Chapter 11

Triggers, Traps, and Working within Incident Command Systems

Objectives

• List four methods that will help the ISO trigger safe behaviors

• List the three ISO “traps” and discuss how each can render the ISO ineffective

• Describe the organizational position of the ISO within the ICS

Objectives (con’t.)

• List the two primary communication tools the ISO uses and list guidelines for each

• Define the national “typing” scheme and how the ISO function can expand for small and large incident types

Introduction• An ISO at an incident

– Communicates clearly – Appeals to the safety sense that can be

sidestepped during working incidents– Can trigger favorable or unfavorable responses

when confronted by firefighters driven by challenge

– Presents concerns in a way that is appropriate and appealing to the IC

Triggers

• ISOs remind firefighters to operate:– Within a plan– In a safe manner– Within solid risk/benefit ranges

• Work safe triggers– Basic approach of ISO to help firefighters work

more safely– Can be passive or active

Triggers (con’t.)

• Visibility– Passive trigger– Effective in self-correction– Wear a high-visibility vest

• States “SAFETY”• Use a distinctive vest color (usually green) and

highly reflective trim

Triggers (con’t.)

• Example– Passive trigger– ISOs should:

• Participate in crew accountability system• Use appropriate PPE• Follow department policies• Obey zone markers

Triggers (con’t.)

• Example (con’t.)– ISOs working alone should:

• Always be in sight of another responder (or request a partner)

• Always be in shouting distance of another responder• Let somebody know where you are going when

taking a tour of the incident scene• Don’t walk into, or breathe, smoke • Self-monitor rehab needs

Triggers (con’t.)

• Soft intervention– Active trigger to provide awareness that a

hazard or injury potential exists• Use of humor• Subtle reminders• Information sharing• “Peer-talk”

– Should not be used to stop, suspend, or alter activities

Figure 11-2 Often a simple reminder (a soft intervention) is all that is needed to prevent an injury.

Triggers (con’t.)

• Firm intervention– Active trigger to immediately stop, suspend or

alter an activity based on an imminent threat– Imminent threat: activity, condition, or inaction

that will most certainly lead to injury or death– NFPA 1521 states that the ISO

• Has the authority to use firm interventions• Should immediately report firm interventions to IC

Traps

• ISOs can be trapped into operational modes and activities that render them ineffective– Responders may dismiss ISO’s general

approach

• Well-intentioned, inexperienced ISOs fall into the following traps

Traps (con’t.)

• The Bunker Cop– Spends too much time looking for missing,

damaged, or inappropriate use of PPE– Focuses on skill proficiency at incident– Misses the big picture of incident safety– May result in firefighter resentment

Figure 11-4 The ISO who takes the Bunker Cop approach misses the big picture.

Traps (con’t.)

• The CYA Mode– ISO tries to ensure that he or she is not held

personally accountable for incident scene actions

• Constantly citing CFRs, standards, and other numbered requirements

• May wash his/her hands of an infraction

– To avoid CYA label, practice “good intent” and “personal concern”

Traps (con’t.)

• The Worker– Pitches in and helps crews with their tasks– Cannot stay mobile and focused on the big

picture– Often occurs when crew number is low

Working within Command Systems

• Effective and efficient ISOs work within an incident management system (IMS)

• Efforts to make IMSs NIMS-compliant– Incident command systems– National incident typing scheme– Expansion of ISO functions when necessary

Working within Command Systems (con’t.)

• Incident command systems– The IC is responsible for overall management

at an incident scene and for the safety of responders

– Codependency between ISO’s support of IC and IC’s faith in ISO

Working within Command Systems (con’t.)

• Incident command relations– Authority

• The ISO must yield to the IC’s authority and present requests rationally and professionally

– Communications• Radio: use “Safety” identifier and limit use to safety

functions• Face-to-face: every 15 minutes

Figure 11-6 The ISO must respect the fact that the ultimate authority for firefighter safety rests with the incident commander.

Working within Command Systems (con’t.)

• Incident command relations (con’t.)– Solution-driven approach

• Here’s what I see (a factual observation)• Here’s what I think it means (your judgment about

the hazard)• This is what I would do (your solution)• What do you think? (acknowledge the IC’s authority)

Figure 11-7 The ISO can be part of the solution path, as opposed to just bringing problems to the table.

Figure 11-8 The ISO should strive to be a consultant to the incident commander.

Working within Command Systems (con’t.)

• The National Incident “Typing” Scheme– NIMS integration center (NIC)

• Responsible for developing a national resource typing protocol

• Will most likely use and expand the typing scheme used by the wildland fire community

• Type ratings are ranked with lower numbers indicating higher capabilities

• Uses incident management teams (IMT) with specific expertise exceeding that of local level

Working within Command Systems (con’t.)

• The National Incident “Typing” Scheme (con’t.)– Type V: Local, agency, or jurisdiction specific– Type IV: Multiagency or jurisdiction (automatic

and mutual aid responses)– Type III: Regional– Type II: State– Type I: National

Working within Command Systems (con’t.)

• Expanding the ISO function with the IMS– ICS/NIMS language

• ICS is the hands-on responder management part of NIMS

– Local-level ISO expansion• ISO request ASOs for prolonged, complex, hazmat,

trench rescue, and confined spaced incidents • ISOs become central contact point for ASOs

Working within Command Systems (con’t.)

• Expanding the ISO function (con’t.)– Further ISO expansion options

• Currently, NIMS does not allow ISO to have units (useful for full-blown incidents)

• ISO should remain at command position when using multiple ASOs

• Maintain a manageable span of control: five to one• For more than five ASOs: have ASOs in each

functional area report to an ASO, who then reports to the ISO

Working within Command Systems (con’t.)

• Expanding the ISO function (con’t.)– A solution to the NIMS weakness: scaling the

ISO function• Create a safety section• ISO manages and coordinates safety management

function across all participating organizations• Give more specificity to ASO roles• Divide safety functions into units

Figure 11-10 An organizational chart for scaling the ISO function into units, used to bridge an NIMS weakness.

Working within Command Systems (con’t.)

• The ISO as part of the national response team– In national incidents, the ICS component and

ISO become an area command of NIMS– A joint field office (JFO) is established – A safety coordinator is assigned to assist the

ICS safety officer and coordinate federal resources

Summary

• ISOs are only as effective as their ability to trigger safe behaviors

• Triggers– Passive or active– Soft intervention most often used

• Awareness, reminders, and suggestions

Summary (con’t.)

• Traps– Bunker Cop– Performing hands-on tasks– Presenting a liability-protecting front

• ISOs understand and support the authorities of the IC– Good communications– Solution-driven approach

Summary (con’t.)

• Growth of safety functions– Use national typing scheme– Request ASOs from IC

• If span of control is exceeded, multiple ASOs report to single ASO, who then reports to ISO

– Aim to be NIMS compliant– Weaknesses in NIMS may lead to the creation

of a scalable SO function