.·

CHAPI'i::R FIVE

Chapter Five

Il-lDOCHTI'lA, ASBAN AND THE H¥0R POt·IERS

.·

Hhen the ASEAN was formed in 1967 t\-TO of its

founder members, Thailand and the l:>hilippines, ,.,ere

actively aiG.ing the Americans in its \var in Vietnam.

These two countries were also members in the anti-

communist SEATO. During the formation of the

J4SEAN no mention was made either in the declaration

or in the final corrummique about the largescale

American intervention in Vietnamo It was natural

that Vietnam reacted sharply to the creation of ASEAN

as an imperialist ploy created to contain the commu­

nist movements in the region. 1 Even \vhen the idea of

Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality was propounded,

there was no attempt or plan by the ASEAN to get the

Americans out of Indochina. The ZOPF.\N idea, in fact,

had it been realized would have meant keeping the

pro-US regimes in South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos

in fact, and no interference by the outside powers,

which meant China and the soviet Union should refrain

from supporting the communist movercents.

1 Asian Almanac, September 1967, p.2271 •..

Almost since the inception of the ASEAN, Vietnam

had been suspicious of .ASEAl.~' s motivations. It is

natural becuuse, not only two of SEATO members, Thai­

land and the Philippines, were actively engaged in

aiding the Arneri~ans in the Vietnam, but other ASEAN

members were by and large prO-'I:restern. Excepting

Indonesia, all other 1~&~~ members had some or other

security arrangements \'lith the \'lest. Also, no ASEAN

member ever carne to the rescue of the Vietnamese in

their \•rar. Vietnam's antagonism did not wane even

after the end of the war, though ASEAN promptly

opened up the Association membership for the Indochina

countries. North Vietnam made it clear that it '\'rould

have nothing to do \'lith ASEAN as long as two of its

members belonged to SEATO and permitted UoSa bases

and troops on their territory. After the January 1973

Paris Peace accord, all of the ASEAN states realised

the importance of repairing their relations \·lith Hanoi

but none was prepared to pay the price demanded by the

North Vietnamese, viz., the imnediate withdrawal of

u.s. troops, dismantling of u.s. bases, and the liqui­

dation of the SEATo·.

\ihen it became clear by the early seventies

that the·Arnericans were not likely t~ succeed in Viet­

nam, the perception of ~dependent Hanoi's future role

Z10

in southeast Asia by the ASEAN elite sho'.-Ied a remarkable

degree of polarisation. A nrinority opinion, especially

led __ by Halaysia, expected Hanoi to be pre-occupied 'I:Jith

the problems of reconstructing war ravaged economy,

neither desiring nor capable of playing a larger role

in the region. And to maintain an equidistance between . ?

the Soviet Union and China,- while others, Thailand,

Indonesia and Singapore, reflected Malay perception

and anticipated expansionist and aggressive North '

Vietnam to take over Indochina stat~s and actively

help the insurgents in the ASEAN. 3 Malaysia felt that

the best \'ray would be to secure Soviet Union and China

assurances for neutralization.

ASEAN's Reactions to Indochinese Victorie~

The announcement of resignation and departure

of President Nguyen Thieu on 21 April 1975, marked the

end of the anti-communist regime in sout Vietnam, Indo-

nesia \vas the first country to react to the develoP-

ments in Indochina. Its Foreign Minister, Adam l-1alik0 I

2 Bhabani Sengupta, Soviet-Asian Relations in 1970s and Beyond ( Ne\·1 York, 1976) , _p_. 234.

3 Ibid.

said on 21 April that Thieu• s resignation had brought

Vietnam closer to a negotiated settlemento The

natipnal aspiration of the Indochinese people to

achieve real peace and independence was nm-1 at

the point of materialising. He hoped that the coun-

tries of Indochina would eventually '\'lish to join ASEAJ..~ 0 0

because its members also wished to be independent of

foreign influence. 4 A small controversy arose imme-

diately after the liberation of south Vietnam on

30 April 1975 between Vietnam, and Thailand and

Singapore about the return of American aircraft flown

to Thailand and Singapore by the south Vietnamese.

Thailand suspended the removal of the aircraft only

\·!hen the u.s. completed the task of shifting all usable

aircraft to Guam. Listing past 11 crimes" of Thailand

goven1ment in assisting the Americans and former

Saigon regime in the Vietnam war and maintenance of

US military bases for bombing of North and South

Vietnam, the Vietnamese comnunist party paper, ffi1an Dan,

4 Asian Almanac, 19 July 1975, p.7139.

commented that the Vietnamese people might forgive

and forget past misdeeds committed principally by

former dictatorial militarist administration in

Bangkok, but will not tolerate any further ·hostile

actions. 5 Singapore and the Philippines did not

heed the demand of Vietnam for return of south Viet-

narnese pror:erty taken by those \'lho fled the country

on the eve of communist victoryo But this and later

tensioh on the Thai border did not deter Vietnam in

proposing to forge friendlier relations with ASEANo

Vietnam was more concerned about the reconstruction

of its Nar ravaged economy than to keep alive the

tension Hi th the .ASEAN countrieso Nalaysia was the

only country which categorically expressed its inten­

tion of returning all the aircraft and sea vessels to

the People's Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam. 6

The communist victories in April 1975 forced all . .

the ASEAN countries to reassess their. foreign policieso

Previously all the ASEAN m~mbers had recognized the

governments of Cambodia and south Vietnam. Horeover,

Thai and Filipino forces participated along with the

5 Asian Almanac, 19 July 1975, p. 7139o.

6 Ibid.

~13

Americans in the Indochina war before 1973 ceasefire

and these countries also had the u.s. bases in their

countries. Only ~~laysia had diplomatic "relations

\'lith North Vietnam since 1973. Though the five

ASEAN countries jointly recognized the new communist

go~ernment in Kampuchea on 18 April 1975, the day

Phnom Penh fell but they toqk no common action on

the ne\or south Vietnam regime. The first ASEAN coun­

try to establish relations '-'lith South Vietnamese

Provisional Revolutionary Governrcent ltras Nalaysia,

\·Thich granted recognition on 2 May 1975 7 and signed

an agreement for establishment of diplomatic relations

on 29 July 1975. The Indonesian Cabinet decided on

the same day (29 July) to recognize the Provisional

Revolutionary Government.

The Foreign Hinisters of ASEAN in a meeting

held on 13-15 ~~y 1975 in Kuala Lumpur discussed the

situation. The ~~laysian Prime ~linister Tun Abdul

Razak said in his opening speec~ that ASEAN was ready

to cooperate \'lith the ne'tt-t governments in Indochina o

He hoped that they would set aside "recriminations over

the past and ancient fears born of the cold \l-Iar", and

\·Jork to build peaceful, prosperous /and neutral South-

7 Ne\'1 straits Times, 3 Hay 1975.

east Asia. 8 i•lhile .Hr. Adam Halik called for mutual

adjustments based on the Pancasila (five principles)

instead of negative notions of fear or undertainty or

of perceived "vacuums" in pm-1er relationships. The

Thai Foreign ~linister Chatichai Chunawan called for

an early meeting of all thG Southeast Asian countries,

including _those of Indochin'a, to discuss comnon problems

and to remove misunderstandings and sucpicions. 9 A

joint statement issued on the concluding day of the

conference said that the ASEAN col.mtries "'ere ready

"to enter into friendly and hannonious relations '\'lith

each nation in Indochina", and "to cooperate with

these COl.mtries in the conmon task of national develop....

ment, and that differences in social and political

systems should not be an obstacle to the development

of constructive and mutually beneficial relations". 10

Gen. Romulo stated on 19 May that Asruu~ had not issued

any invitation to any country to join the organization,

but was willing to consider any application for member­

ship which it might receive. 11

8 New Straits Times, 14 t-1.ay 1975,

9 ~sing's Contemporary Archives, 15-21 September 1975, pp.27333-34.

10 Ibido, p.27334.

11 Bangkok Po~, 20 May 1975o

Though China had different motivations in its

ambition to cultivate warmer relations, atleast the

Philippines and Thailand, \<:hich had been not so enthu­

siastic in their response, found it expedient on their

part to establish _diplomatic links \vith the People's

Republic of China. President.He~rcos visited Beijing

on 7 June 1975, first visit to China by an ASEAN

Head of State, and met \'lith ~:.lao and Chou En-lai.

Iviarcos emphasized: "l1ie have lmo\'m the humiliation

of colonization and enslavement" and after expelling

the Spanish in 1898 the Filipinos "fell as a prize to

a new conqueror (the United States)". He continued

that although the past Philippine policies had been

11 oriented lesser tmvard Asian countries and strong

non-Asian actions", but nm-1, 11\'le must review our

alliances, reapprise our destiny and, in a \-lord, go

out into the \·lorld". China, he added, \'las "the

natural leader of the Third '\'orld". 12 A conmunique

was signed in Beijing·on 9 June establishing diplomatic

relations bet'\tleen the two countries. The Philippine

government on the same day announced that it had ter­

ndnated all existing official relations with Tai\Jan,

abrogate_d the treaty of friendship and all other

12 Peking Revie\..,, vol. 18, no.24, 13 June 1975, p.lo.

official agreements bet'\ITeen the two countries. In the

light of ne1t1 developments in Indochina Thailand also

started looking around to ensure its security. l?re-

mier Prarn6j visited the other four ASEAN countries

in June and July 1975. He arrived in China on 30 June

1975 and emphasized that the "the important considera-

tion underlying Kuala Lumpur Declaration in Nove~)er

1971 (Southeast Asia to be a Zone of Peace, Freedom

and Neutrality) is that the ASEAN countries \"ish the

1tlhole of Southeast Asia to be an area free from the

rivalry and conflict of the great pm'lers •.• u 13

The second development after 1975 \oTas the

second thoughts about the u.s. military bases in the

Philippines and Thailand. President ~~rcos stated

that in vie1tr of the developments in Indochina and the

changing pO\ver relations in Asia three government agen-

cie·s were re-evaluating security policies, including

security treaties with the United States and the

presence of the u.s. military bases in the country.

After revie\'ling the agencies• s reports, the Foreign I

Policy council recommended to the President that the

13 Pekino Revie\'r, vol.18, no.27, 4 July 1975, p.l2.'

status ~o was no longer tenable; and the u.s. had been

formally notified of the Government's desire for con-

sultation. On 7 July 1975, Pre.sident 1-.i.arcos gave

details of his Government's proposals in a speech:

"We want to put an end to the practice of extra-territoriality in our country,· in keeping \'lith our dignity as a sove­reign republic and in keeping \vi th the the developments of. our times. By mutual agreement, we are now ready to enter into negotiations \vith the u.s. on our mutual defence pact, military aid pact and mili­tary bases agreement, we want to assume control of all these bases ·and put them to a productive economic, as well as, mili­tary use. At the same time we are will­ing to enter into arrangerrents that \·rould help the u.s. to maintain an effective presence over the air and sea lanes of the \'lestern Paci fie .... u14

Harcos might have been promptc=d to review the u.s. mili-

tary role in the Phillippines for three reasons.

Firstly, to get friendly towards the communist regimes

of the region, i.e., the People's Republic of China

and the Indochina countries, \'lho could be potential

supporters of the insurgents. .t-·larcos \•Janted to neu-

tralise this as far as he could. Secondly, in the \'lake

of increasing opposition to his regime and to the UoSo

presence, Harcos \vanted to assert his position vis-a-vis

I 14 1I<eesing 1 s Contemcorary Archives, 15-21 September,

!1975, p.27334.

the United states and to shov1 the \vorld that he \•ras

not simply a puppet in.the hands of the Americanso

And ·thirdly, Harcos '"anted to extract as much economic

aid as possible from the Americans.

The Thai Foreign ¥.dnistry announced on 5 Nay

1975 that 7,500 of the 27,000 US troops in Thailand

\'lould be withdrawn before the end of June •. The supreme

command stated on 2 June that 17 B-52 bombers in Thailand

would be 'Vlithdra\m by 6 July and the 31 F-111 fighter

bombers by 15 June, and that the us operations at the

Ubon air base would be immediately discontinuedo

These and other withdrawals left 200 US aircraft in

Thailand, compared 700 or so during the Vietnamese

\>Jar. In a further statement on 3 September, t'be Thai

Supreme Command announced that another 3, 000 us troops

vTould be wi thdrmm by the end of October and that ope­

rations would cease from the Nkhon l?hanom air base. 15

In compliance 'VTith the policy laid dmm by IV"J.r. Kukrit

\'lhen taking office that all us troops must be withdra\m

from Thailand by 20 :t-1arch 1976, the air base at Ubon·

in northeastern Thailand was handed over to the Thai

15 Ibid., p.27336.

government on 31 January and that at Korat on 2 March,

leaving only the Utapao base (on the Gulf of Siam)

sti~l under us control. The Utapao naval station at

Sattahip ''1as turned over to Thai government on 16 15 July 1976. After this date the only us military

personnel remaining in Thailand apart from those

attached to the Embassy and the SEA.'l'O medical research

laboratory '\·zhere 263 members of the Joint u.s. Hilitary

Advisory Group, compared with 48,000 troops manning 93

installations in 1969.

Third most important development in the after- .

math of 1975 developments was the decision about SEATOo

Both Thailand and the Philippines decided to phase out

the military pacto Thai Premier Hr. Pramoj visited

the Philippines on 21-24 July 1975o A joint communique

issued after the talks \'lith Premier Marcos reiterated

their readiness and willingness to enter into friendly ~

and harmonious relationship '\dth each nation in Indo-

china and to cooperate with these countries for stability

.in the region. They also reaffirmed their view that

foreign military bases in the region were temporaryo

They expressed their conviction that their future

relations '\·lith the major powers would continue to be

fruitful and based on mutuality of interests. In line

16 ~l,cok Post, 16 July 1976.

\\lith this view they urged the major powers to contri-

bute·in more positive ways to the development of the

region in order to enhance the common objective of

peace, progress and stability in southeast Asia

Reviffidng the role of SEATO and 11oting that it had

served its purpose commendably the two leaders agreed

in principle that uthe Organization should be phased

out to make it in accord with the new realities in

the region. 17Tun Abdul Razak t·.relcorred the proposal

on 29 July saying that it '\tTould be in line 't.Jith the

concept of freedom, peace and neutrality ~f the region. 18

The t-tinisterial Council of the SE.i'\.TO meeting in Ne'\-r

York on 24 September 1975 decided that the Organization

should be phased out over the next two years, although

the treaty itself would remain in being. A communique

stated that the decision had been taken in view of

changing circumstances in the Southeast-Asia region. 19

Although SE..~To· military activities \'tere drastically

reduced in 1973, the organization continued to support

the internal security of its two regional members -

Thailand and the Philippines.

17 Bangkok Post, 25 July 1975.

18 Ne\'.r Straits Times, 30 July 1975.

19 International Herald Tribune, 25 September 1975.

'

Fourthly, all the ASEhl~ countries expressed their

\4illingness to develop friendly relations \·lith the newly

liberated countries of Indochina. ASEAN as a group

extended recognition to cambodia on 18 April, 1975. 20

The very fact that ASEM~ as a group, and not the indi-

vidual coilsti tuent conn tries, recognized Cambodia \'las a

swgnificant development to forge political unity to

face the ne\<1 situation that cropped up in the region.

The capture of Phnom Penh by Khmer Rouge forces on

17 April 1975 left no hopes as General Lon Nol and

l?is troops surrendred unconditionallyo !•1alaysian

Hinister of Foreign Affairs issued a statement on

18 April on the ASEAN recognition of Cambodia. It

said: 11 In vie\'/ of the developments in Cambodia and

restoration of peace and noting that Royal Government

of National Union of Kampuchea has been established

in Cambodia, ASEAN desirous of promoting goodwill,

friendship and understanding \'lith _cambodia to further

the cause of peace and·stability in Southeast Asia has

agreed to recognize GRUNK as the sole and legal govern­

ment of Cambodia ..... 21 It. further noted that the

ASEAN conntries, consistent \'lith their aims and objec-

20 Bangkok Post, 20 April 1975.

21 Asian Almanac, 5 July 1975, p.7108.

tives and previous pronouncements, stand ready to extend

cooperation tm11ard the relief of hardship and for the

reconstruction and rehabilitation of cambodia and expre­

ssed its \villingness to cooperate v.1ith GRUNK in its

efforts to bring progress and prosperity. The instant

AS~~ recognition of Cambodia could be firstly, not to

allow China to have undue leverage over Kampuchea;

secondly f though it was communist party of Cambodia that

was responsible for the victory, Sihanouk still was the

leader , and thirdly, to distance Cambodia from Vietnam.

The ne'"-governrrent under the Prime Ministership of Pham

Van Dong took quick action to improve relations Hith the

other southeast Asian countries establishing diplomatic

relations "'-11th the Philippines and Thailand. The new

government adopted a markedly more friendly attitude towards

the members of the ASEAN tha~ Democratic Republic of Viet­

nam or Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Viet­

nam in the past. The Foreign Hinister Nguyen Duy Trinh,

said in an interview on 5 July that the government was

prepared to establish and develop relations of friendship

and cooperation vlith other Southeast Asian countries on

the basis of the following principles: (i) respect for

each other's independence, sovereignty and territorial

integrity, and non-interference in each other's inter­

nal affairs; (ii) . not allmdng any foreign country

to use one's territory as a base for direct or indirect

aggression or intf-~rvention against the other countries

in the region; (iti) establishment of friendly relations,

economic cooperation and cultural exchanges o~ the busis

of equality and mutual benefit; and (iv) development of

cooperation among the countries in the region for the

building of ·prosperity in keeping \"lith each country• s

specific conditions and for the sake of indepenc:'lence,

peace and genuine neutrality in Southeast Asia. 22 Again

Vietnam outlined its policy tm·rard other countries of

the region in a broadcast. 2 3 Vice-I"'Jinister for

Foreign Affairs, Phan Hien, as an envoy of Premier Pham

Van Dong, led a four member delegation to Halaysia, the

Philippines, Singapore, Indonesia, Bu~, and Laos from

5 to 28 July 1976~ Phan Hien en route from Indonesia

to Burma made an unannounced stopover in Thailand on

20 July. Adam Halik of Indonesia said that his cmmtry

would offer its expertise and training in oil industry

to Vietnam as part of its policy to help restore develoP-

ment of the co\mtryo Halik said he was assured by Phan

Hien that the Socialist Republic of Vietnam would not

export revolution to other countries of southeast Asia. 24

22 23

24

Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 3 September

Asian Almanac, 5 l"J.arch 1977, p. 8112.

Ibid., 2 April 1977, pp.8161-62.

1976, p.27919.

On .ASEAN Phan Hien indicated that Vietnam \'IOUld rather

deal \'lith each ASEAN member coW1t·ry individually. He

also· made it clear time and again that his country \-lould

not sell captured us arms either to the insurgents or to

25 any other country. Foreign ~dnister of Thailand,

Pitchai Rattakul, told Phan Hien to cooperate \>Tith the

ASEAN as a group rather than individually. Vietnam

found it difficult to discard its criticism of ASEAN

that it \·las an imperialist creation to co~tain conunu-

nism with military objectives. By then Thailand ~ .. tas

the only country in ASEAN which did not have diplomatic

relations \•lith Vietnam. Hanoi radio broadcast a letter

dated 5 July 1976 by Minister of Foreign Affairs of

Vietnam to Pitchai inviting him for ·talks. It

said that 11with regard to Thafland, the Vietnamese

side has on many occasions pointed in the past to hold-

talks on basic principles to normalize relations between

the countries 11•26

To counter Vietnam's earlier stand that ASEAN

\~s basically for military cooperation, and to forge I

' itself in a unified fashion and to review the situation

25 Ibid., p.8162, also Ne"t York Times, 1 r-Jay 1977 o

26 Asian Almanac, 26 February 1977, p.8109

in the light of ne\-r developments, a surrrnit of ASEAN member

states was held in February 1976. ASEAN Heads of Govern-

ment met in Bali, Indonesia, and declared that ASEAN was

not meant to replace SEATO but was aimed at achieving

meaningful cooperation of peaceful coexistence in south-

east Asia. This summit meeting was significant.not only

because the .i~SEAN Heads of State met for the first time

but they also decided to 11 improve the ASEAl'l machinery

to strengthen political cooperation amongst membersu and

11 strengthening of political solidarity by prom<?ting har-

monization of views, coordinating positions and, \<!here

. bl d d . bl t 1 • t. . « 2 7 poss~ e an es1ra e a(~ng common ac 1ons o ! ... t the

same meeting in the Treaty of Arrdty and Cooperation in

southeast Asia, under Article 18, a brief but politically

significant mention was made, which says: "It (.4\.SEAI.\f)

shall be open for accession by other states in southeast

Asia 11, 28 \-rith an obvious reference to the communist

regime~ in Indochina. Quoi Nahn Dhan (Vietnam Army Daily)

commented, that 11 moun:ting of the ASEAN as part of its

(the United states) scheme of intervention and aggression

against comnunist governments in Southeast Asia"; also

27 AS&\N Concord, see Annexure-III.

28 ASEA1'1 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in southeast, See Appendix.

Vietnam accused Indonesia as a regional policeman and

others as u.s. lackeys. 29 Despite the assurances

doubts persisted in the minds of newly liberated Indo-

china countries about the objectives of calling ASEAN

summit meeting imm~diately after the war in inactive

Vietnam, because ASEA.N had been more or less inactive

for over a decade and not much progress was made

toward economic cooperation which it was meant foro

The Bali summit also discussed the security aspects. 30

Vietnam demanded that ASEA}l countries, if they wanted

to be truly independent, should come out of the American

influence and Hithdra'\-1 all military facilities of the

~-iest. The Government of North Vietnam also made a

statement that it \·rould support all insurgency move-

ments in the non-communist coUntries of Southeast Asiao

The Prime ~linister of Malaysia, Datwc Hussein bin Onn,

on 6 March 1976 described the above statement as "very

regret.table 11, and that ASEAJ.~ had no intention of what-

f f i 'l't bloc. 31 soever o orm ng a rru. J. ary

29 New Straits Times, 26 February 1976o

30 See Appendix for Bali Swnrnit Deciarati9n.

' 31 Ne\" Straits Times, 8 March 1976.

The Fifth Conference of Non-~ligned nations in

Colombo, Sri Lanka, which \oTas held betv1een 16 and 19

August 1976 '\<Jitnessed the first confrontation bet\'.Teen

the communist and the non-communist countries of south-

east Asia. Pharo van Dong told the conference: "\'le

support the Southeast Asian peoples in their efforts

to achieve genuine independence, peace and neutrality

and, on the basis of four prit~iples put forward

. \ recently, '\ore are prepared to develop relatJ.ons of

friendship and cooperation in many fields with our

neighbours in the region ••• 32 On 18 August, three.

ASEAN non-aligned members, Indonesia, Halaysia, and

Singapore opposed a Lao move to insert.an anti-

American passage into a declaration on the creation

of a zone of peace in southeast Asia. 33

But efforts to establish diplomatic relations

'ltiith Thailand and friendlier relations with other !

countries did not stop on the part of Vietnam, through-

out 1976 Vietnam pursed an active diplomacy to'\'Iard the

ASEAN countries. But Vietnam declined an invitation

32 Times of India, 18 August 1976.

33 Asian Almanac, 9 April 1976, p.8168.

to join Asruu~. 34 A14-member Thai delegation led by the

Minister for Foreign Affairs, ?itchai Rattakul,

visited Laos and Vietnam bet\'leen 31 July and 6 August

1976, and the governments of Thailand and Vietnam deci-

ded to establish diplomatic relations and exchange

representatives at. ambassadorial level. 35 'l'he Viet-

namese Foreign ~linister, Nguyen Duy Trinh, on a visit

to Laos expressed deep desire to develop friendlier

ties with .ASEAN on the basis of 11 non-aggression

against each other and not letting their respective

countries to be used by any foreign country as a

direct or indirect bases of ag0ression or intervention

against other countries". 36 Since the end of 1977 Vietnam

positively and ''-'armly responded. to the gestures of the

AS~~ countries for betterment of relations. Vietnam

took a nwnber of measures tm"ard this end. The Deputy

Hinister of Foreign Trade, Nguyen Chanh, visited t~'.talaysia,

the Philip];>ines and Indonesia· in November 1977. Vietnam

and Thailand agreed to normalise relations in Decembero

34 Asian Recorder, 21-27 Nay 1977, p.l3756.

35 see for full text, Asian Al~anac, 26 March 1977 1

pp.8145-48.

36 The ?indu, 31 December 1977.

Again the Vietnamese Foreign i1Unister paid an official

visit to N.alaysia on 3-6 January 1978, to the Phili­

ppin~p on 6-9 , and 'thailand on 9-12 si9ning various

trade and technical cooperation agreements.

l·lith the increasing tension on the border with

Kampuchea, Vietnam sought closer relations \-lith the

AS&l}l probably to isolate Kampuchea in the region.

The Deputy Foreign ~tinister, Phan Hien, told on

4 July 1978 that, Vietnam has to take steps to protect

itself in the present circumstances~ ... (and) the \-ray

the situation is developing it is necessary for us to

be prepared for an emergency ... 37 Probably this "'as

the first hint by the Vietnamese authorities to face

any eventuality. He also made clear that Vietnam

sincerely wanted to develop friendly relations .with

the ASEAN, Japan, '·vestern· Europe, and the United states.

l'n1ile pruisin.g the ?oviet Union for its relentless

support and socialist help, he said that the People's

Republic of China had not assisted "much" and had

stopped aid for t"\>TO to three years. Asked about

previous Vietnamese accusations that there was no

real independence in some ASEAN countries, he said:

37 Asian Almanac, 4 November 1978, p.9121e

11 '£hese are misWlderstandings, we have never had such a

vie\'1 11 0

38 The VietnarrEse l?rirre Hinister Pham van Dong

accompanied by l'd.nister of Foreign •rrade, Dang Viet

chau, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Phan B~ien, and

the Vice-Minister at the Prime N.inister•s office, Hoang

Quo Dqng, visited Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia,

!-1alaysia, and Singapore during September-October 1978o

Pham in his long sojourn to all the ASEAN capitals,

first went to Bangkok, the immediate neighbour. Durin9

his stay from 6th to lOth September, Pharo and his counter-

part, Gen. I<riangsak signed a nUillber of agreements of co-

operation. Speaking after the fare\~11 to Pharo, Gen.

Kriangsak said that Pham• s remark that Vietnam would

not support the Conununist insurgents in Thailand \vas

the first such utterance ever made any "Y1here in the

\-Jorld. Similarly, l?ham visited the Philippil'les (16-20

September), Indone.sia {20-23 September), Halaysia

(12-16 October), and Singapore (16-17 October) and

signed a number of bilateral agreements. At all these

places the Zone of Peace idea in Southeast Asia \-.'aS

discussed and agreed to vealise it to maintain stabi­

lity in the region. 39 This was a great diplomatic

success of Pham and he was able to isolqte Kampuchea

38 Ibid.

39 For details of talks and agreements signed, see Asian Almanac, December 1978, Pl·'•9188-94.

in the region. He might have tried to convince the

ASEAN leaders that it was Kampuchea \'lhich 't'Ias disturb-

ing. peace in southeast Asia supported by China. But

the Vietnamese a~tion in Kampuchea in the end of 1978

and beginning of 1979 and su~sequent toppling of Pol . Pot completely ruptured the well nurtured relations

between Vietnam and the ASEAN. For the last six

years though Vietnam tried its best but could not

make much head\>Jay to improve the relations "rith the

ASElJN, and it may not be possible before a political

solution t~ Kampuchea problem is foundo

The situation inside Kampuchea during 1976-77

remained obscure, as virtually no outsider \'las allowed

into the country and movements of foreign diplo~ts

were restricted. The only source of information to

the outside \vorld \·!as through the refugees who managed

to cross the ~orders iuto Vietnam and Thailando Pol

Pot, \rlho had been the Prime Hinister since April 1975,

had resigned on 27 September 1976 for health reasons • .

For one year nothing was heard about Pol Pot, but on

28 September 1977 it \rTas announced that the Prime

~tinister Pol Pot was leaving for a visit to China. on

the occassion of the· 11 Seventeenth Anniversar4"0of the

Communist Party of Kampuchea on 27 September 1977 1

Pol Pot made a five-hour speech to 10,000 representa-

tives of the government, the party, and the cooperativeso

This Has the first occassion. on which the Comnunist

Party•s existence and the fact that Pol Pot was its

Secretary, had officially been revealed. Pol Pot

began by saying: 110n the occasion of this year's cele-

brations of the 17th Anniversary of the founding of

our communist Party of Kampuchea to the nation and the

international arena ••• u, \'lithout explaining '\o~hy its

existence had been kept secret even after it had taken

over the pm-rer. He stated that the first national

congress of the Commuhist Party of Kampuchea \'las held

in secret in Phnom Penh bet\ITeen 30 September ·and

2 October 196o. 41 Pol Pot's speech confirmed the

reports that the Kampuchean government \ttas pursuing a

more radical policy of collectivization and the forma-

tion of com-nunes \'/here private property in land and

use of money \ITas said to have been completely abolishedo

These radical measurc.=.:s imposed on the people \rd thout any

previous ~•perience had severe side effectse A Yugoslav

-------------40 It implies that the Communist ?arty of Kampuchea

\·.ras formed in 1960, according to Pol Pot.

41 David Chandler, 11Kampuchea Communist Party's Birth­day", Pacific Affairs, vol.86,nOo 1, Surruner 1983, pp.288-300. For excerpts of Pol Pot's speech, see I<eesing• s Cont;_emporary Archives, 3 February 1978, pp.28805-06.

broadc~st ·of 2 December 1977 repprted the Kampuchean

Deputy Premier 1 Ieng Sary 1 as having explained:· "lfnat

\-Je \'lant is to create something that never v1as before

history. No model exists for \·That we are building.

He are not imitating either the Chinese or Vietnamese

modelo l·le are pursuing radical transformation of the

country 1 with agriculture as the base. l'li th revenues

from agriculture we are building industry which is to

serve the development of agriculture 11 • 42 Border skir­

mishes vJith Vietnam along with the radical internal

measures further widened the differences bet\>leen Viet-

nam and Kampuchea.

1978 \vas significant in fo_:menting the polariza­

tion in the politics of Indochina; and southeast Asia

subsequently. The trouble that started between Vietnam

and Kampuchea in 1977 took a serious turn by the middle

of 1978 and decidedly the cotmtries started moving

closer to the two socialist camps resulting in the

break of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

There was also a marked change in their attitude tmmrd

· other countries in Southeast Asia. Vietnam, despite

its closeness with the Soviet Union did not close the

42 Ibid.

options of maintaining friendlier relations with the

ASElJ.~ countries. Though Vietnam was cri·tical of the

AS~i.-J and its objectives, it mello\lled do"m to a co:::l-

siderable extent as the tension mounted along the

border Hith Kampuchea. lfuile Ieng Sary, the then

Foreign I~nister of Kampuchea said that his co~~try

11 is determined not to join any regional association

or to be an ally of any country11• 43

The border clashes between Vietnam and Kampuchea

\·Thich had occurred at intervals almost since the end

of Indochina \var in 1975, developed into serious fight-

ing in 1977. The origin of the Vietnam-Kampuchea

border conflict could be traced back to the French

colonial days which left many Vietnamese and the Kampu-

cheans on the wrong side of the border demarcations.

The border clashes that started during the end of 1976

and beginning of 1977 betvreen Vietnam and Cambodia

intensified gradually. 11 Parr.ot Beak" was the place of '

bitter fighting because of its strategic importance,

as it was to the Americans. 44 11Border clashes, mostly

provoJced by Cambodia, occurred along the frontier on

an ever increasing scale during 1977 11•45

43 1\lainchi Daily News, 7 December 1976.

44 !-1arian Kirsch Leighton, "Prospects on the Vietnam­Cambodia Border Conflict 11

I ~ian survex, vol 0 18, no.5, .t1ay 1978, p.448.

45 Ibid.

Ultimately on 31 December 1977 Kampuchea brok.e

off diplomatic relations '\·lith Vietnam. 46 Though not

much information was available to the outside \<lorldo

fighting, continued throughout 1978o Significuntly,

Vietnam offered to negotiate to end the conflict.

In the rreantime ASEAN maintaining a neutralist posi-

tion appealed to both Kampuchea and Vietnam to settle

the issue amicably. 47 In the first week of January

1978 the ambassadors of respective coWltries '\-tere '\-tith-

dra\mo Prince Sihanouk on 4 January 1978 expressed

his complete SUPl~rt for the Kampuchean Goven1ment 8 s

position. 48 Throughout 1978 the Vietnamese largely

remained defensive repelling the attacks of Kampuchea

and at the same time inflicted heavy losses on Kampu­

chea. on 3 December 1978 Vietnam announced the setting

up of liberation front with 14 people in its Central

Collr:littee called Kampuchean Liberation Front for

National Salvation {KNU~~S) headed by Heng samrin. 49

46 Sunday Times, 1 January 1978.

47 Bangkok Post, 1 January 1978.

48 Ibid., 5 January 1978.

49. Ibid., 4 December l978o.

This \~s a decisive step by Vietnam to remove Pol ~ot

from power, and by 7 January 1979 the Front forces

\·lith sup1Jort from the Vietnamese forces successfully

captured almost all the provinceso This action by

Vietnam s1~rked off sharp reactions from the ASEAN

countries who strongly felt that their securities

"Vrould be under serious threat.

On 12 January 1979 the Foreign Ministers of Singa-

pore, Halaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines fle\-1 to

Bangkok for an emergency meeting of Foreign Hinisters

of ASE.W. They promised to support any 11 recruests and

measures 11 made by Thailand. ~rime Minister Kriangsak,

after private discussions \'lith all the Foreign t-linis-

ters of ASillUq, said, that all the ASID~q ministers were

unanimous in adopting a common stand. 50 On 13 January

the Foreign Ninisters of ASEAN called for an irrmediate

and total withdrawal of foreign forces from Kampuchea.

They declared that the Kampucheans should determine

"\,, their O\m future 11 free from interference or influence '

51 from outside pO\oJersn. The resolution was primarily

directed at the United Nations Security Council debate

50 Banokok Post, 13 January 1979.

51 Bangkok Post, 14 January 1979.

and did not imply that ASIDU~ might take joint action

against Vietnam. Rajaratnam, the Foreign Minister

of !iinga,?Ore, '\oJho a::ted as spokesman said: 11 'i·.fe Hant to

be friends with Vietnam, but ''e \>lant Vietnam to re-

assure us. This statement is a request to Hr. Pharn

Van Dong, an appeal to Nr. Pharn Van Dong, to restore

his credibility.u 52 Asked vlhat ASEAl\l would do if

Vietnam refused the request, Rajaratnam noted

the current debate in the u.N. security Council and

said, "it is question of '\.Yhat the U.N. vdll do 11• In

an interview published in Jakarta on 17 January 1979,

the Vietnamese a~Jassador, . Tran My, announced that

his country was 11Willing to have talks on a bilateral

or multilateral basis with AS&~ member countries in

the efforts to find peace and stability in Southeast

A • II 53 s~a • Giving a detailed account of events that led

·to Vietnam's move in Kampuchea, he stated that Vietnam

had offered a peaceful settlement through negotiations

on 6 June 1978 \'lhich was rejected by Pol Pot Government.

He also stated, that the second peace proposal through

the United Nations '\'las also rejected. 54

52 Ibid.

53 New Straits Times, 18 January 1979 ..

54 Ibid.

&:38

China launched on 17 February a punitive expedi-

tion against Vietnam to teach a lesson for its action

in -Kampuchea. China and Vietnam share 700 miles of

com!";1on border, although there ,.,.ere differences over

the actual sites of borde.r markings, it never created

serious rift between them. In addition to land bounda-

ries, Vietnam was at odds over the decision of terri-

torial jurisdiction in the Gulf of Tonkin bet\•reen

seacoast of North Vietnam and China • s Hain·an islandso 55

I

China • s attack gre"r over a series of policies Vietnam

adopted since the beginning of 1978 ,.,.hich, the Chinese

thought, were purposefully against China and its inte-

rests in southeast Asia. The Hanoi decision to clamp

do\>m on the private business \·lhich \VclS by and large

controlled by the Chinese in South Vietnam severely

affected them. Even after three years of liberation

the government could not control effectively the private

sector according to its needs. The Second Five-Year Plan,

initiated in 1976 \.ms to be implemented and if government

wanted effective control over distribution of essential

55 For Chinese version of the border dispute, see 11 1'-1emorandum On Vice-Premier Li Xinnian• s Talks with Premier Pham Van Dong, 11 Beijing Revie\'1, June 10, 1977, Beijing Revie"'' 30 March 1979, pp.17-22.

goods, especially agri~ultural products, it t<~as indis­

pensable for a socialist planning to get rid of private

businesso At that time under those circumstances in

south Vietnam "I-:tanoi • s decision was both ideologically

correct and politically necessaryu. 56 secondly, there

had.been a lingering suspicion that the Chinese who

formed the main comprodore bourgeois and capitalists

were basically anti-revolutionary. Prob~bly because

of Vietnam's close political proximity with c~ina during

the liberation t·rar, Vietnam did not contemplate any

serious action against the ethnic Chinese in Vietnamo

Thirdly, as China had already sided with Kampuchea in

the Vietnam-Kampuchea _dispute, there \ttas no need to \>TOO

the Chinese in Vietnam to get sympathy from the People's

Republic of China. The open quarrel bett,een Vietnam

and China broke out in t-1arch 1978 \~Then Vietnam launched

its collectivisation programme in ~he south, thus. affect­

ing the Chinese. The decrees issued in ~~reb 1978·demo­

netized the private.property, and confiscated the inven-

tories. These measures along t-Ti th de-urbanization hit

the ethnic Chinesemen and traders \~Jbo started the

56 Nguyen Manh Hung, "Sino-Vietnamese Conflict: Pm'ler Play Among Communist Neighbours", Asian survey, vol.l9, no.ll, November 1979, p.l043.

57 exodus. Vietnam claimed the Chinese subversion of

the Vietnan~se Hoa (Chinese in Vietnam) popul~tion

thus depriving Vietnam of a productive, energetic,

potential population. The crackdown on the ethnic

Chinese by the Vietnamese authorities in the south

resulted in the exodus of Chinese to the neiuhbouring

58 countries. In H.ay 1978 China cancelled t'\orenty one

aid projects in Vietnam, and on 13 July, five days

after Vietnam joined Council for l4utual Economic Aid

(CNF..A), an exclusive economic grouping of the Soviet

~nion and East European countries, Beijing cancelled

all aid to Vietnam and recalled the experts working so

in that cotmtry. J Significantly, the Chinese leaders

kept quiet about Pol Pot's repression of the Kampu-

chcan Chinese.

The developments in Indochina after 1975 were

due to their o\m ma1dng by Kampuchea and Vietnam '\tthich

enabled the outside powers to intervene directly or

57 Far E9stern Economic Review, 15 June 1979, p.21.

58 For details about the noat people, see zakari Haji Ahmad, 11Vietnamese Refugees and ASEAN 11

, Contemoo­~v southeast Asia, vol.l 11 no.1, May 1979 11

pp.66-74.

59 ~-straits Times, 19 July 1978.

indirectly. Th,e genocidal re.gime of Pol Pot had to

bear the responsibility for the present situa~ion.

Th~ increasing repression and massacre of population

by Pol Pot, including the Vietnamese in Kampuchea,

and in order to cover up the frustration of the

people and to divert attention of the people, the

Phnom Penh leadership resorted to border conflict

with Vietnam. As this border conflict could not be

settled through negotiations it gave leverage for

major powers to interfere and take sides. Vietnam

did not C0'\·1 dmm to t~e pres sun~s of the Chinese

leadership to take anti-USSR position, China vlithdrew

its aid and actively supported Kampucheao The Soviet

Union v.'hich had been trying to get a foot-hold in that

region found an excellent opportunity in the Vietnam-

Kampuchea conflict. Starved of aid to rebuild the

war ravaged economy, Vietnam vias left '\vith no option

~ut to turn to the Soviet Union. Vietnam's position, Asi~-

and also of the Soviet Union in theiPac~fic region,

would have been very precarious if China were to go

ahead 'lrlith its plans •. The already blooming friendship

of China and the United States was further boosted

when China and Japan signed a treaty, ''lith an anti­

hegemony clause obviously aimed at the Soviet Union~ 60

60 Article-II, Sino-Japan Treaty, November 1978, see Asian Recorder, 17-23 September 1978, for full text.

Z4Z

China openly advocated for the presence of the United

states including its military bases in the Phili-

ppines. Just after three months of Sino-Japanese

Treaty in November 1978 Vietnam signed a Friendship

Treaty \vith the soviet Union, vrhich was the logical

outcorre of those regional and international circum­

stances. The culmination of Indochina's turmoil came

to an end in December 1978 \dth the military inter­

feren~e by Vietnam and toppling of the Pol Pot

regime in January 1979.

After straining its relations \'lith Albania over

Vietnam-Kampuchea conflict (Albania supported Vietnam),

China lost probably the only socialist supporter, that

\<Ia s the Pol Pot regime. Hi th the increasing friendship

with the u.s. there was every possibility that the

communist parties of Southeast Asia might lose faith

because of China's attitude toward the United States1

which is .considered number one enemy of communism, and

this changed attitude of China might ensue in splits

and formation of pro-Vietnam and pro-Soviet groups.

China's efforts to keep away the Soviet Union failed,

and,in fact there were reports that Vietnam offered

temporary military facilities in Cam Ranh Bay naval

base and Danang air base, earlj.er vacated by the Americans.

For the soviet Union it was certainly a breakthrough,

for in the \-lhole of Asia-Pacific region it did not

have a sing~e base excepting patrolling ships in the

Pacific and Indian Oceans, thus breaking the monopoly

of the US-Japan - South Korea-Australia defence linJc 61 up. _ It was extremely important for the Soviet Union

to secure some hold in Southeast Asia. Its position

would be highly vulnerable if it were to face any

contingency in the Asia-Pacific region with slow

movement of ships from vulnerable northern Europe

or Black sea ports, a distance equal to halfway around

the '\>TOrld. There vms the possibility of the U.So

bottling up of the Soviet fleet in the Sea of Okhotsk

in a war and thus establishing a u.s. bastion of

regional supremacy in Northeast Asia and batter the

forces of the USSR.

Concorrmi ttant \-lith the Treaty of Friendship and

Cooperation, .Hoscow has been providing huge amounts of

aid to Vietnam. In the late 1979 the Soviet Union ~ms

estimated to be providing nearly 30 per cent of Viet-

nam•s rice and other vital commodities like Petroleum,

chemical fertilizers and spare parts for Vietnam's

transport system. C~mA has provided preferential

61 Sheldon ~v. Simon, "China, Vietnam and ASEAN: The Politics of Polarisation 11

, Asian Survey, vol.XIX, na.12, December 1979, p.1175.

exchange rates for intra-block trade. 62 Along \·lith

this the Soviet Union is the only military aid giver

to Vietnam. Simultaneously Vietnam's trade Hith the·

Soviet Union also increased rapidly. The Soviet Union

crediting itself as the sole fighter against American

imperialism, could capitalize on the above policies

of the Communist Party of China, in spreading its

influence among the insurgents in the ASEAN countries.

China in its opposition to the soviet Union has

openly advocated for a strQng American presence in

Southeast Asia to the delight'of the ASEAN countrieso

In fact the present China's leadership urged the ASEAN

leaders to becorre a part of a "joint front u against

the USSR. Nore importantly China lost face \'I hen it

could not protect the Pol Pot regime. The ASEAN coun-

tries have ah;ays been suspicious of the Chinese.

~~laysia and Indonesia have openly expressed their

apprehensions over the increasing role of the PRC in

Southeast Asian affairso They prefer a strong Vietnam

as a counterweight to Chinese influence. Only Thailand

has so far taken an outright pro-Beijing position,

probably due to its OYm internal conditions and change

in pO\·ter relationship.

62 Douglas Pike, "The USSR and Vietnam: Into the swamp", Asian survey, vol.XIX, ~ 12, December 1979, pp.l193-66.

In order to reduce the Thai communist party's

activities it '·las tactically necessary for Thailand

to be pro-China, for the corrmunist party in Thailand

is pro-China. In the early 1980s the communist insur-

gent activities are at ·their lowest since 1960s in

Thailand. In June 1981, the communist ~arty of

Thailand openly appealed to Bangkok for joint efforts 4 "63 against the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea. The

ASEAN leaders are complacent that Vietnam ''~OUld not

attempt an armed intervention in Thailand for various

reasons, like: (i) Vietnam has already over-extel}.ded

its capacity: {ii) historically, Vietnam's influence

never extended beyond Indochina; and {iii) there

are no effective insurgent fronts on the lines of

Kampuchean Front for National Salvation.

"The Foreign Hinistet of the Socialist Republic I

of Vietnam, Phan Hien, during a visit to Jakarta, cate-

gorically stated that there was no benefit in exporting

revolutions than rice, lumber, coal etc., to the .ASEAN

countries. 64 Also, as early as 8 July 1975, such ASEAN

63 Bangkok Post, 12 June 1981.

64 Justus van der Kroef, 11ASEA.H Security and DeveloP­ment: Some Paradoxes and Synfuels", Asian Affairs, vol.IX, part-II, June 1978, p.l44.

leaders as ~~laysia's Premier Tunku Abdul Razak cate-

gorically declared that the cormmni st regimes in Indo-

chiqa posed no threat to Southeast Asia, and even

mooted tlw idea of their entry into ASEAN. 6·5 Vietnam

showed positive gestures that it was more interested

in its economic developll}ent than anything else. In

fact the Vietnam-AS~~ relations were poised for a

1'1arm beginning in 1978, but the later developments

marred the relations.

Although the ASEAN countries shmred enough unity

to react to the developments in Indochina, one could

see a degree of di:Eference, if not division, ~f percep-

tions. Perhaps Indonesia and Halaysia might acce.r*- a

broader coalition of the current Heng samrin regime in

order to reduce the tensions in the region and possibly

to minir:Uze the influence of both the Soviet Union and

China in Southeast Asia. 'rhe opposite viel'T, held most

strongly by Thail<;md, and Singapore, is that Hanoi

would eventually compromise if international pressure

is mounted through the UN, if anti-Vietnam forces are

65 Justus van der Kroef, "The Cambodian Problem in Southeast Asia's ·strategic Consideration", .Asian Profile,· .April 1980, p.l86.

given sanctuary along the Thai border and actively

sup)orted, if ecoaomic aid is denied to Vietnam, and

if threat of second China attack is sustained. This

\'las evident from the reactions of various countri~s

66 since the Vietnamese intervention in Kampuchea.

The first official statement by the Indonesian chair­

man of ASEAN standing Committee on 9 January i979

was vague and mild, merely expressing strong regret

at the escalation of conflict, but not criticizing

or naming Vietnam. 67 Four days later the ASEAN ·

Foreign Ministers issued a stronger stutement deploring

a1~ed intervention and demanding withdrawal of foreign

troops, still not naming Vietnam. 68 But by the time of

the Bali Foreign I··Iinisters Conference in June the posi-

tion had hardened and the lines of division \'/ere broaden­

ing bet\·Teen ASEAN and Hanoi. 69 It \'ras proba.ble that the

United States, and China through the u. N l-Tould have put

66 Leszek Berzynsk:i., "Vietnam• s ASEAN Diplomacy: Incentives for Change" I \•Torld Today, vol.40, noo 1, January 1984, pp.29-30o

67 J.A.C. Mackie, 11 Southeast Asia in 1979: A Polltical overview 11

, Southeast Asian Affairs 1980, (Year Book of the Institu·te of Southeast Asian studies, Singa­pore),· pp.3-5. Also ~ee, Bangkok Post, 10 January 1979.

68 Bangkok Post, 14 January 1979.

69 see, ASEAN Foreign Ninisters l\leeting, Bali,29-30 June 1979. Asian Recorder, pp.15107.

pressure to harden the ASEAN attitude to,.rord Vietnam.

Broadly,· Singapore was the most outspoken anti-Vietnam

(and anti-Sovi,:=t) while trying not to appear pro-Chinao

The Thais gradually took a pro-China and pre-Pol Pot

position. Indonesia took the most tolerunt view of

Vietnam's actions of all the ~~EAN countries and

appeared to be rather suspicious of China•s longterm

objectives, but it too moved to a harder line later

on keeping in line with the ASEAN. ~~laysia and the

Philippines took an intennediate _position, sounding

more accorrmodative than confrontative. The collec-

tive response to Vietnam's intervention constituted

a strategy of attrition designed to place breaking

strain on the government and society of Vietnam. The

initial expectations were that Vietnam would be vulnerable

to pressures because it was economically weak, had obliga-

tions in Laos, and had overreached itself in I<ampucheao

Such a strategy ''~ould mean: "For China, Vietnam would

be cut dmm to size. and repent of its role of serving

Soviet global interests, for Thailand, an interposing

buffer would be reinstated bet'tveen itself and Vietnam,

and for the United States, a regional proxy of the soviet '

Union ~s co~tained". 70 ' .

70 Leszek Buszynski, "'I'he· Balance of .Advantage in Indochina", Horld Today, vol.38, m6, June 1982, p.233.

-J T'he first contact between Vietnam and ASEAN 'l.·las

established in October 1979. Hhile visiting Bangkok

for a conference of the U.N. Economic and Social comni-

ssion for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), Nguyen co 'l'hach,

the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, on 19 October

1979 handed Gen. Kriangsak a letter from Premier Pharo

Van Do~g expressing his desire to promote friendly

relations with Thailand. At their meeting Gen .. Kriangsak

and Nguyen agreed that all problems between them should be

resolved through diplomatic channelsa 71 At a press con-

ference Nguyen ruleq out the Vietnamese army invading

Thailand or crossing the border in pursuit of P,ol Pot

su~porters. He told the Vietnam's troops had entered

Kampuchea previously on two occasions, during the '1.-lar

against the French, and again against the .~ericanso JL~d

on all occasions had \vithdr~nm imnediately after the vic­

tory. He said that the Vietnamese entered Kampuchea for

a third time because of "aggression and threats of aggre-

ssion by China against, the three Indochina states", -and

72 'l.vould 'l.vithdraw -v1hen the aggression ceased. The Foreign

71 Banokok Post, 20 October 1979.

72 Bangkok Post, 21 October 1979.

Hinisters of ;"scAN \vho met in Kuala Lwnpur on 14 Decem-

ber 1979, agreed that Tengu Ahmad Rithauddeen, the

lv'J.alaysian Foreign Ninister, should visit Hanoi and

indicated that ASE.l\.N \vas prepared to have a dialogue

\'lith Vietnam. 73 Rithauddeen visited Hanoi and had

talks \-.rith the leaders of Vietnam but nothing concrete

came out of it. In the meamvhile the Indochina coun-

tries launched bitter attack on China that the nchinese

expansionists and hegemonists are the direct and most

dangerous enemy of the three Indochina countries and a

dangerous enemy of peace, national independence and

social progress in Southeast Asia ... 74 Vietnam offered

to talk with the ASEAN countries about Kampuchea and

the bilateral relations. The proposal for non-aggre-

ssion pact was rejected by. the Thai Government on

10 June 198o.75 President Sw1arto, who visited ~~lay-

sia on 26-27 Narch 1980 held talks \iith Datuk. Hussein

./13 Ne'" Straits Times, 15 De<~:ember 1979. See ASEAN Foreign Ministers Special Neeting, Kuala Lwnpur, 14-15 December 1979.

74 Bangkok Post, 4 April 1980.

75 Bangkok Post, 11 June 1980.

be easier if both China and the Soviet Union ended

their involvement in Southeast ~sia and Vietnam. 76

Datuk Hussein bin Onn subsequently visited Singapore

on 12-13 Nay to ~ave talks Hith the Prime I'linister,

Lee Kuan Ye'\ITo He told a press conference that there

had been 11 certain changes" in Vietnam• s vie\vs on a

solution to Kampuchea without giving much details. 77

Since the beginning it '\'las obviou's that the

military solution '\·las not possible even if China

participated actively, and ASEaN '\~s not prepared

for that. Even the Americans supported China's

position in the United Nations undermining the ASEAN's

. 't. 78 pos~ ~on. The United States has its m~Tn global

interests. The soviet threat put fo.rward by the us

and China is an exaggeration and this \otould probably

aggravate the tension creating problems for the ASEAN.

The Soviet threat would be convenient for the Americans

to justify the selling of sophisticated arms to its

allies in the region, and can put more pressure on

76 New Straits Times, 28 ~~rch 1980.

77 New Straits Times, 14 May 1980. Angst

78 Bernard K. Gordon, "ASEAN/and American Policy", Foreign PolicY,. rQ47, sumner 1982, p.51.

Japan to spend more on defence though some of the ASEAN

countries do not share this vievr. The soviet Union is

justified Hhen it said • : 11 It is an open secret that

the Soviet Union is the only great pol-ter that did not

fight in vTars in Southeast Asia, and it threatens no

one there". 79 Noscow also accused China that it never

positively responded to a call by Indochina states for

a non-aggression pact and peacef~l co-existenceo And,

the u.s. and China • s support to Pol Pot \'Ia s only to

perpetuate the tension in the region. Moreover,

given the nature of Vietnamese nationalism, the Soviet

military foothold may not take deep roots. Under the

present circumstances of dip matic isolation and

pressure by the United States, China, and ASEAN, Viet-r.

nam ,has. no choice but to depend on the Soviet Union. ,.r

)

China has got its 0\ffi interests in per_I::)etuating the :- '

' Kampuchean st9lemate. Firstly, only an unresolved

Kampuchean problem.weuld give China an increased role

in the southeast Asian ~~airs, especially in Thailand,

while other .ASEAN countries are alt-rays suspicious of

China. Secondly, Kampuchean problem would be ideal for

China to develop its realations Hith the ASF..Al..\1 countries,

79 N. Isayev, "Peace and Security for Southeast .Asian, International Affairs (HoscovT), m 8, J'\U:gust 1982, p.17o Also, see, Bhabani sen Gupta, So~i~Sian Relations in 1970s and Beyond {Ne\•T York,· 1976) , p.205.

because still Indonesia an? Singapore do not have

formal diplomatic relations v!ith China.,

The Indochina countries pro1~scd that Kampuchea

and 'l'hailand should establish "a demili tarizec1 zone

in the border areas bet,'l'een the t\·lo colll1tries, set

up a joint comnission to implement agreements gua­

ranteeing peace and stability in border areas and

agree upon a form of international control 11 , ,.,hich

Has dismissed by Thailand on 19 July 1980, as a

11 a political track aimed at luring 'l'hailand .into

negotiating "':Tith Hen<] Samrin Government 11 .. 80 ASEAN

also proposed an alternate plan for the establish-

ment of demilttarized zones 11 on the Kampuchean side 11

of the border \<lhich \!Tas obviously not acceptable to

the Vietnamese on the grot.md that the plan \'las inten­

ded to cover the infiltration of rebels into Kampuchea

from Thailand. Nguyen Co Thach and Air .t-·iarshal Siddhi

Savetsila met for talks in New York -on 1 October, but

failed to reach any agreement. Again the General

Assembly of the United Nations rejected on 14 October

1900 a proposal not to recognize the Khmer Rouge dele-

80 Bangkok Post, 20 July 1980 ..

gation' s credentials - by 75 votes to 35; \·rith 32

abstentions. 81 In the meantirre the ASEAN countries

sought the cooperation of China in broadening the

anti-Vietnamese front to include the nationalist and

anti-communists and to make Prince Sihanouk as the

head of the front. Singapore Prine N.inister, l·ee

Kuan Yew, \V'ho visited Beijing on 11-14 November

1980, stated that China \•!as not seeking tor estore the

Khmer Rouge Government and agreed that the Kampuchean

people shoul,d be free to decide their o·wn future

without intimidation by the Khmer Rouge or any armed

82 forces.

The basic difference of approach by A.SEAN and

Vietnam '\rrclS tr1at while the AS&~N countries \vant a

complete \-Iithdrawal prior to a politipal solution,

Hanoi maintains that its military presence was due

to threat from China. The Foreign f·tinister of Viet­

nam said in Kuala Lumpur, that the presence of

.Australia and Ne\V' zealand troops in Singapore and

Malaysia under the Five Power Defence Arrangement

vras violation of ASEAN' s Zone of Peace, Freedom and

81 Ne\·-1 Straits Times, 15 October 1980.

82 Ne\v Straits Times, 16 November 1980.

Neutrality concept, although these troops did not

pose any threat to Vietnam. He also said that inter-

vention in Kampuchea \·.ras a moral obligation to express

solioarity. 83 ASEAN has been in dileruna over the

Kampuchean issue. In the absence of any political

· solution the stances of ASEAN and Indochina are bound

to harden. Singapore and Thailand, the hardliners,

\-ranted the non-comrnunist leaders to lead the anti-

Vietnam movement so that maximum aid could be given,

but Indonesia v1anted to keep its communication open

. ' tl' H . 84 Th d . f f . t 1 d t \•TJ. 1 ano~. ese ~ ··erences nave no e o any

indicution of split in the A.SE!t.No In January and

June 1981 the Indochina countries put fonvard plans

for regional consultations '~1ich were rejected by the

ASEAi·r_. j\n international conference on Kampuchea spon­

soreq by the UN \'las held on 13-17 July 1981 which

adopted a declaration calling for: (i) total with­

drawal of the Vietnamese troops within specified time

and \'lith U.N. verifi!=ation, (ii) U.N. measures durcing

the withdra\·.ral period to prevent I<ampuchean armed ele­

ments from seizing pol..rer, (iii) U.N. guarantees against

83 New Straits Times, 11 ~~y '1980o See, Parimal Kumar Das, "Indochina, A.SEAN and Thailanda The Changing Perspectives Since 1975 11

, Problems of Non-:\lignrnent, vol.2, no.3, September-November 1984, pp.269-82.

84 Guardian (London), 4 April 1981 •.

the interference by external powers, (iv) UoN. super­

vized free elections, (v) agreement to prohibit the

introduction of foreign forces into Kampuchea, (vi)

respect for Kampuchean sovereignty, indep.endence 0

and territorial inte:gri t~ and (vii) assurances that

Kampuchea \vill not be a threat to any of its neigh­

bours. 85 The declaration was, hm·rever, rejected by

Vietnam which had boycotted the cogference.

The Foreign Ninisters of Indochina on 28 January

1982 ·proposed a regional conference bet\<Teen ASEAN and

Indochina countries in J.'.:Iarch 1981. After the countries

or the groups had concluded a treaty on peace and sta-

bility in South~ast Asia, a broad international confe-

renee should be convened to recognize and guarantee the

treatyo Gen. Carlos P. Romulo, the Foreign ~tinister of

the Philippines, and Chairman of the ASBAN standing.

Committee, rejected the proposal on 6 February on behalf

of ASEAN because they "ignore the root cause of the

problem, the blatant breach of the fundamental princi-

ples of the non-aligned movement and the U.N. charter"

85 Lau Teik Soon, .. ASEAN and the Cambodian Problem", Asian survey, vol.XXII, n •. 6, June 1982, pp.549-50. Also see, Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 16 April 19821 P• 31432 e

and "seek to justify and perpetuate Vietnam's presence

86 in Kampuchea 11 •

At a meeting of Foreign .Hi.nisters of Indochina

countries on 6-7 July 1982, it was annoLmced that,

(i) Vietnam and the People's ReoUblic of Kamouchea - I .A.

had agreed on .the vTithdravral of a number of troops

from Kampuchea, (ii) the PRK '\·ras prepared to discuss

'\vith. Thailand the establishment of 11 safety zones ..

along their' common border0 and (iii) the three Indo-

chinese countries would agree to the participation

of the Soviet Union, China, France, the United King-

dom, and the United States in an international confe-

r~nce on Southeast Asiao In the safety zones only

PRl< and Thai troops '\'rould be present. In mid-1982

Vietnam launched a diplomatic initiative on the Kampu-

chean question \vith visits by the Vietnamese Foreign

~linister to several Western countries in April 1982, I

and said, that Vietnam \vould consider the '\•rithdra\-rl I

of troops if the Thai Government declared that it would

not supr~rt the Khmer Rouge and if China pledged that

it \-rould respect the independence of the countries of

. Indochina. 87 Nguyen Co Thach after announcing partial

86 .llin:!__$.traits Times, 7 February 1981.

87 ~sing's Contemporary Archives, January 1983,· Po31888.

troop vlithdravTal on 15 July \'Ienton a tour of Singapore,

Burma, Malaysia, and Thailand from 18 July om·rard, but

could not make nn.1ch headway in convincing the .i\SEAN

leaders of the latest significant change in Vietnam's

position. A special meeting of ASEAN Foreign 1\'linis-

ters \·:as held in Bangkok on 7 August 1982 at '\llhich

it '\ITas announced that there was no apparent change

in Vietnam• s policy tm•Jard Kampuchea, but continued to

support the t\vo key principles of ~i thdrawal of troops

and self-determination by the Kampuchean people" They

also welcomed the formation of the Coalition Govern-

~rent of Democratic Kampuchea as a "positive step

tm·1ard a comprehensive polj_tical solution11 • 88 The

unilateral partial troop Hithdra'\111 by the Vietnamese

was not convincing to Thailand \'lhich took an increasingly

toughter stance. Air Chief I•larshal Siddhi Savetsila said

on 11 August 1982 that there was little evidence that

the offer \'las sincere and if there \'las indeed a genuine

'\llithdra'\'lal and not j~st simply another routine rotation

of disengaged troops. 89

88 Bangkok Post, 8 August 1982. Special ASEAN Foreicm Ninisters t·1eeting, Bangkok, 'Z-8 August, 1982 o

89 Bangkok Post, 12 August 1982.

It became imperative for ASEAN and the t-Jest to

justify their sup.::ort by broadening the Kanpuchean

rebel base. Hence ASEAN tried to form an alternative

to Pol Pot by bringing together the various rebel

groups to make its international support more eff:ectiveo

The first indication of formation of joint front of

all forces opposed to the Vietnamese in Kampuchea

came in the early 1982. The exiled Prince Sihanouk,

\·rho \'-las reluctant to join hands \>lith the Khmer Rouge

met \>lith the former Prirne Ninister of Kampuchea,

Khieu Samphan, in Beijing and announced that they had

reached preliminary accord on the fonnation of a coa­

lition to oppose the Vietnamese backed regime in

Phnom Penh. They also expressed the hope that Son

Sann, leader of the third resistance group, \'lould

join them. 90 In April 19.82 Nalaysian Government

offered Kuala Lumpur as a venue for the three faction

leaders to sign an agreemento There were also reports

that Singapore was giving military aid to Son Sann fac-

tion. Further more, Leo Tindemans, the Foreign

Minister of Belgium and then the Chairman of the

Council of Hinisters of European Communities, said

90 New York ·Times, 22 February 1982.

~60

at the ASEAN Foreign rtinisters conference in Singapore

in the middle of June 1982, that as many as seven out

of ten 3uropean Community member countric~s had recently

indicated that they might 'ltTithdra'" their support for

Khmer Rouge controlled Democratic Kampuchea regime at

the United Nations. 91

Since the beginning there \'las little hope that

the resistance movement would sustain against the Viet-

namese; and, the disparate groups fighting seperately

\"rould make chances further bleaker. China with its

avovTed sup.t")ort ·to Khmer Rouges \olould not be justified

in anning them and expecting them to fight from Thai-

land and expecting the Thais to support pol Pot foll0\11-

ers. Undoubtedly Pol Pot faction was battle trained

and had more follo\>ring. The United States also could

not give any aid so blatantly to the communist Khmer

Rouges. To make it convenient to all, a coalition was

proposed so that resistance could be s·ustained and

thus constant pressure could be put on Vietnam. The

u.s. Deputy Secretary of State, Walter E. Stroessel Jr.,

said that the United States would consider extending

material sup1)ort to the Kampuchean rebelso China also

91 ~ing' s Contemporary .~"\rchives, January 1983, p.31886.

expressed its full support for plans for a coulition

92 by the three groups. An agr~~ement on the formation

of ap anti-Vietnamese Kampuchean Coalition Government

was co~cluded in Kuala Lumpur on 22 JW'le 1982. Its

signatories '\o'lere Khieu samphan, the Prime Hinister

of the Khrrer Rouge GovernrrEnt of Democratic Kampuchea

it was recognized by the U.N. as the legitimate govern-

rnent. Prince Narodom Sihanouk, the Head of State until

1976, and Son Sann, the Kampuchean People's National

Liberation Front leader and a fanner Prime Ninister

(in the Governrnent of Sihanouk in 1967). The Reagan

administrr.~t.ion immediately '~elcorred this decision. 93

Sinanouk made it clear that the coalition should not have

any illusion that it 'HOuld defeat Vietnam militarilyo

He also proposed a Geneva conference to be attended by

all factions of Kampuchea, including Heng Samrin.

ASEAH, Vietnam, Ja1_.-;an, Australia, New zealand, the five

permanent rrembers of the UN Security Council, and

Yugoslavia, as a symbol of non-aligned ~emento

Sihanouk described the I~hmer Rouges as crude and those

who were responsible for great misery and many deaths,

including many members of his family. 94 Khieu sa~phan

92 Ne\'l York Times, 20 June 1982.

93 NeH Yor]{ Times, 23 June 1982.

94 Ne'\'.t Struits Times, 25 June 1982.

acknowledged that the Khrrer Rouges had corru·11itted errors,

but would abide by the result of free elections.

Sihanouk also appealed to the international community,

particularly the United States, to provide both mili­

tary and humanitarian assistance. 95

Prince Sihanouk said on 3 July 1982 that among

the ASEA.N countries l1alaysia, Singapore, and Thailand

encouraged him to anticipate military or other material

aid when the coalition had established its credibility.

Indonesia and the Philippines, on the other hand, made

it clear that any material assistance from them 'l:mUld

be only for humanitarian purposes and for the rehabilita-

96 tion of Kampuchea. Vietnam '.;arned .ASEAN of its I<ampu-

chean policy of perpetuating the problem rather than

f . d' ~ . 97 J.n 1.ng a so:.ulltJ.on. The formation of coalition

government '·10uld mean the Vietnamese would have to

prolong their stay in Kampuchea. The Vietnamese Com~u-

nist Party ne\-JS paper, ]$han Dan, in an article on 22 June

1982 regretted that ASEAN countries allo'\'red themselves

95 :tbid.

96 ~eesing•s Contemporary ~rchives, January 1983 0

p.31887.

97 The International Tribune, 20 July 1982, and The Hindu, 23 July 1982.

/

to become involved in supporting the formation of the

Kampuchc\ln coalition, \'lhich it described as a "monster

creat~d by Chinese expansionism and u.s. imperialisrn11o

This assessment "ras also reflected in comments from

h PRK . . . Ph P h 98 t e reg~me ~n nom en •

Since its formation the coalition constituents

could not get along well. Prince Sihanowt was alleged

to have stab~d that he \-laS compelled into the coal it ion

but \<tas not given the assi. stance promised either by

China or ASEAN and he \<IUS annoyed that they had since

done "nothing to help him". 99 The coalition govern-

rrent, according to The Times, was 11 teetering on the

edge of d-isintegration... The report quoted Prince

Thomico Sism<tath, an aide of Prince Sihanouk, as saying

during a private visit to Singapore on 14 December 1982,

that 11 if they (ASEAN) go on supporting son sann the way

they are, it \'l'ould break the coalition11•

100 lfuile ASEAI.'l

has been aiding Son saru1 faction, China is supplying

military equipment to Khmer Rouge faction; Prince

Sihanowc remains only nominal head of the goverrunent-

in-exile. Even after the forruation of coalition no

98 Keesing•s Contemporary Archives, January 1983, p.31887. .

99 The Times, 15 December 1982.

100 Ibid.

major breakthrough carne fort'h and Vietnam continued

its hot pursuit of rebels in every dry season of the

year. Some of the ASEAN mem.bers are also doubtful

about the effectiveness of the coalitiono The fact

that only Halaysians recognised the coalition govern-

rrent headed by Prince Sihanouk shmvs hmv enthusiastic

the ASEAN is. Sihanouk himself more than once said

that he would step dO\m. On 30 :t-.1ay 1983 Sihanouk

proposed a new coalition to include Heng samrin fac-

tion also, because he was v~ry sceptical about win­

ning a vror against Vietnam. 101

1983 did not witness any significant break-

through toHard a solution of the Kampuchean problemo

But the heav:i.J~t fighting vras reported between the rebels

and the Vietnamese in the beginning of 1983 in the

Thailand frontier area, vrhere Vietnamese and PRK' s

troops overran a number of military bases of the

Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea. The

anti-Vietnarrese guerrillas have been apparently opera­

ting from ;inside the Thailand border ~'lith the support

from outside po'-1ers. Washington also started supplying

military equiprrent, including ground-to-air missiles,

to Thailand in respons~ to an appeal for aid against

101 Asian Recorder, 9-15 July 1983, p.17261. Also see, Peter Schier, 11 The Kampuchean Situation: An Interview with Prince Sihanouk" 1 Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol.V, ~4, ~~rch 1984, pp.487-95.

the Vietnamese attacks. some border skirmishes between·

Thailand and the Vietnarrese troops '"'ere also reported. 102

Vietnam started a partial \·li thdra\val of its forces from

Kampuchea on 2 Nay 1983, ~ 03 \·lith about one fifty members

of foreign media present. Hhereas in July 1982 there

\-Iere no journalists during the troop \•lithdrawal.,

Probably, the course of Kampuchean history \'rould

have been different had the Americans not intervened

in Vietnam and later not extended the Vietnam vlar into

Kampuchea. The neutralist Sihanouk \·ras never a commu-

nist and \·10uld have rr;mained a nationalisto Kampuchea

might have continued to be a neutral country under

Sihanouk, had he not been overthrmvn by the military

headed by Lon Nol in 1970 \·lith active American support.

The u.s. interfered and extended the Vietnam war into

Kampuchea \vith certain narrm·1, sectarian interests of

tackling the Vietnamese, but it bom:~eranged. This act

helped the Khmer Rouge to increase its influence among

the masses in the \vake of military oppression and thus

ultimately captured power in 1975. The Vietnamese did

help a lot the Khmer Rouge coming into power and never

102 Bangkok Post, 1 April 1983.

103 Bangkok Post, 3 Jv'ay 1983.

~66

"muld have imagined that it \·Tould becorre its arch

enemy. Though differences in tactics existed for a

lon<J time betvJeen the Vietnamese and Kampuchean

comnlli£ist parties, they never fought each other. The

big po\·Ter interference in the regional politics \vould

only harm the regional poHers. In the case of Kampu­

chea the schism betHeen China and the Soviet Union is

directly reflected in the politics of Indochinao

ASEA.N \·las put in a fix after the Vietnamese interfe­

rence in Kampuchea. It was difficult for ASEi4-N to

sup_-:-.ort Pol Pot and at the same time convince the

ViGtnamese that Khmer Rouges would not stage a come­

back if Vietnam withdre\v its forces from Kampucheao

~breover, China has been the ardent supporter of

Khmer Rouge; and this drove Vietnam closer to the

Soviet Union. The United States vthich objected to

Vietnam•s entry into the United Nations by vetoing

six times and not heeding Vietnam•s pleas for norma­

lization of relations. and thus contributed its own

share even after the \var.

The u.s. eenounced Pol Pot as a violator of

human rights but started supporting him after his

overthroN. The then u.s. Secretary of State, Edmund

Huskie, announced that the United States would support

Pol Pot's claim to representation in the UnitE'd Nations

despite the fact that 11\<te abhor and condemn the regime• s

human ric~j11ts record and "t<rould never sup~;>Ort its return

to poHer in Phnom Fenh". 104 The u.s. Position is so

paradoxical that it sup1··orts Pol Pot regime and at the

same time denounces it. The Soviet Union unequivocally

suprorted Vietnam in its conflict \.Jith Kampuehca, but

it restruined itself for quite sometime criticizing

china for its part in the Indochina conflict. It. vranted

· the ongoing Sino-Soviet clialogue to go smoothly and 'Vtas '

inter(:!sted in its effortis to normalize relations \•lith

China. China \·rith its ne\·T folmd friendship with the

l·lest was r..ot very keen.. Although the Soviet Union

criticized China,. its official neHspaper, Pravda,

broke its self-imposed silence on matters critical

o~ China only in December 1982 by reproducing a lengthy

article from a Vietnamese journal vlhich deals \·lith the

' 105 theoritical matter.s of the communist partyo NoscoH

at the same time assured ASEAN repeatedly that both

Hanoi and Hosco\'1 \·Tere interested in a peaceful and

stable Southeast Asia and '\ITOuld not create any problems

for Thailand. In the first week of February 1983, the

Soviet Deputy Premier, Nikhaf Kapitsa, came on a brief

104 1n_~ernational Herald Tribune, 29 September 1980.

105 · Asian Recorder, 29 January-4 February 1983, p.l7009o

visit to l:ialaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand, and then

fleH to Hanoi. He bosically urCJed for direct talk~

bet\rreen Vietnam and the ASEJ~N countries. Ka.:_::ista

after returning from Southeast Asia, smm~oned the

ASEAl.·i am'JJassadors to a conference in Ivi.oscow to assure

them, that 11 Vietnam '·,rould not invac:!e Thailand11, and a

.solution to Kampuchean problem could be found only

through direct negotiations bet\'leen J1..SEAN and Indo-

china countri~s. He als~ emphasized the Soviet desire

to strengthen ties with AS~~N. 106 Though Vietnam is

heavily dependent on Hosco\'1 for aid, Vietnam is crucial

for the Soviet Union to make its presence felt and to

be accepted as a major power in Southeast Asia. Viet-

nam•s support is also necessary to counter China and

the United States.

Despite variation in the ASEAN countries• · percep.­

tions on t~1e developments in Indochina, ASEAH managed

to mnintain its political unity. For ASEAN, acceptance

of the Vietnamese action \'Tould establish an ominous

precedent for Vietnam's future dealings with the ASEAl~

countriE!s. Vietnar.1 wanted AS.EA..T\1 to recognize its (Viet­

·nam• s) interests in Indochina and not to forget the

106 Bangkok Post, 13 March 1983.

2.69

long-term d~ngers from China. Vietnam's relations

"Vli th A.SEAi.~ are important, for it is mainly due to

ASEAN' s efforts that the Kampuchean issue is alive

at the United Nations, and various other inter-

national platforms. AS:i:aN countries differ as to

the intensity of pressure on Vietnam, the extent to

\\'hich Vietnam actually repres·ents a threat and the

advisability to depend O!l great pm-wer support to

. d h . . t • 1 . 107 J.n uce a c ange J.n VJ.e nam s po J.cy.

Hanoi has maintained that its forces \'TOUld

remain as long as the thre~:t of China e~'ists to Indo-

china countries. Though Vietnam indicated repeatedly

its ·vlillingness to negotiate with the ASEAN or even a

broader platfor~ it asserted emphatically a nunmer of

times that its dominant position in Indochina is irre­

versible. It also made it clear that it \·Jo.uld not

like. any neighbot~ as enemy. Hanoi said time and

again that the ASE.AN-Vietnarn confrontation "only bene-

fits the Chinese hegemonists 11• This ASEAN is avmre of,

and can not take lightly. Vi~:tnam is also \'lell a\'rare

tl-1at no one in the region, let alone rebels, would

107 Leszek Busynski, n.66,pp.29-30.

\

~70

successfully challenge in Kampuchea. Even Sihanouk

admitted several times that the Vietnamese forces

can11ot be ejected from Karnpucheao He said: "t'le are

fighting to oblige the clients to talk, not to \orin

th be ·t · · 'bl .. loa A th over e wur, cause l. l. s :tntpossl. e~ s e

ASEAN! s position hardened, Vietnam started raising

few embarrassing questions like the Indonesian inva-

sion .of East Timor in 1975 and its repression o~ I.

local people, presence of American bases in the.Phili-

ppines, and the presence of the Australian and Ne"T

Zealand forces in ~~laysia and Singapore. It is unde-

terred by the repeated U.N. resolutions against its

presence in Ka.mpuchea. lV'hen for the fourth time the

U.N. General Assembly continuously reiterated the

earlier demand for complete withdra,-Tal in October

1982, Nguyen Co Thach, the Foreign.~linister of Viet­

nam, said in Jakarta on 31 Dc~ober 1982 that' 11 '1.1-renty

years of favourable votes for Taiwan in the U.N. did

nothing to change the, situation in China; on the contra­

ry, the situation in China changed the vote in the U.N.

Four years of favourable votes for Pol Pot in the UN can

not change the situation in Kampuchea 00o109 Since 1982

lO 8 Bangkok Post, 23 June l9 83 ..

109 Justus van der Kroef, 11The Kampuchean Problem11 Diplomatic Deadlock or Initiative 11 , £Qn_temporary Southeast Asia, vol.V, ~3, December 1983, p.266o

271 - - ....

Vietnam has been proposing unconditional talks bet\•Jeen

ASEAN and Indochina, not just on Kampuchea but also

ori. all problems relating to peace, inde~~ndence and

security of Southeast Asi~. Vietnam hopes to bring

ASEAN to negotiating table by raising issues other

than Kampuchea so as to settle the Kampuchean problem

at the regional level, for it is ~o secret that only

because of ASEAN the problem is alive internationallyo

In the meantime, Heng Samrin is encouraged by the

growth of the Kampuchean Army trained by the V~et­

narrese. The resistance movement is basically con­

fined to the border areas of Tha.ilando Heng samrin I

regime has also consolidated its political control

through rene\-red efforts to build up the Conununi st

party in the country, primarily through mass orga-

nizations. Every year the 11 National Day of Hatred"

(20 May) is celebrated commemorating the horrors of

the Pol Pot governmen~ reminding people of the horrors

and a?y sympathy ~ould mean the country. plunging once

. . t . h 110 aga1n 1n o a n1g tmare.

110 Elizabeth Becker, "Kapuchea in 1983: Further from Peace", Asian survey, voloXXIV, m.1, January 1984, p.45.

·rhe fuct that the Vietnamese army and the Front

forces of Heng Samrin shattered Pol Pot's twenty three

divisions in just 14 days and occupied 19 provincial

capitals within 20 days speaks for itself the amount

1 P · d 111 Th d f of sup?ort Po ot en]oye • ere Here mass e -cc-

tions from Khmer fronts combined ~:;ith massive support

from the people to the Heng Samrin regime. 112 Resis-

tance movement can not succeed without popular support.

Vietnam• s fears of Chinese thr~at to the Indochina coun-

tries in the event of complete '·Jithdrm-1al from Kampuchea

are not unfounded. That is why, Vietnam seeks assuran-

ces from China and has even proposed a non-aggression

treaty bet,·Jeen China and Indochina countries for the

vJithdraHal of troops, 1:1hich China is not prepared to doo 113

\-'then Thailand protested strongly against the Viet-

namese incursions into Thailand on the border d 1lring

the hot pursuit of rebels, even Kapitsa, the

Deputy Foreign ltinister of the Soviet Union, reiterated

'<Ihat Hanoi already threatened to do ioe., to

extGnd help to the insurgents in the ASEAN states. 114

111 Alfred Burchett, The China, cambodia, Vietnam Trianqle (Chicago, 1981), p.208.

112 Ibid.

113 Justus van der Kroef, "Kampuchea: Protracted Con­flict, Suspended Compromises 11

, Asian surve2, vol.XXIV, no.3, Narch 1984, pp. 319-20.

114 Ne'" York Times, 10 February 1983

Ivloscow is also getting weary of ASEAN' s stand and

might resort to some kind of pressure tactics. At

the same time, there ~res no likelihood of any new ... • 'I

us diplomatic initiative in the conflict. US Secre­

tary of State on an Asian visit in February 1983 dec-

lared, that as long as Vietnam continued its pre-

sence in Kampuchea and backed the Heng san~in regime,

the u.s. would not budge in. He also said, that the

u.s. and the People's Republic ~f China agreed to

get Vietnam out of Kampuchea. 115 Nith the re-election

of Nakasone in Japan, Ronald Reagan in the United States,

u.s. policy ih southeast Asia vlould be to counter the

Soviet threat. The policy in Southeast Asia '\·JouJ.d be

adjunct to, not focus of, the respective national

interests of the United States and Japan so as to

maximize their goals on a global scale.

Hashington views the Kampuchean issue with an

international perspective and tries how best it could

make use of it in ~erving its global interests. The

Kampuchean issue enabled the u.s. to maximize its

military sales and assistance to the AS~1 countries

to maintain internal stability.

115 Ibid.

The Kampuchean problem is viewed entirely

differently by the major po"'ers from that of the re­

gional povrers. It is increasingly becoming a tussle

bet'\rteen the Soviet Union and Vietnam on the one side

and the United states, China, and the l~SE.t1.H on the

other. If ASEAN falls prey to the pressures of

the major po\-Ter it might not gain mUcho As far

as the ASBAN position is concerned, it is getting

rather dangerously closer to the US-China line than

evolving its o\om policy. AS&AN is \'lell a'wlare that

its demands (passed in the United Na.tions resolutions)

\vould not be met by Vietnam and nothing concrete is

expected to evolve out of international conferenceso

Even if Vietnam withdra\ols its forces there is no

guarantee that the coalition \1oUld come to pm;rer

either mili.tarily or elecorally. ASEAN is also not

sure about!the viability of the coalition, because so

far only Halaysia has recognized the coalition headed

by Prince Sihanouk. 1 The viable alternative for .ASEAN

would be to bear its interests in mind and break the

stalemate between ASEAN and Vietnam before it is too

late. The Vietnamese Foreign l"rinister, Nguyen Co Thach,

on a visit to ~~nila and Bangkok in June 1983 suggested,

that ASEJ'\N should stop asking questions about its

presence in Kampuchea, bec?use Kampuchean is an

is!,>ue between China and the Indochina states a:nd not

bet\·leen Indochina and the ASEAN. He said a solution

to Kampuchea \'lOU ld take a long time and asked the

AS~N to put it aside to be solved 11 \vhen ap12ropriate"

and instead, "set a frame'\rJOrk for peaceful co-e~ds­

tence in Southeast Asia 11•

116 ·so far, the ASEAN

approach to Kampuchean problem had been nnsuccessfulo it

He said "is dangerous because tension leads to ' I 1\

reaction and reaction leads to escalation". 117

Even if the ASEAN tries to mount pressure on Vietnam,

it may not succeed. If Vietnam uithdra\'IS from

Kampuchea as it has. proz:nj.sed, ASEAN ,,,ould find it

difficult to mend its fences \-lith Indochinao That

might be too late.

116 Banakok Post, 27 June 1983o

117 Ibid.