Chapter 5 World War II - · PDF file... World War II | 135 Chapter 5 World War II ... Although...

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World War II | 135 Chapter 5 World War II 1940–1945 T he fleet faced the supreme test of war only 30 years aſter acquiring its first airplane and just 19 years aſter commissioning its first aircraſt carrier. Naval aviation carried the fight to the enemy and forged ahead to become the backbone of fleet striking power. In one swiſt, skillfully executed stroke at Pearl Harbor, Japanese carrier planes temporarily crippled the Navy’s bale line. e handful of carriers in the Pacific filled the ensuing void and demonstrated the potency of naval airpower when they struck a retaliatory blow against the Japanese home islands in 1942. Although the geographic position of the United States provided the strategic advantage of the ability to move ships between the Atlantic and Pacific fleets via the Panama Canal, it also placed the nation squarely between two wars with few commonalities. Air operations in the Atlantic consisted of a blockade and campaign to protect convoys of ships that delivered raw materials, munitions, and reinforcements to the Allies. e convoys’ safe arrivals enabled a series of amphibious operations that liberated the European continent from Axis hegemony. In the Pacific, Allied strategy focused first on stopping Japan’s alarmingly rapid advance, and then on the bierly contested task of driving the enemy forces back over a broad expanse. e United States entered World War II unprepared to execute either Allied strategy—Atlantic or Pacific. e Navy and Marine Corps air arms mustered only one small and seven large commissioned aircraſt carriers, five patrol wings, and two Marine aircraſt wings, about 5,900 pilots and 21,678 enlisted men, 5,233 aircraſt of all types, including trainers, and a few advanced air bases. Distance from the enemy and tremendous industrial power, however, enabled the United States to build the ships, planes, and equipment necessary for victory. American armed forces drove the Axis from strategically located bases, cut off its raw materials, and placed the Allies in position to launch the final air and amphibious offensives. ese late efforts would be rendered unnecessary by the destructive power of the atom unleashed upon the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but the fleet’s liberation of Japanese-held islands in the Central Pacific made the atomic aacks possible. For the first time in naval history the opponents engaged each other entirely in the air without sighting enemy ships. Radar pierced the night, giving the fleet new eyes, as technological progress improved the defense and added power to the offense. Scientists contributed to the war effort by developing specialized equipment and applying scientific principles to operational tactics. Logistics assumed new importance, and advances in replenishment at sea increased naval mobility. In the course of the war, Navy and Marine pilots claimed the destruction of more than 15,000 enemy aircraſt in the air and on the ground; sank 174 Japanese warships, including 13 submarines totaling 746,000 tons; destroyed 447 Japanese merchant ships totaling 1,600,000 tons; and sank 63 U-boats in the Atlantic. In combination with other agents, Navy and Marine air forces helped sink another 157,000 tons of warships and 200,000 tons of merchant ships, and another 6 Japanese and 20 German submarines. Although World War II contributed significantly to the development of aviation, experience proved some prewar theories on the role of airpower to naval operations to be misconceived. e bombing tests of the 1920s had persuaded some airpower proponents of the obsolescence of navies, but carrier task force operations in the war gave lile credence to such conclusions. ose who questioned the importance of airplanes to navies were equally off the mark. Advocates of independent airpower had also doubted the possibility and usefulness of close air support for troops; bale experience

Transcript of Chapter 5 World War II - · PDF file... World War II | 135 Chapter 5 World War II ... Although...

  • World War II | 135 PB |

    Chapter 5

    World War II19401945

    The fleet faced the supreme test of war only 30 years after acquiring its first airplane and just 19 years after commissioning its first aircraft carrier. Naval aviation carried the fight to the enemy and forged ahead to become the backbone of fleet striking power.

    In one swift, skillfully executed stroke at Pearl Harbor, Japanese carrier planes temporarily crippled the Navys battle line. The handful of carriers in the Pacific filled the ensuing void and demonstrated the potency of naval airpower when they struck a retaliatory blow against the Japanese home islands in 1942.

    Although the geographic position of the United States provided the strategic advantage of the ability to move ships between the Atlantic and Pacific fleets via the Panama Canal, it also placed the nation squarely between two wars with few commonalities.

    Air operations in the Atlantic consisted of a blockade and campaign to protect convoys of ships that delivered raw materials, munitions, and reinforcements to the Allies. The convoys safe arrivals enabled a series of amphibious operations that liberated the European continent from Axis hegemony.

    In the Pacific, Allied strategy focused first on stopping Japans alarmingly rapid advance, and then on the bitterly contested task of driving the enemy forces back over a broad expanse.

    The United States entered World War II unprepared to execute either Allied strategyAtlantic or Pacific. The Navy and Marine Corps air arms mustered only one small and seven large commissioned aircraft carriers, five patrol wings, and two Marine aircraft wings, about 5,900 pilots and 21,678 enlisted men, 5,233 aircraft of all types, including trainers, and a few advanced air bases.

    Distance from the enemy and tremendous industrial power, however, enabled the United States to build the ships, planes, and equipment necessary for

    victory. American armed forces drove the Axis from strategically located bases, cut off its raw materials, and placed the Allies in position to launch the final air and amphibious offensives. These late efforts would be rendered unnecessary by the destructive power of the atom unleashed upon the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but the fleets liberation of Japanese-held islands in the Central Pacific made the atomic attacks possible.

    For the first time in naval history the opponents engaged each other entirely in the air without sighting enemy ships. Radar pierced the night, giving the fleet new eyes, as technological progress improved the defense and added power to the offense. Scientists contributed to the war effort by developing specialized equipment and applying scientific principles to operational tactics. Logistics assumed new importance, and advances in replenishment at sea increased naval mobility.

    In the course of the war, Navy and Marine pilots claimed the destruction of more than 15,000 enemy aircraft in the air and on the ground; sank 174 Japanese warships, including 13 submarines totaling 746,000 tons; destroyed 447 Japanese merchant ships totaling 1,600,000 tons; and sank 63 U-boats in the Atlantic. In combination with other agents, Navy and Marine air forces helped sink another 157,000 tons of warships and 200,000 tons of merchant ships, and another 6 Japanese and 20 German submarines.

    Although World War II contributed significantly to the development of aviation, experience proved some prewar theories on the role of airpower to naval operations to be misconceived. The bombing tests of the 1920s had persuaded some airpower proponents of the obsolescence of navies, but carrier task force operations in the war gave little credence to such conclusions. Those who questioned the importance of airplanes to navies were equally off the mark. Advocates of independent airpower had also doubted the possibility and usefulness of close air support for troops; battle experience

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    validated such support as indispensable. The disappointment of naval officers who visualized decisive fleet engagements in the tradition of Trafalgar and Jutland matched that of airpower theorists who saw their predictions go awry. By the test of war it became exceedingly clear that neither armies nor navies could achieve objectives in war without first achieving air superiority, and that neither could exert as much force alone as with the aid of air striking power.

    1940

    4 JA N UA RY The establishment of Project Baker in Patrol Wing 1 expanded experiments with blind landing equipment.

    15 F E BRUA RY Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, noting that reports on air operations in the European war stressed the problem of aircraft vulnerability, recommended equipping naval aircraft with leak-proof or self-sealing fuel tanks, and pilots and observers with armor. The Bureaus of Aeronautics and Ordnance had investigated these forms of protection for two years, but this formal statement of need accelerated procurement and installation of both.

    2 4 F E BRUA RY The Bureau of Aeronautics issued a contract for television equipment, including a camera, transmitter, and receiver capable of airborne operation. Researchers used this equipment to transmit instrument readings obtained from radio-controlled structural flight tests and to provide target and guidance information for the conversion of radio-controlled aircraft to offensive weapons.

    27 F E BRUA RY The Navy awarded a contract to Vought-Sikorsky Aircraft for the design of a full-scale flying model (as distinguished from a military prototype) of a Flying Flapjack fighter, designated VS-173, with an almost circular wing. This design, which produced a potential high speed of nearly 500 mph combined with a very low takeoff speed, originated in the research of former National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics engineer Charles H. Zimmerman.

    29 F E BRUA RY The Bureau of Aeronautics initiated action that led to a contract with University of Iowa professor H. O. Croft to investigate the possibilities of a turbojet propulsion unit for aircraft.

    19 M A RCH The Navy authorized fleet activities to apply additional national star insignia on the sides of the fuselages or hulls of Neutrality Patrol aircraft to assist in their identification.

    22 M A RCH The Navy initiated guided missile development at the Naval Aircraft Factory, Philadelphia, Pa., with the establishment of a project for adapting radio controls to a torpedo-carrying TG-2 airplane.

    A PR I L Fleet Problem XXI, consisting of two phases and lasting into May, involved coordination of commands, protection of a convoy, and seizure of advanced bases around the Hawaiian Islands and eastern Pacific. Observers noted the tendency of commanders to overlook carrier limitations and assign them excessive tasks, the need for reliefs for flight and carrier crews under simulated war conditions, the success of high-altitude tracking by patrol aircraft, and the ineffectiveness of low-level horizontal bombing attacks. The war compelled the cancellation of Fleet Problem XXII in 1941.

    23 A PR I L Cmdr. Donald Royce was designated to represent the Navy on an Army Air Corps evaluation board for rotary-wing aircraft. The board was incidental to legislation directing the War Department to undertake rotary-wing aircraft development.

    25 A PR I L Wasp (CV 7) was commissioned at Boston, Mass., Capt. John W. Reeves Jr. commanding.

    7 M AY President Franklin D. Roosevelt ordered fleet ships to remain in Hawaiian waters indefinitely as a signal of American resolve to deter Japanese aggression. Subsequently, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet Adm. James O. Richardson asserted that the facilities at Pearl Harbor were inadequate to support the fleet and protect against attack. Richardsons stance contributed to his relief on 1 February 1941 by Adm. Husband E. Kimmel.

    16 M AY President Franklin D. Roosevelt requested a congressional appropriation of $1.18 billion to strengthen national defense, including $250 million for the Navy and Marine Corps.

    27 M AY Secretary of the Navy Charles Edison directed the equipment of six DD-445class destroyers with planes,

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    catapults, and plane handling gear. Halford (DD 480), Hutchins (DD 476), Leutze (DD 481), Pringle (DD 477), Stanly (DD 478), and Stevens (DD 479) were subsequently selected. On 23 December 1942 Pringle received the first aircraft, an OS2U-3 Kingfisher, BuNo 5870. Just before the new year, BuNo 01505, an OS2N-1, was assigned to Hutchins. Before these two ships and Stanly joined the fleet in early 1943, however, shortcomings in the plane hoisting gear led to removal of the aviation equipment. Halford and Stevens performed limited aircraft operations, but in October 1943, the Navy ordered the equipment removed from both ships and cancelled its installation on Leutze.

    14 J U N E The Naval Expansion Act of 1940 was signed into law. The measure authorized an 11 percent increase in the size of the fleet, approved a 79,500-ton augmentation of aircraft carrier tonnage over the limits set by the 1938 expansion act, and sought to increase the number of naval aircraft by instituting a cap of 48 airships and 4,500 planes. The next day, President Franklin D. Roosevelt approved an Act of Congress to raise the total number of planes to 10,000, including 850 for the Naval Reserve.

    17 J U N E Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Harold R. Stark requested $4 billion from Congress to increase the authorized strength of the Navy by 70 percent. This measure was subsequently known as The Two Ocean Navy Act and signed into law on 19 July.

    20 J U N E The Bureau of Construction and Repair merged with the Bureau of Engineering to fo