Chapter 12 Waisbord

8/12/2019 Chapter 12 Waisbord

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Chapter12

LatinAmerica

SilvioWaisbord

The

press

contributes

to

democratic

governance

by

monitoring

and

holding

the

powerful

accountable(watchdog),coveringissuesofpublicsignificancethatrequiretheattentionofcitizensand

policymakers (agendasetting), and facilitating the expression of a myriad of perspectives (gate

keeping). This study reviews the conditions that affect the performance of the press as watchdog,

agendasetter, and gatekeeper in Latin America, and discusses courses of action to strengthen the

qualityofpressreportingonawiderangeofissuesandviews.1

By performing watchdog, agendasetting and gatekeeping functions, the press promotes

criticism,deliberation,

and

diversity

of

opinion.

These

are

key

principles

of

the

democratic

public

sphere,

thecommunicativespace for the formation ofpublic opinion and the promotionofcivic interests. As

analyzedbyJrgenHabermas,thenotionofthepublicsphereremainsusefultoassessthestateofthe

pressincontemporarydemocracies.2Surely,asseveralauthorshaveperceptivelyobserved,Habermas

original analysis presents some limitations, namely an idealized reconstruction of the conditions for

public discourse in European bourgeois democracies, and an excessively pessimistic view about the

declineofthequalityofdemocraticspeech in latemodernity.3Despite itsshortcomings,thenotionof

thepublicsphereremainsrelevantbothasaconceptualconstructandanormative idealtoassessthe

performance of the press. It rightly points out problems for civic expression created by encroaching

stateandmarketpower.Itholdspublicdeliberationandcriticalinformationascentraltothedemocratic

process through which citizens scrutinize governments and other powerful actors, identify public

demands,andshapepolicymaking.Itdrawsattentiontotheroleofinstitutions,includingthepress,in

fostering reflexiveandcriticalpublics. Although Habermas theoryofcommunicationaction turned to

locatingdemocraticspeechinintersubjective,unmediatedsituations(ratherthaninstitutions,ashedid

previously),hisrecognitionoftheneedforformalforatonurturedeliberationandcriticismstillgrounds

the

notion

that

the

press

is

a

preeminent

institution

in

the

public

sphere.

4

From this perspective, the press should offer platforms for public dialogue, stimulate

conversationsonawiderangeofpublic issues,andturntheattentionofpolicymakersandcitizensto

matters of relevant public interest. Press theories have identified several conditions for the press to

perform its democratic obligations. Liberal positions have stressed the need for constitutional

prerogatives to shelter the press from government intrusion. Radical and communitarian arguments


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have emphasized the need for dispersed ownership to avoid monopolistic information markets and

ensureadiversityofperspectives.Socialresponsibilitypositionshaveraisedtheissueoffairaccessand

publicethicsascrucialforthedemocraticpress.5Incontemporarydemocracies,alltheseconditionsare

necessary to facilitate the wide availability of information that monitors state actions and business

practices,highlightsissuesofpublicinterest,andbringsoutmultipleperspectives.

Althoughtheidealofthepublicspherestillofferacompellingframeworktoassessthestateof

the media in democracy, it does not offer concrete guidelines about press policies andjournalistic

practices. Classic analyses of the public sphere, notably the work of Habermas and Hannah Arendt,

focused on smallgroup settings and restricted polities. Thus, the ideals of deliberation and criticism

need be rethought in the contexts of largescale and mediated democracies.6 How can those ideals

inform largemediasystemsandjournalisticpractices incontemporarydemocracies?Howcantheybe

madeeffective

in

todays

press,

an

institution

vastly

different

and

more

complex

than

the

print

media

in

colonialAmericaorinBritishandFrenchbourgeoisdemocracies?HowdowereconcileHabermasvision

ofunmediateddiscourseasidealspeechwiththefactthatjournalismsdefiningtaskistomediatethe

flowof information? Thesequestionsarecentraltounderstandingtheconditionsthatstrengthenthe

contributionofthepresstodemocraticgovernance.

Heremy interest isto foregroundthe ideaofmediadiversityasthe fundamentalprinciplefor

thepresstopromotedeliberationandcriticisminLatinAmerica.Althoughmediadiversityisacontested

notion,

it

provides

a

blueprint

for

media

democracy

that

is

characterized

by

the

heterogeneity

of

content and structures.7 For Denis McQuail, media diversity contributes to democracy by reflecting

differences insociety,givingequalaccesstovariouspointsofview,andofferingwidechoices.8Here I

focusonstructuraldiversity,aninstitutionalfeatureofpresssystemsasawholerelatedtoownership

and regulation, and performance diversity, which refers to the practices and content produced by

news organizations. Both are important to promote media democracy; both continue to have severe

problems intheregion.Theexistenceofnewsorganizationsanchored indifferentprinciplesaswellas

theproductionofdiversecontentarebothequallynecessarytofosterexpandtherangeofperspectives

inthe

media.

Fromapublicsphereperspective,mediadiversity iscrucialtopreservecommunicativespaces

that limit the influence of governments and large business. In Latin America, it requires overcoming

persistentobstaclesthathavehistoricallyundermineddemocraticjournalismandopportunitiesforcivic


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expression in the press. Specifically, it demands regulating the influence of states and markets,

promotingdispersedownership,andlevelingcitizensaccesstonewsmaking.

Mediapluralismoffersapointofreferencetoassesswhetherpresssystemseffectivelyexpand

therangeofissuesandperspectivesinthepublicsphere.Apluralmediasystemoffersastrongerbasis

forthepresstorepresentadiversityofinterests.Itisanchoredininstitutionalpluralism,thatis,ahybrid

andbalancedorder integratedbyorganizationsthat functionaccordingtoamixofcivic,political,and

commercial principles.9 Institutional pluralism is necessary to preserve and renew deliberation and

criticismascoreprinciplesofthepublicsphereincontemporarydemocracies.

Despite recent advances in democratic expression, media pluralism remains weak in Latin

American democracies. The succession of civilian administrations in the past twentyfive years has

usheredinbetterconditionsforthepressandpublicexpression.10Onlysporadically,however,thepress

offers a wide set of perspectives on issues of public interest, and scrutinizes official secrecy and

wrongdoing. The persistent weakness of media diversity coupled with the primacy of official news

undercut potential opportunities for the press to make a stronger contribution to democratic

expression.

The end of military dictatorships improved the conditions forjournalistic practice and civic

participation. An extensive literature has documented significant actions towards participation and

emancipationinthepastdecades.11Theexistenceofrobustandvibrantpublicspheresisaremarkable

characteristic

of

contemporary

Latin

American

democracies.

The

mobilization

of

human

rights,

indigenous,womens,youth,andenvironmentalmovements;theemergenceofnovelformsofcitizens

participation and journalism; the rise and consolidation of various protest groups; experiments in

participatory administration and budgeting; and the mushrooming of NGOs and civic advocacy

organizationsdemonstrate thevitalityofcivicexpression.These formsofcivicparticipation,however,

shouldnotbeconsidereduncritically.Publicspheresbrimmingwithmobilizedgroupsarenotinevitably

synonymouswithdemocraticdeliberationandinstitutionalizedgovernance.Whilesomeareexpressions

ofcriticaldebateandprogressiveparticipation,othergroupscontributetopoliticalpolarization.While

some are authentic expressions of grassroots mobilization, other groups are closely linked to state

interestsandclientelisticnetworks.12

Theconsolidationof liberaldemocraciesandtheaffirmationofavibrantcivilsocietyhavenot

beensufficientconditionstoinstitutionalizemediapluralism.Aparticipativeandlivelypublicsphere,in

principle,offersarichreservoirfortheaffirmationofpluralpresssystemsanddemocraticjournalism.It


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doesnotnecessarilyimprovetheperformanceofthepress,however.Thetenuousinstitutionallinkages

betweenthepressandthepublicsphere, Iargue,underminethepotentialofthepresstostrengthen

democratic governance. This paper explores why the connective tissues between the press and the

publicsphereremainweakinLatinAmerica,anditconcludesofferingactionstostrengthenthoseties.

Thelegacyofweakmediapluralism

Contemporary Latin American democracies inherited a weak legacy of media pluralism.

Althoughtheregionhasarich traditionofcivic initiativestodemocratize informationandexpression,

the prospects for pluralistic media systems have been compromised by authoritarianism, turbulent

politics,andthecollusionbetweenthestateandbusiness.Unregulated influenceofgovernmentsand

markets coupled with the close proximity between official and business interests have historically

underminedmediademocracy.13

These dynamics took different shape in authoritarian and democratic periods. Authoritarian

regimes bulldozed democratic expression through censorship and repression. While they persecuted

oppositionalmedia,theysoughttoensurepositivenewsthroughfavoringownerswithbusinessdeals.

Duringdemocraticperiods,governmentsdidnotengage informalcensorshipandrepression,butthey

were not inclined to change fundamental structures to promote civic interests. The result was the

consolidation ofpress systems dominated by amix of state and market interests. Although print and

broadcast media largely followed a commercial logic, they assiduously courted governments to reap

political

and

economic

benefits.

Under

these

conditions,

truly

independent

journalism

was

exceptional.Keepingahealthyautonomyfromthestatewasnotsoundbusinessfornewsorganizations

thatpursuedcommercialgoals.

Throughout the region, the oldest and most influential newspapers were born as projects of

partisanfactionsandpowerfulfamiliesduringthepostindependenceperiod.Manyof todays leading

newspapers (e.g. Perus El Comercio, Brazils Estado de Sao Paulo, Chiles El Mercurio, Argentinas La

Nacin) were founded during the oligarchic republics of the nineteenth century. In the context of

restricted

democracies,

in

which

a

small

percentage

of

population

held

political

rights,

newspapers

expressedtheeconomicandpoliticalambitionsofelitefactionsandpoliticalparties.Likewise,thepress

was also partisan in countries under prolonged dictatorial regimes. They were conceived as political

endeavors,oftenfundedbypersonalfunds,ratherthanmarketdrivenenterprisestoensuremeansfor

publicexpression.Partisanjournalismremaineddominantduringthegradualexpansionofdemocracyin

the firstdecadesof the twentiethcentury.Partisanismwascentral tonewspapers thatexpressed the


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interestsofurbanmiddleclassesandtheworkingclassesthatfoughtfortheexpansionofpoliticaland

social rights. Massmarket tabloids avoided being closely identified to political parties, but they still

maintainedcloselinkstogovernmentsandpoliticalleaders.

Despitethelongtraditionofproximitybetweenpoliticalpartiesandthepress,apartisanpress

didnotbecomedominantduringthetwentiethcentury.Continuouspoliticalinstabilityunderminedthe

continuityofpoliticalparties,andthus,thelongtermsurvivalofpartisannewspapers.Colombiawasthe

only exception; the stability of its bipartisan democracy survived allowed the traditional Liberal and

Conservative parties to hold moderate influence over newspapers.14 In most countries, however, the

continuouscyclesofcivilandmilitaryregimesanddecadelongdictatorshipsunderminedthelifespanof

thepartisanpressaswellasnewspapersthatexpressedcivicgroups(e.g.tradeunions,religious).The

partisanpresscouldnotsurvivecensorshipandpersecution,socialupheaval,andeconomicturmoil.The

weaknessof

the

partisan

press

paved

the

way

for

the

consolidation

of

amarket

based

press.

National

presssystemstypicallyfeaturedelitenewspapersthatrepresentedtheinterestsofdominanteconomic

andpoliticalgroups,andbroadsheetsandtabloidsthatcateredtomiddleclassesandtheworkingclass.

Themarketlogicprevailedoverthepartisanlogic.

Thefactthatthepresshasbeen largelyorganizedaroundcommercialprinciples,however,did

notresultinthecompleteseparationofthepressfromthestate.Infact,themainstreampressandthe

statehaveconsistentlybeenataclosedistance.Thisrelationshipwasbasedoneconomicandpolitical

linkages

and

mutual

advantages.

Government

officials

needed

the

news

media

to

advance

their

political

goals,andthebusinessprospectsofmediacompanieswerepinnedtomaintaininggoodrelationswith

thestate.Officialswereableto influencenewspapersthroughdiscretionarycontrolofpublic finances

such asgovernment advertising, controlover newsprint production and/or importation, and arbitrary

control of special funds. In some cases, coronelismo electrnico (electronic clientelism), as it is

calledinBrazil,wasdominant,particularlyinruralareaswherevastnumbersofmediapropertieshave

beeninthehandsofgovernmentofficials.15

So, the problem was not state ownership of the press, but rather, the excessive power of

governments and private interests. Despite the overall growth of marketbased media, government

advertisingcontinuedtobeasignificantsourceofmediarevenue,particularly incountriesandregions

withsmalleconomiesandadvertisingbudgets.16Whileofficialsfounditbeneficialtocourtnewspapers

to ensure favorable coverage, newspapers with close connections to governing powers reaped

economic benefits, such as advertising, tax breaks, importation permits, and broadcasting licenses.


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More than longstanding, organic mouthpieces for political parties, newspapers offered shortterm

supportforspecificadministrations.

Althoughthesedynamicshaveprevailed,attimes,therelationsbetweenthepressandnational

governmentswereconflictive.Whereaspressdissentduringmilitarydictatorshipswasrareandmostly

confined to alternative, leftwing publications, mainstream newspapers clashed with governments

duringdemocraticperiods.Ideologicalreasonstypicallycausedconflictsbetweengovernmentsandthe

press. For example, conservative dailies not only opposed populist governments such as Perons in

Argentina and Vargas in Brazil between the 1930s and 1950s, and the socialist administration of

SalvadorAllende inChile intheearly1970s.Theyalsoactivelysupportedmilitary interventions.Leftist

and liberal newspapers opposed conservative governments and military dictatorships. Press

government tensionsescalatedduring timesofpoliticalpolarization.Presidentsandcabinetmembers

admonished

critical

newspapers,

and

sought

to

punish

them

through

ordering

investigations

into

newspaperfinancesandtemporaryclosures,andpassingdraconianlegislation.17

Similar dynamics also affected broadcasting policies. Private interests dominated radio and

television since their beginnings. Neither public broadcasting nor mixed systems were strong

alternatives to the private model. Public stations have been chronically underfunded and remained

controlledbygovernments.Privatebroadcasting,however,wasnotcompletelydistantfromthestate.

Like newspaper owners, radio and television proprietors were also interested in maintaining close

linkages

with

governments

to

keep

licenses

and

expand

business.

Governments

controlled

official

advertising,whichparticularlyforstationsinsmalltownsandeconomicallydepressedareas,remaineda

vital financial source. In some cases such as Brazil and Mexico, tightknit linkages between state and

privateinterestswerecrucialfortheconsolidationofbehemothbroadcastingcompaniessuchasGlobo

andTelevisa,respectively.18

In summary, the legacy of press and democracy has simultaneously been plagued by both

marketcaptureandstatecapture.Bothauthoritarianandpopulistregimesusedstateresourcesto

control media markets and suppress deliberation and criticism. Powerful business, in turn, influenced

governmentpoliciestoexpandandconsolidatepower.Thebasisformediapluralismwasweakbythe

timetheregionshiftedfromauthoritarianismtodemocracyinthe1980s.

Mediapluralism,aforgottenpriority

The consolidation of democratic rule has not significantly altered the historical structural

relationsamong media,stateand markets. Unquestionably, todaysconditions are significantly better


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thanduringthemilitarydictatorships.Theabsenceofstatesponsoredeffortstosuppress freedomof

expressionandpersecutedissidents,theabolitionofformalcensorship,andthemoderateenforcement

of constitutional rights have contributed to the improvement of the conditions for democratic

expressionintheregion.

Overall conditions are troubling, however. Table 12.1 shows the consolidation of clear

patternsduringthepastyears.

[Table12.1abouthere]

AnnualsurveysconductedbyFreedomHouseandReporterswithoutBordershave identified

threegroupsofcountriesintermsoftheconditionsforpressdemocracyandpublicexpression.First,

there is a small group of countries (Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay) where conditions have been

consistentlybetter than in the rest of the region. This isnotsurprising,considering that theoverall

qualityofdemocracyinthesecountrieshasalsobeenpraisedbyscholarsandinternationalagencies.19

Second,therearetwocountries(CubaandVenezuela)wereconditionshavebeenextremelydifficult

forthepressforduetothepoliticalcharacteristicsoftherulinggovernments.Itwouldbeshortsighted

toequateconditions inbothcountriesgiven thedifferencesbetweenCubasdecadeoldcommunist

ruleandChavezssocialistpopulistregime.Despitethelattersattempttosuppresscriticism,formsof

dissentingjournalisminbothprintandbroadcastingpersistamidstpoliticalpolarizationinVenezuela.

The situation in Colombia, a country that used to included in this group until recently, seems be

changing.Against

ahistorical

context

of

prolonged

internal

conflict

and

extensive

anti

press

violence,

the ongoing process of pacification has gained renewed force and has benefited media democracy,

too.Third,theconditions inthemajorityofcountriesfitsFreedomHousespartiallyfreecategory.

After the initial process of liberalization during the transition to democratic rule in the 1980s and

1990s, media democratization has languished in most countries. Media pluralism hasnt showed

significantimprovements,buttherehasntbeenamajorreversaltowardsauthoritarianpolicies.

Themainproblemisthatoldstructuralobstaclesremaininplace.Therehavenotbeenmajor

policy

initiatives

to

reform

press

systems

in

order

to

promote

diversity

and

strengthen

countervailing

forcestostateandmarketpowers.Thevastmajorityofelectedadministrationshavebeenequivocally

committedtodemocraticcommunication.Regardlessofwhethertheyembracedneoconservativeor

populistpolicies,governmentshavegenerallyaimedtopreservethecurrentstatusquo.Atbest,some

administrationshavetolerateddissentwithoutpersecutingcritics.Atworst,othershavetriedtocajole

themediathroughvariousmeans.Inneithercase,hasmediapluralismbeenamainpolicypriority.20


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Pressorganizationshaverecordednumerouscasesoflocalandnationalgovernmentsthathave

continuedtorunroughshodoverthemedia.Theyhaveresortedtovariousmeans.

First,governmentshavecontinuedtomanipulatepublicresourcestorewardcomplacentnews

organizations and punish critical journalism. The allocation of official advertising, tax breaks, and

favorableloansonstateownedbankstonewscompaniesisstillplaguedwithsecrecyandfavoritism.21

Some governments have blatantly bribed publishers and poured astronomical funds into newspapers

andbroadcastingstations.22Publicbroadcastinghasbeenpronetocronyismandpropaganda.Officials

have arbitrarily granted and renewed television and station licenses, and in many countries, have

personallybenefittedfromtheprivatizationofradioandtelevisionstations.

Second, while governments have used legislation to advance shortterm political goals and

business interests, theyhavebeen reluctanttosupport legalchanges to facilitatemediadiversityand

public scrutiny. On the one hand, some administrations have relaxed crossmedia ownership laws to

furtherpromote theambitionsofmediacorporations.Criticshavedubbednew legislation theClarin

law and Televisa law in Argentina and Mexico respectively, as they were ostensibly intended to

benefit the most powerful media corporations in each country.23 In Peru, the 2004 broadcasting law

lacksmechanismstocontrolexecutivedecisions,promotecivicparticipation, increasetransparencyof

mediaoperations,anddefendaudience interests. New lawsandgovernment inactionhave facilitated

concentrationofmediaownership.24Ahandfuloflargecorporationscontroltheleadingnewspapersin

many

countries,

including

Argentina,

Bolivia,

Chile,

Guatemala,

and

Venezuela.

25

Likewise,

most

televisionmarketshavebecomeconsolidated inimperfectduopoliessuchas inBrazilandMexico, in

whichtwocorporationscontrolthemainovertheairstationsandcablesystems.

On the other hand, civilian governments have been largely uninterested in promoting a legal

environmentthatencouragescriticaljournalism.Tellingly,manypresslawspassedduringauthoritarian

regimes have not been overturned yet. Libel and slander laws provide officials with a range of legal

weaponstobrowbeatthepress.Themajorityofcountrieslacklegalmechanismstorequirerecordingall

official communication and proceedings, and to facilitate public access to government information.

Doubtless,thepassingoffreedomofinformationlawsinrecentyearsinArgentina,PeruandMexicois

auspicious.Mobilizedcoalitionsofcivicgroupsshouldbecreditedforraisingawarenessandconducting

advocacy with legislators to pass adequate legislation. Unfortunately, various problems weaken the

effective enforcement of the laws and, ultimately, their contributions to accountability and

transparency.26


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Third,antipressviolencehascontinued.Humanrightsandpressfreedomorganizationshave

recorded scores of cases of official coercion of the press. Methods include verbal attacks on news

organizations, pressure onjournalists and media owners to suppress critical stories or cancel news

programs,andorderingtaxinquiriesandpoliceraidsofnewsrooms.Oneissueofparticularconcernis

that official tirades against the press legitimize antipress violence in countries such as Colombia,

wherejournalists are frequently the target of attacks by the police, the military, and extralegal

groups. Furthermore, government inaction perpetuates impunity and undermines press democracy.

The failureofgovernmentstoconductthorough investigationsandprosecuteoffendersexacerbates

thelackofaccountability.

In summary, opacity and arbitrariness characterize government decisions affecting the press.

Governments have been effective at passing legislation to benefit officials and business allies, and

preservinglaws

that

shelter

officials

from

public

scrutiny.

Regrettably,

they

have

showed

little

interest

in

supporting policies to promote media pluralism. This would have required reinforcing government

accountability, rolling back legislation that discourages critical reporting, enforcing sunshine laws,

diversifying patterns of media ownership, and soliciting and ensuring broad participation from civic

society.

With a few exceptions, none of these steps were taken. There have been limited efforts to

democratize access to public broadcasting.27 Take the case of community radio. Although leading

stations

in

metropolitan

areas

have

increasingly

been

incorporated

into

cross

media

corporations,

a

myriadofpublic,private,mixed,andcommunitygroupsownandmanageradiostationsscatteredinthe

region.Radioownershipismoredispersedthaninothercountries,largelyduetothesignificantgrowing

numberofstationsandlowerbarrierstoentry.Amoredisaggregatedmarketstructurepartiallyexplains

why radio, in principle, offers better opportunities for public expression than newspapers and

television.28However,themajorityofcommunity radiostationsare in legal limbo.Governmentshave

beenreluctanttopasslegislationtoprovidealegalframeworktosupporttheiroperations.

Although the collusion between government and large media corporations has remained

dominant,relationshavenotalwaysbeenpeaceful.Theascendancyofpopulisminthelastdecadehas

ushered in clashes between governments and rightwing proprietors. They have battled over

communication policies and official criticism of the press. Frequently, presidents used a strong

nationalisticandclassbasedrhetorictocastigateowners. Inresponse,associationsrepresenting large


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media owners have excoriated governments. These conflicts have taken place against a backdrop of

increasedpoliticalpolarizationintheregion.

Doubtlessly,theleadcasehasbeentheconflictiverelationsbetweentheChavezadministration

andtraditionalmediaownersinVenezuela.Sincecomingtopowerin1999,Chavezhaspassedlawsthat

were fiercely opposed by media owners.29 The government accused conservative proprietors of

supportingthefailed2002coup.ThecontroversialdecisionnottorenewthelicenseofRadioTelevision

Caracas,oneoftheoldest televisionstations in thecountryownedbyanantiChavezbusinessgroup,

wastheflashpointinadecadeoftenserelations.

In other countries, populist administrations and large media groups also engaged in fierce,

mostly rhetorical,battles. Althoughconfrontations did not reach ashowdownas theydid in Chavezs

Venezuela,therehavebeenconflictsbetweengovernmentandmediacorporationsinArgentina,Bolivia,

Ecuador and Nicaragua.30

Presidents have frequently criticized media owners for defending anti

popular interests, and offering biased reporting of government policies. Despite highprofile, verbal

sparring, populist governments have not faced undivided opposition from media proprietors. In fact,

theyhaveenjoyedamicablerelationswithownerswhohavenotcriticizedgovernmentpolicies.

Besides the unregulated influence power of governments and business, statelessness is

another major obstacle for democratic journalism, particularly in the interior of many countries.31

Statelessnessreferstosituationwherestatesfailtomeetkeyobligationssuchasthecontroloverthe

legitimatemeans

of

violence

and

the

guarantee

of

civic

rights.

In

such

situations,

extra

legal

actors

(e.g.

paramilitaryandparapoliceorganizations,drugtraffickers,othermafialikeoperations)exertabsolute

and autonomous power through violence. Governments are ineffective in controlling violence and

enforcinglaws.Certainly,suchsituationsdonotonlynegativelyaffectthepress,buttheyerodepolitical

and economic stability that is essential for the public sphere. However, journalists and civic

organizations,particularlythosewhorevealcorruptionandcallforaccountability,arethemaintargets

ofviolence.

The

lack

of

serious

investigation

and

prosecution

of

perpetrators

further

deepens

statelessness. Colombia and Mexico, which global press organizations have considered some of the

worldsmostdangerousplace forjournalists in thepastdecade,areexamplesof thissituation.Areas

suchasColombiasMagdalenaMedioorMexicosnorthernborderwiththeUnitedStatesarenotorious

nostatezones.Communityradiostationsandprintjournalistswhohavechallengedparamilitaryforces

anddrugtraffickersandhaveexposedcomplicitybetweengovernmentofficialsandillegalactors,have


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sufferedthebluntoftheattacks. Inthesecircumstances,any formofcriticaljournalism is impossible.

Peace and security, two minimal conditions for the existence of the press and the public sphere, are

missing.Reasoned,moderate,andcriticalpublicdiscourseisanathematotheexerciseofnakedviolence

andabsenteegovernment.

The combination of quidpro quo practices between the state and media corporations, the

persistentlackofmediapluralism,andstatelessnessunderminetheprospectsforademocraticpress

inLatinAmerica.

Thetensionsofwatchdogjournalism

The conditions analyzed in the previous section provide the backdrop to analyze the

performanceofthepressaswatchdog,agendasetter,andgatekeeper.Myargument isthatalthough

the mainstream press occasionally scrutinizes wrongdoing and brings out a plurality of civic voices,

effortstopromotewidedeliberationandcriticismareoftendrownedoutinpresssystemsthatprioritize

theinterestsofgovernmentsandlargecorporations.

Several studies have analyzed the state of watchdog journalism in the past decades.32

Throughouttheregion,pressexposeshavehadsignificantpoliticalrepercussions includingjudicialand

congressionalinvestigations,andtheresignationofpublicofficials.Theseriesofexposesandscandalsin

the region suggested auspicious innovations and the contributions of news organizations to social

accountability.33Althoughthesehavebeenunprecedenteddevelopmentsintheregion,theyshouldnot

bemistakenfortheconsolidationofadversarial,publicmindedjournalism.Thepresshasnotradically

changedfromlapdogtowatchdogjournalism.Watchdogjournalismhasevolvedalongaseesawpath,as

itsfortuneschangedaccordingtopoliticalcircumstances.

Some analysts have recently suggested that watchdogjournalism has lost much of its vigor.34

News organizations have sporadically revealed public and private wrongdoing. Hardhitting,

investigative reporting has remained marginal. Leading news organizations have dismantled

investigativeunits.Numerousreportersandeditors,whoproducedexposesandheaded investigations

inthe

1990s,

left

daily

journalism.

Newspapers

that

symbolized

watchdog

journalism

have

seemingly

abandoned critical reporting, changed ownership, or closed down due to economic difficulties (which

were,insomecases,theresultofadvertisingboycottsfromadvertisersandgovernments).

Structural arrangements and dynamics between the state and the market account for the

uneven presence of watchdogjournalism. Several countrywide surveys show that reporters blame


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editorialtimidityandgovernmentinfluenceforlimitedopportunitiesforcriticalstories.35Whileitishard

to produce concrete evidence of behindthescene maneuvers and decisions, opinion columns and

newsroom grapevines are filled with speculations about government andbusiness pressures on news

organizations to refrain from publishing critical reports. Practicing watchdog journalism has often

brought negative consequences for news organizations such as tightened advertising revenues,

restrictionstoofficialeventsandpressconferences,verbalthreats,andphysicalattacks,assassinations

andbombings.

Three issues should be considered to assess the contributions of watchdog journalism to

deliberationandcriticism:thethematicagendaofexposs,editorialbias,andthequalityofcoverage.

The portfolio of watchdog stories has focused on a range of crucial subjects. Revelations on

humanrightsabusesandcriminalactivitiesbymilitaryandpoliceofficershavedemonstratedpersistent

violations of civil rights and corruption. Investigations into drugtrafficking have laid bare complex

linkagesbetweengovernmentofficialsand illegaltrade.Storiesonkickbacksforgovernmentcontracts

andcashforvotesschemes inCongressesrevealedwrongdoingatthecoreofdemocratic institutions.

Exposs of fraudulent practices by small business and crimes by lowlevel officials (mayors, council

members, police officers) have shed light on widespread corruption. Revelations about cases of

pedophilia in the Catholic Church shed light on an institution that has historically wielded significant

power in the region. Stories scrutinizing corporate wrongdoing, however, have been few and far

between.

Even

when

stories

have

put

the

spotlight

on

cases

of

corruption

showing

complicity

between

governmentsandbusiness,thecoveragehasdisproportionatelyfocusedontheresponsibilityofpublic

officials.

Thescarcityofinvestigationsaboutcorporatemalfeasancereflectspoliticalinstitutionalfactors

thatshapenewsproduction,namelyeditorialpoliticscombinedwiththepowerofofficialsourcesand

journalisticvaluesandpractices.

Theriseofwatchdogjournalismneedstobeunderstoodagainstthebackdropofnewpolitical

communication

dynamics.

The

press

has

moved

centerstage

as

elites

and

mobilized

publics

have

chosen

to wage political battles on the media. Given their status as newsmakers and legitimate sources,

political elites hold unmatched advantage to influence news. Scores of press investigations have

originatedintheeffortsofelitestoinfluencethepress.Forreporters,governmentinfightinghasoften

providedcopiousandsensitive information.Powerbattlesamonggovernmentofficialshavebeen the

breedinggroundforexposes.Cabinetmembers,congressionalcommitteesandjudges,anddisgruntled


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12

military and police officers have often piqued newsroom attention and provided evidence of

governmentwrongdoing.36

Whileofficials leaksprodreportersandeditorstopursuestories,theorganizationalcultureof

journalismandthepoliticaleconomyofthepresshaveinfluencedtheevolutionofstories.

Ontheonehand,thecentralityandprestigeofofficialnewsskewsjournalismtowardscovering

officialwrongdoing.Just likepresidentialdeclarationsandcongressionalhearings,expossareanother

formofofficialnews.Newsroompracticesthatprioritizeofficialnewsalsostimulate interest inofficial

corruption. Official news are regularly lead stories, and receive prime space in newsholes. Cadres of

reporters maintain regular contact with official sources. Domestic politics remains the most

prestigious news beat in the professional culture ofjournalism.37 Thus, explosive information from

officialsources ismore likelytoturn intowhatastorydenunciations.Ontheotherhand,ownership

patternsinpresseconomieslimitthethematicagendaofwatchdogjournalism.Itishardtoimaginethat

watchdogjournalism would sniff out corporate corruption given that the largest news companies in

countriessuchasColombia,EcuadorandtheDominicanRepublic,justtomentionsomeexamples,are

partofbusinessgroupswithextensiveholdingsinkeyindustries(e.g.banking,bigagribusiness,tourism,

mining,energy,food,andtelecommunications).Thelackofmediadiversitydoesnotexcludewatchdog

journalism,butitnarrowsdowntherangeofpotentialissuesforinvestigation.

Press ownership is tied to a second important aspect of watchdog journalism: the role of

editorialpartisanism.

Editorial

sympathies

have

motivated

news

organizations

to

reveal

different

cases

of wrongdoing. As mentioned earlier, although the majority of news organizations do not maintain

organiclinkageswithpoliticalparties,theyareidentifiedwithspecificideologiesandpoliticaleconomic

interests. Most Latin American countries lack solid party systems to support partisan journalism.

Instead, news organizations have supported administrations and officials due to various reasons

includingcommonideologyandbusinesspragmatism.38

Not surprisingly, then, editorial interest in different cases of wrongdoing has fallen along

ideological

and

political

divisions.

Left

leaning

and

liberal

news

organizations

have

exposed

human

rightsabusesandwrongdoing inconservativeadministrations.Conservativenewsmedia,instead,have

scrutinizedwrongdoingduringleftistandpopulistadministrations.Newsorganizationswithideologically

diffused editorial politics have covered a wide range of cases of corruption. Political polarization has

sharpened such divisions. In times when conflicts between administrations and news organizations

escalated, such as during the recent skirmishes between populist governments and rightwing


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13

proprietors, watchdogjournalism has been tainted by political and ideological rifts. The scrutiny of

governmentpowerhasbeenoftenmotivatedbypoliticalantagonismratherthatsomepostpolitical,

professionalgoaltoservethepublicinterest.Currentpoliticalconditionsmakeitdifficulttoconceive

anyformofwatchdogjournalismthatstaysabovethepoliticalfray.Politicalpolarizationdragsthepress

totakesides,andinturn,thepresssharpenspoliticalpolarization.

Two reactionsarepossiblevisvis thechronicweaknessof"professionaljournalism inLatin

Americaanditsimpactontheperformanceofwatchdogjournalism.Fromapositionthatembracesthe

ideals of professionaljournalism, one could lament this situation on the grounds that partisanism

inevitably compromises quality and fairness. Instead, from a perspective that is skeptical about the

prospectsofpostpoliticaljournalismintheregion,onecouldsuggestthatcompetitivepoliticsarethe

main reservoir for the press to foster democratic deliberation and criticism in the public sphere. The

presence

of

competitive

elites

and

organized

publics,

rather

than

journalistic

commitment

to

professionalvalues,setsthebasisforpresscriticism.

Thesepositionscarrynormativeandempiricalimplications:Whatkindofwatchdogjournalismis

betterforthedemocraticpublicsphere?Onethatscrutinizespoweranimatedbywantingtoservethe

public interest?Orwatchdogjournalism inspiredbypartisan ideology?Whatkind isfeasible inLatin

America given political polarization, lack of government transparency, and concentrated media

markets?Welackpersuasiveanswertothesequestions.Theprescriptiveandpragmaticramificationsof

possible

answers

need

to

be

carefully

considered,

particularly

to

assess

appropriate

course

of

actions

to

strengthenwatchdogjournalism.

A third issue is the quality of press denunciations. Watchdogjournalism has rarely been truly

investigative.Intheprintmedia,ithasoftenbeenabsorbedbynewseventsthatarerelativelyeasy

andcheaptocover.Ontelevisionnews,ithastypicallyresortedtohiddencamerasandotherethically

dubious newsgathering techniques to produce ratingsfriendly stories. Consequently, exposs have

been focusedon individuals,episodicevents,andwhatastorynewsratherthanstructuralcauses

and dynamics of corruption.Events are rarely used to produce thematic coverage of wrongdoing.39

Forexample,newsaboutthedevastatingconsequencesofhurricanesandearthquakesarerarelyused

toreportonpoliciestomitigatedisasters,socialpatternsofresidentialdistribution,and landproperty

issues. Thematiccoverage requires editors to remove reporters from the pressuresof daily deadlines

and provide financial support to conduct investigations. In addition to obstacles to access official

information,inadequateworkingconditionsmakesreporterstoodependentonofficial leaksandother


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14

interested parties to gather information. Frequently, the result are stories with flimsy evidence,

undocumented conclusions, and birdseye views of deepseated problems and complex webs of

corruption.

In summary, the tensions of watchdogjournalism are found in the linkages between news

organizationswithmarketsandgovernments,newsroomroutines,andprofessionalcriteriadetermining

news.Whilestructuralconnectionsbetweenthepressandthestatereducethechancesforscrutinizing

official actions, conflicts between governments and news organizations increase opportunities for

adversarialjournalism.Whileconcentratedmediaownershipdiscouragesjournalismfrom investigating

corporatewrongdoing,itdoesnotexcludethepossibilitythatnewsorganizationsmayprobecorruption

in other areas. While professional criteria push reporters to cover big stories about official

wrongdoing, organizational routines drive reporters to cover eventcentered news about corruption.

Structural

and

organizations

constraints

do

not

completely

push

out

watchdogjournalism,

but

they

narrowthepotentialtopicsandunderminethequalityofreportingthatholdspoweraccountable

Thepressasagendasetterandgatekeeper

Structuraldynamicsandprofessionalbiasesalsoconstraintheagendasettingandgatekeeping

rolesofthepress.Asagendasetter,thepressshouldreportonavarietyofsignificantpublicproblems

that need attention from citizens and policymakers. As gatekeepers, journalists should facilitate

dialogueamongmultipleperspectivesbybringingoutarangeofviewsfrom individualsandorganized

groups.The

press

in

Latin

America

is

ill

equipped

to

give

adequate

and

balanced

attention

to

issues

and

opinions.Itispredisposedtoreportonissuesthatareimportanttoofficialsourcesandotherindividuals

and institutions with fluid media access. It is biased to cover issues that are primarily the concern of

welloffmediaaudiences. It isunwilling to focuson issues thatmayantagonizepowerfulofficialsand

majoradvertisers.

The press focuses on issues that are relevant to powerful newsmakers, conventional news

sources,andurbanandwealthieraudiences.40Ittendstoignoreissuesaffectingcitizenswithoutmedia

and

political

clout.

For

example,

it

fails

to

pay

attention

to

health

issues

that

mainly

affect

the

young,

the

old, the poor, ethnic minorities, and rural populations.41 Environmental issues that affect urban

populationsarelikelytogetmorepressattentionthanissuesaffectingruralareas.42Crimeinwealthier

neighborhoodsdrawsmorecoverage,andoften feedsmediapanicsandcrimewavesthatdonot

matchactualincidenceorsocialdistribution.43


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15

Thepressdoesnotonlypresentanarrowrangeofissues,butitalsofailstogivebalancedspace

todifferentperspectives.Severalstudieshaveconcludedthatpoliticalelitesremainprimarydefiners

of the news, and that the news media neglects to provide adequate coverage of issues affecting

disempoweredcitizens.InChile,poorcitizensarelessfrequentlypresentinnewscoverage.Whenthey

getmediaattention,theyareoftenportrayedashaplessvictimsorcrimeperpetrators.44

InColombia,

coverage of the prolonged internal armed conflict has been dominated by official sources, mainly

politicians and military officers. Voices proposing peaceful solutions have received substantially less

attention. Poor and rural citizens, who disproportionately make the swelling numbers of people

displaced by the conflict, are rarely given opportunities to present their views.45 Although Brazilian

journalismhasincreasinglyofferedmorecoverageonenvironmentalissues,ittendstofocusonofficial

opinionsandconcernsovercivicvoicesandlocalactionstoaddressproblems.46

The

institutional

conditions

of

news

production

account

for

bias

in

agendasetting

and

gate

keeping.Prevalentjournalisticvaluesandworkconditionsfavorreportingonspecifickindsofissuesand

perspectives.Reportingpracticesandrulesreinforcetheagendasettingstatusofofficialsourcesand

other powerful newsmakers. The reluctance of news organizations toassign adequate resources puts

pressuresonreporterstoproducefastand lowcostnews, insteadoftimeconsumingnewsgathering.

Rushedtodelivercontentundertightdeadlines,reporterstypicallyresorttoconventionalsourceswho,

expectedly,prioritizespecificissuesandperspectives.Consequently,acombinationofshoddyreporting

andeditorialconstraintsproducessuperficial,inchoate,andincompletecoverage.

Becausetheylackpoliticalinfluenceandnewsmakingprestige,civicvoicesareatadisadvantage

toinfluencenewsandpublicagendas.Admittedly,theriseofcivicadvocacyjournalisminrecentyears

suggests promising changes to enrich the range of issues and perspectives that are presented.47 A

growingnumberofcivicassociationsandnongovernmentorganizationsintheregionhaveengagedin

news production. From Brazilbased networkAgenciaNacionaldeDireitosda Infancia to Argentinas

ReddePeriodismoSocial, a range of civic groups has aimed to changenews coverageof a myriadof

socialissuesinthemainstreampress.Hopingtoimprovethequalityofnewscoverageonsocialissues,

theyhave

used

avariety

of

sourcing

strategies

such

as

the

establishment

of

specialized

news

services,

cultivatingrelationswithreporters,stagingnewsevents,andproducingstoriesformassdistribution.

The limitations of the press as agendasetter and gatekeeper raise questions about suitable

interventionstoimprovecoverageofissuesthatarecentraltodemocraticgovernance.Itisnotobvious

whethercivicactors caneffectively influence institutionalpractices that influencenewscontent. Civic


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16

voices are not only notoriously underrepresented in media ownership, but they are also consistently

sidelinedbyjournalisticroutinesthatprivilegetopdown,officialnews.Insocietieswithappallingsocial

disparities and governance problems, the press remains hamstrung by narrow political and private

interests.

These problems reflect the thinness of the connective tissues between the press and civic

society.Aslongasthepressprioritizesrelationswiththestateandthemarket,itishardtoenvisionhow

news organizations would consistently offer critical and balanced information on issues that affect

substantialsegmentsofthepopulation,particularlythosewhoarealreadysociallymarginalized.

LatinAmericaoffersan interestingcaseofunevenadvances incivicexpression.Conditions for

freedom of expression are considerably more open than in any other previous period in the modern

politicalhistoryoftheregion.Deliberationandcriticismarehardlyabsentinthepublicsphere.Thereis

noshortageofmobilizedpublicsaroundadiversesetof issues.Theeffervescenceofmultipleformsof

civic expression suggests dynamic national public spheres. The press, however, has failed to tap into

civic society in ways that it could better serve a diversity of public interests. It has often cautiously

followed, reacted, and/or simply ignored emerging demands as well as new political and social

movements.Opportunitiestoscrutinizepowerandcoverawidersetofpublic issuesandperspectives

aresubordinatedtocoveringpoliticalelitesandnotoffendingmajoreconomicinterests.

Obstaclesandoptions

Toenhancethequalityofpressperformanceisnecessarytopromotemediapluralism,increase

accountabilityofgovernmentdecisionsaffectingthepress,andstrengthencoverageofcivicissuesand

opinions. The goal should be to reinforce the connective tissues between the press and the public

sphere.Suchchangeswouldnothappenwithoutaperspectivethatprioritizesinstitutionstrengthening

and has substantive political will. Although some reforms could be accommodated within prevalent

structures,achievingmediapluralismandaccountabilityareunimaginablewithoutwrestling influence

power from government and private interests. Interventions need to be guided by assessments of

obstacles

for

democratic

journalism

and

lessons

from

past

experiences

of

media

reform

in

the

region.

Aninstitutionalistperspectiveshouldtakeprecedentoverviewsthatreducemediapluralismto

theimpactofglobalizationandnewtechnologies.Recently,globalizationandtechnologicalinnovations

haveanimatedhopefulviewsabouttheprospectsforpressanddemocracy.Althoughglobalmovements

forcivicexpressionandtechnologybasedformsofcitizensjournalism(e.g.blogs,cellphonesandSMS,

electronic social networks) provide new opportunities for civic expression, it would be mistaken to


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17

automaticallyconsiderthemthebellwetherofpressdemocracy.Oneshouldnotexaggeratetheirability

to chip away at calcified structures and practices in the Latin American press. Although crossborder

civicmovementscontributetoraisingattentionaboutpressissues,governmentsmaintainconsiderable

discretion over the dissemination of information and media policies. The use of new technologies

remainshighlyunequalacrosssocialstrata.WhiletheInternetoffersinformationthatisnotavailablein

the old media, television and radio still attract the largest audiences. Different forms of citizen

journalism remain peripheral in press systems dominated by state and commercial interests. What

needstobeaskediswhetherglobalizationandnewtechnologieseffectivelyredressmajorinstitutional

obstaclesatthecoreofpresssystems.

As a conclusion, this section discusses three approaches to advance the contributions of the

presstodemocraticgovernanceinLatinAmerica.Iproposeacombinationofinterventionstotransform

mediastructures,

government

accountability,

and

journalistic

practices.

Onesetofinterventionsneedtosupportthediversificationofmediaownershipandactionsfor

mediareform.HereIproposesomeillustrativeideas.Supportadvocacyamongkeyactors(government,

business,civicsociety)tospearheadchangesinlegislationtoreducetheinfluenceoflargecorporations

inpresssystems.Raisethevisibilityofmediapluralism inglobalandregional,anddiscussalternatives

formediareformwithgovernmentsandotherrelevantparties.Forexample,PerusVeeduraCiudadana

(CitizensWatchdog)andAMARCsUruguayprogramplayedkeyroles inadvocatingforpolicychanges

and

conducting

consultative

meetings.

Although

the

specifics

of

the

2004

broadcasting

law

were

far

fromwhattheVeeduriahadproposed,thegroupsuccessfullymobilizedpublicandprivatesectorsand

generatedwidespreaddebateaboutmediapolicies. InUruguay,AMARChadaprotagonistroleduring

the public debates and congressional process that resulted in the passing of the community

broadcasting law in 2007. Another way to contribute to the diversification of media ownership is

throughstrengtheningthe financialviabilityofsmallprint,broadcasting,andwebbasedmediathat

are not affiliated with governments or corporations, particularly in areas with weak economies and

government manipulation of public funds. The Swiss Foundation Avina, for example, gives grants to

community

radio

stations

to

develop

media

management

skills

(among

other

goals)

to

increase

the

prospects for their future sustainability. Multilateral and bilateral donors can support programs that

offereconomicincentives(e.g.microloans,grants,subsidies)andopportunitiesforstrengtheningmedia

managementcompetencies.48Theseprograms,especiallyifgovernmentsaretherecipientsoffundsand

coimplementers,requiretransparencyandcivicparticipationtoavoidfavoritismandcorruption.


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18

Asecondsetofactionsshouldaimtoreducediscretionarycontroloftheexecutiveondecisions

thataffectpressperformance.Moretransparencyandpublicparticipationintheuseofpublicresources

may help to redress centralized power and media patronage. Some areas of intervention include

management of officialadvertising,structure and controlof publicbroadcasting,anddecisionmaking

around issuessuchas taxation, importationpermits,andnewsprintproduction.Organizationssuchas

ArgentinasAsociacinpor losDerechosCivileshavedoneapioneeringmonitoringandpublicizingthe

preferential allocation of public advertising by governments, the use of freedom of information laws,

and other vital issues for democratic governance. It is also important to foster the sense that

government information is a public resource rather than a private good. Shifting such mindset is

tantamount to a major revolution. It demands ensuring the collection and preservation of public

records, strengthening the capacity of government offices to respond to requests from citizens and

journalists,

and

informing

the

population

about

the

existence

of

laws.

By

the

same

token,

the

revocation

of punitive legislation againstjournalistsand the passing and enforcement of access to information

laws are critical, too. Here the work of Mexicos Group Oaxaca stands out for it led the process that

resultedintheapprovalofthefederalFreedomofInformationlawin2001.

A third area of intervention is journalistic practice. Two complementary strategies are

recommended.Oneistoworkwithnewsorganizationsandjournalisticassociations.Certainly,thereare

no shortage of training programs that aim to promote a democratic press in Latin America. An

impressivenumberofassociations,universities,anddonorsregularlyofferworkshopsthatcoverarange

ofreportingskills.Standardtrainingprograms,however,areincompletetoinstitutionalizecivicvoicesin

the press. Curricula that focus on teaching tools and competencies often miss the fact that training

alonedoesnotchangejournalisticpractices.Withoutthe interestofnewsorganizationstomodifythe

currentsystemofincentivesandexpectations,capacitystrengtheningprogramsareunlikelytoachieve

substantial changes. Although they might be of interest to reporters, new skills are unlikely to bring

significantdifferencesas longasroutinesandculturesthataffectperformanceremainunchanged.To

putitdifferently,capacitystrengtheningisnotaboutsimplytransmittingandacquiringskills.Itisabout

reinforcingdemocratic

institutions

and

distributive

competencies

across

the

public

sphere

to

promote

theuseofjournalisticcompetenciesthatfavorcivicperspectives.

Continuous support for professional associations is also important. Many associations (Perus

Instituto de Prensa y Sociedad, Argentinas Foro de Periodismo Argentino, Brazils Observatorio da

Imprensa)haveplayedakeyroleinadvocatingforfreedomofinformationlaws,raisingconcernsabout


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21/28

20

widenopportunities fordeliberationandcriticism.Amoredemocraticpublicsphere isunthinkableas

longassharpdisparitiesinaccesstothepresspersist.


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21

Table12.1:PressFreedominLatinAmerica

Country Year

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Argentina PF PF PF PF PF PF

Bolivia

F

F PF PF PF

PF

Brazil PF PF PF PF PF PF

Chile F F F F F F

Colombia NF NF NF NF NF PF

CostaRica F F F F F F

Cuba NF NF NF NF NF NF

DominicanRepublic PF PF PF PF PF PF

Ecuador PF PF PF PF PF PF

ElSalvador PF PF PF PF PF PF

Guatemala PF PF NF PF PF PF

Haiti PF PF PF PF PF PF

Mexico PF PF PF PF PF PF

Nicaragua PF PF PF PF PF PF

Panama PF PF PF PF PF PF

Paraguay PF PF PF PF PF PF

Peru

F

PF PF PF PF

PF

Uruguay F F F F F F

Venezuela NF NF NF NF NF NF

Notes:F=Free,PF=Partlyfree,NF=Notfree.

Source: Freedom House. Freedom of the Press: A Global Survey of Media Independence.

www.freedomhouse.org


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22

Table12.2:Threatstomediapluralism

Country Violenceagainst

thepress1

Privatemedia

concentration2

Media

legislationon

communityand

publicmedia

3

Preferential

allocationof

official

advertising

4

Argentina + +

Bolivia + + +

Brazil + + + +

Chile + +

Colombia + + + +

CostaRica +

Cuba

DominicanRep +

Ecuador +

ElSalvador +

Guatemala +

Haiti +

Honduras +

Mexico + + +

Nicaragua +

Panama +

Paraguay +

Peru + +

Uruguay + +

Venezuela +

Notes:Typesofthreatstomediapluralismareoperationalizedasfollows:

1.Tenormoredeathsofjournalistsbetween1992and2008.

2.Ahandfulofcompaniescontrolsubstantialholdingsinonemediaindustry(newspaper,magazine,

radio,overtheairtelevision,cabletelevision,satellitetelevision).

3.Pressandbroadcastinglawspassedduringauthoritarianregimesarestillinforce.

4.Casesofpreferentialassignationofofficialadvertisinghavebeenrecordedbetween2000and2008.

Source:CommitteetoProtectJournalists.


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23

Endnotes

1SeePippaNorris.2005.Globalpoliticalcommunication:Goodgovernance,humandevelopmentsand

masscommunication,inFrankEsserandBarbaraPfetschEds.,ComparingPoliticalCommunication:

Theories,Cases,andChallenges.NewYork;CambridgeUniversityPress.

2JurgenHabermas.1989.TheStructuralTransformationofthePublicSphere.Cambridge:MITPress.

3CraigJ.Calhoun1992.HabermasandthePublicSphere.Cambridge:MITPress.4Habermasdevelopedthispointlargelyinresponsetohiscritics,particularlyNancyFrasersargument

abouttheneedtodistinguishbetweenweakandstrongpublicsinthepublicsphere.Seeher

contribution

in

Calhoun,

Habermas

and

the

Public

Sphere.

5Ontheliberalmodel,thelocusclassicusisFredrickS.Siebert,TheodorePeterson,andWilbur

Schramm.1956.FourTheoriesofthePress.Illinois:UniversityofIllinoisPress.Foracritique,seeJohn

Nerone.1995.LastRights:RevisitingFourTheoriesofthePress.Illinois:UniversityofIllinoisPress.A

comprehensivediscussiononpressmodelsisfoundinDennisMcQuail.2000.MassCommunication

Theory.London:Sage.

6Fordiscussionsonmediapoliciesandjournalisticpracticesalongthelinesofpublicsphereprinciples,

seePeterDahlgrenandColinSparksEds.1991.CommunicationandCitizenship:Journalismandthe

PublicSphere

in

the

New

Media

Age.

London:

Sage;

James

Curran

and,

Jean

Seaton.

2003.

Power

WithoutResponsibility:ThePress,Broadcasting,andNewMediainBritain.London:Routledge;Tanni

HaasandLindaSteiner.2001.Publicjournalismasajournalismofpublics:Implicationsofthe

HabermasFraserdebateforpublicjournalism,Journalism,2(2):123147;JimMcGuiganandStuart

Allan.2006.Mediatingpolitics:JurgenHabermasandthepublicsphere,inDavidBerryandJohn

TheobaldEds.,RadicalMassMediaCriticism:ACulturalGenealogy.Montreal:BlackRoseBooks;and

NicoCarpentier.2007.Copingwiththeagoraphobiamediaprofessional:Atypologyofjournalistic

practicesreinforcingdemocracyandparticipation,inBartCammaertsandNicoCarpentierEds.

ReclaimingtheMedia.Bristol,UK:Intellect.

7Amongothers,seeKariKarpinnen.2006.Mediadiversityandthepoliticsofcriteria,NordicomReview

2:5368;JanvanCuilenberg.1999.Oncompetition,access,anddiversityinmedia,oldandnew,New

MediaandSociety1(2):183207.

8DenisMcQuail.1992.MediaPerformance:MassCommunicationandthePublicInterest.London:SAGE.


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24

9SeeJamesCurranandMichaelGurevitchEds.2001.MassMediaandSociety.3rdedition.London:

Arnold;andJohnKeane.1991.TheMediaandDemocracy.Cambridge:PolityPress.

10Among

others,

see,

Chappell

Lawson

and

Sallie

Hughes.

2005.

Latin

Americas

postauthoritarian

media,inRachelMayandAndrewMiltonEds.,(Un)civilsocieties:HumanRightsandDemocratic

TransitionsinEasternEuropeandLatinAmerica.Lanham:LexingtonBooks;ChappellLawson.2002.

BuildingtheFourthEstate:DemocratizationandtheRiseofaFreePressinMexico.Berkeley:University

ofCaliforniaPress;andSallieHughes.2006.NewsroomsinConflict:JournalismandtheDemocratization

ofMexico.Pittsburgh:UniversityofPittsburghPress.

11Forathoroughdiscussionofthissubject,seeLeonardoAvritzer.2002.DemocracyandthePublicSpace

inLatinAmerica.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress.

12SeeRichardFeinberg,CarlosH.Waisman,andLenZamoscEds.2006.CivilSocietyandDemocracyin

LatinAmerica.NewYork:PalgraveMacmillan.

13SeeSilvioWaisbord.2000.MediainSouthAmerica:Betweentherockofthestateandthehardplace

ofthemarket,inJamesCurranandM.ParkEds.,DeWesternizingMediaStudies.London:Arnold.

14MariaTeresaHerranyJavierRestrepo.1995.EticaparaPeriodistas.Bogota:TercerMundo.

15A2001studyestimatedthatalmostaquarterofbroadcastingcompaniesinBrazilareownedby

politicians.Politiciansweregrantedalmost78percentofnewlicensesgrantedbetween1999and2001.

Thisreinforces

existing

patterns

by

which

political

families

have

astronghold

on

both

print

and

broadcastinthemajorityofBrazilianstates.SeeRogerioChristofoletti.2003.Dezimpassesparauma

efetivacriticademidianoBrasil,paperpresentedatthemeetingofINTERCOM,BeloHorizonte,

September.

16Asubstantialliteratureintheregionhasanalyzedthisissue.OnBrazil,seeAlciraAbreu.2002.A

ModernizaodaImprensa,19702000.RiodeJaneiro:JorgeZahar.

17ElizabehFoxEd.1988.TheStruggleforDemocracy.London:Sage.

18JohnSinclair,Theagingdynasties,inElizabethFoxandSilvioWaisbord.2002.LatinPolitics,Global

Media.Austin:

University

of

Texas

Press.

19UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme.2004.DemocracyinLatinAmerica:TowardsaCitizens

Democracy.BuenosAires:Aguilar,Altea,Taurus,Alfaguara.


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26

ExpresineInformacin.Caracas.EspacioPblico;EleazarDiazRangelandothers.2003.Chvezy los

MediosdeComunicacinSocial.Caracas.Alfadileditores.

30RonaldGrebe.2007.EvoMoralesylosmedios.Chasqui.

http://chasqui.comunica.org/content/view/552/142/

31SilvioWaisbord.2007.Democraticjournalismandstatelessness,PoliticalCommunication24:115

129.

32SeeRosentalAlves.2005.Fromlapdogtowatchdog: TheroleofthepressinLatinAmericas

democratization,inHugodeBurghEd.,MakingJournalists,181204.London:Routledge;andSilvio

Waisbord.2000.WatchdogJournalisminSouthAmerica.NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress.The

discussionbelowlargelydrawsfrommybook.

33EnriquePeruzzottiandCatalinaSmulovitzEds.2006.EnforcingtheRuleofLaw:SocialAccountabilityin

theNewLatinAmericanDemocracies. Pittsburgh,PA:UniversityofPittsburghPress

34JulietGill.2006.MuzzlingtheWatchdog:ChangingMediaPerformanceinDemocraticArgentina,

Ph.D.dissertation,UniversityofMiami; J.Brito.2003.Ellenfueradesujaula:la"primavera

fiscalizadora"delperiodismochileno,InformacinPblica,ust.cl.

35SeeFOPEA.2005.Sobrelosperiodistasylaprofesin.BuenosAires:FOPEA;ObservatoriodeMedios.

2003.InformesobreelestadoactualdelalibertaddeprensaenColombia.Chia:Universidaddela

Sabana;

36

For

examples,

see

Waisbord,

Watchdog

Journalism

in

South

America.

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40AnoverviewisofferedinSantiagoPedraglio.2005.Agendasdistantes:Losmediosdecomunicaciny

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la

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los

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AmericanHealthOrganization.AureaM.daRochaEd.,1995.Saude&Comunicao:Visibilidadese

silncios.SoPaulo:Hucitec/Abrasco.


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extincin,Chasqui70.http://www.comunica.org/chasqui/jukofsky70.htm

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andthe'civic'model.InKarinWahlJorgensenandThomasHanitzschEds.HandbookofJournalism

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48SeeCIMAandNED.2007.TowardEconomicsustainabilityofthemediaindevelopingcountries,June.

Washington:Center

for

International

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Assistance.

Chapter 12 Waisbord

Documents

Transcript of Chapter 12 Waisbord