Changes in Young Europeans’ Values During the Global ...

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Changes in Young Europeans' Values During the Global

Financial Crisis

Sortheix, Florencia M.

2019-01

Sortheix , F M , Parker , P D , Lechner , C & Schwartz , S 2019 , ' Changes in Young

Europeans' Values During the Global Financial Crisis ' , Social Psychological and

Personality Science , vol. 10 , no. 1 , pp. 15-25 . https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550617732610

http://hdl.handle.net/10138/289229

https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550617732610

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Changes in Young Europeans’ Values During the Global

Financial Crisis

Journal: Social Psychological and Personality Science

Manuscript ID SPPS-17-0191.R2

Manuscript Type: Original Manuscript

Keywords: Values, economic crisis, young adults, Europe

Abstract:

We investigate the impact of the global financial crisis (GFC) on the personal values of youth and young adults (age 16–35 years) from 16 European countries. Using time series cross-sectional (TSCS) data from seven waves (2002–2014) of the European Social Survey (ESS), we examined (1) whether the GFC led to value shifts between cohorts of young people and (2) whether welfare state provision moderate the

expected value shifts. Multilevel analyses showed that, following the GFC, the importance of security, tradition, benevolence and, to a lesser extent, conformity values increased. In contrast, hedonism, self-direction, and stimulation values decreased. In line with our moderation hypothesis, power and, to a lesser extent, achievement values increased following the GFC in countries low on welfare expenditures but decreased in countries high on welfare expenditures. Contrary to expectations, increases in tradition and benevolence values were more pronounced in high-welfare countries.

http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/spps

Social Psychological and Personality Science

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VALUE CHANGE DURING THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 1

Abstract

We investigate the impact of the global financial crisis (GFC) on the personal values of youth

and young adults (age 16–35 years) from 16 European countries. Using time series cross-

sectional (TSCS) data from seven waves (2002–2014) of the European Social Survey (ESS),

we examined (1) whether the GFC led to value shifts between cohorts of young people and

(2) whether welfare state provision moderate the expected value shifts. Multilevel analyses

showed that, following the GFC, the importance of security, tradition, benevolence and, to a

lesser extent, conformity values increased. In contrast, hedonism, self-direction, and

stimulation values decreased. In line with our moderation hypothesis, power and, to a lesser

extent, achievement values increased following the GFC in countries low on welfare

expenditures but decreased in countries high on welfare expenditures. Contrary to

expectations, increases in tradition and benevolence values were more pronounced in high-

welfare countries.

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Changes in Young Europeans’ Values During the Global Financial Crisis

In the wake of the global financial crisis (GFC) that depressed the world economy

after 2008, almost one third of youth (<18 years) in the European Union were at risk of

poverty or social exclusion (Schraad-Tischler, 2015). Many suffered dire economic

consequences, were unable to find training or work, and experienced years of under- or

unemployment (Scarpetta, Sonnet, & Manfredi, 2010). How might this period of uncertain

economic circumstances affect young people’s outlook on life? To address this question, we

examine whether the GFC affected young people’s (age 16 to 35) basic personal values

(Schwartz, 1992). Personal values define what is important and desirable in life, the goals

that guide attitudes and behaviours (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992). Values are relatively

stable motivational characteristics. However, individuals’ value priorities do change during

the life course and in response to major changes in life circumstances (Bardi et al., 2014;

Bardi & Goodwin, 2011; Bardi, Lee, Hofmann-Towfigh, & Soutar, 2009).

Our study has two main objectives. First, we assess whether European young people’s

values changed predictably after the onset of the GFC. We build on recent models of value

change (Bardi & Goodwin, 2011; Bardi et al., 2009) to predict how the GFC changed cohorts

of youth’s priorities for specific values by considering the motivational underpinnings of each

value (Schwartz, 2015). Second, we examine whether the level of social expenditure in a

country moderated the impact of the GFC on values. We assume that the perception of

uncertainty induced by the GFC was the key mechanism through which the GFC impacted

young people’s values. We postulate that welfare state investments tempered the sense of

uncertainty and insecurity. Such investments can provide a partial safety net and buffer the

effects of the GFC on values to some extent.

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Basic Personal Values

We adopt Schwartz’s (1992, 2015) widely used and well-validated model of the

content and structure of basic personal values. Personal values provide standards for selecting

and justifying actions and evaluating situations, objects, and people (Schwartz, 1992), and

predict important outcomes, such as attitudes toward immigration (Davidov, Meuleman,

Billiet, & Schmidt, 2008), voting behaviors (Schwartz, Caprara, & Vecchione, 2010), and

subjective well-being (Sortheix & Schwartz, 2017).

The ten values, shown in Table 1, form a circular structure that organizes them in

relation to one another based on the (in)compatibilities of their underlying motivations

(Schwartz 1992; 2015). Two higher-order dimensions summarize value relations. Self-

transcendence versus self-enhancement differentiates values that express concern for others

(benevolence and universalism) from values that express a concern for one’s own needs and

interests (achievement and power). Openness to change versus conservation differentiates

values that concern seeking independence of action, thought, and novelty (self-direction,

stimulation, and hedonism) versus preserving the status-quo and resisting change. Schwartz

(2015) further noted that the self-transcendence and openness values both express growth and

self-expansive motivations that oppose the self-protection and anxiety-control motivations

that conservation and power values both express.

Table 1. Value types and their motivational goals.

Value Motivational goals

Achievement Personal success, demonstrating competence according to social standards

Power Social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and resources

Security Safety, harmony and stability of society, of relationships, and of self

Conformity Restraint of actions likely to upset others and violate social expectations or

norms

Tradition Respect, commitment and acceptance of the customs and ideas that

traditional culture or religion provide the self

Benevolence Preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with whom one is in

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frequent personal contact

Universalism Understanding, and protection for the welfare of all and the environment

Self-

Direction Independent thought and action-choosing, creating, exploring

Stimulation Excitement, novelty and challenge in life

Hedonism Pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself

How Do Values Change?

Theorists attribute change in societal or cultural values to changing historical,

ecological, economic, institutional, and cultural events and circumstances (Inglehart & Baker,

2000; Schwartz, Bardi, & Bianchi, 2000). They posit that unfavourable life circumstances

lead individuals to become more materialistic, increase deference to authority, and emphasize

security. In contrast, increasing prosperity and favourable life conditions lead individuals to

emphasize self-expression (e.g., Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Maslow, 1943). Such changes

typically require substantial time.

Analyses of short-term value changes among individuals in response to external

environmental cues reveal that changes in individuals’ values follow a predictable pattern. As

implied by the circular structure of the Schwartz value system , increases in the importance of

any given value are accompanied by decreases in opposing values in the circle (Bardi et al.,

2009; Maio, Pakizeh, Cheung, & Rees, 2009). Perception of risk or threat, for example,

increased the importance of self-protection values (e.g., security and tradition) while reducing

the importance of growth values (e.g., stimulation and self-direction). This pattern emerged

following experiences of a terrorist attack (Verkasalo, Goodwin, & Bezmenova, 2006), war

(Daniel, Fortuna, Thrun, Cioban, & Knafo, 2013) and migration (Lönnqvist, Jasinskaja-Lahti,

& Verkasalo, 2011).

Similar threat-driven value change might occur during a major economic crisis such as

the GFC. To our knowledge, no previous research has studied the implications of the GFC for

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young people’s value priorities in a cross-national, comparative perspective. A study in the

United Kingdom found increased security–conformity values after 2008 (Austin, 2016). A

study across six waves of the European Social Survey found high value stability (Tormos,

Vauclair & Dobewall, 2017). However, these studies investigated the general (adult)

population and did not consider the special impact the GFC could have on young people.

The Present Study

The present study adds to the scarce body of evidence on value change following

economic crises by analysing time series cross-sectional (TSCS) data of youth and young

adults from 16 European countries. Young people are especially vulnerable to the negative

consequences of economic crises (OECD, 2015; Scarpetta, Sonnet, & Manfredi, 2010).

Elder’s (1999) pioneering work demonstrated that the Great Depression affected the entire

youth population, not only those who suffered objective and persistent deprivation

personally. Economic crises put young people at risk just when they confront major

developmental tasks like transitioning from school to work and establishing themselves in the

labour market (Lechner, Tomasik, & Silbereisen, 2016). Events like the GFC may delay these

transitions, prolong the period of educational and career uncertainties, and damage long-term

status attainment (Heckausen & Schultz, 1995; Parker, Schoon, Tsai, Nagy, Trautwein, &

Eccles, 2012). Hence, studying effects of the GFC on young people is especially important.

Hypothesized Effects of the GFC on Young People’s Values

We posit that the GFC was an influential and persistent driver of value change because it

caused enduring economic insecurity that worsened young people’s prospects (Danziger &

Ratner, 2010; Kalleberg, 2009; Scarpetta et al., 2010). Problems paying for or continuing their

education, difficulty finding jobs, layoffs, together with media reports of unemployment and

economic failure threatened accomplishment of young people’s main developmental tasks in

work and family life. We assume that this induced a strong sense of insecurity and

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uncertainty among cohorts of young people. We base our hypotheses regarding the way this

sense of uncertainty and insecurity changed specific values on the motivations underlying the

values.

Self-protection anxiety-control. Self-enhancement values (power and achievement)

aim to protect the self by actively controlling or overcoming threats through gaining control

over people and material resources, and demonstrating competence. The need to cope with

the harsh, challenging conditions following the GFC may have elicited greater

competitiveness and achievement striving–key expressions of self-enhancement values.

Economically challenging conditions increase materialistic values and the desire for control,

as do experimental manipulations intended to induce insecurity; materialism correlates highly

with power values (e.g., Burroughs & Rindfleisch, 2002; Kasser, Ryan, Couchman, &

Sheldon, 2004; Twenge, Baumeister, DeWall, Ciarocco & Bartels 2007). We, therefore,

expect that self-enhancement values became more important in response to the threats

triggered by the GFC.

We expect that conservation values (security, conformity, and tradition) increase in

importance, too. These values share self-enhancement values’ self-protection and anxiety-

control motivation (Schwartz, 2015). They aim at avoiding conflict, unpredictability and

change through passively fitting in, conforming to group expectations, and relying on

traditional institutions and modes of thought. The importance of such values increases under

conditions of existential threat (Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Schwartz, 2015).

Self-expansive growth. These values flourish in secure, predictable, and supportive

environments that provide opportunities for attaining the goals that growth values promote

(Schwartz, 2015). When people have little chance of realizing these values, they tend to

downgrade their importance, thereby reducing frustration and adapting to prevailing

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circumstances (cf. Schwartz & Bardi, 1997, on the effects of life under communist regimes

on values).

We expect that the importance of openness-to-change values (self-direction,

stimulation and hedonism) decreased in the wake of the GFC. Attaining their goals requires

the freedom and resources needed to explore and pursue ones’ ideas, talents, and preferences

with minimal limitations and constraints. However, the GFC likely generated a perceived

sense of lost opportunities and confidence in the future. Studies of the impact on values of

major events that threaten security, such as wars (Daniel et al., 2013) and terrorist attacks

(Verkasalo et al., 2006), found that such events decreased the importance of openness to

change values.

We also expect that the GFC reduced the importance youth placed on universalism,

the value that expresses concern for the welfare of outgroup members, of the weak and

vulnerable in society, and of nature. During economic recessions, people tend to focus less on

the needs of others in the society, as evidenced by a decline in civic engagement (Clark &

Health, 2014). Fewer financial and psychological resources are available to invest in the

problems of others in the wider society, problems likely to become greater during hard times.

Benevolence, like universalism, is a self-expansive growth value. However, contrary

to universalism, we expect that benevolence values increased in importance. Benevolence

concerns protecting and enhancing the well-being of close others, family, and friends. We

assume that concern for close others increases in times of crisis as people seek and give

support to members of their in-group. Social bonds have a buffering effect in the presence of

stress (Cohen, & Wills, 1985). During the economic recession in the US, people concerned

themselves more with family and close acquaintances and valued helping them more

(benevolence) but people showed no greater concern for their community or the environment

(universalism) (Greenfield, 2009; Park, Twenge & Greenfield, 2014, 2017).

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In sum, we expect that the importance of self-protection anxiety-control values

(conservation, and self-enhancement) increased (Hypothesis 1) and the importance of self-

expansion growth values (openness to change and universalism) decreased (Hypothesis 2)

consequent upon the GFC. We expect benevolence values to increase after the GFC

(Hypothesis 3). This pattern of value changes is consistent with the circular motivational

structure of the ten values. We hypothesized that the protection-based values increased in

importance and the growth-based values decreased. Benevolence values were the exception

because they, like tradition values to which they are adjacent in the circle, emphasize

preserving in-group solidarity in the face of adversity.

The Welfare State as a Contextual Moderator of Value Change

We reason that perceptions of economic insecurity and resource scarcity induced by

the GFC activated schemas of self-protection and anxiety in young people. One factor that

might counter this sense of uncertainty and insecurity is the welfare state. The welfare state is

a socio-political institution explicitly designed to provide existential security (Wulfgramm,

2014). Radcliff (2013) argued that a strong welfare state provides sources of support beyond

the labour market, reduces anomie, and increases individual agency and well-being. A strong

welfare state may have reduced both the real economic costs of the GFC for individuals and

the perceived uncertainty/insecurity it generated. In the ESS countries, strong welfare

investments reduced the impact of unemployment on subjective well-being (Wulfgramm,

2014; Ochsen & Welsch, 2012). By reducing fears about future living standards, welfare

investments may have offset the impact of the GFC on the wider population, not only on the

unemployed or insecurely employed. We hypothesize that the strength of the welfare state,

indexed by levels of national social expenditure, moderated the effect of the GFC on young

people’s values. We expect that the GFC produced greater shifts (whether upward or

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downward) in the values of young people in countries that invested relatively little in social

welfare versus countries that invested substantially (Hypothesis 4).

To assess whether the perception of threat and insecurity induced by the GFC

influenced values beyond the effects of economic indicators, we introduced several controls.

We tested whether effects of the GFC on values held after controlling for individuals’

employment status and subjective income and country unemployment rates.

Method

Participants

We used seven biennial rounds (2002–2014) of the European Social Survey (ESS) as

a quasi-panel study. The ESS data are TSCS data. That is, the ESS is best conceived of as a

panel of countries, whereby a sample of individuals from each country is surveyed at each

wave (but not the same individuals). The weighted ESS is a representative sample of each

country’s population at each wave. We studied young people (age 16 to 35) from those

sixteen countries that participated in all seven ESS rounds, yielding a total sample of 54,931.

Table S1 in the online supplement lists the sample size for each country in each round. For

detailed information about the ESS see www.ess.nsd.uib.no.

Measures

Personal values. We measured personal values with the 21-item version of the

Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ21) adapted by Schwartz (2005) for the ESS. Each item

describes a different person in terms of what is important to him/her. Respondents are asked:

“How much is this person like you?” on a scale from 1—very much like me to 6—not like me

at all. We recoded responses so that high scores represent greater similarity with the portrait.

We controlled for individual differences in scale use by centering individuals’ value scores

on their mean response (Schwartz, 1992). Reliabilities for the PVQ21 in the ESS (Greatest

Lower Bound) of the two-item indexes of the values (three for universalism) averaged .53,

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ranging from .26 for tradition to .68 for achievement. As expected, internal consistencies

were low, because each value is intended to represent a broad concept. Multi-dimensional

scaling and multi-group confirmatory factor analyses support the equivalence of meaning of

the values across ESS countries (Bilsky, Janik, & Schwartz, 2011; Schwartz & Rubel, 2005).

Individual-level controls. First, participant’s unemployment status was assessed by a

question about respondents’ main activity during the last seven days. We recoded this

variable into three categories: “working in a paid job”, “unemployed” (both actively and not

actively seeking a job), and “other” (in school, permanently sick or disabled, retired, doing

community or military service).” Missing values were .8%, .09% and .11%, respectively. We

used “working in a paid job” as the reference.

Second, we controlled for subjective income using the following question: “Which of

the descriptions on this card comes closest to how you feel about your household's income

nowadays?” Participants answered on a 4-point scale (1 = living comfortably on present

income”; 4 = “living very difficulty on present income”). Missing cases were 2.6%.

Third, we included three demographic variables that are related to value priorities

(Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz & Rubel, 2005): gender (range from 48% to 57% female by

country and 51% to 52% by ESS round), age (average age range from 26 to 29 by country

and 27 to 28 by ESS round) and education (years of full-time education; average range from

11.16 to 14.65 years by country).

Global financial crisis (GFC). The ESS collected data on values both before and

after the GFC from represented samples of the given populations. Thus, it replicated a natural

repeated measures quasi-experimental design. Following a quasi-experimental design, we

created a dummy variable to capture the purported effect of the GFC on young people’s

values (for a similar approach see, Parker et al., 2016). This dummy variable distinguished

pre-crisis from post-crisis years. We treated the first four ESS rounds (2002, 2004, 2006, and

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20081) as preceding the GFC and the later three rounds (2010, 2012, and 2014) as consequent

upon the GFC. This approach treats the GFC as a quasi-experimental treatment variable.

Thus, the coefficient for the GFC variable represents an estimate of the average treatment

effect (see, Morgan & Winship, 2014). It indicates how young people’s values after the onset

of the GFC in late 2008 differed from their values before the GFC.

In addition to the quasi-experimental design represented by the GFC dummy, we

controlled for ESS round. The first round (2002) served as the reference. This controlled for

potential trends in young people’s values over time other than those related to the GFC (i.e.,

any trend across the waves that might bias the calculation of the GFC effect).

Country unemployment rate. We extracted unemployment rates for each country

for each ESS round from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and development

(OECD) website: https://data.oecd.org/unemp/unemployment-rate.htm.

Country social expenditure. We used the OECD index of national social expenditure

comprised of cash benefits, direct in-kind provision of goods and services, and tax breaks

with social purposes. This index measures countries’ annual expenditure on social welfare as

a percentage of GDP, making it a good indicator of the countries’ overall generosity of

welfare provisions (https://data.oecd.org/socialexp/social-spending.htm). Missing data were

completed with information from Eurostat (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/). Table S4 in the

supplements presents the scores on social expenditure per country by round.

Analytic Strategy

Our data had a multilevel structure; individual-level responses (personal values) were

nested in ESS round (controlling for time trends) and countries. There is an ongoing debate in

the literature regarding whether fixed effects (FE) or random effects (RE) models are more

1 Although data for Round 4 (2008) were gathered at the end of this year, when unemployment rates started to

rise in most European countries, we included this wave as pre-crisis because we assume that the GFC had

lagged effects on values. Including Round 4 as pre-crisis provides more conservative estimates.

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appropriate for such analyses (e.g., Bryan & Jenkins, 2015). The widely used FE models

include unit dummies (i.e., one dummy for each country except a reference country) to

account for any observed or unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity between the countries.

In RE models, a random intercept is estimated as a model parameter from the data for each

country based on distributional assumptions. Multilevel models remain fairly common

despite arguments for fixed effects that a) countries are rarely sampled randomly from a

population and b) country-specific estimates can be biased when there are few countries

(Bryan & Jenkins, 2015). We take a conservative approach by reporting results from both

models. We present the results of the fixed effects model in the paper (Tables 2 and 3) but

only interpret results that are significant in both models2. The results from the random effects

models can be found in in the supplementary material (S2 and S3).

Our base FE model has the following equation:

� = �� + �� + � � + �� + � �� + � ��

where Y is the outcome variable of interest (each value). GFC is the critical variable

representing the global financial crisis, which equals zero for ESS rounds 1 to Round 4 (until

2008) and 1 for rounds 5, 6 and 7 (after 2008). Gender, age, and years of education are

individual controls3. The two remaining terms are sets of dummy variables representing

country (Belgium is the reference category) and ESS round (round 1 is the reference

category) to account for potential pre-existing trends (i.e., trends present prior to the GFC). In

the RE models, country and ESS round were instead included by estimating a random

intercept.

2 Although our multilevel models relied on rather few countries, they included a small number of country-level

predictors and focused on the fixed effects coefficients which simplifies estimation. Also note that for

estimating the interaction effects between welfare and GFC, we relied on more than 80 data points for social

expenditure (one for each country per wave). 3 Regarding age affects, we tested whether there could be an interaction between age group (16-–24 vs. 25-–35-

year-olds) and the GFC. Results (available from the second author) showed no significant interactions.

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Results

Effects of the GFC on Young People’s Value Priorities

Table 2 present results from our longitudinal multilevel analysis models focusing on

the GFC dummy variable as a predictor of change in personal values. Note that all FE models

presented in Table 2 control for age, gender, and years of education and contain fixed effects

for country and ESS round (or, in the RE specification, a random intercept). As can be seen,

the global financial crisis had a statistically significant effect in the FE (Table 2) and RE

models (Table S2) on all but universalism and only marginally for conformity values in the

base model (M1). In line with Hypothesis 1, security, tradition and, to a lesser extent,

conformity values increased after the GFC. Achievement and power decreased significantly

in the fixed effect model, but these effects were not significant in the random effects model,

so are not interpreted. In contrast, hedonism, self-direction, stimulation, but not universalism

decreased after the GFC, partially supporting Hypotheses 2. The largest effect was the

increase in benevolence with an effect size of .245 (coefficient expressed in Cohen’s d),

supporting Hypothesis 3.

Table 2

Main Effects Models for Effect of the Global Financial Crisis with Country Fixed Effects.

Value

Base Model Controlling for Covariates

� 95% CIs P � 95% CIs p-value

Achievement -.056 -.088 , -.023 .001 -.047 -.085, -.01 .014

Power -.060 -.093 , -.026 >.001 -.014 -.053, .025 .484

Security .057 .025 , .088 >.001 .065 .028, .102 .001

Conformity .030 -.003 , .063 .077 .050 .011, .088 .012

Tradition .080 .048 , .113 >.001 .052 .014, .091 .008

Benevolence .245 .213 , .278 >.001 .225 .188, .263 >.001

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Notes. The effects of GFC are expressed in Cohen’s d units (i.e. standard deviation units).

Standard errors are in brackets. The base models (M1) control for years of education, age,

and the dummy variables for country and ess round. The covariate models (M2) add controls

for individual employment status, country unemployment rate, subjective income, and

country level social expenditure.

The GFC effects remained almost unchanged and statistically significant even after

controlling for individual employment status, subjective income, country unemployment rate,

and social expenditure (Table 2, M2).

The Moderating Role of the Welfare State

In the next set of models, we considered possible moderation of GFC effects on values by

country investment in welfare. For this purpose, we extended model M2 of Table 2 by adding

interactions of GFC dummies with yearly social expenditure (for each country per wave).

Table 3 provides both estimates of these interactions and, using the derived estimates and the

delta method, the simple slopes for low social expenditure (2 SD below average across

countries and time), average expenditure, and high expenditure (2 SD above average). Figure

1 plots these results.

Table 3

Effect of the Global Financial Crisis Moderated by Social Expenditure with Country Fixed

Effects.

Interaction Effect

Low Social

Expenditure

Average Social

Expenditure

High Social

Expenditure

D 95% CI p D 95% CI D 95% CI D 95% CI

Achievement -.035 -.056, -.013 .001 .014 -.038, .066 -.056 -.094, -.018 -.125 -.187, -.064

Power -.057 -.078, -.036 >.001 .086 .032, .140 -.028 -.067, .011 -.142 -.203, -.082

Security -.003 -.025, .018 .749 -- -- -- -- -- --

Universalism -.001 -.034 , .032 .945 .007 -.032, .046 .726

Self-Direction -.100 -.133 , -.067 >.001 -.091 -.129, -.052 >.001

Stimulation -.064 -.097 , -.032 >.001 -.095 -.134, -.057 >.001

Hedonism -.079 -.110, -.047 >.001 -.101 -.138, -.064 >.001

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Conformity -.011 -.032, .01 .320 -- -- -- -- -- --

Tradition .035 .013, .056 .002 -.008 -.062, .045 .061 .022, .100 .131 .068, .194

Benevolence .042 .021, .062 >.001 .153 .101, .205 .236 .198, .274 .319 .259, .380

Universalism .038 .017, .059 >.001 -.060 -.112, -.007 .016 -.023, .056 .093 .030, .156

Self-Direction .026 .004, .048 .022 -.136 -.19, -.082 -.084 -.123, -.045 -.032 -.096, .031

Stimulation -.002 -.023, .019 .851 -- -- -- -- -- --

Hedonism -.019 -.039, .001 .061 -- -- -- -- -- --

Notes. -- Simple effects are not estimated for variables if the interaction effect is not

significant. Interaction effects are expressed in Cohen’s d units (i.e. standard deviation units).

Models controls for gender, age, individual employment status, country unemployment rate,

individual subjective income, country average subjective income, country, and ESS round.

Hypothesis 4 predicted smaller changes in values in countries with higher welfare

investment. Significant interaction effects between GFC and countries’ social expenditure

emerged for achievement, power, tradition, benevolence, self-direction, and universalism

values (Table 3, Figure 1). Power values tended to increase in low welfare countries, and

power and achievement values tended to decrease in high welfare countries. Self-direction

values decreased more in low than in high welfare countries. Universalism tended to decrease

in low welfare countries but to increase in high welfare countries. Tradition and benevolence

values increased across countries, and this increase was larger when welfare was high. Note

that the interactions for power and benevolence values were significant only in the fixed

effect model. The universalism interaction was marginally significant in the random effects

model (S3).

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Figure 1. Effect of the GFC on values moderated by social expenditure. Black lines represent

point estimates. When there is a significant moderation effect, three estimates are given

which are, from left to right, dark grey = -2 SD below the mean, grey = mean, and light grey

= 2 SD above the mean on social expenditure. Black lines represent 95% confidence

intervals.

The results for power, achievement, self-direction, and universalism partly supported

Hypothesis 4, stating that welfare investment buffered the impact of the GFC on values.

Specifically, higher welfare investment mitigated the increase in power and achievement

values and the decrease in universalism and self-direction values. However, results for the

other six values did not support the buffering hypothesis. Conformity and security increased,

and stimulation and hedonism values declined to a similar degree across countries, regardless

of social welfare investment. Contrary to our moderation hypothesis, the increases in

benevolence and tradition values were larger rather than smaller in high welfare countries.

The mean plots per year from 2002 until 2014 (Figure 2) show the differences in

value change between high and low welfare investment countries.

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Figure 2.

Values’ z-scores for countries high and low on social expenditure by year.

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Discussion

This study examined cohort differences in youth’s personal values in the wake of the

GFC, a major economic threat that infused the lives of young Europeans with substantial

uncertainty and insecurity (Danziger & Ratner, 2010; Scarpetta et al., 2010). Analyses of

representative national cohorts of European youth and young adults from six biennial ESS

waves (2002–2014) revealed that (1) the GFC led to shifts in youth’s values and that (2) the

welfare state (i.e., national levels of social expenditures) partly moderated the effects of the

GFC on values. However, the moderation effects were more complex than expected. The

GFC effects were significant even after controlling for period effects (ESS wave), and a host

of individual and country level economic indicators.

First, our analyses revealed that values that express self-protection/anxiety-control

motivations (security, tradition, and, to a lesser extent, conformity) increased in importance

after the onset of the GFC, whereas values that express growth/self-expansion motivations

(hedonism, self-direction, and stimulation) decreased. As anticipated, benevolence, which

focuses on in-group solidarity and the well-being of close others, increased after the GFC.

This pattern of value changes follows the circular value structure proposed by the Schwartz

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theory and is in line with our expectations that the GFC would trigger uncertainty and a

perceived existential threat (Inglehart & Baker, 2000).

Second, our analyses pointed to an important role of the welfare state as a moderator

of the effects of the GFC on young people’s values, although this role was more complex

than we envisioned. We initially reasoned that the welfare state would counteract the

uncertainty created by the GFC by bolstering perceived existential security, thereby buffering

its effects on values. Results showed that power and, to a lesser extent, achievement and

conformity values tended to gain importance only where welfare investment was low. Indeed,

these values tended to decrease in importance where welfare investment was high. Welfare

state investment did not moderate the change in security values; it was insufficient to prevent

a rise in the importance of security values, the values most directly related to a sense of

uncertainty/insecurity.

Contrary to our moderation hypothesis, the decline in young people’s openness to

change values (hedonism, self-direction, and stimulation) post-GFC occurred largely

irrespective of welfare investments. In retrospect, this lack of moderation may make sense. At

times of economic crisis, the very continuity of welfare investments is threatened. This may

undermine the expectations of future opportunity and growth that promote openness to

change values.

Universalism values tended to decline in countries with low welfare investment but

increased slightly in countries with high investments. This provides some support for the idea

that welfare investments sustain universalism values during times of crisis. Contrary to

expectations, tradition and benevolence values increased even more strongly in high

investment than in low investment countries, even though both these values concern the in-

group. We expected that less state support would have a stronger impact in fostering

increased reliance on, concern for, and commitment to traditions and close others. Perhaps,

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however, the presence of state support provides individuals with more effective resources to

devote themselves successfully to protecting solidarity and the interests of close others.

Overall the increases in benevolence and tradition provide evidence of raising

communitarianism similar to that reported in the US after the economic crisis (Park et al.,

2014; 2017).

We assumed that the GFC was a period characterized by feelings of insecurity and

uncertainty that are widely shared across Europe even in countries that were less severely

affected by the crisis according to objective data (e.g., Poland, Germany). Additional

analyses demonstrated that the GFC effects on values could not be explained by purely

economic factors, including country-level unemployment rates (an objective indicator), and

subjective income. Although no definitive proof, this is in line with our assumption that the

sense of uncertainty that characterized this period shifted values in a predictable way based

on the Schwartz theory.

Implications for Future Research and Limitations

Past research that examined only the higher order values and included the entire age

range in ESS samples revealed little change in personal values (Tormos et al., 2017). The

current study uncovered greater change by (a) studying young people, whose values are

theoretically more malleable, and (b) by studying the ten single values. Examining only

higher order values may miss some changes because it combines single values (e.g.,

benevolence and universalism) that may change in different directions.

The effects of economic crises are not distributed evenly across populations; some

groups are more affected than others. In the US economic crisis starting 2008, for example,

younger, less educated, and minority workers were more likely to lose their jobs (Hout,

Levanon, & Cumberworth 2011). Further research is needed to identify individual

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characteristics that may buffer or accentuate the impact of economic crises on value change

in young people.

The observed effects of the GFC seem to have dissipated over time for some values in

our study (Figure 2). In low welfare countries, power, achievement, and conformity values

rose sharply immediately after the crisis but bounced back subsequently. For universalism,

benevolence, tradition and security values, however, effects of GFC seem long-lasting.

Further research with data from later rounds of the ESS could assess how persistent the

effects of the GFC on values are. However, in the European context, new threats (e.g.,

terrorism and mass immigration) may impact values.

We note three limitations of the current research First, our analyses used TSCS data

from the ESS, comparing the personal values of cohorts of youth before and after the GFC.

Studies using individual-level panel data from multiple countries could test our hypotheses

more rigorously. Unfortunately, such multi-national individual-level panel data are not

available.

Second, all observed effects were small on average. However, they were not

negligible, given the high stability of values. Third, because we studied relatively few

countries, our results should be interpreted with caution, particularly with regard to the

moderating effects of the welfare state.

Conclusion

The overall findings suggest that the GFC induced change in the values of recent

cohorts of young Europeans. Their priorities shifted toward self-protection values,

particularly, security, tradition, and, to a lesser extent, conformity and shifted away from

growth/self-expansion motivations, particularly hedonism, self-direction, and stimulation.

Findings also suggested that countries’ welfare investment may moderate the degree and

direction of change for some values. Thus, the extent of welfare investment provided a

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context for recent cohorts of young people to transit through the difficulties caused by the

GFC.

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1

Supplementary Online Material

Table S1

Sample Size by Country and ESS round.

Country

ESS Round

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Belgium BE 559 553 505 496 489 514 494

Switzerland CH 517 599 411 479 374 414 429

Germany DE 715 688 699 606 744 704 687

Denmark DK 441 392 352 363 361 397 378

Spain ES 461 532 599 803 614 513 511

Finland FI 481 458 436 497 437 534 471

France FR 452 442 533 526 421 419 475

Great Britain GB 500 521 591 581 587 498 476

Hungary HU 479 417 352 442 446 556 361

Ireland IE 592 291 460 520 749 766 604

Netherlands NL 597 450 484 404 384 391 409

Norway NO 562 439 431 399 445 449 377

Poland PL 685 600 561 535 587 606 474

Portugal PT 392 587 523 514 414 469 255

Sweden SE 477 463 430 406 387 504 476

Slovenia SI 470 400 391 369 370 312 289

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Table S2

Main Effect Models for Effect of Great Recession with Country Random Effects.

M1

Base Model

M2

Control for

Employment

status

M3

Control for

Unemployment

Rate

M4

Control for

Subjective Income1

M5

Control for Social

Expenditure

Achievement .003(.015) .005(.016) .009(.017) .009(.017) .034(.021)

Power -.030(.024) -.030(.024) .014(.026) -.007(.024) .011(.027)

Security .075(.017)*** .076(.017)*** .063(.019)** .065(.020)** .098(.024)***

Conformity -.003(.017) -.002(.017) -.002(.019) .007(.018) .002(.023)

Tradition .034(.012)** .035(.012)** .035(.013)** .032(.013)* .013(.015)

Benevolence .110(.021)*** .112(.021)*** .131(.023)*** .118(.023)*** .083 (.028)**

Universalism -.034(.018)^ -.035(.019)^ -.033(.021) -.037(.020) -.041(.025)^

Self-Direction -.047(.016)** -.052(.018)** -.049(.017)** -.046(.017)** -.042(.019)*

Stimulation -.026(.013)* -.029(.012)* -.042(.015)** -.040(.012)** -.046(.015)**

Hedonism -.054(.016)** -.055(.016)** -.062(.018)*** -.071(.016)*** -.082(.021)***

Notes. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05. Standard errors are in brackets. All models control

for years of education, age, and dummy variables for country and ess round. 1At individual

and aggregated to year by country level.

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Table S3

Effect of the Global Recession on Value Priorities Moderated by Social Expenditures with

Country Random Effects

Interaction

Effect

Low Social

Expenditure

Average Social

Expenditure

High Social

Expenditure

Achievement -.031(.018)^ .093 (.040) .032 (.021) -.030 (.042)

Power -.062(.024)* .135 (.055) .011 (.027) -.113 (.055)

Security .010(.021) -- -- -- -- -- --

Conformity -.018(.019) -- -- -- -- -- --

Tradition .036(.013)* -.052 (.029) .015 (.015) .082 (.030)

Benevolence .025(.024) .034 (.054) .085 (.028) .135 (.056)

Universalism .038(.021)^ -.116 (.048) -.040 (.024) .037 (.050)

Self-Direction .020(.017) -.082 (.039) -.042 (.019) -.001 (.040)

Stimulation .004(.013) -- -- -- -- -- --

Hedonism -.019(.017) -- -- -- -- -- --

Notes. -- Simple effects are not estimated for variables where the interaction effect is not

significant. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, ^ p > .05. Standard errors are in brackets.

Model controls for gender, age, individual employment status, country unemployment rate,

individual subjective income, and country average subjective income. Effects in grey are for

those interactions that were significant in fixed effects models but not in the random effects

models.

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4

Table S4

Social Expenditures as a Percentage of GDP.

Country

ESS Round

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Belgium BE 24.35 25.29 25.15 26.3 28.3 29.02 29.17

Switzerland CH 17.95 18.9 17.93 17.48 18.43 18.78 19.27

Germany DE 26.06 25.95 25.04 24.22 25.92 24.56 24.85

Denmark DK 24.8 25.13 24.95 25.38 28.94 28.91 29

Spain ES 19.34 2.14 2.43 22.19 25.84 26.1 26.07

Finland FI 23.19 23.96 23.75 23.34 27.42 28.39 3.18

France FR 28.13 28.68 28.13 28.2 3.66 31.03 31.94

Great Britain GB 18.58 19.5 19.24 2.88 22.79 22.5 21.58

Hungary HU 20.83 21.04 22.18 22.65 23.04 22.5 21.37

Ireland IE 14.19 14.89 15.01 18.49 22.39 20.97 19.16

Netherlands NL 19.22 19.89 20.15 19.59 22.09 22.51 22.66

Norway NO 22.72 22.3 19.49 19.15 21.92 21.34 22.45

Poland PL 22.04 21.24 2.58 2.23 2.63 19.03 19.49

Portugal PT 20.32 21.69 22.06 22.22 24.48 24.53 24.52

Sweden SE 27.55 27.7 26.64 25.57 26.27 26.7 27.14

Slovenia SI 22.25 21.52 21.07 19.87 23.4 23.6 23.08

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