise in executingthe encirclement. The use of airborne or airmo-bile forces enhances the probability of successin this type of operation, In the conduct of anencirclement, it is preferable to occupy the en-tire line of encirclement simultaneously; how-ever, if this is not possible, the best escaperoutes are covered first,

6-10. Infiltration

U. Infiltration is a technique of movementused with the other forms of maneuver. Theattacking force moves as individuals or smallgroups through, over, or around the enemy for-ward defense elements to a previously desig-nated assembly area in the enemy rear, Duringthe movement, these individuals and smallgroups seek to avoid detection and engagementby the enemy. By this means, a strong forcemay be deployed into the enemy rear withoutbeing subjected as an entity to decisive enemyaction during movement. Once assembled, theforce executes its assigned mission, Infiltrationis an important means of achieving surprise,

b. The dispersed pattern of a nuclear btittle-fleld presents frequent opportunities for move-ment of unitx by infiltration. In such an envi-ronment, movement by infiltration is an impor-tant technique for reducing the vulnerabilityof troops to nuclear attack,

6-I 1. Night combat

a. Night combat is an

.

integral part of all op-

A9

erations and offers an excellent opportunity fordeception and surprise, During stability opera-tions, the desirability of conducting night oper-ations to achieve surprise and maintain pres-sure against insurgents must be constantly as-sessed. The principles of the daylight attackapply; however, maintaining direction andcontrol require special measures, The degree ofsuccess attained by night attacks is largely de-pendent on the training and conditioning oftroops, prior reconnaissance, simplicity of theplan, effective control measures, and the en-emy’s night surveillance capability. Infiltrationcan be particularly effective in night operations,The objectives for a night attack are generallylimited in depth by the difficulty in maintain-ing control, particularly after the enemy hasbeen alerted. Then nuclear weapons are em-ployed, the devastating effect on enemy defen-ses may permit the assignment of deeper objec-tives.

b, Battlefield illumination and use of nightvision and surveillance equipment increase theefficiency of units operating at night and facili-tate the employment of supporting fires.

c. Then friendly nuclear fires are used atnight, adequate warning is required to reducethe problems of dazzle and loss of night vision.These fires should be carefully coordinatedwith the operations of other friendly units, In-tegration of nuclear fires with the scheme ofmaneuver is mandatory. This assists in pre-venting the creation of obstacles to the assaultelements or the alteration of terrain featuresselected as control measures, Quick-actingchemical agents can be used for casualty effecton targets when creation of obstacles by nu-clear fires is unacceptable. Enemy use of nu-clear weapons during the attack may causedazzle or Ioss of night vision for friendlytroops.

642. I%nninga. Planning an attack, like other operations,

is initiated by the receipt or assumption of amission for the force. The tasks required to ac-complish the mission are developed in the esti-mates of the commander and his staff.

b. The mission is the governing factor in thepreparation of estimates, and subsequently the

operation plan or order, and in the execution ofthe attack. All command and staff actions mustbe continuously compared with the mission toinsure that the details of the operation contrib-ute to mission accomplishment. The missionmay be to secure an area or to defeat an enemyforce. To facilitate planning, coordination, andcontrol, the mission is usually translated intospecific terrain objectives, the securing ofwhich will permit control of the area or f~lcili-tate destruction of the enemy force.

c. The objectives sel~cted become the basisfor determining the scheme of maneuver. Theyare considered in relation to the characteristicsof the area, the enemy and friendly situations,relative combat power, and enemy capabilities,These factors, once analyzed, indicate the vari-ous courses of action available.

d. After the objectives have been selected,the scheme of maneuver, allocation of availableforces, fires, combat support, and combat ser-vice support can be determined. The meansavailable will seldom permit all attackingforces and the reserve to be equally weightedin combat power. Furthermore, it is usuallyundesirable to expend excessive combat poweragainst main enemy strength when it can beemployed elsewhere with more effectivenessand greater economy. For these reasons, it isusually desirable to designate a main attackand one or more supporting attacks. The at-tack anticipated to produce the most decisiveresult and have the greatest probability of suc-cess is designated the main attack. It is ac-corded first priority in the allocation of combatpower. Supporting attacks, which are em-ployed primarily to fix the enemy and reducehis capability to react against the main attack,are allocated the minimum resources requiredto accomplish the assigned tasks. Nuclear, bio-logical, or chemical (NBC) preparatory firesmay reduce the enemy’s strength sufficiently towarrant deep, multiple, equally weighted at-tacks.

e, A portion of the combat power of theforce is held in reserve to be employed at a de-cisive time and place to obtain a favorable de-cision. The reserve is used to exploit the suc-cess of the attack, maintain the momentum ofthe attack, or provide additional security. It is

one of the commander’s principal means of in-fluencing the action once the operation is un-derway. The strength and composition of thereserve vary with its contemplated mission, theforces available, the type of offensive opera-tion, the form of maneuver, the terrain, possi-ble hostile reaction, and the clarity of the situ-ation. When the situation is relatively clearand enemy capabilities are limited, the reservemay consist of a small fraction of the force.When the situation is obscure, the reserve mayconsist initially of the bulk of the command,prepared for employment at any point. Whilethe reserve should be large enough to obtain adecision when it is committed, the forces allo-cated to it must not unduly weaken the mainattack. It must be provided adequate combatsupport and the necessary transportation—both air and ground—to achieve the requiredmobility, Once the reserve is committed, a newreserve is reconstituted with minimum delay.

f. The fire support plan provides for fires indirect support of the assault elements and ingeneral support of the entire force. Provisionis made for adequate support of the reservewhen it is committed. An important considera-tion is the decision on whether to fire a prepa-ration. Such a decision is based on knowledgeof the enemy’s dispositions, NBC protection,available ammunition, and the results expectedconsidering the loss of surprise. When nuclearweapons are to be employed, the plan includesthe general allocation of nuclear weapons andfires to subordinate units; the use of nuclearweapons in the preparation, if fired; and thenumbers and types of weapons to be held in re-serve. Retention of nuclear weapons in reservegives the commander an additional, powerfulmeans of influencing the course of the opera-tion. Areas wherein reserve forces and weap-ons are likely to be employed are kept underintensified surveillance. Certain areas may beso critical to the success of the operation as towarrant allocation of specific weapons and theestablishment of rapid, prearran~ proce-dures for calling for the fires. When nuclearweapons are to be employed in the preparation,the predicted obstacles that will be createdmust be evaluated as they affect the movementof friendly troops.

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g. Attack plans include the measures for co-ordination and control of the various spects of

dthe operations. As a minimum, obj tives; anda line of departure, time of attack; or startingpoint, are prescribed. Additional measures mayinclude the assignment of zones of action,boundaries, axis of advance, direction of at-tack, lines of departure, phase lines, andcheckpoints. The guiding principle in the useof control measures is maximum freedom ofaction for subordinate commande~s, yet thehigher commander must maintain sufficientcontrol to insure a coordinated for~a effort.

6-13. Executiona. The attack is characterized by fire and

maneuver, combined and controlled to create apreponderance of combat power, that culmi-nates in a powerful and violent assault in thedecisive area.

b. Once the attack is launched, flexibility andspeed in the employment of combat power areparamount. The attack is characterized by aseries of rapid advances and assaults by ma-neuver and fire until the final objective is se-cured. The attack is executed vigorously andall favorable developments are exploited, If theadvance lags in any portion of the zone, theweight of the attack should be shifted quicklyto a part that offers greater opportunity forsuccess. The attack maintains continuous mo-mentum and is not delayed to preserve thealignment of units or to adhere closely to thepreconceived plan of attack, Momentum ismaintained by—

(1) The timely employment of reserves,the airlift of combat elements, the redirectionof units on intermediate objectives, and theprovision of adequate combat support and com-bat service support, or a combination of thesemeans. In some instances, commitment of aportion of the reserve may be sufficient to ac-complish the desired task.

(2) The advance of attacking echelons asrapidly as possible to their objectives. Enemyresistance is bypassed unless it can be quicklyoverrun or is so strong that it interferes withaccomplishment of the mission. If the com-mander decides to bypass enemy strongpoints,he must recognize the danger of subsequent en-

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trapment as well as the effect the bypassedforces may have on succeeding phases of theoperation, including the danger to followingcombat service support units.

(3) The timely displacement of combatsupport elements and the provision of plansfor close-in protective fires and fires to supportthe continuation of the attack.

(4) The modification of combat servicesupport plans or the implementation of contin-gency plans to provide the necessary support tosustain operations, to include airlift of sup-plies.

c. To maneuver forces most effectively andemploy fires to gain his objectives, the com-mander must keep informed of the progress ofthe attack, enemy reactions, and the situationconfronting subordinate units. During the at-tack, he may increasingly decentralize controlto subordinate commanders to permit them toreact more rapidly to changes in the situation.Through knowledge of the situation, and of thehigher commander’s concept of the operation,the subordinate commander modifies and im-plements the plan.

d. Between areas of enemy opposition, at-tacking forces move rapidly by ground and air.When enemy resistance is encountered, thecommander’s first consideration is to reducethis resistance by having his leading elements,supported by fire, rapidly overrun and destroythe enemy. If a more deliberate attack mustbe made, attacking echelons move within as-saulting distance of the hostile position underthe protection of supporting fires and smoke.In a short, violent, and well-coordinated at-tack, the assault force destroys the enemy bymaneuver, fire, or a combination thereof. Whennuclear weapons are employed, a deliberate at-tack is usually unnecessary.

e. The commander provides security withoutsacrificing the momentum of the attack, Plansand procedures should prescribe actions to betaken in event of an enemy counterattack. By-passed enemy forces must be contained or keptunder surveillance pending subsequent elimina-tion, Covering forces, patrols, flank guards,eoheloned reserves, and firepower protect ex-posed flanks andtion from ground

~ln

gaps between units. Protec-attack may frequently be re-

—

quired for combat support and combat servicesupport units when areas to the rear of attack-ing echelons have not been cleared. Halts arekept to the minimum; they permit the enemyto reorganize and may sacrifice the momentumof the attack. Especially in nuclear warfare,the failure to exploit an advantage relentlesslymay nullify the success achieved. When unitsmust be rested and resupplied, they are re-placed by fresh units or reserves to maintainthe momentum of the attack, For those unitsauthorized to halt, orders should include thetime and area of the halt, missions and loca-tions of supporting units, and command andcontrdl measures, Some units may be divertedinto dispersal areas to prevent congestion dur-ing the halt, Dispersal areas are planned toprovide concealment, to aid defense, to reducevulnerability to enemy attacks, and to facili-tate resumption of the attack, Units in disper-sal areas take protective measures to reducetheir vulnerability.

~. Minimum forces, making maximum useof supporting fires, consolidate the objectives,The remainder of the command disperses andreorganizes to continue the attack without de-lay. Designated combat elements maintain con-tact and obtain information on which the com-mander plans future actions, Continuation ofthe attack with fresh troops, a new directionof attack, or exploitation of success by thereserve may require a passage of lines. Passageof lines must be executed with great speedunder nuclear conditions. Use of the wide zone,characteristic of nuclear warfare, providesgaps between friendly units that can be effec-tively used by the passing forces.

6-14. Meeting Engagement

A meeting engagement is a combat action thatoccurs when a moving force, incomplete]y de-ployed for battle, engages an enemy force(static or mobile) about which it has inade-quate intelligence. The action ceases to be ameeting engagement when the enemy’s situationhaa been developed and subsequent planned andcoordinated operations are undertaken. Theseactions occur frequently at the lower echelonsof command in both offensive and defensive op-erations, The principal characteristics of meet-

ing engagements are limited knowledge of theenemy and minimum time available for thecommander to develop the situation and formu-late and execute plans.

&l 5. Movement to Contacta. Movement to contact is a tactical opera-

tion designed to gain or reestablish contact. Anadditional objective of friendly forces duringmovement to contact is to gain an advantageover the enemy that will facilitate future oper-ations. Maximum advantage of position at thetime of contact is achieved by properly organ-izing the force for combat and by maneuveringthe force components, The movement to con-tact is pushed aggressively to gain the objec-tive before the enemy can react. Every intelli-gence and security agency is used so that themain force will become engaged under themost favorable conditions. Air cavalry unitsmay be effectively employed in intelligence andsecurity roles, to include light air and groundcombat during the movement to contact. Tacti-cal aircraft and long-range missile fires may ~employed early to achieve fire superiority. Thebulk of the combat power of the force shouldremain uncommitted to permit flexible employ-ment upon contact with the enemy. Executionis decentralized, but sufficient control is main-tained to permit effective use of long-rangesupporting fires.

b. The movement to contact is normallymade in multiple cohnnns. The command isnormally organized into a covering force, amain body that includes the advance guard,and flank and rear security forces. Subordinatetactical groupings employ various formationsas required by their individual situations andmissions.

c. The composition, size, and operations ofthe covering force may influence the entirecourse of the battle. The mission assigned thecovering force is to develop the enemy situa-tion and prevent unnecessary delay of the mainbody. Its operations may include attacking todestroy enemy resistance, securing and holdingkey terrain, or containing large enemy units,The covering force is organized to accomplishits mission well forward ofhighly mobile, well-balanced

Aao6818A— —

the main body. Aforce is required.

FM 100-5

Close coordination between the covering forceand the main body is essential. Normally, con-trol is retained by the overall commander ofthe force moving to contact. However, widelydispersed operations may favor decentralizingcontrol to column commanders.

d. The main body contains the bulk of com-bat power of the force. Units of the main bodyare organized for combat and are positioned inthe advancing columns to permit maximumflexibility for employment during the move-ment or after contact with the enemy is estab-lished. The advance guard is used to expeditemovement of the main body, to maintain con-tact with the covering force, and to provide se-curity to the front of the main body.

e. Flank and rear security forces protect themain body from ground observation and sur-prise attack. These security forces must bestrong enough to defeat minor enemy forces orto delay strong enemy attacks until the mainbody can deploy. Flank and rear securityforces operate either under the control of thecommander of the force moving to contact orunder the control of subordinate elements movi-ng in proximity to them. Close coordinationwith air reconnaissance, observation, and sur-veillance contributes to the security of themain body.

f. The movement to contact may frequentlybe made at night or during other periods of re-duced visibility. This requires all units to beskilled in night movement. The movement tocontact terminates when major enemy resist-ance necessitates the deployment of the mainbody.

6-16. Reconnaissance in Force

A reconnaissance in force is a limited-objectiveoperation by a considerable force to discoverand test the enemy’s dispositions and strengthsor to develop other intelligence. A reconnais-sance in force is usually planned and executedas a limited-objective attack. Even when heuses it primarily to gather informati~ a, thecommander executing a reconnaissance in forceis alert to seize any opportunity to exploit tac-tical success. If the enemy situation must bedeveloped along a broad front, a reconnaiss-ance in force may be conducted using strong

6-11

probing actions to determine the enemy situa-tkmatselectedpoints. The size of the force issufficient tocausethe enemy to react in aznan-ner that discloses his location, disposi-tions, and strength. Since a reconnaissance inforce is used when the knowledge of oppositionis unknown, a combined arms force of infantryand armor, with artillery, Army aviation, andengineer support, is employed. Reconnaiss-~nce-in-force operations may result in unac-ceptable losses, disclose the commander’s ulti-mate intentions, or provoke an unwanted gen-eral engagement, When the enemy possessesappropriate nuclear delivery means, the risk inpresenting a profitable target may outweighthe value of the information desired. The re-connaissance in force is particularly adaptableto the fluid characteristics of the nuclear bat-tlefield and will serve as the basis for many of-fensive operations.

647. Exploitation

a. Exploitation is the followup of gains totake full advantage of success in battle. It isthe phase of offensive operations that destroysthe enemy’s ability to reconstitute an organizeddefense or to withdraw in good order in theface of a threatened disaster. The psychologi-cal effect of exploitation creates confusion andapprehension throughout the enemy command,reduces the enemy capability to react, and maybe decisive.

b. Planning for exploitation should providefor rapid, continuous advance; adequate com-bat support and combat service support; andthe selection of decisive objectives. %ovisionmust be made for regrouping of component e]e-ments while other elements continue the ad-vance. Army air reconnaissance and securityunits may be effectively employed a8 intelli-~enoe and security agencies throughout allphases of exploitation.

c. The missions of exploiting forces includethe seizure of deep objectives to cut enemylines of communications and the disruption ofe~emy command and control facilities, The mis-sion assigned the exploiting force commandershould be sufficiently broad to avoid restrictionof opportunities to disrupt and destroy theenemy. The commander must realize that

troops and their leaders frequently are tired atthe time opportunity for exploitation occurs,and aggressive, demanding leadership is re-quired.

d. Exploitation is usually initiated when theenemy force is having recognizable difficulty inmaintaining his position. This condition is in-dicated by decisive gains by friendly forces;lessening of enemy resistance, particularlysupporting fires; and an increase in the num-ber of prisoners captured and equipment aban-doned. Once begun, the exploitation is executedrelentlessly to deny the enemy any respitefrom offensive pressure in the drive to thefinal objective,

e. Forces in the exploitation normally ad-vance on a wide front, depending on the mobil-ity of the force, road net, and other aspects ofthe terrain. Only those reserves that are neces-sary to insure flexibility of operation, contin-ued momentum in the advance, and minirnum-essential security are retained. Airmobile andairborne forces are used to secure objectivescritical to the advance and to cut enemy linesof escape. Swift raids, thrusts, and envelop-ments by ground and airmobile forces delay orprevent enemy reorganization, Actions arecharacterized by boldness, prompt use of avail-able firepower, and rapid and unhesitating em-ployment of uncommitted units. The exploitingforce is committed in the decisive direction,

f. The exploiting force commander must bealert to prevent the dissipation of combatpower in achieving minor tactical successes orin reducing small enemy forces. The aim is toreach the objective with the maximumstrength as rapidly as possible, Control is vitalto prevent overextension of the exploitingforce if the enemy is capable of regrouping un-expectedly to attack the command, Availablefires are employed to destroy enemy forces thatcannot be bypassed or contained. Security fromenemy nuclear attack is enhanced by rapid ad-vances to keep enemy forces off balance and toneutralize their intelligence and surveillancecapability.

g. The effectiveness of the exploitation maybe enhanced by the commitment of additionalforces with a mission of following and sup-porting the exploiting force. These forces

b12 AGO6918A

,:. FM 100-5

widen or hold the shoulders of the penetration,secure lines of communications, and relieve ele-ments of the exploiting force containing by-passed enemy forces. Control of the forces per-forming a follow-and-support mission is re-tained by the next higher commander. Liaisonbetween the following and supporting unit andthe exploiting unit should be accomplished.Units given a follow-and-support missionshould, where possible, possess or be providedmobility equal to that of the exploiting unit.

6-18. Pursuita. The pursuit is designed to cut off and an-

nihilate a hostile force attempting to escape.As enemy demoralization begins and enemyforces disintegrate under relentless pressure,an exploitation may develop into a pursuit. Apursuit may also occur in any operation inwhich the enemy has lost his ability to operateeffectively and attempts to disengage. In a pur-suit, the enemy loses his ability to influence thesituation and acts in accordance with the pur-suer’s actions.

b. In the conduct of a pursuit, direct pres-sure against retreating forces is maintained re-lentlessly, while an enveloping or turning forcecuts the enemy lines of retreat. Double envel-opments of the retreating main force are exe-cuted when conditions permit. Maximum useshould be made of airmobile and airborne ele-ments in the enveloping forces.

c. Pursuit operations are conducted aggres-sively and under decentralized control, Com-manders remain well forward to provide impe-tus to the operation and must take decisive ac-tion to overcome any inertia in the command.Pursuit is pushed to the utmost limits of en-durance of troops tind equipment during bothdaylight and darkness. Tactical air supportwill assist in inflicting damage on the retreat-ing enemy, concentrating on his lines of with-drawal and his reserves. Continuity of combatservice support is vital to the success of thistype of operation.

Section IV. DEFENSJVE

6-19. Purpose

a. Defensive operations employ all meansand methods available to prevent, resist, ordestroy an enemy attack. The purpose of a de-fensive operation may be to-

(1) Develop more favorable conditionsfor offensive action.

(2) Economize force in one area to applydecisive force elsewhere.

(3) Destroy or trap a hostile force.(4) Reduce the enemy capacity for offen-

sive action.(5) Deny ‘In enemy entry into an area.

b. In the defe,, ~~ the commander seeks toUSQthe operational area and means avai]ableto his advantage and to the enemy’s disadvan-tage.

64206 Mensiw CwMdera?ioma, In defensive operations, the defender

, seeks to seize and retain a degree of initiativeby selecting the area of battle, by foraing theenemy to react in confomity with the defen-siv~ pl$n, and by exploiting enemy weakness

AQO6$1~

and

OPERATIONS

error. Defensive operations may be im-posed by an inability to attack. However, thecommander—particularly under fluid, nuclearbattlefield conditions—may deliberately under-take defensive operations in combination withdeception to destroy the enemy.

b. The deliberate shift from offense to de-fense, or vice versa, may occur rapidly andwith considerable frequency. A defensive oper-ation usually is a composite of major andminor actions and engagements. Elements ofthe command may be defending, delaying, at-tacking, feinting, or delivering fires as part ofthe defense.

o. An ofiensive attitude is necessary to seizeopportunities to destroy the enemy. Psycholog-ical preparation of troops and strong leader-ship in the defense are essential to maintainhigh mmvde, alertmess, and an agg~essive alt-itude. The troops must understand that an ef-fective defense is an opportunity to destroy theenemy,

d. The conduct of defensive operations underadverse conditions is the supreme test of the

&13

,

FM 1Q()-5

field commander. The defender must fully usethose advantages that he possesses and can im-provise. He must take greater risks and con-serve his resources, yet commit them unhesi-tatingly and decisively at the proper time. Hemust deal with the serious problems of leadingtroops without the evident success of offensivecombat. The highest order of leadership andtactical skill is demanded.

e. The mission and the area to be defendedshould be stated in terms that permit the com-mander to use his means to maximum advan-tage, with minimum restriction on specific ter-rain features to be held. Defensive operations,however, inherently require restrictions notpresent in offensive operations. These resultfrom the need for some degree of centralizedcontrol to insure the most effective use of re-sources, so that an adequate reserve remainsfor the decisive portion of the action.

6-21. Forms of Defense

a. Mobile Dejewe. The mobile defense isthat defense in which minimum forces are de-ployed forward to warn of impending attack,to canalize the attacking forces into less favor-able terrain, to impede and harass them, and tocause their disorganization. The preponderanceof the combat power of the defending force isemployed in vigorous offensive action to des-troy the enemy at a decisive time and place.

(1) In general, the forward defense areaforces employ the principles of the delaying ac-tion, while the remainder of the force uses theprinciples of offensive combat. In nonnuclearoperations, the mobile defense is applicable tohighly mobile warfare and to situations inwhich broad frontages must be covered. Thistype of defense is the preferred form in the nu-clear environment, because it reduces their vul-nerability to nuclear attack and perserves theirfreedom of action. In both environments, themobile defense may provide an opportunity todestroy the attacking force and regain the ini-ti~tive, Set patterns of action are avoided. Thedefending commander must retain freedom ofaction to choose the time and place to launchMs decisive counterattack. This form of de-fense requires that the defending force havemobility comparable or superior to that of the

enemy. The utilization of airmobile forces inthe mobile reserve will improve the flexibilityand responsiveness of the overall force to tacti-cal situations.

(2) Generally, successful employment ofthe mobile defense depends on the ability ofthe defending force to yield terrain to achievedecisive results through the employment of thereserve as a counterattack force. Forward de-fense area forces should not be overextended orexposed to defeat in detail. Forward defensearea forces must possess sufficient combatpower to compel the enemy to concentrate hisforces for attack where they may be destroyedby firepower and maneuver. When circumst-ances dictate that a portion of the force con-duct a mobile defense while adjacent units areconducting an area defense, the flanks of theadjacent units cannot be exposed by the for-ward defense area forces of the mobile defenseunits.

b. Area Defcwe. Area defense is based on re-tention of specific terrain.

(1) When retention of specific terrain ismandatory, the commander places primary re-liance on the ability of fires and forces de-ployed on position to stop and repulse the at-tacker. The force may or may not be physicallyon the key terrain or its approaches before theenemy attacks, particularly under nuclear con-ditions. In retaining specific terrain, the com-mander must use sufficient forces in the for-ward defense area to create the necessary com-bat power on or to dominate the terrain to bedefended. The forward defense area normallyhasahigher priority for forces than does thereserve, The reserve is employed to block anddestroy the enemy, to eliminate penetrations ifthey occur, or to reinforce threatened areas.The defensive concept requires detailed fireplans, organization of the area to exploit thenatural defensive strength of the terrain, andplans for the maneuver of the reserve.

(2) Thearea defense normally @keamax-imum advantage of existing obskcles, reducesthe danger of attack at night or by infiltration,and forces the attacker to employ maximumcombat power to accomplish a penetration,

c. Vatitiom &Defwiv6@wattow.(1) The area defense and the mobile de-

+14 AGO6918A

fense are at opposite ends of a scale of widevariations in defensive operations. Frequently,neither of these basic patterns will be suitableto a given situation andmission, In such cases,a variation incorporating applicable portionsof each mustbe devised,

(2) In a larger force conducting the de-fense, the operations of the various componentunits may encompass both defensive patternsand delaying operations, with certain unitsbeing assigned primarily an offensive role.

&-22. Maneuver in the Defense

a. Maneuver by combat elements in the de-fense includes the spoiling attack, the counter-attack, the counteroffensive, and the delayingaction. Offensive maneuver is important in allforms of defense and is particularly significantin the mobile defense, Offensive maneuver isundertaken to exploit the results of attack byNBC and other weapons, to destroy a penetrat-ing force at a time and place of the defender’schoosing, to strike the enemy when he is un-prepared and thus achieve significant results,or to assist in disengaging a force. The delay-ing action is employed to permit units to moveto other positions from which they can executeeither offensive or defensive missions or togain space for employment of nuclear weapons.

b. A spoiling attack is an offensive operation

launched by a defender against enemy forma-tions that are preparing for attack. Its purposemay be to destroy a portion of the enemy force,to throw the enemy off balance, to secure ter-rain from which to launch an attack, or todeny the enemy ground observation and sur-veillance of the defended area.

6-2% Defensive Areas and Forcqs

a. The defensive areas are the security area,the forward defense area, and the reserve area.Forces And fires of the command are allocatedto each in accordance with the defensive plan.The general scheme of maneuver or defensiveorganization of these elements is prescribed insufficient detail to permit intelligent executionof the plan.

& Forces of the security area furnish infor-mation on the enemy, deceive him, and providea oounterreconnaissance

AGO6M8A

screen, Within their

FM 100-5

capabilit~, they delay the enemy and reduce hiscombat power. Under active nuclear conditions,an important additional mission is locating anddeveloping nuclear targets. Elements of the se-curity force may be designed to stay behindadvancing enemy elements. The compositionand support of the security force include long-range reconnaissance and observation means,both ground and air; strong firepower; a highdegree of mobility; and excellent and securecommunications.

c. The composition of forward defense areaforces varies with the defensive purpose.

(1) When the defense is based on the re-tention of specific terrain, major forces areused to organize the ground, Because of the in-ability to develop an impregnable defense, a re-serve is required to maintain the continuity ofthe defense.

(2) The forces allocated to the forwarddefense area in a mobile defense, while not sostrong as those in an area defense, must be ca-pable of forcing the enemy to deploy. They re-quire long-range fire capabilities and normallya mobility equal to or greater than that of theenemy.

d. The forces of the reserve are the primarymeans by which the defender regains the ini-tiative. Retention of a relatively large reserve,consistent with the requirement for forces inother defensive areas, permits offensive actionboth within and forward of the battle area.When the mobile defense is employed, the re-serve is the strongest and most decisive ele-ment of the force, While it may be required toperform defensive actions, its primary missionis to defeat the enemy by offensive combat. Thecombat power allocated the reserve includesfire as well as maneuver elements. When nu-clear fires are authorized, the ability of the re-serve to concentrate overwhelming combatpower quickly in a given area greatly increasesib offensive capabilities, In addition, the re-serve provides flexibility and may be used to-

(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)

Reinforce units.Occupy positions,Insure retention of key terrain.Assist in disengagement of units.Replace forward units,Extend flanks.

6-15

FM 100-5

(7) Provide security against infiltrationand airborne and airmobile attack.

(8) Conduct operations against irregularforces.

6-24. Planning

a. Development of the best overall defensiveplan requires consideration of—

(1) The mission.(2) The nature of the terrain and the de-

gree to which specific terrain must be held.(3) Relative mobility.(4) The depth of the defensive area.(5) The relative combat power of oppos-

ing forces,(6) The relative air and nuclear situa-

tions.(7) Reserves available at higher echelons.(8) The ability to provide combat service

support for the various plans.(9) The deployment of combat service

support units and facilities supporting theforce.

b. The means available to the commander inplanning defensive operations include forcesdeployed in defensive positions, fires respon-sive to the commander, and units maneuveringin conformance with the defensive plan. Eachof these means depends on the others for maxi-mum effect. The defender’s task is to combinethese means in proper proportion to accom-plish the defensive mission. Considerationsar+

(1) Facilitating the use of these means byexploiting the natural defensive strength ofthe terrain. The natural strength of the areacan be increased by the aggressive, offensive-minded use of fortifications and barriers andby the development of detailed fire and maneu-ver plans. Normally, the defender can selectand reconnoiter the defended area before itsorgmization and thus influence the attacker toconform to the defensive plan.

(2) Holding orcontrolling s~ifictirrainas indicated bythetission. Theterrainis aria-lyzed to determine the relative criticality of av-enues of approach into the defensive area,areas suitable for offensive action, and existi g

7or potential obstacles that, if developed, wiSxvmgthen the defense.

{\

c. Fires are planned to destroy the enemyforce or to permit exploitation by maneuveringelements to complete its destruction. As thelevel of use of nuclear weapons increases, therelative importance of fires in defensive opera-tions increases. Fires are planned to permit en-gaging the enemy force early although, insome instances, fire may be withheld to developmaximum surprise and shock. The decision tofire at long range or to withhold fires is criticaland must be made by the commander in eachcase. Plans must be sufilciently flexible to per-mit this latitude. Fires are planned against allelements of enemy combat power, such asenemy fire delivery means, reserves, commandand support installations, and units in contact.

d. Effective combat intelligence is criticaland is normally difKcult to obtain because thedefender lacks the initiative and is frequentlyinferior in combat power and reconnaissancemeans. Thus, the defender must make the mosteffective use of the means available. His de-tailed knowledge of the operational area, plusthe increased susceptibility to detection of theattacker on the move, permits him to concen-trate Ns effort on likely assembly areas, criti-cal defiles, and other areas the enemy is likelyto use.

e. The counterattack is a basic element ofthe defense. Its function varies in accordancewith the type of defense being conducted. Al-though there are occasions wherein the coun-terattack is made by fire alone, more decisiveresults usually accrue from a combination offire and maneuver. The principles of offensivecombat are applicable to the conduct of thecounterattack. Plans for the defense includecounterattack plans in those areas whereinthey are most likely to be required or wherethe maximum opportunity to destroy enemyforces may occur.

(1) In the area defense, the function ofthe counterattack is to destroy or eject the pen-etrating force and regain control of the battlearea.

(2) In the mobile defense, the counterat-tack is the decisive element by which the com-mander accomplishes his mission. The objec-tive is to destroy the enemy force and to ex-ploit the ensuing opportunity to regain the ini-

AGO 5M8A

tiative, to include operations within the en-emy’s rear area.

f. The employment of biological and chemi-cal weapons is planned for defensive opera-tions. Use of persistent-effect chemical agentsmay increase the effectiveness of fires againstknown enemy weapon positions and enemy re-serves not suitable for nuclear attack. Persist-ent-effect chemical agents are also used to con-taminate barriers, obstacles created bydemoli-tions, and defiles as an aid in impeding enemymovement and canalizing his advance. ~onper-sistent-effect chemical agents may be employedagainst targets of opportunity and against con-centrations of troops in the attack. Chemicalminefield, including mineflelds in which chem-ical and high-explosive mines are intermixed,are included in barrier plans.

g. Barrier plans are developed concurrentlywith other plans. It is necessary to take maxi-mum advantage of natural obstacles and to im-prove them. The effectiveness of an obstacle isextremely limited when it is not covered byob-servation and fire. Lanes and gaps are requiredfor the necessary movement of reserves andother forces in the battle area. Barrier plansestablish the location of barriers, responsibil-ity for construction, and priority in comple-tion. The barrier plan is developed concur-rently with antitank and fire plans and mustbe carefully coordinated with counterattackplans.

6-25. Defense Against Arm-w

a. Effective operations against an enemy pos-sessing a significant armor capability requireantitank defenses throughout the operationalarea, Such defenses are planned to cover thoseavenues of approach presenting the greatestthreat to the command.

b. Maximum use is made of natural andmanmade obstacles to facilitate the destructionof enemy armor by canalizing it into the fieldsof fire of antitank weapons. The entire anti-tank weapon system is used. This includes indi-vidual antitank weapons, mines, tanks, artil-lery, armed ~ircraft, and nuclear weapons. Theantitank defense is established in depththroughout the defended area. Artillery high-explosive and chemical fires may be used on

FM 100-5

tanks to destroy the weapon, to produce casual-ties among the crews and accompanying infan-try, and to separate the infantry from thetanks to facilitate close-in infantry antitankaction.

c. lf the enemy armor succeeds in overrun-ning forward areas, antitank weapons locatedin depth seek to stop this advance. Forces inthe forward areas must remain in position toprevent enemy infantry from accompanying itsarmor and to contribute to the destruction ofthe penetrating tanks. Reserve forces heavy inarmor are then committed to destroy the pene-tration.

6-26. Executiona. ln the defense, a continuous, aggressive,

intelligence collection effort, including the useof air and guerrillas, is essential in determin-ing the probable strength, composition, direc-tion, and time of the enemy attack.

b. The action of combat units on positionmay vary from delay to defense at all costs.Combat units employed in defensive positionsaccomplish their mission by destroying theenemy with fires and by impeding his advanceto the extent that he can be destroyed by fireand maneuver. Combat units may disengageand shift rapidly from defensive to offensivemaneuvers.

c. Unless surprise offers a gl*eater opportu-nity for success, the attacking forces are takenunder fire as early as possible by aircraft andlong-range artillery. As the enemy advances,he is taken under fire by elements in the secur-ity area. Security forces warn; deceive; de-velop intelligence; and, if part of the mission,execute maximum delay without becoming de-cisively engaged. They inflict maximum casual-ties on the advancing enemy and force him todeploy. As a means of collecting target infor-mation, security elements may remain in thearea after passage by the enemy,

d. The attacker’s disposition forward of thedefensive area may favor a spoiling attack.When considering such an attack, the com-mander must evaluate the risks involved interms of their effects on accomplishment of his

mission.e. As the attacker approaches the forward

FM 100-5

defense area, he is taken under fire by allweapons within effective range, unless fires aredeliberate withheld as a surprise measure,Previously selected target areas are kept underclose surveillance, For maximum effect on fleet-ing targets, fires must be readily responsive tothe commander.

f. 1n the mobile defense, the forward ele-ments conduct essentially a delaying action.Their operations may extend over considerabledepth in the battle area. These elements must,however, be prepared to stop and hold terrainon short notice to assist the success of the deci-sive counterattack. The mobile defense is basedon the counterattack as the decisive element.Criteria for determining when the counterat-t~ack should be launched are primarily thosefor assessing offensive maneuver, Among thesignificant considerations are the degree towhich the forward defense area forces huvesucceeded in weakening the attacker and thepotential remaining for further reducing hiseffectiveness. It is desirable that the enemy bestopped or slowed down and that he be disor-ganized, but these are not requirements andshould not inhibit initiative in launching thecounterattack.

(1) The counterattack capability is notdissipated against minor enemy success. Whenthe counterattack is launched, it is given thefull means to accomplish the mission. Piece-meal commitment of counterattack forces jeop-ardizes the success of the operation, Thecounterattack is carried out rapidly and vio-lently, employing as much combat power MInecessary to insure success.

(2) On occasions, it may be necessary tolaunch separate countera~cks against two ormore enemy forces. The more effective methodis the elimination of enemy forces in order ofthe seriousness of their threat. Simultaneouscounterattacks by elements of the reserve di-v~de the available combat power and should beavoided, but such action may be required insome situations.

(3) Although counterattack pkmsareprc-pa~*ed in advance, the counterattack may belaunched before or after the times planned andin an entirely different area than anticipated.The probability of successful accomplishmentof the mission is the controlling factor.

(4)Local counterattacks on a small scalemay be used to assist in disengaging a force orto cause the enemy to change his plans. Small-scale attacks conducted with skill and determi-nation may have an effect on the enemy out ofproportion to the actual combat power in-volved.

g. The area defense is conducted in recogni-tion of the fact that the battle area has beenorganized to halt the enemy; or if he pene-trated the forward defense area, he must beblocked and contained in areas that favor thecounterattack. The counterattack is the princi-palmeans foreliminating the penetration, Thetime to launch it is one of the most dificult de-cisions required of the commander. It shouldbe launched at the time the attacking force ismost vulnerable. It may, however, be launchedas a result of an inability to cause the enemy toreact to the defensive plan, Following penetra-tion of the forward defense area, there is a pe-riod during which the momentum of the attackmay be slowed, the attacking force somewhatdisorganized, or the attacker’s combat powerdissipated to the extent that he is vulnerable toattack. Considerations in selecting the timeand place for the counterattack are similar tothose of the mobile defense. Additional consid-erations peculiar to the area defense are—

(1) Dissipation of fires and reservesagainst minor penetrations may leave the de-fender without means to react against majorpenetrations; or

(2) If the penetration achieves such suc-cess that a counterattack would be ineffective,it may be necessary to use the reserves in ablocking role and depend on higher echelons toconduct the counterattack.

SectIonV. RE7’ROGRADE OPERATIONS

6-27. General away from the enemy. A force executes 8 re-a. A retrograde operation is any movement trograde operation voluntarily only when a

of a command to the rear, to the flanks, or distinct advantage is to be gained, In either

L1 R .0..---.” .

FM 100-5

~Vgnt, st~ch an action must be approved by the~mt higher commander. TO be successful, it~@ be executed according to well-organized@ins. Adisorgtmized retrograde operation inthe faceof enemy strength invites disaster.

b. Retrograde operations conducted inn nu-ulw+w environment necessitate prepmvltion ofd~tailetl plans for the tactical employment ofnuclear weapons, to include highly selectiveuse of atomic demolition munitions. Revisionsto the initial scheme of maneuver may be nec-essary to reduce those vulnerabilities inherentin retrograde operations, Key identifiable ter-fain positions may have to be avoided in consid-eration of enemy nuclear cap~bility. Closecontact with the enemy is maintained as longas possible. Emphasis is cmtechniques to deny relativelyto the enemy.

6-28. Types of Retrograde

mobile defensiveimmobile targeta

Actions

Retrograde actions are classified as—a. Withdrawa/-An operation by which all

or part of a deployed force disengages from theenemy.

b. Dek@ng actio-An action in which aunit trades space for time and inflicts maxi-mum punishment on the enemy without becom-ing decisively involved in combat.

c. Retirement-An operation in which nforce not in contact moves away from theenemy.

d. Combi?uztion of t~pe8—In a large com-mand that is in contact with the enemy, a com-bination of the above types usually is neces-sary, either simultaneously by adjacent units,or by one type developing into another. For ex-ample, a retirement is frequently preceded by awithdrawal. A retirement may be covered by alkwae exeouting a delaying aotion.

w Retrograde movements are conducted toac~om@ish one or more of the following:

(1) To harass, exhaust, and inflict punish-rnmt on the enemy.

(2) To draw the enemy into an unfavora-ble situatkm.

(8) To pe?mit employment of the com-mand or a portion thereof elsewhere.

(4) To avoid combat under undesirableconditions.

(5) To gain time without fighting a deci-sive engagement,

(~) TO disengage from battle.(7) To conform to movements of friendly

troops.(8) To shorten lines of communications.

b. Retrograde operations by a defender maypermit him, with the lesser portion of hisforce, to reduce the combat effectiveness of anattacker so that these two forces approach par-ity. Nuclear fires enhance the eflect of a delay-ing force. The resulting situation permits thedefender to seize the initiative with offensiveaction by his reserve elements. Skillful use ofterrain to slow down, confuse, and deceive theenemy is exploited by firepower, demolitions,and raids to make the enemy pay a high pricein casualties for the ground he gains.

6-30. Withdrawal

a. Local withdrawals are normal in defen-sive operations, Combat units may frequentlymake withdrawals to perform other missions,These withdrawals may involve disengagementfrom the attacking force. Under certain cir-cumstances, it may be necessary for the de-fending force, or an element thereof, to executea general withdrawal. A gene~*al withdrawalmay be part of a plan, as in a delaying action.

b. A withdrawal not under enemy pressurerequires the use of effective countersur-veillance and primarily depends on speed of exe-cution and deception. It may be accomplishedby stealth or in conjunction with a nuclear orground attack to divert the enemy’s attention.Plans must include provisions for the eventual-ity of detection and interference with the at-tempted operation. Successful withdrawals ofthis type normally will be limited to darknessor other periods of poor visibility or to difficultterrain under conditions of friendly air superi-ority, Poor visibility and difllcult ter~*ain com-plicate friendly control. The use of smoke andconcealed routes assists in reducing the enemycapability to observe friendly movements.Enemy interference by use of airborne or ~ir-mobile troops must be anticipated.

c. A withdrawal under enemy pressure de-

Mafl E818A 6-19

pends on maneuver, firepower, and control. Allavailable fires, to include nuclear fires, may beused in the withdrawal of closely engagedfriendly forces, Forward elements move to therear by aggressively employing small-unit de-laying tactics. The rearward movement mustbe coordinated.

& Wh~n simultaneous withdrawal is notpracticable, the commander must determinethe order of withdrawal. Withdrawing themost heavily engaged units first from the areasof greatest enemy pressure may subject majorelements of the command to encirclement anddestruction. Withdrawing the least heavily en-gaged units first may result in loss of all or amajor portion of the most heavily engagedunits, The decision must be based on a determi-nation of which plnn best preserves the integ-rity of the force and which best contributes toaccomplishment of the mission.

e, Reserves are deployed well forward to as-sist in the withdrawal by fire or ground attack.When withdrawing under pressure, the reservefrequently launches spoiling attacks to disor-ganize, disrupt, and delay the enemy attack.Reserves may also be used to cover the with-drawal and to extricate encircled or heavily en-gaged forces.

f. A withdrawal may not always involveplanned disengagement, When a force not ini-tially engaged with the enemy withdraws, itscontinued retrograde movement becomes a re-tirement (para 6-32).

6-31. Delaying Action

a. The delaying action is a defensive opera-tion in which a force inflicts maximum delayand damage on an atticker without becomingdecisively engaged, This is the type of actionnormally fought by the forward echelons ofthe mobile defense, although these forces mayhave some additional restriction on their mn-m+uver and area of operations. Entrapmentsmay also be facilitated by a delaying force.

b, In the delaying action, most of the combatpower of the force conducting the operation isclisposed in forward areas. Fires are decentral-kiwel.Reserves are employed primarily to assistin the disengagement Qfforward elements.

U,A delaying action may be accomplished ona single position, cmsuccessive positions, on al-

ternate positions, or by suitable combinationsof these. Delaying positions are organized inlimited depth, since full reliance is placed onlong-range fires to facilitate the delay. Closecombat is avoided.

cl. The integration of a delaying action intothe mobile defense is covered in paragraph6-21u. It is employed in u similar manner inoperations designed to entrap an enemy force.

e. In conducting a delaying action, forces en-gage the enemy at long ranges to cause casual-ties and to force him to execute time-consum-ing deployments. In some situations, however,long-range fires may be deliberately withheldfor deception purposes. Delaying forces striveto offer sufficient resistance to prevent infiltra-tion and to force the enemy to maw for deli-berate attacks. A massed enemy is attackedand destroyed by fire and, where appropriate,exploited by maneuver. If the operation is notdesigned to deceive or entrap, the commanderof the covering force subjects the advancingenemy column to repeated flank attacks by ag-gressive mobile forces, inflicting maximum de-struction while avoiding decisive engagement.The availabi~ity of low-yield nuclear weaponsand precision delivery systems will assist dis-engagement and may permit the command toaccept closer engagement than would other-wise be practicable.

6-32. Retirementa. A retirement normally will be covered by

security forces that may execute delaying oper-ations. The retii*ing force may be subjected toguerrilla att~cks, airmobile or airborne raids,long-rtinge fires, and enemy psychological war-fare operations, Movement may also beimpeded by refugees.

b. Security is an important consideration inexecuting a retirement. Movement by night isemphasized; day movement may be possibleonly by infiltration of small groups, Maximumadvantage is taken of air mobility. In the ini-tial phases of the retirement, elements of thecommand may separate and move in dispersedgroups to designated assembly nre~s. The retir-ing force fights only as required by its mission,Maximum use is made of communications se-curity meassures, especially rndio listening si-lence.

“km AGO 6918A

FM 100-5

Section VI. REAR

6-33. General

overall area security and control is the respon-sibility of the senior commander in the area,butrear area protection (RAP) presents prob-lems that are different from those existing inthe forward area. The primary mission per-formed in rear areas is combat service support.The purpose of RAP is to prevent or minimizeenemy interruption of combat service support,with its resulting reduction of combat effec-tiveness of the force. In modern warfare, thethreat of such interruption is much greaterthan in the past. Installations that were for-merly protected by distance from the front arenow within range of mass-destruction weap-ons. Extended frontages and wide g~ps be-‘tween combat forces increase the vulnerabilityof rear areas to attack and require greater em-phasis on RAP and counterintelligence meas-ures. RAP is divided functionally into reararea security and area damage control.

6-34. Rear Area Security

a. Rear area security operations are thosemeasures taken before, during, and after anenetny airborne or airmobile attack, sabotageaction, infiltration, guerrilla action, to reducetheir effects, These measures do not include ac-tive air defense operations. Attacks of a mag-nitude that endangers the entire command arepart of the main battle and beyond the scope ofrear area security.

b. The enemy capability for airborne, airmo-bile, guerrilla, or infiltration operations pre-sents a continuous threat to the rear areas of acommand. Successful employment of these cap-abilities by an enemy can have a dernorali~ingand decisive effect on an unprepared force anduan disrupt its continuity of combat servicesupport. In stability operations, requirementsfor base defense may cause use of combat unitsfor security.

c. Plans to secure the rear area must be pre-pared to counter the enemy threat. Accurateand timely intelligence concerning the enemy’scapabilities, including use of guerrillas, is animportant consideration in developing the ov-erall plan, The composition and strength of

.-- Oma OA

AREA PR~TECTl~N

forces assigned missions of rear area securitymust be based on the evaluation of the enemy’scapability and the primary mission of the over-all force. Further, such plans integrate Wmeans, to include not only all friendly forces inthe area, but friendly guerrillas and paramili-tary forces that are available. Successful de-fense, or destruction of enemy forces in rearareas, depends on the ability of friendly forcesof sufficient size to react rapidly and on the ef-fectiveness of communications,

d. The lines of communications, which in-clude all the routes-land, water, and air—that connect an operating military force with abase of operations, and along which suppliesand reinforcements move, are the lifelines ofthe military force in a theater (area) of opera~tions. The longer the lines of communications,the more vulnerable they are to interdiction,The destruction or serious interruption of thelines of communications jeopardizes accom-plishment of the force mission and, therefore,constitutes a major consideration in the con-duct of effective rear area security operations.

e. Forces committed to rear area securityshould be adequate to counter the most likelyenemy threat or combination of threats. Unitslocated in the rear area must be fully used tocontribute to the defense of installations andlines of communications. Eflective rear area se-curity requires th~t each installation plan, pre-pare, and rehearse for its own defense and itspart in the overall rear area security plan, Thenature of the threat may require locating ororganizing highly mobile combat forces in rearareas. Positive command authority; clear areasof staff responsibility; and adequate, securecommunications must be established, Lmatingand fixing the enemy is one of the major prob-lems in rear area security, Frequently, thismay be accomplished best by controlling areaslogical for enemy attack until the enemy re-veals his location and permits the launching ofoperations to destroy him,

~. Plans must provide for the defense of crit-ical areas or Installations. First priority mustbe given to the u~e oftroops for security of

combat service supportth~ir own installations,

&91

w low

A security force may also have to be disposedin dispersed locations where elements canmove to block enemy threa~. When the enemyis located, those elements of the security forcenot engaged in blocking are assembled rapidlyf6r decisive action to destroy the enemy. Unitsmay aot on their own initiative; however, con-trol must he established to insure coordinatedaction as the nature of the threat is clarified.

6-35. Area Damge Cmtrd

Area damage control includes those measurestaken before, during, or after hostile action ornatural or manmade disasters to reduce theprobability of damage and minimize its effects.These measures include both preventive findreadiness actions.

a. Preventive measures include dispersion,rehearsals, construction of protective shelters,development of warning systems, and counter-intelligence.

b. Readiness measures include the establish-ment of area damage control teams. Theseteams should be equipped and trained to estab-lish control at the scene of the event: assessdamage; provide emergency medical treatmentand evacuation; provide emergency feedingand water; conduct flrefighting and decontami-nation of materiel; perform traftlc oontrol; andmonitor, mark, and report the degree of con-tamination in the area.

=6. Command Arrangementsa. In the rear area, all commanders are re-

~ponaible for local security and area damagecontrol for their own uniti and installations,C)verall responsibility for RAP in a specificarea is the responsibility of a designated conn-mander. He is responsible for insuring the in-t~gr~ticm of local seourity and area damageOontrol plans into an overall RAP plane Whenueaeasary for operational control and coordhm-tiun, subareas are formed within the rear area.All units physically within the subarea, indud”ing combat unit replacement awaiting assign-xmmt, are integMed into the RAP plans forthat subarea. ThWWplans are coordinated be-Wwm adjaaent units and with higher head-Wm?tirs,

b, RAP and aombat sorviee support activitiesare performed in the same geographic area and

involve the same forces. Since the use of com-bat service support units in RAP is a diversionfrom their primary mission of supporting com-bat forces, the manner and extent to whichthese units are diverted must be the decision ofthe commander responsible for all these inter-related activities. Thus, an effective system forRAP must possess the following characteris-tics:

(1) A single commander responsible foractivities in the same geographic area with thenecessary staff and communications, These ar-rangements must not be temporary or impro-vised or be established only after attack,

(2) A definite fixing of geographic re-sponsibility.

(3) A ccmtrol structure that prevents con-flict and competition among organizations re-sponsible for rear area security, area damagecontrol, and combat service support,

6-37. Defmse Agaimt Aivbme andAhmbile Attcwk

a. Defense against airborne or airmobile at-tack includes air defense measures, a warningsystem, troops disposed or available to defendlikely landing zones and objectives, and a mo.bile reserve, Every effort is made to isolate mlprevent reinforcement of the enemy forces. Iflocal forces are not able to defeat the attacker,they form a base for counterattack bystronger, mobile reserves. Armor is effectiveagainst airborne and airmobile forces whenavailable and when the terrain permits its use.

b. A major problem is to obtain accurate in-formation on the location and extent of enemylandings. This problem results from exagger-ated reports, scattered landings, and communiscations breakdowns in the affeoted areas, Allmeans of observation and communications areused. Unless ground vehicles are air trans-ported in large numbers, airbame forces arerelatively immobile after landing. This usuallyrequires that airborne forceg land on or neartheir objectives. This fact can be used to ad-vantage by the commander in planning his de-fense. It assists Mm in deoidlng where to de-P1OYforces in anticipation of airborne attackand how to employ them during the attqck,Consistent with troop safety, nuclear weaponsare used against enemy formations in the air

&iiM

FM 100-5

and during landing, or on their assembly areaswhen they can be loaated.

c. When a major airborne or airmobilethreat justifies the expenditure of resources,and when time permits, obstacles and barriersare improved or constructed in likely drop andkmding zones and in exits toward logicalenemy objectives, While obstacles and barrierscannot be considered an absolute defenseagainst airborne attack, they impede theenemy and deny him free use of available ter-rain and may reduce the number of forces nec-essary to defend key areas. Inundation, propo-sitioned atomic demolition munitions, andchemical agents should be considered in an-tiairborne or antiairmobile defense.

&38. Defense Against Infiltration

a. Defense against infiltration becomes in-creasingly important as dispersion on the bat-tlefield increases, Enemy forces may infiltrateand assemble in rear areas for attack. An infil-trated enemy force constitutes an enemy targetacquisition unit that can call down accurate,long-range fires. Early detection and elimina-tion of these forces are essential.

b. Measures that aid in controlling infiltra-tion include extensive counterrecormaissance,combat patrols, antipersonnel obstacles, warn-ing devices, electronic surveillance devices, aircavalry, and defoliation of wooded approachroutes. Every effort is made to identify likelyenemy assembly areas to the rear of friendlyforces. Priority is given to destroying theenemy in these areas before he can reorganizeand launch his ~ttack.

6-39. Ihfmse Against Guerrilla Fercesa. All units and installations are subject to

guerrilla attack and sabotage. EITective local

security is essential to defense against these at-tacks. Special provisions are made for—

(1) Ground and air reconnaissance ofrear areas.

(2) Aggressive patrolling in the localareas and between installations,

(3) Mutual assistance by adjacent units,(4) Defense of installations and critical

areas.(5) Armed escortAJ.(6) Use of friendly civilians as guides,

agents, or counterguerrilla units,(7) Mobile combat forces usimg air or

ground vehicles, or a combination of both, totake offensive action against guerrillas.

b. Intelligence is required on areas suitablefor guerrilla bases, identity of guerrillaleaders and civilian supporters, communica-tions facilities, and sources of supply, Guer-rilla effectiveness depends in great measure oncurrent information. Thus, care must be takento prevent their securing information offriendly operations, installations, and troopmovements. Particular attention must be givento communications security, especially trans-mission security measures.

o. The political, administrative, and eco-nomic aspects of the area are considered in de-fense planning. Special attention should begiven to measures to deny logistic support tothe guerrilIa force. Guerrilla forces cannot op-erate efhxtively unless supported in some de-gree by the local populace, Continuous effortmust be placed on gaining the support of thelocal populace in counterguerrilla operations,Planning is coordinated with overall RAPplanning, information on the conduct of popu.lace and resources control operations is son.tained in FM ~1-23.

d. Additional details on counterguerrilla op-erations are contained in FM 31-16.

Sectk VU. BATTLE UNDER S?IiCIAta CQNt)lTlON$

6-M). General or a combination of these, may require spe-Battile under special conditions encompasses cially trained troops and speoial techniques,thosa operations in which the natural and tactios, or materiel. AU Army forces are capa-mamnade oharaderistics of the area, the na- ble of operations under these conditions, butM% of the opwihns, the unique conditions special training and equipment may be re-under which the operations may be conduoted, quired.

AGO6818A L23

FM 1004

6-41. fortified Areas

a. A fortified area is characterized by nu-merous mutually supporting defensive worksand localities, organized in width and depth,Seldom will the fortified area be a singlestrong] y organized locality. Fortified areasprovide the defender with a high degree ofprotection and permit economy of force. Defen-sive works may consist of permanent-type for-tifications and extensively developed field forti-fications located within an extensive barriersystem. Additional characteristics of a fo~*tifl~clarea include a strong outpost system, which, initself, may be fortified; a well-developed roadand signal net; and a highly mobile reservecentrally located and provided with an exten-sive network of covered approaches.

b. In offensive operations, enemy fortifiedareas are normally contained by minimumfriendly forces, while the main force bypassesand continues the advance to more distant anddecisive objectives. Action to reduce a fortifiedarea may include a siege or an attack from therear. NBC munitions facilitate the destructionand neutralization of fortified areas. The abil-ity of biological and chemical figents to pene-trate structures and fortifications lessens theeffectiveness of cover. Surface and subsurfacenuclear bursti may be employed to create gapsin the fortified area or to isolate sections of thearea. If nuclear bursts we used, they must becarefully coordinated with adjacent forces andevaluated as to possible interference withfriendly maneuver.

c. A primary purpose for the defense of afortified area is to involve the enemy in reduc-ing fortified positions so that he dissipates hispower and becomes vulnerable to counterat-tacking forces, Such a defense permits econ-omy of force in forward areas, thus makingavailable proportionately larger reserves for 8counterattack. These reserves must be highlymobile and aggressively employed to insure thesuccemful defense of a fortified area.

d. Details on combat in fortified and built-upareas are contained in FM 91-50.

6-42. BuWJp AreasCL.Built-up areas containing solid masonry

or concrete and steel structures modified for

defense purposes resemble fortified areas,These areas are conspicuous topographical fea-tures for which details are usually uvailable,They offer cover and concealment for troopsand weapons, Built-up areas may be untenablebecauseof their susceptibility to neutralizationor destruction by conventional or nuclear mu-nitions. These areas are also vulnerable to neu-tralization by biological or chemical munitions.Extensive subterranean systems may providethe defender with additional protection, Built-UP areas reduced to rubble retain their defen-sive characteristics and restrict the use of mo-torized or mechanized forces, Fighting inbuilt-up areas is characterized by close combat,limited fields of fire and observation, canaliza-tio,l of vehicular movement, and difficulty incontrol of troops. In employing NBC weupons,the commander must consider their effect onthe civilian population and make plans for itscontrol and evacuation.

b. When practicable, built-up areas are by-passed find isolated. If they must be reduced,methods applicable to reduction of fortifiedareas are employed. Terrain dominating theapproaches is secured to isolate the area. Mo-bile forces are used best in the enveloping role.Objectives within the built-up area are selectedto divide the enemy defense. In a nuclear envi-ronment, the advantages gained through theuse of nuciear weapons must be weighedagainst the creation of obstacles to the assaultforce.

c. The defense of a built-up area should beorganized around key features whose retentionpreserves the integrity of the defense and per-mits the defender to move readily. Plansshould provide for using subterranean systemsin defending against nuclear attack. A built-uparea is prim~rily an obstacle to the nttacker,but mayalso bean obstacle to the defender incounterattack operations, Consequently, consi-deration should be given to defending outsidethe built-up area. Defense of a built-up areamust provide for a reserve to counter enemyaction within the built-up area andoz]thedom-lnating terrain outside the area.

6-43. INver Lines

a. Wide, unfoldable rivers impose restric-tionson movement and maneuver. They consti-

FM 100-5

tute obstac~es to the attacker and form naturallines of resistance for the defender. An attackacross an unfoldable river requires tacticaland technical preparations propotiionate to thesize of the river and the relative strength ofopposing forces. Other requirements for the at-tack of a river line are special types of intelli-gence, specialized training, close coordination ofall forces, crossing equipment, and adequatemeans for control during the crossing. Thetimely use of airmobile and airborne forces fa-cilitates river crossings and should be fully ex-ploited. Maximum use is made of Army avia-tion in all stages of river-crossing operations.

b. As a result of the planning initiated dur-ing the advance to a river, the commnnder de-P1OYSforces in a manner that insures readyavailability of essential crossing means whenthe river is reached, The advance to an unfold-able river is made with great speed on n broadfront. Speed m]d violence in the attack, plusthe confusion of battle, may create an opportu-nity to secure bridges before the enemy de-stroys them. The actual crossing of a river ispart of the overall operation and not the pri-mary objective. Supporting fires, particularlynuclear or chemical, may be used to secure nbridge intact by neutralizing the personnel de-fending the bridge. The advantage gained bycapturing a bridge must be exploited. A bridge-head must be promptly established to secure orconstruct the bridge and permit crossing of theremainder of the command.

c. In a nuclear environment, the capabilityof the defender to employ nuclear weapons amp-lifies the requirement for multiple crossingson extended frontages, Continuous movement,without delay for buildup, is essential. Combatforces mounted in amphibious armored vehi-cles 8peed the crossing and reduce the depen-dence on bridges.

d. Defense of a river line is facilitated by theorganization for defense that exploits the natu.rgl terrain features and the resources availa-Me. Only screening forms may h at the river

6-44. Jungles

a. Jungles are areas of tropical rain forestand secondary growth, varying in locale frommountains to low-lying swampy plains. Theyare further chtiracterized by a lack of in-dustrial or cultural development and fully de-veloped lines of communications. Jungle ter-rain and climate limit movement, observation,fields of fire, communications, and control, Be-cause of these limitations, the difficulties ofjungle operations increase in proportion to thesize of the force involved, Cover and conceal-ment are excellent in this type of terrain andincrease the possibility of achieving surprise.As a result, both the attacker and the defendercommit large portions of available forces to se-curity missions. Key terrain features in jun-gles include trails, navigable rivers, highground, and communications centers. Thesefeatures are diflicult to identify because of in-ferior maps and limited visibility, The value ofhigh ground may be reduced by restrictions onobservation and fields of fire. An additionalcharacteristic of jungle operations is the re-duced capability to acquire targets. Heavy for-ests have characteristics similar to those ofjungles.

iA In the offensive, security elements are es-sential to prevent surprise and to protect thecommand, In jungles, successful security forceoperations are dependent on proper trainingand conditioning of troops in off-trail move-ment. Airmobile and uirborne units with airlines of supply facilitate jungle operations,Since the size of offensive operations is ofteniimited by the capability to resupply the force,bases of supply are profitable targets for at-tack.

c. The critical aspect of a defense in junglesis the communications network. To guardagainst surprise, the defense must be organizedin depth, provide all-round defense, and con.tain well-organized security forces both for thedefended area and for supply routes, Provisionmust be made for a mobile reserve, Biologicaland chemical agents are particularly effective

IIne wh& the defense is being conducted @ in jungle operations because of the nature ofmarily by nuclear fires. -

6. Details on river-crossingumtained in FM $1--60,

hnn R.*Q.4

operations arethe terrain and atmospheric conditions, Defoli-ants can be used to improve observation andfields of fire. If nuclear weapons are emploved,

6-25

FM 100-5

they can be used to create obstacles throughblast effects or radiological contamination toenhance any natural obstacles that may be pre-sent.

d. Details on jungle operations are containedin FM 31-80.

645. Deserts

o. Deserts are semiarid and arid regions con-taining a wide variety of soils in varying re-lief, Deser@ have one common characteristic—lack of precipitation, which results in a lim-ited water supply. However, flash floods occurih these regions. Because of the shortage ofwater, vegetation is scarce, In these areas, mil-itary operations rely on an adequate supply ofwater. Depending on the terrain relief and thetrafficability of the soil, the lack of roads mayor may not canalize operations. A greater free-dom of movement exists in these regions thanin other mvms, Highly mobile forces may playa dominant role in operations in semiarid andarid regions, Freedom of maneuver and thevastness of these regions favor a fluld type ofwarfare characterized by dispersed formationson extended frontages with considerable depth.Additional characterititios include increasedproblems of control, limited concealment, dim-culty in determining location and maintainingdirection, increased combat service support andequipment maintenance problems, and a re-quirement for specialized training and acclima-tion of all personnel, Ground reconnaissanceforces, provided with armor and air defensemeans, and air reconnaissance elements are es-sential to prevent surprise. Air superiority isextremely important to successful desert oper-ations.

b. During offensive operations in semiaridmd arid region$, wide envelopments by ar~nored, mechanized, or motorized forces are fa-Kn!ed beoaww of freedom of maneuver. Be”xwso of limited concealment, surprise must be\ttained by deception, appropriate cwnmunica-&ms seaurity measures~ and rapid movemenkFeriods of limited vi~ibility should be ex-)loited. (lhjectlves for the attxwk includemerny troops, communications centers, 8upplyNwes,water sources, and key terrain features.I?heinfluence of olimate and terrain in arid *

gions must be considered in planning the use ofnuclear weapons. Likely nuclear targets in”elude combat service support and air installa-tions.

c. Defensive operations in these regions em-phasize mobility and flexibility, Provisionshould be made for direct fire weapons, a highdegree of mobility, and adequate and securecommunications. The organization of the de-fense should emphasize measures against airand armor attack.

CLDetails on desert operations are containedin FM 31-25. ‘

646. Mountains

a. Mountains cause compartmentation ofmilitary operations. Their rugged characteris-tic limit road nets. Vegetation may vary fromjungle to bare slopes. The weather is charac-terized by rapid, extreme changes in tempera-ture accompanied by mist, rain, or snow. Oper-ations in mountains frequently require specialequipment, training and acclimation of person-nel to altitude conditions. Mountainous terrainretards and restricts mobility, reduces the ef-fect of firepower, and makes communicationsand supply difficult. Key terrain features in-clude heights that dominate lines of communi-cations, mountain passes, roads, bridges, andrailroads. Within density-altitude limitations,helicopters are valuable for moving equipmentand personnel. Nuclear and chemical weaponscan be used in mountain operations to restrictmovement. Increased reliance must be placedon weapons having a high angle of fire and onarmed aircraft.

b. In mountain operations, frontal attack ofan enemy position is avoided whenever possi-ble. Envelopment of enemy positions is facili-tated by the crossing of difficult terrain withspeoially trained and organized forces. Air-transported forces are ideally suited for envel-opments. Although aentrally planned, the exe-cution of attacks is normally decentralized be-cause the capability for control i$ limited byterrain, The use of armor in the maneuverforce will be reducecl, but its direct fire capa-bilities are used when possible, Flanks, detiles,road nets, and communications centers must besecured, When nuolear weapons are available

FM 100-!

.b support the attack, small-yield weapons maybe favored to avoid blocking restricted avenuesof approach.

c. Control of dominating terrain protectingroad nets or passes normally is the key to theorganization of a defense in mountainousareas, Security forces are required to preventsurprise, particuhwly of observation posts andpatrols, Air reconnaissance is useful as a se-curity means and permits observation of other-wise inaccessible terrain. Although counterat-tacks are difficult to plan and execute, they canbe deuisive if timed properly. Nuclear andchemicol weapons can canalize the enemy oraugment barrier plans.

d. Details on mountain operations are con-t~ified in FM 31-72.

@17. Deep Snow and Extreme Cold0perath2ns

a. Deep snow and extreme cold are found inthe arctic, subarctic, and temperate zones andat high altitudes in all zones. The areas inwhich tlmse conditions exist vary from for-ested to relatively barren regions and vary ex-tensively in population. The subarctic and arc-tic regions of the world constitute the largestareas of deep snow and extreme cold, An addi-tional characteristic of these areas is the obsta-cles to movement created by thaws, Deep snowdoes not necessarily reduce the mobility of pro-perly trained and equipped troops; in certainterrain, it may enhance their mobility.

b. The conduct of operations in arctic andsubarctic regions will require the applicationof special techniques and equipment and willbe affeoted by the following factors:

(1) During the winter, cold, snow, frozenwaterways, permafrost, and short periods ofdaylight prevail. These factors create prob-lems, such as constant need for shelter andheat, incmmsed dependence of taotioal opera-tions cm combat service support, ditlloulties inthe contdiructioa of fieid fm%ifloatimw, difii~cultks in establishing and maintaining com-munications, and need for spedal *nter equip-ment and @thing, Airoraft may uzw frozen -lakes and rivers for landing areas.

(2) During the summer, the area is uhar-aoterized by numerous and extensive swamps,

lakes, and rivers; abundant insects; and, a!times, continuous daylight. Special equipmentsuch as boats and low ground-pressure trackecvehicles, is needed. During these conditions, de’creased mobility and increased vulnerabilit~make special skills in movements a prime con’sideration,

(3) During the spring breakup, sudderthaws weaken the ice on waterways ancswamps and make existing roads almost im”passable, The ground thaws to a depth va~yin~from a few inches to several feet, depending orthe geographic location of the area. These fat.tors will hamper extensive overland movement.

(4) During the fall, ground and water.ways frequently freeze before heavy snowfalls. Before the snowfall, troops and vehiclescan move cross country with ease; however, illsome cases early snowfall will insulate thtground and prevent its freezing until late inwinter. This condition impedes cross-countrymobility.

(5) During all seasons, the lack or scar.city of roads affects large-scalo operations, par”titularly combat service support, which in.creases the requirement for engineer supportand extensive use of air lines af communications. Limited map coverage adds importanc(to effective navigation vnd control measures.Extensive forests and barren land connpllcatxall types of operations.

c. Offensive and defensive operations irthese areas are conduoted as in other climatesHowever, operations in these areas will requir~greater combat service support-especiall}fuel, clo*hing, and shelter-and more time tcaccomplish even simple tagks, Since road”bound troops are extremely vulnerable to al”types of enemy action, the capability to mowcross country is a requirement for successfu”operatio~. The control of land routes of com~munications is vital in both offensive and de”fensive operations. Typical nuclear targets in’cltade combat service support installations anccommunication centers,

c&Details on northern operations are comtained in FM 31-71.

648. IUvedne Qpetutkmoa. Riverine operations are military opera

AGOI18MA 62

tions conducted in areas with extensive inlandwaterways and inundated or swampy terrain.. b. A riverine area is a land environment

characterized by water lines of communica-tions with an extensive network of rivers,streams, canals, paddies, swamps, or muskegextending over broad, level terrain, parts ofWhich may be inundated periodically or perma-nently. It may include sparsely populatedswamps or forests, rivers and streams thathave steep banks densely covered with tropicaltrees or bamboo, and relatively flat and openterrain. Ocean tides may affect riverine areasnear the seashore or far inland, These areasmay support a large agrarian population con-centrated along the waterways, e.g., the rice-growing delta areas of Southeast Asia. Otherriverine areas may be completely devoid ofhuman habitation, e.g., the vast muskegswamp areas of northern Asia and NorthAmerica.

c. In developing areas where overland trans-portation capabilities are limited and surfacewater is abundant, inland waterways providenatural routes for transportation and commun-ications and are logical centers of popul~tion,In riverine areas water routes have strategicand tactical importance to military forces.They are particularly important to guerrillaforces in insurgency operations. Defeat of in-surgents in a riverine environment requires in-terdiction and control of waterways and adja-cent land areas.

d. Riverine operations include all militaryactivities designed to achieve or maintain terri-torial control of a riverine area by destroyinghcwtile forces and restricting or eliminatinghostile activities, A characteristic of riverineoperations is the extensive use of joint water-moblle forces, together with groundmobile andairm~bile forces, in a predominant land battle.Airmobile forces are particularly suited foruse in blooking, reserve, or reaction roles inriwwine operations because their movement isunrestricted by terrain. The basic nature ofriwwine operations is ground combat in a landenvironment characterized by water lines ofcommunicaticm.

e, The optimum organization for commandand oontrol of riverine operations involving

both Army and Navy elements is the joint taskforce (JTF). The commander of the Armycomponent committed in a riverine area is theJTF commander, with a small joint staffformed from the assigned component staffs.The unified commander may consider that ade-quate assistance can be provided by a closesupport relationship. This method provides forcontrol of a riverine operation by mutual coop-eration and coordination, with the Navy ele-ment providing close support to the Armyforces.

f. All means of mobility are somewhat re-stricted during riverine operations, Foot move-ment is least desirable for maneuvering forces;it exhausts troops and severely limits theirrate of movement, Movement and maneuvernormally require n combination of availablemeans of mobility—foot, wheeled or trackedvehicles, shallow-draft boats, helicopters, andfixed-wing aircraft. Water transportation maybe used extensively to move troops and equip-ment. Exploiting the movement, fire support,and logistic capabilities of supporting Navyelements significantly enhances Army fire-power and maneuver capabilities.

o. Tactics and techniques governing otherground operations apply in riverine areas. Spe-cial organizational and operational proceduresare required when offensive ground forces,supported by naval ships and craft, operate di-rectly from inland waterways.

h. Riverine operations are distinct from am-phibious operations in that they require contin-ual use of specialized watercraft, equipment,and techniques. However, certain principlesand techniques of amphibious operations canbe adapted to riverine operations.

i. The significant difference between riverineand conventional operations is that in riverineoperations one or more demerits of the forceuse existing waterways as the primary line ofcommunications. The nature of riverine opera-tions necessitates integrating the operations ofground forces, naval units, and supporting airelements, ~oordination and cooperation amongparticipants are mandatory. Their operationsare interdependent; however, since the basicnature of riverine warfare is sustained groundcombat, all forces must be considered a single

A(IO R% IRA

FM 100-5

tactical entity responsive to the needs and re- highly trained units to any depth into enemy-quirements of the ground force. held areas for the purpose of reconnaissance,

f. For further information on riverine opera- raids, and general disruption of enemy opera-

tions, see FM 61-100 and FM 81-75 (Test). tions. Depth and duration of the operations arelimited only by the resources for delivery of

649. Ranger operations the forces andtheir mission. For further infor-Ranger operations are overt operations by mation, see FM 21-50.

Section WI. RELIEF OF COMBAT UNITS

6-50. General

a. When tactical operations continue for Mprolonged period, conservation of fightingpower, maintenance of effectiveness, and therequirements of the tactical plan may necessi-tate the periodic relief of units. Such reliefswill be accomplished by relief in place, passageof lines, or withdrawal through nrearwardpo-sition.

b. The congestion inherent in each of theserelief operations requires detailed considera-tion of measures to reduce vulnerability andrisk of enemy attack. Close cooperation and co-ordination of plans among the units involvedare essential. The appearance of normal activ-ity should be maintained during these opera-tions. Maximum use is made of darkness andother periods of poor visibility. Secrecy, decep-tion, and speed of execution are emphasized.Arrangements must provide for the transfer ofcommand between the commanders involved.Under nuclear conditions, relief in place andpassage of lines are highly vulnerable opera-tions, which, when required, must be conductedwith speed and secrecy. Particular attentionmust be given to communication security meas-ures.

6-51. Relief in Ikea. A relief in place is an operation in which

all or part of a unit is replaced by the incom-ing unik The responsibilities of the replacedelements, which may involve attack or defense,are transferred to the incoming unit. The in-coming unit may be asaigned a new missionupon completion of the relief,

b. The commander of a unit being relieved isresponsible for the defense of his assigned sec-tor until the passage of command. The time ofpassage of command, to include operational

control of incoming and outgoing units, is de-termined by mutual agreement of the affectedcommanders unless it has been specified byhigher headquarters. This passage normallyoccurs when the forward area commandershave assumed area responsibility, and the in-coming force commander has established nec-essary communications to contro] the entiresector.

c. In a relief in place for continuation of thedefense, the incoming unit must conform withthe general defense plan of the outgoing unituntil passage of command. Every effort mustbe made to accomplish the relief without weak-ening the tactical integrity of the position,Combat support units normally should not berelieved at the same time as combat elements,

6-52. Passage of Lines

a. A passage of lines is an operation inwhich an incoming unit attacks through a unitthat is in contact with the enemy, or when aunit withdraws through another unit occupy-ing a rearward position.

ho In a forward passage of lines, the unitbeing passed through supports the attackingunit until their fires are masked, at which timethey may remain in position, be withdrawn, orcommitted to other action, The passing unitnormally is given priority in the use of facili-ties. The passage is made as rapidly as possibleto reduce vulnerability to attack.

c. In the rearward passage of lines, the unitin position provides maximum assistance to thewithdrawing unit and takes up either the de-laying mission of the withdrawing unit or thedefense when the passago has been completed.The withdrawing unit is given priority onroads and facilities, provided it does not inter-fere with the defense. The defensive plan must

I%! IC)Q-5

be considered in selecting points for the pas- positions. Measures should be adopted for mu-sage. The poink and routes should be kept to a tual recognition of the affected units and noti-minimum, consistent with the need to reduce fication of the defending force when the with-vulnerability and to avoid occupied defensive drawal incomplete.

Section IX. OPERATIONS DURING UNRESTRICTED SCALEOF USE OF NUCL6AR WEAPONS

643. General

a. This section discusses the operational em-ployment of Army forces during periods of un-restricted scale of use of nuclear weapons, asdefined in paragraph 64b.

b. The environment visualized herein is onein which nuclear weapons are employed inboth quantity and yield to such an extent thattheir effects will saturate the battle area. As aresult, the ability of ground forces to maneu-ver decisively will be drastically reduced tem-porarily. While larger forces normally will beunable to maneuver without prohibitive losses,small units up to battalion si~e frequently willbe able to move with sufficient freedom to per-mit them to continue effective operations. Fur-thermore, there will be local variations in thelevel of effects that will allow forces of sub-stantial size to continue their assigned mis-sions without being unduly restricted in theirability to maneuver,

c. Because a prolonged, intensive exchangeof nuclear fires is extremely devastating andresults in widespread destruction of both mili-tiry forces and the civilian population, suchoperations can be expected to be of relativelyshort duration.

d. Decisive results will accrue to the combatforce that can gain nuclear fire superiority inthe exchange, and at the same time preservesufficient maneuver elements to exploit the fireascendancy when achieved.

e. The full capabilities of nuclear weapon de-livery systems are employed to achieve fire su-periority. High-priority targets inolude enemynuolear delivery sites and associated controlsystems, weapon stockpiles, and command andommmmications facilities. Intelligence effortsare focused on the development of these tar-g&$*

~. The m~jor consideration is reduction ofthe nuclwr-effects level to an extent that willA.mn

permit combat forces to resume efi’ective ma-neuver, It is to this end that fire superiorityover the opposing force is sought, even thoughthe efforts in this regard may temporarilyraise the level of nuclear effects. Once the en-emy’s nuclear delivery capability has been re-duced significantly, the nuclear-effects levelcan be permitted to subside, and combat forcescan again employ maneuver decisively.

g. The widespread destruction of the civilianenvironment will magnify the problems of con-trol over the population and restoration of gov-ernmental institutions and may require the useof Army forces to support or replace civiliangovernmental authority.

h. During periods of unrestricted scale ofuse of nuclear weapons, Army forces will par-ticipate in the efforts to gain nuclear fire supe-riority, conduct limited offensive and defensiveoperations, and preserve force integrity for thesubsequent exploitation phase.

i. Small combat units, beside~ performing re-connaissance and security missions, are em-ployed in limited offensive and defensive opera-tions. Appropriate offensive tasks include infil-tration of enemy-controlled areas to secure keyterrain and destroy important installations.Defensively, these units are employed to coun-ter similar attacks by the enemy. Offensive ef-forts should not be permitted to compromisethe integrity and effectiveness of the majorforce through a series of unprofitable actions,

j. GuerrilJa forces may be used to obtain in-formation; conduct interdiction operations;and attack enemy communications, control fa-cilities, and other critical installations.

k. Deception operations are initiated to mis-lead the enemy concerning the location offriendly troops and critical installations and tocause him to expend his nuclear weapons onunprofitable targets, Electronic deception isundertaken in coordination with other plannedelectronic warfare operations.

1.Electronic warfare operations include bothpwwive (communications and electronic secur-ity) and active (jamming and deception) mea-sures and countermeasures, Active electroniccountermeasures are taken against airborneand ground-based communications and non-communications radiators. Prime ta~gets in-clude combat surveillance, reconnaissance, tar-get acquisition, countermortar/counterbattery,command and control communications, datalink, fuzed ordnance, missile and missile deJiv-ery systems, and aircraft electronics.

6-54. Force Integrity

Those forces that cannot be profitably em-ployed in the efforts to gain fire superioritymust be preserved for the exploitation phasethat follows. Normally, a significant amount ofthe combat and combat support elements of aforce fall into this category. These forces aredispersed and concealed in protected positionsin a defensive posture. Their primary mission

FM Tcm-5

is retention of operational integrity and sur-vival,

6-55, ExploitationFollowing the nuclear exchange, the combatand combat support elements must be reconsti-tuted rapidly to resume or initiate mobile oper-ations. Since both combatants will undoubtedlysuffer severe damage during the nuclear fire-fight, even a small, highly mobile exploitationforce may achieve decisive results when em-ployed in an aggressive and timely manner.Additional forces are reconstituted, refitted,and committed to action as resources permit.

6-56. Support Elements

Support forces that can contribute to the ef-forts to gain fire ascendancy are so employed.Other supporting forces devote their efforts tosurvival and to preservation of their resourcesfor the exploitation phase.

A(X3 6818A

*CHAPTER 7

All? MOWMENTS AND AIRBORNE OPERATIONS

Section 1.

7-1. Introduction

u. The United States maintains its ArmedForces in a posture that permits timely responseto the demands of its national strategy. In partic-ular, the United States must be capable of rapidlydeploying sufficient forces and materiel to any po-lx?ntial trouble spot in the world. This mobilityboth acts as a deterrent to the would-be aggres-sors and facilit~tes the geographic containment ofcombat actions until sufllcient combat power canbe committed to defeat the aggressor.

b. This chapter deals with the movement ofArmy forces by air in Air Force airlift aircraftfor administrative or tactical purposes. Detailson such operations are found in FM 57-1, FM61-100, and FM 100-27.

c. Army forces located in the United States andoverseas are maintained as part of strategic mo-bile forces capable of rapid deployment to anypart of the world. Movement of these forces byAir Force aircraft extends the range of the mobileforces and provides timely intertheder and intra-theater deployment to execute military operations.The forces may be moved directly to the objectivearea or they may be moved to intermediate stag-ing areas from which they can be further de-ployed by Army means or relifted by Air Forceairlift aircraft. Stockpiling supplies and equip-ment near areas of anticipated employment in-creases strategic mobility by reducing the require-ments for airlift aircraft.

7-2. Characteristics

Airborne operaticms combine the speed and flexi-bility of Air Force airlift aircraft with the landcombat capability of Army forces, An airborneoperation can be initiated by either administra-tive or operational (tactical) air movement aspart of a strategic or tactical operation, The as-sault operation may be by parachute or airland orby a combination of them. The ground forces in-

AmA�99hA

GENERAL

vohed may be units especially organized andequipped to conduct airborne operations, conven-tionally organized air-transportable units, or acombination of them.

7-3. Classification

a. Airborne operations are classified as shortduration or long duration.

& Short-duration operations are conducted withminimum reinforcement and air-delivered fol-lowup supply. Only essential combat service sup-port is provided in the objective area, The opera-tion terminates with the early Iinkup, relief, with-drawal, or restaging of the force for subsequentoperations.

c. Long-duration operations require reinforce-ment of the airborne force by combat, combatsupport, and combat service support units and in-clude substantial use of air-transportable units inan airland and followup role. The force employedis usually committed to sustained ground combat.Long-duration operations involve a considwablebuildup of troops, supplies, and equipment by air.

7+ Concepts

Successful airborne operations utilize speed oflanding and concentration of mass to compensatefor initial lack of firepower and mobility in anobjective area. These forces have the advantage Ofinitiative, surprise, and shock effect Assaultforces also will frequently be at full strength andwill have the advantage of speoial training and,when feasible, operational rehearsals. Large-scaleairborne operations require multiple dispersedairfields in the departure area and suitable land-ing zones in the objective area if airlandings areplanned.

7--5. Nuclear Environment

a. The nature of an air movement operationmakes the foroes involved particularly vulnerable

-,

C 1, FM 1004

to enemy nuclear attack. The enemy nuclear capa-bility and the manner in which it may be em-ployed must be carefully evaluated. The hazards toaircraft and operating personnel from bothftiendly or enemy nuclear fires must be consid-ered.

b, The vulnerability of the force can be mini-mized by reducing the execution time of eachphase of the operation and by strictly observingappropriate communications security measuresduring the planning and execution phases of oper-ation, Additional considerations that contribute tolessening the vulnerability are dispersed marshal-ing areas, multiple air columns and small serials,a large multiple airhead complex, and rapid aa-sembly and movement of forces from the landingarea to initial objectives.

7-6. Deployment Conceptsa. The transporting of Army units, personnel,

equipment, and supplies in Air Force airlift air-craft for any purpose, including airdrop and air-land, is broadly termed antion,” Generally, two typesrecognized: administrative

Section 11.

“air movement opera-of air movements areand operationaL Ad-

ORGANIZATION AND

7-7. Organizutioncd Concepts

a, The U.S. Air Force is responsible for provid-ing air transport to the Services. To accomplishthis, the Air Force maintains both strategic andtactical airlift organization and, in coordinationwith other Services, develops the doctrine, tactics,and procedures employed by these forces.

b, Airlift forces are maintained at a high peace-time manning and utilization rate to insure thatadequate routes and facilities exist for executionof wartime or contingency missions. The proce-dures followed in peacetime are the same as thosetbr wartime operations, as is the structure tocommand, control, and support the airlift force.This concept insures that a smooth transitionfrom peacetime to wartime conditions can bemade by expanding and accelerating existing op-erations. In addition, techniques and proceduresof strategic and tactical airlift organizations arecomplementary so that the forces of each may beused to augment the other. These latter arrange-meuta are designed to permit air movement ofcombat forces and their support from departurepoint to final destination with a minimum of com-mand changes and transfer points.

ministrative air movements provide the capabilityto deploy and sustain an effective military forcefrom CONUS or from one theater to another tocounter any enemy act or threat. Operational airmovements are associated with the movement ofpersonnal and cargo by airlift forces available tothe theater commander to conduct and supportcombat operations within the theater. U.S. Armyforces are organized and equipped to respond toboth administrative and operational (tactical)movements.

b. The term “airborne operation” describes anair movement operation in which ground combatforces and their combat and combat service sup-port are delivered by Air Force aircraft into anobjective area for execution of an administrativeor operational mission, The ground combat forcemay be comprised of air-transportable or airborneunits, or a combination of them, They may beairdropped or airlanded, Army forces participat-ing in an airborne operation are referred to asairborne forces. An administrative air movementis not considered an airborne operation althoughthe procedures used in airborne operations maybeapplicable.

MISSIONS OF AIRLIFT FORCES

c. The size and the composition of the airliftforce for a given operation are determined by therequirements of the supported force and may varyfrom a few aircraft to total mobilization of allnational airlift resources. Regardless of size, how-ever, the forces for both strategic and tacticalairlift operations must contain certain elementsthat are essential to ai? movement opera-tions, e.g.—

(1) Airlift aircra~ ~*’h the capability to flyunder adverse weather itions and a limitedcapability to airland al rdrop personnel andmateriel in the combat zone under adverseweather conditions.

(2) Aerial port units trained and equipped toprovide terminal operations support.

(8) An air movement command and controlsystem that permits centralized direction of theoverall operation with decentralized execution ofthe several separate functions, The system mayalso provide facilities for the ground force com-mander to control his forces en route and prior toexecution of a parachute assault through estab-lishment of an airborne command post.

(4) Administrative, logistic, and communica-tion support demerits for the airlift force.

7-8, Composi~ion of Airlift Resources

a, Active MilitaT~ FOTCM. Active U.S. AirForce strategic and tactical airlift organizationsprovide the rapid initial response necessary incontingency situations. Strategic airlift forces arenormally employed between continental UnitedStates (CONUS) and oversea theaters and be-tween cwersea thenters, Tactical airlift forces arenormally employed within a theater. When thesituation requires, however, either force may beemployed in the other’s role for short periods.

b. Air Reserve Forces. Air Force Reserve andAir National Guard airlift units have a wartimemobility assignment to augment the airlift re-sources of the Active forces, The capabilities ofthe Reserve forces are used on an opportune basisin peacetime for routine logistic operations, spe-cial missions, exercises, and contingencies to in-sure wartime responsiveness. These resources areconsidered an integral part of the total airliftforce.

c. Civil Reserve Air Fleet. The Civil ReserveAir Fleet is comprised of specifically identifiedaircraft owned by commercial airlines, which areoperationally suitable for augmenting the AirForce strategic airlift force. When activated, op-erations of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet are man-aged by the U.S. Air Force; however, the aircraftare operated on contract by the commercial air-line out of the civil airports utilizing companycrews and ground support facilities.

7-9, Missions of Airlift Forces

a. The missions of airlift organizations includestrategic deployment of combat forces, tacticalmovement of these forces, akrial SUPPIY,resupplytand aeromedical evacuation. Wide latitude inselection of techniques to accomplish these mis-sions is possible because of the flexibility inherentto airlift operations.

b. Contingency operations, which require rapiddeployment of combat forces to support friendlynations or protect the national interests, are themost important mission of the airlift forces. Suchoperations are normally conducted to support ex-isting war plans, but they may be executed toprovide the application of force in unplannedareas on an emergency basis.

c. Support of strategic deployment of forcesand the strategic resupply operations for theseforces are primary tasks of the strategic airliftforce. When port facilities road, rail, and/or in-

land waterway networks become operational, air-lift is used to deliver critical, high-priority items.Two types of airlift service are operated,

(1) Common-user airlift service is operatedfrom established or mutually agreed on aerialports over established air routes, Continuing, pre-planned logistic and personnel air movements nor-mally use this service.

(2) Special assignment airlift missions arerequested to move cargo requiring special han-dling or to move personnel and cal*gobetweenpoints other than those in the established com-mon-user system.

d. Tactical employment of ground combat unitsby airlift refers to the assault landing o~*para-chute assault of airborne forces on or near animmediate tactical objective. Airlift resources forthese operations are normally provided by tacticalair forces assigned within the theater. When theground combat units to be employed are drawnfrom sources outside the theater or when there isinsufficient tactical airlift resources in the theaterto execute the assault, strategic airlift forces maybe used.

e. Movement of personnel and cargo by tacticalairlift within a theater is accomplished by pre-planned or scheduled route service or by alloca-tion of airlift sorties to supported units.

f. Aeromedical evacuation between overseaareas and CONUS is provided by turnaround air-craft of the strategic airlift force. Evacuationwithin an oversea theater is provided by the tacti-cal airlift forces assigned to the theater. Evacua-tion from an assault airhead is provided by theairlift force servicing the airhead.

g. Civil Reserve Air Fleet aircraft are assignedpassenger and cargo missions within CONUS andin oversea theaters. Aircraft are used in theircommercial configuration to the extent possible.Cargo aircraft assigned to the fleet are requiredto be compatible with the Air Force materialshandling system; however, only palletized or bulkcargo is hauled. Passenger aircraft may havehigh-density seating installed if the aircraft isconfigured to receive this modification. All extraseating, cargo tie-down equipment, and cargo re-straining nets are provided by the commercial car-rier. Palletizing is accomplished by the user.

7-10. Activation of the Civil Reserve AirFleet

a. The Civil Reserve Air Fleet is a contracted

Mmalawi 7-!

~ ‘~frm ~wu+

~~gani~ation that uses the commercial carrier’sowganization$equipment, personnel, and operatingknowledge. Contracting carriers are pledged toprovide the designated amount of airlift in re-sponse to airlift emergencies as determined by theappropriate governmental agencies.

b. Activation procedures provide for a gradualapplication of Civil Reserve Air Fleet resourcesthrough three incremental airlift emergencystages. Airlift emergency stages are expressed byincreasing severity as follows:

(1) Stage 1, The Commanding General, Mili-tary Airlift Command (MAC), has the authorityto declare a Stage I committed expansion. This isexpansion airlift committed to the MAC to per-form airlift when the

7-11. Characteristics

Strategic air transport

MAC force cannot meet

both deployment and channel traffic requirementssimultaneously,

(2) Sta~e Il. The Secretary of Defense hasthe authority to declare a Stage 11 airlift emer-gency. This is additional airlift expansion identi-fied for a major contingency airlift emergency notwarranted by a national mobilization.

(3) Stage 212. A Stage 111 national emer-gency may be declared by the Secretary of I)e-fense only after the President or Congress of theUnited States has declared an unlimited nationalemergency, or by the Director, Office of Emer-gency Preparedness, when given specific author-ity. This stage requires activation of the totalCRAF airlift capability for Department of De-fense during m~jor military emergencies involv-ing US. forces.

Section III. STRATEWC AIR MOVEMENTS

operations are movementsin which combat forces are moved from CONUSto an oversea theater, or from one oversea theaterto another, Such deployments are usually under-taken to counter a hostile threat to the security ofthe United States or its allies by reinforcingcombat elements present in a theater or by posi-tioning combat elements where none are present,The emergency may occur without notice or itmay be the result of increasing international ten-sions over a period of time, The forces deployedare usually delivered to aerial ports in friendlyhands, but they may be directly introduced into anobjective area by parachute assault or airlandedoperation.

7-12. Responsibilities

a. Approved operations and contingency plansare the basis for determining the strategic airliftrequirements of Army organizations. Based ontmh plans, commanders of CONUS units preparetimtative plans for loading and submit their air-lift requirements through command channels tothe unified commander, or, if no unified commanddxucture exists, to the Department of the Army.Units in oversea theaters submit their require-xhents through Army component command chan-nels to the theater commander, Requirements areexpressed in as much detail as possible. Consider-ation of various international conditions, theplanned deployment schedule, and situations inme deployment area that influence the air move.

ment plan and the method of delivery are in-cluded.

b. Based on the requests of the Chiefs of Smw-ice, theater, and unified commanders, the JointTransportation Board acts for the Joint Chiefs ofStaff to insure that U.S. Air Force airlift re-sources are used to achieve the maximum benefitfor the national interests. To accomplish this, theJoint Transportation Board may select or altercourses of action to increase the airlift capabilityor decrease the airlift requirements of a Service,theater, or command. The Joint ‘IkansportationBoard allocates airlift resources for contingencyplanning purposes based on the forecast missionsand requirements of the Services, theaters, andcommands. Unless otherwise directed at the timeof the outbreak of war or other emergency, theseallocations automatically become effective and su-persede existing peacetime allocations.

c. At the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,the U.S. Air Force designates strategic airliftforces to support oprations and contingencyplans. The designated airlift force commander, incoordination with the supported Army force comm-ander, is responsible for the development of adetailed air movement plan. The plan includesdesignation of departure airfields; number andtype of aircraft; aircraft flow schedule, loadingprocedures; air routes and en route stopoverpoints; arrival airfields or, for movements thatterminate in a combat assault, the method andpoints of delivery into the objeetive area: andprocedures for continued support of the assaultforce.

—-

d. Certain Service responsibilities are fixed byjoint regulation, regardless of the nature of thedx%tegiomovement. Details of these responsibili-ties are contained in AR 59-106/AFR 76-7, Oper-ation of Air Force Terminals.

7-13. Support for Administrative AirMovements

a. Logistic and Admhi$irative Assista~ce.Maximum logistic and administrative assistanceis provided to the deploying force from agenciesoutside the force. For units deploying fromCONUS, these services are furnished by the in-stallation commander of the 8t8tiOh from whichthe force is deployed, In overma areas, the theatercommander signates the support agencies.

b, Departutw Airjield Control Group. A depar-ture airfield control group (DACG) is organizedfrom elements of the deploying organization thatare not immediately required to accompany thedeploying force. The mission of this group is tocoordinate and control theoutloadingof the forceand to resolve problems of an inter-Service naturewhich arise. As a minimum, the departure controlgroup should consist of a command section and anoperations section. Administrative and supportsections are organized as required by the size andscope of the air movement operation. A summaryof the organization and functions of the departureairfield control group is contained in FM 57-1.

0. lntemediate St@ing Area, An intermediatestaging area is a stopover point between the aer-ial port of origin and the objective area throughwhich the deploying force passes. The purpose ofthe stopover may be to reconfigure a force de-ployed administratively into combat formations;regroup aircraft formations; prepare aircraft~oads; unite forces drawn from several locations;or provide time for rest, acclimatization, and

training of assault force$, TO control operationsin the intermediate staging area, the Army andAir Force component commanders establish ajoint coordinating element composed of an AirForce airlift control element, a departure airficidcontrol group and an arrival airfield control groupfrom the deploying Army force, and an intermedi-ate stagihg area command, The intermediate stag-ing area command provides administrative andlogistic services such as billeting, mess, mainte.nance, communications, supply, and health serv-ices to include assistance in rigging and outload-irig. Details on the organization and functions ofthe intermediate staging area command are con-tained in FM 57--1,

d. Arrival AirfieZd Contvol Group. When thestrategic deployment terminates at an airfieldcontrolled by friendly forces, an arrival airfieldcontrol group (AACG) will be deployed with theadvance party to accomplish duties and responsi-bilities associated with the reception and off-load.ing of personnel, supplies, and equipment. Theorganization and the functions of the arrival air-field control group generally parallel those of thedeparture airfield control group,

e, Airlift Control Ehment. An ALCE is pro-vided by the Air Force component commander tomaintain operational control over airlift units andaIl airlift aircraft at the depmture and arrivalairfields, The ALCE is responsible for coordinat-ing all operational aspects of the mission to in-clude aircraft movement control, communications,coordination of onloading and offloading opera-tions, aeromedical evacuation, marshaling of air-craft, and continuous liaison with all agencies toinsure that the operation is proceeding accordingto plan, The ALCE assists the deploying unit withload planning and preparation,

SectJon IV. BASIC PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

7-14. Worldwide Cqaabillty 7-15. Concepts of Employment

All but a few Army units are air portable in the a. The flexibility of an airborne force permitsairlift aircraft of today. Although the large-scale wide latitude in selecting the routes of approachdeployment of armored and mechanized units by and the area in which the force may be commit-air is not expected, deployment of such units up to ted, The ability of such forces to move rapidly andbrigade sise ia practicable, This capability, cou- to land on or near their objectives enhances thepled with the propositioning of certain organiza-tions and equipment in oversea areas, provides

achievement of surprise and facilitates the mass-

the means by which the United States fulfills its ing of comb:it power. The presence of these forces

commitment; to its allies and protects its interests constitutes a threat that affects the enemy’s capa-abroad. bilities by compelling him to deploy his camlmt

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w �t #n*, a vu-u

power to protect vital installations ih his rearareas as well as in the forward combat zone.

b. The primary prerequisites to success in airmovement operations are the movement of forcesto an objective area without incurring unaccepta-Me losses and the provision to these forces of therequired combat power. Measures to attain theseobjectives hwlude suppression of the enemy’s airdefense capability and provision of adequate airdefense in the marshaling area, en route to theobjective area, and in the objective area.

7+$. Ground Combat Operations

Ground combat operations are initiated by an as-sault consisting of the landing and securing ofinitial objectives. After consolidation of the objec-tive, the assault force may defend the airheadarea; conduct further offensive operations; linkupwith other forces; or restage or withdraw to en-gage in subsequent operations. Offensive opera-tions maybeconducted concurrently with thecon-solkktiontosecure additional objectives to facili-tate future operations. The offensive phase, ifun-dertaken, is initiated as soon as possible after theassault,

7-17. Effects of Nuclear Weaponsa, In a nuclear environment, the use of large

airborne forces may be difficult because of theease with which air movements are detected andMeeffectof nuclear air defense weapons against,aircraft formations. For these reasons, en routeair columns and tactical forces in the objectivearea are dispersed to the maximum consistentwith missions and control capabilities. Tacticalnuclear attack in the obj”wtive area before air-borne assault may facilitate control of the area bythe assault force. The advantages and disadvan-tages of this course of action must be carefullyconsidered.

2),To obtain neuessary dispersion, a battalion orbrigade is usually the largest unit employed in anairhead under threat of, or actual, nuclear condi-tions. Corps airborne operations in which the bulkof the combat forces is parachuted or airlandedinto the objective area will be rare. The success ofairbo~e operations in anuckar war will, there-fore, depend on the ability of brigade or rein-forced battalion-size units to conductsemi-independent operations.

?’-18, Jnfhmnce of Enemy Armor

When an enemy armored threat exists,

v<.&

effective

armored-

defeating weapons and armored units if feasible,should accompany the assault forces. Tho assaultforce initially uses close air support and its or-ganic firepower, to include scatterable antitankmines; exploits terrain that limits armor employ-ment; and concentrates antitank mines along ave-nues of approach,

7-19. Influence of Friendly Forces

Potential assistance from regular forces in thecontemplated area of operations must be carefullyevaluated. These forces may provide security forthe airhead, They may block key approach routesinto the objective area or secure vital installa-tions. Once on the objective, U.S. forces can oper-ate in direct concert with such forces, The secu-rity of operations involving these types of forcesrequires special consideration. The success of theoperation must be independent of the actions ofsuch forces, Additional assistance from guerrillaor paramilitary forces controlled by the host coun-try or US. unconventional warfare organizationsmay be considered,

7-20. Support Requirements

The limited availability of aircraft requires thatonly equipment essential to mission accomplish+ment be moved to the objective area, Ground mo-bility may be reduced by an initial shortage oforganic ground vehicles and, therefore, organic orsupporting helicopters should be delivered(flown/airlanded) to the objective area as earlyas. possible. Concerted efforts also are made tocapture and exploit enemy supplies; equipment;weapons; vehicles; and petroleum, oils, and lubri-cants (POL). Long-range fire support in the bat-tle area is provided primarily by close air supportand missiles,

7-21. Coordination With Other Forces

All participating forces in an airborne operationmust be completely integrated under a singlecommand. Operations must be coordinated withother forces whoareoperating cloaetotheobjec-tive area or whose weaponsinto the objective area

7-22. Command, Control,Comfnunlcatimw

are capable of firing

and

The command, control, and communications of thecomponent forces in joint airborne operation arespecified by the commander exercising joint con-

A411t81RIIA

trol and supervision over the operation.Considerations in specifying these responsibilitiesinclude-

s. The mission and duration of the operation.

& The functions and capabilities of the unitsinvolved.

c. The nature and size of the forces to be fur-nished by each Service.

d. Capabilities and limitations of available com-munications system.

e. Organization of the area; geographic locationof the operations; and the strengths, dispositions,and capabilities of friendly and enemy forces.

~. The attitudes of the civilian populace and thegovernmental structure in the objective area.

7-23. Airborne Organizutkw

a. General. Airborne organizations are specifi-cally equipped and trained to execute assault la~d-ings from the air. All equipment organic to theseorganizations is air portable or airdroppable inAir Force aircraft, Some of the bulky items re-quire disassembly into major components for par-achute delivery; therefore, it is preferred to air-land this equipment, Airborne organizations in-cludecombat, combat support, and combat servicesupport units.

b. Airborne Corps. An airborne corps headquar-ters is designed to control operations involvingtwoormore airborne divisions, This corps super-vises the execution of airborne operations by eneor more of its subordinate elements when the en-tire corps is not employed in the airborne opera-tion. Thecombat power of thecorpsmaybeaug-mented from elements of other supporting fieldarmy units and elements from other Services.These augmentations generally are required in thearea of combat service support. The corps mayalso contain allied units. Airborne divisions in aninfantry role require augmentation that willnormally be provided to the divisions by assignedfield army units attached to the corps. The air-borne corps may also control ?inkup forces andguerrilla units when they fall within its area ofoperations.

o.Airborne DMim. Airborne divisions are thelargest units of combined arms and support er-ganized primarily for the execution of airborneassaults. They are ~pecially trained to entercombat by parachute and are capable of land{ngbehind enemy lines in unprepared and defended

areas to engage the enemy immediately and effec-tively.

7-24. Air”Por?able Organizations

a. Aimobile Diviswn. The airmobile divisioncan participate in airlanding or in the airlandingphase of an airborne operation. The division’sequipment is all air portable in Air Force airliftaircraft; however, certain aircraft require disas-sembly time which may preclude timely introduc-tion into the objective area, When the distance tothe objective and when the enemy air defensemeans permit, it is preferable to fly organic air-craft into the objective area to avoid partial disas-sembly.

b. lnfantW Division. Most of the infantry divi-sion’s equipment is air portnble in an operationalconfiguration in Air Force airlift aircraft, Excep-tions are certain aircraft and heavy engineerbridging equipment, which require partial disas-sembly that may preclude timely introduction intothe objective area. As with the airmobile division,organic aircraft are flown into the airhead ifwithin range and if tactically feasible, The infan-try division is well suited to participate in air-borne operations in the airlanding role.

o. Armored and Mechanized Divisions. The ar+mored and mechanized divisions do not normallyparticipate in airborne operations because muchof their equipment—particularly main battletanks and self-propelled artillery-cannot be eco-nomically air-transported. Armored and mecha-nized brigades may be deployed with organicequipment for airborne operations if the situationrequires and if sufficient aircraft are available,The armored and mechanized divisions are mostoften employed as the ground linkup force forairborne operations.

7-25. Organization for Joint AirborneOperations

a. Within CONUS, contingency plans estab-lished by Joint Chief of Staff direction provide forthe conduct of strategic operations involving twoor more Services The unified commands, in re-sponse to the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved plans,direct Service component commanders to preparesupporting plans including neceswwy troop lists,Following completion of the implementing plansincluding tl*oop lists supporting the Army taskorganization, the Army component commanderpasses them to the appropriate unified command

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Q ‘1, FM 1Q*5

which, in turn, submits them to the Joint Chiefs direct attachment of one Service to another. The of Staff for approval, Responsibility for the authority establishing the joint force or directing combat readiness of the troop units assigned in attachment will specify the purpose or mission, the contingency plans is retained by the parent the effective date and duration of attachment, and Service, On receipt of implementation instruc- the extent of authority to be exercised by the com­tions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the unified manders to which other units are assigned. commander issues an initiating directive to the component commander and passes operational 7-26. Weather aornmand of the troop units to the predesign~ted Means of providing current weather information joint task force commander. at departure sites, along appronch routes, and in

b. In oversea areas, the theater commander may the objective areas are essential. Weather mini-establish a joint airborne task force or he may mums are prescribed for each operation.

Se@ion V. PLANNING AND CONDUCTING AIR MOVEMENTS AND AIRBORNE OPERATIONS

7-27. Procedures tions security measures to be observed must be carefully considered during the planning phase.

a, Air movement and airborne operations plan­ning is characterized by an inverse sequence of b. In a division-size joint airborne operation, detailed planning and by continuous, close joint the division and corps headquarters must ex-coordination, Specified procedures are outlined in change liaison personnel to insure coordination FM W-1, FM 61-100, and FM 100-27. and complete integration of all plans. The size,

duration, and complexity of the airborne opera-b. An air movement operation requires data on tion will determine the size of the liaison element

the mission of the airlifted force, availability of from each headquarters. airlift, aircraft capabilities, departure area, spe­cial measures required to safeguard the security c. In airborne operations, inter-Service coordi­of the operation, and combat intelligence. From nation must provide a clear understanding of the time an operatjon is announced until it is com- marshaling procedures, the air movement require­pleted or abandoned, coordination, briefings, and ments, the concept of operations in the objective conferences between parallel echelons of Air area, and the procedures for supply by air. Coor-Foroeand Army units arecontlnuous. Both Serv- dination between Army forces and units provid­ices must agree on each operational detail before ing the airlift must be initiated early in the plan-initiating operations. Points on which agreement ning phase and must be continuous, cannot be reached are referred to the unified/joint force commander for resolution, d. Plans for airborne operations that require

detailed joint coordination include, as a minimum, the air movement plan and the marslwling plan.

7-28. Plannlng Respwtsibility crnd Coordination 7-29. The Ground Tactical Plan

a, A senior headquarters considers many air- a. The ground tactical phmformsthebasisfor botne operations and assigns planning reaponsi- all other plans. Theassigned mission is translated b~lity for certain operations to subordinate head- into objectives, the early control, destruction, or q~~ters. To as~ist participating and planning neutralization of which is required to accomplish h~adqumters in developing plans concurrently, to the mission.rwiuce planning time, andtoinaure coordination,%hesenior headquarters issues planning directives b. In an airborne operation, there may be multi­‘that cwntain operational information, intelligence, ple airheads in the objective area. In selecting thewm@lmrinformation, and necessary combat aup- ~irhead or objecttve area, consideration is given~ort and combat service support information, to enemy capabilities, particularly the nuclearThe command charged with executing the specific capability and the probability of its use.~~~~~tion develops tlm detailed plans. Airoraft.~equiromentsand the availability of aircraft must o. The ground tactical plan includes a determi­‘be determined as soon as possible. Communica- nation of the strength, composition, and deploy­

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ment of the forces required to accomplish earlysecuring and defense of the objective area, Theground tactical plan must be logistically feasible.

d. The ground tactical plan includes an analysisof the capabilities of friendly guerrilla forces inthe area that could assist in accomplishing theoperation.

e. Based on the ground tactical plan, the forcecommander prescribes priority of movement andphasing of units into the objective area.

7-30. The Landing Pkm

Based on the requirements of the ground tacticalplan, the landing plan is developed to indicate themethod, sequence, and place of arrival of troopsand materiel in the objective area, Landing areasshould be of sufficient number and size to accom-modate the forces involved, reduce their vulnera-bility, and position them to execute the groundtactical plan,

7-31. The Air Movement Plan

The air movement plan phases the force into theobjective area in the sequence determined by theArmy airborne force commander. The plan pre-scribes the use and allocation of aircraft and re-lated facilities to meet the requirements of theforce commander within technical and tacticallimitations. Specific aircraft loads are developedduring air movement planning and are included inthe air loading t~bles that maybe appended to theair movement plan. This plan begins with theloading of the airlift aircraft and ends with thedelivery of units totheir objective areas. The airmovement plan is prepared jorntly and is ap-proved by the joint forca commander.

7-32. The Marshaling Plan

The marshaling plan is based on the air move-ment plan. This plan schedules the movement ofunits of the airlifted force to departure airfields,It delineates responsibility for providing facilitiesand services while units are marshaling in dis-persed areas, and it includes plans for loadingaircraft and briefing troops for the forthcomingoperations. This plan is also jointly prepared andapproved.

7-33. Subquent Operational Planning

The ground tactical plan will include actions to betaken after initial objectives are secured. Typicalmissions include the securing of areas from whichsubsequent operations will be launched, conduct-

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ing an exploitation from the airhead, conductingharassing and interdiction operations, reinforchgunits beyond the reach of surface means, linkingup with advancing forward elements, and with-drawing,

7-34. The Airborne Assauh

Airborne operations are normally initiated by anassault phase, during which units may be commit-ted under decentralized control until initial objec-tives are secured, Depending on the terrain andthe enemy situation, the airborne assault is nor-mally executed by the parachute delivery and as-sault landing of forces into the objective area,Normally, airlandings, as opposed to assault land-ings, are conducted in projected areas or areasfree of the enemy.

7-35. The Securing and Organization ofObjectives

The securing of assault objectives, organization ofthe airhead, offensive operations in the objectivearea, and establishment of security are initiatedduring the early part of the assault phase to capi-talize on the elements of surprise and shock effectinherent in the air-delivered assault, The degreeto which the objective area is occupied and organ-ized for defense isdetermined bythemission, thetype of airborne operation being conducted,enemy capabilities, and the characteristic of thearea of operations and planned subsequentactions. The buildup in the objective area pro-ceeds concurrently with itssecuring andorganiza-tion. The extent of buildup widl depend on theenemy situation and plans for linkup or with-drawal of the committed units. Airborne opera-tions may be entirely offensive in nature and mayrequire no securing or defense of an airhead, asin multiple independent attacks or raids thatculminate in immediate withdrawal. This typeof action requires a high degree of air and groundfirepower, accurate and timely intelligence, andmobility.

7-36. Dispositkns in the (3blectiveArea

a. Forces in the objective area normally aredisposed for defense of key terrain and aro dis-posed to reduce vulnerability to air and nuclearattack. Multiple defensive positions are organizedto cover the main routes of approach. Avenues ofapproach and gaps between defensive positionsare covered by nuclear and other fires; smallground and aerial combat detachments; antitankweapons; and, when available, armor. Naturalobstacles are exploited in the defense. Tactical

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~if ~econnakmnce, air surveillance, and groundt~connaissance provide information on enemyoperations, Reserves are held in readiness incentral locations to facilitate their rapid move-ment within the airhead and are positioned to adddepth to the defense against the most threatenedarea+ The reserve may be reinforced by unitsfrom forces not heavily engaged.

b. Rocket, missile, and air support is used inlong-range interdiction missions to destroy ordelay enemy reinforcements. The airborne forcemust have immediately responsive air support-

(1) To provide air reconnaissance to detectand report enemy activities that may affect theforce,

(2) To perform close air support missions todefeat enemy targets in the battle area.

(3) To perform counterair operations tomaintain air superiority over the areas occupiedby the force.

c. Friendly forces operating in the objectivearea can assist the airborne force by interdictingenemy movement in and near the objective area;attacking enemy command, control, communica-tions, and supply installations; and executing sup-porting attacks and deception plans, These forcesalso assist in evas{onand escape; selecting, mark-ing, and securing drop and landing zones; andcolleating information. Although assistance from

these forces is integrated into tactical planning, toinclude alternate plans, the successful executionof primary and alternate plans is not made con-tingent on their assistance.

7-37. Withdrawal

For all airborne operations, plans for withdrawalare prepared before initiating the operation.These plans necessarily include use of any avaiia-ble air, land, and sea transport means. With-drawal from the objective area may be asplanned, or it may be forced by the enemy.

7-38. Lhtkup

a. When a linkup between an airborne force andother friendly forces is planned, detailed coordi-nation between the forces is essential. Provisionmust be made for linkup points, command andstaff liaison, assumption of command, a system ofmutual recognition and identification, early radiocontact to establish forward positions, fire sup-port, coordination measures, and actions follow-ing Iinkup.

b. Upon linkup, command of the Army elementof an airborne force normally passes to the seniorground commander in whose zone the element isoperating, providing he is able to control, support,or influence the action of the force.

Section W. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT FOR AIRBORNE OPERATIONS

7*39. GenertilCombat service support is essential to any combato~eration. The problems normally inherent in pro-viding combat service support are magnified in anairborne operation by the displacement of forcestmd the limitations of airlines of communications.~ deal adequately with these incremwdproblems.planning for resupply, maintenance of equipment,e~aouatim Ofcasualties, and handling of prisonersof war must be emphasized. Details on combataprwiaesupport for airborne operations are con-Mined in I?M %16, FM 64-% FM 67-1, FMW1OO, and FM NlQ40.

‘“‘240. siqqdy‘~onmn?rentwith tactical planning, consider~%ion

;. ‘&.gtvento the provision of all supplies and equip-~‘JWM teq~h’ed to accomplish the mission. The;%+L.”L( qa~titiie~ and types of supplies and equipment~~~Qw$ied by assault forms in ajrborne operationsr

?*MA

are dictated by initial combat requirements. Caremust be exercised to insure that only those sup-plies required to satisfy the immediate needs ofthe force are deIivered initially into the objectivearea because excess supplie~ and equipment con-stitute a burden to the force. Provision must bemade to establish and maintain required levels ofsupply in the objective araa. This is done by phas-ing supplies into the objective area on an accom-panying, followup (automatic and on=call), androutine basis. In airborne operation, ammunitionand POL products normally constitute the majortonnage iteme.

741. Maintenance

The problem of maintenance in airborne opera-tions is magnified by the relatively few mainte-nance pmwonnelin the objective area and by thedamage to equipment that may occur during airddivery. To reduce requirements, operator main-tenance must be emphasized and intensive maMte-

AaO 8180A

tiancemvst be performed before departure to in-sur~ the highest standard of operational readiness~f@lequi~ment e@mingthe objective area. The@~nned duration of the operation will affectm~~htemmcepltmning. Maintenance requirementsin ~hort-duration operations may be largely satis-fied by preoperational efforts, to include replace-r!ient of nonreparable equipment. However, forape~atimwof longer duration, planHmust includeprovi$ion for maintenance personnel or units inthe objective area. Major equipment items may beevacuated from the objective area tp maintenancefacilities, provided suitable landing areas and therequired aircraft are available.

7-42. TrcmsportationSince transportation within the airborne objeotivearea is normally limited, air delivery of supplies

direct to the user is accomplished where possible,Maximum use is made of captured enemy vehiclesto supplement limited transportation resources.

7-43. Evacuation

Evacuation by air, using the return airlift capa-bility of assault am.i resupply aircraft, is normalin airborne operations, The sick and wounded,prisoners of war, selected indigenous personnel,captured enemy materiel, and damaged equipmentare evacuated from the objective area in accord-ance with plans and as the situation requires,Evacuation of casualties from the objective areanormally takes precedence over all other evacua-tion requirements. For details on Army and AirForce evacuation responsibilities, see FM 57-1and FM 100-27.

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