Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights...
-
Upload
gilbert-bradford -
Category
Documents
-
view
249 -
download
4
Transcript of Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights...
![Page 1: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/1.jpg)
Chapter 14
Monopoly
Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.
![Page 2: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/2.jpg)
Monopoly
• A monopoly is a single supplier to a market
• This firm may choose to produce at any point on the market demand curve
![Page 3: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/3.jpg)
Barriers to Entry• Barriers to entry are the source of all
monopoly power– there are two general types of barriers to
entry• technical barriers• legal barriers
![Page 4: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/4.jpg)
Technical Barriers to Entry• Production may exhibit decreasing
marginal and average costs over a wide range of output levels– relatively large-scale firms are low-cost
producers• firms may find it profitable to drive others out of
the industry by cutting prices• this situation is known as natural monopoly• once the monopoly is established, entry of new
firms will be difficult
![Page 5: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/5.jpg)
Technical Barriers to Entry
• Another technical basis of monopoly is special knowledge of a low-cost productive technique– it may be difficult to keep this knowledge
out of the hands of other firms
• Ownership of unique resources may also be a lasting basis for maintaining a monopoly
![Page 6: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/6.jpg)
Legal Barriers to Entry
• Many pure monopolies are created as a matter of law– with a patent, the basic technology for a
product is assigned to one firm– the government may also award a firm an
exclusive franchise to serve a market
![Page 7: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/7.jpg)
Creation of Barriers to Entry
• Some barriers to entry result from actions taken by the firm– research and development of new products
or technologies– purchase of unique resources– lobbying efforts to gain monopoly power
• The attempt by a monopolist to erect barriers to entry may involve real resource costs
![Page 8: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/8.jpg)
Profit Maximization• To maximize profits, a monopolist will
choose to produce that output level for which marginal revenue is equal to marginal cost– marginal revenue is less than price
![Page 9: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/9.jpg)
Profit Maximization
• Since MR = MC at the profit-maximizing output and P > MR for a monopolist, the monopolist will set a price greater than marginal cost
![Page 10: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/10.jpg)
C
Profits can be found in the shaded rectangle
Profit Maximization
AC
MC
DMR
Quantity
Price
Q*
The monopolist will maximize profits where MR = MC
P* The firm will charge a price of P*
![Page 11: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/11.jpg)
The Inverse Elasticity Rule
• The gap between a firm’s price and its marginal cost is inversely related to the price elasticity of demand facing the firm
PQeP
MCP
,
1
where eQ,P is the elasticity of demand for the entire market
![Page 12: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/12.jpg)
The Inverse Elasticity Rule
• A monopoly will choose to operate only in regions where the market demand curve is elastic– eQ,P < -1
• The firm’s “markup” over marginal cost depends inversely on the elasticity of market demand
![Page 13: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/13.jpg)
Monopoly Profits
• Monopoly profits will be positive as long as P > AC
• Monopoly profits can continue into the long run because entry is not possible– some economists refer to the profits that a
monopoly earns in the long run as monopoly rents
• the return to the factor that forms the basis of the monopoly
![Page 14: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/14.jpg)
Monopoly Profits
• The size of monopoly profits in the long run will depend on the relationship between average costs and market demand for the product
![Page 15: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/15.jpg)
Monopoly Profits
Quantity
PriceMC
AC
MRD
Quantity
PriceMC
AC
MRD
Positive profits Zero profit
P* P*=AC
C
Q* Q*
![Page 16: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/16.jpg)
No Monopoly Supply Curve
• With a fixed market demand curve, the supply “curve” for a monopolist will only be one point– the price-output combination where MR =
MC
• If demand shifts, the marginal revenue curve shifts and a new profit-maximizing output will be chosen
![Page 17: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/17.jpg)
Calculating Monopoly Output
• Suppose that the market for frisbees has a linear demand curve of the form
Q = 2,000 - 20P
orP = 100 - Q/20
• The total costs of the frisbee producer are given by
C(Q) = 0.05Q2 + 10,000
![Page 18: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/18.jpg)
Calculating Monopoly Output
• To maximize profits, the monopolist chooses the output for which MR = MC
• We need to find total revenue
TR = PQ = 100Q - Q2/20
• Therefore, marginal revenue is
MR = 100 - Q/10
while marginal cost is
MC = 0.1Q
![Page 19: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/19.jpg)
Calculating Monopoly Output
• Thus, MR = MC where
100 - Q/10 = 0.01Q
Q* = 500 P* = 75
• At the profit-maximizing output,
C(Q) = 0.05(500)2 + 10,000 = 22,500
AC = 22,500/500 = 45
= (P* - AC)Q = (75 - 45)500 = 15,000
![Page 20: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/20.jpg)
Monopoly with Linear Demand
• Suppose that the inverse demand function facing the monopoly is of the form
P = a - bQ
• In this caseTR = PQ = aQ – bQ2
MR = a – 2bQ
![Page 21: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/21.jpg)
Monopoly with Linear Demand
• Profit maximization requires thatMR = a – 2bQ = MC = c
Q = (a – c)/2b
• Inserting this back into the inverse demand function yields
P = a – bQ = a – (a – c)/2 = (a + c)/2
![Page 22: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/22.jpg)
Monopoly with Constant Elasticity Demand
• Suppose that the demand function is of the form
Q = aPe
• In this caseMR = P(1 + 1/e)
![Page 23: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/23.jpg)
Monopoly with Constant Elasticity Demand
• Profit maximization requiresMR = P(1 + 1/e) = c
P = c(e/(1 + e)
• Because e < -1 for profit maximization, P > MC– the gap will be larger the closer e is to -1
![Page 24: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/24.jpg)
Monopoly and Resource Allocation
• To evaluate the allocational effect of a monopoly, we will use a perfectly competitive, constant-cost industry as a basis of comparison– the industry’s long-run supply curve is
infinitely elastic with a price equal to both marginal and average cost
![Page 25: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/25.jpg)
Monopoly and Resource Allocation
Quantity
Price
MC=AC
DMR
If this market was competitive, output would be Q* and price would be P*
Q*
P*
Under a monopoly, output would be Q** and price would rise to P**
Q**
P**
![Page 26: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/26.jpg)
Consumer surplus would fall
Producer surplus will rise
There is a deadweightloss from monopoly
Monopoly and Resource Allocation
Quantity
Price
MC=AC
DMR
Q*Q**
P*
P** Consumer surplus falls by more than producer surplus rises.
![Page 27: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/27.jpg)
Welfare Losses and Elasticity
• Assume that the constant marginal (and average) costs for a monopolist are given by c and that the compensated demand curve has a constant elasticity:
Q = Pe
where e is the price elasticity of demand (e < -1)
![Page 28: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/28.jpg)
Welfare Losses and Elasticity
• The competitive price in this market will be
Pc = c
and the monopoly price is given by
e
cPm 1
1
![Page 29: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/29.jpg)
Welfare Losses and Elasticity
• The consumer surplus associated with any price (P0) can be computed as
00
)(P
e
PdPPdPPQCS
11
10
1
0
e
P
e
PCS
e
P
e
![Page 30: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/30.jpg)
Welfare Losses and Elasticity
• Therefore, under perfect competition
1
1
e
cCS
e
c
1
11
1
e
ec
CS
e
m
and under monopoly
![Page 31: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/31.jpg)
Welfare Losses and Elasticity
• Taking the ratio of these two surplus measures yields
1
111
e
c
m
eCSCS
• If e = -2, this ratio is ½– consumer surplus under monopoly is half
what it is under perfect competition
![Page 32: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/32.jpg)
Welfare Losses and Elasticity
• Monopoly profits are given by
mmmmm Qce
ccQQP
11
eec
ec
eec
ee
m
1111111
1
![Page 33: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/33.jpg)
Welfare Losses and Elasticity
• To find the transfer from consumer surplus into monopoly profits we can divide monopoly profits by the competitive consumer surplus
ee
c
m
ee
eee
CS
11111
1
• If e = -2, this ratio is ¼
![Page 34: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/34.jpg)
Monopoly and Product Quality• Market power may be exercised along
dimensions other than the market price– type, quality, or diversity of goods
• Higher-quality or lower-quality than competitive firms?– depends on demand and the firm’s costs
![Page 35: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/35.jpg)
Monopoly and Product Quality
• Suppose that consumers’ willingness to pay for quality (X) is given by the inverse demand function P(Q,X) where
P/Q < 0 and P/X > 0
• If costs are given by C(Q,X), the monopoly will choose Q and X to maximize
= P(Q,X)Q - C(Q,X)
![Page 36: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/36.jpg)
Monopoly and Product Quality
• First-order conditions for a maximum are
0),(
QCQ
PQXQP
Q
0
XCX
PQ
X
• MR = MC for output decisions
– the marginal revenue from increasing quality by one unit is equal to the marginal cost of making such an increase
![Page 37: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/37.jpg)
Monopoly and Product Quality• The level of product quality chosen under
competitive conditions is the one that maximizes net social welfare
*
0),(),(
QXQCdQXQPSW
• Maximizing with respect to X yields
*
00),(
Q
XX CdQXQPX
SW
![Page 38: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/38.jpg)
Monopoly and Product Quality• The difference between the quality choice
of a competitive industry and the monopolist is:– the monopolist looks at the marginal valuation
of one more unit of quality assuming that Q is at its profit-maximizing level
– the competitive industry looks at the marginal value of quality averaged across all output levels
![Page 39: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/39.jpg)
Monopoly and Product Quality
• Even if a monopoly and a perfectly competitive industry chose the same output level, they might opt for different quality levels– each is concerned with a different margin
in its decision making
![Page 40: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/40.jpg)
Price Discrimination• A monopoly engages in price
discrimination if it is able to sell otherwise identical units of output at different prices
• Whether price discrimination is feasible depends on the inability of buyers to practice arbitrage
![Page 41: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/41.jpg)
First-Degree Price Discrimination
• It may be possible to charge each buyer the maximum price he would be willing to pay for the good– perfect or first-degree price discrimination
• extracts all consumer surplus• no deadweight loss
![Page 42: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/42.jpg)
The monopolist will continue this way until the marginal buyer is no longer willing to pay the good’s marginal cost
Q1
P1
The first buyer pays P1 for Q1 units
Q2
P2 The second buyer pays P2 for Q2-Q1 units
First-Degree Price Discrimination
Quantity
Price
D
Under perfect price discrimination, the monopolist charges a different price to each buyer
MC
![Page 43: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/43.jpg)
First-Degree Price Discrimination
• Recall the example of the frisbee manufacturer
• First-degree price discrimination would mean the firm will want to produce the quantity at which price is exactly equal to marginal cost
![Page 44: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/44.jpg)
First-Degree Price Discrimination
• Therefore,P = 100 - Q/20 = MC = 0.1Q
Q* = 666
• Total revenue and total costs will be
511,5540
100)(666
0
*
0
2
Q Q
QdQQPR
178,32000,1005.0)( 2 QQc
• Profit is much larger (23,333 > 15,000)
![Page 45: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/45.jpg)
Market Separation• Perfect price discrimination requires the
monopolist to know the demand function for each potential buyer
• We can also assume that a monopoly can separate its buyers into a few identifiable markets– can follow a different pricing policy in each
market– third-degree price discrimination
![Page 46: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/46.jpg)
Market Separation• All the monopolist needs to know in this
case is the price elasticities of demand for each market– set price according to the inverse elasticity
rule
• If the marginal cost is the same in all markets,
)1
1()1
1(j
ji
i eP
eP
![Page 47: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/47.jpg)
Market Separation
• This implies that
)11(
)11(
i
j
j
i
e
e
PP
• The profit-maximizing price will be higher in markets where demand is less elastic
![Page 48: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/48.jpg)
Market Separation
Quantity in Market 2Quantity in Market 1
Price
0
DDMRMR
MCMC
Q2*
P2
Q1*
P1
If two markets are separate, maximum profits occur by setting different prices in the two markets
The market with the less elastic demand will be charged the higher price
![Page 49: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/49.jpg)
Third-Degree Price Discrimination
• Suppose that the inverse demand curves in two separated markets are given by
P1 = 24 – Q1
P2 = 12 – 0.5Q2
• Suppose that MC = 6
• Profit maximization requires thatMR1 = 24 – 2Q1 = 6 = MR2 = 12 – Q2
![Page 50: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/50.jpg)
Third-Degree Price Discrimination
• Optimal choices and prices are
Q1* = 9 P1* = 15
Q2* = 6 P2* = 9
• Profits for the monopoly are = (P1 - 6)Q1 + (P2 - 6)Q2 = 81 + 18 = 99
![Page 51: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/51.jpg)
Third-Degree Price Discrimination
• We can calculate the deadweight losses in the two markets– note that the competitive output would be 18 in
market 1 and 12 in market 2
DW1 = 0.5(P1-MC)(18-Q1) = 0.5(15-6)(18-9) = 40.5
DW2 = 0.5(P2-MC)(12-Q2) = 0.5(9-6)(12-6) = 9
![Page 52: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/52.jpg)
Third-Degree Price Discrimination
• If this monopoly were constrained to charge a single price, it would set P = 15 and sell only in the first market
• Deadweight loss increases– total potential consumer surplus in market 2
is lost
DW = DW1 + DW2 = 40.5 + 0.5(12 – 6)(12 – 0)
DW = 40.5 + 36 = 76.5
![Page 53: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/53.jpg)
Two-Part Tariffs• Linear two-part tariff
– buyers must pay a fixed fee for the right to consume a good and a uniform price for each unit consumed
T(q) = a + pq
– the monopolist’s goal is to choose a and p to maximize profits, given the demand for the product
![Page 54: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/54.jpg)
Two-Part Tariffs• Because the average price paid by any
demander is
pqa
qT
p
![Page 55: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/55.jpg)
Two-Part Tariffs
• The tariff is only feasible if resale can be prevented between those who pay a low price and those who pay a high price
![Page 56: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/56.jpg)
Two-Part Tariffs• One approach for profit maximization
would be for the firm to set p = MC and then set a equal to the consumer surplus of the least eager buyer– this might not be the most profitable
approach– in general, optimal pricing schedules will
depend on a variety of contingencies
![Page 57: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/57.jpg)
Two-Part Tariffs• Suppose there are two different buyers
with the demand functionsq1 = 24 - p1
q2 = 24 - 2p2
• If MC = 6, one way for the monopolist to implement a two-part tariff would be to set p1 = p2 = MC = 6
q1 = 18 q2 = 12
![Page 58: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/58.jpg)
Two-Part Tariffs• With this marginal price, demander 2
obtains consumer surplus of 36– this would be the maximum entry fee that
can be charged without causing this buyer to leave the market
• This means that the two-part tariff in this case would be
T(q) = 36 + 6q
![Page 59: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/59.jpg)
Two-Part Tariffs• Profits for the firm would be
= T(q1) + T(q2) – AC(q1 + q2)
= 72 + (6 · 30) – (6 ·30) = 72
![Page 60: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/60.jpg)
Regulation of Monopoly
• Natural monopolies such as the utility, communications, and transportation industries are highly regulated in many countries
![Page 61: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/61.jpg)
Regulation of Monopoly• An enforced policy of marginal cost
pricing will cause a natural monopoly to operate at a loss– natural monopolies exhibit declining
average costs over a wide range of output
![Page 62: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/62.jpg)
Regulation of Monopoly
Quantity
Price
D
MRAC
MC
Because natural monopolies exhibit decreasing costs, MC falls below AC
C1
P1
Q1
An unregulated monopoly will maximize profit at Q1 and P1
C2
P2
Q2
If regulators force the monopoly to charge a price of P2, the firm will suffer a loss because P2 < C2
![Page 63: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/63.jpg)
cover the losses on the sales to low-price customers
The profits on the sales to high-price customers are enough to
Regulation of Monopoly
Quantity
Price
D
ACMC
Suppose that the regulatory commission allows the monopoly to charge a price of P1 to some users
P1
Q1
C1
Other users are offered the lower price of P2
P2
Q2
C2
![Page 64: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/64.jpg)
Regulation of Monopoly• One way to avoid this dilemma is the
implementation of a multiprice system– charge some users a high price– maintain a low price for marginal users
![Page 65: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/65.jpg)
Regulation of Monopoly
Quantity
Price
D
ACMC
The monopoly could charge some users the high price (P1) and others a low price (P2)
P1
Q1
P2
Q2
The profits from one class of user would then subsidize the losses from the other users
![Page 66: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/66.jpg)
Regulation of Monopoly• Another approach would be to allow the
monopoly to charge a price above marginal cost that is sufficient to earn a “fair” rate of return on investment
![Page 67: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/67.jpg)
Regulation of Monopoly
• Suppose that a regulated utility has a production function of the form
q = f (k,l)
• The firm’s actual rate of return on capital is defined as
k
wkpfs
ll
),(
![Page 68: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/68.jpg)
Regulation of Monopoly
• Suppose that s is constrained by regulation to be equal to s0, then the firm’s problem is to maximize profits
= pf (k,l) – wl – vk
subject to this constraint
• The Lagrangian for this problem is
ℒ = pf (k,l) – wl – vk + [wl + s0k – pf (k,l)]
![Page 69: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/69.jpg)
Regulation of Monopoly
• If =0, regulation is ineffective and the monopoly behaves like any profit-maximizing firm
• If =1, the Lagrangian reduces toℒ = (s0 – v)k
which (assuming s0>v), will mean that the monopoly will hire infinite amounts of capital
![Page 70: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/70.jpg)
Regulation of Monopoly
• Therefore, 0<<1 and the FOCs for a maximum are:
ℒ /l = pfl – w + (w – pfl) = 0
ℒ /k = pfk – v + (s0 – pfk) = 0
ℒ / = wl + s0k – pf (k,l) = 0
![Page 71: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/71.jpg)
Regulation of Monopoly
• Because s0>v and <1, this means that
pfk < v
• The firm will hire more capital than it would under unregulated conditions– it will also achieve a lower marginal
productivity of capital
![Page 72: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/72.jpg)
Dynamic Views of Monopoly
• Some economists have stressed the beneficial role that monopoly profits can play in the process of economic development– provide funds that can be invested in
research and development– provides an incentive to keep one step ahead
of potential competitors
![Page 73: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/73.jpg)
Important Points to Note:
• The most profitable level of output for the monopolist is the one for which marginal revenue is equal to marginal cost– at this output level, price will exceed
marginal cost– the profitability of the monopolist will
depend on the relationship between price and average cost
![Page 74: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/74.jpg)
Important Points to Note:
• Relative to perfect competition, monopoly involves a loss of consumer surplus for demanders– some of this is transferred into monopoly
profits– some of the loss in consumer surplus
represents a deadweight loss of overall economic welfare
• a sign of Pareto inefficiency
![Page 75: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/75.jpg)
Important Points to Note:
• Monopolies may opt for different levels of quality than would perfectly competitive firms
• Durable good monopolists may be constrained by markets for used goods
![Page 76: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/76.jpg)
Important Points to Note:
• A monopoly may be able to increase its profits further through price discrimination– the ability to practice price discrimination
depends on the ability to prevent arbitrage among buyers
![Page 77: Chapter 14 Monopoly Nicholson and Snyder, Copyright ©2008 by Thomson South-Western. All rights reserved.](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022061605/56649eac5503460f94bb2d2c/html5/thumbnails/77.jpg)
Important Points to Note:
• Governments often choose to regulate natural monopolies – the type of regulatory mechanisms
adopted can affect the behavior of the regulated firm