CHAPTER 5

THE COALITION GOVERNMENT UNDER BJP AND

THE POKHRAN II EXPLOSION

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This chapter basically touches upon the policy of the BJP on the nuclear issue

which is quite distinct from the other political parties and how the logical outcome of this

distinct stand was the Pokhran II explosion.

The second section of the chapter deals with the national and international

reaction to Pokhran II.

The following section detailly analyses the political fallout of Pokhran II­

Response of Parliament.

5.1 BJP and it's Stand on the Nuclear issue

After the fall of the Gujral Government following withdrawal of support by the

Congress, general elections were announced. The verdict that was given by the electorate

was not at all clear. While the BJP emerged as a party with the largest number of seats,

the results were rather baffling. The BJP as a party fared disappointingly in its strong

holds like Rajasthan and managed to make deep in roads in states like Karnataka, Tamil

Nadu and Orissa. In the post election scenario the Bhartiya Janata Party was forced to

take the help of various other regional parties to forge together a rag tag coalition in order

to govern the country. Regional parties like the Akali Dal of Punjab, Trinamul Congress

of Mamta Banerjee of West Bengal, the AIADMK led by Jayalalita, the Samta Party of

George Fernandes, the fledgling Biju Janta Dalled by the late Biju Patnaik's son Naveen

Patnaik and of course the Telgu Desam Party of Chandrababu Naidu. The post election

secenario was like a game of musical chairs. Hectic parleys, confabulations, agreements

gained momentum to clear the flux that was created as a result of the split verdict.

Perhaps the last minute clincher was the turn around by the Telugu Desam Party of

Chandrababu Naidu which decided to support the new formation. Naidu one of the

architects of the erstwhile United Front decided to dump the Front to extend supp011 from

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outside. He also managed to foist a little known partyman G .M. Balayogi to occupy the

plum post of speaker of the Lok Sabha in return for extending support to the BJP. The

suave and technology friendly CM of Andhra Pradesh extracted a pound of flesh by

talking away the post of the Lok Sabha Speaker and not allowing his partyman to join the

government. Smaller political formations like the Arunachal Congress led by Geong

Apang and the Farooq Abdullah led National Conference joined in supporting the

government. After garnering support the BJP finally reached the magical number to form

a government which brought together leader of different political hues to take charge of

governance of this huge country. It was but natural that the BJP could not induct some of

its seasoned players due to compulsion of coalition politics. In ministry formation, what is

to be noted here is the induction of a fire brand leader like George Fernandes to take over

the Defence Ministry. Much could be read into this step. Perhaps the Prime Minister was

conveying a message to one and all that the government would follow a tough line with

regard to defence issues.

On the important nuclear issue the BJP's stand had always been different from

mainstream political parties. The erstwhile Jana Sangh had always been an avail

supporter of India going nuclear. As far back as 1964, the Jana Sangh is one of its first

resolutions adopted on the nuclear issue said "the Bharatiya Jan Sangh has always been of

the view that the nation's determination to build up military strength adequate enough to

frustrate the gravest challenge to its independence and integrity should not be limited by

pseudo pacifist inhibitions. Since the last two years India has been at undeclared war with

China. The fact has been known for quite some time that China was feve1ishly active

trying to detonate nuclear device of its own. The serious implication which China's

success would have in regard to this Sino-Indian involvement and the psychological

impact and atomic bang by paking would have on other Asian countries, could have

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easily been foreseen by the Indian authorities and a suitable policy chalked out to meet

the impending development. But in its smug ostrich like complacency the Government of

India not only refused to do anything of the kind but it further kept on confusing and

misinforming public opinion by raising an economy bogey to silence the growing popular

demand that India should build up its own atom bomb. The Jana Sangh disagrees

basically with this approach. No price can be considered too high where the country's

defence is involved. 1 The Jana Sangh, the predecessor of the BJP was quite vocal in its

campaign that India should go nuclear. Even after the Pokhran I explosion in 1974, the

Jana Sangh passed a resolution on June 2, 1974 stating that May 18, 1974 was a "red

letter day in Indian history". Mr. L. K. Advani, the President of the Jana Sangh wrote in

an article that India should manufacture nuclear weapons "to protect our independence".

He further added that the demand is no longer confined to a section or sections which can

be called the bomb lobby. It is a nation's demand". 2 The only dilution in the stance of the

Jana Sangh took place when it immerged with the Janata Party to be part of the Janata

government when A. B. Vajpayee took charge of the crucial Ministry of External Affairs

Ministry and L. K. Advani was put in charge of the Information and Broadcasting

Ministry. These two stalwarts toned down their demand that India should go nuclear and

followed the general Morarji Desai line of nuclear dovishness. It was political expediency

or in other words compulsions of coalition politics which forced them to bring about a

change in their thinking. However, after the fall of the Desai government and formation

of the Bhartiya Janata Party in 1980, the party was back to its original stand. A. B.

Vajpayee participating in the demand for grants of the Ministry of Defence said that "the

government must make a nuclear bomb in view of Pakistan's repeated efforts to acquire

1 Resolution adopted at the Patna Session of the Jana Sangh in December, 1964.

2 Indian Express. New Delhi, 31 May, 1974.

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nuclear capability".3 However, since 1980, the BJP's stand has been consistent without

any wavering. The BJP as a party has become more and more vocal in its demand that

India should go nuclear. In its election manifesto of 1989, the BJP said that "we must go

for the nuclear option".4 In the subsequent election that India faced in the wake of the fall

of the V.P. Singh government, the 91 election announced. In its electon manifesto which

was released before the country went to the polls the BJP's language become much more

vocal. In its election manifesto the BJP said that if the party comes to power the party will

give "our defence forces nuclear teeth". 5 In the election that followed five years later the

BJP said in its election manifesto of 1996 "reevaluate the country's nuclear policy and

exercise the option to induct nuclear weapons" .6 In the following election that catapulted

them to the government the BJP was perhaps the most vocal when its stated in its election

manifesto 1998 that "the BJP rejects the notion of nuclear apartheid and will actively

oppose attempts to impose a hegemonistic nuclear regime. We will not be dictated to by

any body in matters of security requirements and in the exercise of nuclear option.7 A

close scrutiny of the party's thinking on the nuclear issue will reveal a more and more

strident stand whose hallmark was that if voted to power it would definitely go for a

nuclear explosion or in other words it was not ambiguous in its stand like other political

parties. It's pronouncements on the nuclear issue were quite clear and nothing was left to

speculation.

3 Lok Sabha Debates, July 19, 1980.

4 BJP election manifesto, election 1989.

5 BJP election manifesto, election 1991.

6 BJP election manifesto, election 1996.

7 BJP election manifesto, general election 1998.

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5.2 Pokhran II: A Vindication of the BJP Stand

After Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee's assumption of the office of the Prime Minister it

seemed in the initial days of his government that compulsions of coalition politics would

weigh down heavily on the BJP and the BJP would not be able to take this drastic step. In

the run up to the government formation the BJP in consultation with other coalition

partners came out with the National Agenda for governance which laid down broad

policy formation on almost all issues. The National Agenda for governance stated that a

National Security Council would be set up to undertake the first ever strategic defence

review. The document said that in the course of the review the government would

"reevaluate the nuclear policy" and then exercise the option to induct nuclear weapons."8

Even George Fernandes, India's Defence Minister in a widenranging interview said that

"our National Agenda has said that at the end of doing a strategic review, which will be

the first of its kind, if we come to the conclusion that things have reached a stage with

China and Pakistan-one an acknowledged nuclear power and the other claiming to be a

nuclear power - and that India now needs to take the plunge, then so be it. What we are

saying in so many words is what is implied in the national position. So why are some

people now saying "Oh God" and talking about international sanctions, and posing the

question whether poverty alleviation or the weapons programme is more important. All

this is a lot of hot air because our national policy implied in no uncertain terms such a

development at some point in time. The only question is, has that point in time arrived.

We have not said that it has arrived. In the course of the strategic review, if we believe

that the time has come, so be it.9 Singing a slightly different tune, the Prime Minister said

in Parliament "our party feels India should have the bomb since it will place the country

8 National Agenda for Governance released in March. 1998.

9 Frontline, Chennai, April24, 1998. p-10.

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in a strong po&ition vis-a-vis the outside world. But other political parties apparently have

a different view and therefore we have decided to keep the issue aside till a national

consensus as reached." 10 Even President K.R. Narayanan's address to the joint session of

Parliament made no mention of nuclear related issues. However, the Vajpayee

government contrary to its public posture was preparing the ground for Pokhran II, the

second round of nuclear explosion at the same site in the deserts of Pokhran. Even though

the top leadership of the BJP had reconciled itself to the compulsion of coalition politics

by putting the explosive issues of the Ram Janmabhoomi, Mathura temple and unifmm

civil code on the back burner, on this very important nuclear issue it chose to follow a

very active line albeit very discreetly. On such an important issue of national security, the

sole prerogative in a country like India lies with the head of the government. Taking full

use of that discretion preparation for the tests were shrouded in complete secrecy. The

genesis of operation Shakti can perhaps be traced back to March 20, the second day of the

BJP led government. On that day, Dr. R. Chidambaram, the Department of Atomic

Energy Secretary and Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commissiuon called on the new

Ptime Minister. Nineteen days later, Vajpayee summoned both Chidambaram and A.P.J.

Kalam head of the Defence and Research Development Agency to give them the go ahead

for the tests. Brajesh Mishra, Principal Secretary to the PM was entrusted with the task of

liaising with the scientific establishment. 11 The process thus started. The political

establishment had given the go ahead. The process that was begin finally culminated

when the country became witness to three nuclear blasts on May 11 Shakti 98 was the

name bestowed upon the series of tests that concluded on May 13, with 2 further

10 Ibid p-5. 11 India Today May 25, 1998.

147

detonation May 13. 12 In a statement issued by Brajesh Mishra, Principal Secretary to the

PM following the three nuclear tests it was said "As announced by the PM this afternoon

today, India conducted three underground nuclear tests in the Pokhran range. The tests

conducted today were with a fission device, a low yield device and thermonuclear device.

The measured yields are in line with expected values. Measurements have also confirmed

that there was no release of radioactivity into the atmosphere. These were contained

explosions like the experiment conducted in May, 1974. "These tests have established

that India has a proven capability for a weaponised nuclear programme. They also

provide a valuable database which is useful in the design of nuclear weapons of different

yields for different delivery systems. Further they are expected to carry Indian scientists

towards sound computer simulation capability which may be supported by sub-critical

experiments, if considered necessary.

The Government is deeply concerned as were previous governments, about the

nuclear environment in India's neighborhood. These tests provide reassurance to the

people of India that their national security interests are paramount and will be promoted

and protected. Succeeding generation of Indians would also rest assured that

contemporary technologies associated with the nuclear option have been passed on to

them in this 50th year of independence. It necessary to highlight today that India was in

the vanguard of nations which ushered in the partial test ban treaty in 1963 due to

environmental concerns. The Indian representatives have worked in various international

forums, including the conference on disarmament, for universal non discriminatory and

verifiable arrangements for the elimination of the weapons of mass destruction.

12 Frontline, Chennai, June 5, 1998

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"The government would like to reiterate its support to efforts to realise the goal of a truly comprehensive international arrangement which would prohibit underground nuclear testing of all weapons as well as related experiment described as 'sub critical' or hydro-nuclear".

India would be prepared to consider being an adherent to some of the

undertakings in the comprehensive test ban treaty. But this cannot obviously be done in a

vacuum. It would necessarily be an evolutionary process from concept to commitment

and would depend on a number of reciprocal activities.

"We would like to reaffirm categorically that we will continue to exercise the most stringent control on the export of sensitive technologies, equipment and commodities -especially those related to weapons of mass destruction. Our track record has been impeccable in this regard. Therefore, we expect recognition of our responsible policy by the international community."

"India remains committed to a speedy process of nuclear disarmament leading to total and global elimination of nuclear weapons."

"Our adherence to the chemical weapons convention and the biological weapons convetion is evidence of our commitment to any global disarmament regime which is non-discriminatory and verifiable. We shall also be happy to participate in the negotiations for the conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty in the Geneva based conference on disarmament."

"In our neighborhood we have many friends with whom relations of fruitful cooperation for mutual benefit have existed and deepened over a long period. We assure them that it will be our sincerity endeavour to intensify and diversify those relations further for the benefit of all our people. For India as for others, the prime need is for peaceful cooperation and economic development". 13

13 Full next of statement of Principal Secretary to the PM, Shri Brajesh Mishra's statement published in Hidustan Times. New Delhi, 12 May, 1998.

149

5.2.1 National Response

The Pokhran explosion led to a vigorous debate as used in the media both in India

and abroad. In an article by A M Roosenthal in the International Herald Tribune it was

said "Americans should understand that it was the west, particularly the United States,

that built policy road leading to the India underground explosion. The utter should in

Washington shows more than an intelligence failure. It shows attitudes about India are the

same western mush of arrogance, ignorance and condescension that they have been for

half century since Indian independence. Just as plainly it shows the danger of the new

ingredient that President Bill Clinton added - the drive to make China the partner of

America in the last years of this century and all the next, partner in trade, technology,

knowing the capabilities of Chinese armed forces, and its security strategy that will affect

Asia and the Pacific. 14

Prof. M.G.K. Menon renowned scientist and former Union Minister argued in an

article in the Hindustan Times on 20th May, 1998 "In 1974, India conducted a peaceful

nuclear explosion at Pokhran. Since then for the past 24 years, India has been sitting on

the fence in a position of nuclear ambivalence. In 1974, and the years after, one was not

allowed to use any other expression other to described that test. Over this period, China

has streaked ahead in its nuclear and missile programmes. There have also been

developments in this area by Pakistan, with the active assistance of China and tacit

connivence of the USA. There have been continuing reports at high levels from Pakistan,

of that nation possessing nuclear weapons. There have also been reports of the recent

firing of the Ghauri missiles by Pakistan. It is with these two countiies that India has one

of the most extensive borders. Against this background one must view what happened on

14 Rosenthal A.M.,The West Drove India Down the Nuclear Road, International Herald Tribune, New York. 16-17 May, 1996.

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May 11, when India conducted three underground nuclear tests simultaneously at

Pokhran, it has since carried two further tests. All public debates in this area, have been

clouded with uncertainty and questions marks raised as to whether India was truly a

nuclear weapon state. In the Asia, the 1974 test had clearly established its capability to

carry out a nuclear explosion in the 20 kilo ton range. However, there was a campaign to

create doubts about India's capabilities to fabricate any sophisticated warheads. Why

these doubts existed has always been beyond me. After all it was a matter of packaging

which called for political will and direction for proceeding with the programme and

conducting the needed tests. The clear and unambiguous decision taken by Prime

Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee has brought clarify to the situation as far as India is

concerned. India is no longer sitting on the fence. It is now a nuclear weapon state. One

must place on record, that in its election manifesto, the BJP had clearly stated "the BJP

rejects the motion of nuclear apartheid and will actively oppose attempts to impose a

hegemonistic nuclear apartheid and will actively oppose attempts to impose a

hegemonistic nuclear regime. We will not be dictated to by anybody in matters of security

and in the exercise of one nuclear option. However, we have been living in a make

believe world since 1974. If that event had not taken place, one could have argued very

differently. One could have stood if one wished to, on a high moral ground, on Gandhian

principles and the like. After Pokhran 1974, the governments in power had supported

continuing work in this area but never in an open fashion to inspire confidence either of

the armed forces or the public at large. One gave an impression of being afraid of firmly

going in for the nuclear option. Many sanctions and controls have been imposed in the

past even in the areas not related to the nuclear programmes. Such consequence are bound

to be there and have to be faced. 15 India's leading defence analyst K. Subramanyam in a

15 Menon M.G.K., Success in science, Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 20 May 1998.

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speech delivered at the India International Centre clearly underlined the mood in the

made and the country in general when he said "Yes, I was happy (over Pokhran II). Not

because, as many people think, I endorse nuclear weapons. I am totally opposed to

nuclear weapons. It was not a question of weaponry. It is a question of assertion of India's

dignity, sovereignty and India's right to be equal with any other major power of the world

because we represent one sixth of humanity. That was the issue because a nuclear weapon

is not a weapon of war. It is not likely to be used in war fighting. If it is ever used that

will be a crime against humanity. The weapon was not the issue. If only the world had

listened to us and had moved in the direction of disarmament, it is quite possible we

would have reconciled ourselves to be without nuclear weapons. But the world did the

most horrible thing that ever happened was on May 12, 1995 when the international

community legitimised nuclear weapons by extending the NPT in an indefinite and

unconditional manner. That was a watershed and after that we had no option left but to go

nuclear. Because up to that point it was argued that NPT was a cold war arms control

measure. It was so only for 25 years. After the cold war was over, when there was no

animosity among the major powers of the world, they dragooned the entire international

community into legitimising this weapon of mass destruction and perpetuated nuclear

apartheid.

If you look at the world map, the entire area from Vancouver to Vladivostok is in

a security framework called organisation for security and cooperation in Europe. That

organisation has four nuclear weapon powers in that are all partners for peace. The

security of this vast areas consisting of white industrial nations is based upon nuclear

deterrence. It extends further to South Korea, Japan, Australia, New Zealand because they

all have bilateral security treaties with the United States and obtain nuclear deterrent

protection from the United States. Then, the entire western hemisphere is in the

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organisation of American States which is again a security organisation of which the US is

the leader. The United States nuclear security umbrella is spread over the entire western

hemisphere. China with its 1.2 billion population has its own nuclear weapons, and

therefore obtain its own nuclear deterrent security. In spite of all our pleadings, a majority

of the world community accepts nuclear deterrence as a legitimate security doctrine and

they live under a security paradigm of nuclear deterrence. It is a harsh fact. We can't run

away from it. It is not a question of what we consider as good or moral. We have to live

in this international community as it exists. We have to take into account the views of

other nations of the world and if you want to influence their behavior we have to first

understand their behaviour pattern. If we look at it objectively, the majority of the world

population excepting for the African continent and the Arab States, South Asia and South

East Asia, is under a nuclear deterrent security paradigm. On May 11 we joined that

mainstream paradigm.

Therefore it is not a question of our isolating ourselves as some people have

argued. Now if we want to change it, we can do that only by operating on this paradigm

and in order to do that we must have the weapons. Otherwise, they are not going to listen

to us as they have not listened to us for the last 50 years. That was the problem facing

India and that was the reason why I advocated India exercising the nuclear option. Not

because I approve of nuclear weapons. It is of how we handle the harsh world dominated

by the nuclear security doctrine. 16

Another very prominent defence analyst C. Raja Mohan argued that "India's

decision to become a declared nuclear weapon power is rooted in the geopolitical changes

that have taken place in Asia since the end of Cold War and could have a significant

16 ·Excerpts fro rna speech by K. Subramanyam at the India International Centre on 16th May, 1998 Text published by IIC, New Delhi, May, 2998.

153

effect on their evolution. The great powers, in particular the sections in their foreign

policy establishments have China-centred view of Asia, as well as the arms controllers,

are likely to try and limit the impact of a nuclear India on Asia politics. But this policy is

unlikely to succeed. Integrating India in the global non-proliferation order and ensuring

that there is balance against China in Asia would be a far more sensible policy for the

great powers. China had trouble with both the super powers developed its own

independent nuclear deterrent from the mid 1960's. India with its aspirations for

autonomy in international affairs steadily developed its weapon capability. Shocked that

neither the US nor China had turned up to prevent its vivisection by India in 1971,

Pakistan moved to acquire its own nuclear deterrent.

The end of the Cold War resulted in widespread expectation that nuclear restraint

arms control would emerge as a "collective good" in Asia. In fact, the trends have gone

the other way. Several factors have made nuclear weapons far more important to Asian

security. These include the collapse or loosening of the traditional alliances in the region,

increasing question about the credibility of an extended deteiTence, concerns about the

rise of China and uncertainty in US policies towards Beijing.

The revival of the Indian nuclear debate at the end of the cold war has not been

accidental. It was firmly rooted in the implications of the collapse of the Soviet Union for

Indian security. The strong relationship that New Delhi had build up with Moscow during

the cold war and the belief that the central balance between US and USSR was immitable

allowed India the luxury of keeping it nuclear option open. But the collapse of the Soviet

Union, the emergence of China-once India's peer as the second most important power in

the world, the consequent disorientation of India's foreign policy and the fear that India

will forever be marginalised in the Asia and global geopolitics forced New Delhi to

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reconsider its nuclear policy in the 1990' s. 17

Raja Mohan has argued that India's going nuclear has a lot to do with geopolitics

of Asia. The cold war and the nuclear balance between USSR and USA served a great

cause in Asia but the end of cold war actually brought about different results. The rise of

China, Pak and policy of US towards both the states and above all the fall of the USSR, a

trusted Indian ally brought about a rethinking in Indian policymakers minds.

The reaction to the tests was overwhelming. Whether it was the man on the street,

or the intelligentsia it was widely welcomed. Defence analysts, members of the academic,

ex-foreign service officials who at various points of time dealt with the nuclear issue,

scientists, the armed forces - the general emphoria that was generated underscored the

belief that the tests were long overdue and the government had taken a step in right

direction. The belief in the country that the powerful west must be given a strong and

befitting answer pervaded every section of the society.

"India in conducting five tests, including a thermonuclear test between the 11th and 13th of May'98 implies the following: India has affirmed to itself and confirmed to the world its status as a full fledged nuclear state. Secondly, these tests confirm the sophisticated level of the Indian technological capacities in the spheres of high energy physics, nuclear engineering with capacities for computer simulation and sub-critical tests in future. Third, India has acquired a strategic position as a balancing factor both in regional and international power equations". 18

By carrying out five nuclear weapons test within 48 hours, India has at long last

demonstrated its political will and courage expected of any nation which has a modicum

of self-respect and aspires to be a regional and global player of some significance. It is

17 Raja mohan. C., India's Nuclear Weapons and the Asian balance Indian Defence Review July-Sept. '98 Vol. 13, No.3. 18 Dixit J.N., India now balancing factor in power play, Hindustan Times, New Delhi 15th May, 1998.

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ironical that this courage come to be mustered by a BJP led government. It has been

apparent for several years now that just keeping the nuclear option open was not of much

significance. It is ironical that this courage come to be mustered only by a BJP-Ied

government. It has been apparent for several years now that just keeping the nuclear

weapons option open was not of much significance, that each passing day made its

exercise so much more difficult and a time would soon come when it became impossible

for any nation to exercise the option. 19

5.2.2 International Reactions

On the important issue of international reaction, the reactions were on expected

lines. Much of the western nations were fiercely critical of India going nuclear. They

could not digest the fact that a country of the third world like India had demonstrated its

nuclear capability and sent a clear message to the world community that it meant

business. It was a clear victory of Indian science, a victory of the Indian people in

general.

The UN Security Council in a statement said "the council expresses its dismay at

the tests." The Council urges all states to exercise maximum restraint with a view to

preventing an escalation in the arms race and to preserving peace in the region" it said. It

(Council) is of the view that such testing is contrary to the defacto moratorium on the

testing of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and to the global efforts

towards nuclear disarmament and nuelear non-proliferation" the statement said. 20

One of India's fiercest critics was Australia which went on record in it's criticism

of India's nuclear test so much so that it called its High Commissioner home for urgent

19 Dubey Muchkund, Exercising the nuclear option, Hindu. New Delhi 18th May, 1998.

20 The Hindu, New Delhi, 13th May, 1998.

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discussions." 1 However it should be borne in mind that Australia's record in such matters

is extremely dismal. It is on of the few countries to have allowed the United States to test

on its own soil.

Canada's reaction too was belligerent. It's first reaction was to recall its High

Commissioner from new Delhi followed by sanctions. The entire Canadian media was

full of critical stories of Pokhran II. In the House of Commons, the New Democratic

Party accused the Liberal Party of helping India to acquire nuclear technology by

exporting the ..... reactor during the 1950's but Deputy P.M. Herb Gray disagreed with this

kind of an allegation. Thus the nuclear explosion in India had its echo in the Canadian

Parliament too. Indian High Commissioner in Canada Rajnikant Verma said in an

interview that he was puzzled over the fuss because New Delhi had not violated any

. . 1 22 mternatwna agreements.

· Perhaps the only country which acted in a different manner or showed its

maturing by not criticising India blatantly was France. Even though France is a prominent

European country it did not join the rest of Europe in condemning India for its nuclear

explosion. A statement by the government spokesperson in Paris said "such measures

(sanctions) were not the right way to encourage India to sign the Non-proliferation

Treaty." The French government expressed concern and also said that "what was more

important than ever was to encourage, to convince and to suggest, so that nothing like this

happens again, the spokesperson added about the tests."23 France could have taken a

stance of this kind keeping in mind a business it has to do with India. At stake was the

selling of aircraft to India by the French Airbus Industries to India Airlines and Air India.

21 Statement issued by United Nations Security Council, published in Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 15th may, 1998. 22 The Observer, New Delhi, 15th May, 1998.

23 The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 14th May, 1998.

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In a period of acute business recession which has affected almost all the economies of the

world, the French thought it fit to take a stand of this kind to an order to safeguard their

business interest. Moreover, it clearly indicated a proper understanding of India's security

perception.

Germany also condemned the Pokhran II explosion by India and cancelled aid

talks with India. Like Australia, Germany has a long and checkered history of being in

league with the USA for its own security. Even during the cold war its Aitforce

conducted exercises to practise delivery of nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union.

Germany for a long time had been toying with the idea of the Euro Bomb and it acceded

very reluctantly to the NPT.24 For a country like Germany, it had absolutely no business

to preach India nuclear non-proliferation. It was like the bandit posing as the sheriff. If

Germany had impeccable credentials on the nuclear front, it would have had the locus-

standi to deliver sermons.

The European Union felt rebuffed after the second round of tests which followed

very quickly after the first round of tests. The EU had appealed for resraint but the

government of India went ahead with the tests.

"The political directors appealed to the government of India to do all it could so

that tension in the region does not increase." an EU spokesperson said. The director in an

appeal to Pakistan said "we have told Pakistan, we disapprove of these tests, and asked

them not to overreact and to exercise restraint. 25 The panel also requested Britain to lodge

a formal protest on EU's behalf.

In the US there was all round condemnation in the congress. Florida Republican

Bill Me Colum, Co-Chairman of the Congressional India Caucus and longtime friend of

2 ~ The Hindu, New Delhi, 13th May, 1998.

25 The Observer, New Delhi, 15th May, 1998.

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India said " the tests were certainly going to strain our relations, which has been better in

the past two or three years then at any time in history." Senator Sam Brown back Kansas

Republican and head of the Senate Foreign Relation Sub committee on Near Eastern and

Suth Asian Affairs urged the Administration to publish India. "It is a terrible action on the

part of the Indian government." He further added "it is an enormous negative blow to our

relationship with India. It will destabilise the region."

Henry Sokolski, a former senior Pentagon official for non-proliferation,

commented "India has just dug a big hole for itself by doing the test - a military, political

and economic hole. Its banking system is in a world of hurt now. It is about to get a death

blow. This is not just a nuclear test for India. It is a political test for the United States."26

In the United States, sharp criticism came from long time friends and foes of

India. The common refrain was that India had committed a mistake by going nuclear and

the five tests were a clear-threat at to international peace. Undlying the vocal criticism

was the clear message that "how could India have the audacity of going in for the nuclear

or in other world how could India challenge the nuclear hegemany perpetrated for a long

time by the United States and its cohorts in the western world. The very fact that even

long time supporters of India joined the chorus of condemning India underscored their

political compulsion and also the fact that the tests by India posed a threat to the United

States of America and the nuclear order it so firmly advocates.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) also reacted in a manner that

was in tune with the West. The IAEA said that India could not be given a status that was

tantamount to the other five nuclear powers. The Agency in response to a statement by a

senior Indian nuclear scientist that India was a full fledged nuclear power, replied in a

26 The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 13th May, 1998.

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statement released by its spokesperson David Kyd said "of course if India steps forward

and says will now there six, well its up to the international community to look at that

issue.'m He noted that the five nuclear powers were designated as such under the NPT.

The reaction of the IAEA was no surprise. It was expected sooner or later as the western

countries were grudging India's new found status.

Another fallout of Pokhran II was the economic repercussion or in other words the

problem of the developed country imposing sanctions on India. One of the first to react on

the sanctions front was the United States of America. Speaking at Bonn with the German

Chancellor Helmat Kohl by his side, President Cilnton said that India had committed a

"terrible mistake" before announcing that he had decided to impose economic sanctions

under a 1994 US non-proliferation law. The President also declared that the US would

oppose loans by international institutions to India. 28

The 1994 non-proliferation law which has never been invoked provides for a

delay of thirty days before implementation which means it would come into force on June

13. Sanctions by the United States would be variety of restriction covering a wide field. It

means a cut off of the US Financial assistance to India except humanitarian and food aid;

an end to the export of certain defence and high technology material; termination of

military aid; a halt of US credit and credit guarantees except for the purchase of food; and

automatic American opposition to international financial institutions loans to New Delhi.

The amount of money involved would be 142.3 million dollars in aid to India lost

year when sanctions were imposed including 91 million dollars for humanitarian and food

aid which would not be affected. The remaining 51.3 million dollars in development aid

would said cut off.

27 The Observer, New Delhi, 16th May, 1998.

28 The Times of India, New Delhi, 14th May, 1998.

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An assistance programme to help India develop its stock market and sell

municipal bonds were also halted. Uncertainty loomed large over the fate of about at 4

billion dollars in projects that were awaiting approval and they were going to be blocked.

10.2 billion dollars in insurance and financing for American forms from the overseas

private investment corporation. Another 20 million dollars for agriculture credits will be

halted.

On the private investment front, the sanctions have had direct effect as it would

entail the involvement of providing finances by international and even loans by US banks

and that was the hurdle because that is where the sanctions come into play. At that point

of time, the United States stood as India's largest trading partner and largest investor.

State department figures indicated imports from India totalled 7.3 billion dollars in 1997

while the US exports to India reached 7.7 billion dollars Jed by aircraft parts, machinery,

fertilizers, scrap metals and computer hardware.

On the international loans front, the scenario was no better India with an external

borrowing stood at the world's largest borrower with 44 billion dollars in loan to date.

The World Bank had plans to double lending to India and these plans were bound to be in

jeopardy due to US and Japanese opposition. In all, such a step could have a bearing on

3.8 billion dollars worth of loan approvals.

Other countries were equally swift m their reactions to Pohkran II. Japan

conveyed its strong protest over the series of nuclear tests and outlined retaliatory

measures including suspension of twenty six million dollars annual grants in aid and

freezing of future aid for any new projects.

Japanese Ambassador Hiryabashi called on Finance Secretary M.S. Alhuwalia to

convey his country's dismay and appealed to India to sign the NPT and CTBT. He said

that he had told the Finance Secretary that Japan had decided to freeze aid for all new

161

projects except emergency and humanitarian aid.

The Netherlands government suspended all economic aid to India following the

tests. The Netherlands also banned all arms deliveries to India following the tests.

Denmark halted humanitarian aid to India, cancelled a high level trade visit and issued a

sharp reaction to the series of tests. In a statement the Foreign Minister of Denmark said

"Denmark deeply deplores these nuclear tests and strongly urges the Indian government

to come to its senses and support the international community's wish for a complete stop

of all nuclear testing. Norway decided to freeze all foreign aid to India apart from

programmes helping the poor. Norway said it would freeze foreign aid indefinitely and

Norway would stop financing to a high technological project in India.

Britain said that it would not go in for sanction despite India's tests.

Germany froze fresh development and worth 300 million dms.

Sweden cut short a three year aid agreement with India worth 900 million crowns

(118 million dollars).29

Britain's reaction was different because it did not impose any sanctions on India.

Britain appreciated India's point of view and took a stand different from other countries

of Europe. Britain's stand is laudable.

In response to the string of sanctions, the government put up a bold facade. The

fold face of the government could be traced to a· calculated strategy on the part of the

government to be bold and upbeat in the face of sanctions. The government, it is believed

had made an assessment of the situation, the likely consequences that it would have to

face in the wake of the nuclear tests. As a damage control exercise, the Prime Minister

wrote letters to the heads of the governments of US, UK, Russia, France, Japan, Canada,

29 The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 14th May. 1998.

162

Germany explaining the compulsions of India going nuclear.

"India has the inherent strength to stand up to any adversity and even sanctions." Prime Minister's political advisor Shri Promod Mahajan said. In reply to a specific query, on US sanctions he said "if anything, the US sanctions would hurt only the US businessman." The basic belief on which the contingency plan of the government rests was the fact that "India stands on its own feet. Foreign aid and investment are welcome. But even if they are slowed down or halted the country as such will not face any adversity." Mr. Mahajan added "before giving the go ahead for nuclear tests, we had calculated all possible impacts of the decision. We are prepared for the worst."30

The sanctions did not worry economists, policy makers and the industry as can be

guaged from their comments in their reactions to the imposition of sanctions by the US

and other countries.

"Impact of any economic sanction on Indian economy will not be very substantial as the total government assistance to India from the developed country is only one percent of the GDP," Prof D. K. Srivastava of the National Institute of Public Finance and Policy said. Another leading economist Prof. K. N. Kabra of the Indian institute of Public Administration said "defence related sanction would have no impact on India but economic sanctions if imposed by the USA and other developed countries could affect the business sentiments and liberalisation process to some extent."

"Implications of any sanction will not be serious." Dr. D.H. Pai Panandikar,

economic advisor, R.P.G. Enterprises said adding that any trade sanction would be

considered a last resort.

Withdrawal of external assistance to India by the USA and opposition at

multilateral funding for a like the IMF and the World Bank would not affect India's

economic interests much, Mr. Srivastava said. "Sanctions do not mean stopping foreign

30 The Observer, New Delhi, 13th May, 1998.

163

investments both direct and portfolio. China is a case in point. US legal sanctions

following the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989 did not affect flow of investment to

China." said Dr. Amit Mitra, Secretary General of Federation of Indian Chambers of

Commerce and Industry (FICCI). He further added that FICCI would use all of its 64

joint business advisory council the world over to convince international business about

India's stability and attractiveness as investment destination.

The country's major stock markets reacted nervously to possible sanctions but

sentiments improved considerably following the Union Cabinet reiterating India's

commitment to total and global elimination of nuclear weapons.

Associated Chamber of Commerce and industry President L. Lakshman said

"global business community would not make this an issue and investment flow would not

be affected though there could be a possible wait and watch stance."31 Thus the general

feeling in the Indian industry was not of nervousness following the imposition of

economic sanction by the USA and some other countries. An analysis of the opinions and

views of prominent economists and heads of apex business bodies indicated that the

Indian economy would not buckle down under the pressure of the US and other countries.

The government too projected a brave front lending immense support to the economy.

While the reaction to the sanctions were not dismissive, nevertheless they sent across the

message that the Indian economy was strong enough to counter such measures.

5.3 Political Fallout and the Response of Parliament

As soon as Parliament assembled after the recess, the Pokhran II explosion which

had been conducted in the interregnum was bound to come up for discussion. The

31 Ibid.

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govemment of the day set the ball rolling by issuing a statement. The Prime Minister Shri

Atal Bijari Vajpayee laid on the table of the Lok Sabha a document titled "Evolution of

India's Nuclear Policy" (see appendix) on 27th of May, 1998. The document is being

commonly referred to as the white paper released by the Govemment. The Prime Minister

followed it up by issuing a statement on the nuclear tests on the same day. For statement

(see appendix). In the debate that followed on the 27th, 28th and 29th of May, 1998 in

which a number of speakers belonging to almost all the parties in Parliament brought

forth a variety of views representing the shade of opinion of political parties, thus helping

in gauging the political reaction to the Pokhran II tests.

Shri P. Chidambaram of the Tamil Manila Congress in a hard hitting speech on

the floor of the Lok Sabha came down heavily on the govemment. The former Union

Finance Minister in the erstwhile Gujral govemment said "this debate, I believe is not

about the testing of the nuclear device. Neither this House not the people of this country

are divided on that issue. A few days ago, the govemment was good enough to ask the

scientists to brief some of us or what we accomplished technically and scientifically

through the tests. Some of the reasons were quite convincing. they said like this: "we

want to validate on the field, on the ground we had accomplished through computer

simulation. We want an opportunity to pass on the next generation of scientists and the

skills involved in the simulation as well as tests."

He went onto question the govemment, what was the provocation? He said that

many who were in Govemment were, still in the House. The House had, three former

Prime Miniffrs. The last two Prime Ministers were the Members of the House. The

person who ~cupied that high office until the 18th of March to which Vajpayee

succeeded on the 19th of March, was a Member of the House and added that they were all

aware of these threat perceptions and threat assessments.

165

He charged the PM by saying that in his National Agenda although he denied it in

the Outlook interview and went on to say that he has been misquoted and if that is so, the

Outlook Editor has committed a great misdemeanor on which action should be taken

action against him. He asked the question whether the Government in its National Agenda

had promised a strategic Defence review before inducting nuclear weapons. Why was this

not done? Your answer, Mr. Prime Minister was and I quote:

"There was no such promise in the National Agenda."

"Either you have been misquoted by the Editor or your answer was plainly wrong because in parenthesis he extracts what your National Agenda says. And, let me read that for the record. Your National Agenda point no. 26 released by the Prime Minister on March, 18 states"

"We will establish a National Security Council to analyse the military, economic and political threats to the nation, also to continuously advise the Government. This Council will undertake India's first ever strategic Defence review. To ensure the security, territorial integrity and unity of India, we will take all necessary steps and exercise all available options. Towards that end, we will re-evaluate the Nuclear Policy and exercise the option to Induct nuclear weapons. "

"If this was your agenda, you promised to set up a National Security Council, you promised to analyse the military and political threats to the nation, you promised to undertake the first ever strategic Defence review, you promised to re-evaluate the Nuclear Policy and you promised at the end of the exercise that you will exercise the option to induct the nuclear weapons, do you seriously want us to believe that all this was done between the 19th of March and the 8th of April when you told Dr. Kalam and others to go ahead with the tests?

Your case, Mr. Prime Minister, is most unconvincing. Your case is extremely

weak. It is built on very shallow foundations and I would urge you to share with us, what

did you discover between the 19th of March and the 8th of April which Shri Gujral did

not discover on the 18th of March? What analysis, what evaluation did you experts make

and tell you by the 8th of April which they did not tell Shri Gujral or Shri Mulayam Singh

166

or others who were in the Cabinet Committee on Security?"

"He went onto say that China was no threat to India. He also said that the last war with China was fought 36 years ago. The circumstances under which that was began and concluded are still surrounded in controversy. The last war with Pakistan was fought 27 years ago"

He said that there were difficulties with Pakistan. But those difficulties could not

be resolved through the nuclear option.32

Shri Chidambaram in his speech made a frontal attack on the government. He was

of the view that the threat from China and Pakistan which the government had cited was

orchestrated. He went on to say that the BJP and the Prime Minster who had stated very

clearly in the National Agenda for governance such a step if at all was to be taken would

be taken after a strategic Defence Review. This he said was a major departure from an

earlier statement. In the course of his speech he also said the party in power was trying to

vigorously promote its own agenda.

Shri Somnath Chatterjee of the CPI(M) one of the most eloquent and brilliant

Parliamentarians of independent India also delivered a speech on the floor of the Lok

Sabha on the 28th of May, 1998.

"They are groping in the dark to find out a justification now, specially so after the statement of the Prime Minister yesterday".

Mr. Chatterjee said that apart from what this country apprehends from Pakistan,

(Pokhran II) aroused a sense of pride amongst the people of this country, this was

32 Excerpts from speech of P. Chidambaram in the Lok Sabha. Lok Sabha Debate, May 27, 1998.

167

necessary; that it was the greatest achievement and the people of this country and they felt

proud of it; that there was jubiliation all around; and there was acknowledgement of the

role of the BJP Government under the leadership of Mr. Atal Bihari Vajpayee. This was

the only real achievement of this exercise.

He opined that he accepted the signal contribution made by the scientists and

engineers in this respect. It is not the monopoly of that said to express their views of

support and acclamation, But the question is, this achievement is now sought to be

utilised for objectives with political overtones.

Mr. Chatterjee said that as the present Prime minister was leader of the opposition

when the special session of parliament to commomerate fifty years of independence was

convened and at that time he made an eloquent speech on a wide range of issues, but he

never mentioned any reservation about our security perception or of the threat this

country was supposedly facing.

Mr. Chatterjee said that he was not against scientific development and progress.

"We never said that we do not want scientific development. We were also very happy and proud when our scientists were able to make a super computer following the denial of the USA to supply one. We also acclaimed the scientists of this country when they placed our satellites in the orbit. We have been openly applauding their achievements. We are proud of the fact that in spite of several restraints and shortages, in spite of lack of full finance and facilities, our scientists and engineers had been able to attain great achievements with high level of dedication. We are proud of them. But do not try to arrogate that to your political purposes. We are now told of this security problem. Yes, there is a security problem. Since that unanimous resolution that was passed in this House, the only important development that has taken place has been the installation of this Government under the leadership of Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee. A Government which is nothing but composed of a rickety coalition of all sorts of political parties and with no commonality of interests or policies, apart from somehow to get in and remain in power"?3 Shri Chatterjee was

33 Excerpts from speech delivered by Somnath Chatterjee in the Lok Sabha, Lok Sabha debates, May 27th, 1998.

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of the view that BJP was aiming at political mileage by taking this step. Citing the example of the Prime Minister's speech which he delivered on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of India's independence as the then leader of the opposition, Mr. Chatterjee said even though Parliament debated on a wide gamut of issues and Shri Vajpayee himself touched a number of issues he did not speak about a security threat. Shri Chatterjee referred to the coalition government as a loose conglomeration of disparate parties and the government which had been plugged by constant troubles like the resignation of two ministers from the government and constant threats to its stability held out by its allies went in for the test. He tried to establish a link between the bomb and Hindu Nationalism and said the BJP through the bomb was touting the package of Hindu Nationalism.

Another very important speech was delivered by Shri I.K. Gujral of the Janata

Dal. Shri Gujral, a former Prime Minister and External Affairs Minister said that once

India enters into the nuclear war race, one should not be under any wrong impression, all

slogans that we have been patriotic and the zeal one might raise, no country has been able

to keep pace. The Soviet Union would not have been destroyed; that civilisation and the

'ism' would not have gone, had they not joined this race, he opined.

Mr. Gujral quoted a newspaper report where the Defence Minister had said that

the weapons have already been handed over to the Army.

"I do not know what he is talking. If that has been done, God help us. I ask the Prime Minister to assure us here that weaponisation does not mean militarisation. I want the Prime Minister to give me an assurance and give an assurance to this House and to the country that we are not joining the nuclear weapons race. Countries in despair can do it. Pakistan can be desperate. It is no democracy like we are. It has no civilizational commitment that we have. It does not have a commitment to peace that we have".

He further added

"let us be not deceiving ourselves because we must understand one thing. God forbid, and I say thrice God forbid if ever a nuclear war comes, there

169

can be no winner, there can be no loser ever give nuclear weapons. That is why heaps have been destroyed. That is why all the SALT Treaties and SARC Treaties have been signed. Why are they being signed? They spent billions of dollars on building them. Even this is not to our satisfaction. We wanted them to be destroyed more speedily. All the same, some people are doing it. Therefore, I would only say this thing. I urge the Prime Minister, when he addresses us to kindly respond to me. I hope, he would respond and tell me, tell you, tell all of us and tell the entire country that under no circumstances will India enter the nuclear weapons race". 34

Shri Gujral was of the view that India should not enter an arms race and he went

on to quote the statement of the Union Defence Minister George Fernandes that

weaponisation was the next step. He deplored weaponisation and said that this would

spell doom for India because not only was it immoral but it also involved enormous cost

which a poor country like India could not afford. He also made another point that India

should neither get provoked by Pakistani threats nor should it play the Chinese Card.

Shri K. Natwar Singh of the Congress was fielded by the Congress party to take

part in the dabate. As it was an important matter the party chose a former diplomat Union

Minister of State for External Affairs to articulate its view point.

"As far as the Congress Party is concerned, our views on the subject have been made clear in the Congress Working Committee which met on the 14th of May and endorsed the statement of the Congress President Shrimati Sonia Gandhi which reads as follows:

I would like to place one record, in this formal meeting of the Congress Working Committee, the pride we feel in the achievement of our nuclear scientists and engineers who are putting India's nuclear capability in the front rank. We recall with equal pride the successive Congress Governments have ensured India's nuclear capability remains up to date so that our security is not compromised.

The nuclear question is a national matter, not a party-run one. On this, every Indian is united. The Congress Party remains committed to a nuclear-weapon-free world, non-violent world and that remains the sheet

34 Excerpts from I.K. Gujral speech in Lok Sabha, Lok Sabha debates, May 29th, 1998.

170

anchor of our policy.

The Congress Working Committee reiterates India's commitment to peace in the region so that India and our neighbors can move ahead in accelerating the economic growth, eradication of poverty, illiteracy and improving the living conditions of all citizens."

Mr. Singh said that the nuclear test is behind us. If the Hon. Prime Minister and

the BJP had simply said in their manifesto that they will have a review of the defence

policy, the strategic policy; there will be a National Security Council which will examine

this and they will then re-evaluate their policy and then they will go for nuclear weapon

programme and exercise the nuclear option, the congress could agree with that. But it is

not so. The reason given, in a letter to the President Clinton, was that there was a security

threat. He wanted to know from the Hon. Prime Minister when did this threat begin. Did

it begin on the 19th of March when he took over? Or, did it being on the 8th of April

when he gave the green signal to his scientists? How serious was this threat?

He said Mr. Vajpayee was presiding over a Government of eighteen parties. While

he had experienced of being the Foreign Minister of India, the said parties felt that the

parallel political and diplomatic management of his action on the 11th and 13th has been

highly unsatisfactory. Mr. Singh contended that

"there are 125 foreign mission in Delhi. They report everyday as to what is happening here. Have you read Shri Muchkund Dubey's article today? You say that you are a nuclear weapon State. Well, good luckto you. But read Muchkund Dubey's article and you will find that it is going to be very very tough. The heat is already being put on you. The US-sponsored access to contain India. What is the access which are actions helped produce Pakistan, Washington, China? And how are they going about it? You please read The Time of India of today carefully and ask you colleagues".

Quoting Muchkund Dubey, Natwar singh said that

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"it is going to be extremely difficult for India to muscle its way into this world nuclear order. After the latest Pokhran Test, India has declared itself a nuclear weapon State and made a number of moves to be recognised as such, etc. The recent five tests themselves have not given India its nuclear deterrent. By these tests, we have only displayed our clear weapon capability in a much higher technological level in 1974. We still have a long way to go before acquiring a credible deterrent."

While commending the scientists he said the nuclear test was a tribute to the

country, a tremendous tribute to our scientists and a tremendous tribute to Shri Jawaharlal

Nehru, Shrimati Indira Gandhi, Shri Rajiv Gandhi, Shri Narasimha Rao, Shri Inder

Kumar Gujnl and all the other Prime Minister who said, 'Go ahead with this

programme.35

Shri Natwar Singh while welcoming the Pokhran II tests as a great scientific feat

questioned the government's motives and asked the government to explain what it meant

by national threat. In a scathing attack on the government, Mr. Singh said it should be

prepared to bear the consequences of having conducted the tests. He said that the tests

were a clear cut deviation from the long pursued policy followed by successive Prime

Minister from Nehru to Gujral.

Shri L.K. Advani in a stout defence of the government said the following:

Mr.Advani questioned Shri Natwar Singh and Shri Chidambaram who

conveniently disregarded the fact that in 1991 just before the elections, the Congress

Party came forth with a manifesto which took cognizance of the threat that this

Government has taken cognizance of. The 1991 election was fought by the Congress

under the leadership of Rajivji. The 1991 Congress manifesto was prepared under the

aegis of Rajivji.

35 Excerpts from K. Natwar Singh's speech in the Lok Sabha. Lok Sabha debates, May 27, 1998.

172

Quoting from the manifesto, Advani said that

"we are deeply concerned that Pakistan is developing the nuclear weapons. It is hoped that they will desist from this disastrous path. They have already inflicted four wars upon India. In case Pakistan persists with the development and deployment of nuclear weapons, India will be constrained to review her policy to meet the threat."

He further said that in all documents of this kind Shri Chidambaram has a role,

nd wondered whether he had any role in drafting the 1991 manifesto.

"In so far as the relations with other countries are concerned and in so far as external security is concerned, they are the concerns either of the External Affairs Minister or of the Defence Minister. But I do believe that in so far as relations with Pakitstan are concerned, they impinge not only on our external security but also on our internal security; and as a person who has been entrusted with the responsibility of looking after internal security, I feel that I can contribute something to this debate.

I believe that since 194 7, Pakistan which declared itself a theocratic State has failed to reconcile with the fact that India has declared itself a non­denominational secular State, because commitment to theocracy and commitment to the two-nation theory logically lead to Kashmir becoming a part of Pakistan. But it did not happen. The leadership of Kashmir and the people of Kashmir decided to go along with India; and they have remained a part of this country since then.

Pakistan's failure to reconcile with this fact has been at the root of many problems that the country is facing in Jammu and Kashmir. That is how, there was a war in 1947, there was a war in 1965 and in a way, even the war in 1971 was related to that. But having failed in all the wars, they adopted a certain strategy which those concerned with India's security can never afford to discard and ignore. It cannot be done. Only those who discard it can think in terms of making statement of this kind: "Are they mounting an attack on Amritsar? Are they doing this? After all, they have very good talks with us. The Gujral doctrine was functioning very well; if you want to throw it overboard, you can do it. Why do you talk about threat perceptions when there are no threats at all? It is hunky-dory all along". It is only that kind of thinking that shows that we are totally oblivious of it or we shut our eyes ostrich-like to the fact that after the war in 1971, Pakistan decided upon a different strategy".

Taking exception to the use of the word bravado by the Congress leader Shti Shiv

Shanker against Shri Vajpayee and his Government. '"He used the word 'misadventure'

against Shri Vajpayee when even the NAM Conference felt that there was no bravado.

This is only a kind of protest against nuclear apartheid sought to be imposed on India by

the nuclear weapons countries. It was supposed to be a natural thing that India had to do

when it was thinking of its security. It is something that has been endorsed by millions in

the country. You go to any part of the country. You go to the villages; you go to the

towns; you go to the cities. Except for the dissonant voice that was heard in this House

yesterday, there will be a very few dissonant voices. It will be the same kind of elation

and joy. In fact, people from abroad kept ringing me again and again that for the first

time, they feel proud that we are there and till now, no one took notice of us".

Mr. Advani said that he had no objection to legitimate criticism.

"But to say that there is no threat at all and everything is hunky-dory, I am sorry, I cannot agree with it. This Government cannot agree with it. This Government has not kept anyone in the dark. From day one, we said that we would do it."

"We talked of a nuclear deterrent. For anyone to argue how can there be a nuclear weapon for defence, we never used the word 'defence' really. We simply said that we had no aggressive intentions for anyone. But 'deterrent' is something which has been the principal reason. Even though many powers in the world have had nuclear arsenals which could destroy the world many times, even then, after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, no one has used them. One reason is deterrence. That is one reason. That is not the only reason. I entirely appreciate it. Therefore, this Government's policy is not confined to simply going in for nuclear explosion and on that basis go on thinking that we are secure. Deterrence itself is defence. After all, when a country has a nuclear weapon, it uses that weapon even for diplomatic coercion. It has used it in the past. Countries have been doing it. We would not like to be subjected to that. It is in this context that the Prime Minister used the word 'defence'. In this case I would give all credit to Shri Vajpayee. He has executed this entire programme in a manner in which it ought to have been executed. I am not aware of it but you have said that he gave clearance to the scientists on the 8th of April. It may have been reported in the Press. I would not even ask him but I do know that even the Raksha Mantri or myself, or those who came to know of it came to know

174

only when it was necessary for him to communicate it and approximately at the same time he was even looking for Shri Sharad Pawar to communicate to him this decision of the Government. So, I would say that he has conducted this entire exercise in an exemplary manner; in a manner in which the Prime Minister of a country ought to have done it."36

Shri Advani speaking on behalf of the government sought to demolish the

arguments of Shri P. Chidamabram and Shri K. Natwar Singh. He said that they were

playing politics and pointed out that the Congress election manifesto released prior to the

1991 election very emphatically stated the threat by Pakistan. Mr. Advani rightly pointed

out that such a threat could not have vanished all of a sudden and the opposition was

playing politics.

He also touched upon another aspect i.e. internal security and how Pakistan had

been playing a covert role in encouraging elements who were a direct threat to the unity

and integrity of India. he said that by Pakistan was directly involved in giving a filing to

terrorist activities in Kashmir and furnished documentary proof to that effect. He said that

the nuclear tests enjoyed wide spread support and wondered why thee were disenting

voices in Parliament. The need of the hour was a credible deterrent and that objective had

been achieved by this step.

An analysis of the reaction of political parties would betray a sense of hypocrisy.

If one goes deep into the whole issue, it was but natural there were political overtones. On

the crucial issue of national security, it must be stated in no unce1tain terms that the threat

was real and not trumped up or orchestrated as alleged by opposition parties.

As far back as 1987, the Annual report of the Ministry of Defence says "in

Pakistan it is now almost certain, on the basis of public evidence including the disclosures

36 Excerpts from L. K. Advani's speech, Lok Sabha Debates, ~lay 28, 1998.

175

made recently by the leading Pakistani scientist (referring to the interview given to

Kuldip Nayar) that it is on the brink acquiring nuclear weapons capability. This

development which has the most serious consequences for India's security has been

compounded by Pakistan's continuing acquisition of weaponry which go well beyond its

security needs. The US Administration has let it be known that it'll provide another large

arms package to .Pakistan on concessional terms. Particularly disturbing is the

administration's willingness to consider transferring to Pakistan sophisticated airborne

early warning systems, which would have a minimal impact on dealing with alleged

intrusion from Afghanistan, but a substantial force multiplier effect against India. The

government of India remains committed to improving and normalising its relations either

Pakistan on the basis of Shimla Agreement, has not made much headway. Pakistan

continues to acquire sophisticated weapons system plainly intended for use against India.

We appreciate discussion on Siachen remain abortive. We appreciate Pakistan's recent

undertaking not to encourage terrorist activities directed against India. During this year, a

dialogue with Pakistan was carried on at various levels and on different security related

issues. However, it cannot be said that these talks have led to any perceptible

improvement in the atmosphere.37 The annual report of the Defence Minstry is by far the

most authoritative source which spells out in detail the threat to national security posed to

India by China and Pakistan.

Throughout the nineties a perusal of the annual reports would indicate that the

threat persisted and the improvement in the situation between India and its neighbours at

different diplomatic levels never in any way had a direct bearing on diminishing the threat

perception in any way.

37 Annual report, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 1986-87.

176

The postures adopted by Pakistan on various issues and its military tie-ups with

vmious countries have remained central to our strategic concerns. Pakistan's clandestine

nuclear weapons programme also continues to be pursued despite the strong that have

developed in its longstanding relations with the US on this point. It is said to be seeking

Chinese assistance in continuing with this as well as in its missile programme. The

continued pursuit of a nuclear programme. The continued pursuit of a nuclear programme

by Pakistan was evidenced in the recent official level admission of Pakistan having the

capability of assembling its own nuclear weapon. while this admission has confirmed the

long held speculation, it has also made us more sceptical of Pakistan's suggestion for a

multilateral approach to the nuclear issue in South Asia. India continued to believe that

the nuclear issue cannot be addressed on a regional basis but needs to be viewed in a

global perspective. Finally, Pakistan's access to nuclear technology and material for its

nuclear weapons programme, reported by through clandestine means, from foreign

sources raises serious doubts about the effectiveness of the non-proliferation regimes. 38

The situation did not seem to have improved the following year as it was reflected in the

Annual report of the Defence Ministry the following year which clearly indicated that the

threat perception in no way diminished. In reference to other powers the report says "the

second tier nuclear weapons states have not shown willingness to engage in a

corresponding process of dialogue for the reduction of nuclear weapons. The

modernisation process of nuclear arsenals of the nuclear weapons state continues

unabated. There are no signs yet that occasion of China and France to NPT would provide

the opportunity and impetus to commence negotiations for nuclear disarmament as

required by the NPT. At the same time unprecedented nuclear proliferation problems

38 Annual report, Ministry of Defence Government of India, 1991-92.

177

have been created in the wake of Soviet Union's demise, new nuclear weapons states

have emerged. The policy pronouncements by these governments not withstanding, we

shall need to remain vigilant about the possible transfer of nuclear weapons technology

and materials to some of our neighbours. The command and control of the former Soviet

weapons, technology and materials to some or our neighbours. The command and control

of the former Soviet nuclear weapons remains a central concern to the international

community. Extensive inspection process in Iraq continued throughout the year,

highlighting the problem of clandenstine nuclear weapons programme. Pakistan which

has been following a clandenstine nuclear weapons programme for two decades has

moved towards a more explicit status. Proliferation of nuclear weapons and associated

delivery systems continue to be a source of concern for our national security. Existing

international instrumentalities have proved inadequate in dealing with the problem. 39

In the same vein, the subsequent report reflected no departure from the fact that

the threat still persisted. It says "Pakistan repeatedly asserted its nuclear weapons

capability and its earlier statement of "capping" it as of July 1990 are now being denied.

China signed the NPT but broke the year long unofficial moratorium on nuclear testing by

detonating an explosion in October 1993. This is a part of China's attempt at further

upgrading its nuclear capability.

Inspite of the end of the cold war, the nuclear weapon power are unwilling to give

up the idea of the nuclear weapons being a currency of power. The logic legitimised the

weapon and is a major reason coming in the way of global denuclearisation. Some

nuclear powers, China, France and the UK are yet to enter the nuclear arms control

process. At the end of 1993, there are reportedly around 50,000 active, inactive and

39 Annual report, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 1992-93.

178

retired nuclear war heads in the world.

We would also need to take note of the reported proliferation of missiles in our

neighbourhood such as in Pakistan, Saudia Arabia and Iran.40

Perhaps in continuation of the some threat, the government's Ministry of Defence

Annual Report of 1995 spoke of global pressures being mounted on India with regard to

its nuclear option- "just as global pressures on India's nuclear option have been growing

so is the case with our missiles programmes. Having developed indigenous missiles in

response to the missile environment around the country, India is being advised not to

proceed further with the deployment of Prithvi, and the development of Agni and other

missiles. A constant watch is being maintained by government on the development and

stockpiling of such systems in our neighbourhood. India will continue with its indigenous

missile development programmes and also keep its options open on the development as

warranted by our national security interests. 41

The following report went on to state the pressure which had begun being applied

on India by the Western nations intensified the pressure but the activities of China were

far from satisfactory. The report states "as in the case of India's nuclear capability, it has

also had occasionally to withstand international pressures brought to bear on its missile

programme. The indigenous development of missile capability by India is in response to

the evolving security environment in its region. China has supplied M-14 missiles to

Pakistan and is aiding with technology and manpower as well in the development of its

indigenous missile programme. there are also credible reports about China continuing to

assist Pakistan in its clandenstine nuclear weapons programme."42 The latest in the series

40 Annual Report, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 1993-94.

41 Annual Report, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 1995-96.

42 Annual Report, Ministry of Defence, Govt oflndia. 1996-97.

179

of repmts i.e. the 1997-98 report also categorically states "there has been no appreciable

movement in the commencement of multilateral negotiations for the complete elimination

of nuclear weapons. China's nuclear weapons statues, Pakistan's self acknowledged

nuclear capability, acquired through covert means, and the presence of nuclear weapons

in the Indian ocean are factors that impinge on India's security calculations. The

indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT formalised for perpetuity the untenable

situation of legitimising the permanent possession of nuclear weapons by small group of

nations. Meanwhile, the illicit transfer of sensitive master equipment and technology to

countries determined to develop a covert capability has continued in the nuclear world.43

On the political front, across the political spectrum, if the views of political parties

as articulated by them in their election manifestos are taken into account, in general

elections that India has faced in the last few years, it became clear that political parties

tried to articulate their views on this issue in a clear and sharp manner and gave a

prominent place to their views on the nuclear issue in their election manifestos. The

Congress said "in case Pakistan persists in the development and deployment of nuclear

weapons, India will be constrained to review her policy to meet the threat.44

Further in 1996, the Congress reiterated "they have already inflicted four wars

upon India. In case Pakistan persists in the development and deployment of nuclear

weapons, India will be constrained to review her policy to meet the threat. 45

In a slight change of language but the meaning remaining the same, the Congress

announced in 1998 "our nuclear policy will continue to be for peaceful developmental

43 Annual Report, Ministry of Defence, Govt of India, 1997-98.

44 Congrress election manifesto, General election, 1998.

45 Congrress election manifesto, General election, 1991.

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purposes. But we will not be found wanting in case of any threat by hostile forces." 46

With regard to the other parties their views on the nuclear issue have also

crystallised, become more or less clear as can be seen in the election manifestos released

by them in subsequent. Way back in 1989 when a loose conglomeration of non Congress

opposition parties came together to form the National Front, it's views on the nuclear

issues were as follows: "while committing itself to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy,

India cannot ignore the proximity of nuclear weapons and non-nuclear weapon powers in

the region and must take that into account in evolving her security doctrine and it must

keep its option open. The National Front government will work for the removal of the

discriminatory clauses of the NPT.47

The views of the left parties and the Janata Dal, another major opposition party

clearly reflect no major departure. While the Janata Dal, clearly stated "we will take steps

to safeguard the security of the country against threats from any source, internal or

external, military or non-military, nuclear or conventiona1.48

The CPI(M) said we will "rebuff imperalist efforts to subvert our independent

development and resistance to its attempts to impose its NPT and CTBT."49

The CPI stated "India to remain firm in her principled refusal to sign the NPT,

which permits the legitimisation of weapons of mass destruction."50

Prior to the 1998 election, the United Front stated "the UF successfully resisted

pressure to sign the CTBT."51

46 Congrress election manifesto, General election, 1996.

47 Election manifesto of National Front, General Election. 1989.

48 Election manifesto of Janata Dal, General Election. 1996.

49 Election manifesto of CPI(M). General Election. 1996.

50 Election manifesto of CPI(M), General Election. 1998.

51 Election manifesto of United Front, General Election. 1998.

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The Left parties stated "India would not sign any discriminatory treaty on nuclear

weapons like the NPT or the CTBT. 52

The BJP the other principal party has always had a vtew distinct from other

political parties. It's views have been more open and it has made no bones that in the

eventuality of its assumption of power or holding the reins of government, it would

exercise the nuclear option and perhaps those following the BJP' s pronouncements on

this issue over the past several years were not taken aback by the BJP's decision to make

go nuclear. The BJP said "we must go for the nuclear option" in 1989.53

The BJP prior to the subsequent election said the party will give our defence force

"nuclear teeth".54

Prior to the 1996 election the BJP clearly stated that the party will "re-evaluate the

country's nuclear policy and exercise the option to induct nuclear weapons."55

In the last general election it said the BJP will not be dictated by anybody in

matters of security requirements and in the exercise of nuclear option. 56

If one makes an analysis of the stand of successive governments one can safely

come to the conclusion that there existed a threat perception and this was in relation to

both China and Pakistan. The most authentic of sources i.e. the Annual repot of the

Defence Ministry keeps speaking about it. As pointed out in the above paragraphs, close

to a decade prior to the Pokhran II explosions successive governments either run by the

Congress or the Janta Dal supported by the left and now the BJP led coalition always

clearly stated in no uncertain terms in the government's own publication the Annual

52 Election manifesto of Left Parties, General Election. 1998

5' BJP Election manifesto, General Eelection on 1989.

54 BJP Election manifesto, General Eelection on 1991.

55 BJP Election manifesto, General Eelection on 1996.

56 BJP Election manifesto, General Eelection on 1998.

182

Rep011 of the Defence Minsitry there was a threat perception to India's national security

both from China and Pakistan.

Moreover, the political parties which included the Congress, Janata Dal and Left

Parties and even the BJP construed that there was a threat as pointed out in subsequent

election manifestos. The United Front which formed the government in 1996 went on

record several times by stating that the nuclear option would remain open. Perhaps none

of the parties ever contemplated foreclosing the nuclear option.

The BJP was the only party which clearly stated that it would go for an explosion

when elected to power. The BJP want in for the explosions and the opposition while

commending the scientists of India became critical of the BJP. Mr. K. Natwar Singh of

the Congress hit out at the government saying that the threat to national security was non­

existent. Mr. P. Chidambaram of the TMC spoke in a similar tone.

The Left's principal speaker Somnath Chatterjee was no less critical. What should

be noted in the fact that Mr. Natwar Singh and for that matter Mr. Chidambaram who was

in the Congress clearly said that the threat to national security was simply not there but

Mr. Singh and Chidambaram conveniently forgot the fact that they were associated with

earlier governments in senior capacities and those governments stated clearly that there

was a threat perception. Even the Left was part of the Deve Gowda and Gujral

governments and these governments spoke of a threat perception.

What the other political parties grudged was the fact that the BJP would gain

political mileage out of it. They felt that the BJP would package it as a chief electoral

plank and reap a rich political harvest out of it. It's no wonder that Shri Mulayam Singh

Yadav, Defence Minister in the erstwhile Gujral government issued a statement saying

that they would have gone in for the explosion but election intervened. 57 Even Mr. P.V.

57 The Times of India, New Delhi, 16th March, 1998.

183

Narashima Rao's government had contemplated going for this step but backed out

following US pressure.58 Therefore, the BJP took a bold step but the opposition criticism

that the threat perception was orchestrated and did not really exist was unjustified. It

should however, be conceded that the BJP besieged by the troubles of running a coalition,

under repeated threats of its allies wanted to create in real terms an explosion or through

this explosion wanted to prove a point. Moreover, the very fact that it had promised all

along that it would go in for this step and it went in clearly indicated its calculations of

risking international reaction to consolidate its turf at home. It was no surprise that the

other parties which had all along chose to keep the favorite phrase "keeping option open"

close to their hearts felt that they had missed the chance. Moreover, the BJP also thought

that a bold step of defying the west in a matter like this would endear itself to the

nationalist Hindu constituency which would give the BJP kudos in the name of

nationalism. Even though the BJP did not outrightly brand it as a 'Hindu bomb' its allied

organisations gave hints on such lines. Moreover, another factor which must have

weighed in their minds was the fact that the CTBT coming into force in September, 1999

would be an impediment and the BJP should go in for this step to score a point much

before that.

Therefore, it can be finally said the BJP faltering on a number of front in the first

hundred days of its governance clearly did this taking advantage of the fact that the threat

perception which was there should be dealt with or in other words it went for the kill

which other parties had not done and in the process gain political mileage which it could

immediately gain due to failure on a number of other fronts but the BJP will certainly tout

this a major achievement in its electoral arithmetic in the days to come.

58 Raja Mohan C. India crosses one Nuclear Rubicon. The Hindu, New Delhi 12th May,l998.

184